Appendix F
F.1 Introduction
The potential for facility Accidents
and the magnitude of their effects are important factors in evaluating
the waste management alternatives addressed in this environmental
impact statement (eis). This appendix presents accident information
related to the facilities that are or could be involved with the
waste management alternatives. By using postulated accident scenarios
associated with the existing and proposed waste processing, storage,
and disposal facilities, this appendix describes the potential
consequences and risks of waste management activities to workers,
the public, and the environment.
Postulated accident scenarios were developed for
each waste type under the alternatives evaluated in this eis.
This appendix considers the five waste types generated and managed
at SRS: high-level radioactive waste, low-level radioactive waste,
hazardous waste, mixed waste,
and transuranic waste.
F.2 General Accident Information
An accident, as discussed in this appendix, is an
inadvertent release of radioactive or hazardous material from
its confinement to the environment resulting in serious physical
injury or substantial property damage. Initiating events are typically
defined in three broad categories:
- External initiators
originate outside the facility and potentially affect the ability
of the facility to keep the material confined. Examples of external
initiators are aircraft crashes, nearby explosions, and hazardous
chemical releases from nearby facilities that could affect the
ability of personnel to properly manage the radioactive/hazardous
materials facility and its contents.
- Internal initiators
originate within a facility and are usually the result of facility
operation. Examples of internal initiators are equipment failures
and human error.
- Natural phenomena
initiators are natural occurrences such
as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes.
Sabotage and terrorist activities (i.e., intentional
human initiators) could be either external or internal initiators.
For this appendix, "facility Accidents " are accidents associated with facilities that support or are involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of the five waste types identified in Section F.1. Accident scenarios associated with waste management activities performed at a specific facility are also considered "facility accidents."
The probability of an accident (i.e., annual frequency)
and its consequences depend on the type of initiator(s), how often
that initiator occurs, and the frequency with which the resulting
chain of events would lead to a release of material. Potential
Accidents (and their effects) are grouped into
four categories -- anticipated accidents, unlikely accidents,
extremely unlikely accidents, and beyond extremely unlikely accidents
-- based on their estimated annual frequency. Table F-1 lists,
in decreasing order, these accident categories and their corresponding
frequency ranges. For example, if an earthquake of sufficient
magnitude to cause a release of material to the environment is
expected to occur once every 5,000 years, the frequency for this
accident is presented as 1 in 5,000, or 0.0002 (expressed as 2.0E-04;
see Acronyms, Abbreviations, and the Use of Scientific Notation)
per year (i.e., it is an unlikely accident per Table F1).
DOE does not consider events that are expected to
occur less often than once every 10 years to be "Accidents ."
This does not imply that undesirable releases of radioactive or
hazardous materials cannot occur more than once every 10 years.
However, events with a probability of occurring more than once
every 10 years are considered "abnormal events"
because their occurrence is expected during the life of the facility,
and they usually do not result in substantial onsite or offsite
consequences. Potential effects from these releases are addressed
in the Occupational and Public Health sections of this eis. DOE
implements physical and administrative controls on facility operations
and activities to minimize the likelihood and impacts of such
events. Personnel are trained and drilled on how to respond to
and mitigate potential releases from abnormal events.
Table F-2 presents the relative risk of a one-in-a-million chance of dying from several different common-place activities (WSRC 1994a).
Table F-1. Accident frequency categories.
(Accidents per year) | |
| Anticipated accidentsaccidents | Occurs between once in 10 years and once in 100 years |
| Unlikely accidentsaccidents | Occurs between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years |
| Extremely unlikely accidentsaccidents | Occurs between once in 10,000 years and once in 1,000,000 years |
| Beyond extremely unlikely accidentsaccidents | Occurs less than once in 1,000,000 years |
a. DOE (1994a).
Table F-2. Activities that have a one-in-one-million chance of causing death.
| Smoking 1.4 cigarettes | (lung cancer) |
| Eating 40 tablespoons of peanut butter | (aflatoxins) |
| Eating 100 charcoal-broiled steaks | (carcinogens from charcoal broiling) |
| Spending 2 days in New York City | (air pollution) |
| Driving 40 miles in a car | (accident) |
| Flying 2,500 miles in a jet | (accident) |
| Canoeing for 6 minutes | (accident) |
F.3 Historic Perspective
Many of the actions proposed under the waste management
alternatives considered in this eis are continuations or variations
of past SRS operations. DOE studies historic nonroutine events,
abnormal occurrences, and Accidents so similar
events in present or future operations can be minimized or prevented.
Historic events at facilities in the DOE complex are documented
and tracked in two different computer data bases maintained by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory: the Occurrence Reporting
and Processing System (ORPS) and the Safety Performance Measurement
System (SPMS). In addition, Savannah River
Site (SRS) maintains computer data bases, such as the Waste Management
Fault Tree Data Storage and Retrieval System, which track historic
occurrence information and lessons learned specific to SRS facilities
and operations.
Since the implementation of the Site Item Reportability
and Issue Management (SIRIM) program in 1991, which assigns the
responsibilities and requirements for reporting abnormal events
and Accidents at SRS, more than 425 abnormal events
involving waste management activities and operations have been
documented (WSRC 1994b, c). These events were reviewed to determine
whether (1) workers were physically injured, (2) radioactive
or hazardous material was inadvertently released to the environment,
or (3) the occurrence, if not resolved, could have caused
significant consequences to workers, members of the public, or
the environment. One event, involving a procedural violation of
the nuclear criticality safety limits (maximum permissible plutonium
inventory per waste container) established for the Solid Waste
Disposal Facility, was considered to have the potential to have
caused major impacts (an inadvertent criticality and potential
worker fatality). The criticality limits were exceeded because
the plutonium inventory placed in the waste containers was incorrectly
calculated. As an immediate corrective action, DOE suspended all
shipments of transuranic waste to the
Solid Waste Disposal Facility from SRS facilities that generate
transuranic waste. Before resuming shipments, DOE (1) ensured
that no potential criticality hazards existed as a result of the
limits being exceeded and (2) independently evaluated each facility
that generates transuranic waste to ensure that the deficiencies
had been resolved and that the facilities could correctly calculate
the inventories of waste materials being sent to the Solid Waste
Disposal Facility.
DOE also evaluated events that occurred prior to
implementation of the Site Item Reportability and Issue Management
System in 1991. The Waste Management Fault Tree Data Storage and
Retrieval System data base documents several hundred events occurring
between 1988 and 1991. Eight of the 13 events involving the management
of liquid high-level radioactive wastes (such as is done at the
F- and HArea tank farms) involved worker doses in excess
of established DOE limits; 2 involved liquid releases
of radioactive material to Fourmile Branch;
1 involved an airborne release of radioactive particulates to
the atmosphere; and 2 involved personnel assimilations of radioactive
particulates.
Most of the abnormal events resulting from nontank
farm operations were nonradiological in nature, such as minor
physical injuries (e.g., cuts, falls), or involved minor leaks
of radioactive material that did not result in airborne releases
to the environment or a measurable dose to personnel. However,
one event involved the flooding of a shallow land disposal unit
as a result of heavy rains over a period of several days. This
event, which occurred in August 1990, caused several metal boxes
containing low-level radioactive waste to flood. In addition,
when the trench flooded, several of the boxes floated, causing
the stacking configuration of waste containers in the disposal
unit to change. DOE assessments concluded that there were no releases
of radioactive material to the environment.
Abnormal events from the beginning of Solid Waste
Disposal Facility and the tank farm facilities operations in early
1953 through 1988 are discussed in the safety analysis reports
for these facilities. At the tank farms, 17 occurrences were noted
as significant: 9 liquid releases to Fourmile
Branch, 6 personnel assimilations,
and 2 airborne releases of radioactive particulates to the atmosphere.
