Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies (13-AUG-01, GAO-01-850)
Millions of people live and work near eight Army storage
facilities containing 30,000 tons of chemical agents and are at
risk of exposure from a chemical accident at these facilities. In
1988 the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to assist 10 states with communities
near the eight storage facilities. The Army and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) share the federal government's
responsibility for the program's funding and execution. Since its
inception, the program has received over $761 million in funding.
One third of this amount, over $250 million, has been spent on
the procurement of critical items. Because each community has its
own site-specific requirements, funding has varied greatly. For
example, Illinois received as little as $6 million, and Alabama
received as much as $108 million since the states first received
program funding in 1989. GAO found that many of the states have
made considerable progress in preparing to respond to chemical
agencies. Three of the 10 states in the CSEPP are fully prepared
to respond to an emergency and four others are making progress
and are close to being fully prepared. This is a considerable
improvement since 1997, when no state was fully prepared.
However, three states are still considerably behind in their
efforts and will require additional technical assistance to
become fully prepared to respond to a chemical accident.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-850
ACCNO: A01597
TITLE: Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in
Preparing States for Emergencies
DATE: 08/13/2001
SUBJECT: Army facilities
Chemical warfare
Federal/state relations
Emergency preparedness
Health hazards
Army Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program
Utah
Maryland
Alabama
Indiana
Arkansas
Colorado
Kentucky
Oregon
Illinois
Washington
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GAO-01-850
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2001 CHEMICAL WEAPONS
FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies
GAO- 01- 850
Page i GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Funding Needed for Critical Items Exceeds
Projected Costs 10 CSEPP Has Enhanced Emergency Responsiveness, but Most
States
Still Not Fully Prepared 14 FEMA?s and Army?s Management Relations Have
Improved, but
Relations With Some States Are Still Poor 20 Conclusions 28 Recommendations
for Executive Action 28 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31
Appendix II CSEPP?s Funding and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates 35
Appendix III CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items 39
Appendix IV Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States 45
Appendix V Comments From the Department of Defense 59
Appendix VI Comments From FEMA 62
Tables
Table 1: Comparison of CSEPP?s Actual With Projected Funding Amounts 10
Table 2: CSEPP?s Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989- 2000 36 Table 3:
CSEPP?s On- and Off- Post Funding by Operation and
Maintenance and Procurement Categories, Fiscal Years 1988- 2000 (as of Oct.
1, 2000) 37 Contents
Page ii GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Table 4: Critical Items Measure States? Emergency Preparedness 40 Table 5:
Status of Eight Critical CSEPP- Funded Items in 1997 and
2001 41 Table 6: Status of 11 Other Critical CSEPP- Funded Items 43 Table 7:
Detail on 10 States? CSEPP Preparedness, February 2001 48
Figures
Figure 1: Practicing Decontamination of a Victim of a Chemical Accident
During Anniston, Alabama, and Umatilla, Oregon, Communities? 2001 Exercises
8 Figure 2: CSEPP?s Funding by On- and Off- Post Activities, Fiscal
Years 1988- 2000 13 Figure 3: Total CSEPP Funding by State, Fiscal Years
1989- 2000 14 Figure 4: Status of CSEPP- Funded Critical Items by State,
February
2001 16
Abbreviations
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program FEMA Federal
Emergency Management Agency
Page 1 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
August 13, 2001 The Honorable Jeff Sessions The Honorable Gordon Smith The
Honorable Ron Wyden United States Senate
The Honorable James V. Hansen The Honorable Duncan Hunter The Honorable Bob
Riley House of Representatives
Millions of people live and work near eight Army storage facilities
containing nearly 30,000 tons of chemical agents and are at risk of exposure
from a chemical accident at these facilities. Such an accident could affect
people in 10 different states. The Army plans to destroy its entire chemical
weapons stockpile by 2007 and is taking measures to protect the public
before and during the demilitarization process. 1 In 1988, the Army
established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program to assist
the 10 states with communities near the eight storage facilities obtain the
additional necessary equipment and training they need to be fully prepared
to protect the public, the facilities? workforces, and the environment in
the unlikely event of a chemical stockpile accident. The Army and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency share the federal government?s
responsibility for the program?s funding and execution. On the basis of
varying needs for critical items (such as warning sirens, protective
equipment, and response plans) required by the states, the Army and the
agency agree that when these items are in place, the states and communities
are fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency. The program
established a self- imposed goal of reaching full preparedness by 1998. In
1999, the Army estimated that the program would cost about $1.2 billion
through 2010.
1 In April 1997, the U. S. Senate ratified the U. N.- sponsored Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical
Weapons Convention, effectively agreeing to dispose of the chemical
stockpile weapons and materiel by April 29, 2007.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
In 1997, on the basis of a congressional request, we reported on the status
of the program and identified several key management weaknesses. 2 After an
accidental chemical release at the storage facility in Utah in May 2000, you
requested that we perform another assessment of the program?s status and of
any continuing management problems. As agreed with your offices, we
addressed the following questions: (1) What is the status of the program?s
funding? (2) What progress have the communities in the 10 states made toward
being fully prepared? (3) What changes in federal management relations with
the states and communities in the program could help achieve the goal of
full preparedness? The scope and methodology of our work are described in
appendix I. Regarding reported financial information, we did not
independently determine its reliability.
Since its inception, the program has received over $761 million in funding.
One third of this amount, over $250 million, has been spent on the
procurement of critical items. Because each community has its own
sitespecific requirements, funding has varied greatly. For example, Illinois
received as little as $6 million, and Alabama received as much as $108
million since the states first received program funding in 1989. The Army
expected the states to have completed the procurement of critical items by
1998. This is not the case and currently too little planned funding remains
to procure all the critical items the states have identified as needed to be
fully prepared for a chemical emergency. The Army?s 1999 estimate of the
total funding needed to obtain all necessary items was also too low. The
program has already spent over 85 percent of all the procurement funding it
was expected to need through fiscal year 2010. In 2000, the Army and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency increased their estimate of total
program costs but still did not include all the procurement funding the
states will need in the near term. The 2000 estimate is understated because
the Army, the agency, and the states did not identify all the items the
program will need.
Three of the 10 states (Maryland, Utah, and Washington) in the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program are fully prepared to respond to a
chemical emergency and 4 others (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon)
are making progress and are close to being fully prepared. This is a
considerable improvement since 1997, when no state was fully prepared.
2 See Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91, June 11, 1997). Results
in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
But the overall program has not progressed as quickly as expected and has
failed to meet its own 1998 deadline for achieving full preparedness.
Currently, three states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) are still
considerably behind in their efforts. Calhoun county in Alabama is far from
being fully prepared, does not have an agreed- upon response plan, and has
not done enough to educate the public about the program. This raises the
question of whether it would be able to adequately respond to a chemical
emergency. Problems in federal management relations with state and local
emergency management officials have contributed to delays in achieving full
preparedness. Some state and local emergency management officials have said
that, unless all critical items are in place, they will not support the
start of the Army?s destruction of chemical agents in their locality. The
Army?s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is committed to
addressing local concerns regarding readiness to avoid delays in the
destruction of the chemical stockpiles.
In the last 4 years, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Army
have made progress in tackling some long- standing program management
problems. After years of disagreement, in 1997, officials signed a new
memorandum of understanding defining their specific roles and
responsibilities in the program. By doing so, they addressed some of the
management problems that were caused by unclear roles and responsibilities
and the lack of coordination. However, a number of problems have contributed
to slowness in executing the program and to leading all the states and local
communities to full preparedness. A lack of initiative in some areas by the
Army and the agency, combined with poor working relations with some states
and communities, has resulted in the failure to resolve major unresolved
issues in the three states that are farther behind. Specifically, the Army
and the agency are not providing Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky and their
local communities enough technical assistance and guidance to resolve
outstanding issues. They have not been effective in disseminating
information on emergency management or best practices and lessons learned in
all seven states that are still not fully prepared. And in all 10 states,
they have issued uneven and unclear performance measures, and they have not
provided guidance on plans and procedures for reentry to contaminated areas.
We are making recommendations to improve the Federal Emergency Management
Agency?s and the Army?s management and implementation of the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program to bring all communities to full
preparedness. In comments on a draft of this report, the Agency and the Army
generally concurred with our recommendations.
Page 4 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Both provided technical comments that we considered and incorporated in the
report where appropriate.
In 1985, the Congress required the Department of Defense to carry out the
destruction of the U. S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and
established an organization within the Army to manage the disposal program.
The Congress directed the program to provide maximum protection to the
environment, the general public, the personnel involved in disposing of the
chemical weapons at the eight storage sites. 3 Further, the Congress
authorized the Secretary of Defense to make grants to state and local
governments, either directly or through the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to assist them in carrying out functions related to emergency
preparedness. In 1988, the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to help communities near the stockpile storage
sites establish a full level of emergency preparedness and response
capabilities. CSEPP also helps to implement the emergency preparedness at
the Army installations storing the chemical stockpile.
The Congress originally set 1994 as the date for the complete destruction of
the stockpile. This date was later extended to 2007, after the Senate
ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, on April 24, 1997. Under
the convention, April 29, 2007, is the deadline for the destruction of
chemical weapons stockpiles.
CSEPP is a partnership between the Army, as custodian of the chemical
stockpile, FEMA, which has long- standing experience in preparing for and
dealing with all types of emergencies, and state and local governments. In
October 1997, the Army and FEMA signed a revised memorandum of understanding
under which FEMA assumed responsibility for off- post (civilian community)
program activities. The Army continued to manage
3 The storage facilities are Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Newport Chemical Activity,
Indiana; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; Blue
Grass Army Depot, Kentucky; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon. Besides the
communities in the eight states listed above, communities in Illinois and
Washington could also be affected by chemical accidents at Newport Chemical
Activity, Indiana and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon, respectively.
Background
Page 5 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
?on- post? (installation) emergency preparedness and provide technical and
financial support for both off- post and on- post activities. FEMA provides
the civilian community with expertise, guidance, training, and other
support. Specifically, FEMA?s CSEPP roles and responsibilities are to (1)
administer the off- post funds; (2) support the states in developing
response plans; (3) prepare, develop, deliver, and evaluate training; (4)
provide technical assistance; and (5) develop programs for evaluating off-
post readiness. Similarly, the states and communities also have
responsibility for developing response plans and evaluating resource
requirements. To improve overall management, the Army and FEMA use 12
?benchmarks,? or performance measures, to execute the program and report on
its status. These performance measures were revised in January 2000 and are
now also used for budgeting, accountability, and for assessing the status of
states? preparedness to respond to chemical emergencies.
The Army?s Chemical Demilitarization Program (including CSEPP) has a 1999
total life- cycle (from start to finish) cost estimate of about $15 billion.
4 The Army periodically updates the estimate. In 1985, the Army?s original
cost estimate for the disposal project, the largest portion of the program,
was $1.7 billion. This grew to nearly $10 billion in 1999. In 1988, it
estimated that the cost of CSEPP would be $114 million. CSEPP has a 1999
life- cycle cost estimate of $1.2 billion. Sharing responsibility for the
program, the Army provides the 10 states and the local communities near the
storage sites with funding for the off- post program through FEMA. As with
other emergency preparedness programs, FEMA administers this program through
its regional offices to the states.
Under the current management arrangement, the Army, FEMA, and the states and
counties share responsibility for preparing CSEPP annual budgets. The states
and counties are responsible for identifying the requirements and developing
annual requests for the critical items that they believe are needed to be
fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency. After each state prepares
its initial budget proposal, it
4 The Army initially established the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project to
oversee the destruction of the nation?s chemical weapons stockpile, while
providing human health and the environment with maximum protection. Since it
began in 1986, it has become known as the Chemical Demilitarization Program
and has expanded to include CSEPP (1988), the Non- stockpile Chemical
Materiel Product (1993), the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project
(1994), and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program (1997).
Page 6 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
negotiates an acceptable level of funding for its proposed projects with the
appropriate FEMA regional office. The approved budget proposal is then
forwarded to FEMA?s headquarters for further review and approval. After the
Army approves a total funding amount that it will transfer to FEMA for
CSEPP?s off- post activities, FEMA?s headquarters prepares a Cooperative
Agreement with specific activities, funding, and periods of performance for
each state. On the basis of these Cooperative Agreements, FEMA issues funds
received from the Army as needed throughout the fiscal year to match a
state?s budgeted CSEPP spending. The states then apportion the funds among
various state agencies and the local communities (counties and cities)
surrounding the sites for their CSEPP operations.
Although the Army?s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is
responsible for the stockpile?s safe destruction, the current arrangement
between the Army and FEMA does not provide the Program Manager with direct
responsibility for CSEPP. 5 However, in the past, FEMA has received
supplemental funding from the Program Manager to help meet CSEPP?s
unexpected funding needs. But the Program Manager told us that the program
no longer has any uncommitted funds on hand to support CSEPP?s activities.
