Nuclear Threats - Korea / Truman - 1951
It is commonly believed that it was the threat of atomic warfare that forced an armistice in Korea in 1956. John Foster Dulles, who conveyed that threat, believed it to have been effective. This belief became a cornerstone of US foreign policy for the remainder of the decade, in which China was several times threatened with the bomb. Whether this ruse was truly effective is now the object of debate.
US strategists believed that they enjoyed a clear, if limited, nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. In view of Soviet ascendancy in conventional warfare, particularly the Soviet numerical advantage in Europe, they felt nuclear superiority ought somehow to be used (having first presumed it usable.) They thought that the combination of restraint and resolve employed in the Berlin Crisis had worked and would work again.
Atomic diplomacy refers to attempts to use the threat of nuclear warfare to achieve diplomatic goals. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S. officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived from the American nuclear monopoly. In the years that followed, there were several occasions in which government officials used or considered atomic diplomacy.
In the years that immediately followed the Second World War, the U.S. confidence in its nuclear monopoly had ramifications for its diplomatic agenda. The fact of the bomb was useful in ensuring that Western Europe would rely on the United States to guarantee its security rather than seeking an outside accommodation with the Soviet Union, because even if the United States did not station large numbers of troops on the continent, it could protect the region by placing it under the American “nuclear umbrella” of areas that the United States professed to be willing to use the bomb to defend.
The U.S. insistence on hegemony in the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan stemmed in part from the confidence of being the sole nuclear power and in part from what that nuclear power had gained: Japan’s total surrender to U.S. forces. Though it inspired greater confidence in the immediate postwar years, the U.S. nuclear monopoly was not of long duration; the Soviet Union successfully exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and the People’s Republic of China in 1964. But in America’s nuclear monopoly was largely intact. The first Soviet bomb test had been conducted in August 1949; the first Soviet air drop would not be made until 1951.
While the end of World War II brought peace and prosperity to most Americans, it also created a heightened state of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fearing that the Soviet Union intended to "export" communism to other nations, America centered its foreign policy on the "containment" of communism, both at home and abroad. Although formulation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and the Berlin Airlift suggested that the United States had a particular concern with the spread of communism in Europe, America's policy of containment extended to Asia as well. Indeed, Asia proved to be the site of the first major battle waged in the name of containment: the Korean War.
The division of Korea into two halves had come at the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily divide Korea and oversee the removal of Japanese forces. In August of 1945, the Soviet Union occupied Korea, which had been under Japan's control since 1910. The United States quickly moved its own troops into southern Korea. Japanese troops surrendered to the Russians in the north and to the Americans in the south.
In 1949 China underwent a revolution that brought Mao Zedong and his Communist party into power. The nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, had retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) while they continued their war with mainland China. Mao quickly moved to ally himself with the Soviet Union, and signed a treaty with the Soviets in 1950. The Truman administration faced criticism from Republicans who claimed he had "lost" China. They criticized him for not providing enough aid to the Chinese nationalists. The suggestion by Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the administration recognize the communist government of China only gave them more ammunition for their attacks.
The Truman administration also faced internal criticism regarding its commitment to anti-communism at home. Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin had recently begun his infamous hunt for communists within the U.S. Government. Although McCarthy was just getting started, the recent trials of Alger Hiss and others for espionage left the Truman administration apprehensive about its anti-communist credentials. Truman and his advisors found themselves under increased domestic pressure not to appear "soft" on communism abroad.
The Korean War broke out in June of 1950 when North Korea, after gaining the Soviet Union’s implied support, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. The Soviets were convinced that the United States would not intervene. However, the United States did act to bring the United Nations Security Council into the situation. The decision to intervene in Korea grew out of the tense atmosphere that characterized Cold War politics. On the eve of the North Korean invasion, a number of events had made Truman anxious. The Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, ending the United States' monopoly on the weapon. In Europe, Soviet intervention in Greece and Turkey had given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which funneled aid to war-torn Europe in the hopes of warding off communist political victories.
Thus, when North Korean troops invaded the South, the Truman administration seized upon the opportunity to defend a non-communist government from invasion by communist troops. Determined not to "lose" another country to communism, and interested in shoring up its anticommunist credentials, the Truman administration found itself defending a nation a world away from U.S. soil. Yet Truman's response was not merely a response to internal pressure. The invasion of South Korea made Truman genuinely fearful that the Soviet Union and China intended to expand the sphere of communism throughout Asia.
In June 1950, America had a stockpile of nearly three hundred bombs, with over two hundred and sixty aircraft capable of dropping them on Soviet targets. The USSR, which had exploded its first bomb only ten months earlier, could strike America only with one-way bombing flights or by smuggling weapons into American ports aboard merchant vessels. While both sides dramatically increased their stockpiles during the first years of the Korean War, the overall balance remained similarly skewed until 1953.