At the Solid Waste Disposal Facility, events primarily involved
spills or leaks of organic solvents and small fires (limited to
only one or a few waste containers) attributed to spontaneous
chemical combustion resulting from improper packaging and did
not result in measurable or significant releases of radioactive
material. Since 1981, no fires have occurred in the transuranic
waste storage drums, culverts, or carbon
steel boxes at the Solid Waste Disposal Facility.
F.4 Accident Analysis Methodology
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidance
issued by the DOE Office of NEPA Oversight (DOE 1993) recommends
that accident impact analyses "...reference Safety Assessments
and Safety Analysis Reports, if available." Most of the facilities
considered in this eis have pre-existing safety documentation
that analyzes the consequences and risks associated with operating
the facilities. In accordance with this NEPA guidance, existing
safety documentation was referred to during the preparation of
the accident analysis portion of this eis. This appendix used
three Westinghouse Savannah River Company
technical reports (WSRC 1994c, d, and e) as the basis for the
accident analysis information presented. These technical reports
used safety analysis reports, preliminary safety analysis reports,
hazard assessment documents, basis for interim operations documents,
safety assessments, and other safety evaluations.
This analysis assessed the effects of radiological
releases on four receptor groups in order to compare results among
the alternatives. They are:
- uninvolved worker at
100 meters: an individual 100 meters (328 feet) from the point
of a release
- uninvolved worker at
640 meters: an individual 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point
of a release
- offsite maximally exposed
individual: a hypothetical member of the public who lives along
the SRS boundary and who would receive the largest exposure from
a release
- offsite population
within 80 kilometers (50 miles): all the people within an 80-kilometer
(50mile) radius of SRS
AXAIR89Q (WSRC 1994f), a computer
code developed specifically for analyzing the consequences of
accidental releases of airborne radioactive particulates from
SRS, was used to calculate the consequences to the receptor groups
identified above for each of the accident scenarios postulated
in this appendix. Consequences for the uninvolved workers and
the offsite maximally exposed individual were calculated using
50 percentile meteorological assumptions (meaning that half the
time meteorological conditions such as wind speed and barometric
pressure are better than the assumption, and half the time they
are worse), in accordance with DOE guidance (DOE 1993). DOE believes
that the 50 percentile meteorological assumptions provide an estimate
of the consequences under more realistic exposure conditions than
would be expected if one of the postulated Accidents
occurs. The AXAIR89Q computer code, which calculates population
doses differently than doses for individuals, is not programmed
to determine the population dose for meteorological conditions
not exceeded 50 percent of the time. Therefore, for the offsite
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), DOE assumed very
conservative meteorological conditions within 99.5 percentile.
As a result, the consequences from postulated accidents are higher
than would normally be expected for the offsite population.
As noted above, uninvolved workers are evaluated
at 100 and 640 meters (328 and 2,100 feet). Typically, uninvolved
workers at 100 meters (328 feet) are in a facility's emergency
planning zone, which generally extends to the facility's boundary.
However, uninvolved workers at 640 meters (2,100 feet) are
likely to be outside a facilityís emergency planning zone,
and it typically would take longer to notify these workers of
an accident at the facility. The purpose of presenting accident
impacts for the uninvolved workers at these two distances is to
provide a comparison of results for uninvolved workers who are
likely to be initially aware of an accident and those who are
not. It should be noted that the methodology described in the
following sections does not take credit for emergency responses
to Accidents (e.g., evacuating personnel to a
safe distance or notifying the public to take shelter) in determining
potential effects on workers or members of the public. To minimize
the potential for human exposures and impacts to the environment
if an accident occurs, SRS has established an emergency plan (WSRC
1994d) that governs responses to accidents. Section F.8 summarizes
the SRS Emergency Plan.
A maximum credible design basis earthquake at SRS,
estimated to occur once every 5,000 years, could potentially impact
multiple facilities within a single facility area, resulting in
the release of radioactive and/or toxic materials. It is also
possible, although probably less likely, that an earthquake of
the same magnitude could damage facilities in more than one facility
area (e.g., F- and H-Areas), resulting in simultaneous releases
to the environment. See Section F.6.
F.4.1 RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
This appendix presents quantitative impacts to SRS
workers and members of the public from postulated radiological
Accidents using the following parameters: dose,
accident frequency, latent fatal cancers, and risk
of latent fatal cancers per year. These parameters were either
referenced in or developed from information provided in the following
technical reports: Bounding Accident Determination for the
Accident Input Analysis of the SRS Waste Management Environmental
Impact Statement (WSRC 1994e), Solid Waste Accident Analysis
in Support of the Savannah River Waste Management
Environmental Impact Statement (WSRC 1994c), and the Liquid
Waste Accident Analysis in Support of the Savannah River Waste
Management Environmental Impact Statement (WSRC 1994b). The
quantities of radioactive materials and how these materials affect
humans are important in determining health effects. The International
Commission on Radiological Protection has made specific recommendations
for quantifying these health effects. Results
are presented in terms of latent fatal cancers calculated using
the ICRP-60 conversion factors of 0.0005 latent fatal cancers
per rem for the public and 0.0004 latent fatal cancers per rem
for workers if the dose is less than 20 rem. For doses of 20 rem
or more, the ICRP-60 conversion factors are doubled (ICRP 1991).
A quantitative analysis of these facilities is not
possible because some of the facilities proposed for waste management
activities are in the pre-design or conceptual stage of development.
Therefore, a qualitative discussion of accident impacts is provided
for proposed facilities for which a quantitative accident analysis
does not exist.
Additionally, this analysis presents potential impacts
to involved workers from postulated Accidents
qualitatively rather than quantitatively for several reasons,
the most relevant being that no adequate methodology exists for
calculating meaningful consequences at or near the location where
the accidental release occurs. The following example illustrates
this concept.
A typical method for calculating the dose to an involved
worker is to assume that the material is released in a room occupied
by the individual and that the material instantly disperses throughout
the room. Because the involved worker is assumed to be in the
room when the release occurs, this worker probably would breathe
some fraction of the radioactive (or hazardous) materials for
some number of seconds before leaving the room. Typically, estimates
of exposure time are based on assumptions made about worker response
to the incident (e.g., how long before the worker leaves the room,
or whether during evacuation the worker passes through an area
of higher airborne concentration). The uncertainty of estimation
is extremely great, and no additional insight into the activity
is available because the occurrence is assumed to be undesirable;
therefore, it is not necessary to perform the calculations. Historical
evidence indicates that room contaminations are nonfatal Accidents
with the potential for minor personnel contamination and assimilation.
DOE accepts that if the exposed individual is close
enough to the location of the accident, it will be impossible
to show acceptable dose consequences against typical guidelines.
This is especially true if all Accidents with
a frequency as low as once in a million years -- beyond which
it is not possible to statistically demonstrate protection of
worker life from standard hazards in the workplace -- must be
considered. For example, it is more likely that an employee would
be fatally injured by falling equipment during an earthquake severe
enough to occur only once every 5,000 years than from the radiological
dose that individual would receive from materials released during
the earthquake. Therefore, this appendix addresses potential consequences
to involved workers qualitatively. DOE assumes that the immediate
impacts of the accident (in this case an earthquake) to the worker
would be from the facility in which the worker was located at
the time of the accident; while the consequences from another
facility affected during the earthquake would have little immediate
impact upon an "involved" worker.
