Department of Energy: Follow-Up Review of the National Ignition Facility (01-JUN-01, GAO-01-677R)
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, operated by the
University of California under contract with the Department of
Energy (DOE), is constructing the National Ignition Facility
(NIF) to simulate, in a laboratory setting, the thermonuclear
conditions created in nuclear explosion. This will allow
scientists to evaluate the behavior of nuclear weapons without
explosive testing. This report reviews (1) the role of NIF in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, (2) the relationship of NIF to
other Stockpile Stewardship Program elements, (3) the impact of
delays in constructing NIF on the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
(4) a description of funds spent to date on the project, and (5)
an assessment of whether the new baseline has clear goals,
adequate and sustainable funding and achievable milestones. GAO
found that (1) NIF is expected to contribute to DOE's Stockpile
Stewardship by attracting new scientists, supporting the
stockpile's refurbishment, and supporting research to improve the
understanding of weapons science, (2) DOE has yet to certify that
the completion of NIF will not negatively affect the balance of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, (3) future delays in
constructing NIF may adversely affect DOE's ability to conduct
weapons science research, (4) through fiscal year 2000, DOE has
spent $1.3 billion on the NIF project, plus another $250 million
in related costs (mostly those supporting research and
development), and (5) the new baseline for NIF (a) contain goals
that are clouded by the lack of consensus among the three
national laboratories about what size NIF should be and how it
should be deployed, (b) contain optimistic assumptions about
NIF's operating costs that may compromise future budget
projections, and (c) do not contain any short-term milestones.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-677R
ACCNO: A01115
TITLE: Department of Energy: Follow-Up Review of the National
Ignition Facility
DATE: 06/01/2001
SUBJECT: Schedule slippages
Cost overruns
Facility construction
Nuclear weapons testing
Laboratories
Weapons research and development
DOE Accelerated Strategic Computing
Initiative
DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program
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GAO-01-677R
Page 1 GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
June 1, 2001 The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member Armed Services Committee United States Senate
The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Subject: Department of Energy: Follow- Up Review of the National Ignition
Facility The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, operated by the
University of California under contract with the Department of Energy (DOE),
is constructing the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore,
California. In this stadium- sized laser facility, DOE?s goal is to
simulate, in a laboratory setting, the thermonuclear conditions created in
nuclear explosions. This will allow scientists to evaluate the behavior of
nuclear weapons without explosive testing. DOE considers NIF an essential
element of its multi- billion- dollar Stockpile Stewardship Program, which
is responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in
the absence of nuclear testing.
On August 8, 2000, we issued identical reports on NIF to the Subcommittee on
Military Procurement, House Committee on Armed Services, and to the House
Committee on Science. 1 These reports highlighted the reasons for NIF?s cost
and schedule overruns, the effects of cost and schedule problems on other
weapons and science programs, and the effectiveness of the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory's actions to correct its project management problems.
In our reports, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy arrange for an
independent outside scientific and technical review of NIF?s remaining
technical challenges as they relate
1 See National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused
Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays (GAO/ RCED- 00- 141 Aug. 8, 2000)
and National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused
Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays (GAO/ RCED- 00- 271 Aug. 8, 2000).
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 2
to the project?s cost and schedule risks. In addition, we recommended that
the
Secretary not reallocate funds from nuclear weapons programs to NIF until
DOE evaluates the impact of NIF?s cost and schedule plan on the overall
weapons program and certifies that the selected NIF plan will not negatively
affect the balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 directed the
General Accounting Office to review the NIF and to report to the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services by March 31, 2001. The review was to
include
the role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the relationship of
NIF to other Stockpile Stewardship Program elements, the impact of delays in
constructing NIF on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a description of
funds spent to date on the project, and an assessment of whether the new
baseline has clear goals, adequate and sustainable funding, and achievable
milestones.
In discussions with the staff of both committees, it was agreed that a
formal briefing by March 31, 2001, would meet the congressional mandate. We
provided a briefing for the staff on March 30, 2001, using the enclosed
briefing slides. (See enc. I.) This letter summarizes the briefing.
