Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused (Letter Report, 05/26/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-97)
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) implementation of the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative, focusing on: (1) DOD actions to make the nuclear,
biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within
its organization, activities, and functions; (2) other actions DOD can
take to improve implementation of the Initiative; and (3) the actions of
the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to
coordinate the research and development programs of DOD, the Department
of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. intelligence community to identify and
eliminate unnecessary duplication.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological,
and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its
activities and functions, such as training and field exercises and the
acquisition of weapon systems and equipment; (2) DOD has given greater
emphasis to this threat in policy and planning documents, and the Joint
Staff has made considerable effort to determine and prioritize the
counterproliferation requirements of the unified commands; (3) the
services have increased the importance placed on counterproliferation
requirements in their acquisition programs, training, and doctrine; (4)
regional unified commands have incorporated counterproliferation
concepts, equipment, and tasks into their planning and military
exercises; (5) while DOD has taken positive steps, it can do more to
integrate and focus its response to the growing threat posed by the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; (6) DOD does
not have an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine document to
provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in a nuclear,
biological, and chemical environment across the spectrum of military
operations; (7) such a document will help ensure that
counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire
body of joint doctrine; (8) DOD also has not taken sufficient action to
provide reasonable assurance that its weapon systems and equipment can
survive and operate in a biological and chemical environment; (9)
studies indicate that DOD's organization structure may be too diffused
to effectively manage and integrate DOD's counterproliferation mission;
(10) DOD has not developed key strategy documents and management plans
to aid in directing and managing its counterproliferation initiatives;
(11) internal DOD reviews have identified the need for a comprehensive
strategy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and a military strategy for integrating offensive and defensive
capabilities; (12) there is also no management plan to guide, oversee,
and integrate departmentwide initiatives; (13) DOD primarily coordinates
its counterproliferation activities with DOE and the intelligence
community through the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee;
(14) DOD, DOE, and intelligence agency officials generally expressed
satisfaction with the exchange of information that the Committee had
provided about ongoing programs among the agencies; and (15) however,
the Committee has taken little action to identify and eliminate
undesirable redundancies among research and development programs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-00-97
TITLE: Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat
Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused
DATE: 05/26/2000
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Nuclear warfare
Chemical warfare
Nuclear proliferation
Interagency relations
Weapons research and development
Weapons systems
Redundancy
Performance measures
Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER: DOD Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Defense Reform Initiative
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GAO/NSIAD-00-97
Appendix I: Chronology of Major Counterproliferation Milestones
30
Appendix II: Our Recent Unclassified Reports on
Counterproliferation and Related Subjects
32
Appendix III: Additional Information on DOD's Actions to
Institutionalize Counterproliferation
34
Appendix IV: DOD Counterproliferation Organization and
Coordinating Bodies
46
Appendix V: Organizations and Offices Contacted
58
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense
61
Appendix VII: Comments From the Department of Energy
70
Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken by DOD to Institutionalize
Counterproliferation 34
Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of
the 1996 and 1999 Defense Planning Guidance 36
Table 3: Examples of Joint and Combined Exercises With Counterproliferation
Elements 42
Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies 56
Figure 1: Counterproliferation Areas, Organizational Elements, and Functions
15
Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense 48
Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff 49
Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services 50
Figure 5: Organization and Functions of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency 53
Figure 6: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Personnel Levels 54
Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency 55
DOD Department of Defense
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-284722
May 26, 2000
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative in response to the growing threat posed by
the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, often
referred to as weapons of mass destruction.1 The Initiative calls for the
development of offensive and defensive capabilities--to include equipping,
training, and preparing U.S. forces, in coalition with the forces of friends
and allies--to prevail over an adversary that threatens or uses such weapons
in peacetime and during all phases of conflicts. The Secretary of Defense
has described the threat and the potential use of these weapons against U.S.
and allied forces as the greatest and most complex challenge facing the
Department of Defense (DOD). The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, in testimony to the Congress in February 2000, underscored the
presence and seriousness of the threat.
Since the Initiative was announced, the Congress has increased funding for
counterproliferation while there have been congressional committee concerns
expressed about the direction and DOD's management of the
counterproliferation program. At your request, we reviewed DOD's
implementation of the Initiative. This report describes DOD actions to make
the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine
consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and
identifies other actions the Department can take to improve implementation
of the Initiative. It also examines the actions of the interagency
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to coordinate the research and
development programs of DOD, the Department of Energy, and the U.S.
intelligence community2 to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication.
The U. S. National Military Strategy states that the continued proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological
weapons, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely in both a
major theater war and smaller scale contingencies. These weapons are capable
of causing mass casualties, and their threat or use can disrupt the planning
and conduct of military operations. DOD believes effective deterrence
against the use of these weapons depends on a range of nuclear and
conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses
and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. DOD
estimates that for fiscal year 2001 it will invest over
$7.3 billion on the research, development, and acquisition of such
conventional response capabilities, with about $5.3 billion of that
investment on missile defense. Although an unclassified estimate is
unavailable, additional funding is spent to provide intelligence support for
counterproliferation.
To help ensure that DOD's counterproliferation policy objectives are met and
that implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and
focused, the Secretary of Defense, in 1996, established the
Counterproliferation Council composed of senior DOD civilian and military
officials.3 The Council is to monitor departmental progress on developing
the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to effectively execute
its counterproliferation objectives. In 1997, DOD's Quadrennial Defense
Review report4 stated that a key challenge the Department must meet to
ensure it is prepared for the NBC threat is to institutionalize--integrate
or make permanent--counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every
facet of military activity. A chronology of major events surrounding DOD's
Counterproliferation Initiative is included in appendix I.
To review activities and programs related to countering proliferation
threats within the Departments of Defense and Energy and the U.S.
intelligence community, in 1993 the Congress established the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee.5 The Committee's charter
includes addressing shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to
counter the proliferation of NBC weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems; identifying and eliminating undesirable redundancies or
uncoordinated efforts; and establishing priorities for programs and funding.
Since 1995, the Committee has submitted an annual report to the Congress
detailing its findings and recommendations.
We have extensively reviewed U.S. government efforts to both prevent and
combat the proliferation of NBC weapons. A summary of our recent
unclassified reports on combating the use of such weapons is provided in
appendix II.
DOD is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a
matter of routine consideration within its activities and functions, such as
training and field exercises and the acquisition of weapon systems and
equipment. Since the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was
announced, DOD has given greater emphasis to this threat in policy and
planning documents, and the Joint Staff6 has made considerable effort to
determine and prioritize the counterproliferation requirements of the
unified commands.7 The services, particularly the Air Force, have increased
the importance placed on counterproliferation requirements in their
acquisition programs, training, and doctrine. Regional unified commands have
incorporated counterproliferation concepts, equipment, and tasks into their
planning and military exercises.
While DOD has taken positive steps, it can do more to integrate and focus
its response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. DOD does not have an overarching joint
counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of
how DOD should respond in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment
across the spectrum of military operations. Such a document, which was
recently approved for development, will help ensure that
counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire body
of joint doctrine. DOD also has not taken sufficient action to provide
reasonable assurance that its weapon systems and equipment can survive and
operate in a biological and chemical environment. Additionally, studies by
DOD and a congressionally mandated commission indicate that DOD's
organization structure may be too diffused to effectively manage and
integrate the Department's counterproliferation mission.
DOD has not developed key strategy documents and management plans to aid in
directing and managing its counterproliferation initiatives. Internal DOD
reviews have identified the need for a comprehensive strategy for countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military strategy for
integrating offensive and defensive capabilities. There is also no
management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate departmentwide initiatives,
which would include a reporting and evaluation process with performance
measures to allow for a continual assessment of the Department's progress in
achieving goals and objectives.
DOD primarily coordinates its counterproliferation activities with the
Department of Energy and the intelligence community through the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. DOD, Energy, and intelligence
agency officials generally expressed satisfaction with the exchange of
information that the Committee had provided about ongoing programs among the
agencies. However, the Committee has taken little action to identify and
eliminate undesirable redundancies among research and development programs,
one of the primary reasons the Congress established it. The Committee does
not have a process to facilitate such determinations and provide a basis to
make decisions on eliminating undesired redundancies.
This report includes recommendations that the Secretary of Defense
(1) develop strategies, a management plan, and performance measures to help
guide and manage the implementation of DOD's counterproliferation actions;
(2) include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the
Department's organization for counterproliferation;
(3) take steps to help ensure that the nuclear, biological, and chemical
threat is being given sufficient attention in military doctrine and in the
design and development of weapon systems and equipment; and (4) devise and
implement a mechanism to help identify and eliminate undesirable
redundancies among counterproliferation programs. DOD generally agreed with
our recommendations and indicated that many corrective actions that are
responsive to them have already been started. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Energy and
the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed a draft of the report but did not
comment on our findings and recommendations.
DOD has taken actions to integrate the threat of NBC weapons into its
organization, activities, and functions. Actions include incorporating
counterproliferation guidance into major department planning and policy
documents; establishing offices and other organizational elements that focus
on counterproliferation issues; increasing NBC warfare emphasis in training,
exercises, and education; and improving intelligence support of
counterproliferation initiatives. DOD officials believe these actions have
improved the Department's ability to develop and field the capabilities
required by U.S. forces to respond to an enemy's use or threatened use of
NBC weapons.
Since 1993 DOD has been giving greater emphasis to the NBC threat in its
planning and policy documents. For instance, the defense planning guidance
provided by the Secretary of Defense to DOD components has placed increased
emphasis on the NBC threat, particularly the biological and chemical threat,
and the importance of preparing for it. The 1998 and 1999 planning guidance
state that countering the NBC threat will be given a high priority in
defense planning. These documents discuss factors, such as intelligence and
logistics support and the active and passive defense and counterforce
capabilities, that are required to fight and win in an NBC environment in
greater detail than the 1996 guidance. The documents require that major
joint8 exercises routinely include activities to assess and enhance
preparations for sustained operations in chemical and biological warfare
environments. The military services and the unified commands are to ensure
that routine individual, unit, joint, and combined9 training exercises
incorporate realistic chemical and biological threats.
To better manage its counterproliferation efforts, DOD has taken steps to
improve its organizational structure. For example, the Air Force has
established a central headquarters office for counterproliferation, which is
the focal point for all Air Force counterproliferation activities, including
doctrine, strategy, policy, and requirements. This office has developed a
master plan to provide the overarching guidance to enable the Air Force to
meet its counterproliferation goals and a long-term plan to guide the
development and acquisition of improved counterproliferation capabilities.
The office has also initiated studies of subjects such as the implications
of the NBC threat for strategic airlift operations and the metrics used to
assess the readiness of Air Force units to respond to the threat. These two
studies are to be used to identify solutions to current airlift problems and
to develop meaningful criteria for measuring and reporting force readiness.
In training and exercises, the unified commands and the military services
have incorporated counterproliferation tasks into service training,
large-scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises, seminars, and
operations. In intelligence support, the Defense Intelligence Agency--DOD's
focal point for integrating intelligence information on foreign NBC warfare
programs in support of counterproliferation--has established a
counterproliferation support office and is increasing the size of the
office's staff. It has created a center to provide improved intelligence
analysis on underground facilities. Potential adversaries may use such
facilities to protect and conceal their NBC weapons programs. The Agency has
also developed a computerized system to provide current, substantive
intelligence information and support to policy makers, force planners, and
unified combatant commanders. Appendix III discusses other
institutionalization actions.