Many accident scenarios can be postulated for each
SRS facility; to attempt to analyze all potential accident scenarios
and their impacts would not be useful or meaningful. However,
a broad spectrum of Accidents can usually be identified
and analyzed for a given facility to provide an understanding
of the risks associated with performing activities in that facility.
Safety analysis reports and other safety documentation usually
analyze a broad spectrum of accidents that are considered credible
(i.e., they are expected to occur at least once every one million
years) and estimate their potential impacts on workers, the environment,
and the public.
For this eis, the term "representative bounding
accident" means postulated events or Accidents
that have higher risks (i.e., consequences times frequencies)
than other accidents postulated within the same frequency range.
For example, the accident scenario within each frequency range
(defined in Table F-1) that presents the highest risk
(i.e., consequence times frequency) to the offsite maximally exposed
individual is the representative bounding accident for that frequency
range because its risk is higher than that of other accidents
within the same frequency range. Determining the representative
bounding accident is part of a "binning" process, whereby
all the accident scenarios identified for a facility under a specific
alternative would be assigned to a selected frequency range. The
highest-risk accident scenario within each frequency range is
then designated the representative bounding accident. It should
be noted that the consequence value used to calculate risk is
dose to the offsite maximally exposed individual.
Once the representative bounding Accidents are identified, it is not necessary to further consider other accident scenarios for that particular alternative. The bounding accident scenarios are further evaluated to provide accident impacts for the receptor groups. An evaluation of the risks associated with the representative bounding accidents for facilities associated with a given alternative can establish an understanding of the overall risk to workers, members of the public, and the environment from operating facilities under a specific alternative. However, since some accident impacts are not represented in quantitative terms, the term "representative" must preface the phrase "bounding accident." This is because without a complete list of quantitative impacts from accidents for all facilities (existing and proposed), the true bounding accidents may not be absolutely defined. Figure F-1 shows the concept of bounding risk Accidents . Section F.5 identifies the representative bounding accidents postulated for the facilities considered in this eis.
F.4.2 CHEMICAL HAZARDS ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
To fully understand the hazards associated with SRS
facilities associated with the alternatives considered in this
eis, it is necessary to analyze potential Accidents
involving hazardous as well as radiological materials. Because
the long-term health consequences of human exposure to hazardous
materials are not as well understood as those related to radiation
exposure, a determination of potential
health effects from exposures to hazardous
materials is more subjective than a determination of health effects
from exposure to radiation. Therefore, the consequences of accidents
involving hazardous materials postulated in this appendix are
presented in terms of airborne concentrations at various distances
from the accident. The quantities and airborne concentrations
at various receptor locations were extracted from technical reports
(WSRC 1994b, c) supporting this eis.
Because safety documentation exists for many of the
facilities within the scope of this eis, it was used whenever
possible to determine potential events involving hazardous materials
and the health effects that could result
from inadvertent releases of these materials to the environment.
However, because these safety documents were developed for different
purposes, the methodologies used to analyze potential events at
the facilities are sometimes different. In general, the methodology
used to develop most of the existing safety documentation included:
(1) identifying hazardous materials present in quantities greater
than reportable quantities (40 CFR 302.4), threshold planning
quantities (40 CFR 355), or threshold quantities (40 CFR
29:1910.1000, Subpart Z); (2) modeling an unmitigated release
of those hazardous materials to the atmosphere to determine airborne
concentrations at the various receptor locations [100 meters
(328 feet), 640 meters (2,100 feet), and the nearest SRS
boundary]; and (3) comparing those airborne concentrations to
Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values established
by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA 1991).
Three ERPG values (ERPG-1, -2, or -3) are typically
assigned to hazardous materials or chemicals in terms of airborne
concentration (milligrams per cubic meter or parts per billion).
The types of emergency response actions required to minimize worker
and public exposure are determined by considering which of the
three ERPG values is exceeded. The three types of ERPG values
defined are:
- ERPG-1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.
- ERPG-2: The maximum
airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly
all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing
or developing irreversible or other serious health effects
or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective
action.
- ERPG-3: The maximum
airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals
could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing
life-threatening health effects.
The American Industrial Hygiene Association has not
established ERPG values for some hazardous materials. When such
materials would be present at SRS facilities in substantial quantities
(exceeding the various threshold criteria), airborne concentrations
of these materials at the various receptor locations were compared
to the most restrictive exposure limits established by other recognized
organizations to control worker exposures to hazardous materials.
Table F-3 lists the hierarchy of exposure limits that DOE used
in place of ERPG values to determine potential health effects
resulting from the postulated hazardous material releases.
For facilities for which safety documentation was
not developed in accordance with the methodology described above,
the typical difference in the methodology involved which hazardous
materials were required to be evaluated, not how the evaluations
were performed. In the case of the Defense Waste Processing Facility's
Organic Waste Storage Tank, for example, which was recently evaluated
in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,
Defense Waste Processing Facility (DOE 1994b), hazardous materials
designated "Extremely Hazardous Substances" in accordance
with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986 were evaluated, rather than materials that exceed the reportable,
threshold, or threshold planning quantities.
The potential events at the various facilities analyzed in this eis that could release hazardous materials to the environment were evaluated using one of the methodologies described above. DOE further analyzes potential events involving hazardous materials at the Consolidated Incineration Facility and
E-, B-, and N-Areas (WSRC 1994c). DOE further discusses
the analysis methodology for events involving hazardous materials
at the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility, the F/H-Area tank
farms, the Defense Waste Processing Facility's
Organic Waste Storage Tank, and waste storage tanks at the Savannah
River Technology Center (WSRC 1994b).
Although safety documentation exists for most of
the facilities and facility areas that perform waste management
activities, there is no safety documentation that analyzes potential
events involving hazardous materials in M-Area. Using the second
methodology described above, it was determined that sulfuric acid
would be the only chemical present in M-Area in sufficient quantities
to warrant further evaluation in this eis. Consistent with the
methodologies, DOE analyzed an unmitigated release of the entire
sulfuric acid inventory in M-Area using a commercially available
computer code called EPICode (Homann 1988) that models the atmospheric
dispersion of chemicals released to the environment. DOE then
compared the resulting airborne concentrations against the ERPG
values for sulfuric acid to determine the potential health effects.
(if primary guidelines are unavailable) | alternative guideline | |
| ERPG-3 | IDLHc | NIOSH (1990) |
| ERPG-2 | LOCd PEL-Ce TLV-Cf TLV-TWAg multiplied by 5 | EPA (1987) CFR (1990) ACGIH (1992) ACGIH (1992) |
| ERPG-1 | TLV-STELi TLV-TWA multiplied by 3 | ACGIH (1992) ACGIH (1992) |
a. This table is based on information presented in the Toxic Chemical Hazard Classification and Risk Acceptance Guidelines for Use in DOE Facilities (WSRC 1992).
b. Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL): "A concentration of a substance in air (as a gas, vapor, or aerosol) that may be judged by the Department of Defense to be acceptable for the performance of specific tasks during emergency conditions lasting for a period of 1 to 24 hours. Exposure at an EEGL might produce reversible effects that do not impair judgment and do not interfere with proper responses to an emergency." The EEGL is "...a ceiling guidance level for a single emergency exposure, usually lasting from 1 to 24 hours -- an occurrence expected to be infrequent in the lifetime of a person."
c. Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH): "The maximum concentration from which, in the event of respirator failure, one could escape within 30 minutes without a respirator and without experiencing any escape-impairing (e.g., severe eye irritation) or irreversible health effects."
d. Level of Concern (LOC): "The concentration of an extremely hazardous substance in air above which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time."
e. Permissible Exposure Limit - Ceiling (PEL-C): "The employeeís exposure which shall not be exceeded during any part of the work day."
f. Threshold Limit Value - Ceiling (TLV-C): "The concentration that should not be exceeded during any part of the working exposure."
g. Threshold Limit Value - Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA): "The time-weighted average concentration for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect."
h. Time Weighted Average - Short-Term Exposure Limit (TWA-STEL): "The employeeís 15minute time weighted average exposure which shall not be exceeded at any time during a work day unless another time limit is specified...."
i. Threshold Limit Value - Short-Term Exposure Limit (TLV-STEL): "The concentration to which workers can be exposed continuously for a short period of time without suffering from (1) irritation, (2) chronic or irreversible tissue damage, or (3) narcosis of sufficient degree to increase the likelihood of accidental injury, impair self-rescue, or materially reduce work efficiency, and provided that the daily TLV-TWA is not exceeded."