The following summarizes our findings:
The Role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program
NIF is expected to contribute to DOE's Stockpile Stewardship Program in
three ways: by attracting new weapon scientists, supporting the stockpile's
refurbishment, 2 and supporting research to improve the understanding of
weapons science. Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore laboratory
officials have a general consensus that NIF, along with other scientific
facilities, can attract new scientists to the stewardship program. However,
because of the timing of planned stockpile refurbishments, NIF will not make
any contribution to the refurbishment of W76 and W80 warheads or the B61-
Mod 7 and 11 bombs in the stockpile. Although NIF is expected to support
research efforts to develop the capabilities needed to certify the
stockpile's safety and reliability, including the validation of computer
codes for the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, 3 the three
laboratories lack a complete consensus on NIF?s research contribution. While
all of the three weapons laboratories agree that NIF is one of several
important facilities needed to successfully support weapons science
research, Los Alamos National Laboratory officials believe that using
plutonium in NIF and achieving robust (repeatable) thermonuclear ignition
are key to NIF?s value in the area of studying weapons primaries. However,
NIF has not been approved for using plutonium, and the achievement of
ignition is not guaranteed. Moreover, Sandia National Laboratories
2 Refurbishment activities include extending the life of existing weapons
through scientific study and replacing parts. 3 The Initiative aims to
develop advanced computer models that will simulate nuclear explosions in
three dimensions with higher resolution than previous models.
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 3
officials believe that NIF will not contribute to certifying whether weapons
can
survive hostile environments (those where radiation is present), and intend
to rely instead on existing research facilities and computer simulations.
The Relationship of NIF to Other Stockpile Stewardship Program Elements
DOE has yet to certify that the completion of NIF will not negatively affect
the balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. NIF is one of numerous
facilities needed to successfully conduct the program. For example, other
scientific research facilities will be needed to conduct weapons science
research, and functioning production facilities will be needed to refurbish
the stockpile. Although we recommended in our August reports that DOE
evaluate and certify that NIF?s cost and schedule would not negatively
affect the balance of the program, the Department has not done so.
The Impact of Delays in Constructing the NIF on the Stockpile Stewardship
Program
Future delays in constructing NIF may adversely affect DOE's ability to
conduct weapons science research. DOE and laboratory officials agree that
delays in constructing NIF to date will not affect meeting its current
weapons science research milestones but that any additional delays may
affect the ability to attract and retain scientists who desire to work on
sophisticated science facilities such as the NIF. In addition, NIF delays
would postpone certain weapons- related experiments, which would increase,
to some extent, the uncertainties associated with understanding how weapons
function.
A Description of Funds Spent to Date on the Project
Through fiscal year 2000, DOE had spent $1. 3 billion on the NIF project,
plus another $250 million in related costs (mostly those supporting research
and development). NIF's completion is expected in 2008 at a cost of almost
$4. 2 billion ($ 3.5 billion in the NIF project's costs and about $700
million more in related costs). This would result in a schedule that is 6
years longer than originally planned and a cost that is about $1. 4 billion
higher than originally estimated. NIF's cost increases and delays were
caused by a combination of poor Lawrence Livermore management and inadequate
DOE oversight.
An Assessment of Whether the New Baseline Has Clear Goals, Adequate and
Sustainable Funding, and Achievable Milestones
New baseline goals for NIF are clouded by a lack of consensus among the
three laboratories about what size NIF should be and how it should be
deployed. Proposals from DOE's Los Alamos and Sandia laboratories would
limit NIF?s size to 48, 96, or 120 laser beams until NIF's performance could
be assured. Livermore states that building a smaller NIF would not be cost-
effective, since most of the infrastructure supporting the full 192- beam
design will soon be completed. Livermore estimates that pausing at 48, 96,
or 120 beams, to assess NIF performance before restarting, could add up to
nearly $600 million in increased
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 4
project costs. Livermore?s cost estimates for alternative deployment options
have
not been independently reviewed by DOE or others. Optimistic assumptions
about NIF?s annual operating costs may compromise budget projections.
Livermore?s projected annual NIF operating cost of $108 million is based on
some optimistic assumptions. The major assumption is that a fourfold
increase can be achieved in the performance of NIF?s final optics laser
glass. Replacing glass more often will significantly increase the cost of
operating the laser. Although the laboratory states that it has a scientific
solution to the technical problem of damage growth in the final optics when
laser light strikes the glass surface, the concept has yet to be tested in
an engineering and production environment. Other optimistic laboratory
assumptions include NIF's obtaining reduced Livermore overhead rates and
being excused from contributing project funds to support Livermore?s
Laboratory Directed Research and Development program-- normally a 6- percent
charge levied on all laboratory programs.
