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41 Regulatory Compliance

41.01

Commentors state that DOE did not provide enough advance public outreach and notice for the public hearings. Several commentors believe many groups were underrepresented at the hearings including: minority, downstream, and rural communities; Georgia government officials; and SRS employees. The commentors suggest that DOE should make a special effort to involve these groups in public involvement and should also train the minority communities in order for them to contribute substantial comments. Commentors recommend that DOE include visiting schools and universities, and produce better advertisements to notify the public about the program. Another commentor suggests that DOE should automatically notify those who have participated in the past and national offices of groups that would be interested in the topics at stake. One commentor suggests that notices should be at least one month in advance. Other commentors state that there was plenty of notice for meetings and commended DOE for the effort in writing the document, holding the public hearings, and answering questions from the public. One commentor asks how to receive copies of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.

• Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10[c]). The public comment period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment on the document since preferred alternatives were identified in the Draft PEIS. DOE has had an extensive and ongoing public outreach program on the Complex since the Reconfiguration Program was proposed in 1990. DOE has utilized several different methods for publicizing public meetings and providing Program information to the public. In addition to advertising in the traditional media, notices and meeting information have been made available electronically and various program documents can be requested or accessed using the toll-free information line, the electronic bulletin board (Internet), and the World Wide Web DOE Home Page. A speaker's bureau has also been established with DOE officials available on a limited basis as requested to speak with interested groups concerning DP activities and issues. This can be requested through the toll-free line or the electronic bulletin board services. DOE has continued to keep the public informed during the public comment period and will continue to do so through the publication of the ROD.

41.02

The commentor does not understand the recent decision on DAHRT, where the judge claims that it is only required that an environmental study be completed, not that it would be found to not have negative effects. Commentor believes that NEPA just delays actions; it does not change them. The commentor notes that NEPA only requires EISs and public hearings; it does not mandate that anyone choose the least destructive course of action.

• Response: The regulations for implementing NEPA state, "The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment" (40 CFR 1500.1[c]). Preparation of NEPA documents as the commentor points out are part of the process. "The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals defined in the act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government" (40 CFR 1502.1). The scheduling of proposed actions which require NEPA review includes the necessary time for complying with NEPA and in most cases does not delay the action. NEPA does not mandate that an agency select the least destructive course of action but does require that the agency "... identify and assess the reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize adverse effects of these actions upon the quality of the human environment" (40 CFR 1500.2[e]). DOE must demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of NEPA before making final decisions on its major Federal actions.

41.03

Commentors state that decisions to be made in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program were predetermined and that input from the public and local officials has little impact on the PEIS or decision process. Commentors express disappointment that DOE did not consider comments and suggestions from the scoping meetings and wonder to what extent public support at various candidate sites was considered in the PEIS process. One commentor points out that the preferred alternative is not always the final choice, while another commentor asks if there was a mechanism for citizens to get the ROD changed. A commentor states that if this is a democracy and majority rules, then the public should be allowed to vote on the PEIS. A commentor warns DOE that they must not underestimate the comments the public makes and that the public will not go away. The commentors also state that Congress and the President control DOE funding and they feel shut out of the defense spending authorization process. Specifically, one commentor notes that money has already been allocated for NIF in DOE's budget for fiscal year 1997. Commentors feel that DOE is withholding important information from the public. Another commentor states that DOE should provide the public with information that would allow them to participate in policy development, and that the "classified for national security" blanket should be removed. Another commentor perceives DOE's position on national security policy as being a policy of so much complexity that it is well beyond the grasp of the public.

• Response: DOE has not made any decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS proposed actions. DOE has identified in section 3.8 of the Final PEIS the preferred alternatives for both stockpile stewardship and stockpile management. The ROD on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will be issued no earlier than 30 days following the issuance of the Final PEIS. The decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will be identified in the ROD. The ROD, which will be published in the Federal Register and is a publicly available document, will also include the rationale and various factors used by DOE in making the decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
  
  Chapter 2 of the PEIS discusses the national security policy considerations and the role they play in defining the purpose and need of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program was developed in response to changing world conditions, an end to the Cold War, and the reaffirmation of the proposed CTBT. DOE participates regularly in Congressional hearings on defense issues in which the stockpile stewardship and management issues are discussed. Congress determines how funds are allocated and DOE spends monies consistent with Congressional direction. Therefore, Congress ultimately determines whether the decisions resulting from the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS will be implemented.

41.04

Commentors state that DOE cannot expect the public to make decisions on DOE programs in bits and pieces.

• Response: Since the time when the original commitment was made to prepare a PEIS on reconfiguration of the Complex and a PEIS on environmental restoration and waste management, the world has changed significantly. Most importantly, the Cold War has ended, the Nation's nuclear arsenal is being reduced significantly, and a significant amount of special nuclear materials have become surplus to national security needs. These changed circumstances have had a significant effect on DOE's strategic planning, and the PEISs being prepared are responsive to these new circumstances. Because of the large scope of these programs there is no way to avoid some overlap of issues. However, the purpose and need for DOE's proposed programs and relationships between these programs are clearly described in each of the PEISs and site-wide NEPA documents. Section 1.7, Other National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, of the PEIS discusses other DOE programs and their relationship to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.

41.05

The commentors express widely differing views on the PEIS public hearing scheduling, formats, and content. Commentors state that DOE did not tell the truth to the public in the PEIS and the meetings were nothing more than public relations efforts and not worth the cost and effort to hold them; that transcripts be taken at meetings and incorporated into the PEIS so that comments could be accurately tracked and responses verified; that the modified format was better than before because some people may hesitate to approach a microphone during public hearings; that the format should be adhered to and not changed mid-meeting, and that the meetings should focus on environmental impacts, not impacts to peace. Other commentors express the view that the public meetings are a valuable forum for the public and hope that DOE will continue their use. Many commentors favor the formal hearing format rather than the workshop format. One commentor also points out that 1) public meetings are attended by and large by the same people grinding out their own agendas and obviously not interested in facts; 2) too many participants suggest they are representing the public; often this amounts to a public of 1 or 2; and 3) meetings provide a forum for many negative anti-establishment and emotional, vitriolic attacks on any good faith efforts. Commentors ask many questions including: why didn't DOE have a meeting in Oakland, in addition to LLNL, for similar reasons Santa Fe hosted a public meeting; does NEPA allow DOE to lie in the PEIS; is DOE required to respond to comments from the public; why the comments collected do not go through an impartial agency rather than to the reading rooms; and why aren't there more means available for the public to express their opinions to DOE, rather than just NEPA. Another commentor states that the charts handed out at the meetings should be clearly labeled.

• Response: The public hearings on the Draft PEIS were conducted using a modified traditional hearing format. The change in format was in response to past public comments on the interactive public hearing format used for the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS and more recent requests by interested parties near several DOE sites. The modified format included a formal statement period in addition to the interactive session, and the recording of a verbatim transcript of the hearing in addition to the notation of comments by designated notetakers. Efforts were made by DOE to accommodate the public to as large an extent as was feasible. For this reason, modifications were also made between sites as necessary to fulfill special needs or requests from the public, elected officials, and site representatives. The additional public hearing was held in Santa Fe because of substantial public requests and because the city is located in proximity to two of the proposed alternative sites (LANL and SNL) which could potentially receive both stockpile stewardship and stockpile management missions. The principal area affected and public interest area for LLNL potential stewardship missions was the city of Livermore; therefore, only one meeting was held at Livermore.

41.06

Commentors state that the PEIS process was procedurally defective. One commentor states that there are perceived advantages which go to the locations where the PEIS authorship (Albuquerque Area Office) takes place. Another commentor believes that the PEIS pitted LANL and ORR against each other. In addition, the commentor suggests that DOE obtain competent independent evaluations, not location centered, but more broadly centered, using the expertise of people attending the meeting and elsewhere in the Nation to add more credibility to the entire PEIS process.

• Response: The analysis for the PEIS is conducted in accordance with CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021) and procedures. The DOE Albuquerque Operations Office's lead in preparing the support stockpile management alternatives reports with oversight of DOE Headquarters represented the best coordination point between stewardship and management elements of the Program. All proposed management alternatives were developed in cooperation with all DOE weapons complex sites. In addition, all supporting data and peer review were provided by each affected site and underwent a substantial comment and revision process. Technical experts at each site with relevant experience in each of the proposed mission areas at both the management and working level provided input and review. The process used in developing the management alternatives and the screening process for determining the preferred alternatives can be found in the Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives report and the Stockpile Management Preferred Alternatives Report which are available in the DOE Public Reading Rooms near each site.

41.07

A commentor suggests that a civilian review board be set up to oversight DOE. Other commentors point out that the Defense Facility Safety Review Board performs that responsibility now and that it has been recommended that EPA and OSHA be added to DOE facility oversight. One commentor states that citizen advisory boards are not accountable to the local citizens and do not speak for the citizens with respect to safety concerns.

• Response: Section 4.14 describes the regulations and requirements under which all DOE sites conduct their operations during the normal course of their work activities. This section also describes the applicable DOE orders requiring the reviews performed by the sites of all planned and existing construction and operation for potential accidents and the assessment of the associated human health and environmental consequences of an accident. The sites associated with the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program would comply with these DOE orders and update the appropriate safety documentation before authorization of construction or start of operations.
  
  On January 25, 1995, DOE created the Advisory Committee on External Regulation of Department of Energy Nuclear Safety and charged it with providing advice, information, and recommendations on whether and how new and existing DOE facilities and operations, except those covered under Executive Order 12344, might be externally regulated to ensure nuclear safety. The Advisory Committee has made the following recommendations concerning the structure of the external regulation: (1) an existing agency-either the NRC or a restructured Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board-regulate facility safety at all DOE nuclear facilities under the Atomic Energy Act; (2) OSHA regulate all protection of workers at DOE nuclear facilities under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, unless regulation of worker risks at a given facility could significantly interfere with maintaining facility safety in which case all worker protection would be regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; (3) EPA continue to regulate environmental protection matters for all DOE nuclear facilities and sites under the environmental statutes; and (4) states with programs authorized by the EPA, OSHA, or the regulator of facility safety acquire or continue to have roles in regulation of environmental protection, facility safety, and worker protection comparable to those they now exercise in the private sector. The committee believes these recommendations will strengthen, streamline, and simplify the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy has convened a DOE working group to review the recommendations and determine how to implement them. A report is due to the Secretary by the Fall of 1996. DOE, the Administration, and Congress will be involved in determining external regulations for DOE facilities.
  