F.5 Accident Analysis by Waste Type
This section presents potential impacts from postulated
radiological and chemical Accidents at the facilities
that are or could be involved in the management of waste materials
at SRS. This section has been organized according to waste type,
with an analysis for each of the alternatives presented in this
eis. Each of the following sections includes a list of the facilities,
postulated radiological accident impacts, and postulated chemical
accident impacts associated with the waste type.
F.5.1 HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
The following sections address the impacts of postulated
Accidents associated with the alternatives considered
in this eis for the management of liquid high-level waste.
F.5.1.1 Facilities and Accidents: High-Level Waste
The accident analyses considered all facilities and
processes involved in the management of liquid highlevel
waste. The facilities were identified from the information on
high-level waste provided in Chapter 2 of this eis. The facilities
involved in the management of high-level waste for all alternatives
considered in this eis are the F/H-Area Evaporators,
the Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator, the New Waste Transfer
Facility, the F/H-Area tank
farms, and the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility. Descriptions
of these facilities are provided in Appendix B. For each of these
facilities, a list of postulated accident scenarios was developed
to support high-level waste accident analyses for each alternative.
Table F-4 lists potential Accidents associated with the management of high-level waste. These accidents were extracted from the technical reports supporting this eis (WSRC 1994b, c, and e).
Table F-4. List of potential Accidents associated with the management of high-level waste.
(rem) | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to a feed line break | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to waste tank filter fire | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to design basis earthquake | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to waste tank filter fire | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to evaporator pressurization and breach | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to hydrogen explosion | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to organic fire - waste tank | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to HEPAc filter fire | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to hydrogen fire - waste tank | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to waste tank overflow | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to waste tank overflow | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to organic fire - waste tank | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to hydrogen fire - waste tank | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - pump tank | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - pump tank | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to waste tank overpressurization | ||||
| RHLWEb release due to design basis tornado | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to waste tank overpressurization | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to straight wind | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to hydrogen explosion - pump tank | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to straight wind | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to earthquake | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to hydrogen explosion - pump tank | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to vehicle crash (scenario A; see #63) | ||||
| H-Area waste release from feed pump riser | ||||
| F-Area waste release from feed pump riser | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - evaporator | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - CTSe tank | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to waste tank overpressurization | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to waste tank overpressurization | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to tank leak | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to earthquake | ||||
| Design basis ETFd liquid release due to straight wind |
Table F-4. (continued).
(rem) | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| H-Area airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to tank leak | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - evaporator | ||||
| F-Area airborne release due to hydrogen explosion - CTSe tank | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to hydrogen explosion - CTSe tank | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to hydrogen explosion - CTSe tank | ||||
| F-Area liquid release due to hydrogen explosion - evaporator | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to a hydrogen explosion - evaporator | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Design basis ETFd liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| F-Area liquid release during catherization | ||||
| H-Area liquid release during catherization | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to leaks | ||||
| H-Area liquid release due to a vehicle crash (scenario B; see #30) | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to overflow | ||||
| Design basis ETFd liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to a siphoning incident | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to spill | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFd airborne release due to siphoning incident | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| Design basis ETFd airborne release due to a siphoning incident |
a. The dose given is for the offsite maximally exposed individual using 99.5 percentile meteorology.
b Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator.
c. High efficiency particulate air.
d. Effluent Treatment Facility.
e. Concentrate transfer system.
F.5.1.2 Accident Analysis for the High-Level Waste No-Action Alternative
This section addresses the effects of postulated
Accidents associated with the no-action alternative
considered for high-level waste.
Impacts from Postulated Radiological AccidentsAccidents
DOE identified the representative bounding accident
scenarios for the no-action alternative from the list of potential
radiological Accidents presented in Table F-4.
Figure F-2 identifies the highest-risk accident scenarios
in each frequency range. As shown in Figure F-2, for all but the
lowest frequency range, the representative bounding accidents
are associated with the operation of the Replacement High-Level
Waste Evaporator. Table F-5 lists the high-level waste representative
bounding accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers
for exposed workers and the public.
Accident Scenario 1 -Replacement High-Level
Waste Evaporator release due to a feed line break: A break in
the feed line to the Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator could
occur if feed was pumped after the feed line became plugged. The
feed line can become plugged due to excess sludge and suspended
solids collecting and solidifying in stagnation points within
the feed line. If feed pumping continued, the excess pressure
would eventually cause a rupture in the feed line or jumper connection.
Numerous indicators would alert the operator of a feed line rupture.
In the event of a break, the automatic level control system in
the evaporator would indicate decreased lift activity as the level
of liquid in the evaporator dropped. Because supernatant
would now be accumulating in the evaporator cell, the evaporator
sump and differential pressure sensors in the ventilation system
would also indicate leakage. Finally, the radiation monitor in
the stack would register an increase in the radiation level of
material leaving the ventilation system.
The Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator is planned
to operate from 1999 to 2018, when DOE expects to have completed
high-level waste management activities. Between 1994 and 1999
-- before the Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator is operational
-- the highest-risk accident in the anticipated accident
range would be Accident Scenario 2: H-Area airborne release due
to waste tank filter fire.
Accident Scenario 3 -Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator release due to a design basis earthquake: Studies reported in the supporting technical report (WSRC 1994c) indicate that SRS is located in an area where moderate damage could occur from earthquakes. In this accident scenario, an earthquake is assumed to disrupt the operation of the evaporator facility. The feed input and bottoms output are assumed not to be affected during the earthquake, and the steam supply is assumed to continue to flow at the normal rate; therefore, the evaporator contents continue to be boiled off as normal. However, the demister is assumed to be damaged and its performance is degraded. The accident results in a release to the environment through a broken process line between the evaporator vessel demister and condenser. The highest-risk accident in this frequency range between 1994 and 1999 would be Accident Scenario 7: H-Area airborne release due to waste tank organic fire.
Accident Scenario 5 -Replacement High-Level
Waste Evaporator release due to evaporator pressurization and
breach: An evaporator breach would be possible if the internal
pressure in the evaporator exceeded the design pressure, which
could be caused by demister mesh pad blockage; excessive levels
of condensate and vent line blockage; or steam bundle failures.
A breach of the evaporator would result in an energetic release
of the vessel contents into the evaporator cell and a subsequent
unfiltered airborne release of waste into the atmosphere when
the high efficiency particulate air filters become overloaded.
The associated pressure increase would be detected by independent
bubble tube pressure sensors within the evaporator vessel. These
sensors are tied to interlocks that would provide for mitigation
of the event. These devices must fail for an overpressurization
to occur. From 1994 to 1999 -- before the Replacement High-Level
Waste Evaporator is operational -- the highest-risk
accident in this frequency range would be Accident Scenario 15:
H-Area airborne release due to pump tank hydrogen explosion.