Although past internal reviewers concluded that NIF?s milestones are
challenging but doable, most major performance milestones will not occur
until fiscal year 2004, when the first test of a laser beamline is to be
made. Livermore has developed a detailed plan of NIF's milestones, including
a revised comprehensive work breakdown structure. Past internal reviewers
concluded that NIF could be built within the cost and schedule represented
by these milestones. However, to better ensure tracking of progress, other
laboratories and program reviewers recommended that more near- term
milestones be added in order to assess NIF laser performance.
Other Issues- Continuing Problems with DOE Oversight, Project Management,
and the Lack of an Independent External Review Process Add to the NIF
Project's Risks
Persistent DOE oversight problems continue to place the NIF project at risk.
The NIF project office at DOE's headquarters is still not fully staffed, and
the laboratory?s monthly NIF reports to DOE do not summarize technical
project risks.
The NIF project does not manage about $700 million in research and
development that directly supports NIF. This research primarily involves
activities related to target physics and is considered crucial to NIF?s
success. This research is managed outside the NIF project and is not
included in NIF's monthly reporting. DOE is currently studying how these
activities might be brought under the NIF project's control so that the
project and its supporting research are fully integrated under a single
management structure.
NIF still lacks an independent external review process. Independent external
reviews are valuable for measuring cost, schedule, and technical success in
any large and ambitious science project. Yet, no such external independent
reviews of NIF have been conducted or planned. DOE?s own orders state that
external independent reviews are beneficial; however, DOE plans to continue
its own internal review program-- allowing Defense Programs officials to
manage the
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 5
process themselves. An external cost review conducted in August 2000 was not
independent, according to both the contracted reviewer and a DOE official
overseeing the review. The review was conducted in support of an internal
review, not as a separate effort. While DOE's current internal reviews are
valuable, an external independent review, as we recommended in our August
2000 reports, would provide the confidence that the NIF project is
technically feasible and reasonable with respect to cost and schedule.
Agency Comments
We met with Department of Energy officials and provided them with a draft of
our briefing slides for comment. The Department generally agreed with our
findings and offered several clarifying changes, which we have incorporated
as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we interviewed Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and DOE officials responsible for NIF and officials from other
DOE laboratories and scientific institutions whose programs are affected by
NIF. In addition, we obtained the latest cost and schedule data from DOE,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and other laboratories conducting
research in support of the NIF project. We conducted our review from October
2000 through March 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government
audit standards.
_ _ _ _ _ This letter will also be available on GAO?s home page at http://
www. gao. gov. If you have any questions about this letter or need
additional information, please call me on (202)- 512- 3464 or Gary Boss on
(202) 512- 6964. Key contributors to this report were Gary Boss, James Noel,
Thomas Kingham, and William Lanouette.
(Ms.) Gary Jones Director Natural Resources
and Environment Enclosure
Enclosure I Page 6 GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National
Ignition Facility
Briefing Charts on NIF
Status of GAO?s Followup Review of the Department of Energy?s National
Ignition Facility
Prepared for the House and Senate Armed Service Committees
March 30, 2001 GAO?s Objectives The National Defense Authorization Act for
2001 required a
GAO review of the following:
Role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
Relationship of NIF to other SSP elements Impact of delays in NIF on SSP
Description of funds spent to date Assessment of whether the new baseline
has
clear goals
adequate and sustainable funding
achievable milestones
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 7
Background
NIF completion is expected in 2008 at a cost of $3. 5 billion, with
another $700- plus million in related research and program costs
NIF is taking 6 years longer and $1. 4 billion more to complete than was
originally planned
NIF?s Role in the Stockpile Stewardship Program
NIF is part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program-- an integrated program to
maintain the nation?s nuclear weapons in a safe and reliable state
NIF is expected to contribute to stockpile stewardship by
Attracting and training new weapon scientists
Supporting and refurbishing the stockpile
Supporting research ?campaigns? to improve understanding of weapons
science
Although funded by the Energy Department?s Defense Programs, NIF is also
expected to make contributions to basic science
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 8
NIF?s Role-- Attract Scientists
NIF can contribute to attracting new scientists
By providing a scientific challenge, NIF, along with other facilities and
activities, is an important factor in attracting and retaining scientists
Prior to the end of testing, a nuclear weapon test was the primary method
for training weapons designers
Absent testing, multiple scientific facilities, like NIF, will be needed to
train and evaluate new weapons designers
NIF?s Role-- Refurbish Stockpile
NIF will not make any contribution to planned stockpile refurbishments
DOE plans to rebuild the W76 and W80 warheads, and the B61- Mod 7 and 11
bombs, in order to extend their lifetimes
Because of the timing of these refurbishments and the approach being taken
to refurbishment, NIF will have no role in meeting production deadlines
NIF also will not contribute to certifying the remanufactured W88 pit
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 9
NIF?s Role-- Support Campaigns
NIF is expected to support four weapons science
?campaigns?