  Advisory boards act as liaisons between the public and Federal, state, and local governments and agencies. The boards provide an important forum for stakeholders and agencies to explore complex problems and generally provide independent policy and technical advice to affected parties.

41.08

The commentors believe that the threat of using nuclear weapons and the environmental impacts that result from using the weapons are impacts that should be analyzed in the PEIS. According to a commentor, the nuclear arsenal is a temptation to those in power. Another commentor adds that stockpile stewardship and management does not cover the global consequences an accident like Chernobyl could cause. One commentor notes that the PEIS should state that the stockpile sizes discussed could obliterate the planet. The commentor believes that LANL is a bomb designer's dream come true and that the United States will use these weapons if it wants to. The commentor believes this because of a quote from DOD attorney John McNeil stating, "Nuclear weapons can be targeted in ways that either increase or decrease resulting incidental civilian injury and collateral damage, and their use may be lawful or not depending upon the enemy's conduct." The commentor does not agree with these views, especially the idea of incidental civilian injuries, considering the fact that there were 210,000 dead within months of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 300,000 survivors suffering slow deaths and painful lives over the next 50 years. Commentors state that the American people cannot trust that our nuclear weapons, if they exist, will not be used on civilians again. The commentors cite the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities, stating that it could have been demonstrated in a nonpopulated area to show U.S. capability. Commentors feel that there is no way to be aware of all the possible effects of nuclear weapons at this time. According to commentors technically there is too much that is unknown, and the world needs to obtain a better understanding of the impacts of nuclear materials. A commentor asks where in the PEIS the impacts to the present agricultural economy which has built and sustained the Texas Panhandle were; why were the risks to this economic stronghold not assessed; what will happen when we no longer produce food for people, where is our priority; are bombs more important than food. The commentor states that those in agriculture strive to produce quality, wholesome food for the world population--one farmer feeds in excess of 131 people, yet the industry across the road from us builds bombs to annihilate people. The commentor asks where is our sense of morality and respect for life. Food is the most important commodity we produce--it must be protected.

• Response: The use of nuclear weapons and the resulting environmental impacts are beyond the scope of this PEIS.

41.09

Commentors are concerned with the cost of the PEIS and would like DOE to spend taxpayer money more frugally. Another commentor asks how much money has been spent on the PEIS.

• Response: NEPA requires DOE to assure that major Federal actions are taken only after due consideration of their environmental impacts. Preparing a PEIS in compliance with NEPA is a complex and costly task for a program as complex as Stockpile Stewardship and Management. The cost to complete the PEIS was approximately $10 million, which is commensurate with the complexity of the issues analyzed.

41.10

Commentors feel that issuing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS, and the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS, the Pantex Site-Wide Draft EIS and NTS Site-Wide EISs at the same time prohibited them from thoroughly and responsibly reviewing and commenting on the proposed programs and actions. The commentors state that DOE has placed an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the affected communities and the public, and request DOE provide assistance to have an independent evaluation performed. Commentors state that by releasing all these documents, DOE was restricting public comment and placing more emphasis on proposal preparation than proposal analysis and review. Another commentor sees the combined meetings as a step forward and feels that DOE is recognizing that there are some overlaps among programs.

• Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10[c]). The public comment period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment on the document. The public comment period on the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS, which did not identify any preferred alternatives for storage and disposition, was extended from 60 to 90 days to allow the public to fully review and comment on the proposed alternatives. Each of the other documents, as with all DOE NEPA documents, has a public comment period of at least 45 days. Although DOE coordinates all programs and the preparation of NEPA documents, the sheer number of documents being prepared by DOE sometimes results in the release of several documents at the same time. Every effort is made to provide adequate public review of the documents in these cases, balanced with DOE's needs and mission.
  
  The PEIS and site-wide EISs prepared by DOE comply with the letter and spirit of NEPA. Each document has a concise summary of the most important information found in the entire document. Moreover, the PEISs are organized so that a focused review of any individual site can be readily accomplished. For example, if a member of the public (or a local community) is most interested in just one site (e.g., ORR), each PEIS covers the potential environmental impacts at that site in about 100 pages. Lastly, the main body of each environmental document is written to be understood by the general public, with more detailed, supporting information in appendixes. As a final point, DOE provides a significant amount of funding to states to oversee DOE's operations at the DOE sites as they relate to the health and safety of the public in surrounding communities. We do not believe it is appropriate to provide separate funding to local governments and organizations for document reviews of this kind when we are providing large block funding to the state for such reviews and oversight.

41.11

The commentor feels the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS represents a sequence of site-specific reviews which is not an adequate EIS.

• Response: The format of the PEIS (i.e., discussion of the environmental impacts of the proposed Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program alternatives by site) was selected as the most efficient and user friendly way to communicate the complex issues covered in the document. It allows members of the public who may only be concerned about potential impacts at the DOE site nearest them to focus their review. The use of the format was for the convenience of the public and does not make the PEIS inadequate.

41.12

The commentor feels the NEPA process requires by law a range of reasonable alternatives so the public may evaluate an evenhanded analysis which includes many analyzed alternatives and their ramifications on the environment and international policy. Several commentors feel that DOE has unreasonably constrained the alternatives it analyzes in order to support the one alternative that is preferred. Another commentor states that there is no discussion of the current proposed alternatives' relationship to the anticipated next generation stockpile stewardship facilities.

• Response: Chapter 2 of the PEIS discusses the purpose, need, proposed action, and the reasonable alternatives for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The range of reasonable alternatives was developed based on two different perspectives discussed in detail in this chapter. The discussion of the purpose and need describes the constraints placed upon DOE in meeting the Program objectives and the formulation of reasonable alternatives addressed in the PEIS. One perspective (section 2.2) is from the top level of national security policies for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. The other perspective (section 2.3) focuses on the relevant technical efforts to maintain a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The alternatives considered and the reasons they were eliminated from detailed study are discussed in section 3.1.2. Also see the response to comment summary 40.85 for additional discussion of the range of reasonable alternatives considered.

41.13

The commentor feels statements such as "none," "minimal," "within regulatory statutes and guidelines," "manageable," and "amenable" are not credible when describing environmental impacts.

• Response: The terms that the commentor refers to were used by DOE at the public hearings to summarize information presented in the PEIS. Their use was prefaced with the statement that these were DOE's subjective opinions of the impacts described in the PEIS. They were used in an effort to simplify complex information. Others may disagree with these subjective terms. The potential impacts identified in the PEIS are described using some of the terms identified by the commentor as appropriate based on the detail of the analysis. Where data was sufficient to quantify the potential effects of the proposed action they are provided. When regulations, guidelines, or standards were available for comparison purposes they are shown in tables or text with appropriate discussion. In some cases the data and level of analysis was insufficient to quantify effects and the description of impacts are described qualitatively. When qualitative analysis is presented, the discussion necessarily uses terms similar to those noted by the commentor. The discussion supporting both quantitative and qualitative analysis is appropriate to aid the reader in interpreting the potential impacts of the proposed action.

41.14

The commentors request an extension of the public comment period on the Draft PEIS and ask if there will be another public comment period after the Final PEIS.

• Response: DOE did not extend the comment period beyond May 7, 1996, although late comments were considered to the extent possible. Members of the public may submit comments on the Final PEIS, including the preferred alternatives. A decision on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will not be made until at least 30 days after the EPA Notice of Availability of the Final PEIS appears in the Federal Register.

41.15

The commentor believes that NEPA mandates an analysis of economic and impacts on future generations. The commentor also believes that costs, timing, and consumption of nonrenewable resources should together drive the PEIS. The commentor wants a complete environmental impact assessment which includes the impact on future generations. The commentor points out that the words "future generations" are not stated in the document. The commentor questions why these items are missing.

• Response: Chapter 4 of the PEIS describes the affected environment and the potential environmental impacts, including the socioeconomic impacts, expected from the proposed Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. Nonenvironmental issues concerning cost, schedule, and technical risk are presented and analyzed in the Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives report and the Stockpile Management Preferred Alternatives Report which are available in the DOE Public Reading Rooms near each site. The consumption of nonrenewable resources for each of the alternatives is discussed in section 4.17. By completing this PEIS, DOE is meeting the requirements of section 101(b)(1) of NEPA (i.e., "it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations...").

41.16

One commentor states that a policy document is needed as the "mother" of all of these NEPA processes. The commentor states that such a document would provide the bridge between the PEISs (and other NEPA processes as needed) and explain their relationship.

• Response: DOE is a diverse and highly complex department with many varied activities. At any given time a number of actions are being planned, constructed, and implemented. Accordingly, there are a number of NEPA actions being conducted simultaneously. In order to explain how the actions proposed by the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS fit into the context of actions proposed by other NEPA documents, section 1.7 was constructed. This section provides the reader with a description of the other major NEPA actions presently being conducted by DOE and describes their relationship to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.
  
  DP has an office solely devoted to NEPA coordination. This office reviews all NEPA actions to assure consistency of assumptions, data, and factual information. Besides this internal DP consistency control, all major NEPA actions are reviewed by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, the Office of the General Counsel, and other appropriate departmental elements for consistency with DOE NEPA requirements, DOE policy, and other DOE actions. Such a review and concurrence process is dynamic and constantly reflects current policy and other program considerations.