The greatest risk to the local community is from an event that would cause a
chemical release while the chemical weapons are in storage. Lowprobability
occurrences, such as an airplane crash, earthquake, or serious accident in
the storage area, could potentially cause a cloud or plume of toxic chemical
agent to be released into the air, putting the surrounding community at risk
of exposure. In the unlikely event of such an incident, the professional or
volunteer emergency personnel in the community would be the first
responders. The type of protective action response- evacuation or sheltering
in place- would be determined for each of the numerous zones in the counties
that surround each site on the basis of recommendations made by emergency
personnel at the Army post. To be able to effectively support the evacuation
or shelter- in- place emergency response, local emergency management
activities require that critical items, such as warning sirens, protective
equipment, and response plans be in place. The Army and FEMA also fund joint
training exercises that
5 The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) has
policy, guidance and oversight responsibility for CSEPP in coordination with
FEMA. The U. S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is responsible
for the management and execution of the on- post activities while FEMA is
responsible for the management and execution of the offpost activities.
Page 7 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
bring together the personnel, equipment, and response plans to practice
emergency response preparedness. To illustrate, figure 1 shows three scenes
around a decontamination unit during (training) exercises at Anniston,
Alabama on March 2, 2001 and Umatilla, Oregon on May 8, 2001.
Page 8 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Figure 1: Practicing Decontamination of a Victim of a Chemical Accident
During Anniston, Alabama, and Umatilla, Oregon, Communities? 2001 Exercises
Source: FEMA.
Page 9 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
The off- post emergency preparedness program is linked to the
demilitarization program through its budget and in two other ways. First,
the emergency program is designed to protect the public from a chemical
emergency while the chemical weapons are in storage and during the
demilitarization process. The public faces the highest risk when the
stockpile is in storage because that is when the greatest amount of agent is
present. When the destruction of the stockpile munitions begins, the risk to
the public begins to decrease as the stockpile diminishes. When the
destruction of the chemical weapons at a site is complete, the risk is gone
and CSEPP funding for local preparedness ceases.
Second, certain CSEPP and demilitarization program conditions must be met
before states will agree that it is safe to begin the destruction
operations. If state officials do not believe they have a satisfactory level
of emergency preparedness, it will be difficult for the Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization to begin destruction of the chemical weapons at a
stockpile site. This linkage between the demilitarization and the emergency
preparedness programs has thus set the official date that a state must be
fully prepared for a chemical emergency as the date when the
demilitarization process is scheduled to begin. If a state is not prepared
and thus delays the start of demilitarization operations, it will cost the
Army millions of additional dollars to pay contractors and support the
facility.
The Army, FEMA, and the states continue to use the projected start of
demilitarization at each facility as the goal for having the needed critical
items in place at the local communities near the stockpiles. Furthermore,
this date also guides their program management and funding priorities.
Likewise, this date matches either state law or planning goals linking the
start of demilitarization operations with CSEPP readiness. For example,
Oregon requires the governor to officially sign a statement that emergency
preparedness at Umatilla is adequate before operations there are authorized
to begin. Officials in other states also told us that similar emergency
preparedness initiatives need to be completed before demilitarization
operations begin. Without state officials? agreement that their emergency
preparedness is complete, the Army will not be able to begin
demilitarization operations.
Page 10 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
CSEPP?s funding needs have continued to grow since 1997, after the Army said
that the states would have all critical items in place by the end of 1998
and that, in particular, procurement funding requirements would diminish
soon thereafter. Funding has generally been in line with the Army?s
estimates of total needs through fiscal year 2000, but the program has
already spent nearly all the procurement funds that had been estimated as
needed through fiscal year 2010. The Army and FEMA are recalculating cost
estimates for fiscal years 2003- 07, but according to information provided
by FEMA and the states, even this revised estimate will not include money
for all needed items. According to the Army?s and FEMA?s financial
documents, through the end of fiscal year 2000, the states received about
half of the total CSEPP funding. But they have received different amounts
because they each have different needs.
FEMA officials told us that the Army has generally funded the CSEPP program
in line with the Army?s life- cycle cost estimate and program cost
projections, but they added that these projected amounts are less than past
and current individual state requirements. For example, the states have
requested unfunded critical items that exceeded the procurement funding that
the Army predicted. To illustrate, through fiscal year 2000, the Army
provided almost 88 percent of the total procurement expenses projected
through fiscal year 2010. (See table 1.) Our review shows that needed
procurement funding will exceed the amount estimated for fiscal years 2001-
10. In contrast, during fiscal years 1988- 2000, the program spent just over
53 percent of the total projected operation and maintenance funds.
Table 1: Comparison of CSEPP?s Actual With Projected Funding Amounts Dollars
in millions
Fiscal years Operation and maintenance Procurement Total Actual funding
1988- 2000 $509.0 $252.7 $761.8 1999 Working life- cycle cost estimate
1988- 2010 $948.2 $289.1 $1,237.3 Percent spent
1988- 2010 53.7 87.4 61.6 Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by
the Department of the Army, Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization,
and the U. S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. The 1999 Working
Life Cycle Cost Estimate was provided by the Army Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization.
Funding Needed for Critical Items Exceeds Projected Costs
State Requirements Are Greater Than Program Cost Projections
Page 11 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
FEMA and the Army rely on the states and local communities to initiate
funding requests. However, since the eventual funding decisions flow from
the Army?s budget process, the states and FEMA have found it difficult to
fund any newly identifiable requirements or other valid program needs once
the budget is set. Such added costs to the program arise when unanticipated
critical needs are asked for by the states on the basis of unforeseen rapid
population growth around some chemical storage sites or when some critical
items have needed unexpected repair or replacement.
The Army?s budget for CSEPP is part of the Department of Defense? s overall
program, planning, budgeting, and execution budget process, 6 which entails
long planning request lead times. The lead time for projecting budget
requests is 18 to 24 months beyond the time required for a particular item
or funding need. FEMA and the states and local communities have not always
adequately planned for anticipated and replacement needs and have had many
unanticipated needs arise within this budget window. For example, some new
and unanticipated CSEPP requests were not included in the Army?s and FEMA?s
budgets for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 because the Army?s budget is already
set and cannot be expanded. As a result, when budget cost estimates and
funding are below the program?s actual requirements, FEMA and Army officials
told us that FEMA has had to delay or spread out funding for some critical
items. When FEMA and Army officials have to deny such funding requests, or
socalled
?unfunded requests,? from the states because funds are not available, they
deny the states and local communities the opportunity for reaching full
preparedness by not providing needed critical items in a timely manner.
Correspondingly, if the Army and FEMA do not assist the states and local
communities in accurately identifying requirements in a timely matter and
determining the appropriate levels of funding, the states may not be fully
prepared when chemical demilitarization is set to start. Any delay in
achieving full preparedness could, in turn, delay the start of chemical
demilitarization operations and would potentially cost the Army millions of
dollars and jeopardize meeting the 2007 deadline. This unacceptable scenario
may call for increased federal funding and funding in a more timely fashion.
6 The Department of Defense uses this process as its primary decision
structure to determine program costs and requirements.
Page 12 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
The Army, with the assistance of FEMA and the states, began updating the
CSEPP life- cycle cost estimate in March 2000 and recalculating cost
estimates for fiscal years 2003- 7. Army and FEMA officials said that the
estimate would increase by about $90 million. Though the revised cost
estimate was not available to us at the time of our review, FEMA and state
officials told us that not all the critical items that states will require
nor the associated funding for all needed items were included. Our
discussions with federal, state and local CSEPP officials identified several
items, costing at least $50 million, which were not included in the
projected procurement funding requirements. State officials told us that
because of population growth and unexpected equipment replacement needs,
they were not able to anticipate these critical needs. Such unfunded items
include a communications system for the counties and the state of Oregon,
the overpressurization of facilities in Alabama, and highway reader boards
(signs) in Indiana. FEMA officials told us they would try to add additional
funding needs to the revised cost estimate this summer. However, it is
unlikely that these additions will include all of the items needed in the
near future. These needed items have to be funded through new
appropriations. Though FEMA and the Army have some discretion to reprogram
or reallocate some funds for newly identified CSEPP needs, this discretion
is limited, and there are few available funds to reprogram to meet unfunded
requests.
In many cases, personnel in the local communities do not have adequate
experience and training to understand, identify, and prepare requests to
meet federal and state budget and cost estimates. Thus, FEMA officials told
us that state and local CSEPP officials have not always adequately
identified the critical items they will need. As a result, the latest cost
estimate is not sufficient to fund all critical items, and funding for the
program will have to be increased in order to procure all needed items to
achieve full preparedness.
Since the inception of the CSEPP program in 1989, the Army has provided
$761.8 million in funding. As figure 2 shows, the CSEPP off- post program
has received the bulk of program funds since its inception and is growing.
Most of the growth in program costs has been in FEMA?s off- post program,
while funding for the on- post program has stabilized at about $30 million
annually since fiscal year 1993. Typical on- post- funding requirements
include alert and notification and communication equipment, as well as
emergency operations personnel and training expenditures. Likewise, off-
post funding requirements encompass similar expenditures plus public
awareness activities and exercises. The Army?s New Life- Cycle Cost
Estimate Understates Future Requirements
Most CSEPP Program Funds Support Off- Post Activities
Page 13 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
on- post activities received $270. 2 million, or about one- third of the
funding, and FEMA?s off- post activities received $491. 6 million, or about
two- thirds. Of the total off- post amount, the states received about
threefourths, or $368.9 million, and FEMA used the rest to fund its
activities and to purchase items for the states. (See app. II for further
information on CSEPP funding amounts and procedures.)
Figure 2: CSEPP?s Funding by On- and Off- Post Activities, Fiscal Years
1988- 2000
Note: The Army?s on- post program began in fiscal year 1988, while FEMA?s
off- post program was first funded in fiscal year 1989.
Source: Our analysis of the Army funding documents provided by the Army
Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization and the U. S. Army Soldier and
Biological Chemical Command and FEMA. In addition, both the Army and FEMA
verified the amounts provided by the Army to FEMA.
The states received varying amounts of funding ranging from a low of $6.2
million for Illinois to a high of $107.8 million for Alabama. (See fig. 3.)
Because each state had different emergency response capabilities when the
program began, FEMA uses the principle of ?functional equivalence? to guide
resource allocation. Under this principle, FEMA provides each state or local
community with adequate assets to meet a level of response capability agreed
to by FEMA, the Army, and the states. Thus, FEMA and the Army provide the
states with levels of funding support according to their requirements and
mutually agreed- upon needs. For example, each state should have emergency
warning sirens; however, the number and location of these sirens would
depend upon local conditions and requests. States Received Different
Amounts
Page 14 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Figure 3: Total CSEPP Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989- 2000
Note: The above amounts represent a combination of actual expenditures and
available funding. See table 2 in appendix II for more detail on the funds
the states received.
Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by FEMA?s headquarters, the
six FEMA regional offices, and the 10 states.
The Army and FEMA have made significant progress in the last 4 years in
enhancing the states? emergency preparedness. Three of the 10 states are
fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, and 4 others are close to
being fully prepared. (See app. III for more details on each state?s
status.) In 1997, none of the states had attained all of the items deemed
necessary to respond to a chemical emergency. Despite significant
improvements in these states, more work is needed at the remaining three
states where issues about some critical items are still unresolved. One of
the counties in Alabama, Calhoun, has no agreed- upon response plan and has
not informed the public about the actions they may be directed to take. This
situation raises the question whether the county will be able to adequately
respond to a chemical emergency. Additionally, some state and local
emergency management officials indicated that until critical items are in
place, they will not support the Army?s initiation of the destruction of
chemical weapons at the stockpile site in their communities. CSEPP Has
Enhanced
Emergency Responsiveness, but Most States Still Not Fully Prepared
Page 15 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
All the locations we visited indicated that their program has improved since
our June 1997 report. In 1997, none of the 10 states had attained all of the
program?s critical items considered necessary for emergency preparedness;
now 3 of the 10 states have. (See fig. 4.)
The three states (Maryland, Utah, and Washington) considered fully prepared
to respond to a chemical emergency individually cited several reasons for
their program?s success. For example, Maryland and Washington state and
local CSEPP officials indicated that their state had an extensive disaster
control program in place prior to CSEPP because of their involvement in the
Radiological Emergency Program. 7 In addition, the Maryland state CSEPP
director told us that an active cooperative community effort, such as
participation in integrated process team meetings, helped CSEPP achieve its
goals in Maryland. Utah?s and Washington?s CSEPP officials indicated that
communications, cooperation, teamwork, and interpersonal relationships are
the root of their success in implementing CSEPP. Additionally, Washington
state?s CSEPP officials cited the inclusion of state and local CSEPP
officials in the budgeting process as contributing factors to the program?s
success. These three states, like the others, have ongoing needs for
equipment upgrades, equipment replacement, and/ or expanding response
capability. For example, additional equipment such as sirens may be required
to accommodate a change in population growth. (For further information about
these additional needs in each state, see app. IV.)
7 Because of the proximity of communities in Maryland and Washington to
nuclear power plants, those states follow federal guidelines issued by both
the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Three States Now Fully
Prepared
Page 16 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Figure 4: Status of CSEPP- Funded Critical Items by State, February 2001
Note: States require different numbers of critical items to achieve a fully
prepared emergency response capability.