?Campaigns? are research efforts to develop capabilities needed to certify
stockpile safety and reliability
NIF is expected to support campaigns on:
Weapon secondaries (thermonuclear explosive) (including ignition)
Weapon primaries (nuclear explosive)
Dynamic properties of materials in weapons
Hostile (radiation) environments
NIF experiments also will help validate computer codes for the Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI)
NIF?s Role-- Support Campaigns
Complete consensus among laboratories is lacking on NIF?s contribution to
weapons science ?campaigns?
All labs agree that NIF is important for supporting the weapon secondaries
campaign
The labs do not fully agree on NIF?s value to the primary and materials
campaigns
Los Alamos believes that, while NIF can be useful, using plutonium in NIF
and achieving robust (repeatable) ignition are key to NIF?s value for
supporting the primaries campaign
Livermore agrees ignition is key to NIF?s value
However, NIF has not been approved for using plutonium, and achieving
ignition is not guaranteed
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 10
NIF?s Role-- Support Campaigns
Los Alamos believes other facilities, such as the Z pulsed- power machine,
are better for studying materials
Sandia believes NIF will not contribute to certifying that weapons can
survive hostile environments
Sandia officials intend to rely on existing facilities, such as the Saturn
pulsed power machine, and weapons simulation through computer modeling
NIF?s Relationship to other Elements of Stockpile Stewardship
While NIF is important, other facilities are needed to successfully support
weapons science campaigns
For example, the Dual- Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test facility (Los
Alamos) is needed to assess the condition and behavior of nuclear weapon
primaries- however, this facility is still under construction
In addition, operational weapons production facilities are needed to
refurbish the stockpile
For example, a functioning Y- 12 Plant (Oak Ridge) is needed to refurbish
weapon secondaries- currently, portions of Y- 12 are shut down for safety
reasons
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 11
NIF?s Relationship to other Elements of Stockpile Stewardship
Because all aspects of Stockpile Stewardship are important, we recommended,
in August 2000, that DOE evaluate and certify that the NIF?s cost and
schedule problems would not negatively affect the balance of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program
DOE has not evaluated the impact of NIF?s cost and schedule problems on the
balance of the SSP, especially the need to refurbish the stockpile and
rebuild its infrastructure
The Impact of NIF Delays On Stockpile Stewardship
NIF?s original delays will not affect meeting current weapons science
campaign milestones
According to DOE officials, additional delays may affect their ability to
attract and retain scientists
According to Los Alamos and Livermore weapons scientists, additional delays
or NIF?s termination will increase, to some degree, the uncertainties
associated with their understanding about how weapons function
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 12
Description of Funds Supporting NIF
Cost Category Prior Years FY 2001 FY 2002- 2008 Totals TPC 916.3 290. 1
1041. 7 2248.1 R& D (ICF) 402.7 75.9 721. 4 1200.0 REBASELINE
TOTAL 1319.0 366.0 1763. 1 3448.1 Target Physics
(LLNL) 173.0 30.0 291. 0 494.0
TOTAL LLNL 1492.0 396.0 2054. 1 3942.1 Other labs/ contractors 71.3 14.7
105. 6 191.6
UK Contribution 0. 0 9. 2 36. 8 46. 0
TOTAL 1563.3 419.9 2196. 5 4179.7
New NIF Baseline-- Clarity of Goals
New baseline goals are clouded by the lack of consensus among the weapons
labs-- the users of NIF-- on what size NIF should be or how it should be
deployed
While agreement exists that NIF should be built, the three nuclear weapons
labs provided alternative to DOE
Livermore advocated an accelerated schedule for completing NIF with all
192 beams
Los Alamos proposed limiting NIF to 120 beams until NIF performance could
be successfully demonstrated
Sandia proposed a 48- 96 beam NIF until specific milestones could be met
DOE is attempting to reconcile these different views
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 13
New NIF Baseline-- Clarity of Goals
According to Livermore Lab
Building a smaller NIF is less costly, but this is not a cost effective
strategy since the infrastructure for a full NIF is to be built early
Pausing the NIF for tests after 48 or 120 beams, and then restarting
later, makes the NIF more costly to build and causes a multi- year delay
Accelerating the schedule for completing NIF would save $219 million
Importantly, Livermore Lab estimates have not been independently reviewed
or carefully studied by DOE
New NIF Baseline-- Clarity of Goals
Options Savings/ Added Cost
48 Beams only Savings = $540 M 1 96 Beams only Savings = $442 M 1 120 Beams
only Savings = $388 M 1 48 Beams (3 year pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $583M
2 96 Beams (3 year pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $379M 2 120 Beams (3 year
pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $272M 2 1 These represent theoretical savings
in budget authority by terminating NIF. They do not include termination
expenses. 2 These figures were developed by NIF managers at Lawrence
Livermore and presented to DOE. They were not independently verified.
