Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
(Chapter Report, 03/08/96, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89)
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to
strengthen controls over nuclear materials in the newly independent
states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, focusing on the: (1) nature and
extent of problems with controlling direct-use nuclear materials in NIS;
(2) status and future prospects of U.S. efforts in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and (3) executive branch's consolidation of
U.S. efforts in the Department of Energy (DOE).
GAO found that: (1) of the 1,400 metric tons of nuclear material that
the former Soviet Union produced, much is not related to the nuclear
weapons industry; (2) this material is extremely vulnerable to theft and
diversion because it has not been have accurately and completely
inventoried, NIS do not have adequate resources to track its movement,
it is relatively safe and easy to handle, and economic and social
upheavals have increased its value; (3) the amount of nuclear material
available is expected to increase as Russia dismantles its nuclear
weapons; (4) seizures of small quantities of these stolen materials have
happened only by chance; (5) the Department of Defense's threat
reduction program has gained momentum at NIS facilities and Russia has
agreed to upgrade controls at high-priority sites and develop a national
material protection control and accounting (MPC&A) regulatory
infrastructure; (6) DOE lab-to-lab programs have improved controls at
two Russian labs and begun providing monitors to several Russian weapons
facilities; (7) the United States plans to expand its MPC&A assistance
program in 1996 to all known NIS direct-use nuclear facilities and has
consolidated management and funding for most programs in DOE; (8)
inherent uncertainties regarding costs and verification abilities could
affect the expanded program's success; and (9) DOE is developing a
long-range plan to improve the MPC&A systems in all facilities handling
direct-use material by the year 2002, consolidate program plans, and
develop a centralized cost-reporting system and a flexible audit
approach.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD/RCED-96-89
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve
Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent
States
DATE: 03/08/96
SUBJECT: Nuclear waste disposal
Nuclear facility security
Dual-use technologies
International agreements
Foreign governments
Nuclear proliferation
International cooperation
Larceny
Federal aid to foreign countries
Inventory control
IDENTIFIER: Soviet Union
Russia
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Belarus
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
DOD CTR Government-to-Government Program
DOE Lab-to-Lab Nuclear Material Control Program
Commonwealth of Independent States
Project Sapphire
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
March 1996
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION - STATUS
OF U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROLS IN NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES
GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89
Nuclear Nonproliferation
(711098)(170262)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CTR - Cooperative Threat Reduction
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
GAN - Gosatomnadzor
HEU - highly enriched uranium
KGB - Komityet Gosudarstvyennoj Byezopasnosti
MPC&A - material protection control and accounting
MINATOM - Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
NIS - newly independent states
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-270052
March 8, 1996
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
This report responds to your request that we review U.S. efforts to
strengthen controls over nuclear material in the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union. As requested, unless you publicly
announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of
this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we
will send copies to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy;
and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties on request.
If you have any questions concerning this report, we can be reached
at (202) 512-4128 and (202) 512-3841, respectively. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Harold J. Johnson
Associate Director, International
Relations and Trade Issues
National Security and International
Affairs Division
Victor S. Rezendes
Director, Energy, Resources, and
Science Issues
Resources, Community and
Economic Development Division
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Safeguarding nuclear material that can be used directly in nuclear
explosives has become a primary national security concern for the
United States and the newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union. Terrorists and countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as
little as
25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 kilograms of
plutonium to build a nuclear explosive. The seizure of HEU and
plutonium in Europe and Russia has prompted concerns about how the
newly independent states control their direct-use materials. The
Ranking Minority Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on
National Security requested that GAO review U.S. efforts to help the
newly independent states strengthen their nuclear material controls.
GAO's report addresses (1) the nature and extent of problems with
controlling direct-use nuclear materials in the newly independent
states; (2) the status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help
strengthen controls in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and
(3) the executive branch's consolidation of U.S. efforts in the
Department of Energy (DOE). The scope of GAO's review included
direct-use nuclear material controlled by civilian authorities in the
newly independent states and direct-use material used for naval
nuclear propulsion purposes. GAO did not review the protection,
control, and accounting systems used for nuclear weapons in the
possession of the Ministry of Defense in Russia. U.S. officials
believe there to be relatively better controls over weapons in the
custody of the Ministry of Defense than over material outside of
weapons.\1 GAO recently issued a report that addressed the safety of
nuclear facilities in the newly independent states.\2
--------------------
\1 The Department of Defense (DOD) has an ongoing program with the
Russian Ministry of Defense to enhance the security of nuclear
weapons in Ministry of Defense custody during transportation and
storage.
\2 See Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other
Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union (GAO/RCED-96-4 Nov.
7, 1995).
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
"Direct-use nuclear material" consists of HEU and plutonium that is
relatively easy to handle because it has not been exposed to
radiation or has been separated from highly radioactive materials.\3
Direct-use material presents a high proliferation risk because it can
be used to manufacture a nuclear weapon without further enrichment or
irradiation in a reactor. Many types of nuclear facilities routinely
handle, process, or store such direct-use materials. Direct-use
material can be found at research reactors, reactor fuel fabrication
facilities, uranium enrichment plants, spent fuel reprocessing
facilities, and nuclear material storage sites, as well as nuclear
weapons production facilities. Material protection, control, and
accounting (MPC&A) systems are used at such facilities to deter,
detect, and respond to attempted thefts.
The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary
strategies to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material
controls over direct-use material in the newly independent states: a
government- to-government program, and an initiative known as the
lab-to-lab program.\4 Under the government-to-government program,
initially sponsored and funded by the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program,\5 the United States
agreed in 1993 to work directly with the governments of Russia,
Ukraine, and Kazakstan to develop national MPC&A systems and improve
controls over civilian nuclear material. The United States extended
such assistance to Belarus in 1995. Although CTR funds were used,
DOE was responsible for implementing the program. In April 1994, DOE
initiated the lab-to-lab program to work directly with Russian
nuclear facilities in improving their MPC&A systems. The program is
limited to Russia and intended to rapidly improve controls at
civilian research, naval nuclear propulsion, and civilian-controlled,
nuclear weapons-related facilities. This program is funded jointly
by DOE and the CTR program.\6
--------------------
\3 HEU is uranium enriched above 20 percent in the isotope uranium
235. An isotope is a variation of a chemical element.
\4 The government-to-government program is implemented through formal
agreements that establish, among other things, rights to audit and
examination by U.S. officials. The lab-to-lab program works
directly with Russian nuclear facilities and is not bound by the
formal agreements. To the maximum extent feasible, the
government-to-government programs are required to use U.S. goods and
services, while the lab-to-lab program can purchase goods and
services from other suppliers as needed.
\5 Congress established the CTR program in 1991 to help Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus safely store, transport, and destroy
weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation. See
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Helping the Former Soviet Union Reduce
the Threat: An Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995).
\6 DOE is also providing assistance to upgrade four facilities that
are not included in the lab-to-lab program. These facilities are
located in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Uzbekistan.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The Soviet Union produced approximately 1,200 metric tons of HEU and
200 metric tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of
nuclear weapons, is highly attractive to theft, and the newly
independent states may not have accurate and complete inventories of
the material they inherited. Social and economic changes in the
newly independent states have increased the threat of theft and
diversion of nuclear material, and with the breakdown of Soviet-era
MPC&A systems, the newly independent states may not be as able to
counter the increased threat. Nuclear facilities rely on antiquated
accounting systems that cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear
material losses. Many facilities lack modern equipment that can
detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material from
facilities. While as yet there is no direct evidence that a black
market for stolen or diverted nuclear material exists in the newly
independent states, the seizures of direct-use material in Russia and
Europe have increased concerns about theft and diversion.