Integration shortcomings require DOD's attention to better ensure that its
counterproliferation efforts are integrated and focused. We identified the
following four:
· An overarching joint doctrine document has not been developed to provide a
comprehensive, integrated picture of how DOD should respond and operate in
an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations.
· A systematic approach does not exist to provide reasonable assurance that
NBC survivability features are incorporated in weapon system designs.
· DOD's organizational structure may be too diffused to facilitate efficient
and effective management and integration of the Department's
counterproliferation efforts.
· Key strategy documents and management plans have not been developed to
help guide, oversee, and integrate the multiple departmentwide
counterproliferation initiatives.
Adapting military doctrine to deal with operations in an NBC environment is
critical because doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide the
employment of military forces. Unified commands build plans and conduct
exercises on established doctrine. Because the offensive, defensive, and
intelligence elements of counterproliferation cover so many aspects of
military operations, those elements can be found in numerous joint and
service doctrine publications. There is no one overarching joint
counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of
how DOD should respond in an NBC environment across the spectrum of military
operations and help ensure that counterproliferation is being satisfactorily
integrated in the entire body of joint doctrine.
Several publications are either under revision to correct deficiencies or
are being developed to fill voids in the body of joint doctrine. For
example, the principal joint doctrine for NBC defense (Joint Publication
3-11),10 which deals particularly with the passive defense area of
counterproliferation, has been extensively revised. DOD officials expect the
new version to be published in spring 2000. Among the deficiencies being
addressed in the new version is the lack of a thorough discussion of
biological warfare and service responsibilities for chemical and biological
defense and decontamination in joint operating areas, such as ports and
airfields.11 Joint doctrine for active defense against the NBC threat is
contained in air and missile defense doctrine publications that provide the
fundamental principles for responding to all air and missile threats.12 This
doctrine, which was completed in 1999, also contains some discussion of the
offensive, or counterforce, elements of counterproliferation. Two new joint
doctrine publications in development--one on attack operations against an
adversary's high value targets and one on joint targeting of an adversary's
forces and related capabilities--are expected to provide additional
principles for counterforce operations. The targeting doctrine, for example,
will provide guidance for the targeting of critical mobile targets, such as
missile launchers. Joint assessments identified the need for such doctrine.
With regard to conventional responses to NBC weapons and their associated
infrastructure, counterforce operations are not discussed exclusively in any
joint or service doctrine publication. However, the joint doctrine
publications for nuclear operations include counterforce issues for the
employment of U.S. nuclear weapons.
While there are over 100 joint doctrine publications, no single joint
publication synthesizes counterproliferation doctrine. The Air Force,
recognizing the value of such a document, is preparing a doctrine
publication that will discuss all areas of counterproliferation in Air Force
operations. Air Force officials believe this "capping" publication will
provide a clearer centralized picture of how the Air Force is to respond in
an NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. The other
services do not have a similar publication, though the Navy is considering
one. In April 2000, while our report was at DOD for review, a joint doctrine
committee approved a Joint Staff proposal for an overarching
counterproliferation doctrine publication for joint operations. The document
will be developed, with final publication expected in winter 2001. Such a
capping document would complement, not replace, existing doctrine
publications in providing a centralized picture of counterproliferation
doctrine.
The Joint Staff has taken steps to examine counterproliferation guidance and
correct deficiencies in several joint doctrine areas, but it has not
systematically reviewed all joint doctrine to help ensure that
counterproliferation is satisfactorily integrated. Additionally, Joint Staff
officials told us that a number of supporting publications that would
provide further practical guidance for implementing doctrine on NBC issues,
such as for consequence management, had not been developed.
Counterproliferation-related tasks span many missions, functions, and types
of military operations, including intelligence support to operations, rear
area operations, joint special operations, space operations, base defense,
airlift support, nuclear operations, amphibious operations, operations other
than war, and antiterrorism. While deficiencies in doctrine can be
identified and changes made to improve doctrine through lessons learned from
joint training and exercises, a review has not been made to assist in
ensuring that the entire body of doctrine satisfactorily addresses the NBC
threat. Development and maintenance of an overarching joint
counterproliferation doctrine publication should help satisfy this need.
DOD major acquisition program regulations require that systems essential to
the accomplishment of missions be able to survive at the NBC contamination
levels anticipated in their operating environment.13 However, DOD does not
have a systematic approach that identifies weapon systems that should be
capable of operating in a biological and chemical contaminated environment
and that provides sufficient management controls to provide reasonable
assurance that appropriate survivability features are incorporated in the
design of these systems.
DOD has stated that the ability of U.S. systems and equipment to survive and
operate in an NBC environment is a major concern. However, DOD's regulations
for acquiring major weapon systems only state that survivability needs to be
addressed during the acquisition process--key provisions that would promote
the consideration of survivability are lacking. For example, survivability
is not a condition of the process' milestone exit criteria.14 In a January
1999 report,15 a DOD team reviewing the status of the Department's chemical
and biological defense program found that weapons survivability in a
chemical and biological environment was a concern across the Department. The
team's findings corroborated and updated a 1995 DOD Inspector General
report.16 The team noted a lack of uniform standards among the services to
ensure survivability in systems and equipment they are acquiring. In their
acquisition processes, the services treat survivability differently. For
example, the Army uses criteria for evaluating survivability, but if the
criterion is not met, the program manager can waive it. The other services
do not use specific criteria and, therefore, have no waiver process. In the
acquisition of chemical and biological defense systems and equipment, the
team found that design and test measures to ensure that survivability
requirements are sufficiently considered in weapon system acquisitions are
largely absent from the process.
Recognizing the potential seriousness of the survivability problem, the DOD
study team developed a plan for immediate application to all DOD acquisition
programs. The plan included implementing interim measures to immediately
strengthen the survivability provisions in DOD's major acquisition program
regulations and studying how NBC contamination survivability criteria
developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and adopted by the Army
could be cost-effectively utilized for all DOD acquisition programs. It has
been over a year since the report was issued, and no action has been taken
on the plan nor has an implementation timetable been established. According
to the DOD official responsible for implementing the proposed measures,
action has not been taken because of the investment required and the issue
is not considered a top priority.
While several DOD officials concurred with the study team's report, they
noted that survivability is only one of several criteria to be considered in
the design and development of weapons and equipment. Others, such as cost
and combat effectiveness, could take priority. Survivability design features
could include filtered overpressurized ventilation systems to minimize the
effects of chemical and biological weapons on combat vehicles, ships, and
aircraft or hardening against electromagnetic radiation for command,
control, communications, and intelligence systems.
Other factors may further reduce the likelihood that acquisition programs
will incorporate survivability features in system design. For example, DOD
is required to purchase commercial items to the maximum extent
practicable.17 According to one DOD official, this can reduce the likelihood
that systems and equipment being acquired will be designed to operate in an
NBC contaminated environment. Also, DOD program and acquisition
decision-making bodies generally do not include representatives with
responsibilities for NBC survivability requirements. The study team's
January 1999 report recommended that such a representative be appointed to
attend reviews for acquisitions that involve compliance with NBC
contamination survivability requirements. At completion of our review,
action had not been taken on this recommendation.
Counterproliferation
While DOD has taken steps to improve its organizational structure to better
manage its counterproliferation efforts, its counterproliferation
organization for establishing policy and guidance and developing offensive
and defense capabilities, including intelligence support, still consists of
diverse constituencies and involves numerous organizations and committees
that are loosely connected. Questions have been raised by the Congress, a
key congressionally mandated commission, recent DOD studies, and officials
we interviewed about DOD's organizational changes and the efficiency and
effectiveness of DOD's organization structure for managing
counterproliferation.
As shown in figure 1, the counterproliferation mission involves many diverse
DOD organizational elements and numerous functions and activities that
present management challenges for DOD in integrating its
counterproliferation initiatives. Each of the organizations, such as the
Joint Staff, must ensure that issues related to the four areas of
counterproliferation--counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and
consequence management--are fully considered in its planning, policies,
doctrine, acquisition, and other functions. In turn, the actions of each
organization must be coordinated to ensure consistency in application and
direction throughout DOD. As noted in a comprehensive congressional staff
report on DOD's organization and decision-making procedures, inefficient
mission integration can lead to gaps in capabilities, wasted resources
through undesirable duplication, interoperability problems, unrealistic
plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and ineffective
fighting forces.18
Figure 1: Counterproliferation Areas, Organizational Elements, and Functions
Source: DOD.
To promulgate policy and provide oversight, DOD established an office for
counterproliferation policy and a senior-level counterproliferation council.
The Office of Counterproliferation Policy reports to an Assistant Secretary
who also oversees nearly a dozen other offices that are involved in various
policy and strategy issues, three of which concentrate on preventing the
proliferation of NBC weapons. The Counterproliferation Council is
responsible for ensuring that the implementation of DOD's
counterproliferation efforts is integrated and focused. While it provides a
venue for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss DOD's
counterproliferation efforts, the Council has largely functioned as an
information gathering body.
DOD's efforts to develop and acquire active and passive defense and
counterforce capabilities for counter-NBC operations involve many DOD
organizations. The Ballistic Missile Defense and Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense Organizations work with the unified commands, services, and
other DOD agencies to develop active defense systems to counter an
adversary's use of ballistic and cruise missiles. Passive defense
capabilities are being developed by the services with oversight
responsibility assigned to an office within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. Two joint service groups are responsible for joint NBC defense
requirements, priorities, training, and doctrine and for coordinating and
integrating NBC defense research, development, and acquisition efforts.
Counterforce capabilities are being developed by each of the military
services and the Special Operations Forces, but there is no central
organization or management structure similar to those for active and passive
defense. Appendix IV provides additional information on DOD's
counterproliferation organization.
Several organization changes were included in the Secretary of Defense's
1997 Defense Reform Initiative19 that were intended to raise the priority of
DOD proliferation-related activities and improve the Department's overall
performance. The Initiative was the impetus for creating the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, which brings under one director the mission-oriented
capabilities of DOD to reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction.
It also assigned responsibility for all proliferation policy under a new
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction. DOD
proposed to abolish the position of the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Affairs, which was created by
the Congress (10 U.S.C. 142). This proposal was unsuccessful because of
strong congressional opposition.20 In opposing this change, the Senate
Committee on Armed Services believed the position was necessary for
fulfilling specific congressionally mandated responsibilities and for
ensuring appropriate senior-level oversight and implementation of DOD
guidance.
In July 1999, a congressionally mandated commission reported on the results
of its assessment of the federal government's organization for combating
weapons of mass destruction proliferation.21 The Commission noted the
diffusion of counterproliferation responsibilities throughout DOD's
organization and the lack of a focal point responsible for integrating the
organization and its efforts. It recommended establishing (1) a senior
position for all proliferation-related issues in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and (2) an Assistant Secretary of Defense
position for technology acquisition programs bearing on combating
proliferation. These recommendations were never adopted by DOD. Some
officials we interviewed agreed with the Commission's conclusions and
recommendations, believing the suggested organizational changes would
increase the Department's focus on counterproliferation issues and improve
DOD's ability to make difficult decisions on the best allocation of limited
resources across the counterproliferation areas and agencies. Others
disagreed, believing that the current organization provides the necessary
attention and management tools for managing the counterproliferation
mission. Although DOD prepared comments to the Commission's report and
recommendations, we were unable to review or be briefed on them because a
governmentwide response to the report had not been released.