Source: Our analysis of data provided by FEMA, the Army, and state and
county emergency management agencies.
Four states (Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon) continue to lack all
the items critical for responding to a chemical emergency. But these states
have plans and actions in place to acquire the needed critical items by
2003. FEMA has either funded the items or has taken action to bring the
states into compliance with CSEPP guidance. In some cases, the items are
currently being distributed. Accordingly, we judged these states to be
progressing toward performance goals and full preparedness.
Arkansas still has gaps in four of its critical items. For example, not
all of the personal protective equipment has been distributed to the
emergency Four States Are Close to
Full Preparedness
Page 17 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
responders. Additionally, two overpressurization projects 8 will not be
completed until August 2002. The current tone alert radios 9 do not work as
intended and need to be replaced, and not all medical response personnel
have received the necessary CSEPP training.
Colorado is in the process of distributing its tone alert radios. Once
Colorado completes this distribution effort, it will be considered fully
prepared.
Illinois still has capability gaps in two of its critical items. Although
FEMA approved funding for 40 tone alert radios in February 2001, they have
not yet been delivered and distributed. And only one of three hospitals
participating in the program has a full supply of antidote.
Oregon still has capability gaps in two of its critical items. The current
communications system is cumbersome to use and does not meet CSEPP?s
standards. A recent proposal to over- pressurize five facilities is under
review. Although not an item included in the assessment of CSEPP?s
preparedness by the Army and FEMA, the state also wants monitoring equipment
to analyze an area to determine if it is safe to enter after a chemical
accident.
The remaining three states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) do not have
several critical items in place. It will require a major effort by the Army,
FEMA, and the states and their communities to have them in place in the near
future because the states have many unresolved issues concerning these
outstanding critical items. If these issues are not resolved shortly, the
start of demilitarization operations may have to be delayed. Army efforts to
destroy the stockpile within the Chemical Weapons Convention?s mandated time
frame may also be compromised. For example, plans are for the Anniston,
Alabama, site to be operational by March/ April 2002- some 9 to 10 months
from now- requiring all critical items to be in place by this date. Among
the unresolved issues facing the three states are controversies surrounding
what facilities to over- pressurize, the number of
8 An overpressurization system creates a higher air pressure inside a
building so that no outside air can enter the facility. This device allows
people to remain safely inside during a chemical accident.
9 A tone alert radio transmits to households in a response zone information
about the protective action they are to follow. They are placed in all
houses and transmit the same information as sirens in the zone. Three States
Lack Many
Critical Items and Have Major Unresolved Issues
Page 18 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
highway reader boards to order, the number of shelter- in- place kits to
order, and the strategy for both evacuation and sheltering in place. Delays
have been attributed to issues such as (1) complicated projects that were
initially managed at the local level but were later assigned to a more
experienced entity to manage and (2) the lack of timely federal response to
requests.
Alabama has major unresolved issues with FEMA and the Army and is lacking
five critical items (overpressurization, tone alert radios, coordinated
plans, CSEPP staffing, and shelter- in- place kits). There are unresolved
issues with two of these five items. Specifically, Army?s, FEMA?s, and
Alabama?s CSEPP officials have not agreed on how best to address the state?s
overpressurization projects and its coordinated plans. State officials told
us that Calhoun County and FEMA have not agreed on the number of facilities
requiring overpressurization systems. FEMA is planning to over- pressurize
some portion of 28 different facilities but has funded only eight of these
projects. FEMA advised us that it believes an additional request by Calhoun
County is without merit and not supported by science. The issue of
coordinated response plans centers on local preference for a strategy of
evacuation. Despite attempts by the Army and FEMA to have the state and
Calhoun County officials consider a strategy combining evacuation and
sheltering in place, Alabama?s overall immediate response zone counties?
protective action strategy covered evacuation only. In 1999, the Army funded
a study that designed a strategy with both evacuation and sheltering in
place. 10 Talladega county, Alabama, uses the study?s guidebook to determine
its response strategy. However, Calhoun county?s CSEPP leaders and FEMA
still do not agree on how to incorporate and resource a strategy that
includes shelter in place. As a result, Calhoun county has not participated
in FEMA?s outreach campaign. In addition to five critical items, Alabama is
also seeking additional sirens and is considering requesting additional
personal protective suits and decontamination equipment. FEMA is in the
process of reviewing the request for the additional sirens.
Indiana is lacking four critical items (personal protective equipment,
tone alert radios, mobile highway reader boards, and shelter- in- place
kits). Three of these items have been received but they are in storage and
will not be distributed until later in the year. Indiana has an unresolved
issue
10 Alabama CSEPP Protective Action Recommendation Guidebook, Innovative
Emergency Management, Inc. (Baton Rouge, La., Feb. 15, 2000).
Page 19 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
with its capability to use highway reader boards. According to state CSEPP
officials, the state had proposed using the Indiana Department of
Transportation?s mobile reader boards during a chemical emergency. However,
the transportation department decided that it could not share its reader
boards with CSEPP. Now, Indiana?s CSEPP managers say they need additional
funding to purchase reader boards for CSEPP. According to FEMA officials,
the agency has not received a request for highway reader boards. Indiana is
also seeking additional sirens and FEMA is in the process of reviewing this
request.
Kentucky is lacking four critical items (overpressurization, tone alert
radios, coordinated plans, and medical planning). CSEPP officials and FEMA
have yet to resolve the issues involving overpressurization, coordinated
plans, and medical planning. Although two schools and one hospital will be
over- pressurized, state officials have identified at least another 35
facilities that will require additional protection. FEMA and state and local
CSEPP officials have not agreed on the number of facilities and type of
protection they need. FEMA officials said the U. S. Corps of Engineers has
studied the need for overpressurization and will recommend the number of
facilities. Also, the state and counties are using draft plans that have not
yet been approved by state CSEPP officials. Additionally, not all of the 13
hospitals that participate in the program have the needed chemical
antidotes. FEMA has not decided whether it will provide funding to fully
resource these hospitals. In addition to these four items, Kentucky is
seeking additional personal protective equipment, decontamination equipment,
and sirens. FEMA is in the process of reviewing the request for these
additional items.
Army and state CSEPP officials were concerned that without an approved CSEPP
response capability, states will delay the issuance of environmental permits
needed before the destruction of chemical weapons can take place. In August
2000, the governor of Oregon appointed an executive review panel to evaluate
whether an adequate emergency response program was in place and fully
operational for any emergency arising from the storage or destruction of
chemical weapons at the Umatilla Chemical Depot. 11 The panel is expected to
provide an interim recommendation in
11 The Oregon Executive Review Panel?s membership consists of
representatives from Umatilla and Morrow Counties, the States of Oregon and
Washington, first responders, mayors, Citizens Advisory Commission, Oregon
Health Department, Environmental Quality Commission, the Department of
Environmental Quality, Oregon state police, Confederated Tribes of Umatilla
Indian Reservation. States Want Emergency
Response Programs in Place Before Destruction of Chemical Weapons Begins
Page 20 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
June 2001 and a final recommendation in October 2001 on whether the governor
should certify CSEPP as fully effective and operational. State CSEPP
officials were concerned that the lack of a CSEPP- approved tactical
communications system and the state?s need for equipment to monitor for
chemical agent will delay the issuance of environmental permits in that
state. FEMA officials however told us they had approved funding for
equipment to monitor for chemical agent.
Although Alabama does not have a CSEPP certification requirement, state and
county CSEPP officials told us they will not support the Army?s goal to
begin the destruction phase of the chemical demilitarization program until
critical CSEPP items are in place and fully operational. CSEPP officials in
Indiana and Kentucky expressed similar sentiments. The Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization has gone on record as being committed to
addressing local communities? concerns regarding CSEPP?s readiness to avoid
delays in the start of demilitarization operations.
The Army and FEMA have improved their joint management of CSEPP since our
1997 report, which found that no state was fully prepared and cited several
major management weaknesses. Since then, the Army and FEMA have acted upon
our recommendations. They have improved their working relations with each
other and have more clearly defined their individual roles and
responsibilities. They have not, however, been as successful in their
working relations with states and local communities. FEMA, in particular,
has not always taken a proactive approach to helping states and their local
communities with technical support, using best practices, and disseminating
information. FEMA has not provided as much guidance as it could to help
local communities fully understand all critical aspects of the program.
Thus, the local communities have not been able to take advantage of all
available resources, maximize coordination and efficiency, and assume their
place as full partners in the program. Additionally, the national benchmarks
and accompanying planning guidelines for interpreting and assessing the
program?s progress are unclear. As a result, communities interpret the
benchmarks differently and apply different measures of capability. Moreover,
the Army and FEMA have failed to provide enough guidance on an essential
element of the program- reentry to areas potentially contaminated by
chemical agents. This lack of program guidance has caused uncertainty and
concern among state and local CSEPP officials. FEMA?s and Army?s
Management Relations Have Improved, but Relations With Some States Are Still
Poor
Page 21 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Since we reported on a number of management problems with CSEPP in 1997,
FEMA and the Army have made considerable progress in how they work together.
12 Among the problems we reported on were that (1) management roles and
responsibilities were fragmented between Army and FEMA offices and were not
well defined, (2) planning guidance was imprecise, (3) the budget process
lacked coordination and communications, and (4) financial data and internal
controls were inadequate. Partially in response to our recommendations, in
October 1997 they signed a new memorandum of understanding that clarified
their roles and responsibilities in the program. This arrangement has
greatly reduced conflict in their direction and guidance of oversight. They
also revised benchmarks that are used to identify local communities? needs
and progress. In addition, they use national planning guidance to shore up
their efforts to enhance accountability and performance. 13
Since 1997, the Army and FEMA have both been placing greater emphasis on
public awareness and readiness campaigns. For instance, FEMA has helped
local communities establish procedures for the dissemination of accurate and
coordinated information in case of an emergency, and it has established an
?integrated process team? at each storage site to obtain community input
into initiatives. Also, FEMA and the Army have established a site on the
World Wide Web that provides a list of materials that an emergency manager
or planner can consult for basic information about the program, including
technical reports and publications. The Army and FEMA have not, however,
been able to develop the effective working relations with all states and
local communities that they developed with each other.
FEMA and the Army have not been proactive in providing some muchneeded
technical assistance, advice, and budget guidance. This void left some state
and local CSEPP officials in seven states without assistance in areas where
it was clearly needed. Three states and their communities are still
experiencing trouble carrying out their roles and have unresolved issues.
For example, many local CSEPP officials do not have either the training or
substantial expertise in chemical weapons, budgeting, or the acquisition of
very specialized high- tech equipment needed for emergency
12 See GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91. 13 See Planning Guidance for the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP, May 17, 1996). Federal Management
Problems Have Been Addressed
FEMA and the Army Not Always Proactive in Providing Technical Assistance
Page 22 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
response systems. Yet in spite of complaints by some local CSEPP officials
that they need more and better technical and budgetary assistance, Army and
FEMA officials have not always reached out to help communities learn what
they need, how to get it, or, most importantly, who they can turn to for
assistance. Army and FEMA officials said that they have provided both
general and specific information on many of these topics via training
opportunities, publications, and copies of exercise reports. But because
they view the program as primarily a state- managed endeavor, they also
normally rely on the state and local community officials to ask for such
assistance.
We found a number of cases where FEMA did not offer specific technical
assistance when local CSEPP officials were having difficulties with
complicated administrative processes or were unaware of available options to
meet requirements. For example, several local community officials said they
were unaware that various radio communication systems (tone alert radios)
and alert and notification (sirens) options are available or that different
states had varying experiences with contractors. Similarly, various state
officials said they needed additional technical risk assessment assistance
from the Army and FEMA to evaluate the toxic properties of various stored
chemicals and the potential adverse exposure effects they may have on
humans. 14 Furthermore, several local community officials said that
unfamiliarity with federal contracting procedures and accounting practices
have caused unnecessary program delays and confusion. Particularly in the
case of CSEPP?s budgeting matters, the lack of assistance and guidance has
created delays in requesting needed items. Many local CSEPP officials told
us they still do not understand how the Army?s budget process works and how
to plan ahead for future requirements and acquisitions. Without accurate and
timely estimates, program officials have difficulty determining how much
funding they will need and when they will need it.
We recognize the need for the Army and FEMA to give states and local
communities both flexibility and sufficient independence in carrying out
their programs. However, we believe that the Army and FEMA also have a
responsibility to fully inform state and local CSEPP officials of the types
of assistance the federal government is able and willing to provide. The
FEMA officials we spoke with agreed that some local CSEPP officials may
14 The National Resource Council is studying air borne chemical agent
exposure limits for the Army.
Page 23 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
not know of the types of assistance available, but said they had, in most
cases, responded to the local officials? needs. FEMA officials said that,
starting in January 2001, they began to formally educate state and local
officials on budgetary issues through a seminar. However, this single
seminar did not reach all CSEPP staff in the states and local communities
and will need to be repeated. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA
said it is providing other budgetary assistance and guidance in the form of
additional instruction on topics such as federal grants and financial
processes. Most of these new initiatives had not been fully implemented at
the time we ended our review.