41.17

The commentor states that the Draft PEIS has not considered the full range of proposed and potential stockpile stewardship alternatives that is required by NEPA. The commentor states that DOE has characterized a number of potential stockpile stewardship facilities as not "ripe" for NEPA review because they have not reached the stage of development and definition that is necessary for evaluation and decisionmaking (Draft PEIS, section 1.2). The commentor states that next generation facilities are included in budget planning and, thus, should be proposed actions in the PEIS. The commentor also believes the ability to perform detailed (i.e., site-specific) environmental impact analysis is not the relevant standard for inclusion of a project in a PEIS. Commentor contends that the exclusion of the Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF), HEPPF, ARS (X-1), and Jupiter facility from the analysis of proposed actions is not supported by the facts, and is a violation of NEPA.

• Response: In the Notice of Intent for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS (60 FR 31291, June 14, 1995), DOE expressed its intent to propose six new facilities for stockpile stewardship: (1) CFF; (2) Atlas Facility; (3) NIF; (4) HEPPF; (5) AHF; and (6) Jupiter Facility. While DOE recognized that these six facilities were at different stages of research, development, and definition, the intent was to make the PEIS as forward-looking and complete as possible, with regard to the future stockpile stewardship program.
  
  Following scoping, when preparation of the PEIS actually began, DOE realized that three of these facilities (HEPPF, AHF, and Jupiter) were so minimally defined that it would have been premature to "propose" them, in the NEPA-sense, for the purpose of decisionmaking, since more R&D was needed. Therefore, in section 3.3.3 of the Implementation Plan for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS (DOE/EIS-0236IP), DOE explained that these three facilities were "not currently defined well enough to be considered as proposed stockpile stewardship alternatives."
  
  Events associated with R&D of the Jupiter facility illustrate the point that the next generation facilities are not currently defined well enough to be considered as proposed stockpile stewardship alternatives. The Jupiter Facility would be a significant technological advancement in the pulsed-power x-ray source capability. During the time the Implementation Plan was being prepared, scientists at SNL realized that, although the concept of Jupiter was defined (a 32 MJ pulsed-power x-ray source), how to achieve that concept was unclear. In fact, SNL scientists concluded that Jupiter represented so large a technological advancement that they developed the concept of the Advanced Radiation Source (ARS) (X-1). The ARS (X-1), which is envisioned as an interim step to an eventual Jupiter facility, would be a four-fold increase over current pulsed-power x-ray sources, yet would only be one-fourth the power envisioned for Jupiter. The performance requirements for the ARS (X-1) have not been fully established; the type of technology to provide the basis for the facility has not been determined, nor have concepts for the resultant physical plant. Consequently, impacts from facility construction as well as from facility operation can only be theorized. Thus, not even ARS (X-1) has reached the stage where the concept can be defined well enough for decisionmaking purposes. Jupiter, which is dependent on ARS (X-1) development, is even further from definition.
  
  However, even though the next generation stockpile stewardship facilities are not defined well enough to be "proposals," they are programmatically assessed in the PEIS to the extent practicable. As DOE stated in section 3.3.3 of the Implementation Plan, "these next generation facilities can be described in general terms such that a consideration of cumulative impacts that might be related to the ultimate science-based stockpile stewardship program can be qualitatively assessed." Section 4.11 of the PEIS describes what the impacts of these three next-generation facilities might be, to the extent they can be forecast at this time. The purpose of section 4.11 is to provide an assessment of the potential cumulative environmental impacts associated with the ultimate science-based stockpile stewardship program.
  
  For each next generation facility, data were developed using a surrogate facility. For example, for AHF, which would be a facility for conducting hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments, the tests and experiments themselves can be anticipated to be similar to such activities as analyzed at DARHT; therefore, the DARHT impacts were used for reference. For HEPPF, surrogate data from BEEF, an HE test facility at NTS, were utilized. For the ARS (X-1) and Jupiter, surrogate data were developed from the existing Saturn and Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA) facilities at SNL. Section 4.11 has been expanded in the Final PEIS to describe more fully the foreseeable impacts of the next generation facilities.
  
  Regarding the comments that next generation facilities are included in budget planning documents and thus, should be analyzed as proposed actions in the PEIS, the budget process does not address the issue of whether, for NEPA purposes, a project has been proposed or not. Because of the time requirements for Congressional funding, projects are often submitted for line item funds before NEPA completion. Some money needs to be spent during R&D in order to define facilities so that they can then be proposed and evaluated; it is therefore consistent with NEPA to spend money to develop this information. In the case of sophisticated scientific R&D like that for enhanced experimental capability for weapon physics, these expenditures often can be substantial, just for the preliminary stages of exploring theories and proving concepts. This process often involves performing complex experiments using existing facilities that have high operating costs. This experimentation occurs well in advance of the development of the basic information needed for eventual conceptual facility design.
  
  DOE agrees that the ability to perform detailed (i.e., site-specific) environmental impact analysis is not the relevant standard for whether a facility should be included in a programmatic EIS. This is why DOE has included the next generation facilities in the PEIS and has developed a programmatic-level evaluation of potential cumulative program impacts. However, in order for a facility to be a "proposal" in the NEPA sense, the facility must be ripe for decisionmaking. This in turn requires more than just speculative definitions of facility designs.
  
  The following is a more detailed discussion of why each of the next generation stockpile stewardship facilities is not included as a proposed action in the PEIS:
  
  AHF: DOE has modified the Final PEIS (section 3.1.2) to include additional clarifying information on the status of research toward a definition of a future AHF. The commentor quotes extracts from DOE's fiscal year 1997 budget request, among other items, and concludes that DOE's plans for an AHF are sufficiently mature to warrant full consideration and NEPA analysis in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. R&D activities relevant (and indeed, necessary) to DOE's ability to determine the feasibility and form of a future AHF are being pursued within the ongoing DOE R&D program. Such radiographic technology R&D has been a historical part of weapons R&D activities. At this point, the feasibility and definition of an AHF is still insufficiently determined for DOE to propose such a facility or adequately analyze it for the purposes of NEPA. For example, performance requirements for such a facility have not been fully established; the type of technology to provide the basis for the facility has not been determined and concepts for the resultant physical plant vary significantly; and therefore impacts from facility construction and operation remain speculative. DOE's present judgment is that significant R&D activity, spanning years, will be necessary.
  
  Early in its planning for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, DOE intended to propose that an AHF, representing the next generation of hydrotest capability beyond DARHT, be included within the scope of the PEIS. Conceptually, AHF would improve on the capabilities of DARHT and apply data and information gained from DAHRT. AHF thus could never be an alternative to DAHRT, because DAHRT is an essential precursor to AHF. The intent to propose AHF was to make the document as forward-looking as possible with regard to the future of science-based stewardship. Upon further reflection, however, DOE decided not to propose AHF in the PEIS because AHF's parameters were so minimally defined that a meaningful analysis of its environmental impacts would have been impossible to perform.
  
  Possible technology approaches to an AHF have been discussed within the DOE technical community. These technologies still require development and validation. The specifications and technical requirements for an AHF (that is, determination of what capabilities should be required of an AHF for assessment of stockpile aging and related effects, beyond those of DARHT) are also still being defined. This was noted in the DARHT Final EIS (Volume I, page 3-45) and in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS. The items excerpted by commentors from the DOE fiscal year 1997 budget request reflect a portion of the research activities both ongoing and anticipated, that are necessary to evaluate and develop these technologies, understand requirements, and provide a decision basis for a possible future AHF proposal by DOE.
  
  Three basic technology approaches are currently being examined. These include linear induction accelerators of a type similar to those in the baseline DARHT design, an inductive-adder pulsed-power technology based on technology now in use for other purposes at SNL and elsewhere, and high-energy proton accelerators similar to technology in use at Los Alamos Neutron Science Center and elsewhere in the United States and internationally. The first two represent different approaches to accelerating a high-current burst of electrons, which produce x rays when stopped in a dense target. The x rays actually produce the flash radiograph. This is the approach used in the existing PHERMEX and FXR facilities and to be used in DARHT when completed. The third approach would use bursts of very energetic (approximately 20 billion electron volt) protons, magnetic lenses, and particle detectors to produce the radiographic image. The impacts associated with construction and operation of facilities based on these different technologies cannot be fully defined at this time (because of technical uncertainties) and could be significantly different depending on the technology approach. For example, acreage required could be comparable to or somewhat larger than the 3.6 ha (9 acres) of land resources required for DARHT, but use of proton radiography could require an accelerator comparable in scale to the kilometer-long Los Alamos Neutron Science Center or to other large accelerators operated by DOE. Therefore, the size of the footprint, as well as other factors which to some degree govern environmental impacts, is speculative at this time.
  
  Each of these technology approaches not only has some technical promise, but also has technical issues to be resolved or demonstrated. Therefore, DOE is examining approaches to perform the necessary R&D. As commentors have noted, DOE has proposed increases in future operating budgets to Congress to better address these research issues. DOE does not believe that these individual details of its ongoing and evolving R&D activities, within the historical and ongoing mission of the DOE's weapons R&D responsibilities, in themselves constitute a distinct "proposed action" appropriate for NEPA analysis and alternatives in this PEIS.
  
  HEPPF : DOE has modified the Final PEIS to include additional clarifying information on HEPPF, and its relationship to ongoing pulsed power research and the Atlas Facility. A discussion of the relationship of HE pulsed power with Atlas and of the complementary nature of laser and pulsed-power experiments is also contained in the Atlas site-specific analysis in appendix K, which has also been revised in the Final PEIS to incorporate updated information.
  
  A new HEPPF would be a direct outgrowth of the longstanding Athena program; however, this activity is no longer known by that name. (The name Athena was a Los Alamos identifier only, and such R&D has also been performed under other designations. It is now pursued within the high energy density physics element of Los Alamos' Stockpile Stewardship Program activities.) Since the 1960s, DOE has pursued weapon research applications of electrical pulsed power on the microsecond time scale. This R&D program has involved HE pulsed-power generators of various types, which have been exploded at existing HE firing sites in the Complex, as well as fixed-facility capacitor banks such as Pegasus II. Some HE firing sites (e.g., TA-39 at Los Alamos) have been specially configured to support these pulsed-power experiments; a principal firing site at TA-39 has within its bunker a capacitor bank to provide the seed electrical current for the HE pulsed-power generators. Impacts of these ongoing R&D activities are included in the No Action alternative in the PEIS.
  