The results of two recent DOD studies tend to support the need for some
reexamination of the DOD organization structure to determine if adjustments
can be made to realize greater efficiency and effectiveness in the
management and integration of the Department's initiatives. A major
conclusion of a November 1999 Joint Staff study22 was that the 1999
Commission was right--the integration function required for DOD's NBC
defense program is too diffused. The study found that the integration that
needs to take place is not always occurring. An October 1999 DOD report23 on
the defense intelligence community support of joint counterproliferation
operations cited the need for improvements in policies, processes, and
mechanisms to manage and oversee intelligence support of the
counterproliferation mission. Similar problems were identified 3 years
earlier by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
a Management Plan
Important management tools, including (1) a comprehensive Department
strategy for countering the NBC threat; (2) an integrated military strategy
that describes how the offensive and defense capabilities of U.S. forces
will function together to achieve maximum capability against the threat; (3)
a management plan that can be used to guide, oversee, and integrate DOD's
multiple departmentwide counterproliferation initiatives; and (4) a
reporting and evaluation process with qualitative and quantitative
performance measures for assessing departmentwide progress toward achieving
counterproliferation strategic goals and objectives, have not been
developed. The absence of such tools makes it very difficult to ascertain
the strategic direction and status of DOD's Counterproliferation Initiative,
particularly how the Department plans to effectively integrate the
organizations, plans, policies, requirements, and programs of the diverse,
but complementary, counterproliferation areas.
In 1996, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the unified commands
conducted a 6-month review of the strategic environment expected for the
year 2010. An important element of that review was the NBC threat. The
resulting report24 cited the need for a comprehensive Department strategy
for countering this threat because of the threat's gravity for deployed U.S.
forces and for the U.S. homeland. This strategy was never developed.
The Secretary of Defense's May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report stated
that to advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation concepts,
the Joint Staff and the unified commands would develop an operational
strategy for integrating the offensive and defensive elements of U.S.
counterproliferation capabilities. Because the capabilities necessary to
deal with NBC weapons and conditions cover such a broad range of joint and
service operations, there is a tendency to assume that the sum of the
deterrence, active, passive, counterforce, and consequence management
capabilities will be sufficient to meet the requirement to fight and win in
an NBC environment. The kind of operational strategy discussed above would
more effectively integrate the broad range of existing and developing U.S.
capabilities into a mode of operations and indicate areas where further
progress is needed. It would also describe the means by which a broader
DOD-level counterproliferation strategy would be executed. The Joint Staff
is preparing a strategy document, but its development has languished because
of staff shortages and higher priorities. As described to us by the Joint
Staff, the document might not provide the integrated strategy sought. It
would be more of a collection of current guidance contained in numerous
publications, rather than a strategy for bringing together the offensive and
defensive capabilities for countering NBC weapons. The Joint Staff plans to
issue this document in June 2000.
In addition to the absence of documented counterproliferation strategies,
DOD has not created a single, integrated master, or management, plan to
guide, oversee, and integrate its departmentwide counterproliferation
efforts. Such a plan would establish specific responsibilities, goals,
objectives, timetables, and a process for reporting and evaluating the
progress toward achieving goals and objectives. It would also serve as a
tool to guide execution of counterproliferation strategy.
Some organizations involved in counterproliferation have created or are
considering developing master plans. For example, the Air Force published a
comprehensive master plan for counterproliferation in 1997 that detailed its
approach for developing and providing capabilities, requirements to support
the unified commands, and shortfalls and deficiencies and measures to
correct them. An Air Force official told us the plan helps the Air Force to
integrate all the various counterproliferation efforts that were once
separate functions and encourages working relationships among the efforts.
Counterproliferation officials in Navy and Marine Corps headquarters stated
that their services saw value in having such plans and are considering
creating similar master plans. These officials also saw a benefit in having
a DOD-wide counterproliferation master plan to provide a better focus for
executing their individual service efforts.
A senior policy official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us
that his office considered developing a comprehensive departmentwide master
plan but decided against it. The official said ensuring that
counterproliferation is addressed in major department policy and planning
documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance, is a better approach than
a master plan. He also added that creating such a plan would take quite a
bit of resources and time.
DOD also has not established a reporting and evaluation process for
assessing departmentwide progress toward achieving counterproliferation
strategic goals and objectives. Such a process is important to implement the
strategy, to assess its effectiveness, provide information on what needs to
be done to refine policy and program directions, and assist with program
budget management. The qualitative and quantitative performance measures
developed under this process could allow for a constant assessment of
progress toward a strategy's goals and objectives in order to gauge success
or failure and to adjust the strategy accordingly. Such goals and
performance measures would be consistent with the principles of the
Government Performance and Results Act, which the Congress anticipated would
be institutionalized and practiced at all organizational levels of the
federal government.25
and Eliminating Undesirable Redundancies
DOD coordinates its programs that are strongly related to
counterproliferation with the Department of Energy and key intelligence
agencies primarily through the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
(see app. IV). The Committee's coordination of ongoing research and
development programs is necessary to ensure that funding is optimally used
and that undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts are eliminated.
While the Committee has enhanced the exchange of information among these
agencies, it has not taken determined steps to identify and eliminate
undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts throughout
counterproliferation programs.
DOD, Department of Energy, and intelligence agency officials generally
expressed satisfaction with the exchange of information that the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee provides. They believe the
Committee has led to good interaction at the working level as a result of
representatives from the agencies preparing the Committee's annual report.
The officials also cited instances where coordination had enabled the
agencies to leverage work being done by each other. A typical example is
where the agencies participate in each other's tests to develop needed test
data. Senior-level meetings, while less frequent than working group
meetings, also have reportedly improved communication among the agencies.
The Committee has also helped to focus the efforts within DOD, the
Department of Energy, and the intelligence community in support of
counterproliferation policy and has reported to congressional defense
committees annually on these activities.
Undesirable Redundancies and Uncoordinated Efforts
The Committee has not taken concerted actions to identify and eliminate
undesirable redundancies, one of the primary reasons the Congress
established it.26 While several Committee participants believe duplication
had been reduced, they were able to provide few examples. Central
Intelligence Agency officials cited, for example, an instance where two
similar projects being conducted by two Department of Energy laboratories
were merged. This duplication was identified when a review was made of a
list of research and development projects with potential intelligence
implications. While duplication can be identified through normal
coordination actions, a process has not been established to focus on
identifying and eliminating duplication. As far back as 1994, the Committee
itself recognized the need for a system to identify overlaps.
Overlap and duplication within and among the agencies could be widespread,
as evidenced by a 1999 U.S. Joint Forces Command assessment of organizations
and projects developing capabilities to attack critical mobile targets,
particularly ballistic and cruise missiles with NBC warheads. The Command
initially identified and obtained information on 525 projects related to
joint experiments it was planning. These projects included experiments,
demonstrations, studies, simulations, exercises, and war games.27 In its
assessment, the Command used an integration database tool to assess each
project for relevance to the mobile target experiment and identified 113
associated projects that it deemed applicable. Representatives from each of
these projects met to share information and identify opportunities to pool
their efforts. While some of the project teams had established strong
relationships, many had not. The Command also found some duplication among
the projects, but it believes the type of cooperation demonstrated by their
efforts will reduce that redundancy. The Command has continued to expand its
database and identify additional projects, beyond the initial 113,
associated with attacking mobile targets. Although these projects have
counterproliferation implications, we found no evidence that the Committee
had reviewed these projects to determine whether they overlapped or were
redundant.
In its 1996 report, the Committee recommended development of an integrated
chemical and biological defense research and development plan for DOD,
Energy, and the intelligence community. In May 1999, the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, seeing no action on this recommendation, directed the
Committee to submit the integrated plan to congressional defense committees
by March 1, 2000.28 In July 1999, the Committee tasked development of the
integrated plan to a newly established joint chemical and biological defense
research and development focus group. DOD officials believe the coordination
and collaboration involved in developing such a plan could result in
identifying and eliminating duplicative programs and uncoordinated efforts
in passive defense. DOD said that similar plans may be developed to optimize
integration of joint research and development activities in the other areas
of counterproliferation. The Central Intelligence Agency, recognizing the
difficulties faced in eliminating unnecessary duplication among programs,
sees the focus group as a limited but positive step. Difficulties have been
encountered in developing the plan and the March 1, 2000, deadline was not
met. In explaining the delay, DOD officials cited difficulties in merging
the research and development programs of two independent agencies.
While DOD has taken actions to integrate considerations of the NBC threat
into its organization, activities, and functions, it is very difficult to
gauge the progress or context of the Department's counterproliferation
actions relative to stated goals and objectives. Development of mechanisms
such as a comprehensive strategy, a military strategy, and a management plan
complemented by a reporting and evaluation process would provide an
integrated long-range vision and comprehensive guidance to better focus and
direct DOD's counterproliferation efforts and tools to guide and oversee
progress toward achievement of goals and objectives. Without such
mechanisms, it is difficult for senior leaders, the Congress, and others to
determine the progress and success of DOD's efforts and make optimal
decisions on the effective use of resources to develop the capabilities
required for the counterproliferation mission.
While DOD has taken steps to strengthen its counterproliferation
organization, studies indicate that the links between policy and programs,
as well as among the major counterproliferation areas--counterforce, active
defense, passive defense, and consequence management--could be strengthened.
A strong organizational focus is necessary to ensure efficient integration
and management of the wide range of counterproliferation initiatives being
carried out by many diverse and loosely connected DOD organizational
elements. Inefficient integration of these initiatives can lead to gaps in
capabilities, wasted resources through undesirable duplication,
interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine,
inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.
DOD has not developed an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine
document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in an
NBC environment across the spectrum of military operations. Developing and
maintaining a comprehensive overarching doctrine for counterproliferation
could identify and eliminate gaps in addressing counterproliferation-related
tasks in the body of doctrine. Gaps in doctrine can result in weaknesses in
the ability of joint forces to effectively train, respond, and operate in an
NBC environment. Joint training policy, for example, requires that the joint
tasks, such as the decontamination of NBC contaminated equipment, used in
joint training be supported by doctrine.
DOD's acquisition processes, including those of the military services, are
not providing effective oversight to guard against developing and deploying
systems and equipment that cannot perform effectively in an NBC contaminated
environment. Failure to field NBC survivable systems and equipment would
significantly affect the ability of U.S. forces to sustain operations in
such an environment.
Although interagency coordination among DOD, Department of Energy, and the
intelligence community is reported as good, the full potential benefit of
the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee is not being realized.
While tasked by the Congress to identify and eliminate unnecessarily
redundant programs or uncoordinated efforts, the Committee does not have a
procedural mechanism to facilitate such determinations and decisions within
and across the counterproliferation areas. The results of the U.S. Joint
Forces Command's assessment of organizations and projects developing
capabilities to attack critical mobile targets suggest that there are
opportunities to improve coordination and identify potential undesirable
redundancies and uncoordinated efforts in counterproliferation. Identifying
and eliminating unneeded redundancies and uncoordinated efforts is necessary
to ensure that the resources available for counterproliferation efforts are
optimized.
To more clearly determine DOD's progress in implementing its
Counterproliferation Initiative, provide additional tools to guide and
oversee its efforts, and ensure greater accountability to the Congress, we
recommend the Secretary of Defense take actions to develop (1) a
departmentwide strategy that takes a long-term, comprehensive view of the
nuclear, biological, and chemical threat and links ends, ways, and means to
better integrate DOD's policies and programs for counterproliferation and
(2) a military strategy for integrating U.S. offensive and defensive
capabilities. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop
(1) a management plan that clearly delineates responsibilities, explicit and
outcome-oriented goals, a process for reporting, evaluating, and validating
its progress, and a resource strategy for ensuring funding of its efforts
and (2) quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be used to
assess progress toward goal achievement.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should include in the next
Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department's organization
for counterproliferation to determine if adjustments can be made to realize
greater efficiency and effectiveness in the management and integration of
the Department's initiatives.