Although FEMA and the Army have both been placing greater emphasis on public
awareness campaigns, they have not always carried out effective public
information or awareness campaigns about CSEPP in local communities. As a
result, communities in some states are openly hostile or suspicious of the
overall aims and goals of the program and do not see it as their own.
Furthermore, FEMA has not taken the lessons learned from some of the more
successful states and applied them elsewhere to avoid public relations
problems or to increase overall understanding and acceptance of the program.
One prime example of such problems has been the controversy in Alabama over
two different types of responses to a chemical emergency:
?shelter in place,? whereby people seek shelter in whatever building they
are in and take specific protective actions, and evacuation, which involves
leaving an area of risk until the hazard has passed and the area is safe for
return. Alabama?s local CSEPP communities had only planned for evacuation
for years. The Army funded the production of a guidebook published in 2000
that provides emergency personnel with step- by- step instructions to
evacuate or shelter in place in the event of a chemical accident or incident
at the Alabama storage site. County officials claim that the Army and FEMA
have been trying to use the guidebook to persuade them to adopt shelter- in-
place strategies without addressing several outstanding safety issues. The
Army, which funded the guidebook through FEMA under an existing Army
contract at the request of the state and counties, initially refused to
endorse or assume any ownership of the study. However, the Army acknowledged
that local communities? continued reservations to the idea of sheltering in
place raised questions about the whole CSEPP concept of sheltering- in-
place. It has now formally supported the guidebook, provided that its use
does not hamper the Army?s ability to meet mandated alert and notification
times to the off- post Ineffective Dissemination
of Information and Best Practices
Page 24 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
community. The Army also announced that it would evaluate the assumptions
and scope of the guidebook for correctness and applicability.
Much of the controversy surrounding the study and its recommended response
strategy of sheltering or evacuation was due to poor relations with the
Calhoun county CSEPP officials. FEMA and Army officials did not have a
?partnered? strategy with local community participants and a coordinated
public information initiative on the study, thus causing a public relations
problem that placed both agencies on the defensive and in a reactive, rather
than proactive, mode. FEMA has had other controversies that led to similar
public relations problems, though not as severe, in Indiana, Kentucky, and
Oregon. At various times, some local community leaders have been advocating
a greater proactive role by the Army and FEMA in public relations and team-
building initiatives for the program- not just for emergency planning, but
also for the decision- making process that comes before the planning and
that requires local CSEPP officials? involvement, support, and ownership.
Strategies that include resources for proactive information campaigns can be
very effective in building local CSEPP officials? ownership.
FEMA has rarely leveraged the lessons learned from some of the more
successful state efforts and applied them elsewhere to increase
effectiveness while avoiding public relations problems. An example of a
successful approach that has not been used is FEMA?s very positive
experience in Oregon, where innovative management schemes and practices were
implemented to improve coordination, services, and local community
participation. We recommended such program coordination in our 1999 report
identifying strategies and results- oriented organizational frameworks for
enhancing the program?s implementation in Oregon. 15 There, FEMA and the
state of Oregon placed both of their CSEPP representatives inside the local
community (rather than at state or regional headquarters) to provide a
concrete and daily presence that is both reassuring and more immediately
effective. In addition, the state of Oregon has organized a governing ruling
board- composed of all key state and local CSEPP officials- to provide more
direction, coordination, and oversight at the local level. All the Oregon
CSEPP community participants we spoke with expressed great satisfaction with
this arrangement and feelings of accomplishment, thanks to the new
organizational structure.
15 See Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program for Oregon and
Washington
(GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 13, Oct. 26, 1999).
Page 25 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Although FEMA is not actively considering setting up or endorsing similar
structures elsewhere, officials said they had explored such an arrangement
in Alabama.
FEMA also has no plans to disseminate best practices or lessons learned
among the different states and communities. The Army and FEMA use the
quarterly meetings of CSEPP?s State Directors and annual gatherings of all
CSEPP stakeholders as an opportunity for participants to share information
and experiences. Only recently, in November, 2000, did FEMA create a public
affairs team to recommend ways to ensure that the public is aware of
protective action strategies. In addition, FEMA provides an inventory of
literature that may have implications for emergency preparedness on a Web-
site. This is not enough. If FEMA had a more timely, proactive approach to
sharing lessons learned with all 10 states and had taken the initiative to
apply them where unresolved issues were slowing progress, the program would
be farther along. A more proactive management approach to share and apply
success stories, such as with special tone alert radios purchased by
Arkansas, may have helped resolve issues in Indiana.
The benchmarks FEMA uses to measure performance are not defined consistently
in the national planning guidance and in FEMA?s policy papers. The
information about the benchmarks in these documents cannot be fully
reconciled and used for measuring compliance. Additionally, FEMA officials
told us that the benchmarks were not evaluated with the same standards in
all states. This makes it difficult to measure and compare performance or
accountability and to identify requirements correctly to assist in budgetary
determinations.
The new and revised national benchmarks that FEMA issued in August 2000
identify both the items and processes necessary for full chemical emergency
preparedness. Also in 2000, FEMA and the Army issued supplementary
information (policy papers) to the national planning guidance for the
development of local emergency response plans. However, the 1996 guidance
does not consistently match the definition of terms in the revised
benchmarks. Furthermore, the guidance for measuring compliance with the
benchmarks (known as ?community
profile? guidance) is not always internally consistent. For example, one
benchmark says that communities must have a ?functioning
communications system? (so emergency personnel can talk to one another) and
another mentions a ?functioning alert and notification system? (to alert
citizens of an emergency). But the community profile Performance Measures
Vary Because Guidance Is Inconsistent and Not Standardized
Page 26 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
guidance does not specify what constitutes a functioning item, and the 1996
guidance cannot be traced to the definition of terms in the revised
benchmarks to determine what constitutes a functioning item.
The Army and FEMA believe that states are in the best position to determine
their priorities and requirements. They cite ?functional
equivalency?- the concept that it is not necessary to provide every local
community with identical assets and resources, as long as the community?s
basic emergency management capabilities meet CSEPP?s guidance. Thus, CSEPP
policy allows benchmarks to be modified from state to state as appropriate
to address any unique community circumstances. In some cases, however,
states do need clarification on the benchmarks and additional guidance in
order to perform their responsibilities. For example, at least three states
(Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) have had problems interpreting some of the
benchmarks for 2000. And because there is limited guidance on how to measure
the local communities? compliance with the benchmarks, state and federal
assessments are not standardized. Alabama, Oregon, and Utah, for example,
use different grading systems to measure local community compliance. At the
same time, FEMA?s regional offices have, at times, used their own and
different criteria for measuring compliance. Some state officials expressed
concerns about the lack of standardization of benchmark measurement. For
example, about the possible adverse effects that this unevenness may have on
funding in states with more rigorous standards.
One of the areas where the Army and FEMA do not agree concerns planning
guidance for what is known as ?reentry.? Reentry is the process of
determining if and when it is safe to return to a contaminated area or leave
shelters after a chemical accident. In 1996, we reported that the planning
guidelines for reentry were missing and needed to be developed. Although the
Army did develop draft guidance in 1997, 5 years later no site- specific
guidelines for reentry have been distributed or used. Additionally, we found
that no one at FEMA knew of generic (not sitespecific) guidance issued by
the Army in 1997. Neither the Army nor FEMA has endorsed or funded any
technical or support studies to assist local communities in planning for
reentry. Currently, a working group, FEMA and the Army Have
Not Completed Key Planning Guideline
Page 27 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
composed primarily of state, local, and installation planners, is studying
reentry and recovery. 16
The Army believes it has provided an adequate comprehensive framework to
communities for developing site specific plans to address reentry in any
given scenario. It said it has conducted classroom simulation exercises on
reentry with some communities. However, we do not believe the guidance or
exercises are sufficient. The guidance is not site- specific, and the
exercises are tabletop- not on- the- ground exercises- and have been limited
in number. State and local CSEPP officials do not agree that the Army has
provided sufficient guidance for their planning purposes.
The principal reason for inaction is a disagreement over whether reentry is
in fact part of the initial response to a chemical stockpile emergency, and
therefore part of CSEPP. If it is not considered an element of CSEPP, then
it is exclusively under the purview of the Army. While FEMA has been largely
noncommittal on the issue, Army officials insist that reentry must be
implemented and planned by the Army?s Service Response Force, 17 with
assistance from state and local officials. Army officials also believe that
because every emergency is different and unpredictable, there is no way to
assess local preparedness for reentry or make specific reentry plans until
an emergency actually happens. State and local CSEPP officials disagree with
the Army and have been working together on an interim conceptual plan.
A 1994 planning concept paper on recovery from a chemical weapons accident
was prepared for the Army. But it contained only limited public awareness
information and no guidance based on it was distributed to the states and
their communities. The only guidance prepared by the Army has not been
distributed to the CSEPP community nor to FEMA officials we interviewed.
Furthermore, the guidance does not address the local CSEPP officials?
concerns. The Army and FEMA have, thus, left unanswered a number of
questions on such issues as participants? roles and responsibilities,
effective monitoring and verification schemes, and the appropriate types of
protective clothing that would be required.
16 FEMA did not create this working group until December 2000, near the end
of our review. The group has formed five subcommittees to develop policy
recommendations. 17 An emergency response organization commanded by a
general officer tasked with performing and sustaining the Chemical Accident/
Incident Response and Assistance plan.
Page 28 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
While the Army and FEMA have made considerable progress in assisting state
and local communities to be fully prepared to respond to a chemical
emergency, thousands of people who live near at least three of the eight
chemical storage sites are still at a higher risk of exposure to a chemical
accident than necessary. Since the Army and FEMA have not always actively
assisted the states in determining their local communities? CSEPP needs,
seven states have not been able to provide local emergency responders with
all the necessary items. Of these seven, three are still seriously
unprepared to respond to a chemical accident. The Army may not be able to
begin destroying its chemical agents at two of these sites on schedule
unless further improvements are made in the emergency preparedness of those
communities. As a result, residents will face higher risks for a longer
period, the Army may incur millions of additional dollars to maintain the
program beyond its projected completion date; and the Army may not meet the
Chemical Weapons Convention destruction deadline.
To ensure that communities are safe and that demilitarization can begin on
schedule, the Army and FEMA need to move in a timely manner to apply lessons
learned and best practices to improve poor working relations with these
states and their communities, especially with those where demilitarization
of the stockpile is most threatened by delays. These lessons include better
guidance to the state and local CSEPP officials in the three states with
unresolved issues to determine needed critical items and additional
technical assistance to acquire them. In addition, the Army and FEMA need to
improve the accuracy of the life- cycle cost estimate for CSEPP so that
estimated funding is sufficient to procure all needed items as quickly as
possible. They also need to make the measurement of the program?s benchmarks
consistent in all states to better monitor accountability and identify
requirements correctly, and they need to provide guidance and planning for
reentry to all states and their communities.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army and the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency adopt a more proactive approach to improve
working relations with Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
states and communities. Better relations would help assure the states and
their communities that all the necessary actions will be taken to fully
prepare them and keep them prepared to respond to a chemical accident.
Specific actions should (1) provide technical assistance, guidance, and
leadership to the three states with long- standing issues to resolve their
concerns, especially Alabama and its issues with Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Page 29 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
sheltering- in- place, evacuation, and the collective protection of
facilities; (2) provide all states and their communities with training and
assistance in preparing budget and life- cycle cost estimates and guidance
and plans on reentry; and (3) establish specific measures of compliance with
the benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify
requirements.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the FEMA and the Army generally
concurred with our recommendations.
In its comments, FEMA focused on the ?need to capture and share lessons
learned and best practices? with local communities and cited a series of
very recent initiatives it has undertaken to do so. However, FEMA?s
characterization of this issue as one of our key concerns is incorrect.
Capturing and sharing lessons learned and best practices is only one of
several areas in which we believe FEMA and the Army need to become more
proactive. These include providing technical assistance, planning guidance,
and outreach.
FEMA also disagreed with our finding that three states are not fully
prepared to respond to a chemical emergency and claimed that the tables in
appendix III and IV show that all states are indeed fully prepared. FEMA
claimed that ?the language in the body of the report does not accurately
reflect the GAO findings displayed in Appendix III and IV.? We disagree. As
our report and the tables in the appendices clearly show, seven states do
not have all the critical items they need to have in place and functioning
in order to respond to a chemical emergency- as FEMA?s own criteria (in
CSEPP guidance and in FEMA?s benchmarks) clearly state that they should. The
three states in question, furthermore, are even farther behind in their
preparedness than the other four. Furthermore, in its comments, FEMA also
acknowledged that Calhoun county, Alabama, is ?far from being fully
prepared.?
The Army?s comments are included in their entirety in appendix V. FEMA?s
comments are reproduced in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
offices; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Installations & Environment); the Under Secretary
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 30 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
of Defense (Comptroller); the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 6020 if you have any questions. Key
contributors to this report were Donald Snyder, Joseph Faley, Bonita Oden,
James Ohl, and Stefano Petrucci.