Accident Scenario 53 -Design basis F/H-Area
Effluent Treatment Facility airborne release due to a tornado:
Damage to equipment that would result in a release of radioactivity
could occur during a sustained wind or tornado. The F/H-Area Effluent
Treatment Facility is designed for a sustained wind speed of 137
kilometers (85 miles) per hour. Outside tanks and piping would
be subjected to the full force of the wind and could be struck
by windblown objects, either of which could result in a release
of radioactivity. Equipment and piping located inside a process
building could be damaged by roof debris and falling portions
of the upper structure. Some of the liquid released would evaporate
and become airborne and some would drain to surface water
streams. No credit is taken for tank dikes, high efficiency particulate
air filtration, or for a release from an elevated stack.
F.5.1.3 Accident Analysis for the High-Level Waste for Minimum, Expected, and Maximum Waste Forecasts
This section addresses the impacts of postulated
Accidents associated with alternatives A,
B, and C considered for high-level waste. The facilities that
support alternative A, alternative B, and alternative C
and their periods of operation are identical to the facilities
and periods of operation that support the
no-action alternative. Thus, postulated radiological accident
scenarios and their impacts are the same as described in Section
F.5.1.2.
DOE assumes that conclusions for representative bounding
accident scenarios for high-level waste management under the alternatives
would not be changed by the minimum, maximum, and expected waste
forecasts. Since the accident analysis for each accident scenario
is based on a conservative assumption of peak utilization of the
facility, differences between minimum, maximum, and expected waste
forecast would only affect how long the facility would operate.
Therefore, while consequence or frequency for postulated Accidents
are not changed, the expected duration of risk from
a facility-specific accident scenario could be longer or shorter,
as appropriate. Impacts for these cases are addressed in the representative
bounding accident descriptions.
F.5.1.4 Impacts to Involved Workers from Accidents Involving High-Level Waste
The highest risk accident scenarios for
high-level waste involve releases from the Replacement HighLevel
Waste Evaporator, tank farm tanks, or the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment
Facility. These releases would be due to feed line breaks, overpressurizations
and breaches, explosions, or natural disasters. Of these accident
scenarios and their postulated releases, the ones associated with
the Replacement HighLevel Waste Evaporator are assumed to
have the greatest potential for adverse effects on involved workers.
This assumption is based on the higher consequences for the Replacement
HighLevel Waste Evaporator accident scenarios than those
for the tank farm or F/HArea Effluent Treatment Facility.
While some exposure to involved workers could occur due to an
accidental release, timely evacuation as the result of monitoring
activities would prevent substantial radiological exposure. DOE
assumes no fatalities would be likely from radiological consequences.
F.5.1.5 Impacts from High-Level Waste Chemical Accidents
The results of the chemical hazards assessment completed
for chemicals stored or processed in facilities located in the
area of the F/H-Area tank farms as addressed in the Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement, Defense Waste Processing Facility
are presented in Table F-6. The calculated 100meter
(328foot), 640meter (2,100-foot), and offsite chemical
concentrations are compared to the appropriate ERPG-1, -2, and
-3 guideline concentrations. A nitric acid release from Building 24161H
is the only accident with calculated concentrations that exceed
the ERPG-3 limit at 100 and 640 meters (328 and 2,100 feet).
Because the concentrations calculated for the SRS boundary for every chemical do not exceed the respective ERPG-1 concentrations (even assuming a total unmitigated release of all chemicals), specific accident scenarios (i.e., an accident initiator and resulting accident progression resulting in a release to the environment) were not developed, nor were corresponding frequencies of occurrence identified. More realistic accident scenarios and associated frequencies were not necessary because the bounding consequences for the unmitigated release of the entire inventory, however improbable, were within established guidelines.
The nitric acid concentrations that exceed the ERPG-3
limit could pose a risk of major reversible tissue
damage. Because the chemical concentration in air decreases with
distance from the release location, offsite individuals would
be exposed to chemical concentrations less than the ERPG-1 limit.
However, onsite personnel in the immediate area of a release could
encounter concentrations that exceed the ERGP-3 limit. While perhaps
not instantly lethal, even short exposures could be extremely
dangerous.
The F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility is classified
as a low-hazard facility based on the chemical hazards assessment
contained in the Effluent Treatment Facility Hazards Assessment
Document (WSRC 1993). Table F-7 lists the results of this
chemical assessment. The calculated 100-meter (328-foot), 640-meter
(2,100-foot), and offsite chemical concentrations are compared
to the appropriate ERPG-1, -2, and -3 guideline concentrations.
A nitrogen dioxide release from the storage area and a nitric
acid release from process chemical storage tanks are the only
postulated Accidents with calculated concentrations
that exceed the ERPG-3 limit at 100-meters (328-feet). However,
no accidents resulted in air concentrations at 640-meters (2,100-feet)
or the SRS boundary that exceeded ERPG-3 guidelines. Additionally,
the nitrogen dioxide release scenario had a calculated concentration
at the SRS boundary that exceeded the ERPG-1 guideline but remained
under the ERPG-2 guideline.
No chemical hazards analysis or accident consequence
analysis exist for the chemicals at the Replacement High-Level
Waste Evaporator. However, it is assumed that the chemical hazards
posed by this facility would be bounded by those posed by existing
evaporators in the F/HArea tank farms.
F.5.2 LOW-LEVEL WASTE
This section evaluates the impacts of postulated
Accidents associated with the alternatives considered
in this eis for the management of low-level waste.
F.5.2.1 Facilities and Accidents: Low-Level Waste
The accident analyses considered all facilities and processes involved in the management of low-level waste. The facilities were identified from the low-level waste information provided in Chapter 2 of this eis. Table F-8 lists the facilities associated with each of the alternatives. Descriptions of these facilities are provided in Appendix B. For each facility, a list of postulated accident scenarios was developed to support the low-level waste accident analysis for each alternative.
Table F-9 lists potential Accidents
associated with the management of low-level waste. This list was
extracted from the technical reports supporting this eis (WSRC
1994b, c, d, and e). All the accidents listed in Table F-9 are
supported by quantitative analyses. It should be noted that because
accident impacts for proposed facilities are mainly qualitative,
they are not listed in the table.
Table F-5. Representative bounding radiological accidents under the no-action alternative.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | RHLWEd release due to a feed line break
| 7.00E-02e
| 6.41E-01 | 2.28E-02 | 3.76E-04 | 1.81E+01 | 1.79E-05
(2.56E-04) | 6.38E-07 (9.12E-06) | 1.32E-08 (1.88E-07) | 6.34E-04 (9.05E-03) | |
| 3 | RHLWEd release due to a design basis earthquake | 2.00E-04
| 1.92E+01 | 6.83E-01 | 1.12E-02 | 5.43E+02 | 1.54E-06
(7.68E-03) | 5.46E-08 (2.73E-04) | 1.12E-09
(5.60E-06) | 5.43E-05
(2.72E-01) | |
| 5 | RHLWEd release due to evaporator pressurization and breach | 5.09E-05
| 4.79E+01 | 1.70E+00 | 2.80E-02 | 1.35E+03 | 1.95E-06
(3.83E-02) | 3.46E-08 (6.80E-04) | 7.13E-10
(1.40E-05) | 3.44E-05
(6.75E-01) | |
| 53 | Design basis ETFe airborne release due to tornado | 3.69E-07
| 2.17E-03 | 6.91E-05 | 3.90E-05 | 3.44E-04 | 3.20E-13
(8.68E-07) | 1.02E-14
(2.76E-08) | 7.20E-15
(1.95E-08) | 6.35E-14
(1.72E-07) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Replacement High-Level Waste Evaporator.
e. Effluent Treatment Facility.