To provide assurance that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is
being given sufficient attention in the body of military doctrine, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense have the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine
publication that encompasses all elements of counterproliferation.
To improve the attention given to nuclear, biological, and chemical
survivability in DOD and service acquisition processes, we recommend that
the Secretary devise and implement a systematic approach that identifies the
systems and equipment that need to be capable of operating in a nuclear,
biological, and chemical environment and provides reasonable assurance that
appropriate features are incorporated into the designs of these systems.
To strengthen the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee in identifying and eliminating any unnecessary redundant programs,
the Secretary of Defense, as Committee Chairman, should direct the Committee
to devise and implement a procedural mechanism that establishes clear
criteria, procedures, and a process for making such decisions.
We received written comments from the Departments of Defense and Energy on a
draft of this report, which are included in their entirety as appendixes VI
and VII, respectively. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and
indicated that many corrective actions that are responsive to them have
already been started as a part of the continuing implementation of the
Counterproliferation Initiative. DOD also provided technical comments to the
draft that were incorporated in the report where appropriate. The Department
of Energy did not have any comments on our findings or recommendations. We
obtained oral comments from the Central Intelligence Agency on specific
sections of the report and have made changes in the report where
appropriate.
While DOD acknowledges that there is merit to our recommendations, it is
noncommittal on most of them. We examined many of the initiatives DOD cites
in its comments and have discussed them in this report. We believe the
Department's corrective actions are limited, and that the long-term
challenge posed by the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
requires a more concerted, focused, and integrated effort by DOD. Therefore,
we continue to believe that the Department should implement our
recommendations. DOD's comments and a more detailed discussion of them are
included in appendix VI.
To identify actions DOD has taken and opportunities for further action to
institutionalize counterproliferation throughout DOD's organization,
activities, and functions, we obtained information, documents, and
perspectives from officials at all levels of the Department, including the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, relevant defense
agencies, the four military services, and the four unified commands that we
visited, including their service component commands. We also obtained
perspectives from former defense officials, military experts, and
academicians, and defense support contractor staff. Appendix V lists the
principal organizations where we performed work.
We reviewed an extensive array of policy, planning, and guidance documents,
joint and service doctrine, acquisition program documents, military plans,
intelligence documents, posture statements and speeches, congressional
hearings and testimonies, relevant legislation, statutory reports, open
literature, and studies and assessments. In particular, we examined several
Defense Planning Guidance documents to understand how counterproliferation
guidance has evolved. We examined the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's
counterproliferation concept plan and corresponding plans prepared by the
regional unified commands. We also reviewed the extent that
counterproliferation tasks had been incorporated into the theater operation
and concepts military plans of the regional unified commands. To ascertain
the extent that counterproliferation tasks have been incorporated into joint
and service field exercises, we asked the Joint Staff to prepare a summary
of the relevant exercises and to include tasks, conducted by the unified
commands and the services over the past 3 years. We surveyed and obtained
documents from the service and joint intermediate and senior-level
professional military education schools to determine how
counterproliferation concepts had been incorporated into their curricula. To
determine the rationale for recommendations made in the 1999 Report of the
Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, we reviewed the report and
discussed the findings and observations with Commission staff.
To provide a context within which to review DOD's actions and determine the
pervasiveness and extent of institutionalization within the Department, we
used criteria DOD had established for implementing its institutionalization
efforts. DOD plans to institutionalize counterproliferation by (1) embedding
counterproliferation in all aspects of its planning and programming process,
(2) adapting military doctrine and operational plans to deal with NBC
weapons in regional contingencies, (3) maturing acquisition programs to
ensure that U.S. forces will be adequately trained and equipped to operate
effectively in contingencies involving NBC threats, and (4) reallocating
intelligence resources to provide better information about adversary NBC
capabilities and how they are likely to be used. We also used these criteria
to examine actions aimed at institutionalization at all levels of DOD's
organization, in the functional areas of planning, programming, and
budgeting, and across the four areas of counterproliferation capability
efforts (counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence
management). We did not evaluate the impact or effectiveness of the actions
because it was beyond the scope of our work.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee, we discussed the level of interagency coordination and
collaboration with DOD, Department of Energy, and Central Intelligence
Agency officials and staff. We also discussed with these officials and
obtained information on the development of the Committee's annual report to
the Congress, the structure of the Committee and its network of supporting
committees, and the implementation of key Committee recommendations. We
reviewed the legislative history and legislation establishing and defining
the Committee's authority and responsibilities and compared each of the
Committee's annual reports from 1994 to 1999. To determine the Committee's
actions to identify and eliminate unnecessary redundancy or uncoordinated
efforts among agency programs, we asked senior officials and action officers
to cite specific examples and provide documentation.
Our review was conducted from April 1999 through February 2000 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees;
the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Bill
Richardson, the Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Louis Caldera, the
Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the
Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, the Secretary of the Air Force;
General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the
Honorable George J. Tenet, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency;
Dr. Jay Davis, the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and the
Honorable Jacob J. Lew, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3610 or Marvin Casterline at (202) 512-9076.
Key contributors to this assignment were Mark Wielgoszynski,
Joseph Kirschbaum, and Sally Newman.
Norman J. Rabkin
Director, National Security
Preparedness Issues
Chronology of Major Counterproliferation Milestones
Continued from Previous Page
Date Event Description
Stated that countering
1991 January Department of Defense (DOD) weapons of mass destruction
annual report issued.
is a high priority.
Established as the focal
The Central Intelligence point for all Intelligence
September Agency established the Community activities related
Nonproliferation Center. to proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical
(NBC) weapons.
Report noted deficiencies in
1992 April DOD issued Conduct of the combating weapons of mass
Persian Gulf War report.
destruction.
White House issued Guidance defined U.S. policy
1993 September Presidential Decision objectives in the prevention
Directive 13. of proliferation.
Established the Chemical and
National Defense Biological Defense Program.
Funding for the program was
November Authorization Act for Fiscal centralized and overall
Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160)
enacted. management responsibility
placed in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
Secretary of Defense Identified need to recognize
December announced the Defense new mission of protection in
Counterproliferation addition to proliferation
Initiative. prevention.
Assigned responsibility
within DOD for developing
Deputy Secretary of Defense policies, acquisition
issued memorandum, "DOD Role strategy, a statement of
in Counterproliferation." military roles and missions,
and intelligence support for
Counterproliferation
Initiative.
First of annual
Interagency group issued Counterproliferation Program
1994 May Report on Nonproliferation Review Committee report
and Counterproliferation series. ("Nonproliferation"
Activities and Programs. was dropped from title the
following year).
Memorandum's purpose was to
focus DOD expertise to
Secretary of Defense issued enhance effectiveness of
nonproliferation and
June memorandum, "DOD counterproliferation
Counterproliferation Policy"
is issued. activities. Emphasized
development of plans to
conduct counterproliferation
operations.
Counterproliferation Support Program's goal is to "address
August Program established by key shortfalls in
Deputy Secretary of Defense. counterproliferation
capabilities."
Order declared a national
Executive Order 12938, emergency to deal with
November "Proliferation of Weapons of "proliferation of nuclear,
Mass Destruction," is biological, and chemical
issued. weapons and the means of
delivering such weapons."
This version of the National
Security Strategy stated ". .
.a key part of our strategy
White House issued A is to seek to stem the
1995 February National Security Strategy proliferation of [weapons of
of Engagement and mass destruction and
Enlargement. missiles] and to develop an
effective capability to deal
with these threats." The 1996
update repeated this phrase.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Emphasized deterrence and
Staff issued revised improved capability to
National Military Strategy. operate in contaminated
environments.
Report concluded that
improvements were needed in
Secretary of Defense regional unified command
approved Chairman, Joint planning processes and that
May Chiefs of Staff, the unified commands should
Counterproliferation be responsible for
Missions and Functions Study implementing
Report. counterproliferation policy
in their geographic areas of
responsibility.
Date Event Description
The regional unified commands
President signed revised were assigned
Unified Command Plan. counterproliferation
responsibilities.
Document provided information
DOD issued first version of on the nature of global
1996 April Proliferation: Threat and proliferation and DOD
Response. policies and programs for
countering the threat. It was
updated in November 1997.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Plan directed the five
Staff, approved regional unified commands to
May "Counterproliferation of develop regionally specific
Weapons of Mass Destruction" counterproliferation plans.
concept plan (CONPLAN (All of the plans were
0400-96). approved by August 1999.)
Created senior-level
DOD Directive 2060.2, "DOD Counterproliferation Council
July Counterproliferation to provide oversight of DOD's
Implementation," issued. implementation of the
Counterproliferation
Initiative.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff issued Instruction Instruction provided policy
September 5113.02, and guidance for the
"Counterproliferation employment of U.S. forces for
Charter," issued. counterproliferation.
The new National Security
Strategy states that the
United States must plan and
White House issued A prepare to fight major
1997 May National Security Strategy theater wars "under
for a New Century. conditions where an adversary
may use asymmetric means,"
including weapons of mass
destruction.
Assessment viewed chemical
and/or biological attack as a
"likely condition of future
DOD issued Report of the warfare" and directed a
Quadrennial Defense Review.
$1-billion
counterproliferation funding
increase.
The strategy stated that
employment of weapons of mass
destruction in both major
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of theater war and smaller-scale
September Staff, issued new National contingencies is increasingly
Military Strategy. likely and U.S. forces must
have a balanced
counterproliferation
capability.
DOD panel report called for
creation of Defense Threat
November Defense Reform Initiative Reduction Agency to
Report issued. consolidate nonproliferation
and counterproliferation
efforts.
Described the Air Force's
Air Force issued strategy and objectives for
December counterproliferation master confronting weapons of mass
plan. destruction capable
adversaries.
Called the threat or use of
chemical and biological
weapons a likely condition of
1998 April Defense Planning Guidance future warfare and provided
2000-2005 issued.
increased guidance to DOD's
components for responding to
the threat.
Merged the On-Site Inspection
Agency, the Defense Special
Weapons Agency, the Defense
October DOD established the Defense Technology Security Agency,
Threat Reduction Agency. and selected program
management functions in the
Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
Committed NATO members to
share weapons of mass
North Atlantic Treaty destruction information,
1999 April Organization (NATO) Weapons broaden planning, coordinate
of Mass Destruction on nonproliferation measures
Initiative announced. and on civilian protection,
and establish a NATO weapons
of mass destruction center.
Group created to enhance
Counterproliferation Mission cooperation on
November Support Senior Oversight counterproliferation among
Council established. regional unified and
functional unified commands.
Our Recent Unclassified Reports on Counterproliferation and Related Subjects
Title Message
Testing problems have slowed
release of the anthrax vaccine. The
manufacturer has yet to get Food
and Drug Administration permission
to release lots produced after
restarting operations following
Medical Readiness: DOD Faces renovation shutdown. DOD's plans
Challenges in Implementing Its Anthrax for maintaining an adequate supply
Vaccine Immunization Program assume approval of tested lots in
(GAO/NSIAD-00-36, Oct. 22, 1999) less time than in past. It has no
contingency plan and is not meeting
its requirement to consistently
record vaccination data. It has not
informed personnel how to provide
necessary data for its monitoring
system. Thus, it may not be able to
monitor vaccine safety.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Testimony summarizing the message
Observations on Actions Taken to in our previous reports and
Protect Military Forces testimonies on DOD's efforts to
(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49, Oct. 20, 1999) resolve problems identified in the
Gulf War.