  Commentors may be confusing evolutionary development beyond a particular design of HE pulsed-power generator (Procyon), with a possible follow-on HE firing site, configured specially for pulsed-power experiments, beyond the existing capabilities in the Complex. It is the latter that would be the prospective purpose of HEPPF. The Final PEIS has been modified in order to clarify this distinction. An HE pulsed-power generator, such as Procyon, is basically an assembly of HE and metal (e.g., copper) and other components which is explosively and destructively detonated a single time, resulting in a brief pulse of high electrical current being delivered to the experimental configuration. High magnetic fields result from the high current pulse and may either be directly used to study materials phenomena or may be used to produce high pressures and implosions of (typically) cylindrical shells. (See the discussion in the Atlas site-specific analysis, appendix sections K.1 and K.2.1.) Procyon is therefore the name of a type of explosive generator, and is not a facility. A typical Procyon generator with the experimental region attached is about 3 m (10 ft) long. In principle such an experiment could be performed at any appropriately equipped explosive firing location, within applicable environmental limits. DOE believes that the continued evolutionary R&D on explosive generators and their use in pulsed-power experiments, within the historical and ongoing mission of DOE's weapons R&D responsibilities, do not in themselves constitute a distinct "proposed action" appropriate for NEPA analysis and alternatives in this PEIS. Rather, such R&D activities are needed to develop the required information so that DOE can formulate a proposal.
  
  As distinct from an explosive generator, a firing site is a facility typically consisting of a firing location, associated hardened bunkers, and related equipment, in an area from which personnel can be excluded. Many different HE experiments (including those in which pulsed electrical power is produced) can be performed at a HE firing site, as long as the explosive blast, and other experiment parameters, do not exceed the capabilities of the firing site. Currently most of the largest-scale HE pulsed-power experiments in the United States, whether for technology development, weapons stockpile stewardship, or for unclassified scientific collaborations (conducted separately) including those with Russian scientists, are conducted at a Los Alamos pulsed-power firing point at TA-39. As noted in the PEIS, section 3.3.4.2, this experimental capability has a limit of approximately 500 kg (1,100 lbs) of HE. Therefore a potential need for a new HEPPF was postulated to support generators using much larger explosive charges, which though not yet demonstrated could produce higher pressures in larger masses and volumes than can be accessed at the LANL site. Existing laboratory sites cannot readily support experiments with much larger charges, as noted in the section 3.3.4.2.
  
  Since the idea of an HEPPF was first conceived some years ago, BEEF was separately developed as a firing site at the NTS, based on refurbished bunkers originally developed for atmospheric nuclear tests. Although not specially configured for HE pulsed power like the principal LANL firing site, in its current configuration BEEF is suitable for a variety of HE experiments including many pulsed-power technology experiments, and experiments related to such purposes have been part of recent qualification tests. Therefore, it may be possible to make modifications to BEEF when the need for and definition of such modifications is clear, to satisfy any future need for a new HEPPF. (As at other firing sites many pulsed-power experiments could be performed at BEEF without capital modifications.) At this time, the definition of such modifications is insufficient to make a full analysis meaningful; however, section 4.11 describes these modifications and impacts to the extent that they can currently be foreseen. Analysis of the impacts of operating the existing BEEF facility for explosive experiments, including experiments that involve pulsed-power technology, is incorporated in the NTS Site-Wide EIS.
  
  Commentors note correctly that both HE pulsed power and R&D associated with capacitor banks, such as Pegasus II or the proposed Atlas, are activities within the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. For some years DOE has pursued both capacitor bank facilities and HE experiments in pulsed power, since HE generators offered a means to explore higher energy (higher current) frontiers without major capital investment, albeit at a relatively low data rate, and capacitor banks offered the advantages of repeatable (and indoors) experimental facilities with higher data rates, for broad experimental use. Data from HE experiments, for example, have helped provide validation of technical issues used in the Atlas design concept. Thus both kinds of activities are sensible aspects of DOE's overall R&D program. Appendix K considers reliance on explosive-driven pulsed-power experiments and discusses why this is not a reasonable alternative to Atlas.
  
  While it is true that if pursued a HEPPF could be available sooner and with less expense than NIF, microsecond pulsed power is complementary, rather than a reasonable alternative, to a laser such as NIF. The technologies provide different physical regimes and experimental scales, both necessary to address stockpile stewardship issues. Relative to this specific comment, neither high explosive nor capacitor-bank microsecond pulsed power is able to provide as high a temperature or pressure as would be provided by NIF. Discussion of this point has been expanded in the Final PEIS in section 3.3 and is also provided in appendix K.
  
  ARS (X-1) and Jupiter : ARS (X-1) and Jupiter have been presented in the PEIS as next generation facilities because extensive R&D of this technology in the existing Saturn and PBFA facilities will be required before DOE would be in a position to propose either of these facilities for NEPA evaluation and decisionmaking. To the extent that specifics of these yet-to-be designed facilities are known, the ARS and the Jupiter facilities would both have an advanced pulsed-power x-ray source to provide enhanced experimental capabilities in the areas of weapons physics, inertial confinement fusion, and weapons effects.
  
  The ARS (X-1) facility would utilize a pulsed-power accelerator capable of producing more than 8 MJ of x-ray energy to study the physics of radiation flow, opacities, high energy densities, the effects of radiation on weapons, and potentially inertial confinement fusion relevant physics. Conceptually, the Jupiter would generate about 32 MJ of x-ray energy, compared to the existing PBFA which is expected to generate 2 MJ of x-ray energy. Since both of these facilities would expand on a research and technology infrastructure already existing at SNL, it is expected that they would also be located at SNL.
  
  The concept for ARS (X-1) grew out of the initial vision at SNL to develop an advanced pulsed-power facility that could provide the source environments for weapon effects testing after the loss of underground nuclear testing. That initial capability was called Jupiter; a 60 MA driver generating ~18 MJ of x-ray energy. In assessing the feasibility of successfully building Jupiter, SNL came to the conclusion that the 36 times increase in x-ray output energy, in going from the existing facility Saturn to Jupiter, represented too high a technical risk. A more logical step is the ARS (X-1), which will allow an increase (by a factor of two) in current to 40 MA and a factor of four in x-ray energy output to 8 MJ over that of the PBFA. Data to support eventual development of the ARS (X-1) will be obtained from research associated with the existing PBFA. This R&D will establish the necessary level-of-confidence to proceed with ARS (X-1). The step to Jupiter, given validation of scaling laws on the ARS (X-1), would follow a similar logical track and would be projected to increase the current by a factor of two (to ~80 MA) and increase x-ray energy output by a factor of four (to ~32 MJ).
  
  The entire development process may be viewed as risk management. It is not prudent to take too large a technical jump at great risk if it is possible to manage the risk and still achieve significant technical progress. Recent breakthroughs in pulsed power (generating record power and hohlraum temperatures) demonstrated on existing facilities at SNL, may be extrapolated to future facilities such as the ARS (X-1) and Jupiter to predict sources that could provide significant new capabilities to support the stockpile stewardship program. However, the performance requirements for these future facilities have not been fully established; the type of technology to provide the basis for the facility has not been determined, nor have concepts for the resultant physical plant. Consequently, impacts from facility construction as well as from facility operation can only be theorized. Thus, neither the ARS (X-1) nor the Jupiter have reached the stage where the concepts can be defined well enough for decisionmaking purposes.

41.18

Several commentors express disagreement with the justification for the No Action alternative as an unreasonable alternative and also state that the alternative is both misnamed and not clearly explained in the Draft PEIS. Commentors indicate that the No Action alternative effectively embraces most of the DOE's actual proposed Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, when one looks at new construction planned or underway. The commentors state that as a result of its fragmented and segmented approach, the discussion of the entire Stockpile Stewardship Program has been unreasonably narrowed down to a discussion of three specific projects. The commentors contend that the following list of publicly acknowledged major Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program components were not adequately discussed, or in many cases mentioned in the current Draft PEIS: DARHT, Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building, Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, Weapons Experimental Tritium Facility, Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility, Lyner Facility, BEEF, and the contained firing facility at PHERMEX. Another commentor adds that DOE is already building stockpile management facilities like the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building upgrades at LANL and the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory at SNL before any public involvement. Another commentor indicates that the Enhanced Surveillance Program was not addressed in the Draft PEIS.

• Response: Given the national security policy decision by the President to enter into a zero-yield CTBT, our Nation will no longer have a proof-positive means to ensure the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The three specific projects (NIF, Atlas, and CFF) described in the PEIS as enhanced experimental capabilities, represent the proposed action for the stockpile stewardship portion of the Program. Each of these projects would provide new capabilities in distinct weapons physics regimes. They would be used to assist in the assessment and certification that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing. Also see the response to comment summary 40.85.
  
  In accordance with NEPA, the PEIS also assesses the No Action alternative. The No Action alternative is described in broad terms in section 3.1.4 of the PEIS, and in more detail in chapter 4 and appendix A of the PEIS. Under No Action, DOE would not take the actions proposed in the PEIS, but would continue with existing actions. For stockpile stewardship, this means continuing the existing actions at LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS related to stockpile stewardship. A table has been added to the site descriptions in appendix A of the Final PEIS to identify and describe the major stockpile stewardship facilities and activities. The relationship between the facilities described by the commentor and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is as follows:
  
  DARHT : Impacts of construction and operation are covered in its own EIS, discussed in section 1.6.2, and DARHT has been judged to be an appropriate interim action by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico (No. 94-1306-m, April 16, 1996). The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS considers DARHT in the No Action alternative in sections 3.1.4 and 3.3.1.1. See the response to comment summary 41.20 for additional discussion on DARHT.
  
  Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory: This project would construct a new building at SNL to consolidate the activities from three existing buildings that are old and inefficient. No change in mission or capabilities would result from the construction of the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory. The EA was completed in November 1995, and a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) was issued in December 1995. Construction and operation of this facility are included in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS No Action alternative.
  
  Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades Project: Three phases of upgrades have been identified: (1) Phase I-upgrades to fix ES&H deficiencies; required even if the life of Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building is not extended; upgrades were categorically excluded; (2) Phase II-upgrades to extend the life of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building for an additional 20 to 30 years to support current R&D mission; an EA is in progress to determine whether a FONSI is appropriate or whether the project should be included in the LANL Site-Wide EIS; (3) Phase III-upgrades not required to support current missions, but rather to support potential future missions; not included in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building EA, but is assessed in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS as appropriate for alternatives that establish new missions at LANL. The Phase III upgrade is also expected to be included in the LANL Site-Wide EIS if the ROD for this PEIS expands LANL missions that require the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building Phase III upgrades. See the response to comment summary 40.90 for additional discussion on the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building.
  
  Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative: Computer systems to be procured to support the science-based stockpile stewardship program. The NOI for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS discussed computational capabilities as follows: "To handle simulations of weapon performance and assessments of weapons safety without underground nuclear testing, improved computational capabilities are needed. However, because there are not expected to be any environmental impacts from this activity, the PEIS is not expected to provide any assessment of these capabilities." No comments were received on this issue during scoping, and because there are no environmental impacts from procuring and operating computers, they are not assessed in the PEIS. See the response to comment summary 41.19 for additional discussion on the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative.
  
  Los Alamos Neutron Science Center: In October 1995, there was an administrative action that transferred landlord responsibility for this facility from Energy Research to DP. Despite this administrative change, this facility still performs the same historic missions. Specific impacts from continued operations are being assessed in the LANL Site-Wide EIS. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS includes the impacts from Los Alamos Neutron Science Center in No Action.
  
  Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility: An EA covering construction and operation of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility was proposed and a FONSI issued in April 1991. This facility has been operational for the past 2 years to support ongoing stockpile stewardship and management missions. Continued operations of this facility are included in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS No Action alternative.
  
  Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility: The proposed action would consolidate surplus machines for nuclear materials criticality training and experimentation from various Complex sites to LANL. No change to current activities at LANL and no new capability results from this consolidation. This consolidation improves the efficiency and management of facilities that are used for the hands-on training of workers on nuclear materials criticality issues. The EA was completed in April 1996 and a FONSI was issued in May 1996. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS includes the impacts from this facility in No Action.
  
  Lyner Facility: Stockpile stewardship activities at NTS have been analyzed in EISs, as well as the NTS Site-Wide EIS. These EISs have identified the impacts of nuclear tests, safety tests, and equation-of-state experiments. Although the term "subcritical" is not used in the previous EISs, some tests and experiments conducted over the past decades, as well as their impacts, are substantially the same as those contemplated by the new terminology. The term "subcritical experiments" is intended to clarify the fact that such experiments would not achieve the condition of criticality, consistent with the President's pursuit of a zero-yield CTBT. The terminology is not intended to define a new form of activity. The NTS Site-Wide EIS, the purpose of which is to evaluate the impacts of near-term (next 5 to 10 years) activities at NTS, includes a project-specific impact analysis of subcritical tests and experiments at the Lyner facility under alternatives 1 and 3. The subcritical tests and experiments are not new activities at NTS for purposes of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, but rather are considered in the context of continuing activities, and are included in the No Action alternative. See the response to comment summary 40.02 for additional discussion on the Lyner facility.
  
  BEEF: This facility at NTS is used to study hydrodynamic motion associated with HE detonations as discussed in sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.4.3. The operation of BEEF is addressed in the NTS Site-Wide EIS. See the response to comment summary 41.17 for additional discussion on BEEF.
  
  PHERMEX: This facility is used to perform high-speed radiography at LANL. It is discussed in section 3.3.1.1. See the response to comment summary 41.17 for additional discussion on PHERMEX.
  
  Enhanced Surveillance Program: This is a term used to describe R&D activities which are aimed at ensuring that the nuclear weapons remaining in the stockpile will continue to be safe and reliable. The Enhanced Surveillance Program is part of the stockpile stewardship and management ongoing program.

41.19

One commentor cites a figure of $2.1 billion for the cost of the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative as proof that the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is already proceeding, and is doing so without constraint. The commentor states that the implication of this is that decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program have already been made, or will be prejudiced by Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative.

• Response: No decisions have been made for the proposed actions described in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Any decisions resulting from the PEIS process will not be made until at least 30 days after the Final PEIS has been filed with EPA.
  
  The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative is a multi-staged computer development program whose goal is to increase by more than a thousand-fold the computational speed and data storage that currently exists. Without underground nuclear testing, computational simulation will be an essential (and sometimes only) means of predicting the effects of aging on component and weapon safety and reliability. Due to the complexity of nuclear weapons, increases of more than a thousand-fold are needed to simulate weapon performance and assess weapon safety.
  
  Because each advance in computational speed and data capabilities is a precursor to the next advancement, Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative can only be developed in stages. Through the end of fiscal year 1996, the commitment of funds to support the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative will be less than $90 million. The funds committed to date are for R&D of the prototype system that will eventually support the stockpile stewardship computational requirements. These R&D activities to date are part of the ongoing stockpile stewardship program, which is independent of the proposed actions described in the PEIS (i.e., regardless of whether or not DOE proceeds with enhanced experimental facilities, all of the expected Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative procurements will be part of the existing program to maintain a safe and reliable stockpile without underground nuclear testing). Because of the independent utility of these Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative procurements, the commitment of resources that has been made does not prejudice the ultimate decisions related to the proposed actions in the PEIS.

41.20

The commentor believes that it is unacceptable that the DARHT Second Axis is not included in the PEIS whereas the Atlas Facility is. In the commentor's opinion, the two projects (DARHT's Second Axis and Atlas) are roughly comparable in costs and start dates.

• Response: Splitting a construction project into separate line items for Congressional budgeting (or combining previously separate line items) does not automatically imply that additional NEPA review is needed, especially when the entire project has already been subject to a NEPA review. While it is true that in the early 1990s, DOE decided to include funding for the second axis of DARHT as a separate line item for Congressional budgeting purposes, DOE has recently determined that it will not now be a separate line item. Citing its decision in the October 1995 DARHT ROD to complete the dual-axis facility with phased containment, DOE submitted a new Construction Project Data Sheet to Congress as part of its fiscal year 1997 budget request. The new data sheet combines both axes into a single line item (new Budget Number 97-D-102). However, no additional funding was requested in fiscal year 1997 for the second axis. The new Congressional data sheet includes all actions directed by the ROD, including constructing the second axis, but indicates that funding for the second axis will be requested only when the "most optimum" funding profile has been determined.
  
  DOE has addressed the need for dual-axis radiography, and the environmental impacts from implementing a decision to construct and operate both the first and second axis, in the DARHT EIS and the related ROD. As commentor notes, the courts have found that DOE properly analyzed the DARHT proposal in the DARHT EIS prior to completing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Therefore, there is no need to include in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS any additional project-specific analyses of the environmental impacts of the 1995 decision to construct and operate the second axis of DARHT since the analysis has already been completed in the DARHT EIS. This PEIS, however, does include the impacts from construction and operation of both axes of DARHT in the cumulative impacts under the No Action alternative.

42 Relationship to Other DOE Programs/Activities

42.01

The commentors urge better integration and timing of the NTS and Pantex Site-Wide Draft EISs, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS, and the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS. Another commentor suggests an integrated program to find the most cost-effective solution. The commentor states that site-wide decisions will be made before programmatic decisions and that this will limit public involvement and full analysis of the alternatives. The commentor wonders why site-wide decisions will be made before programmatic decisions, especially since the programmatic decisions will have an impact at the site. The commentor also questions why different plutonium pit storage options are considered in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS, and the Pantex Site-Wide Draft EIS. Another commentor asks if there will be an attempt to produce a simplified document showing the relationship between the PEISs and site-wide EISs.

• Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10(c)). The public comment period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment on the document. The public comment period on the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS, which did not identify any preferred alternatives for storage and disposition, was extended from 60 to 90 days to allow the public to fully review and comment on the proposed alternatives. Each of the other documents, as with all DOE NEPA documents, has a public comment period of at least 45 days. The schedules for release and the duration of the comment periods for each document was determined in accordance with the directives of the individual programs. Although DOE coordinates all programs and the preparation of NEPA documents, the sheer number of documents being prepared by DOE sometimes results in the release of several documents at the same time. Every effort is made to provide adequate public review of the documents in these cases, balanced with DOE's needs and mission.
  
  Overlapping issues between the PEISs and the site-wide EISs (e.g., storage of plutonium) have been coordinated and analyzed in the respective documents based on the scope of each document. The decision strategy has also been identified in each of these documents for the overlapping issue of concern. For example, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS will support decisions on the long-term storage of pits that will be needed for national security requirements (strategic reserve pits). The Storage and Disposition PEIS will support decisions on the long-term storage of all pits (strategic reserve and surplus) and the approach for dispositioning pits that are surplus to national security requirements. Decisions on the long-term storage of pits would be made in a joint ROD of the PEISs, and a decision relating to the storage of the pits until implementation of the selected long-term storage option would be made in the ROD for the Pantex Site-Wide EIS.
  
  Sections 1.7.1 through 1.7.5, under Other National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, of the PEIS discuss the relationship between the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Pantex, LANL, and NTS Site-Wide EISs. As described in these sections, any decisions on the future roles of these sites in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will be identified in the ROD for this PEIS. These Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program decisions will not compromise any of the analyses presented in the site-wide documents, but will provide additional information on the future missions at these sites that will require consideration in the site-wide EISs.