Table F-6. Chemical hazards analysis results for the F/H-Area tank farm facilities.
|
|
| |||||||
| Nitric acid | Bldg. 241-61H | 42,620.90 | 8.30E+02 | 1.00E+02 | 2.00E+00 | 5.20E+00 | 3.9E+01 | 7.70E+01 |
| Phosphorous pentoxide | Bldg. 241-84H | 0.45 | 7.50E-02 | 2.90E-02 | 3.10E-04 | 5.00E+00 | 2.50E+01 | 1.00E+02 |
| Ammonia | Bldg. 242-24H | 13.6 | 4.50E-03 | 1.80E-03 | 2.40E-05 | 1.70E+01 | 1.40E+02 | 7.00E+02 |
| Hydrochloric acid | Bldg. 280-1H | 22.7 | 7.60E-03 | 3.00E-03 | 3.90E-05 | 4.50E+00 | 3.00E+01 | 1.50E+02 |
| Sulfuric acid | Bldg. 280-1F | 3,828.80 | 3.70E-06 | 2.20E-07 | 3.20E-09 | 2.00E+00 | 1.00E+01 | 3.00E+01 |
a. Kilograms. To convert to pounds multiply by 2.2046.
b. Milligrams per cubic meters of air.
c. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
Table F-7. F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility chemical hazards analysis results.
(328 feet) (mg/m3)b | (2,100 feet) (mg/m3)b | |||||||
| Waste water collection tanks | Lead | 4.41E-01 | 1.07E-02 | 4.24E-04 | 2.15E-05 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 7.00E+02 |
| Waste water collection tanks | Ammonia | 5.51E+01 | 1.34E+00 | 5.31E-02 | 2.68E-03 | 1.74E+01 | 1.39E+02 | 6.95E+02 |
| Treatment building chemicals | Ammonia | 5.85E+01 | 1.42E+00 | 5.36E-02 | 2.85E-03 | 1.74E+01 | 1.39E+02 | 6.95E+02 |
| Treatment building chemicals | Lead | 3.39E-01 | 8.24E-03 | 3.27E-04 | 1.65E-05 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 7.00E+02 |
| Treatment building chemicals | Mercury | 5.79E+00 | 1.41E-01 | 5.59E-03 | 2.82E-04 | 1.50E-01 | 2.00E-01 | 2.80E+01 |
| Outside tanks and HEPAd filters | Mercury | 3.09E+00 | 7.53E-01 | 2.99E-02 | 1.50E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.00E-01 | 2.80E+01 |
| Storage area | Nitrogen dioxide | 3.30E+01 | 7.96E+01 | 3.16E+00 | 1.59E-01 | 8.00E-02 | 1.88E+00 | 5.64E+01 |
| Storage area | Sodium hydroxide | 3.02E+02 | 7.34E-02 | 2.91E-03 | 1.47E-04 | 2.00E+00 | 4.00E+01 | 1.00E+02 |
| Storage area | Nitric acid | 2.12E+02 | 5.17E+00 | 2.05E-01 | 1.03E-02 | 5.15E+00 | 3.87E+01 | 7.73E+01 |
| Storage area | Oxalic acid | 1.13E+04 | 2.76E+02 | 1.09E+01 | 5.52E-01 | 2.00E+00 | 5.00E+00 | 5.00E+02 |
| Process chemical storage tanks | Sodium hydroxide | 2.81E+03 | 6.83E-01 | 2.71E-02 | 1.37E-03 | 2.00E+00 | 4.00E+01 | 1.00E+02 |
| Process chemical storage tanks | Nitric acid | 7.41E+03 | 1.81E+02 | 7.18E-00 | 3.61E-01 | 5.15E+00 | 3.87E+01 | 7.73E+01 |
| Acid and caustic tanks | Nitric acid | 5.87E+00 | 2.33E-01 | 1.17E-02 | 5.15E+00 | 3.87E+01 | 7.73E+01 | |
| Acid and caustic tanks | Sodium hydroxide | 4.01E+00 | 9.90E+00 | 3.93E-01 | 1.98E-02 | 2.00E+00 | 4.00E+01 | 1.00E+02 |
a. Kilograms. To convert to pounds multiply by 2.2046.
b. Milligrams per cubic meters of air.
c. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
d. High efficiency particulate air.
e. Quantity not available but is assumed to be bounded by the quantity for nitric acid in the Process Chemical Storage Tanks based upon comparison of airborne concentrations at 100 meters (328 feet).
Table F-8. Low-level waste facilities identified by alternative.
List of facilities | (moderate treatment configuration) | |||
| E-Area vaultsa | ||||
| Reactor compactor | ||||
| 253-H compactor | ||||
| M-Area compactor | ||||
| Soil sort facilityc | ||||
| Non-alpha vitrification facilityc |
| |||
| Consolidated Incineration Facility |
| |||
| Offsite smelter | ||||
| Shallow land disposald |
a. E-Area vaults includes low-activity waste vaults, intermediate-level tritium vaults, intermediate-level nontritium vaults; long-lived waste storage buildings.
b. These facilities are assumed to remain in operation until proposed facilities come on line.
c. Proposed facility.
d. Shallow land disposal includes the engineered low-level trenches, greater confinement disposal (boreholes and engineered trenches), and naval reactor hardware storage.
Table F-9. List of potential Accidents associated with the management of low-level waste.
frequency | (rem) | |||
| Container breach at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/LLWSBc | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/LAWVd | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/ILTVe | ||||
| Container breach at the eaV/LAWVd | ||||
| Container breach at the eaV/ILTVe (scenario A; see #8) | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Container breach at the eaV/ILTVe (scenario B; see #6) | ||||
| Container breach at the eaV/LLWSBc | ||||
| Explosion at CIFg - tank farm sump and diked area | ||||
| Fire at the ELLTf | ||||
| Large fire at CIFg | ||||
| High wind at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Earthquake at CIFg | ||||
| Tornado at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Explosion at CIFg - Rotary Kiln | ||||
| High velocity straight winds at CIFg | ||||
| Tornado at the eaV/LAWVd | ||||
| Tornado at the eaV/ILTVe | ||||
| Unintentional exhumation of ELLTf | ||||
| Explosion at CIFg - backhoe housing | ||||
| High wind at the eaV/ILTVe | ||||
| High wind at the eaV/LAWVd | ||||
| Explosion at CIFg - tank farm tank |
a. The dose given is for the offsite maximally exposed individual (MEI) using 99.5 percentile meteorology.
b. E-Area Vaults/Intermediate-Level Nontritium Vault.
c. E-Area Vaults/Long-Lived Waste Storage Buildings.
d. E-Area Vaults/Low-Activity Waste Vault.
e. E-Area Vaults/Intermediate-Level Tritium Vault.
f. Engineered low-level trenches.
g. Consolidated Incineration Facility.
F.5.2.2 Accident Analysis for the Low-Level Waste No-Action Alternative
This section addresses the effects of postulated
Accidents associated with the no-action alternative
for low-level waste. The postulated accidents provide a baseline
for comparison of the effects of the postulated accidents associated
with the other alternatives.
Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
From the list of potential radiological Accidents
presented in Table F-9, the representative bounding accident scenarios
were identified for the no-action alternative through the binning
process described in Section F.4.1. Figure F-3 identifies the
highest-risk accident scenarios for the four frequency
ranges. As shown in Figure F-3, most of the accidents were in
the anticipated frequency range. This distribution of accidents
is due to the levels of radioactivity associated with low-level
waste. At the lower accident frequency ranges, the risks become
quite small compared with those in the anticipated accident frequency
range. Consequently, for the no-action alternative, it was not
necessary to analyze an accident scenario beyond the extremely
unlikely accident frequency range. Table F-10 lists the low-level
waste representative bounding accidents, accident consequences,
and latent fatal cancers for exposed workers and the public.