Four federal programs fund research
and development of nonmedical
chemical and biological defense
technologies (two of them for
warfighting applications). The
Chemical and Biological Defense: framework to coordinate these
Coordination of Non-Medical Chemical programs has limited information on
and Biological R&D Program user needs and on how programs
(GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999) relate research and development
projects to needs. More information
about user needs and how user needs
relate to projects would allow
coordination mechanisms to better
identify overlaps, gaps, and
collaboration opportunities.
DOD's Chemical and Biological
Defense Program, in general, and
its research, development, test,
and evaluation activities in
Chemical and Biological Defense: particular, have not satisfactorily
Program Planning and Evaluation Should incorporated key Results Act
Follow Results Act Framework principles. Program goals are vague
(GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999) and unmeasureable, inconsistently
applied, and do not articulate
specific desired impacts.
Performance measures emphasize
activities rather than impacts.
Studies have not been done to
determine optimum number of doses
of anthrax vaccine. The DOD system
to collect data on adverse events
Medical Readiness: Issues Concerning relies on vaccine recipients or
the Anthrax Vaccine their health care providers to
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-226, July 21, 1999) report adverse events. Studies show
that adverse events are reported
significantly less then they would
be under an active surveillance
system.
The Theater High Altitude Area
Defense system's flight-test
schedule did not allow for adequate
ground testing. Interceptors for
tests were not equipped with
Missile Defense: THAAD Restructure sufficient instruments to provide
Addresses Problems but Limits Early optimum test data. Flight-test
Capability (GAO/NSIAD-99-142, June 30, failures have been caused primarily
1999) by manufacturing defects rather
than problems with advanced
technology. These failures have
prevented the Army from
demonstrating that it can reliably
employ the "hit-to-kill" technology
critical to the system's success.
The Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization has achieved
commonality primarily at lower
levels of assembly, such as
components. Officials report
limited success in designing common
Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common systems or major subsystems mostly
Systems and Components Could Result in because of differences in system
Cost Savings (GAO/NSIAD-99-101, May requirements and operating
21, 1999) environments and difficulties in
incorporating new technologies into
mature systems. DOD needs to
establish a structured effort with
appropriate funding to identify and
evaluate common systems and
components.
The organization for coordinating
cruise missile defense across the
services consists of the Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense
Organization for operational
Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made requirements and the Ballistic
but Significant Challenges Remain Missile Defense Organization for
(GAO/NSIAD-99-68, Mar. 31, 1999) acquisition. They are to work
closely together to develop and
refine a theater air and missile
defense master plan. The military
services are primarily responsible
for funding and developing cruise
missile defense capabilities.
DOD is developing two laser
weapons--the Airborne Laser and the
Space-based Laser--to destroy enemy
ballistic missiles. Additionally,
in a joint effort with Israel, DOD
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Efforts to is developing a ground-based laser
Develop Laser Weapons for Theater weapon, the Tactical High Energy
Defense (GAO/NSIAD-99-50, Mar. 31, Laser, which Israel will use to
1999) defend against short-range rockets.
They are in various stages of
development. The airborne laser is
scheduled for full operational
capability in 2009. Laser experts
agree all three systems face
significant technical challenges.
The Army's risk in implementing the
National Security Strategy
increased since its 1996 review.
The Army's risk may be even higher.
The 1998 force structure review was
based on several "best case"
Force Structure: Opportunities for the assumptions, including limited
Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the enemy use of chemical weapons and
Military Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-99-47, immediate access to
Mar. 15, 1999) ports/airfields. The Army's overall
chemical support requirement is
significantly under resourced, with
only about 12,300 of 23,600
required positions allocated end
strength during Total Army Analysis
2005.
DOD does not have a strategy to
address low-level chemical weapons
exposures. It has not stated a
Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a policy or developed a doctrine on
Strategy to Address Low-Level protection of troops from low-level
Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, battlefield chemical exposures.
Sept. 23, 1998) Research indicates low-level
exposures to some chemical agents
may result in adverse short-term
performance and long-term health
effects.
Because the Marine Corps
Lightweight Integrated Suit
Technology Program and the Army's
exploratory development efforts
were research and development
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD's activities, they were not subject
Evaluation of Improved Garment to the same procedures as
Materials (GAO/NSIAD-98-214, Aug. 18, acquisition programs. DOD provided
1998) industry adequate opportunity to
participate. The basic requirement
for a lightweight, launderable,
chemical protective garment did not
change, but certain
mission-specific requirements were
added.
While many Gulf War deficiencies
remain, DOD has increasingly
accepted the urgency of developing
a capability to deal with the
chemical and biological threat. Its
actions have resulted in increased
funding and fielding of more and
better defense equipment. DOD,
however, still needs to decide
major policy and doctrine issues,
improve agent detection
capabilities, provide forces with
better and sufficient numbers of
individual protective equipment,
and deal with collective protection
and decontamination problems.
Doctrine and policy are inadequate
Chemical and Biological Defense: regarding responsibility for
Observations on DOD's Plans to Protect defense of overseas airfields and
U.S. Forces (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-83, ports against chemical or
Mar. 17, 1998) biological attacks. Questions
remain regarding the force
structure and equipment needed to
protect these facilities.
Unresolved doctrinal, policy, and
equipment questions persist
regarding return of chemical or
biological contaminated aircraft
and ships and protection of
essential and nonessential
civilians in high-threat areas.
Servicemembers in high-threat areas
normally lack biological agent
detection capability. Collective
protection facilities and equipment
and agent detection systems are
generally insufficient to protect
the force.
The area air defense system is a
sea-based weapon system being
developed by the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization and the Navy
to defeat theater ballistic
missiles. The Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization and the
Ballistic Missile Defense: Congress consider it a
Improvements Needed in Navy Area high-priority theater missile
Acquisition Planning (GAO/NSIAD-98-34, defense program to protect deployed
Nov. 14, 1997) forces, population centers, and
industrial facilities from theater
missile attacks. The system has
experienced schedule delays;
additional slips are possible. The
Navy plans to begin production
before conducting operational
tests.
Additional Information on DOD's Actions to Institutionalize
Counterproliferation
The underlying objective of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is
to make counterproliferation one of the matters routinely given
consideration within DOD activities. DOD has taken actions since 1993, some
of which are identified in table 1, to integrate the threat of NBC weapons
and their means of delivery into its organization, activities, and
functions.
Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken by DOD to Institutionalize
Counterproliferation
Area Action
DOD incorporated counterproliferation guidance
into major department planning and policy
documents.
The Joint Staff and the regional commands
developed an overarching concept plan for
counterproliferation operations.
Policy and planning Regional unified commands incorporated
counterproliferation tasks and guidance into
military plans.
The Army developed a planning/strategy document
for NBC defense.
The Navy is developing a counterproliferation
master plan.
The Joint Staff established a warfighting
Requirements assessment team to assess joint
determination counterproliferation requirements and
capabilities.
DOD created the DOD Chemical and Biological
Defense Program to manage joint research,
development, and acquisition programs.
Acquisition
The Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations
Command created long-range acquisition plans
(road maps).
DOD components increased NBC emphasis in
service-level training and major joint
exercises.
Training and exercises
The Air Force reviewed chemical and biological
weapons defense training and readiness
deficiencies.
Professional military Joint and service colleges have incorporated
education coverage of the counterproliferation areas into
their curricula.
Defense Intelligence Agency set up a
counterproliferation office and continues to
increase the size of its staff.
Intelligence support
Defense Intelligence Agency created an NBC
threat intelligence database that is widely
accessed to support operations and planning.
While DOD continues to institutionalize counterproliferation, it recognizes
that there are areas where further efforts are clearly warranted. For
example, DOD has agreed to take action in response to DOD Inspector General
reports that have identified deficiencies in service training and
intelligence support. Much also remains to be done to understand the
biological threat and to develop the doctrine, training, and equipment to
counter it. This appendix provides additional discussion of DOD's actions to
institutionalize counterproliferation in its functional areas.
One of the objectives of the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative is to
integrate proliferation concerns into the existing planning process. Major
policy and planning guidance and the strategy for military actions to
counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
delivery systems are contained in numerous key documents such as the
National Security Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, a June 1994 DOD
counterproliferation policy memorandum, DOD's counterproliferation
directive, and the National Military Strategy. However, while presidential
decision directives have been issued on preventing proliferation and
counterterrorism, none have been issued specifically to address the military
measures to combat the threat of NBC weapon use.29
Two DOD planning documents that provide detailed guidance--the Defense
Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan30--have
significantly increased emphasis on the NBC threat. A comparison of the
Defense Planning Guidance of 1996 and 1999 shows a marked increase in
emphasis on the NBC threat. Table 2 provides examples of the differences
between the 1996 and 1999 documents.
Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of the 1996 and
1999 Defense Planning Guidance
1996 Defense Planning Guidance 1999 Defense Planning Guidance
Hostile states may be capable of Threat or use of chemical and
using weapons of mass destruction in biological weapons is a likely
a major theater war. condition in a future major theater
war.
NBC warfare is not mentioned in Need for active and passive defenses
discussing the phases of a major during three phases of major theater
theater war. war is discussed.
NBC weapons or warfare is not Counterforce operations against NBC
mentioned in discussing contingency facilities are cited as a potential
operations. contingency operation.
Planning section contains a detailed
Planning section discusses NBC discussion of defensive measures;
weapons. Most of the discussion is intelligence requirements; logistics;
on proliferation prevention with a counterforce and active and passive
limited discussion of capabilities defense capabilities; and doctrine,
to counter the use of NBC weapons. exercises, and training. Nuclear
survivability is briefly discussed.
Programming guidance briefly
discusses development of Modernization guidance includes more
capabilities to defeat buried and specifics on intelligence support,
hardened targets and active and counterforce, and active and passive
passive defenses against the NBC defense capabilities against the NBC
threat. threat.
At the recommendation of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995
study,31 the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan was revised to explain
counterproliferation policy objectives and identify the missions and assign
counterproliferation tasks to the unified combatant commanders. We reviewed
portions of the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans that
included regional taskings for the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Pacific
Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, as well as the general guidance on
counterproliferation and NBC-related issues. Generic planning guidance
regarding defense against weapons of mass destruction when confronted by
such a threat is provided to all unified commands. This guidance was
essentially identical in the 1996 and 1998 Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plans with the 1998 version providing more specific weapons of mass
destruction taskings for two of the unified commands.
There are several means for identifying the counterproliferation
requirements and capabilities of the unified commands. Formally, each
command annually submits a list of integrated priorities to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, that identifies its highest requirements across all
mission areas. Some commands have included counterproliferation-related
elements among their highest priorities. Additionally, each regional command
and Special Operations Command have prepared a counterproliferation concept
plan for its region that identifies capabilities to carry out missions.
Also, as part of its Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, the
Joint Staff established an assessment team for deterrence and
counterproliferation when the process was established in 1994.32 This team
annually assesses the requirements of the regional unified commands to
accomplish their counterproliferation mission as assigned by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The final assessments of the team are used to influence programming and
budget guidance and to develop recommendations on allocating resources for
joint requirements. The Chairman uses the information to develop two key
documents--the Chairman's Program Recommendations, which contain his
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for consideration in developing
the Defense Planning Guidance, and the Chairman's Program Assessment, which
contains alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for the
Secretary's consideration in refining DOD's programs and budget. The team
has made several important contributions to these documents, such as helping
secure funds for an increase in biological agent detection units.
Since 1995, the deterrence and counterproliferation assessment team has
conducted an annual assessment of requirements and capabilities through a
series of workshops at the unified commands. The 1998 assessment identified
and prioritized 19 requirements and 72 capabilities to meet those
requirements. For example, a high priority identified by the commands was to
provide individual protection to forces and assist allies and coalition
partners with relief from the effect of NBC use. Capabilities necessary to
meet that requirement included individual protective equipment, medical
treatments, specified training, movable NBC detection and characterization
devices, and immediate decontamination. The assessment team determined the
sufficiency of then current capabilities.