In 1953, no nuclear bombers were deployed outside the American mainland. While war plans called for the atomic strikes against Soviet cities, Strategic Air Command estimated it would take three months to bomb Moscow into submission, during which during which time there would be a strong possibility of a counter-strike on American soil. By 1953 jet bombers, aircraft carriers and overseas bases had made swift atomic warfare possible; yet the Pentagon still did not have custody of any complete nuclear devices and the State Department had not yet begun negotiations for the foreign deployment of nuclear weapons. This meant that Washington had no immediately usable nuclear forces near Korea.
Nevertheless, use of the bomb was contemplated by Truman and Eisenhower from the outset. Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ strategy would champion reliance on nuclear weapons and strong alliances as deterrents to Communist aggression.
The possibility of nuclear warfare emerged in Truman’s first wartime meeting with his advisers, when he asked his Air Force Chief of Staff if it were possible to destroy Soviet bases near Korea. The answer was that this was achievable; but would require the use of atomic bombs. Truman ordered the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack, should the Soviet Union join the fighting. Yet while the US administration sought to “let the world know we mean business,” the overall response remained cautious. Rejecting CIA director Roscoe Hillenkoetter’s proposal to seek UN sanction for use of the bomb, Truman limited himself to authorizing the Pentagon to exceed its budget and use the draft.
Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) postponed a decision on a request from General MacArthur for more troops and set aside the Chairman’s proposal that atomic weapons be put at the General’s disposal. These decisions reflected doubts about MacArthur’s judgement, foreshadowing his clash with the President and eventual dismissal. Strategically, they showed a reluctance to disrupt European alliances and hesitance to deploy atomic weapons where they might not prove decisive. In the interim, a decision was made to repeat the B-29 feint of 1948 in Berlin.
The B-29s deployed during the Berlin crisis had had no atomic bombs on board. This time, despite British reluctance, the B-29s were armed with all components of their atomic weapons save the fissionable cores. In this respect, America was concerned as much with signalling resolve to the wavering British as deterrence of Soviet aggression.
On 17 July 1950 Hanson W. Baldwin wrote: "The United States reverses in Korea and the atrocities committed by North Korean troops and Communist execution squads already have evoked demands -- still fortunately few -- that we should use the atomic bomb against Northern Korea.... one or two membes of Congress more noted for their vehemence that their sagacity, have urged the employment of this terrible weapon... the fundamental military reason why the atomic bomb should not - and will not -- be used in the korea fighting is that is use would not be effective."
By the last week of July, MacArthur’s forces had been squeezed inside a ninety-nine mile perimeter in a continuing retreat. At the same time, the commander of the seventh fleet reported that his position in the Taiwan Strait was becoming untenable. MacArthur told Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff that he saw “a unique use for the atomic bomb” in isolating the Chinese communist force in North Korea. If Vandenberg could “sweeten up” the B-29 force at his disposal, the job could be done. When Vandenberg returned to Washington, the scheme was altered to meet the demands of the increasingly desperate military situation, with emphasis on atomic strikes against North Korean cities. Truman, who had refused pleas for a pre-emptive strike against the Chinese amphibious force amassing across the water, was persuaded to authorize the dispatch of ten nuclear-configured B-29s to Guam.
In August of 1950, President Harry Truman sent 10 unarmed B-29 bombers to Guam as part of an atomic task force in response to the Korean War, On August 1, 1950, Truman ordered the 9th Bomb Wing to be sent to Guam as an atomic task force. The B-29s were loaded with unarmed atomic bombs and set out for the Pacific. On August 5, 1950, one of the B-29s crashed during takeoff from Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in California, killing 19 people. The crash scattered mildly radioactive uranium from the bomb's tamper around the airfield. The remaining nine B-29s remained in Guam until September 13, 1950, when they returned to the United States. The bomb assemblies were left behind in Guam. The B-29 Superfortresses were also used in the Korean War for bombing missions against industrial sites, port facilities, and bridges in North and South Korea. This deployment outside the United States was intended to be a show of strength through atomic weapons. President Truman indicated that the use of atomic weapons was a strategy that would be considered, if required.
To make Moscow and Beijing, it is claimed that details of the deployment were deliberately leaked to the New York Times, but there is no evidence of such a leak in the Times archive. It is impossible to tell if this signal of resolve was picked up in China or the USSR. It is likely that at least part of the reasoning behind it was to counter internal criticism of Truman’s handling of the war. What is certain is that China did not back down as a result: The Chinese did not invade Taiwan, instead moving crack military units to the northeast where they began preparation for action in Korea in August. The B-29s took no part in the bombing of North Korea and returned to the US before the Chinese offensive.
When in November 1950 Chinese troops poured across the Yalu, halting the UN forces’ conquest of the Korean peninsula, there was renewed talk of atomic retaliation. On 23 November 1950 General MacArthur had launched an assault on the Communist forces in Korea in an attempt to end the war. On 28 November he issued a special communiqué stating that the United Nations forces faced an "entirely new war" with an enemy force of 200,000 men, including a major segment of the Communist Chinese army.
On 30 November 1950 President Truman stated at a news conference "We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have.""
Q. "Will that include the atomic bomb ?"
THE PRESIDENT, "That includes every weapon that we have."
Q. "Mr. President, you said "every weapon that we have." Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?"
THE PRESIDENT. "There has always been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used."