U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states improve their
MPC&A systems for direct-use material had a slow start, but are now
gaining momentum. DOD's government-to-government CTR program
obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million from fiscal years
1991 to 1995 for MPC&A improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan,
and Belarus. The program has provided working group meetings, site
surveys, physical protection equipment, computers, and training for
projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Initially, the
program was slow because (1) until January 1995, the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had refused access to Russian direct-use
facilities and (2) CTR-sponsored projects at facilities with
direct-use materials in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus were just
getting underway. According to DOD officials, program requirements
for using U.S. goods and services and for audits and examinations
also delayed implementation. The program began to gain momentum in
January 1995 when CTR program and MINATOM officials agreed to upgrade
nuclear material controls at five high-priority facilities handling
direct-use material.\6 DOE and Russia's nuclear regulatory agency
have also agreed to cooperate on the development of a national MPC&A
regulatory infrastructure.
DOE's lab-to-lab program obligated $17 million and spent $14 million
in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This program has improved controls at
two "zero-power" research reactors, and begun providing nuclear
material monitors to several MINATOM defense facilities to help them
detect unauthorized attempts to remove direct-use material.\7 In
fiscal year 1996, the program is implementing additional projects in
MINATOM's nuclear defense complex.
In fiscal year 1996, the United States expanded the MPC&A assistance
program to include all known facilities with direct-use material
outside of weapons in the newly independent states. Management and
funding for the expanded program were consolidated within DOE. DOE
plans to request from Congress $400 million over 7 years for the
program. However, the expanded program faces several inherent
uncertainties involving its overall costs and U.S. ability to verify
that assistance is being used as intended. DOE is responding to
these uncertainties by developing a long-term plan and a centralized
cost reporting system and by implementing a flexible audit and
examination program.
--------------------
\6 Subsequent to the conclusion of GAO's review, DOE and MINATOM
agreed to add four additional sites to the government-to-government
program and two additional sites to the lab-to-lab program.
\7 A zero-power research reactor is a type of research reactor using
fuel that is not very radioactive.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE
PROBLEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Much of the 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 200
metric tons of plutonium produced by the Soviet Union is outside of
nuclear weapons; this stockpile of material is expected to grow
rapidly as Russia proceeds to dismantle its nuclear weapons.
According to DOE, this material is located at 80 to 100 civilian
research, naval nuclear propulsion, and civilian controlled nuclear
weapons-related facilities. It is considered to be highly attractive
to theft because it is (1) not very radioactive and is therefore
relatively safe to handle and (2) in forms that make it readily
accessible to theft, such as items stored in containers that can
easily be carried by one or two persons, or in components from
dismantled weapons.
Nuclear materials in the newly independent states are more vulnerable
to theft and diversion than in the past. Soviet-era control systems
relied heavily on (1) keeping nuclear material in secret cities and
facilities, (2) closely monitoring nuclear industry personnel, and
(3) severely punishing control violations. Closed borders and the
absence of a black market for nuclear material also lessened the
threat of diversion. Without the secrecy and heavy security of the
Soviet system, facilities in the newly independent states must now
rely to a greater degree on other control systems such as manual,
paper-based tracking systems--which cannot quickly locate and assess
material losses--and on labor-intensive physical protection systems
that lack monitors for detecting attempts to steal nuclear material
from a facility. In addition, the newly independent states may not
have complete and accurate inventories of their nuclear materials
because the Soviet Union did not conduct complete and comprehensive
physical inventories at their nuclear facilities. Some of the
facilities GAO visited in March 1995 did not have a comprehensive
inventory of their nuclear materials on hand.
INITIAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES HAD A
SLOW START
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Until January 1995, MINATOM refused to grant CTR technical experts
access to direct-use facilities, limiting the program's efforts to a
low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication line. This obstacle was
removed in January 1995 when MINATOM agreed to allow access to five
facilities with direct-use material. In July 1995, the CTR-sponsored
program made progress in controlling direct-use material by
installing physical protection equipment and providing training at a
MINATOM facility that includes an HEU fuel fabrication line. The
Kazakstani, Ukrainian, and Belarussian governments have been more
willing to allow the United States to help upgrade MPC&A systems at
their direct-use material facilities. However, CTR-sponsored
projects in these countries are just beginning, and improvements to
controls over their direct-use materials will not be completed until
the middle of 1996 at the earliest.
Working directly with institutes and operating facilities, DOE's
lab-to-lab program has completed the first phase of an MPC&A project
at a MINATOM zero-power research reactor that will eventually
computerize its inventory system for thousands of kilograms of
direct-use material and upgrade its MPC&A systems. DOE's program has
also upgraded controls at a zero-power research reactor in Moscow
containing about 80 kilograms of direct-use material by (1)
increasing physical protection for the reactor building, (2)
implementing a computerized material accounting system, and (3)
installing access control equipment. The lab-to-lab program has also
deployed nuclear material monitors at three MINATOM nuclear weapons
facilities and two civilian research facilities. Additional monitors
were being shipped as GAO concluded its review.
UNITED STATES EXPANDS MPC&A
ASSISTANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
The executive branch has decided to consolidate MPC&A assistance in
DOE. In September 1995, the President directed DOE to develop a
long-range plan to improve MPC&A systems at all facilities in the
newly independent states handling direct-use material by the year
2002. The President also transferred funding and management
responsibilities for the CTR MPC&A program from DOD to DOE in fiscal
year 1996. However, DOE faces several inherent uncertainties in
managing an expanded assistance program over the next 7 years. For
example, while DOE estimates that the program will require $400
million to upgrade 80 facilities with direct-use material, it faces
uncertainties in both the number of facilities to be covered (which
could range to more than 100) and the cost per facility (ranging from
$5 million to $10 million per facility). Because of these
uncertainties, program costs could range from $400 million to over $1
billion. In addition, DOE's ability to directly assess program
progress and confirm that U.S. assistance is used for its intended
purposes may be limited because the Russians may limit the measures
that can be used for these purposes at highly sensitive facilities.
DOE IS RESPONDING TO PROGRAM
UNCERTAINTIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
DOE is taking steps to ensure that the program is successful and that
U.S. funds are well spent.
DOE is developing a long-term plan for the expanded program that
consolidates the program plans for the government-to-government
and lab-to-lab programs. According to DOE, the plan establishes
objectives, priorities, and timetables for implementing projects
at the 80 to
100 facilities in the newly independent states. DOE has drafted
the plan; however, the plan had not been issued at the time GAO
concluded its review in January 1996.
DOE is developing a consolidated centralized program cost-reporting
system intended to provide DOE with current financial status for
government-to-government and lab-to-lab projects. The
information should be useful in responding to changing budgetary
requirements for the program.
DOE is implementing a flexible audit and program evaluation
approach to provide some assurances that assistance is used only
for its intended purposes. Under the approach, the United
States will pay Russian laboratories for services and equipment
upon completion of clearly defined delivered products and will
use a series of direct and indirect measures to evaluate program
progress and effectiveness. DOE expects to issue a report on
assurances obtained by the lab-to-lab program in March 1996.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In commenting on this report, the Departments of Energy and State
generally agreed with GAO's assessment of the U.S. effort to improve
nuclear material controls in the newly independent states. The
Department of State offered additional editorial comments that have
been incorporated into the report where appropriate. DOD officials
also agreed with the facts as presented in this report, but expressed
concern about how the report portrays the relative success of the
government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs. These officials
stated that the programs are complementary approaches to achieving
the goal of improving controls and accountability over direct-use
nuclear material in the newly independent states. GAO agrees and has
modified the report accordingly.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Direct-use nuclear material is essential for building nuclear
weapons. The diversion or theft of such material can enable
terrorists or countries to build nuclear weapons without investing in
expensive nuclear technologies and facilities. One way of deterring
and detecting theft is by instituting nuclear material control
systems on a national level and at facilities handling direct-use
material.
WHAT IS DIRECT-USE MATERIAL?