42.02

The commentor would like to see additional nonweapons work at LANL and recommends that the site-wide EIS look at the enhancement of nonweapons work. Another commentor thinks it is ironic that the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS proposes an upgrade of pit production at LANL while the Storage and Disposition PEIS is concerned about what to do with these pits.

• Response: LANL is a multi-disciplinary research facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation and environmental activities. It conducts R&D activities in the basic sciences, mathematics, and computing with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and the environment. A more detailed discussion of the complete spectrum of laboratory activities can be found in the current LANL Institutional Plan, which is unclassified and available to the public. The LANL Site-Wide EIS is currently being prepared and analyzes alternatives for LANL's operation over the next 5 to 10 years. Nonweapons work, and any enhancements thereto, would be included in the site-wide EIS.

42.03

The commentor expresses concern that new programs such as bringing spent nuclear fuel rods from other countries and wastes produced from new programs will contribute to waste management problems since there is no place to dispose of this waste.

• Response: The Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Environmental Impact Study (DOE/EIS-0203-F) analyzes at a programmatic level the potential environmental impacts over the next 40 years of alternatives related to the transportation, receipt, processing, and storage of spent nuclear fuel under the responsibility of DOE. This EIS formed the basis for deciding, on a programmatic level, which sites will be used for the management of the various types of spent nuclear fuel to which DOE holds title. It included the amount of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel that might be accepted in its assessment of potential impacts, and addressed the sites at which the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel could be stored if a decision is made to accept foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. In addition to this document, the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F) evaluates the potential environmental impacts that could result from the DOE and Department of State joint proposal to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Based on these and other environmental impact studies, DOE intends to make decisions and take actions to identify sites for waste management facilities in order to protect public health and safety, comply with Federal law, and minimize adverse effects to the environment.

42.04

The commentor notes that the Lyner facility remains classified so that the "enemy" cannot determine the equation of state information, yet there is no way to determine the environmental impacts of this project.

• Response: A brief description of the Lyner Complex may be found in the NTS Site-Wide EIS appendix section A.1.1.1.3, Dynamic Experiments and Hydrodynamic Tests. Further Lyner Complex details will be addressed in a classified appendix to the document noted above. The details of the Lyner Complex were included in the DP environmental consequences analysis in chapter 5 of the same document. See the response to comment summary 40.02 for additional discussion on the Lyner facility.

42.05

The commentor states that no DOE NEPA document programmatically covers reprocessing. The commentor states that reprocessing is partially covered in a number of different DOE NEPA documents but that there is a need for an integrated document that evaluates reprocessing as a whole over the Complex.

• Response: As the commentor noted, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is not relevant to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. With a decreasing stockpile DOE no longer has a need for reprocessing and is not proposing this action as part of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The recent NEPA studies referred to by the commentor addresses proliferation concerns and issues, or activities to stabilize nuclear materials because of a health, safety, or environmental concern related to the condition of the material. Since the defense-related chemical separations activities (i.e., reprocessing) were shut down at SRS in March 1992, there is a large inventory of in-process solutions containing a wide variety of special isotopes including plutonium-242. These stored solutions could present an unreasonable risk and require continuing vigilance to assure their continued safe storage and to avoid potentially severe radiological impacts should an accident occur. Therefore, the solution containing plutonium-242 is being converted to an oxide which has a stewardship programmatic use. This PEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of storing the oxide material at SRS or transporting the plutonium-242 oxide to LANL or LLNL for storage (section 4.19). Also see the response to comment summary 40.41 for more discussion of plutonium-242.

42.06

The commentors have reservations about an expanded role for Pantex that would include permanent storage of plutonium pits, plutonium scrap, uranium, and such, as well as processing and reprocessing of plutonium and the possibility that a nuclear reactor would be built there to burn mixed oxide fuel or to produce tritium. One commentor asks what kind of capacity does Pantex have right now and how close are they to reaching that capacity level. Another commentor asks what was the preferred alternative for HEU storage.

• Response: Storage of the plutonium strategic reserve could occur at Pantex and does fall within the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. If Y-12 is selected as the site for the secondary and case fabrication mission, HEU strategic reserve storage would remain at ORR. If Y-12 is not selected, then the HEU strategic reserve could also be stored at Pantex. The strategic reserve provides pits and secondaries which could be used for replacement in the enduring stockpile or as feedstock for nuclear fabrication. If the decision is made that strategic reserves be stored with non-strategic reserves, then consolidated storage could be at one of the five sites being considered in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, one of which is Pantex. The commentor is referred to the Storage and Disposition PEIS for information regarding an expanded role at Pantex that would include the long-term storage and disposition of nonstrategic plutonium. Tritium production will not take place at Pantex.

42.07

The commentor expresses concern regarding the Waste Management Draft PEIS proposed alternative for LLNL's Site 300, which is already on the EPA's Superfund List, as a regional facility for mixed LLW.

• Response: DOE needs to make decisions and take actions to identify sites for waste management facilities in order to protect public health and safety, comply with Federal law, and minimize adverse effects to the environment. The Waste Management Draft PEIS is intended to provide environmental information to assist DOE in determining at which sites it should modify existing waste management facilities or construct new facilities. The waste management facilities proposed in the Waste Management Draft PEIS include treatment and disposal facilities for mixed LLW. The Waste Management Draft PEIS analyzes potential environmental risks and costs associated with a range of mixed LLW management alternatives, including one regionalized alternative involving LLNL. After publication of the Waste Management Final PEIS (in late 1996), DOE will issue RODs on the treatment and disposal of mixed LLW. Please refer to the Waste Management Draft PEIS for more information regarding mixed LLW alternatives.

42.08

The commentor feels there are many expensive programs that need funding before undertaking unneeded installations that have a strong appearance of tools for the design and development of new weapons--examples include site cleanup, storage of LLW, long-term storage of plutonium, development of theater anti-ballistic missiles, and storage and reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. Commentor further suggests it would even make more sense to drill contingency holes in Nevada in case an unexpected international situation demanded a special nuclear weapon response for which a test would be required.

• Response: In response to direction from the President and Congress, DOE has developed its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to provide a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. It has evolved from existing predecessor programs that served this mission over previous decades. With no underground nuclear testing and no new-design nuclear weapons production, DOE expects existing weapons to remain in the stockpile well into the next century. This means that the weapons will age beyond original expectations, and an alternative to underground nuclear testing must be developed to verify the safety and reliability of weapons. To meet these new challenges, DOE's science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed to increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of the safety and reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong scientific and technical basis for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy objectives.
  
  Because there can be no absolute guarantee of complete success in the development of enhanced experimental and computational capabilities for stockpile stewardship, the United States will maintain the capability to conduct nuclear tests under a "supreme national interest" provision in the anticipated CTBT. DOE will need to maintain the capability for nuclear testing and experimentation at NTS and the necessary technical capabilities at the weapons laboratories to design and conduct such types.
  
  DOE must set priorities, in consultation with DOD, the National Security Council, and other Federal agencies, in structuring a balanced program to meet national security objectives within constrained funding. The proposed Program is debated each year relative to Program and funding priorities both within the Executive Branch and with the Congress. DOE believes the funded program that results from this debate is one that best strikes a balance between competing interests, and best meets U.S. national security requirements.

42.09

The commentor states that DOE recommends that strategic storage should be collocated with A/D functions, but does not emphasize the protection of those reserves to meet future national security needs. Commentor believes Pantex should be the preferred site for such a mission in coordination with its stewardship functions. In addition, the commentor feels Pantex should be selected for all storage and disposition storage functions as it makes no sense from budget or other perspectives to site strategic storage at one site and surplus at another, and that this would minimize transportation risks and costs.

• Response: Both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Storage and Disposition PEIS analyze reasonable alternatives for the long-term storage of strategic reserves of plutonium and HEU. Because the overall scope of each PEIS is significantly different, different long-term strategic reserve storage alternatives are reasonable for each PEIS. For example, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS evaluates alternatives for strategic reserve storage (in the form of pits and secondaries) at the weapons A/D facility (either Pantex or NTS; Pantex is DOE's preferred alternative). The Storage and Disposition PEIS has a relatively broader scope regarding fissile material storage, which will include the storage of all surplus material, Naval reactor fuel, and Naval reactor fuel feedstock, as well as nonweapons R&D materials. It analyzes alternatives, among others, that would collocate strategic reserve storage. Pantex is one such alternative for this collocation. Preparation of these two PEISs is being closely coordinated to ensure that all reasonable alternatives for long-term strategic reserve storage are assessed. No decision regarding the long-term storage of strategic reserves is expected to be made until both PEISs have been completed. Cost and other factors will be taken into account during the decisionmaking process.

42.10

A commentor expresses opposition to building a tritium facility. Another commentor asks that Southwestern Public Service comments on the Tritium Supply and Recycling Draft PEIS be included in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management and Storage and Disposition PEISs, and the Pantex Site-Wide EIS. Another commentor states that better integration between this PEIS and the Tritium Supply and Recycling Draft PEIS is required because the stockpile sizes considered in this PEIS builds in a bias toward future tritium production.

• Response: The Tritium Supply and Recycling Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0161, October 1995) details the need for tritium and analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with various site and technology alternatives for the production of tritium. It also includes responses to all public comments received on the Tritium Supply and Recycling Draft PEIS. In addition, the ROD published in the Federal Register (60 FR 63878) on December 12, 1995, outlines DOE's plans in pursuing a tritium supply for the enduring stockpile. Section 1.6 discusses the relationship between tritium supply and recycling and stockpile stewardship and management. The comments received on tritium supply and recycling were responded to in the Tritium Supply and Recycling Comment Response Document and considered in making the tritium supply and recycling ROD. They have not been repeated in this document because tritium is an interim action as discussed in section 1.6 of this PEIS.

42.11

The commentor asks, relative to section 1.6.1, what would the need date be for a new tritium facility if we had used START I as a planning base.