Q. "Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atom bomb? Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration?"
THE PRESIDENT. "Always has been. It is one of our weapons."
Q. "Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, or civilian--"
THE PRESIDENT. "It's a matter that the military people will have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things."
Q. "Mr. President, perhaps it would be better if we are allowed to quote your remarks on that directly?"
THE PRESIDENT. "I don't think--I don't think that is necessary."
Q. "Mr. President, you said this depends on United Nations action. Does that mean that we wouldn't use the atomic bomb except on a United Nations authorization ?"
THE PRESIDENT. "No, it doesn't mean that at all. The action against Communist China depends on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has. "
Later the same day the White House issued the following press release: "The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon. However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the questions at today's press conference do not represent any change in this situation."
The comments provoked worldwide reaction and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee rushed to Washington to express his concern. The orders never came. There were several reasons for this: The months since the first crisis of the summer had seen a change in attitude among strategic planners. They felt that once Chinese forces were in North Korea, the bomb would be better used for defence than deterrence. This coincided with a feeling in the State Department that atomic strikes would scare allies more than enemies. On the ground in Korea, the situation was stabilizing and commanders expressed cautious optimism. The JCS recommended Attlee be told America had “no intention” of using nuclear weapons unless they were needed to protect an evacuation of UN forces or to prevent a “major military disaster.”
Although the use of the bomb was never seriously considered, the November crisis had several important consequences: One was to limit the potential use of nuclear weapons to covering the retreat of US forces—in January 1951, MacArthur refused even to consider forward deployment of nuclear weapons for that purpose. Another was the beginning of reform of the ad hoc decision-making process for nuclear deployment, which had proved itself inadequate. Responsibility was transferred in large part to a new National Security Council (NSC) committee.
By April 1951, the United States had returned to the offensive and UN troops were poised to cross the 38th parallel in force. The Chinese, however, appeared to massing for an offensive of their own. Washington also had indications that Moscow had moved three divisions into Manchuria and had positioned other forces to attack Japan.
At home, divisions among strategists were widening. MacArthur’s statement that the UN might abandon its “tolerant effort” to limit the fighting to Korea infuriated the President’s civilian advisers and provoked protest from Britain. Truman’s relationship with congress deteriorated and his popularity fell to an all-time low. It was widely suggested that the people lacked confidence in their leaders’ ability to end the war.
When on April 4th UN troops crossed the parallel, discord in Washington intensified. MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo denied the existence of a Soviet build-up, at the same time claiming that the general was authorised to retaliate against a Soviet attack. In Washington, Senate minority leader Joseph Martin read publicly a letter from MacArthur which implied the administration misunderstood the global strategic significance of the Korean conflict. An unmistakable challenge to Truman’s leadership, the letter set in motion the train of events that would remove the general from command.
On 6th April 1951 Truman took the decision to return B-29s across the Pacific, this time with complete atomic weapons. This followed the Chief of Staff’s recommendation that MacArthur be authorised to retaliate against air bases and aircraft in Manchuria and Shantung in event of an attack originating outside the Korean peninsula. Summoning the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Truman told him that with aircraft accumulating in Manchuria and Soviet submarines in Vladivostok, he feared the Soviet Union was preparing a knockout blow. Arrangements were begun for the transfer of nine complete atomic bombs to Air Force custody.
But the military situation was not as desperate as Truman claimed. Once again, domestic considerations were important: The nuclear deployment was essential in securing the support of the Chiefs of Staff for the dismissal of MacArthur. On 8th April, they agreed to support Truman’s decision to remove the general.
The next evening, Truman publicly defended his action against MacArthur. Without making reference to the B-29s deployment, he warned Beijing and Moscow against escalating the conflict, with the aim was of showing both determination and restraint. Restraint was not the strategy advocated by MacArthur, who in an impassioned speech to congress claimed the Joint Chiefs shared his view that escalation could bring victory in Korea. MacArthur was certainly right in respect: Truman’s veiled warnings had left the Chinese undeterred. Soon after MacArthur’s speech, they launched their biggest ground offensive yet.
The administration realized more must be done and the Pentagon began to hint that the B-29 deployment was more than a routine mission or a feint. Truman approved a second bomber deployment and SAC sent a team to Tokyo, where its commander began planning for possible atomic strikes. Ridgway, MacArthur’s successor, received qualified authority to launch atomic strikes in retaliation to an attack originating outside the peninsula. Reconnaissance aircraft flew over Manchuria and Shantung and messages were conveyed to Beijing, to show that MacArthur’s removal did not signify a softening in nuclear policy.
The Chinese would eventually back down. Yet it is unclear that Chinese leaders were aware of the nuclear deployment in the Pacific. It is as likely Beijing’s eventual shift to a defensive policy was prompted more by the failure of two offensives than by the nuclear threat. Rather than setting a precedent for nuclear deployment, the events of 1950-51 reinforced the reluctance of the Truman administration to use atomic weapons and were seen as one-off responses to particular circumstances. There did emerge, however, a strength of belief in the persuasive power of nuclear diplomacy.
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