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
"Direct-use nuclear material" consists of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) and plutonium that is relatively easy to handle because it has
not been exposed to radiation or has been separated from highly
radioactive materials.\1 Direct-use material presents a high
proliferation risk because it can be used to manufacture a nuclear
weapon without further enrichment or irradiation in a reactor.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, approximately 25
kilograms of HEU or 8 kilograms of plutonium is needed to manufacture
a nuclear explosive, although the Department of Energy (DOE) suggests
the amounts needed to build a weapon may be smaller.
Many types of nuclear facilities routinely handle, process, or store
direct-use material. Besides nuclear weapon production facilities,
direct-use material can also be found at research reactors, reactor
fuel fabrication facilities, uranium enrichment plants, spent fuel
reprocessing facilities, and nuclear material storage sites. Most
civilian nuclear power facilities are of less concern because they
use low-enriched or natural uranium as fuel, which would require
additional enrichment before the fuel would be suitable for nuclear
weapons. While these reactors produce plutonium in spent reactor
fuel, such fuel is dangerous to handle because it is highly
radioactive. Spent reactor fuel also requires reprocessing before it
is suitable for nuclear weapons.
--------------------
\1 HEU is uranium enriched above 20 percent in the isotope uranium
235. An isotope is a variation of a chemical element.
HOW IS NUCLEAR MATERIAL
CONTROLLED?
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
Nuclear materials are controlled to prevent and detect their theft.
Nuclear material can be stolen or diverted by (1) outside individuals
or groups, such as terrorists attempting to break in and steal
nuclear material; (2) inside individuals or groups, such as one or
more employees that have access to nuclear material; and (3)
combinations of insiders and outsiders.
A nuclear material control system consists of three overlapping
components--material protection, material control, and material
accounting. Together they compose a set of procedures, personnel,
and equipment that address both insider and outsider threats.
Material protection systems are designed to limit access to nuclear
material by outside individuals and prevent the unauthorized removal
of material from a facility by inside individuals. Nuclear
facilities protect their material by (1) installing fences with
sensors and television cameras to delay, detect, and assess
unauthorized intrusions; (2) posting armed guards at entry and exit
points; (3) establishing a protective response force that can react
to unauthorized intrusions; and (4) installing nuclear material
monitors to detect attempts to remove material from a facility.
Nuclear facilities also assess the reliability of personnel with
access to nuclear material by conducting background checks and
continuously monitoring their behavior.
Material control systems contain, monitor, and establish custody over
nuclear material. Nuclear facilities control material by (1) storing
material in containers and vaults equipped with seals that can
indicate when tampering may have occurred, (2) controlling access to
and exit from nuclear material areas using badge and personnel
identification equipment, and (3) establishing procedures to closely
monitor nuclear materials.\2 Nuclear facilities also designate
custodians to be responsible for nuclear material in their
possession.
Material accounting systems maintain information on the quantity of
nuclear materials within specified areas and on transfers in and out
of those areas. They employ periodic inventories to count and
measure nuclear material by element and isotopic content. Nuclear
facilities use the inventory and transfer data to establish nuclear
material balances, which track materials on hand and the flow of
material within a specified area. The material balances are closed
periodically by reconciling physical inventory with recorded
inventories, correcting errors, calculating inventory differences and
evaluating their statistical differences, and performing trend
analysis to detect protracted theft of nuclear material. Nuclear
facilities in the United States are capable of updating material
accounting data within 24-hour periods. Some U.S. facilities with
more modern nuclear accounting systems are capable of updating
material accounting data within 4 hours.
In addition to facility systems, the United States and most other
countries have established national material protection, control, and
accounting (MPC&A) systems. These systems include regulations
governing procedures for nuclear material protection control and
accounting, inspection requirements to ensure that the systems are
implemented properly, and tracking systems to provide information on
the location and disposition of nuclear material nationally. In the
United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE have
promulgated regulations on controlling nuclear material.
--------------------
\2 One such procedure is to require two or more authorized persons to
be present when nuclear material is accessed. Another procedure is
to use closely monitored television cameras to maintain surveillance
over nuclear material.
HOW IS THE UNITED STATES
ASSISTING THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT
STATES TO IMPROVE THEIR NUCLEAR
MATERIAL CONTROLS?
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary
strategies to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material
controls over direct-use material in the newly independent states
(NIS).\3 Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program,the
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) entered into agreements with the
governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakstan in 1993 to rapidly
improve nuclear material controls over civilian nuclear material and
develop national MPC&A systems in these countries. On June 23, 1995,
DOD entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Defense in Belarus
to improve controls over its civilian nuclear material. DOE
implements the programs under these agreements.\4
As a complementing strategy, DOE initiated a program in April 1994 of
MPC&A cooperation with Russia's nuclear institutes, operating
facilities, and enterprises. This initiative, known as the
lab-to-lab program, brings U.S. and Russian laboratory personnel
directly together to work cooperatively on implementing MPC&A
upgrades at Russian nuclear facilities. The purpose of the
lab-to-lab program is to rapidly improve MPC&A at civilian, naval
nuclear, and nuclear weapons-related facilities handling direct-use
material in Russia. The program is jointly funded by DOE and the CTR
program.
--------------------
\3 Other related U.S. efforts include the International Science and
Technology Center's Project 40, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program sponsored Russian storage facility and Project Sapphire.
Project 40 will develop an upgraded approach for safeguarding complex
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The storage facility will
incorporate MPC&A elements into its design. Under Project Sapphire,
the United States transferred approximately 600 kilograms of weapons
grade HEU from Kazakstan to the United States.
\4 The CTR program was established by Congress in 1991 to help the
newly independent states safely secure, transport, store, and destroy
weapons and weapons material and prevent weapons proliferation. The
program is conducted with the four states that inherited nuclear
weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved: Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia,
and Ukraine. See Weapons of Mass Destruction: Helping the Former
Soviet Union Reduce the Threat: An Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9,
1995).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
Our objectives were to (1) review the nature and extent of problems
with controlling nuclear materials in the NIS; (2) determine the
status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen
controls over direct-use nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (3) assess plans for consolidating these
efforts in DOE. While seven NIS inherited direct-use nuclear
material, we focused on the four countries that have been the primary
recipients of U.S. assistance--Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and
Belarus.
The scope of our review included direct-use nuclear material
controlled by civilian authorities in the NIS and direct-use material
used for naval nuclear propulsion purposes. We did not review the
protection, control, and accounting systems used for nuclear weapons
in the possession of the Ministry of Defense in Russia. U.S.
officials believe there to be relatively better controls over weapons
in the custody of the Ministry of Defense than over material outside
of weapons.\5 We also did not include in our review the upgrades at
four sites funded by DOE that were not part of the lab-to-lab
program. We recently issued a report that addressed the safety of
facilities in the NIS.\6
To meet our objectives, we reviewed U.S. assessments of the nature
and extent of nuclear material control problems in the NIS; pertinent
program documents, including agreements between DOD and the Russian
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the Ukrainian State Committee on
Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Defense of Kazakstan,
the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, and between DOE and Gosatomnadzor
(GAN); program plans; trip reports; quarterly progress reviews and
State Department cables; and program budget, obligation, and
expenditure data for the CTR-sponsored government-to-government
program and for DOE's lab-to-lab program. We also discussed with DOE
plans to consolidate U.S. MPC&A assistance in DOE.
We interviewed officials from DOD, DOE, the Department of State, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Laboratories (including
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore), the Pacific Northwest
Laboratory, the National Security Council, and the National Academy
of Sciences. We also interviewed nonproliferation specialists from
the Monterey Institute of International Studies. In Russia, we
interviewed officials from MINATOM, Gosatomnadzor (the Russian
nuclear regulatory agency), the Kurchatov Institute, the Institute of
Physics and Power Engineering, the Elektrostal Machine Building
Plant, the MINATOM nuclear weapons laboratories Arzamas-16 and
Chelyabinsk-70, and the Kazakstan Atomic Energy Agency.