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 14
New NIF Baseline-- Adequate and Sustainable Funding
NIF?s internal reviewers concluded that Livermore?s new baseline for NIF
is challenging, but doable
None of NIF?s reviewers reported on project risks in the context of future
cost and schedule impacts
New NIF Baseline-- Adequate and Sustainable Funding
An important funding issue is the cost to operate NIF once it is completed
Livermore estimates NIF annual operating costs of $108 million (FY 2001
dollars) when NIF is fully operational in FY 2011
Livermore says its estimate is a detailed, bottom- up review based on prior
experience operating laser machines
Livermore?s operating cost estimates have not been reviewed by us, DOE,
program reviewers, outside peers, or by independent cost reviewers
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 15
New NIF Baseline-- Adequate and Sustainable Funding
Livermore?s operating cost estimate contains optimistic assumptions
A 4- fold improvement in the useful life of its most sensitive optics (final
optics)-- saving about $50 million annually
Lab claims it has a plan for making optics last longer-- internal program
reviewers agreed but want more research to confirm success
Reduction from Livermore?s normal overhead rates
Exclusion from the Laboratory Directed Research and Development tax (6 %),
which is assessed on all laboratory programs for sponsoring independent
research
New NIF Baseline-- Achievability of NIF?s Milestones
Livermore has a detailed plan of NIF?s milestones, including a comprehensive
work breakdown structure
Past internal reviewers concluded that NIF?s milestones are challenging but
doable and that NIF can be built on cost and schedule
While NIF?s milestones are detailed and well developed
The first milestone that demonstrates machine performance isn?t until FY
2004 when ?first light? is expected
The first weapons experiments with beams aren?t scheduled until FY 2006,
when 48 beams are installed and commissioned
Other labs and reviewers suggested that more near- term milestones be
added to assess laser performance
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 16
Other Issues
Continuing oversight concerns
Although DOE?s federal staff in Livermore now report directly to the NIF
Project Office in headquarters, the same people have performed oversight
since 1999 when NIF?s cost and schedule grew unnoticed
The NIF Project Office in DOE is not fully staffed, further limiting DOE?s
ability to oversee the NIF project
Livermore?s monthly status reports on NIF do not summarize project risks,
the absence of which prevents more effective oversight by DOE and others
Other Issues
Project management issues
Nearly $700 million in NIF research and development work is still managed
outside the control of the NIF Project
These activities are not part of monthy NIF reporting, even though it is
crucial for NIF success
DOE is considering placing this research and development under the control
of the NIF Project
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 17
Other Issues
Project management issues (continued)
DOE stated, in its September 2000 certification to Congress, that it will
prepare a ?report? on how it intends to address issues raised in two prior
NIF reviews (the Carlson- Lehman Defense Program Review and a cost review by
the Burns and Roe engineering firm)
DOE has not fully documented how it has responded to past review findings
and recommendations
Without full documentation, it is unclear if the results from prior
reviews have been fully addressed
Other Issues
Independent review issues
Independent NIF external review is still needed
Independent reviews are crucial to NIF cost, schedule, and technical success
Internal program reviews have been useful, but are no substitute for
independent external review
DOE intends to continue its internal program review of NIF but will allow
Defense Program officials to manage the process
Internal program reviews would have more credibility if managed by officials
outside of Defense Programs, which sponsors NIF
Enclosure I
GAO- 01- 677R Follow- up Review of DOE?s National Ignition Facility Page 18
Other Issues
Independent review issues (continued)
An external review conducted in August 2000, claimed by DOE to provide an
independent review, was not independent according to both the reviewers and
a DOE official
As we recommended in August 2000, an external independent review of NIF is
still needed to provide confidence that the project is technically feasible
and reasonable with respect to cost and schedule
DOE Comments
We asked DOE to review this briefing document
DOE provided clarifying comments which have been incorporated into this
document
(360016)
*** End of document. ***
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