Raymond Decker Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 31 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
During our review, we interviewed officials and obtained data from the
Department of Defense, including the Office of the Inspector General. Within
the Department of the Army, we interviewed and obtained data from officials
in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology. In addition, we obtained data from
representatives of the Program Manager for the Chemical Demilitarization
Program and the U. S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. Since we
recently examined the Army?s on- post efforts, we focused our efforts on
FEMA?s off- post or civilian community activities. 1 Accordingly, we met
with officials of and obtained data from FEMA?s headquarters and its
regional offices concerned with CSEPP. Furthermore, we conducted site visits
and interviewed program officials at the Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Pine
Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Chemical Depot, Colorado; Newport Chemical
Depot, Indiana; Blue Grass Chemical Activity, Kentucky; Edgewood Chemical
Activity, Maryland; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; and Deseret Chemical
Depot, Utah. We either visited or contacted state emergency management
officials in the 10 states involved in CSEPP: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
The counties closest to the chemical stockpile storage sites, and therefore
the off- post areas most at risk during a chemical accident, are known as
the Immediate Response Zone counties. The adjacent counties, and the areas
with a lesser risk, are known as the Protective Action Zone counties.
Funding and time schedule restraints did not allow us to visit all of these
counties. However, we did interview emergency management officials in all of
the Immediate Response Zone counties. These counties are: Calhoun and
Talladega counties, Alabama; Grant and Jefferson counties, Arkansas; Pueblo
county, Colorado; Parke and Vermillion counties, Indiana; Madison county in
Kentucky; Morrow and Umatilla counties, Oregon; Tooele county, Utah; and
Benton county, Washington. The state of Maryland refers to the at- risk area
as the Emergency Planning Zone; we visited and interviewed emergency
management officials in Baltimore, Harford, and Kent counties. We also
visited and interviewed emergency management officials in St. Clair,
Alabama, and Pulaski, Arkansas, both of which are Protective Action Zone
counties.
1 See Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program
Accountability and Financial Management (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 80, May 8, 2000).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 32 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
To assess FEMA?s financial management controls over CSEPP, we traced the
funding provided for this program from the Army through FEMA to the states
and local communities. We interviewed officials, obtained data, and examined
records to determine (1) the extent of CSEPP?s off- post funding provided by
the Army to FEMA for fiscal years 1989 through 2000, (2) FEMA?s use of these
funds, and (3) the funding FEMA provided for the 10 CSEPP states. For the
fiscal years 1989 through 2000, we reconciled CSEPP?s off- post funding that
the Army stated it provided for FEMA with the funding that FEMA stated it
received from the Army. We similarly reconciled the amount of funding FEMA
stated that it provided for the states with the amount of funding that the
states stated they received from FEMA. We initially wanted to determine the
amount of funding used by each of the 10 CSEPP states in terms of the CSEPP
National Benchmarks. However, we found that consistent and reliable data
were not available, especially for the earlier fiscal years, from either
FEMA or the 10 CSEPP states. We also attempted to determine the further
distribution of the funding provided to the states and to the local
communities. However, not all states were able to easily provide this
information for the earlier fiscal years, so we were unable to report these
amounts.
In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and financial
reports that the Army, FEMA, and the 10 CSEPP states used to manage and
monitor the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project. We did not
independently determine the reliability of the reported financial
information. In some cases, because of the age of the financial data
collected, we had to rely upon oral statements and verified this information
to the extent possible and practical.
To determine the status of achieving CSEPP preparedness in communities near
the chemical weapons stockpiles and what remains to be done, we started with
our 1997 CSEPP report results. 2 Since our 1997 report, FEMA has established
new CSEPP National Benchmarks used to identify the capabilities being funded
and for the annual reporting to the Congress. In our 1997 report, we
considered 8 critical items and have since then, in keeping with CSEPP?s
evolving measures, considered 19 critical items during this assessment. In
determining our performance measures we, in some cases, identified sub-
elements within a benchmark and included reentry. According to Army
officials, reentry is not a CSEPP issue. Since
2 See Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91, June 11, 1997).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 33 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
the Army and FEMA have yet to resolve their positions on reentry, we did not
consider it when determining whether a state is fully prepared. We did,
however, solicit comments regarding reentry planning from CSEPP managers at
the federal, state, and local levels. For our assessment of its status, a
state must have all its required items (with the exception of reentry) in
place and operational by February 2001 to be considered fully prepared. (See
table 4 and table 5 in app. III for a status update.) 3
We then obtained FEMA?s latest categorization of the preparedness status of
the 10 CSEPP states as they relate to these CSEPP National Benchmarks. We
then visited each state except Illinois and discussed the preparedness
status of its program with the appropriate state emergency management
personnel. To the extent possible and practical, we also contacted FEMA
personnel from the appropriate FEMA regional offices as well as county
emergency management personnel. From this information, we determined the
preparedness status of each state?s program in terms of how many critical
items were in place and determined changes since our 1997 report. We then
sent a structured questionnaire to the emergency management personnel in the
10 states to confirm our analysis and obtain their comments.
To ascertain how CSEPP lessons learned are developed and shared among Army,
FEMA, and the local communities and how this process might be improved, we
initially contacted the Army and FEMA. We discovered that there is no
formal, established CSEPP lessons learned process. Accordingly, we asked
Army, FEMA, state, and county officials for examples of the lessons learned
that they had shared with each other. We also obtained their concerns and
opinions about management issues confronting the program.
3 Our measure of preparedness was constant for each state. We found that
when state and federal assessments of a local community?s compliance with
the national benchmarks was made, the criteria often varied.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 34 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
We performed our review from November 2000 through April 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards, except for
limitations regarding financial information.
Appendix II: CSEPP?s Funding and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates
Page 35 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Since the inception of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP) in 1988, the Army has provided $761.8 million- $509 million in
operation and maintenance funding and $252.7 million in procurement funding.
1 The Army- managed on- post activities at the eight storage sites received
$270.2 million (one- third) of the total. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)- managed off- post activities received $491. 6 million (two-
thirds) of the total. The off- post funds are to be used to help the
communities surrounding the storage sites in 10 states enhance their
emergency management and response capabilities in the unlikely event of a
chemical stockpile accident. The Army funds and FEMA manages the procurement
of the additional items needed to bring each community to a CSEPP standard
of preparedness. The Army has made several life- cycle cost estimates for
the program.
Of the $491.6 million provided for the off- post activities, FEMA used
$122.6 million (one- fourth) through fiscal year 2000, including some funds
used to support the efforts by the 10 states. 2 This included $79.4 million
used by FEMA.
$29 million of the operation and maintenance funding was used to support
FEMA?s headquarters and the six regional offices involved with CSEPP.
$42.3 million of the operation and maintenance funding was used to support
planning, exercises, training, public affairs, and automation efforts being
performed by the CSEPP states.
$8.1 million in procurement funding was also used to support the CSEPP
states? efforts.
In addition, FEMA currently has $41 million in unissued funding- $1.9
million in operation and maintenance funding for fiscal year 2000 and $39.1
million in procurement funding for fiscal years 1998 through 2000. Most of
these funds will be issued to the states for their program efforts
1 Operation and maintenance funds are available for obligation for 1 year (2
years starting with fiscal year 2000) and procurement funds are available
for obligation for 3 years. Appropriation accounts are closed 5 years after
the obligation period has expired.
2 Also included in the $122. 6 million is $2. 2 million ($ 1.2 million in
operations and maintenance funding and $1 million in procurement funding)
consisting of (1) funding that lacks supporting documentation for FEMA
funding used in fiscal years 1989 through 1996 and (2) expired funding
subsequently returned to the Treasury. Appendix II: CSEPP?s Funding and
Life- Cycle
Cost Estimates Army Funds the CSEPP Program
FEMA?s Use of OffPost Funds
Appendix II: CSEPP?s Funding and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates
Page 36 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
with smaller amounts retained for FEMA?s headquarters and regional offices.
The remaining $368.9 million, or 75 percent of the off- post total of $491.6
million, was distributed to the 10 states, as shown in table 2. Annually,
each state prepares a budget proposal and, in essence, negotiates a level of
projects and funding with the appropriate FEMA regional office. Then, the
approved budget proposal is forwarded to FEMA?s headquarters for further
review and approval. Once approved, FEMA?s headquarters prepares cooperative
agreements with specific activities, funding, and periods of performance for
each state. On the basis of these cooperative agreements, FEMA issues funds
in increments through the fiscal year to match the state?s budget proposal
and agreed upon activities. The funding provided is within the Army?s life
cycle cost estimate. In turn, the states disburses the funds received from
FEMA to the various state offices and local communities.
Table 2: CSEPP?s Funding by State, Fiscal Years 1989- 2000 Dollars in
millions Fiscal year Alabama Arkansas Colorado Illinois Indiana Kentucky
Maryland Oregon Utah Washington Total
1989 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0 $0.8
1990 1.6 4. 6 2.2 0. 1 4.0 1. 0 0.4 1. 1 3.7 1. 0 19.6
1991 1.3 3. 3 1.2 0. 2 0.6 0. 7 1.2 0. 9 1.5 0. 6 11.6
1992 5.5 3. 5 2.9 0. 6 3.8 2. 0 0.4 0. 6 1.0 0. 5 20.8
1993 9.9 1. 5 1.4 0. 4 0.9 5. 3 7.7 8. 1 7.0 8. 3 50.6
1994 11.5 1. 6 1.4 0. 8 2.1 5. 1 3.7 7. 8 5.3 1. 3 40.6
1995 16.0 4. 7 3.6 0. 7 1.3 3. 8 3.7 3. 9 2.8 3. 9 44.4
1996 8.2 2. 0 1.6 0. 5 1.7 3. 4 1.6 2. 7 6.9 1. 4 30.0
1997 6.0 1. 9 1.4 0. 6 1.6 4. 0 1.5 5. 4 4.6 1. 7 28.7
1998 6.9 1. 8 0.3 0. 6 3.0 5. 3 0 7. 4 4.9 2. 0 32.2
1999 34.8 2. 5 1.7 1. 0 3.2 2. 1 0.9 4. 4 4.8 1. 5 56.8
2000 5.9 4. 1 1.5 0. 6 2.1 2. 5 1.3 6. 9 5.7 2. 2 32.8 Total $107.8 $31.5
$19.3 $6.2 $24.2 $35.3 $22.5 $49.5 $48.3 $24.3 $368.9
Note: Funding as of September 30, 2000. The above amounts represent a
combination of actual expenditures and remaining funds. For earlier fiscal
years? appropriation accounts that are no longer available for obligation or
are closed, the amounts are actual expenditures incurred. These amounts
equate to the funding received less any unused funds returned to FEMA. For
appropriation accounts that are available for obligation or open, the
amounts represent a combination of actual expenditures and remaining funds
available for obligation. In addition, numbers may not total because of
rounding.
Source: Our analysis of funding data provided by FEMA?s headquarters, the
six FEMA regional offices, and the 10 states.
Appendix II: CSEPP?s Funding and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates
Page 37 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Army funding provided through fiscal year 2000 included $509 million in
operation and maintenance funding and $252.7 million in procurement funding,
as shown in table 3 below. Of this amount, the Army managed onpost
activities at the eight Army storage sites that received total funding of
$270.2 million.
The $761.8 million total funding from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year
2000 is slightly below the Army?s projected funding. As part of an
acquisition program, the Army prepares a life- cycle cost estimate for
CSEPP. In 1997, the Army estimated the life- cycle cost of this program to
be $1,273.6 million (in 1997 current- year dollars). Of this amount, $776.2
million ($ 536.4 in operation and maintenance funding and $239.8 million in
procurement funding) was incurred through fiscal year 2000, and the
remaining funds are estimated costs through fiscal year 2010. In 1999, the
Army prepared a working life- cycle cost estimate that reflected a slight
decrease to $1,237.3 million (in 1999 current- year dollars). This estimate
included $781. 7 million ($ 517. 7 million in operation and maintenance
funding and $264.1 million in procurement funding) incurred through fiscal
year 2000, and the remaining funds are estimated costs through fiscal year
2010. The 1999 working estimate is $19.9 million above the $761.8 million in
actual funding provided by the Army through fiscal year 2000. In addition,
the Army has an ongoing Defense Acquisition Board Review whereby it and FEMA
are undertaking a complete review of the CSEPP life- cycle cost estimate
through fiscal year 2009 to more adequately address required resources-
based upon requirements established by the various on- and off- post
entities.