In addition, we toured facilities at the Kurchatov Institute and the
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, located in the Russian
Federation, to obtain information on current MPC&A systems
implemented at these facilities. We visited sites in Russia that
have been the recipients of U.S. assistance efforts, including the
Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, the Kurchatov Institute, and the
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. We also witnessed the
demonstration of a model MPC&A system at Arzamas-16.
Our review was conducted between November 1994 and January 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\5 As part of the CTR program, DOD has an ongoing program with the
Russian Ministry of Defense to enhance the security of nuclear
weapons in Ministry of Defense custody during transportation and
storage.
\6 See Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other
Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union (GAO/RCED-96-4 Nov.
7, 1995).
NATURE AND EXTENT OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL CONTROL PROBLEMS IN THE
NIS
============================================================ Chapter 2
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and six other NIS
inherited hundreds of tons of direct-use nuclear material. Much of
this material is thought to be located at 80 to 100 civilian, naval
nuclear, and nuclear weapons-related facilities, mostly in Russia.
However, U.S. and NIS officials do not know the exact amounts and
locations of this material. Much of it is highly attractive to theft
because it is relatively safe to handle and is not in weapons. U.S.
officials are concerned that social and economic changes in the NIS
have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material,
and with the breakdown of Soviet-era MPC&A systems, the NIS may not
be as able to counter the increased threat. While as yet there is no
direct evidence that a nuclear black market for stolen or diverted
nuclear material exists in the NIS, the seizures of gram and kilogram
quantities of direct-use material have increased these concerns.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE
PROBLEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The Soviet Union produced up to 1,200 metric tons of HEU and 200
metric tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of
nuclear weapons, and the stockpile of material outside of weapons is
expected to grow rapidly as Russia proceeds to dismantle its weapons.
The material is considered to be highly attractive to theft because
it is (1) not very radioactive and therefore relatively safe to
handle and (2) in forms that make it readily accessible to theft, for
example, in containers that can easily be carried by one or two
persons or as components from dismantled weapons. This material can
be directly used to make a nuclear weapon without further enrichment
or reprocessing.
Most of the material is located in Russia. Los Alamos National
Laboratory has identified five sectors in the Russian nuclear complex
that handle direct-use material.
Nuclear materials in weapons. (This material is largely in the
custody of the Ministry of Defense.\1 )
The MINATOM defense complex, which contains large amounts of
nuclear material removed from dismantled nuclear weapons and
stockpiles of HEU and plutonium produced for the nuclear weapons
program.
The MINATOM civilian sector, which includes a number of reactor
development institutes such as the Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering at Obninsk, as well as organizations, such as
the Elektrostal Machine Building Factory, that produce nuclear
fuels and materials for civilian applications. (Some of these
institutes and enterprises do both civilian and defense work.)
Civilian research institutes outside of MINATOM, which include the
Kurchatov Institute and facilities run by the Academy of
Sciences, the Ministry of Science, and the Commission on Defense
Industry. (Most of these institutes possess only small
quantities of materials, although some, such as the Kurchatov
Institute, possesses several tons of direct-use material.)
The naval propulsion sector, which includes the Navy and the
Ministry of Shipbuilding. (This sector comprises stockpiles of
HEU used in submarines and icebreakers.)
Other NIS with facilities that handle direct-use material include
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Generally, the nuclear facilities in these countries are operated by
their respective atomic energy ministries or academies of science and
involve nuclear research centers, research reactors, and, in the case
of Kazakstan, a plutonium breeder reactor.
--------------------
\1 A U.S.-Russian government-to-government agreement concerning
technical exchanges on warhead safety and security was signed in
December 1994. Also, in 1995 a CTR-sponsored DOD and Ministry of
Defense Nuclear Weapons Security Group was formed to coordinate
assistance and cooperation to enhance the security of nuclear weapons
in the custody of the Ministry of Defense during transportation and
storage and to facilitate discussion and information sharing on this
and related issues under the Cooperative Nuclear Weapons Security
Program. Nuclear material in the custody of the Ministry of Defense
was outside the scope of our review.
SOVIET-ERA NUCLEAR MATERIAL
CONTROLS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The Soviet Union controlled nuclear materials since the beginning of
its nuclear program in the 1940s. The Soviet approach to controlling
nuclear materials placed a heavy emphasis on internal security, which
corresponded to the political and economic conditions within the
Soviet Union. It placed less emphasis on accounting procedures,
which were used to monitor production, rather than to detect
diversion or ensure the absence of diversion.
The Soviet Union located its nuclear weapons complex in closed secret
cities. The cities were separated from other urban areas,
self-contained, and protected by fences and guard forces. Personnel
working in the Soviet nuclear complex were under heavy surveillance
by the KGB. Personnel went through an intensive screening process,
and their activities were closely monitored. In general, facilities
would control access to nuclear material using a three-person rule,
requiring two facility staff members and at least one person from the
security services to be present when material was handled. The
Soviet-era control system enforced severe penalties for violations of
control procedures.
According to U.S. national laboratory officials, the Soviet system
accounted for nuclear material, although it was not complete, timely,
or accurate. Facilities paid close attention to end-products to meet
production quotas and paid less attention to the use of completely
measured material balances to track net gains and losses of materials
as they were processed or handled. The Soviet system relied on
manual, paper-based systems that made tracking material
time-consuming. They also used standard estimates of rates of loss
for materials that could be held up in processing equipment, such as
pipes, rather then measuring actual losses. According to DOE, in
these respects, the Soviet system of accounting was similar to that
used in the early days of the U.S. nuclear program.
According to Russian officials, traditional Soviet approaches to
nuclear material controls were generally effective because (1) the
Soviet Union was a closed society (separated by a robust iron
curtain) with strict controls over foreign travel by its citizens,
(2) internal security within the Soviet Union was quite rigid and
strict discipline was carried out when controls were violated, and
(3) there was no black market in nuclear materials within the
country.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES
MAY INCREASE THE THREAT OF
THEFT AND DIVERSION OF
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
Social and economic changes in the NIS have increased the threat of
theft and diversion of nuclear material, and Soviet-era MPC&A systems
may not be able to adequately counter the increased threat. The
major nuclear facilities in the MINATOM weapons complex are no longer
secret, and access to these facilities, along with the other nuclear
facilities in the NIS, has increased. According to a U.S.
government assessment, (1) the difficult economic situation has led
to a loss of prestige for nuclear workers, (2) inflation and late
payment of wages have eroded the value of salaries, and (3) pervasive
corruption in society and the increasing potency of a strong criminal
element have weakened the insider protection program based on
personnel surveillance.
With these changes, Russian and U.S. officials have become
increasingly concerned about growing insider and outsider threats of
nuclear theft. According to an official from one of MINATOM's major
facilities in its nuclear weapons complex, the insider threat at the
facility has increased due to the frustrations of the institute's
workers who had not been paid in months. According to this official,
this causes changes in their attitudes toward their work and places
pressures on their families. The outsider threat has also increased
at this facility because the closed city is now open to
businesspeople and outside workers who visit for short periods of
time. According to this official, the institutes do not have
background information on the visitors. Consequently, they have a
lower level of trust in the visitors than in the employees who have
been working at the facility. According to this official, while no
nuclear material has been stolen from this facility, other precious
metals such as platinum and gold have been.
CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL CONTROLS AT NIS
FACILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
With the erosion of traditional nuclear controls, current nuclear
control systems in the NIS have weaknesses that could result in the
theft of direct-use materials. The NIS may not have complete and
accurate inventories of their nuclear materials, and some material
may have been withheld from facility accounting systems. Nuclear
facilities rely on antiquated accounting systems and practices that
cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses. Many NIS
facilities also lack certain types of modern equipment that can
detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material from
facilities.