The low-level waste representative bounding Accidents
and their impacts, as identified in Table F-10, are described
below:
Accident Scenario 1 -Container breach at
the intermediate-level nontritium vault (two containers, noncombustible
waste): The intermediate-level nontritium vault would contain
both combustible waste (paper, plastics, cloth, etc.) and noncombustible
waste (scrap hardware) contaminated with mixed fission products.
Accidents involving this scrap could result in
the airborne release of this contamination. The major contributor
to the dose would be the waste material, which becomes airborne
as a result of the accident. In order to estimate the consequences
of this accident, the following conservative assumptions were
made:
- Two waste containers
were breached. This assumption is based on the hypothetical situation
in which one waste container was being placed (by crane) into
the intermediate-level nontritium vault cell and was inadvertently
dropped (through either human error or crane malfunction) on a
second waste container already within the intermediate-level nontritium
vault cell, resulting in a breach of both containers.
- Analysis has shown that
the radionuclide release due to rupture of a waste container in
the intermediate-level nontritium vault that contains a noncombustible
waste form would conservatively bound the release of an intermediate-level
nontritium vault container that contains a combustible waste form.
Therefore, it is conservatively assumed for this analysis that
the two damaged waste containers have noncombustible waste as
their contents.
- Radiological container
inventory for the intermediate-level nontritium vault is based
on 120 percent of the maximum estimated value.
Accident Scenario 13 -High wind at the intermediate-level
nontritium vault (one container): In a moderate hazard facility,
DOE (LLNL 1990) specifies a maximum wind speed of 175 kilometers
(109 miles) per hour and a wind-driven missile in the form of
a two-by-four plank weighing 6.8 kilograms (15 pounds) and
traveling with a horizontal speed of 80 kilometers (50 miles)
per hour at a maximum height of 9 meters (30 feet). The accident
analyzed for this highwind event is the breach of one container
as the result of a wind-driven missile entering the open top of
the intermediate-level nontritium vault and striking a waste container.
It is assumed that 0.1 percent of the waste material becomes
airborne. Analysis has shown that the radionuclide release would
be the same as that for the container breach accident described
above. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that the high-wind-driven
missile strikes containers that contain noncombustible waste.
Accident Scenario 15 -Tornado (220 kilometers
per hour) at the intermediate-level nontritium vault (two containers):
The accident analyzed for the 220-kilometer (137-mile) per hour
tornado is the breach of two containers as the result of two tornado-driven
missiles entering the open top of the intermediate-level nontritium
vault and each striking one waste container, for a total of two
failed containers. Analysis has shown that the radionuclide release
would be the same as that for the container breach accident described
above. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that the tornado-driven
missiles strike containers that contain noncombustible waste.
F.5.2.3 Accident Analysis for the Low-Level Waste Under Alternative B
This section addresses the impacts of postulated Accidents for low-level waste associated with alternative B.
F.5.2.3.1 Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
This section presents the potential effects of postulated
radiological Accidents at facilities identified
in Table F-8 for the low-level waste management described in alternative B.
Figure F-4 shows the highest-risk accident scenarios
for the four frequency ranges. As shown in Figure F-4, most of
the accidents analyzed were in the anticipated accident frequency
range. The distribution of accidents analyzed is indicative of
the levels of radioactivity associated with low-level waste. At
the lower accident frequency ranges, the risks become quite small
compared to those in the anticipated accident frequency range.
Accidents associated with the Consolidated Incineration
Facility occur in the
less frequent accident ranges. Table F-11 lists the representative
bounding accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers
for exposed workers and the public. DOE assumes that conclusions
regarding representative bounding accident scenarios could change
as a result of the minimum, maximum, or expected waste forecasts.
The accident analysis for each accident scenario is based on a
conservative assumption of peak utilization of facilities. That
is, the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would only
affect how long the facilities would operate. Therefore, while
the consequence or frequency of postulated accidents do not change,
the expected duration of risk from a facility-specific accident
scenario could be longer or shorter, depending on the case. The
number of new facilities needed to meet the low-level waste management
requirements could be affected by the minimum, maximum, and expected
waste forecasts. Thus, the consequence or frequency of specific
accident scenarios could be increased or decreased, depending
on the case. Impacts for these cases will be addressed in the
representative bounding accident descriptions.
Accident Scenario 1 -Container breach at
the intermediate-level nontritium vault (two containers, noncombustible
waste): This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.1.2.
This accident scenario is considered the representative bounding
accident for the anticipated accident range. Under the expected
waste forecast, four additional intermediate-level waste vaults
are expected to be required. For the minimum waste forecast with
two additional intermediate-level waste vaults, it could be assumed
that the frequency of this accident would be less than for the
expected waste forecast. For the maximum waste forecast with nine
additional intermediate-level waste vaults, it could be assumed
that the frequency would be greater than for the expected waste
forecast (i.e., more containers are at risk of a breach).
Accident Scenario 12 -Large fire at the Consolidated Incineration Facility: Most fires at the Consolidated Incineration Facility would be caused by welding, electrical shorts, friction, materials in contact with hot process equipment, and smoking. Other causes would include lightning and explosions. The consequences of such fires would be monetary losses, injuries and death to personnel, and
This accident scenario is considered the representative bounding
accident for the unlikely accident range.
For alternative B -minimum, maximum, and
expected waste forecasts, the Consolidated Incineration
Facility would operate
from 1996 to 2024 and the highest-risk accident in
this frequency range would be Accident Scenario 13: High wind
at the intermediate-level nontritium vault.
Accident Scenario 15 -Tornado [220 kilometers
(137 miles) per hour] at the
intermediate-level nontritium vault: This accident scenario is
detailed in Section F.5.2.2 and is considered the representative
bounding accident for the extremely unlikely accident range.
Accident Scenario 24 -Explosion of tanks
associated with the Consolidated Incineration
Facility: Tanks located
in the vicinity of the Consolidated Incineration Facility include
two liquid waste blend tanks. These 16-cubic-meter (4,200-gallon)
tanks receive wastes from various sources and blend them to a
proper viscosity and heating value prior to feeding into the rotary
kiln. Each tank is fitted with an agitator that continually mixes
the waste and a heater that maintains the temperature. Fuel in
the form of liquid waste is always present in the tanks. Potential
ignition sources include a malfunction of the agitator or heater.
Such a malfunction would have to include disintegration of an
agitator impeller or an electrical short in the heater that overrode
thermostatic control. A transfer error could also be an ignition
source if highly incompatible materials were introduced into a
tank. Lightning could be an ignition source if the tank was not
properly grounded. Simultaneously, a nitrogen blanketing system
would have to fail and oxygen would have to be introduced into
the tank head space for an explosion to occur. Failure of the
nitrogen blanketing system initiates visual and audible alarms
and stops all tank-feed and transfer operations. Once the blanketing
system failed, there would be a period of time before enough oxygen
could diffuse into the tank head space to cause an explosion.
This accident scenario is considered the representative bounding
accident for the beyond-extremely-unlikely accident range.
For alternative B -minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts, the Consolidated Incineration Facility is expected to operate from 1996 to 2024. Technical reports identified no accidents from 1994 to 1996.
F.5.2.3.2 Impacts from New or Proposed Facilities
Table F-8 identifies two proposed facilities under
alternative B for which no quantitative accident analyses exist.