• Response: The need date for a tritium facility based on START I stockpile levels would be 2005. Producing tritium to support a START I-sized stockpile was analyzed in the Tritium Supply and Recycling Final PEIS in section 4.11.

42.12

The commentor states that DOE's approach to the relationship between its NEPA review for its rebuilt Complex and for management of waste from that Complex seems to be to simply assume in this Draft PEIS that all waste management problems will be solved through the Waste Management Draft PEIS, and in the Waste Management Draft PEIS it is assumed that all potential conflicts with the Waste Management Draft PEIS will be resolved in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS. The commentor states that these documents are incompatible for comparison purposes. The commentor points out that there is no analysis in any document which allows citizens or policy makers to compare the aggregate environmental impacts of the various programmatic alternatives for the future of the Complex, no document that provides for any program alternative or comprehensive picture of that alternatives's impacts from materials handling and use in manufacturing, through waste management, to long-term storage or disposal. The compartmentalization of environmental review (separate analyses for weapons research and production and waste management) detracts from the usefulness of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS. The commentor further states that the Draft PEIS waste management analyses for each site for the stockpile stewardship and management alternatives do not provide impacts of waste management, but rather impacts on waste management facilities. There is no analysis of health and environmental impacts of waste management activities which will be attributable to the individual alternatives, despite the fact that much of the contamination of air, soil, and water in the past has been the result of waste management operations. Additionally, the calculated impacts in the Draft PEIS do not include the total impacts of radioactive materials handling to serve stockpile management alternatives, and of treatment, storage, and disposal of stockpile management waste.

• Response: DOE has coordinated the preparation of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS with the preparation of the Waste Management Draft PEIS. The relationship between the two documents is discussed in section 1.7.1 of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The waste volume presented in the Waste Management Draft PEIS are for all DOE sites and facilities and not just the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program activities. Waste management activities that would support the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program are assumed to be per current site practice and are contingent upon decisions to be made through the Waste Management PEIS. The waste volumes from stockpile stewardship and management alternatives have been provided to the Office of Environmental Management to include in the Waste Management Final PEIS analysis. Section 4.13 of this PEIS includes the potential wastes management cumulative impacts at each site for the different waste categories and the potential program and projects affecting that site.
  
  Because the nuclear weapon stockpile level is decreasing and due to waste minimization and pollution prevention practices, the volume of wastes generated from weapons program activities is decreasing. In addition, under the preferred alternative of downsizing and consolidating A/D, nonnuclear fabrication, and secondary and case fabrication, the waste generation would actually decrease at Pantex, KCP, and ORR.
  
  The environmental and health impacts of site waste management facilities and activities are included in the description of the affected environment for each site in chapter 4 of the PEIS. The analysis in the PEIS assumes current and planned site waste management facilities and current handling, storage, and disposal practices in place for all site-generated waste. The types and volumes of waste generated by the stockpile stewardship and management activities would be handled in these facilities in the same manner as all other site waste and in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulations, and DOE orders. Because these facilities are permitted and have been addressed by other NEPA documents and environmental review, and stockpile stewardship and management waste types and volumes would not change or exceed the operating conditions or capacities of these waste management facilities, the environmental and health impacts due to Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program activities would not be substantially different from that described for the existing conditions at each alternative site.

42.13

The commentor recommends that DOE shut-down NTS and convert it to a solar energy testing site if the area is not too hot.

• Response: Chapter 3.2 of the NTS Site-Wide EIS explains DOE's rationale to maintain NTS as a site with multiple programs. NTS has historically been a multi-purpose facility because of its remote location, arid climate, controlled access, and size. For these reasons, a single program alternative, such as the existing Solar Enterprise Zone, as described in the NTS Site-Wide EIS, would fail to meet DOE's need for a site that can support evolving DOE missions, including the capability to resume nuclear testing as mandated by the President.

42.14

One commentor states that the waste figures presented in the Waste Management Draft PEIS are not consistent with those in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Another commentor expresses shock that the amount of waste to be produced over the next 20 years by the stockpile stewardship and related nuclear research programs, as presented in the Waste Management Draft PEIS is much more than what is currently in storage.

• Response: DOE has sought to assure consistency between the two PEISs. The commentor should realize, however, that the Waste Management Draft PEIS makes a bounding analysis of potential waste generation from all DOE facilities and programs, while the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS limits waste generation estimates to waste generated for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Waste Management Final PEIS will be updated to include information consistent with that provided in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.

42.15

The commentor is opposed to DARHT and increased weapons production.

• Response: Facilities required for stewardship purposes, such as DARHT, would be used to assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons in the remaining stockpile. DOE does not plan increased weapons production, but rather is supporting a program to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile, consistent with international agreements, while keeping the remaining stockpile safe and reliable.

42.16

The commentor states that the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS and Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS contradict each other in that the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS indicates that ORR is considered for plutonium and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS states that plutonium would not be located anywhere it is not already located. Conversely, continues the commentor, one of the sites that was not mentioned at all was LANL. The commentor wants to know why LANL was not included in the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS.

• Response: The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program sought alternatives that both built on existing site infrastructure and expertise and tended to further consolidate the Complex to support a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile. For these reasons, sites for plutonium pit production where no existing infrastructure and expertise existed were not considered reasonable. In addition, introducing plutonium to a site with no significant existing infrastructure and expertise would further expand the Complex and be contrary to DOE's desire to further consolidate and/or downsize the Complex. For these reasons, ORR was an unreasonable alternative for the plutonium pit production for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. In contrast, the Storage and Disposition Program sought a broader range of alternatives. These alternatives would, due to international safeguards and inspection considerations, be independent of nuclear weapon program facilities. ORR was considered a reasonable alternative for this mission. Chapter 3 of the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS provides further justification for the selection of ORR as a reasonable alternative site, and the lack of selection of LANL as a reasonable alternative site.

42.17

The commentor asks if DOE currently assumes that as material is transferred on the books from strategic into surplus, that it is then covered by the current Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Environmental Impact Statement (DOE EIS, June 1996) or will there be additional need for documentation to look at the additional material as it gets transferred over.

• Response: One reason that DOE is covering the storage of strategic reserve material in both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Storage and Disposition PEIS is to address this comment. Both PEISs cover the storage of this material to assure that future Program decisions, including decisions to transfer material from strategic reserve to excess, have adequate NEPA coverage.

42.18

The commentor concurs that the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site is not suitable for the stewardship and management of nuclear weapon components and special nuclear materials and that these materials must be removed at the earliest date. Commentor indicates that in addition to nuclear weapons components and special nuclear material at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site there are large quantities of plutonium waste to be removed before D&D can begin, and that existing buildings are not suitable for this kind of storage. The commentor requests an immediate decision on the disposition and schedule of this liability, or permission for commentor's organization (Rocky Flats Cleanup Commission, Inc.) to provide interim storage at a dedicated offsite facility.

• Response: The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site was not considered for any Stockpile Stewardship and Management alternatives, and the comment addresses programmatic issues at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site that are outside the scope of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The commentor should address the DOE Environmental Management Office or the local DOE office at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site regarding the potential capabilities of the Rocky Flats Cleanup Commission, and its ability to address current Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site cleanup problems.

43 General/Miscellaneous Environmental

43.01

The commentor feels that science has been totally neglected. At the last DOE meeting of the Yucca Mountain board, the commentor asked about colloidal studies. The Federal national laboratory did colloidal studies, according to the commentor, and the commentor now wants to know why the studies are not commercialized upon.

• Response: The commentor is referring to the basic issue that radionuclides may attach to colloids and be transported in water when they would otherwise not be expected to move. There have been a number of studies of the colloidal transport of radionuclides from underground nuclear testing in groundwater at NTS. Related studies on similar radionuclides and rocks have been performed for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository project, and DOE's Office of Subsurface Science has conducted studies on other rock types found at NTS. Migration of tritium in groundwater at NTS has been found to be more significant than transport of other radionuclides as colloids. Therefore, present studies focus on transport rates of radionuclides as a result of all mechanisms, not solely colloidal transport. It is also important to distinguish between groundwater flow and the much more rapid flow of water in streams on the earth's surface. Groundwater is subject to distinctly different chemical and physical processes than those applicable to surface waters.

43.02

The commentor asks why all of DOE's really bad Superfund sites are called a National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and suggests DOE should call it National Environmental Research Disaster Site (NERDS). Commentor's definition of a "park" is a piece of ground for ornament and recreation.

• Response: The naming of these sites is outside the scope of the PEIS.

43.03

The commentor believes that denial is a major roadblock to making progress towards peace in the United States because the people working in armaments are deep in denial about how their work is affecting the society and the public's health.

• Response: The proposed actions in the PEIS are consistent with national security policies. The impacts of these alternatives on public health are discussed in the PEIS.

43.04

The commentor wants to know why, in light of the Chernobyl accident and its health and environmental consequences, the U.S. Government insists that it needs to create more radioactive material with the potential for disaster even if the weapons are never used.

• Response: It is assumed that the commentor is referring to the production of special nuclear material (plutonium and HEU). This program does not plan to produce any additional special nuclear material.

43.05

The commentor does not support the new armory proposed for Taos, NM.

• Response: The siting of a new armory near Taos, NM and the environmental impacts of its construction and operation is not within the scope of this PEIS.

43.06

The commentor recommends that a section for the catastrophic environmental impacts of the past weapons program should be included in the summary of environmental impacts section. The commentor cites the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site as an example of how DOE activities have catastrophically affected the public and the environment. Another commentor suggests that leadership rather than technology was the problem at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. The commentor wants to know if the corporate culture that lead to the disaster has changed; what happened at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site and why it had to be shut down; how much of the area around Colorado was contaminated; what is DOE's long-range plan for dealing with the waste; why is the pit fabrication mission being brought to LANL; and what measures DOE plans to undertake to ensure that LANL does not become another Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site.