THE NIS MAY NOT HAVE
ACCURATE AND COMPLETE
INVENTORIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
The NIS may not have accurate and complete inventories of the
direct-use material they inherited from the former Soviet Union.
According to a GAN official, the nuclear safeguard system inherited
from the former Soviet Union was not a comprehensive system. The
Soviet Union did not have a national material control and accounting
system and according to a Russian laboratory official, the Soviet
Union did not conduct comprehensive physical inventories of nuclear
material at its nuclear facilities. Some of the facilities we
visited, such as the Kurchatov Institute, were in the process of
conducting such a comprehensive inventory, but it was not completed
at the time of our visit. At the Institute of Physics and Power
Engineering, officials were conducting an inventory of 70,000 to
80,000 small disk-shaped fuel elements containing direct-use uranium
and plutonium at one reactor. When we visited the facility, they did
not have an exact count of the elements. Figure 2.1 shows examples
of the small disk-shaped fuel elements we observed at this facility
that could be attractive to theft.
Figure 2.1: Examples of Small,
Disk-Shaped Fuel Elements to Be
Inventoried
U.S. and Russian officials are also concerned that some direct-use
nuclear material has not yet been discovered at NIS nuclear
facilities. According to U.S. national laboratory officials, some
nuclear material may have been withheld from facility accounting
systems so that plant managers could make up shortfalls in meeting
their production quotas. According to another national laboratory
official, organizations do not always share information with one
another on the location and availability of specific nuclear
products. Russian officials are concerned that they have no real
information on the amounts or presence of some nuclear material and
that this material has yet to be discovered. According to a DOD
official, HEU for a Soviet navy reactor program that was terminated
years earlier was discovered by Kazakstani officials after the Soviet
Union dissolved. This HEU, enough for over two dozen nuclear
weapons, was transferred from Kazakstan to the United States under
Project Sapphire.
U.S. officials are uncertain as to whether they have identified all
facilities within the NIS where direct-use material is located. The
United States has identified 80 to 100 facilities that handle
direct-use material in the NIS. However, according to a DOE
official, there may be as many as
35 additional facilities where such material is handled.
MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS WOULD HAVE
DIFFICULTY QUICKLY DETECTING
DIVERSION OR THEFT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
Many nuclear facilities in the NIS rely on manual, paper-based
material accounting systems that cannot quickly locate and assess
material losses, rather than computer-based systems. Nuclear
facility operators have to manually check hundreds of paper records
to determine if material is missing. In contrast, U.S. nuclear
facilities use computers extensively to maintain current information
on the presence and quantity of all material. U.S. facilities are
capable of updating nuclear material accounting information within 24
hours, and some can update material accounting information within 4
hours.
Russian accounting systems do not provide systematic coverage of
materials through all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle.\2 According
to U.S. national laboratory officials, these systems do not
adequately measure or inventory material held up in processing
equipment and pipes or material disposed of as waste.
In addition, NIS facilities do not make full use of measured nuclear
material balances, which makes it difficult to detect thefts
occurring over a long period of time. According to a Los Alamos
National Laboratory official, these facilities typically weigh
material at certain points in production and generally measure
radiation emitted from the material. These procedures, while useful
in identifying the types of material present, are less rigorous than
required in the United States because they do not measure the
quantity of material. Diversions of small amounts of nuclear
material could go undetected over time without more accurate
measurements. Figure 2.2 shows a Russian radiation measuring
instrument we observed being used at a facility to identify the types
of material present in reactor fuel elements.
Figure 2.2: A Russian
Radiation Measuring Instrument
Used to Identify the Uranium
and Plutonium Content of Fuel
Elements
Nuclear facilities in the NIS also use material control equipment
that could be made more resistant to tampering by insiders. For
example, nuclear material containers and vaults are sealed with a
wire and wax seal system that could be removed and replaced without
detection. In contrast, in the United States, material is sealed
using numbered copper seals that are controlled and crimped, making
them much more resistant to tampering.
--------------------
\2 The nuclear fuel cycle refers to a sequence of operations
involving supplying nuclear fuel for reactors, irradiating fuel in
reactors, and handling or storing nuclear fuel.
MATERIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
LACK MODERN EQUIPMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3
Material protection systems at NIS nuclear facilities have weaknesses
that could result in the inability to detect insiders or outsiders
trying to steal nuclear material. In the United States, sites
handling direct-use material are protected by two fences; various
sensors designed to delay and detect intruders as they approach a
facility; and television cameras, which allow facility personnel to
assess the nature of the threat. The nuclear facilities we visited
in Russia for the most part did not have such equipment. For
example, during our visit to the Kurchatov Institute, we noticed that
a concrete fence protecting the main facility was crumbling. The
fence appeared to lack television monitors or other sensors. A fence
used to protect another site at the institute with large quantities
of direct-use material did not appear to have any sensors or
television cameras to detect intrusion and had vegetation that could
obscure intruders or those leaving the facility.
We toured another site at the Kurchatov Institute where several
hundred kilograms of direct-use material were present. Although the
site was within the walled portion of the institute, there was no
fencing or other intrusion delay and assessment system around the
site. Although we were accompanied by an institute official who had
cleared our visit with security personnel, we were able to gain
access without showing identification. One unarmed security guard
was posted within the building. In contrast, during a visit to a
Sandia National Laboratory facility in New Mexico, we were required
to show identification and display security badges while we visited a
facility with large amounts of direct-use material. This facility
had numerous armed guards inside and outside the site.
REPORTS OF DIVERSION OF
DIRECT-USE MATERIAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
According to U.S. officials, there is no direct evidence that a
nuclear black market linking buyers, sellers, and end-users exists
for stolen or diverted nuclear material in the NIS. However, the
seizure of gram and kilogram quantities of direct-use material in
Russia, Germany, and the Czech Republic have increased concerns about
the effectiveness of MPC&A systems in the NIS.
The first case involving the theft or diversion of direct-use
material appeared in Russia in 1992. According to U.S. officials,
the more significant cases included the following:
From May to September 1992, 1.5 kilograms of weapons grade HEU were
diverted from the Luch Scientific Production Association in
Russia by a Luch employee. According to a nonproliferation
analyst, the material was diverted in small quantities about 20
to 25 times during the period. The employee was apprehended en
route to Moscow.
In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg trying to
sell
3.05 kilograms of weapons-usable HEU. According to U.S.
officials, Russian media articles claim that the material was
smuggled out of a MINATOM facility located near Moscow in an
oversized glove.
On May 10, 1994, 5.6 grams of nearly pure plutonium-239 were seized
by German officials.
On August 10, 1994, 560 grams of a mixed-oxide uranium plutonium
mixture were seized at Munich Airport from a flight originating
from Moscow.
On December 14, 1994, 2.72 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium were
seized by police in Prague.
U.S. officials stated that they have not uncovered any direct links
between buyers of direct-use materials and end-users that would use
the material for weapons purposes. However, the cases are troubling
for several reasons.
The cases are the first to involve gram and kilogram quantities of
direct-use material.
They show that individuals are willing to take high risks to
traffic in smuggled direct-use material.
While scientific analysis cannot pinpoint which facilities the
material seized in Europe originated from, the criminal
investigations suggest that the material may have come from the
NIS.
The detection of nuclear smuggling so far has been by chance,
rather than by reliance on physical protection control and
accounting systems, or customs checks at the borders of the NIS.