Table 3: CSEPP?s On- and Off- Post Funding by Operation and Maintenance and
Procurement Categories, Fiscal Years 1988- 2000 (as of Oct. 1, 2000)
Dollars in millions On- post funding Off- post funding Total funding Fiscal
year O& M Procurement Total O& M Procurement Total O& M Procurement Total
1988 $2.5 $0 $2.5 $0 $0 $0 $2.5 $0 $2.5 1989 2.4 2. 3 4.7 1. 0 5.6 6. 6 3.4
7. 9 11.3 1990 4.0 8. 2 12.2 9. 9 21.6 31.5 13.9 29.7 43.7 1991 6.3 3. 3 9.6
13.6 14.3 27.8 19.8 17.6 37.5 1992 10.0 1. 8 11.8 15.2 13.2 28.4 25.2 15.0
40.2 1993 24.5 6. 6 31.1 26.7 29.2 55.8 51.2 35.8 87.0 1994 19.6 3. 5 23.1
27.5 20.8 48.2 47.1 24.3 71.3 1995 23.7 0 23.7 30.2 2. 3 32.5 53.9 2. 3 56.2
1996 30.0 3. 4 33.3 26.9 19.6 46.5 56.8 22.9 79.8
Life- Cycle Cost Estimates and Army Funding Through Fiscal Year 2000
Appendix II: CSEPP?s Funding and Life- Cycle Cost Estimates
Page 38 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Dollars in millions On- post funding Off- post funding Total funding Fiscal
year O& M Procurement Total O& M Procurement Total O& M Procurement Total
1997 27.5 0. 2 27.7 29.0 21.5 50.5 56.5 21.7 78.2 1998 30.5 0. 4 31.0 32.7
26.3 58.9 63.2 26.7 89.9 1999 28.5 1. 2 29.7 28.7 12.1 40.8 57.2 13.3 70.5
2000 28.1 1. 7 29.8 30.2 33.9 64.1 58.4 35.6 93.9
Total $237.6 $32.6 $270.2 $271.5 $220.1 $491.6 $509.0 $252.7 $761.8
Legend: O& M = operation and maintenance Note: Funding as of September 30,
2000. The Army?s on- post program began in fiscal year 1988 while FEMA?s
off- post program was first funded in fiscal year 1989.
Numbers may not sum to total because of rounding. Source: Our analysis of
the Army?s funding documents provided by the Army Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization and the Army Soldier and Biological Chemical
Command and FEMA. In addition, both the Army and FEMA verified the amounts
provided by the Army to FEMA.
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 39 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
This appendix reviews the development of the CSEPP benchmarks used by the
Army and FEMA to measure the program?s status and guide funding. We used
subcategories of these benchmarks- specific critical items- to measure the
program?s status in 2001. Overall, half of the needed items are in place in
all the states. In 1997, none of the critical items were in place in all the
states.
As CSEPP has developed, its performance measures have expanded. In 1993 and
1996, the Army and FEMA issued CSEPP benchmarks and program guidance that
identified off- post items critical to respond to a chemical stockpile
emergency. Specifically, the National CSEPP Benchmark guidance issued in
1993 identified nine items needed for emergency preparedness: alert and
notification system, emergency operations center, communications system,
automated- data- processing system, training programs, exercise programs,
community involvement (for public information and education), CSEPP
personnel, and coordinated plans.
The CSEPP National Planning Guidance, dated May 6, 1997 supplements this
list by describing various aspects about each needed item so that it meets
CSEPP?s standards. For example, the 1993 benchmark lists the need for a
functional communications system; the planning guidance further states that
the system must be reliable with at least two independent methods of
simultaneous communications to protect against equipment failure.
In August 2000, FEMA and Army issued CSEPP Policy Paper Number 18, which
reaffirms the 1993 guidance and adds three additional benchmarks that
include administrative support, medical program, and protective action
strategy. And, according to the FEMA CSEPP FY 2000 Annual Report to Congress
(Dec. 15, 2000), personal protective equipment, decontamination equipment,
and medical preparedness are needed for operations at the CSEPP sites. These
items are now considered in the program?s benchmarks.
We used the Army?s and FEMA?s guidance to measure whether the 18 critical
items were in place, were being put in place, or were not agreed to by the
states and local communities, the Army, and FEMA. In our 1997 assessment, we
considered eight critical CSEPP items. Since that report, we have added 10
more items needed to meet CSEPP?s guidance for full preparedness. Some of
our critical items are subcategories of the CSEPP Appendix III: CSEPP?s
Performance
Measures and Critical Items Army and FEMA CSEPP Performance Measures Have
Evolved
GAO?s Performance Measures
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 40 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
benchmarks. For example, in table 4, we divide the CSEPP benchmark alert and
notification system into the following categories: sirens, tone alert
radios, and highway reader boards. We also included reentry, for a total of
19 items considered.
To judge preparedness, we looked at 18 critical items to determine if they
were in place and operational (we excluded reentry in this analysis because
it does not affect the ability to respond to an emergency). If an item met
the requirements that the states, communities, and FEMA and the Army had
agreed to, we measured its status as ?Yes.? If the states and communities
were in the process of acquiring the item, we measured it as
?Partial.? If the item was not in the process of being acquired and there
was no agreement to obtain it, then it was measured as ?No.? In cases where
a state had a critical item in place but required additional equipment, such
as sirens to place near newly constructed housing, we coded the status as
?Yes*.? This means that the initial requirement had been met, but as the
benchmark item was being completed, needs had changed and more of the item
was requested.
We found that 9 of the 18 CSEPP- funded items are in place and operational
in all states where the item was part of the preparedness requirements.
Table 5 compares the eight items we reported on in 1997 and in 2001 and
shows only four of eight items in place and operational in all states. Table
6 contains the additional 10 items we reviewed and shows 5 of 11 items in
place and operational.
Table 4: Critical Items Measure States? Emergency Preparedness Critical
items Performance measure used In GAO?s assessment
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Measure: document that all alert and notification components
are in place and operational.
Automated data processing Measure: determine whether the on- and off- post
emergency operations centers have functional automated- data- processing
systems. Communications system Measure: determine whether a CSEPP standard
communication system is in place and
operational. Coordinated plans Measure: determine whether coordinated plans
are approved and exercised. Emergency operations center
joint information center Measure: document that a functional emergency
operations center is in place for each immediate response zone county and
that the state has a joint information center.
Exercise program Measure: document that approved exercise programs are in
place and have been utilized. Medical support
decontamination units Measure: identify the number of hospitals
participating in the program; determine whether medical staff have received
CSEPP training; and determine the availability of antidote, if
applicable. Determine if required decontamination units are in place and
operational.
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 41 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical items Performance measure used In GAO?s assessment
Personnel vacancies/ CSEPP staffing Measure: determine if all CSEPP- funded
positions are filled. Personal protective equipment/ suits Measure:
determine if personal protective suit components are in place and
operational. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Measure: determine if work on identified
facilities requiring overpressurization has been
completed. Determine if required shelter- in- place kits are in place and
operational. Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign Measure: determine if there is a mechanism in
place for citizens to voice their concerns
regarding the program. Determine if state and counties sponsor CSEPP
calendars, brochures, pamphlets, newsletters, and other similar materials to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Measure: document that approved
training programs are in place and have been utilized. Reentry planning
Measure: document that the state and counties have a reentry plan.
Source: FEMA?s guidance on benchmarks.
Table 5: Status of Eight Critical CSEPP- Funded Items in 1997 and 2001
Program element
Alabama and counties
Arkansas and counties
Colorado and county
Illinois and counties
Indiana and counties
Kentucky and counties
Maryland and counties
Oregon and counties
Utah and counties Washington
and county
Automated data processing system 1997 status 2001 status
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
P Y
Emergency operations centers( s) 1997 status 2001 status Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y
Y P
Y Y
Y P
Y P Y
Y Y
P Y Communi cations system 1997 status 2001 status
P Y
Y Y
Y Y
P Y
Y Y
P Y
Y Y
P P
P Y
Y Y
Personal protective equipment 1997 status 2001 status
P Y*
N P
N Y
N Y*
N P
N Y*
N Y
Partial Y*
Y Y*
N Y Decontami nation equipment 1997 status 2001 status
P Y*
Y Y
N Y
N Y
N Y
N Y*
P Y
N Y Y
N Y
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 42 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Program element
Alabama and counties
Arkansas and counties
Colorado and county
Illinois and counties
Indiana and counties
Kentucky and counties
Maryland and counties
Oregon and counties
Utah and counties Washington
and county
Overpres surization projects 1997 status 2001 status
N P Y
P N
NR NR
NR N
Y NR
P Y
Y N
P NR
NR NR
NR Sirens 1997 status 2001 status
Y Y*
Y Y*
N Y
NR NR
Y Y*
Y Y*
P Y
N Y*
Y Y*
Y Y Tone alert radios 1997 status 2001 status
N P
N P
N P
NR N
N N
P P
N NR
N Y
P Y
N Y
Legend: Y (Yes) means that the CSEPP- funded item is fully operational and
meets standards Y* (Yes*) means item is in place. However, there is a new
requirement for additional items; local communities are acquiring the
additional capability
P (Partial) means that local community is in the process of acquiring the
capability to fulfill an earlier requirement
NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for the CSEPP
item N (No) means the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP
item, although funding may have been approved
Note: Status as of February 2001 Source: 1997 information is from our prior
report, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91, June 11, 1997).
Information for 2001 is based on our analysis of data provided by FEMA, the
Army, and state and county emergency management agencies.
Four of the eight CSEPP- funded items evaluated in our 1997 report are in
place and operational in all 10 states. Since the time of our 1997 report,
all 10 states have acquired CSEPP- approved automated data processing
systems and emergency operations centers. In addition, the initial
requirement for sirens and decontamination equipment has been funded and
items are in place and operational. However, some states have identified a
need to expand their capability in these two areas to accommodate changes in
local demographics, such as population growth, and to replace outdated
equipment.
In some locations, the remaining four items- overpressurization projects,
personal protective equipment, tactical communications systems, and tone
alert radios- are in varying stages of readiness.
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 43 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Table 6: Status of 11 Other Critical CSEPP- Funded Items Program element
Alabama and counties
Arkansas and counties
Colorado and counties
Illinois and counties
Indiana and counties
Kentucky and counties
Maryland and counties
Oregon and counties
Utah and counties
Washington and counties
Coordinated preparedness/ response plans P YYY Y PYYYY
Community involvement program Y YYY Y YYYYY
CSEPP staffing P YYY Y YYY* YY* Exercise program Y YYY Y YYYYY Joint
information center Y YYY Y YYYYY
Highway reader boards Y YYNRNYYYY* Y Medical planning / equipment Y PYP Y
PYYYY
Public awareness program Y YYY Y YYYYY
Shelter- inplace kits NNRNRNRNYNRY Y Y Training Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Reentry
planning N NPN N NNNPP
Legend: Y (Yes) means that the CSEPP- funded item is fully operational and
meets standards Y* (Yes*) means the item is in place. However, there is a
new requirement for more of this item P (Partial) means the local community
is in the process of acquiring the capability to fulfill an earlier
requirement
N (No) means the state and counties do not have the required CSEPP item,
although funding may have been approved
NR means that the state and counties do not have a requirement for the CSEPP
item Note: Status as of February 2001 Source: Our analysis of data provided
by FEMA, the Army, and state and county emergency management agencies.
Appendix III: CSEPP?s Performance Measures and Critical Items
Page 44 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Five of the 11 other CSEPP- funded items are in place and operational. All
10 states have CSEPP- approved community involvement, exercise, and training
programs in place. They also have functional joint information centers and
on- going public awareness campaigns. The other six items (coordinated
plans, CSEPP staffing, highway reader boards, medical planning/ support,
shelter- in- place kits, and reentry plans) are at varying stages of
completeness.
CSEPP federal managers have not prepared guidance on reentry planning. Some
local officials have begun to plan on their own for reentry after a chemical
accident. For example, CSEPP managers in Colorado, Utah, and Washington have
indicated that they have preliminary local community plans in place. These
plans identify the roles and responsibilities of state emergency response
agencies during the reentry phase. We measured the status of this item by
whether the local communities and/ or the state had developed a plan. All
state CSEPP officials told us they are eager for FEMA to issue reentry
guidance and they want to have nationally approved CSEPP coordinated plans.
However in commenting on our draft report, the Army believes it has
adequately provided a comprehensive framework to the communities for
developing site specific plans to address the reentry and restoration for
any given scenario and said it has recently begun classroom simulation
exercises on reentry and restoration with some CSEPP communities
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 45 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
This appendix presents the results of our review of the emergency
preparedness in the 10 CSEPP states. For each state, we list the 19 critical
items and provide our assessment of each. We include a summary of the
condition of each item in each state, on the basis of our observations and
interviews with state and local CSEPP officials in the state. The status of
the critical items is discussed for each state in alphabetical order within
the categories of fully prepared, progressing, and unresolved issues. Table
7 presents our summary of the comments of state and local CSEPP officials we
talked to concerning the status of the 19 critical items in the states.
Maryland?s CSEPP officials said that the state had an extensive disaster
control program in place prior to CSEPP because of its involvement in the
Radiological Emergency Program. 1 It?s easier to plan for a chemical event
in Maryland because only one chemical agent (mustard) is stored in bulk in
Maryland and according to the Army, mustard agent is the most stable and
least toxic agent in the U. S. stockpile. The local CSEPP officials credited
the mitigation activities undertaken by the Army that reduced the
?at risk? population from 333,000 to 55,000. In addition, the Maryland State
CSEPP director told us that a cooperative community effort, such as
participation in the integrated process team (a group of key CSEPP personnel
that focus on a particular issue), helps CSEPP achieve its goals in
Maryland.