• Response: The No Action alternative as it relates to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is discussed in section 3.1.4. All activities currently supporting the stockpile stewardship and management activities at each site within the Complex were projected to the year 2005 and were included in the No Action alternative. In this baseline, the environmental impacts of all DP activities, consistent with NEPA requirements, were identified for each resource or issue area and can be compared to the environmental impacts of the various stockpile stewardship and management alternative proposed actions. DOE plans to maintain the weapons stockpile using emerging technologies as appropriate to mitigate environmental impacts. These new technologies have the potential to further reduce waste generation from the rates described in the PEIS and raw material usage while reducing processing steps and operating costs.

43.07

Commentor suggests that LANL needs competitive bidding for its management contract and oversight by the New Mexican government.

• Response: Federal and state agencies share regulatory authority over DOE facility operations. DOE has entered into agreements with regulatory agencies on behalf of all of the DOE facilities being considered in the PEIS. These agreements normally establish a schedule for achieving full compliance at these DOE facilities. Table 5.3-4 lists the potential requirements imposed by the major state regulations applicable to the PEIS. DOE is committed to managing all facilities in compliance with all applicable regulations and guidelines. Competitive bidding practices are outside the scope of the PEIS.

43.08

The commentor suggests the United States take a leadership role in the elimination of anti-personnel mines but realizes the U.S. economic motivation of the production of mines may make this difficult.

• Response: Anti-personnel mines are beyond the scope of the PEIS.

43.09

The commentor states that no consideration is given to all the chemicals that are poisoning the human body by allowing the chemical companies to put all of their chemicals into food supplies which will harm all humanity in the United States. The commentor asks which is worse: the pollutants that go out by Pantex that affect the local population, or all the chemicals that go into our food supplies affecting the whole nation.

• Response: The use and the potential human health and environmental impacts of chemicals by consumers, manufacturing and industrial facilities, and the agricultural industry are beyond the scope of this PEIS. The affected environment section 4.5.2 describes the existing conditions at Pantex. The environmental impacts from the proposed alternatives at Pantex are described in section 4.5.3 including the potential impacts from site chemical use and emissions.

43.10

The commentor is concerned that the Federal Government is expanding nuclear programs in the State of New Mexico without investing any money in the state. The commentor believes that DOE has no commitment to public health surveillance in the state despite a rapid large-scale expansion of nuclear programs.

• Response: DOE would not be significantly expanding nuclear programs in New Mexico with implementation of its PEIS preferred alternative. However, DOE has and continues to make significant economic investments in the state. A recent University of New Mexico study (The Economic Impact of DOE on the State of New Mexico, jointly prepared by DOE and New Mexico State University, published July 1995, covering fiscal year 1994) attributed more than one in ten jobs in the state directly or indirectly to DOE activities. DOE has also made a significant commitment to public health oversight for its operations in New Mexico. Agreements exist with state regulatory and enforcement organizations for the continued oversight of environmental regulations and waste management. Funding has been provided to the state by DOE for this purpose.

43.11

The commentor asks all the employees of all the laboratories, all the way up to Hazel O'Leary, if there is a solid foundation in nonweapons production, then "wouldn't that be real job security when the balanced budget axe cutters come after you?" The commentor states that global competition for U.S. businesses could be affected tremendously. The commentor believes that scientists in Japan and Germany are helping their businesses design products to be sold around the world. The commentor states that we are doing great in weapons production, but in everything else, we seem to be falling apart.

• Response: DOE has always encouraged its production and laboratory facilities to perform work for other customers when this work did not interfere with DOE mission work and it could be shown that no private industrial facility was willing and capable of performing the work. Performance of this type of work had the advantage to the Government of deferring overhead costs and helping to retain core competencies. As DOD and other Federal agency procurements have decreased in recent years, it has been increasingly difficult to attract work of this kind to DOE facilities.

43.12

The commentor sees the nuclear issue as an issue for the rest of human time. We are the last generation, according to the commentor, that will have the opportunity to address this issue in a responsible manner simply because we are responsible for it. The commentor also stresses the need to have the best scientists working in the nuclear arena. Another commentor wants to know why safer alternatives to nuclear weapons are not being utilized.

• Response: The United States is promoting nonproliferation through the NPT and the CTBT and reductions in its nuclear weapon stockpile through treaties such as START II. Congress and the President have directed the Secretary of Energy to ensure that the stewardship program preserves the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons without nuclear testing and without new weapons production. This includes competencies in research, design, development, testing, reliability assessment, certification, manufacturing, and surveillance capabilities.

43.13

The commentor states that Los Alamos has been billed "the little Oak Ridge" for quite some time, and it looks like a $600 million project. The commentor would like the PEIS to discuss whether Los Alamos has received $600 million for a capital project.

• Response: DOE is aware of concerns in the Oak Ridge community that DOE is taking actions at Los Alamos to establish uranium fabrication and processing capability to the detriment of future ORR Y-12 missions. These concerns are unfounded in fact. There has not been, nor is there planned to be, a "$600 million project" at Los Alamos to establish a "little Oak Ridge." The following actions are being taken at Los Alamos that relate to Y-12 missions.
  
  The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility is being upgraded to fix safety deficiencies and to extend the life of the facility. The primary mission of the facility is plutonium analytical chemistry in support of the LANL plutonium facility (TA-55). One of four operating wings of Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility contains limited capability for HEU operations. A limited amount of DOE funding ($2 to $4 million per year) has been given to Los Alamos for work in this area in recent years. Most of the work has focused on chemical recovery technology for HEU so that LANL can process its onsite legacy residues of enriched uranium.
  
  The Sigma Complex facilities constitute the major LANL facilities for fabrication of components (which do not contain plutonium or HEU) for R&D. Work performed here that relates to Y-12 missions include fabrication of parts from depleted uranium and its alloys, lithium salts, and other specialty metals. These are traditional missions of these facilities that have been ongoing for decades. No significant upgrades have occurred to these facilities in recent years, and the only planned modifications are to accommodate missions transferred from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site under the nonnuclear consolidation program.

43.14

The commentor states that the Government could save $18 million of the laboratory's $40 million travel budget if the top brass drove from Albuquerque airport instead of chartering flights.

• Response: DOE and LANL travel budgets and any potential savings that might be expected from alternative means of travel are beyond the scope of the PEIS. However, if the commentor is referring to the routine flights that were "chartered" between Albuquerque and Los Alamos, these flights were discontinued in 1995 due to reduced traffic demand.

43.15

The commentor believes that the history discussion in chapter 2 should go back further than the beginning of the Cold War in order to provide a better perspective on nuclear weapons issues. Another commentor asks about the differentiation of the terms "post-Cold War" and "neo-Cold War."

• Response: The purpose of and need for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is discussed in chapter 2. This discussion provides sufficient justification for the proposed actions and the alternatives analyzed in the PEIS, and includes a brief discussion of the Cold War.

43.16

The commentor feels that a weapons program is needed to ensure national security. Another commentor feels national security will result from people working towards peace and justice.

• Response: Nuclear weapons are a key component of national security and the President has declared the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile to be a supreme national interest. DOE has reduced the size of the stockpile as a result of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. DOE responds to the direction of the President and Congress. The preferred alternatives were chosen, in part, because they do satisfy U.S. arms control and nonproliferation objectives. One benefit of science-based stockpile stewardship is to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to NPT goals; however, the U.S. nuclear posture is not the only factor that might affect whether or not other nations might develop nuclear weapons of their own. Some nations that are not declared nuclear states have the ability to develop nuclear weapons. Many of these nations rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for security assurance. The loss of confidence in the safety or reliability of the weapons in the U.S. stockpile could result in a corresponding loss of credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and could provide an incentive to other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons programs.

43.17

The commentor applauds DOE's efforts and the fact that we do have a Nation that is willing to put things together, and consolidate nuclear waste and/or enriched uranium and plutonium.

• Response: Within the Complex, there is a common waste management approach that emphasizes four areas of concern: the reduction of environmental impacts by hazardous or toxic substances, process improvements that minimize waste generation, recycling in order to minimize waste to be disposed and raw material use, and the treatment of generated waste. DOE is increasing its efforts at minimizing the use of hazardous materials and the number and volume of waste streams consistent with programmatic needs through active pollution prevention and waste minimization programs. DOE plans to maintain the weapons stockpile using emerging technologies to mitigate environmental impacts. These new technologies have the potential to reduce waste generation and raw material usage while reducing processing steps and operating costs.

43.18

The commentor believes that the effects of forest fires must be included in the discussion of the current environment at LANL. The commentor notes that a recent fire in the Los Alamos and Bandelier area came within two miles of LANL before it was brought under control, and any discussion of the current environment at LANL must include consideration of such fires.

• Response: DOE agrees with commentor that the Dome Fire, a wildfire that burned over 16,000 acres of National Forest Service and National Park Service land just south of LANL in April and May 1996, aptly illustrates the potential impact of wildfire on life, safety, property, and natural resources. Accordingly, DOE, LANL, Los Alamos County, and the Forest Service are working together to take immediate actions to reduce the fire hazard on and around LANL, and to plan for long-term forest management that would incorporate fire management techniques.
  
  AIRNET and NEWNET are the two air quality monitoring systems employed by LANL; AIRNET data are reported to the public annually in the Environmental Surveillance Report, and NEWNET data are publicly accessible over the Internet computer links as they are collected. Neither AIRNET nor NEWNET stations went off-line during the Dome Fire. Over the past 8 months, LANL has eliminated several AIRNET stations that are no longer needed or were redundant with other sampling as part of an overall effort to streamline the sampling networks to ensure their effectiveness. Just prior to the outbreak of the Dome Fire, LANL reprogrammed four of five monitoring stations in the southern part of the laboratory to transmit data at longer intervals in order to determine long-clock stability, but returned to the original transmittal intervals during the Dome Fire to provide better coverage.

43.19

A number of commentors expressed opinions on issues such as changing the DOE seal, undiscovering plutonium, the neutron source of modern warhead designs, the cleanup of nuclear waste at Hanford, and the storage of spent fuel rods.

• Response: These issues are beyond the scope of this PEIS.

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