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO
THE NIS
============================================================ Chapter 3
The United States is pursuing two different, but complementary
strategies to achieve its goals of rapidly improving nuclear material
controls over direct-use material in the NIS. The CTR-sponsored
government-to- government program, which works directly with the NIS,
is only now beginning to improve controls over direct-use material
because (1) until January 1995, Russia's MINATOM was reluctant to
cooperate with the U.S. program because of security concerns and (2)
work at non-Russian facilities with direct-use material is in the
early stages of implementation. The DOE lab-to-lab program, which
works directly with Russian nuclear facilities, has improved controls
over direct-use material at five facilities during its first full
year of implementation.\1
Despite the slow start, the prospects for U.S. efforts to enhance
MPC&A in the NIS are improving. Russia and the United States agreed
in June 1995 to add five high-priority sites that have large amounts
of direct-use material to the CTR-sponsored government-to-government
program. In Kazakstan and Ukraine, the CTR-sponsored MPC&A program
is progressing steadily with improvements at several sites with
direct-use nuclear material. DOE also signed an agreement with GAN,
the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, in June 1995 to cooperate on
the establishment of a national nuclear materials control and
accounting system in Russia. DOE's lab-to-lab program is also
expanding to cover MINATOM nuclear weapons facilities.
--------------------
\1 The five facilities where controls over direct-use material have
been improved are the Kurchatov Institute, the Institute of Physics
and Power Engineering, Chelyabinsk-70, Arzamas -16, and Tomsk-7. All
are located in Russia.
U.S. MPC&A ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
IN THE NIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Both DOD's CTR-sponsored government-to-government program and DOE's
lab-to-lab program were designed to demonstrate MPC&A technology at
model facilities and facilitate the transfer of MPC&A improvements to
other nuclear facilities in the NIS. The CTR-sponsored program works
with the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus to
upgrade civilian MPC&A at selected facilities and develop
regulations, enforcement procedures, and national material tracking
systems. DOE's lab-to-lab program works directly with Russian
nuclear facilities to upgrade their MPC&A controls.
The two programs differ in their strategies to improve MPC&A in the
NIS. The CTR- sponsored program is implemented by DOE through direct
government-to-government agreements between DOD and the respective
Ministries responsible for atomic energy in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus. The agreements and their amendments specify
the total amount of funds available to the programs in each country,
identify the types of facilities that will participate, establish the
roles and responsibilities of the participating organizations, and
establish rights to audit and examination by U.S. officials. To the
maximum extent feasible, the CTR-sponsored MPC&A programs use U.S.
goods and services.
DOE's lab-to-lab program, in contrast, is implemented directly with
Russian nuclear facilities. DOE's national laboratories
participating in the program sign contracts directly with their
Russian laboratory counterparts, and DOE's national laboratories can
purchase goods and services from U.S., Russian, or other suppliers as
needed. The program includes complete MPC&A upgrades at specific
facilities, or the rapid deployment of a particular MPC&A element,
such as portal monitors, as needed.
CTR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
PROGRAM STATUS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
The CTR-sponsored government-to-government program is funding
projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus for improving
civilian nuclear material controls at selected model facilities and
developing regulations, enforcement procedures, and national material
tracking systems. Figure 3.1 shows the location of current
CTR-sponsored government-to- government projects.
Figure 3.1: Current CTR
Government-to-Government
Projects in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus
In Russia, CTR funds have supported MPC&A upgrades for a low-enriched
uranium fuel fabrication facility and a training center. In Ukraine
and Kazakstan, the program has funded site surveys at facilities that
use direct-use material and lower priority material and assisted
national authorities in establishing MPC&A regulations and reporting
systems. In Belarus, the program has funded a site survey at a
facility using direct-use material and is assisting the Belarussian
government in establishing MPC&A regulations and a reporting system.
Since the beginning of the CTR-sponsored program in 1991, DOD has
budgeted $63.5 million for government-to-government MPC&A assistance,
obligated $59.2 million, and spent $3.8 million. The government-to-
government program has provided working group meetings, site surveys,
physical protection equipment, computers, and training for projects
in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. As of January 1996, none
of the projects have been completed. Table 3.1 shows the
distribution of CTR government-to-government program funds among
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.
Table 3.1
U.S. Assistance for CTR-Sponsored
Government-to-Government Programs
(fiscal years 1991-95)
(Dollars in millions)
Country Budget Obligations Expenditures\a
-------------------------- ------------ ------------ --------------
Russia\b $30.0 $27.5 $2.0
Ukraine 22.5 21.5 0.7
Kazakstan 8.0 7.6 1.1
Belarus 3.0 2.6 0
======================================================================
Total $63.5 $59.2 $3.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Our prior work found that DOD's expenditure data can significantly
understate the value of work performed to date. Although we were
unable to obtain data on the value of work performed for the
government-to-government program, our prior report found that the
value of work performed for CTR projects was almost double the
expenditures reported by the program. See Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union: An
Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995) p.10.
\b The $30 million budgeted and $27.5 million obligated for Russia
does not include $15 million in fiscal year 1995 CTR funds for MPC&A
upgrades implemented under DOE's lab-to-lab program.
By July 1995, the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program had
started to improve physical protection at a facility with direct-use
material. The slow pace of the government-to-government program in
Russia can be attributed to two major obstacles. The first obstacle
involved difficulties in negotiating agreements with MINATOM to
obtain access to sites handling direct-use material. The United
States proposed to MINATOM in March 1994 that demonstration projects
be initiated at two HEU fuel fabrication facilities. The U.S.
position was that including these facilities would support
nonproliferation objectives. MINATOM rejected the U.S. proposal
saying that the inclusion of direct-use material was a sensitive and
delicate issue and that experience in cooperating on low enriched
uranium facilities would be needed before expanding to direct-use
materials. As a result, the United States agreed to fund only one
project in Russia, the low enriched uranium facility at Elektrostal.
Recently, physical protection equipment was installed in the building
housing the low enriched uranium fuel line. The same building also
houses an HEU fuel fabrication line, which will be protected by this
equipment. In the summer of 1994, the United States proposed a
quick-fix approach to upgrade MPC&A at Russian facilities with
direct-use material. Under this approach, the United States would
provide expedited assistance to upgrade nuclear material security at
key Russian nuclear facilities. Russian officials were not
supportive of the approach citing concerns about providing the United
States access to sensitive nuclear facilities.
The second obstacle was MINATOM's resistance in recognizing the role
of GAN as a nuclear regulatory entity and GAN's own lack of statutory
authority for oversight and enforcement of nuclear regulations.
According to State Department officials, GAN was often at odds with
MINATOM about the ongoing transition of regulatory authority to GAN.
Also, GAN was unable to assert its regulatory role because it lacked
legislative authority to regulate facilities with nuclear materials.
In addition, despite a decree issued in September 1994 by the Russian
President, that named GAN as the lead agency in overseeing the
security of nuclear materials in Russia and ordered MINATOM to work
with GAN on this issue, there are still disputes over authority
between ministries that have not been resolved.
In Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, the CTR-sponsored government-to-
government program is working to improve MPC&A systems at nuclear
facilities, develop national MPC&A systems, and help them prepare for
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards pursuant to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. However, CTR-sponsored projects are just
beginning, and improvements to controls at the first facility
handling direct-use materials will not be completed until mid-1996 at
the earliest.
In Ukraine, the program has completed a site survey for the Kiev
Institute of Nuclear Research, which uses direct-use material for
fuel in a research reactor and has started delivering access control
equipment. The program is also in the process of conducting a site
survey at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, which also
contains direct-use material. The program is also implementing an
MPC&A project at the South Ukraine Power Plant, which is a lower
priority site because it uses low enriched uranium for fuel. Work at
the Kiev Institute is expected to be completed by mid-1996, and work
at the other sites is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal
year 1997. The program has also established a computer network for
the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to facilitate
the creation of Ukraine's national nuclear database.
In Kazakstan, the focus of CTR-funded work has been on the Ulba Fuel
Fabrication Plant, a low-priority site that produces low enriched
uranium fuel elements for power reactors. The program also conducted
site surveys for research reactor sites at Semipalatinsk and Almaty
and for a breeder reactor at Aktau. DOE expects the program in
Kazakstan to be completed by the end of 1997.