Utah?s CSEPP officials said that communications, cooperation, teamwork,
and interpersonal relationships are the root of Utah?s success in
implementing CSEPP. For example, Utah integrated all of the affected parties
and entities into its CSEPP effort early in the program to facilitate
effective communications and foster good working relationships amongst the
CSEPP stakeholders.
Washington state?s CSEPP officials said that like Maryland it too had an
extensive disaster control program in place prior to CSEPP because of its
involvement in the Radiological Emergency Program. And like Utah,
Washington?s CSEPP officials cite good coordination among all
1 Because of the proximity of some locations to nuclear power plants, they
follow federal guidelines for radiological emergency preparedness issued by
both the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items
in 10 States States That Are Fully Prepared
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 46 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
participating agencies and the inclusion of state and local CSEPP officials
in the budgeting process as contributing factors to the program?s success.
Arkansas still has gaps in five of its critical items. For example, not
all of the personal protective equipment has been distributed to the first
responders. According to state CSEPP officials, the overpressurization
project at the local high school is underway and expected to be completed in
August 2001. The elementary school project is in the design phase, and its
estimated completion date is August 2002. FEMA approved the
overpressurization project for an elementary school for $2.25 million.
According to a state CSEPP official, 15 additional sirens are needed and
FEMA is reviewing this issue. The current tone alert radios do not work as
intended, and Arkansas has $2.5 million to replace them. Medical training is
ongoing. Thus far not all medical response personnel have received the
necessary CSEPP training.
Colorado is in the process of distributing its tone alert radios. Once
Colorado completes this distribution effort, it will be considered fully
prepared.
Illinois still has capability gaps in three of its critical need items.
For example, a state CSEPP official indicated that the state has a need for
additional replacement personal protective suits and FEMA is reviewing this
issue. Although FEMA approved funding for 40 tone alert radios in February
2001, they have not yet been delivered and distributed in Vermillion County.
In addition, only one of three hospitals participating in the program has a
full supply of antidote.
Oregon still has capability gaps in five of its critical items. The
current communications system, consisting of a high- banded very high
frequency radio, is cumbersome to use and does not meet CSEPP?s standards. A
450- megahertz communications system project has been studied and approved.
Its estimated cost is $7.2 million; FEMA is committed to funding the
project, which is expected to be complete no later than August 2002. A
proposal for five additional overpressurization projects is under review.
The state and counties identified a need for additional personal protective
suits, sirens, and CSEPP staff. FEMA will then validate the need for more
suits and it has funded a sound propagation study to validate the need for
the seven additional sirens requested. FEMA officials said they will
consider the need for more staff. Oregon has also recently requested
chemical- monitoring equipment to allow reentry after a chemical accident.
States That Are
Progressing Toward Full Preparedness
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 47 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Alabama has at least two unresolved issues involving overpressurization
projects and coordinated plans, resulting in gaps in its emergency response
capability. State officials told us that Calhoun County, the Army, and FEMA
have yet to agree on the number of facilities requiring overpressurization
systems. 2 Calhoun County requested that more than 130 facilities be over-
pressurized. Excluding the emergency operations centers, currently there are
no facilities in the immediate response zone that have been over-
pressurized. According to FEMA officials, they are planning to over-
pressurize some portion of 28 different facilities but has only funded eight
of these projects. Part of the delay in these projects was due to the
limited procurement experience of the county. The projects were turned over
to the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers to manage, and work has begun on five
schools.
Another unresolved issue in Alabama centers around its coordinated
emergency response plans. Despite the Army?s attempt to have the state and
Calhoun county consider a strategy including both evacuation and sheltering,
Alabama?s overall immediate response zone counties? protective action
strategy remained for evacuation only. As early as November 5, 1993, the
Army informed the local emergency management directors of both of Alabama?s
immediate response zone counties that an evacuation- only strategy may not
be feasible. In 1999, the Army funded a study to produce a guidebook with
step- by- step instructions to Alabama county emergency personnel on how
best to respond to a chemical emergency. The study supported the Army?s
position that a strategy of evacuation and shelter- in- place provided the
safest response to a chemical incident. Talladega county, Alabama, uses the
guidebook to determine its emergency response strategy. However, Calhoun
county?s CSEPP leaders and FEMA still do not agree on how to incorporate and
fund the guidebook strategy. FEMA is in the process of funding Alabama?s
shelterin- place kits, providing the resources to purchase additional
sirens, hiring additional staff, and supporting a public awareness campaign.
In Indiana, it isn?t clear whether FEMA will provide more funding for
highway reader boards. According to state CSEPP officials, the state now
needs more funding for highway reader boards, which FEMA approved earlier.
The state later reprogrammed the funds in support of another
2 An overpressurization system creates a higher air pressure inside a
building so that no outside air can enter the facility. This device allows
people to remain safely inside during a chemical accident. States With
Unresolved Issues
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 48 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
CSEPP project but was hoping to use the Indiana Department of
Transportation?s reader boards during a chemical emergency. However, the
transportation department decided that it did not have enough reader boards
for CSEPP to use. Now Indiana?s CSEPP managers are in need of more funding
to purchase this capability. The state is also now considering purchasing
shelter- in- place kits, but FEMA has not yet provided funding. FEMA is also
funding personal protective equipment.
Kentucky?s CSEPP officials and FEMA have yet to resolve issues involving
enhanced sheltering projects, coordinated plans, and medical planning.
Although 2 schools and 1 hospital will be over- pressurized, the state
identified over 35 facilities that will require enhanced sheltering. FEMA
and state and local CSEPP officials have not yet finalized the number of
facilities. Also, CSEPP needs school buses to be placed by two schools to
evacuate students during an emergency. Additionally, the state and counties
are using draft plans that have not yet been approved. A state CSEPP
official we interviewed was unaware of a target date for final approval.
Additionally, of the 13 hospitals that participate in the program, only
about half have the needed chemical antidote. Local CSEPP officials are
concerned that FEMA has not acted in a timely fashion to fill this gap. FEMA
has not decided if it will provide funding to fully outfit these hospitals.
Table 7: Detail on 10 States? CSEPP Preparedness, February 2001 Alabama
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radio
reader boards Yes*
Partial Yes
CSEPP provided 98 sirens off- post. Alabama now needs additional sirens.
Tone alert radio distribution is currently under way. Three highway reader
boards have been funded and procured. Automated data processing Yes The
Emergency Management Information System and the Federal Emergency
Management Information System are installed in the state and counties. The
state and three counties use the Federal Emergency Management Information
System. The remaining three counties, along with the Anniston depot, use the
Emergency Management Information System. Communications system Yes The
CSEPP- approved automated telephone dialing system, dedicated phone lines,
and 800- megahertz communication system are complete and operational.
Coordinated plans Partial Plans are in place and have been exercised;
questions remain on how to best
incorporate evacuation and sheltering protective action strategies.
Emergency operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes Calhoun and Talladega County Emergency Operation Centers have been in
operation
since 1994. The Joint Information Center is located at the former Ft.
McClellan and has been used during exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 49 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed
full- scale and alternate year exercises. They also participate in quarterly
Chemical Accident/ Incident Response and Assistant exercises. Medical
support
decontamination units Yes
Yes* Nine hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided
for the
emergency medical staff, and the antidote is available. CSEPP purchased five
units; they are operational. More funding is needed to purchase additional
decontamination units. CSEPP?s staffing/ personnel vacancies Partial All
CSEPP positions are filled. FEMA recently provided Calhoun County with
funding
for five additional full- time equivalent positions. According to county
officials, three more full- time equivalent positions are still needed to
perform the 24- hour manning task. Personal protective equipment/ suits Yes*
CSEPP purchased over 2, 000 suits for emergency workers in Alabama. A need
for
additional suits has been identified. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Partial
No The Army is constructing over- pressurization systems in five schools in
Calhoun
County. FEMA is planning to over- pressurize a total of 28 facilities in
Alabama. However, local CSEPP officials have additional facilities they want
FEMA to consider. FEMA approved the request for shelter- in- place kits.
There are no kits in the Alabama communities at this time. Public outreach/
education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional Brochures,
calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP
standards are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning No After the
closing of Ft. McClellan, Alabama was left without a reentry plan.
Arkansas Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes*
Partial Yes
CSEPP provided 58 sirens; 38 are off- post. Arkansas wants additional
sirens. The tone alert radios are experiencing mechanical problems and must
be replaced. CSEPP provided six highway reader boards. Automated data
processing Yes The Emergency Management Information System and the Federal
Emergency
Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the
Emergency Management Information System is used regularly. Communications
system Yes CSEPP?s approved automated telephone dialing system, dedicated
phone lines,
and 800- megahertz communication system are complete and operational.
Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised. Emergency
operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes The immediate response zones have fully operational emergency operations
centers. The joint information center is located in Jefferson County and has
been used during exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 50 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed
full- scale and alternate- year exercises. They also participate in
quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident Response and Assistant exercises.
Medical support
decontamination units Partial
Yes Twenty- three hospitals participate in the program; some medical
emergency staff
have not received CSEPP training. The antidote is available. CSEPP purchased
13 units; they are operational. CSEPP staffing/ personnel vacancies Yes All
CSEPP positions are filled. The state would like to convert some part- time
positions to full- time. Personal protective equipment/ suits Partial CSEPP
purchased 2,030 suits for first responders in Arkansas. These suits have
not all been distributed to the first responder agencies. A need for
additional suits has been identified. Protective actions
over- pressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Partial
NR White Hall High School project is not complete, and the Moody Elementary
School
project is in the design phase. Arkansas did not request shelter- in- place
kits; they are not required at this time. Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional
Brochures, calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the
communities to educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training
programs meeting CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly.
Reentry planning No Arkansas does not have a reentry plan at this time.
Colorado Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes
Partial Yes
CSEPP provided 19 sirens; 13 are off- post. No additional sirens are needed
at this time. Tone alert radio distribution is under way. These radios have
not all been distributed to the local community. CSEPP provided five highway
reader boards. Automated data processing Yes The state and county have both
the Emergency Management Information System
and the Federal Emergency Management Information System; each is
operational. The State uses a Department of Energy hazardous prediction
model regularly, while the county uses the Emergency Management Information
System regularly. Communications system Yes CSEPP?s approved automated
telephone dialing system, dedicated phone lines,
and 800- megahertz communication system are complete and operational.
Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised. Emergency
operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes The immediate response zone has a fully operational emergency operations
center.
The joint information center is located at the University of Southern
Colorado and has been used during exercises. Exercise program Yes The state
participates in tabletop, federally managed full- scale, and alternate- year
exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 51 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Medical support
decontamination units Yes
Yes Two hospitals participate in the program, and training has been provided
for the
emergency medical staff. Antidotes are not necessary, because of the type of
agent stored in Colorado. CSEPP purchased four units; they are operational.
CSEPP staffing/ personnel vacancies Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. The
state noted that it is difficult to attract and retain
highly qualified automation specialists. Personal protective equipment/
suits Yes CSEPP purchased more than 600 suits for first responders in
Colorado. Most have
been provided to the first responder agencies. Protective actions
over- pressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits NR
NR The state, with FEMA?s input, decided that overpressurization was not
required,
given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.
However, this protection was offered only to the residents living nearest to
the stockpile. The state, with FEMA?s input, decided that shelter- in- place
kits were not required, given the distance between the stockpile site and
the nearest community. The kits were provided to residents living nearest to
the stockpile. Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional. Also, the Sierra
Club has expressed its interest in the program. Brochures, calendars, and
other similar materials are being used in the communities to educate the
public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP?s standards
are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning Partial Colorado?s
CSEPP team formalized a reentry plan with Army/ FEMA/ EPA in March
1999 and conducted full- scale reentry Alternate Year Exercise in April
2000. This is not considered a nationally approved plan.
Illinois Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards NR
No NR
There is no requirement for sirens in the protective action zone. FEMA
funded 40 tone alert radios in February 2001; they are not yet in place. The
state does not have a requirement for highway reader boards. Automated data
processing Yes The state has both the Emergency Management Information
System and the Federal
Emergency Management Information System; each is operational. However, the
states and counties use the Emergency Management Information System
regularly. Communications system Yes The CSEPP- approved 800- megahertz
communication system is complete and
operational. The state also uses a high- band radio frequency, pagers, and
the radio amateur civil emergency service. A dedicated hotline system is now
being installed. Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been
exercised. Emergency operations center
joint information center
Yes Yes
The emergency operations centers are fully operational. Illinois uses the
facility in Indiana. The joint information center is located in Rockville,
Indiana, and has been used during exercises. Exercise program Yes The state
participates in federally managed full- scale and alternate year exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 52 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Medical support
decontamination units Partial
Yes Only one of three hospitals is stocked with the needed antidote; more
antidote is
needed. CSEPP purchased 10 units; they are operational. CSEPP staffing/
personnel vacancies
Yes All CSEPP positions filled. Personal protective equipment Yes* CSEPP
provided funding to purchase 400 suits for first responders in Illinois. The
state identified a need for additional suits for their replacement cycle.