Officials at the unified commands we visited were satisfied with the team's
review of the issues and determination of requirements and capabilities. A
U.S. Central Command official noted that the assessment was a useful process
to raise concerns of the regional commands to the Joint Staff. Joint Staff
officials who support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which
oversees the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, said the team
has done a good job of balancing risk, fiscal constraints, and requirements
and effectively communicating the results of its work.
The regional unified commands have responsibility for implementing DOD
counterproliferation policy within their respective geographic areas of
responsibility. Each of the commands has approved concept plans, based on
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept Plan 0400, to meet its
counterproliferation mission based upon theater-unique situations and
circumstances. They have incorporated elements of their counterproliferation
concept plans into other theater plans, particularly their plans for major
theater wars.
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative identified "changing what we
buy" as a key step in acquiring the right capabilities necessary to respond
to NBC threats. DOD has taken several steps to respond to the Initiative's
direction and to institutionalize counterproliferation into defense
acquisition processes. The Report on Nonproliferation and
Counterproliferation Activities and Programs, issued in 1994 by an
interagency group in accordance with provisions of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, discussed key shortfalls in
counterproliferation capabilities. The report also prompted the
establishment of the Counterproliferation Support Program, whose goals are
to leverage ongoing research and development and acquisition programs to
meet the counterproliferation priorities of the unified commands and to
accelerate the deployment of enhanced capabilities to the field. It provides
partial start-up funding for efforts that the services might not otherwise
undertake. Projects that received such funds included the Tactical
Unattended Ground Sensor and Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 also established
the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program.33 The program's mandate is
to coordinate and integrate all DOD chemical and biological defense research
and development and acquisition efforts. Oversight comes from the NBC
Defense Steering Committee, which is composed of the Director for Defense
Research and Engineering, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for Chemical
and Biological Defense, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
and the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Chemical and
Biological Defense directorate. The military services provide day-to-day
management of the program.
Chemical and biological defense has figured prominently in recent research
and development planning documents. Since 1996, chapters on chemical and
biological defense and countering weapons of mass destruction have appeared
in the annual DOD-wide Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan. This
document identifies joint objectives critical to future forces and is
designed to ensure that DOD's Science and Technology Program supports
warfighting requirements. Each chapter defines needed and available
capabilities and lays out a road map for redressing technological
deficiencies. A chapter on hard and deeply buried target defeat was added in
the February 2000 plan. In addition, the Joint Service Materiel Group, which
is responsible for research, development, acquisition, planning, and
technical oversight for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
issued a comprehensive plan of action in April 1998 to guide research and
development and acquisition funding.
To expedite the deployment of needed counterproliferation capabilities, DOD
uses its Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration Program. While the
normal acquisition process can take many years for a new system to begin
production and be deployed, the advanced capability technology demonstration
process focuses on deploying prototypes of promising technologies to
determine their operational feasibility and application. One example is
Portal Shield, a biological agent detection system that provides a
capability to detect, warn, and identify a biological weapons attack on a
fixed location, such as an air base or seaport. DOD considers the Portal
Shield project a success. The number of Portal Shield systems to be acquired
was increased in 1999 in response to the large demand by several regional
unified commands for additional systems. Counterforce weapon capabilities
developed under another counterproliferation demonstration project were used
against hardened targets in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force in 1999.
The technology demonstration program is not designed for full-scale
procurement. To procure larger quantities and provide the operations and
maintenance support for a demonstration item, a military service must agree
to sponsor and provide the necessary funding. These demonstration items must
compete for resources with other major systems being acquired through the
normal acquisition process.
Numerous military tasks and operations support counterproliferation. The
military operations conducted by the unified commands are based on joint
doctrine, trained to unified command and service standards, described in
detail within military theater plans, and exercised and trained to the
standards during unified command, service, and joint training events. While
the unified commands and the services are not required to develop specific
exercises to train associated forces on counterproliferation tasks, they
have incorporated coverage of these tasks into various training events, such
as service training, large-scale exercises, computer-assisted exercises,
seminars, and operations.
Counterproliferation-related elements are found in the joint task lists,
which are the basis for joint training. The requirements for the joint tasks
derive from the Defense Planning Guidance, the National Security Strategy,
the National Military Strategy, and the military theater plans of the
regional unified commands. Each of the services also has a list of essential
tasks, including NBC and counterproliferation issues, that must be performed
to accomplish that service's mission. For example, one Navy task is to
"defend against, detect, monitor, and reduce NBC threats." This task
includes warning and reporting of NBC threats and involves both threat
reduction and implementation of readiness measures. Such essential tasks are
the basis for subsequent training to support readiness.
Each of the services has taken steps to increase the NBC training it
provides as well as enhance its NBC readiness. For example, the Marine
Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force provides NBC training to
deploying Marine Expeditionary Units. In addition, the Marine Corps has
added an organic NBC capability, smaller but similar to the Chemical and
Biological Incident Response Force, to each deploying unit. Similarly, the
Army has developed a series of NBC-related training packages for various
command levels and a plan to further incorporate NBC issues into such areas
as training simulations, models, and the curricula of intermediate and
senior Army service schools. The Army also includes the NBC-related items in
its regular tests of Army Common Tasks for individual soldiers and for
units.
A July 1998 report by the DOD Inspector General described numerous
shortfalls in the execution of chemical and biological defense training
among the services.34 The report concluded that except for Navy surface
ships, unit commanders generally were not fully integrating chemical and
biological defense into unit training. The Inspector General found that such
training was not adequately incorporated into traditional readiness
reporting mechanisms and recommended that the services revise their training
plans and readiness reporting to better reflect the importance of this
training. The services generally agreed with this recommendation. For
example, as a result of a recently completed counterproliferation-readiness
review, the Air Force plans to increase not only unit and individual NBC
training but also the importance of NBC issues in measures of readiness. The
Inspector General also noted the disparity between the relatively good Navy
training of shipboard personnel and the more limited training of Navy air
squadron personnel. The Navy is addressing the issue, especially in the
context of joint operations. A number of major Navy exercises have included
NBC elements for Navy and multiservice NBC-related training. However, the
training and readiness shortfalls identified in the report have led the
Counterproliferation Council to meet with the DOD Senior Requirements
Council to discuss means of further integrating NBC issues into its measures
of readiness. As the DOD Inspector General report suggests, this would
provide further impetus for the services to more thoroughly conduct a
broader range of NBC training.
In addition to the routine service and joint training and scheduled
exercises conducted at the unified and component command levels,
counterproliferation training can be achieved in incidental ways during
events such as humanitarian relief operations, contingency deployments, and
military operations other than war. For example, Pacific Command officials
told us that U.S. forces received valuable practical training during the
summer 1999 evacuation and re-occupation of Johnston Atoll in the Pacific
Ocean. An approaching hurricane prompted a major consequence management
operation on the island, which has a facility for destroying chemical
weapons and agents. Pacific Command officials considered the operation a
good test of the Command's NBC-related capabilities.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues guidance that directs joint
commanders to concentrate training on specific areas the Chairman finds
deficient. For example, weapons of mass destruction and NBC defense are
among the list of issues recommended by the Chairman for immediate action.
Included in the list of items for ongoing training concentration are theater
missile defense, which has a direct counterproliferation role, and areas
such as information superiority, interagency operations, and interface
between commands, which have only a relation to counterproliferation
operations.
All elements of counterproliferation are included in major joint and
combined exercises. Table 3 provides examples of joint and combined
exercises that have had counterproliferation elements over the last 4 years.
Table 3: Examples of Joint and Combined Exercises With Counterproliferation
Elements
Exercise name Participants Counterproliferation element
NATO Crises Scenario used in exercise included
Management NATO forces dealing with an adversary armed with
Exercise 2000 chemical/biological weapons and
medium-range ballistic missiles.
Eligible DOD and interagency Scenarios used in exercises have
Receiver staff included disaster relief and weapons
of mass destruction terrorism.
Theater Missile Conducted with Russian officers to
Defense United States and exercise coordinated theater ballistic
Exercise Russia missile defense of a fictional third
world country.
Focused on consequence management
Brave Knight U.S. European operations and included NBC defense
Command
emphasis.
Trained joint task force and joint
Tempest Express U.S. Pacific task force augmentation cell staff on
Command crisis action procedures for
consequence management operations.
NBC war game, analyses, and seminars
Coral Breeze U.S. Pacific to examine the effects of chemical and
Command biological agent employment on U.S.
operations on the Korean peninsula.
Includes planning, intelligence, and
Matador U.S. European operational tasks that are not
Command counterproliferation-specific but
relate to NBC defense.
Exercises include counterforce and
Ellipse Series U.S. Special support to consequence management
Operations Command
operations.
Turbo Challenge U.S. Transportation Passive defense training incorporated
2000 Command into the tasks for the exercise.
Eagle Resolve U.S. Central Focuses on theater ballistic missiles
Command and other NBC threats.
United Endeavor U.S. Joint Forces Exercise provided training for joint
98-1 Command task force staff on NBC protection in
theater.
Source: Report to GAO: Embedding Counterproliferation Joint Mission
Essential Tasks in CINC and Service Training and Exercise Programs, The
Joint Staff, Jan. 14, 2000.
DOD officials consider professional military education to be vital to
increasing awareness in officers and leaders of the seriousness of the NBC
threat in military operations. DOD intermediate- and senior-level military
schools have incorporated counterproliferation-related topics into their
curricula, though the extent and emphasis of coverage vary among the
schools.
The war colleges provide general coverage of counterproliferation-related
topics in their core programs related to national security decision-making
and operations. For example, 1 of the 14 instructional periods for the Air
War College's Department of Future Conflict is dedicated solely to weapons
of mass destruction. Counterproliferation and NBC issues are also offered as
additional courses at each of the war colleges. For example, a weapons of
mass destruction elective course at the Army War College uses experts in the
NBC field for lectures and provides an opportunity for a detailed study of
NBC weapons and their means of delivery. Such courses generally include
aspects of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The colleges also
regularly conduct conferences, war games, and exercises that address
counterproliferation issues. For instance, counterproliferation issues are
included in an annual war game attended by all of the war colleges at
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
The National Defense University and the Air Force have established academic
centers to improve counterproliferation education and research at their
respective schools and to support other DOD components. These centers
provide instructional support to the professional military education schools
and participate in seminars and war games.
In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that weapons
of mass destruction be considered by the military schools as one of several
special areas of emphasis to incorporate into their curricula. The 1998 list
included the areas of consequence management support to foreign governments
and force protection for U.S. forces operating overseas. Based on input from
throughout DOD, this annual list highlights areas that are considered
important for keeping professional military education on the leading edge of
joint warfighting. However, such guidance contains no specific direction on
the degree to which these topics should be emphasized or where in the
overall curricula they belong. The schools have discretion on how these
areas are incorporated into their curricula. The Air Command and Staff
College noted that some guidance is also provided indirectly through DOD and
joint agencies. They cited an example where the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency provides experts to a major counterproliferation war game at the
school.
Effective intelligence support is critical to all aspects of DOD's
counterproliferation mission. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which is the
DOD focal point for integrating intelligence information in support of
counterproliferation, established a counterproliferation support office in
1995 to provide focus for its efforts. This office had an authorized
personnel level of about 135 in fiscal year 1999. Approval has been given
for the addition of 35 analysts between fiscal year 2000 and 2004. Ten of
those were on board as of January 2000. Expenditures by the support office
increased from about $6 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $20 million in
fiscal year 1999.