In Belarus, the program is upgrading MPC&A systems for direct-use
material at the Sosny Research Center in cooperation with Sweden and
Japan, helping Belarus develop national regulations, and preparing
the government for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
The program has completed a site survey and delivered access control
equipment and interior sensors to Sosny. DOE expects the program in
Belarus to be completed by the end of 1996.
LAB-TO-LAB PROGRAM STATUS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
The lab-to-lab program is funding projects in Russia to improve MPC&A
at sites within nuclear facilities, demonstrate MPC&A technologies,
and deploy MPC&A equipment on an as-needed basis. Figure 3.2 shows
the location of current lab-to-lab projects.
Figure 3.2: Current Lab-to-Lab
Projects
The lab-to-lab program has completed pilot projects at the Kurchatov
Institute in Moscow and the Institute of Physics and Power
Engineering and has demonstrated a model material control and
accounting system at Arzamas-16, a MINATOM nuclear weapons facility.
In addition, the program has deployed nuclear portal monitors around
a nuclear site at Chelyabinsk-70, a second MINATOM nuclear weapons
facility, the Kurchatov Institute, the Institute of Automatics, the
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, and Arzamas-16. Table
3.2 shows obligations and expenditures for the lab-to-lab program.
Table 3.2
U.S. Assistance for Lab-to-Lab Programs
(fiscal years 1994-95)
(Dollars in millions)
Fiscal year Budget Obligations Expenditures
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
1994 $2.1 $2.1 $1.6
1995 15.0 15.0 12.7\a
======================================================================
Total $17.1 $17.1 $14.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a According to a national laboratory official, in fiscal year 1995,
DOE advanced and spent $8.2 million of its own funds for the
lab-to-lab program, while waiting for a transfer of $15 million from
the CTR program. Of the $15 million transferred from DOD to DOE, DOE
spent $4.5 million on the lab-to-lab program in fiscal year 1995 and
carried over $10.5 million into fiscal year 1996.
The pilot project at the Kurchatov Institute improved MPC&A for a
reactor site containing about 80 kilograms of direct-use material.
The improvements included a new fence, sensors, a television
surveillance system to detect intruders, a nuclear material portal
monitor, a metal detector at the facility entrance, improved
lighting, alarm communication and display systems, an intrusion
detection and access control system in areas where nuclear material
is stored, and a computerized material accounting system.
Figure 3.3 shows the types of improvements we observed during our
visit to the Kurchatov Institute reactor site in March 1995.
Figure 3.3: Lab-to-Lab
Cooperative Efforts at the
Kurchatov Institute in Moscow
At Obninsk, the program has upgraded MPC&A systems for a research
reactor facility that houses several thousand kilograms of direct-use
material.\2 The program is providing a computerized material control
and accounting system; entry control; portal monitoring systems; a
vehicle monitor; and bar codes to be attached to the discs, seals,
and video surveillance systems. In addition, the program will assist
the facility with taking a physical inventory and performing
radiation measurements to quantify the amount of material present.
The first phase of this project was completed in September 1995.
A pilot demonstration project was also completed with Arzamas-16 in
March 1995. This project demonstrated MPC&A technologies that could
be applied to MINATOM nuclear weapons facilities and the
CTR-sponsored fissile material storage facility. Using U.S.- and
Russian-supplied equipment, the demonstration consisted of
computerized accounting systems; a system to measure nuclear
materials in containers; access control systems; a monitored storage
facility using cameras, seals, and motion detector equipment; and a
system to search for and identify lost or stolen material. Although
this project did not have a direct or immediate impact on protecting
direct-use material, it has led to greater interest in participation
in the lab-to-lab program by MINATOM defense facilities. Figure 3.4
shows U.S.- and Russian-supplied equipment that we observed in use
during the March 1995 Arzamas-16 demonstration project.
Figure 3.4: Lab-to-Lab
Cooperative Efforts at
Arzamas-16
The lab-to-lab program is also rapidly deploying nuclear material
portal monitors to Russian institutes, enterprises, and operating
facilities. Starting in June 1995, the lab-to-lab program assisted
Chelyabinsk-70 in deploying two nuclear material portal monitors and
a vehicular portal monitor at the entrances to a key nuclear site.
This effort was in response to increased concerns of Chelyabinsk
officials about controlling access to the site. Nuclear material
portal monitors have also been installed at an engineering test
facility at Arzamas-16 and at one of the main entrances to the
Institute of Automatics, where the monitors are undergoing testing
and evaluation. The lab-to-lab program has also started delivering
portal monitors to Tomsk-7. The program officials have signed a
contract to install monitors at all portals at Tomsk-7.
--------------------
\2 This material is especially attractive to theft because it is in
the form of 70,000 to 80,000 small disks containing HEU and
plutonium, along with other material.
PROSPECTS FOR MPC&A UPGRADES
ARE IMPROVING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
While the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program has gotten
off to a slow start controlling direct-use material, the U.S.
government is making progress in expanding participation in the
program to more facilities with direct-use material in the NIS. The
lab-to-lab program is also expanding its outreach to additional
facilities in Russia that require MPC&A upgrades, and DOE officials
have been approached by the Russians to expand their efforts to other
facilities.
CTR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
PROGRAM EXPANDS ITS PROJECTS
TO DIRECT-USE SITES IN
RUSSIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
In January 1995, the United States and Russia agreed to expand the
CTR-sponsored government-to-government program to facilities using
direct-use material. An agreement was signed in June 1995 at the
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting to add five direct-use
facilities.\3 These are high-priority facilities because they handle
large amounts of direct-use material. They include the HEU fuel
fabrication line at the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, the
Scientific Production Association Luch in Podolsk, the Scientific
Research Institute for Nuclear Reactors in Dmitrovgrad, the Mayak
Production Association, and the Institute of Physics and Power
Engineering at Obninsk for a nuclear training laboratory and MPC&A
improvements in addition to those underway in the lab-to-lab
program.\4
--------------------
\3 The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was created in 1993 to overcome
trade barriers in the energy sector but has expanded into other
areas, including business development, space, environment, science
and technology, health, and defense diversification.
\4 Subsequent to the conclusion of our review, DOE and MINATOM agreed
to add six additional sites to U.S. MPC&A programs.
LAB-TO-LAB PROGRAM IS
EXPANDING INTO MINATOM
FACILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The lab-to-lab program plans to implement MPC&A projects at several
MINATOM nuclear weapons complex facilities during fiscal year 1996
and continue work at the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute of
Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk. The lab-to-lab program has
signed contracts to upgrade MPC&A systems at Tomsk-7, Chelyabinsk-70,
and Arzamas-16. The program at Tomsk-7 includes deployment of
nuclear material portal monitors, development of an automated
material control and accounting system for an HEU facility,
development of an access control system for a sensitive facility on
site, and implementation of a rapid inventory system for uranium and
plutonium in containers based on the technology demonstrated in
fiscal year 1995 at Arzamas-16. At Chelyabinsk-70, the program plans
to enhance MPC&A at a reactor facility handling large amounts of
direct-use material.
The lab-to-lab program is also pursuing new initiatives with Russian
nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities and the Russian
navy. In August 1995, representatives of the four Russian nuclear
weapons assembly and disassembly facilities (Avangard, Penza-19,
Sverdlovsk-45, and Zlatoust-36) met to discuss possible joint work to
improve MPC&A at their facilities. U.S. technical experts have also
met with officials from the Russian naval fuel sector and the
Kurchatov Institute to discuss cooperative work to improve MPC&A at
Russian naval facilities. The Russians have proposed a list of eight
potential areas of cooperation for improving MPC&A at the naval
facilities and have recommended that the joint work be conducted with
the participation of the Kurchatov Institute.