Protective actions
over- pressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits NR
NR The state, with FEMA?s input, decided that overpressurization was not
required,
given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community. The
state along with FEMA?s input decided that shelter- in- place kits were not
required, given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest
community. Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
Illinois does not have its own Citizens Advisory Commission but has
representation on the Citizens Advisory Commission in Indiana. Brochures,
calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting
CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning No
Illinois does not have a reentry plan.
Indiana Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes*
No No
CSEPP provided 27 off- post sirens. Indiana may now needs additional sirens.
Tone alert radios distribution has not begun; they are now stored in a
warehouse. CSEPP intended to use the state department of transportation?s
mobile reader boards. However, they are not available for CSEPP to use.
Automated data processing Yes The state and counties have both the Emergency
Management Information System
and the Federal Emergency Management Information System; each is
operational. However, they use the Emergency Management Information System
regularly. Communications system Yes The CSEPP approved 800- megahertz
communication system is complete and
operational. The state also uses a high- band radio frequency and is
considering using an automated telephone dialing system and cellular
telephones. Phase one of their microwave system is almost complete.
Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised. Emergency
operations center
joint information center
Yes Yes
The emergency operations centers are fully operational. The joint
information center is located in Rockville, Indiana and has been used during
exercises. Exercise program Yes The state participates in tabletop,
federally managed full- scale and alternate year
exercises. The state also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/
Incident Response and Assistant exercises.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 53 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Medical support
decontamination units Yes
Yes One hospital participates in the program, training has been provided to
the
emergency medical staff, and the antidote is available. New antidote kits
have been ordered to replace expired kits. Although Indiana?s in place
medical support meets our criteria, the local CSEPP officials expressed
concern about the contracted ambulance service. It will not transport
contaminated victims because it has no proper way to clean the vehicle. The
Veterans? Administration in Danville, Ill., will provide the ambulance
service. CSEPP provided 22 units; they are operational. CSEPP staffing/
personnel vacancies
Yes All CSEPP positions filled. Personal protective equipment Partial Only
32 of 200 suits have been distributed, distribution is ongoing. Protective
actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Yes
No The Vermillion County jail is over- pressurized. The state is considering
over
pressurizing two schools located in the immediate response zone. The
counties have the funding needed to purchase the sheltering kits. Indiana
has no sheltering kits in place at this time. Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional. Brochures,
calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting
CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning No
Indiana does not have a reentry plan at this time
Kentucky Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes*
Partial Yes
CSEPP provided 29 all are in the immediate response zone. According to the
state, five additional sirens will be installed in July 2001. The tone alert
radio distribution has not been completed. The local communities plan to
complete distribution by September 2001. CSEPP provided three highway reader
boards. Automated data processing Yes The Emergency Management Information
System and the Federal Emergency
Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the
Emergency Management Information System is used regularly. Communications
system Yes CSEPP?s approved automated telephone dialing system is in five of
nine counties.
Kentucky also has dedicated phone lines and an 800- megahertz communication
system; both are complete and operational. Coordinated plans Partial
Coordinated plans are still in draft form; they have not yet been approved.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 54 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Emergency operations center
joint information center
Yes Yes
The emergency operations centers are fully operational. The joint
information center is located across from the emergency operations center in
Madison County. It has been used during exercises. Exercise program Yes The
state participates in tabletop, federally managed full- scale and alternate
year
exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises Medical support
decontamination units Partial
Yes* Thirteen hospitals participate in the program. Only half the hospitals
have the needed
antidote and more medical training is required. CSEPP purchased 13 units;
they are operational. Madison County wants to purchase three Wells Fargo
storage trailers to accompany the decontamination units. CSEPP staffing/
personnel vacancies
Yes All requested CSEPP positions are funded. Personal protective equipment/
suits Yes* CSEPP purchased over 1, 000 suits. The state identified a need
for 200 additional
suits for replacement and training. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Partial
Yes The Army is installing overpressurization systems at two schools and one
hospital. At
least 35 additional facilities will need other forms of enhanced sheltering
capability, such as the installation of carbon filters. In addition,
Kentucky will use prepositioned school buses to evacuate children if an
incident occurs during school hours. FEMA is planning to fund this effort.
The shelter- in- place kits distribution began Dec. 2000. Public outreach/
education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Citizens Advisory Commission is in place and functional. Brochures,
calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting
CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning No
Kentucky does not have a reentry plan at this time.
Maryland Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes
NR Yes
CSEPP provided 15 sirens; 9 are off- post. They are in place and
operational. Tone alert radios are no longer required because of the Army
implementing effort to reduce the risk of an incident occurring at the
stockpile site. The population ?at risk? was reduced from 333,000 to 55,
000. CSEPP did not provide highway reader boards; this capability was in
existence prior to CSEPP. Automated data processing Yes The Emergency
Management Information System and the Federal Emergency
Management Information System are installed in the state and counties; the
Emergency Management Information System is used regularly.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 55 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Communications system Yes CSEPP?s approved automated telephone dialing
system is in place. Maryland also has dedicated phone lines, an 800-
megahertz communication system, cellular telephones, and pagers. The state
has access to the radio amateur civil emergency service. Coordinated plans
Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised. Emergency operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes The emergency operations centers are fully operational.
The joint information center is located across from the emergency operations
center in Madison County. It has been used during exercises. Exercise
program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-
scale and alternate- year
exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises Medical support
decontamination units Yes
Yes Six hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided,
and no antidote
is required given the chemical agent stored at the stockpile site. CSEPP
purchased two units; they are operational. CSEPP staffing/ personnel
vacancies Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. The state noted that it is
difficult to attract and retain
highly qualified automation specialists. Personal protective equipment/
suits Yes CSEPP purchased over 400 suits. The suits have been distributed to
the state?s first
responder agencies. Protective actions
overpressurization projects shelter- in- place kits
Yes NR
Army collective protection specialists are working to enhance the
overpressure capability at one of the four schools that have this system.
Shelter- in- place kits are no longer required due to the Army implementing
effort to reduce the risk of an incident occurring at the stockpile site.
Population ?at risk? was reduced from 333,000 to 55, 000 Public outreach/
education community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Maryland Citizens Advisory Commission and Maryland Community Integrated
Process Team are in place and functional. Brochures, calendars, and other
similar materials are being used in the communities to educate the public
about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP?s standards are in
place and offered regularly. Reentry planning No Maryland does not have a
reentry plan at this time.
Oregon Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes*
Yes Yes
CSEPP provided 49 sirens, 42 are off- post. A new study is under way, the
state estimates there is a need for at least five additional sirens. Tone
alert radios have been distributed. CSEPP provided nine highway reader
boards. Automated data processing Yes Only the Umatilla depot has both he
Emergency Management Information System
and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully
operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management
Information System regularly.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 56 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Communications system Partial The state and counties have a tactical radio
system in use on a set of VERY HIGH FREQUENCY frequencies. However, it does
not meet CSEPP?s standards. FEMA is funding the state?s requirement for a
450- megahertz system. Coordinated plans Yes Coordinated plans (incident
command system) were approved January 2001 Emergency operations center
joint information center
Yes Yes
The emergency operations centers are fully operational. The joint
information center is collocated with the Umatilla County Emergency
Operations Center. It has been used during exercises. Exercise program Yes
The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full- scale and
alternate year
exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises. Medical support
decontamination units Yes
Yes Three hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided,
and the
antidote is available. CSEPP purchased four units; they are operational.
CSEPP staffing/ personnel vacancies
Yes* All CSEPP positions are filled. The county requested a full- time
equivalent position for a systems administrator, and Morrow County would
like CSEPP to provide five bi county positions whose funding is currently
shared with the county. Personal protective equipment Yes* CSEPP purchased
500 suits. The state indicated that there is a need for 300
additional suits and some extra- large sized suits. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits Yes*
Yes CSEPP over- pressurized 12 schools, 2 hospitals, and 1 nursing home.
FEMA will
fund five additional facilities to be outfitted with an overpressurization
system. In addition to having overpressurization capability, local CSEPP
officials have requested monitors to determine if chemical agent is present.
The shelter- in- place kits have been distributed. Public outreach/
education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
A Citizens Advisory Commission and governor- appointed executive review
panel are in place and functional. Brochures, calendars, and other similar
materials are being used in the communities to educate the public about
CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting CSEPP?s standards are in place
and offered regularly. Reentry planning No Oregon does not have a reentry
plan at this time.
Utah Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes*
Yes Yes*
CSEPP provided the off- post community with 37 sirens. A recent study
validated the need for 22 additional sirens. Tone alert radios were
distributed to every household in the immediate response zone. FEMA funded a
recent request for nine reader boards.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 57 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s
assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Automated data processing Yes The state and counties have both the Emergency
Management Information System
and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully
operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management
Information System regularly. Communications system Yes CSEPP?s approved
automated telephone dialing system is in place. Utah also has
dedicated phone lines, an 800- megahertz communication system, and pagers.
The state has access to the radio amateur civil emergency service.
Coordinated plans Yes Coordinated plans are in place and operational.
Emergency operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes The emergency operations centers are fully operational.
The joint information center is located at the former Officers? Club at the
Tooele Army Depot. It has been used during exercises. Exercise program Yes
The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full- scale and
alternate year
exercises. It also participates in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises. Medical support
decontamination units Yes
Yes Three hospitals participate in the program, training has been provided,
and the
antidote is available. CSEPP purchased four units and is in the process of
purchasing one more; they are operational. CSEPP staffing/ personnel
vacancies Yes All CSEPP positions are filled. Personal protective equipment/
suits Yes* CSEPP purchased 300 suits; they are operational and have been
provided to first
responder agencies. Replacement suits are now needed. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits NR
Yes The state, with FEMA?s input, decided that overpressurization was not
required,
given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community. The
shelter- in- place kits were distributed with the tone alert radios. Public
outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
Utah has a Citizens Advisory Commission in place and operational. Brochures,
calendars, and other similar materials are being used in the communities to
educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training programs meeting
CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly. Reentry planning
Partial The state indicated that it has a two- step initial plan in place
but said that FEMA or
the Army does not financially support it.
Washington Critical item
GAO?s assessment, Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP
officials
Alert and notification
sirens
tone alert radios
reader boards Yes
Yes Yes
CSEPP provided 20 off- post sirens. The tone alert radios were distributed
to every household in the immediate response zone. The state has 10 highway
reader boards.
Appendix IV: Status of CSEPP?s Critical Items in 10 States
Page 58 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Critical item GAO?s assessment,
Feb. 28, 2001 Summary of comments by state and local CSEPP officials
Automated data processing Yes The state and county have both the Emergency
Management Information System
and the Federal Emergency Management Information System. Both are fully
operational. The state and counties use the Federal Emergency Management
Information System regularly. Communications system Yes CSEPP?s approved
automated telephone dialing system is in place and
operational. Washington also has a high- band radio frequency system,
dedicated phone lines, an 800- megahertz communication system, and pagers.
The state has access to the radio amateur civil emergency service.
Coordinated plans Yes Plans are in place and have been exercised. Emergency
operations center
joint information center Yes
Yes The emergency operations centers are fully operational.
The joint information center is collocated with the Umatilla County
Emergency Operations Center. It has been used during exercises. Exercise
program Yes The state participates in tabletop, federally managed full-
scale, and alternate- year
exercises. They also participate in quarterly Chemical Accident/ Incident
Response and Assistant exercises. Medical support
decontamination units Yes Five hospitals participate in the program,
training has been provided, and the
antidote is available. CSEPP purchased seven units; they are operational.
CSEPP staffing/ personnel vacancies
Yes* All CSEPP positions are filled. The county is seeking an additional
full- time equivalent position for automation support. The state noted that
it is difficult to attract and retain highly qualified automation
specialists. Personal protective equipment Yes The state has more that 300
suits; they are in place and operational. Protective actions
overpressurization projects
shelter- in- place kits NR
Yes The state, with FEMA?s input, decided that over- pressurization was not
required,
given the distance between the stockpile site and the nearest community.
Shelter- in- place kits were distributed with the tone alert radios.
Public outreach/ education
community involvement
public awareness campaign
Yes Yes
Washington does not have its own Citizens Advisory Commission but has
representation on the Citizens Advisory Commission in Oregon and has
representation on the Oregon?s governor- appointed executive review panel.
Brochures, newsletters, and other similar materials are being used in the
communities to educate the public about CSEPP. Training Yes Training
programs meeting CSEPP?s standards are in place and offered regularly.
Reentry planning Partial Washington has a preliminary plan in place but it
states that the Army and FEMA
do not support it.
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 59 GAO- 01- 850
Chemical Weapons
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 60 GAO- 01- 850
Chemical Weapons
Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 61 GAO- 01- 850
Chemical Weapons
Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA Page 62 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA
Appendix VI: Comments From FEMA Page 63 GAO- 01- 850 Chemical Weapons
(350002)
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