Initiatives have been undertaken to enhance intelligence support of
counterproliferation initiatives and further integrate intelligence into
DOD's counterproliferation efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency's
counterproliferation office is now producing a worldwide and four regional
threat assessments every 2 years in support of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation concept
plan. An intelligence requirements office was established at the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency to facilitate the flow of intelligence requirements
and products between the operational and intelligence communities. In 1998
the Defense Intelligence Agency established a computerized system to provide
current substantive intelligence information and related support to
policymakers, force planners, and combatant commanders. By December 1999,
this classified system had 21 U.S. government agencies and organizations
posting data to it. The Agency's data indicate wide use of the system.
Another key initiative was the 1997 establishment of a center to provide
improved intelligence support on underground facilities. Adversaries can use
such facilities to protect and conceal their weapons of mass destruction
programs. Additional initiatives are outlined in the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee's annual report to the Congress.
Two recent DOD assessments of counterproliferation intelligence support--one
by the DOD Inspector General and the other by the Joint Staff--identified
weaknesses in the level of support. Problems cited by the
Inspector General in a classified October 1999 report35 were similar to
deficiencies cited in a 1996 study of biological and chemical weapons
intelligence by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The
Inspector General made numerous recommendations, concurred by DOD officials,
that included establishment of policies, processes, and mechanisms to manage
and oversee intelligence support to the counterproliferation mission. The
December 1999 Joint Staff report36 concluded that there are inadequate
resources to support intelligence collection and analysis of the NBC threat.
The report, signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, recommended more flexible allocation of resources to
support counterproliferation missions and improvements in DOD's intelligence
production program to facilitate analyst collaboration to support
counterproliferation missions.
DOD Counterproliferation Organization and Coordinating Bodies
Various organizations, offices, and coordinating bodies throughout DOD are
assigned responsibilities for executing the 1993 Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative. A 1996 DOD directive37 establishes the
policy, assigns responsibilities, and formalizes relationships among DOD
organizations for implementing counterproliferation activities and programs.
This appendix (1) describes the organizational structures and major missions
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military
services, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for counterproliferation;
(2) presents information on current personnel levels and funding for the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and (3) provides information on key DOD and
interagency coordinating bodies.
Several organizations under the Office of the Secretary of Defense have
counterproliferation-related responsibilities. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,38 is assigned general
responsibilities for, among other things, (1) coordinating DOD research,
development, and acquisition programs to ensure that they adequately support
counterproliferation efforts and U.S. forces' ability to conduct operations
successfully in an NBC environment and (2) providing management oversight to
the advanced concept technology demonstration program and to the directors
of the defense agencies who report to the Under Secretary.39 The Assistant
to the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense provides
oversight of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.40 The Under
Secretary for Policy is to "develop, coordinate, and oversee" policy
implementation throughout DOD and coordinate efforts with other U.S.
government agencies and foreign allies and to oversee the Defense Technology
Security Administration. Although not specifically assigned responsibilities
for counterproliferation, the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, also
plays a key role in the process of planning, programming, and budgeting. The
Defense Intelligence Agency is a combat support agency. As such, it operates
under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence, but submits intelligence
estimates and other substantive products directly to the Secretary and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and, as appropriate, to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, is charged with assisting the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) in the
day-to-day oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The major
counterproliferation-related organizations within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense
Source: DOD.
The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's overall responsibilities for
counterproliferation include (1) preparing guidance for the commanders of
the regional unified commands and integrating the capabilities of the
functional unified commands, such as the U.S. Special Operations Command;
(2) preparing and reviewing plans; (3) making recommendations to the
National Command Authorities41 for operational employment of U.S. forces in
counterproliferation operations; and
(4) developing joint counterproliferation doctrine. Figure 3 shows the Joint
Staff organization and functions for counterproliferation activities.
Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff
Note:
TAMD--Theater Air and Missile Defense
WMD--weapons of mass destruction
Source: DOD data.
The military services' counterproliferation responsibilities include
developing doctrine; conducting research, development, and acquisition
efforts; and organizing, training, and equipping their respective forces to
address NBC threats. The Air Force has established a single headquarters
staff office to serve as a focal point for overseeing all aspects of Air
Force counterproliferation policy to a greater degree than the staff
organizations of the other services. The office's responsibilities include
doctrine, strategy, policy, and requirements, such as developing and
coordinating implementation of the Air Force's counterproliferation master
plan and capabilities roadmap. Like the other services, the Air Force staff
has organizations that perform specific counterproliferation-related tasks.
For example, Air Force civil engineers are responsible for coordinating and
conducting NBC defense at Air Force installations. The other military
services have established different staff offices within their headquarters
to address counterproliferation issues (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services
Note: CNO--Chief of Naval Operations.
Source: DOD.
The planning and execution of the individual elements of Army
counterproliferation-related activities are performed in a number of
separate offices throughout its headquarters. The National Security Policy
Division, which is part of the Army's Strategy, Plans and Policy
Directorate, coordinates arms control and proliferation-related policy
issues and is the point of entry for most Army counterproliferation matters.
A separate Army NBC Defense Division oversees all aspects of Army NBC
defense and serves as the Army focal point for the DOD Chemical and
Biological Defense Program. The Army also serves as DOD's executive agent
for several counterproliferation-related functions such as DOD support to
civil authorities for consequence management and for developing medical,
biological, and chemical weapons countermeasures. The Army is currently
conducting an internal assessment to determine how it should be organized to
better address counterproliferation issues.
The Navy also has a number of staff offices that deal with
counterproliferation issues. The Surface Warfare Division is responsible for
coordinating the Navy's NBC Defense issues as well as serving as the Navy's
focal point for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. An office
under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations
deals with arms control and counterproliferation policy issues.
An officer in the Marine Corps headquarters staff addresses
counterproliferation policy and other issues, such as arms control
agreements and the anthrax vaccine. Personnel at the Marine Corps Systems
Command are responsible for many of the programs and equipment-related
issues of counterproliferation. The Marine Corps and the Navy have proposed
forming a council for the two services, composed of senior officers, to
address specific counterproliferation issues, such as amphibious operations
in an NBC environment.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was established on October 1, 1998, to
reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction and to support
operational forces and develop and field systems for counterproliferation.
The Agency comprises six functional directorates, support elements such as
general counsel and business management, senior advisers representing the
Departments of State and Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and an
advisory panel called the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee.
Three of the Agency's six directorates focus on nonproliferation issues. The
Technology Security directorate is responsible for monitoring export license
applications and U.S. satellite launches to minimize the transfer of weapons
of mass destruction-related technology. The Cooperative Threat Reduction
Directorate is to assist former Soviet Union countries in reducing their
weapons of mass destruction infrastructure and provide verifiable safeguards
against further proliferation. The On-Site Inspection directorate supports
on-site control inspection, escort and monitoring activities, and arms
control confidence building activities and develops treaty verification
monitoring technologies.
The Agency's other three directorates support various areas of the
counterproliferation mission. The Chemical and Biological Defense
Directorate implements the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The
Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate conducts technology
development and provides support to the unified commands in the areas of
counterforce, weapons effects, and force protection. This directorate also
runs the Knowledge Preservation program, which is to protect the U.S.
capability to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the absence of
underground testing. The Nuclear Support and Operations Directorate works on
technical aspects of maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Although the Agency does not directly support DOD's active defense efforts,
its staff participates in DOD-wide working groups on related issues, such as
weapon effects modeling. Figure 5 shows the organization and functions of
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Figure 5: Organization and Functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Note:
CTR--Cooperative Threat Reduction
DARPA--Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DOE--Department of Energy
WMD--weapons of mass destruction.
Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The Agency had a staff of 1,872, or approximately 93 percent of the fiscal
year 2000 authorized personnel total of 2,002, as of February 2000. Slightly
more than 500 of the staff were assigned to the Counterproliferation Support
and Operations, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear Support and
Operations Directorates--the directorates largely involved in the Agency's
support of counterproliferation programs and activities.
(See fig. 6.)
Figure 6: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Personnel Levels
Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The Agency's fiscal year 2000 budget was $1.93 billion. The portion for the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, $791 million, is, by law, protected
from use for other purposes and controlled directly by the DOD Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, which is managed in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program portion, $458 million,
is also protected in the Agency's budget. Figure 7 shows the allocation of
fiscal year 2000 funding for the six directorates and support functions.
Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency
Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
DOD has established two major coordinating bodies for
counterproliferation--the Counterproliferation Council and the NBC Defense
Steering Committee--and leads the interagency Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee. The Counterproliferation Council is designed to bring all
major components together on a regular basis, while the NBC Defense Steering
Committee comprises senior officials with responsibility for the research,
development, and acquisition activities of the DOD Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee is to
coordinate research, development, and acquisition across DOD, the Department
of Energy, and the intelligence community. Table 4 describes the purposes,
composition, and authorities of these bodies.
Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies
Continued from Previous Page
NBC Defense Counterproliferation
Counterproliferation Steering Program Review
Council
Committee Committee
Optimize funding for,
and ensure development
and deployment of
(1) highly effective
technologies and
capabilities for
detection, monitoring,
collection,
processing, analysis,
and dissemination of
information in support
of U.S.
counterproliferation
policy and (2)
disabling technologies
Advise Secretary of in support of such
Defense on policy.
counter-proliferation
matters. Identify and eliminate
undesirable
Make policy To strengthen the redundancies or
recommendations for linkage between uncoordinated efforts
the implementation of the Director, in development and
DOD Defense Research deployment of such
counterproliferation and Engineering, technologies and
activities and the Deputy capabilities.
Assistant to the
Purpose programs. Assistant Establish priorities
Oversee implementation Secretary of for programs and
of DOD Defense for funding; facilitate
counterproliferation Chemical, and interagency and
activities and Biological interdepartmental
programs. Defense Programs funding of programs to
[DATSD/CBD], and ensure necessary
Make recommendations DTRA. levels of funding to
on elements of defense develop, operate, and
policy that deal with field highly capable
counterproliferation systems.
issues.
Ensure that Energy
programs are
integrated with the
operational needs of
other government
departments and
agencies of
government.
Ensure that DOD
national security
programs include
technology
demonstrations and
prototype development
of equipment.
Authority DOD Directive 2060.2 Public Law Public Law 103-160
103-160
When
formed July 1996 November 1998 1993
Secretary of Defense
Reports to Under (or designee),
Chair Deputy Secretary of Secretary of Chairman; Secretary of
Defense
Defense (AT&L) Energy (or designee),
Vice Chairman
Under Secretary of
Defense (AT&L); Under
Secretary of Defense
for Policy; Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs DDR&E; Deputy to
of Staff; under the Assistant
secretaries of Secretary of Under Secretary of
military departments; Defense for Defense (AT&L),
vice chiefs of the Chemical and Executive Secretary;
military services; Biological Special Assistant to
Membership ASD(ISP) (who serves Defense Programs; the Director for
as Executive DTRA director; Central Intelligence
Secretary)a; and the head of for Nonproliferation;
ATSD(NCB); Assistant DTRA's Chemical Deputy Director for
Secretary of Defense and Biological Strategy and Policy,
for Command, Control, Defense Joint Staff (J-5)
Communications, and Directorate
Intelligence;
Director, Joint Staff,
Strategic Plans, and
Policy (J-5)
Principals' Committee
has met twice since
"Upon call of Deputy March 1995. Standing
Meets twice each Committee consists of
Frequency Secretary of Defense year and upon Principals' Committee
of or designee"; in call of the Under members or their
meetings practice, Secretary of deputies and meets at
approximately
quarterly. Defense (AT&L). least annually.