DOE FACES UNCERTAINTIES IN
MANAGING AN EXPANDED U.S.
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
============================================================ Chapter 4
In fiscal year 1996, the United States substantially increase its
MPC&A assistance program to include all facilities in the NIS known
to contain direct-use nuclear material. With the increase, the
executive branch has consolidated management and funding
responsibilities for the DOD-sponsored CTR government-to-government
program and the DOE's lab-to-lab program within DOE. The expanded
program faces several uncertainties involving the number of
facilities to be assisted, costs, and ultimate effectiveness. DOE is
developing responses to each of these issues.
THE EXPANDED PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
The executive branch has acted to address the problem of quickly
improving MPC&A at NIS facilities by proposing a multiyear program to
help the NIS strengthen their controls over direct-use materials. In
September 1995, the President directed DOE to prepare a long-range
plan to enhance nuclear material controls by the year 2002 at the 80 to
100 facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material. The
President also transferred responsibility for funding and supporting
new government-to-government projects, which was the responsibility
of the CTR program, from DOD to DOE in fiscal year 1996.\1 DOE will
also continue to manage the lab-to-lab program.
DOE plans to request from Congress $400 million for the program over
7 years. DOE requested $70 million in fiscal year 1996 and plans to
continue requesting $70 million per year through fiscal year 1999,
then reducing the request to $50 million a year until 2001, and to
$20 million in 2002. DOE plans to work at up to 15 facilities per
year. DOE and national laboratory officials estimate that the cost
per facility will range from $5 million to $10 million, on the basis
of DOD's and DOE's experiences to date working at a limited number of
sites at several facilities in the NIS.
--------------------
\1 However, financial management responsibilities for CTR-funded
projects undertaken in fiscal years 1994 and 1995, including DOD's
fiscal year 1995 funding for the lab-to-lab program, will remain with
DOD.
UNCERTAINTIES FACED BY AN
EXPANDED PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
As DOE prepares to undertake the much larger task of managing the
expanded program, it will face several uncertainties that can affect
program implementation.
As previously stated, DOE does not know how many facilities may
ultimately require assistance. Currently, U.S. officials do
not know where all the direct-use material is located.
According to a DOE official, the United States may need to
include as many as 35 additional facilities beyond the 80 to 100
facilities currently envisioned to achieve its goal of enhancing
controls over all direct-use material.
DOE is uncertain about the total costs of the program. The cost of
the entire program could range from $400 million to over $1
billion based on the estimate that the number of facilities that
may require assistance could range from 80 facilities to as many
as 135 facilities, and that per project costs could range from
$5 million to $10 million.\2 Project estimates could vary as the
program expands to different types of facilities, or if the NIS
consolidate their stockpiles of direct-use material.
DOE may have difficulty directly verifying that U.S. assistance is
used for its intended purposes because the Russians may limit
direct measures that the United States may use at highly
sensitive facilities. DOE plans to provide assistance to
sensitive MINATOM defense facilities. While DOE is attempting
to negotiate the use of direct measures, such as audit and
evaluation procedures wherever possible, the Russians may deny
the use of such direct measures in certain facilities.
--------------------
\2 According to a national laboratory official, these estimates are
based on work completed at a limited number of facilities.
DOE RESPONSES TO PROGRAM
UNCERTAINTIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
DOE is currently developing responses that could address these
program uncertainties, including developing a long-range plan, a
consolidated cost-reporting system, and a flexible strategy for
auditing and evaluating program progress. These responses had not
been completed at the conclusion of our review.
LONG-TERM PLAN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
In September 1995, the President directed DOE to develop a long-term
plan. According to a DOE official, the plan will include strategies,
priorities, and costs for the work at the 80 to 100 facilities where
the U.S. plans to provide assistance. The U.S. strategy is to gain
commitments from the Russians for work at facilities where direct-use
material is present: the MINATOM defense facilities, MINATOM
civilian research facilities, civilian research institutes, and the
naval propulsion sector. DOE's priorities are to (1) improve
controls at facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material, (2)
help the Russians develop and deploy current MPC&A equipment and
technology to these facilities, and (3) assist the NIS in developing
a national MPC&A regulatory system. DOE estimates that the fiscal
year 1996 budget for the lab-to-lab program will be $40 million, the
government-to-government program will be $15 million, cooperation
with GAN will be $10 million, and cooperation for securing Russian
naval nuclear fuel will be $5 million.
According to a national laboratory official, supporting plans are
also being developed by the national laboratories. For example, the
lab-to-lab program has developed a unified U.S.-Russian plan for work
at MINATOM defense facilities. The plan provides objectives,
priorities, a list of facilities to receive MPC&A enhancements, and
approaches for providing assurances that equipment and other support
are used for intended purposes and for protecting sensitive
information. Similar plans for the MINATOM civilian sector and the
independent nuclear facilities are also being developed.
CENTRALIZED COST-REPORTING
SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2
DOE is developing a centralized cost-reporting system for the
government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs. Currently, DOE
does not have a consolidated source of information on the obligations
and expenditures for the two programs. While DOE program managers
receive quarterly financial information from reports prepared by the
national laboratories, there is no central point within DOE where
data for the government-to-government program and lab-to-lab program
are aggregated. A centralized consolidated cost-reporting system
will provide DOE managers with current financial and project status
information. This would be useful in responding to changes in
program requirements and costs and revising program budget requests
to reflect operating experiences at facilities in the NIS.
FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO AUDIT
AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3
Because the United States places a high priority on preventing
diversion of nuclear material, the executive branch has agreed, in
principle, on the need for flexibility in pursuing adequate
arrangements for ensuring that U.S. assistance is used as intended.
The arrangements include formal audit and evaluation rights
negotiated as part of government-to-government agreements and
flexible arrangements developed by the national laboratories to be
applied to the lab-to-lab program.
Under government-to-government agreements, which provide basic rights
and responsibilities for the government-to-government program, the
United States is allowed to conduct audits and examinations during
the period of the agreements upon 30 days advanced notice. These
agreements give U.S. personnel the right to visit sites receiving
U.S. assistance. DOD and MINATOM signed an additional agreement on
Administrative Arrangements for the Conduct of Audits and
Examinations of Assistance. Using these arrangements, DOD conducts
audits and examinations of all CTR-funded assistance and will include
MPC&A assistance.
In contrast, the lab-to-lab program, which works directly with
Russian nuclear facilities, is not covered by the formal
government-to-government agreement with Russia. However, the annex
to the lab-to-lab program plan outlines guidance for ensuring that
assistance is used as intended. The annex specifies various
management controls, such as making progress payments to Russian
laboratories only for specific delivered products, and only after
U.S. laboratory officials have evaluated the product against the
contract to ensure that payments to Russian laboratories are only
used for their intended purposes.
The annex also provides a series of direct and indirect measures to
determine if U.S. assistance is improving nuclear material controls.
Some measures for program success include tracking the amount of
nuclear material covered by strengthened safeguards that can be
directly assessed through visits to facilities and exchanges of
photographs, video tapes, records, and documents to show
implementation of an improved system and more limited access on a
controlled basis to the facilities.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
The Departments of State and Energy generally agreed with the report.
Their comments are presented separately in appendixes I and II. The
Department of State provided editorial comments, which have been
incorporated in the text as appropriate. DOD officials also agreed
with the facts as presented in this report, but expressed concern
about how the report portrayed the relative success of the
government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs. These officials
stated that the programs are complementary approaches to achieving
the goal of improving controls and accountability over direct-use
nuclear material in the NIS. We agree and have modified the report
accordingly.
(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
============================================================ Chapter 4
(See figure in printed edition.)APPENDIX II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
============================================================ Chapter 4
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
Gene Aloise
Charles T. Bolton
Mary Alice A. Hayward
Julie Hirshen
F. James Shafer
*** End of document. ***
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