Working groups, meet
regularly to prepare
annual report.
DOD Chemical and
Biological
Defense Program
Management Plan
(which specifies
relationships and
responsibilities Issues annual report,
Products Briefings by DOD among Report on Activities
and organizations are coordinating and Programs for
reporting presented to the agencies and Countering
Council. provides fiscal Proliferation and NBC
and programming Terrorism.
guidance to the
Joint NBC Defense
Board to develop
the Program
Objective
Memorandum).
aThe position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy was eliminated as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative of
November 1997. The functions of the position were merged with those of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources to create the
office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction.
Note:
AT&L-- Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
ATSD/NCB--Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs
DDR&E--Director, Defense Research and Engineering
DOE--Department of Energy
DTRA--Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Sources: DOD Directive 2060.2; annual reports of the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Defense Annual
Report to Congress, 1999; published overviews of the Joint Service Chemical
and Biological Defense Program; GAO interviews.
Organizations and Offices Contacted
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat
Reduction
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Finance
Officer), Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
The Joint Staff
Headquarters, Department of the Army
· National Security Policy Division
· Chemical and NBC Defense Division
Headquarters, Department of the Navy
· Strategy and Policy Division
· Surface Warfare Division
Headquarters, Department of the Air Force
· Counterproliferation and Nuclear Policy Office
Headquarters, Marine Corps
· Office for Plans, Policies and Operations
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
· Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate
· Counterproliferation Support and Operations Directorate
· Nuclear Support Directorate
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Army Soldier, Biological and Chemical Command, Aberdeen, Maryland
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Defense University, Counterproliferation Center
Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center
Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Institute for Defense Analysis
Science Applications International Corporation
Battelle Memorial Institute
U.S. Joint Forces Command
· Air Force Air Combat Command
· Headquarters, Marine Forces, Atlantic
· Headquarters, Atlantic Fleet
U.S. Central Command
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Pacific Command
· Headquarters, Army Pacific
· Headquarters, Pacific Fleet
· Headquarters, Pacific Air Force
· Headquarters, Marine Forces, Pacific
· Special Operations Command, Pacific
Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base
· Air Force Counterproliferation Center
RAND Corporation
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO's comments on DOD's letter, dated April 20, 2000.
1. While DOD has taken actions that benefit the Department's integration
efforts, these actions, even taken collectively, do not provide the
integrated long-range vision and comprehensive guidance needed to focus and
direct its overall counterproliferation efforts, nor do they provide the
tools to help guide and oversee progress. The breadth and complexity of
counterproliferation permeate through DOD organizations, functions, and
activities. The potential use of NBC weapons against U.S. and allied forces
requires a more comprehensive integrated approach by DOD. Such an approach
would encompass the entire spectrum of counterproliferation programs and
activities and provide greater assurance that all commands, military
services, and department level structures are working together in the most
effective manner. A DOD-wide management plan would establish performance
measures that could be used to clearly measure the effectiveness of
integration efforts while indicating where further progress is needed.
In regard to an integrated military strategy, if the one being coordinated
by the Joint Staff embodies the elements and scope envisioned by the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review, rather than be a collection of current guidance,
it would satisfy the intent of our recommendation.
2. We believe that a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to include
DOD's organization for counterproliferation in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review would be of significant value to the next administration and to those
currently preparing to undertake the Review. Including such an examination
in the Review would provide an early opportunity for the next administration
to consider organizational alternatives for the efficient and effective
departmentwide management of future counterproliferation efforts in light of
its assessment of overall defense needs. The planned initiatives noted by
DOD to improve its understanding of how the counterproliferation mission can
be better satisfied by organizational changes should complement an
examination by the Quadrennial Defense Review.
3. Subsequent to receiving DOD's comments, a proposal by the Joint Staff to
develop a comprehensive overarching joint doctrine publication was approved.
We reviewed the proposal and found it to be consistent with our
recommendation. The new doctrine is planned for publication in winter 2001.
4. DOD agrees that NBC survivability measures must be incorporated into all
military equipment, but indicates that it believes current acquisition
regulations and investments in basic science and technology sufficiently
address NBC survivability. We disagree. As discussed in our report, a DOD
study team concluded in January 1999 that current survivability provisions
in acquisition regulations need to be strengthened and that there is a lack
of uniform standards among the services to ensure survivability in systems
and equipment being acquired. It developed a plan to address these
weaknesses, which after a year, has not been implemented. The thrust of our
recommendation is to take actions consistent with the study team's
recommendations that provide reasonable assurance that appropriate
survivability features are incorporated into systems and equipment being
acquired by the Department.
5. In discussing its response with us, DOD agreed that there may be
opportunities for the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to do
more to identify and eliminate any unnecessary redundant programs. However,
DOD indicated that the Committee has not decided whether the mechanism we
recommend is necessary at this time. We recognize that existing mechanisms
can help eliminate redundancies and uncoordinated efforts, but we were
provided few examples of that occurring. Given the scope of
counterproliferation, including the number of organizational elements
involved, we believe the establishment of a more structured, comprehensive
approach within and across the counterproliferation areas would provide
greater assurance and consistency in evaluating and strengthening the
decision process for eliminating programs that may unnecessarily overlap or
be redundant.
Comments From the Department of Energy
(701160)
Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken by DOD to Institutionalize
Counterproliferation 34
Table 2: Comparison of Counterproliferation-Related Areas of
the 1996 and 1999 Defense Planning Guidance 36
Table 3: Examples of Joint and Combined Exercises With Counterproliferation
Elements 42
Table 4: DOD and Interagency Coordinating Bodies 56
Figure 1: Counterproliferation Areas, Organizational Elements, and Functions
15
Figure 2: Organizations and Functions of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense 48
Figure 3: Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff 49
Figure 4: Organization of the Military Services 50
Figure 5: Organization and Functions of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency 53
Figure 6: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Personnel Levels 54
Figure 7: Fiscal Year 2000 Funding Profile for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency 55
1. Counterproliferation is the activities of DOD to combat the spread of NBC
capabilities and the means to deliver them. The offensive component of
counterproliferation (referred to as "counterforce") includes actions taken
to defeat NBC targets, such as mobile missile launchers, and NBC weapons
production and storage facilities. The defensive component includes "active
defense," which are actions taken to destroy enemy NBC weapons and delivery
vehicles while en route to their targets; "passive defense," which are
measures taken to help U.S. forces survive and operate in an NBC
environment, such as biological and chemical agent detectors and protective
clothing and masks; and "consequence management," which refers to efforts to
mitigate the consequences resulting from the use of an NBC weapon, such as
the decontamination of weapon systems and equipment and casualty evacuation.
Consequence management measures are often included in passive defense.
2. The U.S. intelligence community is a group of 13 government agencies and
organizations that carry out the intelligence activities of the U.S.
government. Members include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence
organizations of the military services.
3. The Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to
continue until the end of fiscal year 2001, by which time
counterproliferation is expected to be established as a mainstream DOD
mission area. Its tenure can be extended by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
4. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, May
1997. The congressionally mandated review was designed to be a fundamental
and comprehensive examination of U.S. defense needs from 1997 to 2015:
potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military
modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the
defense program. (Sections 921-926 of the National Defense Authorization Act
of Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201.) Another review is to be conducted
in 2001 to revisit defense needs and make recommendations to the new
President, as mandated by section 901 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65).
5. Section 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (P.L. 103-160).
6. The staff that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
executing the Chairman's responsibilities.
7. Regional unified commands are composed of components of two or more
military departments and have a broad continuing mission under a single
commander that has geographic responsibilities. The regional commands are
the Joint Forces, Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. Four
other unified commands--the Space, Special Operations, Strategic, and
Transportation Commands--have functional responsibilities.
8. "Joint" refers to two or more of the military services operating in
coordinated action, such as a joint exercise involving units from the Army
and the Navy.
9. "Combined" is used when two or more of two or more allies operate with
U.S. forces.
10. Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Environments, Draft, Joint Publication 3-11, Jan. 7. 2000.
11. We are currently reviewing the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct NBC
defense operations. This review includes an examination of the important
policy issues for successful implementation of Joint Publication 3-11. A
report on the results of this work will be issued later this year.
12. Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, Joint Publication
3-01, Oct. 19, 1999.
13. Section 4.4.1 of DOD Regulation 5000.2R, setting forth the mandatory
procedures for major defense acquisition programs.
14. Exit criteria serve as gates that, when successfully passed, demonstrate
that a program is on track to achieve its goals and should be allowed to
continue.
15. Chemical/Biological Defense Program Overarching Integrated Product Team
Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology), Jan. 24, 1999.
16. Chemical and Biological Defense Management of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs, Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No.
95-202, May 24, 1995.
17. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, P.L. 103-355, section
8104, codified at
10 U.S.C. 2377, establishes a preference for the acquisition of commercial
items to the maximum extent practicable.
18. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, Oct. 16, 1985. Study was conducted in support
of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
19. Defense Reform Initiative, Secretary of Defense, Nov. 1997. The
initiative is designed to streamline DOD's organizational structure and
business practices.
20. Senate Report 106-50 (1999).
21. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the
Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 14, 1999. The report
was required by section 712 (c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-293, and the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, P.L. 105-277.
22. Chemical and Biological Warfare Study of Studies, Deterrence and
Counterproliferation Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Team, Joint
Staff, Nov. 1999.
23. Report Number 00-0IR-01, Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Oct. 15, 1999.
24. Joint Strategy Review, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan. 1997.
25. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62)
requires federal agencies to clearly define their missions, set goals, link
activities and resources to goals, prepare annual performance plans, measure
performance, and report on accomplishments.
26. Section 1605 (b) (2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994
(P.L. 103-160), as amended.
27. A war game is a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation
involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures
designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.
28. Senate Report 106-50 (1999).
29. A presidential decision directive is used to promulgate presidential
decisions on national security matters.
30. The Defense Planning Guidance provides Secretary of Defense guidance to
the military departments for development of their budgets. It includes major
planning issues and decisions, strategy, and policy. The Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the commanders in chief of the
unified commands and chiefs of the military services for accomplishing tasks
and missions based on current capabilities. It also assigns tasks and
resources to the unified commands for preparing their theater plans.
31. Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study Report, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 18, 1995.
32. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process is the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff's conduit for obtaining a systematic view of
future warfighting capabilities. Teams comprised of warfighting and
functional area experts examine key relationships and interactions between
joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities to improve
warfighting effectiveness.
33. Title XVII of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,
P.L. 103-160.
34. Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training, Department of
Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 98-174, July 17, 1998.
35. Report Number 00-OIR-01, Office of the Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Oct. 15, 1999.
36. Combat Agency Review Team Assessment of Defense Intelligence Agency, The
Joint Staff, Dec. 21, 1999.
37. DOD Directive, No. 2060.2, "Department of Defense Counterproliferation
Implementation," July 9, 1996.
38. Logistics was added to the Under Secretary's title at the beginning of
fiscal year 2000.
39. Two of these agencies, On-Site Inspection Agency and Defense Special
Weapons Agency, were disestablished on October 1, 1998, and subsumed into
the newly created Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The Director of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization continues to report to the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who is charged with
ensuring that the director includes counterproliferation as an integral
element within the developmental framework for defense against ballistic
missiles. The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
reports to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
40. With the announcement of the Defense Reform Initiative in November 1997,
DOD sought congressional approval to abolish this position and rename the
Director for Defense Research and Engineering as the "Director, Defense
Technology and Counterproliferation." The Congress did not approve the
proposal, and the position has since been vacant.
41. National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary of
Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.
*** End of document. ***
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