These facilities are listed and briefly described below. Because
these facilities are proposed and their designs are not necessarily
complete, quantitative analyses at this time would provide non-meaningful
risk information (because the designs could be changed)
that could be compared to the risk information available for existing
facilities. However, DOE will perform quantitative analyses throughout
the design, construction, and operation phases of the soil sort
facility in accordance with requirements,
and DOE will ensure that the risks associated with operating these
facilities are within established regulatory guidelines.
The soil sort facilitywould
sort and segregate clean and contaminated soils. This
facility would provide standard sand-and-gravel-handling equipment
with instrumentation for monitoring radiation. Radiation detectors
would divert contaminated material traveling along a conveyer
system in a different direction from the clean soil. By locating
small particles of radioactive material dispersed throughout the
soil, contaminants could be isolated and removed. It is assumed
that the Accidents at the soil sort facility would
be bounded by the accidents selected for alternative B.
Offsite smelter -DOE is currently
studying the use of an offsite smelter to determine the economic
feasibility of recycling low-level contaminated
stainless-steel scrap obtained during the decommissioning of retired
SRS facilities. The intended end products of the stainless-steel
recycling process are containers [2.83-cubic meter (100-cubic
foot) boxes and 55-gallon drums] for the disposal or storage of
radioactive waste originating within the DOE complex. Since no
decisions on siting, configuration of equipment, or even whether
the project would be completed have been made at this time, DOE
assumes that Accidents involving an offsite smelter
would be bounded by the accidents selected for alternative B.
Offsite low-level waste volume reduction ñ
DOE plans to use an offsite vendor to supercompact, repackage,
or incinerate low-level waste. None of the potential Accidents
involving low-level waste identified in Table F-9 occurred
at the compactor facilities. Accidents identified
for low-level waste at the Consolidated Incineration
Facility were not representative
bounding accidents. Therefore, DOE assumes that accidents involving
an offsite volume-reduction facility would be bounded by the accidents
selected for alternative B.
F.5.2.4 Accident Analysis for Low-Level Waste Under Alternative A
Alternative A emphasizes a limited treatment
configuration. Its accident analysis is the same as that for the
no-action alternative. The facilities under alternative A are
identical to the facilities identified to support the noaction
alternative. The impacts from the postulated radiological accident
scenarios are the same as described in Section F.5.2.2 (Figure F3).
F.5.2.5 Accident Analysis for Low-Level Waste Under Alternative C
Alternative C emphasizes an extensive treatment
configuration. The facilities listed in Table F-8 for alternative C
are similar to those that support alternative B for low-level
waste, except that alternative C includes a proposed non-alpha
vitrification facility.
Since this facility does not present a representative bounding
accident, the effects from the postulated radiological accident
scenarios for alternative C are identical to those for alternative B,
as described in Section F.5.2.3 (Figure F-4). A qualitative
evaluation of the impacts associated with the non-alpha vitrification
facility is as follows:
Non-alpha vitrification facility
-The non-alpha vitrification facility would prepare waste
for vitrification, vitrify it, and treat the secondary waste gases
and liquids generated by the vitrification process. The waste
would fall in the following treatability groups: soils,
job-control waste, and equipment. The facility would consist of
a thermal pretreatment unit, a melter, and an offgas treatment
unit. The afterburner would enhance destruction of any remaining
hazardous organic compounds prior to treatment in the offgas system.
It can be assumed that the accident initiators for the non-alpha
vitrification facility would be similar to those for the Defense
Waste Processing Facility
vitrification facility. However, the releases would be minor in
comparison. It is also assumed that the offgas treatment unit
Accidents would be similar to those for the F/H-Area
Effluent Treatment Facility.
F.5.2.6 Impacts to Involved Workers from Accidents Involving Low-Level Waste
The representative bounding accident scenarios for
low-level waste involve the intermediate level nontritium waste
vaults, the long-lived waste storage buildings, and the Consolidated
Incineration Facility.
For the intermediate level nontritium vaults, scenarios involve
a container rupture, a tornado, and a high wind accident scenario.
For the container-rupture scenario, dose contribution from direct
radiation exposure is not considered
major because operations are carried out remotely. The following
features are provided to control exposure and limit injuries to
workers due to container rupture:
- The crane operator is
shielded from waste containers.
- The crane operator has
dosimetry with an audible alarm that sounds when a preset dose
is reached.
- The waste container
lifting-fixtures are remotely controlled from the crane control
cab.
- Cell covers are installed
over partially filled cells to provide radiation shielding.
- The cell cover lifting-fixture
is remotely controlled from the crane control cab and the shielding
plugs are remotely engaged and disengaged.
Because high winds and tornadoes
can usually be predicted and proper precautions taken before major
damage occurs, radiological and/or chemical effects to the facility
workers due to high winds or tornadoes are considered to be minor.
Procedures exist to discontinue operation and place waste containers
in safe temporary storage areas in cases of inclement weather.
For the long-lived waste storage buildings accident
scenario, a fire involving a dropped deionizer vessel was identified
as the representative bounding accident. Although workers would
only be expected to be in the immediate vicinity of the long-lived
waste storage buildings during waste handling operations, they
would be exposed to occupational and industrial types of injuries
associated with a fire and could possibly receive a dose due to
exposure to radioactive materials.
The accident scenarios for the Consolidated Incineration
Facility involve a fire
or explosion. The consequences to facility workers from either
a fire or explosion in the immediate area include occupational
and industrial types of injuries (possibly including death) as
well as doses resulting from contact with radioactive materials.
While some exposure to involved workers could occur
due to an accidental release of radioactive materials in all scenarios,
DOE assumes no fatalities to workers would be likely from radiological
consequences.
F.5.2.7 Impacts from Low-Level Waste Chemical Accidents
No chemical hazards assessment was performed for
the low-level radioactive waste facilities. The chemical inventories
for each facility that has hazard assessment documentation were
compared to the reportable quantities as listed in 40 CFR Part
302.4. None of the facilities has sufficient quantities of hazardous
chemicals to warrant a complete chemical analysis.
F.5.3 HAZARDOUS WASTE
Identification of Hazardous Waste Facilities
The accident analyses considered facilities and processes
that support the management of hazardous waste.
The facilities were identified from the hazardous waste information
provided in Chapter 2.
Table F-12 lists the facilities associated with each of the alternatives.
Descriptions of these facilities are provided in Appendix B.
Although Table F-12 identifies several nuclear facilities
(e.g., Consolidated Incineration Facility),
there are no radiological Accidents associated
with hazardous waste. Radiological material
with a hazardous waste component was identified as mixed waste
and is addressed in Section F.5.4.
Since mixed waste facilities contain
radioactive materials with a hazardous chemical component, and
in some cases, results of the accident scenarios for mixed waste
bound the chemical hazards at hazardous waste
facilities, impacts from chemical hazards for hazardous waste
are addressed in Section F.5.4.7 for mixed waste.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | Container breach at the ILNTVd
| 2.00E-02
| 6.47E+01 | 2.30E+00 | 3.31E-02 | 1.68E+03 | 1.04E-03
(5.18E-02) | 1.84E-05 (9.20E-04) | 3.31E-07 (1.66E-05) | 1.68E-02 (8.40E-01) | |
| 13 | High wind at the ILNTVd | 1.00E-03
| 1.01E-03 | 6.08E-04 | 3.04E-04 | 2.11E+01 | 4.04E-10
(4.04E-07) | 2.43E-10
(2.43E-07) | 1.52E-10
(1.52E-07) | 1.06E-05
(1.06E-02) | |
| 15 | Tornado at the ILNTVd | 2.00E-05
| 4.07E-04 | 7.73E-02 | 1.18E-02 | 1.18E+01 | 3.26E-12
(1.63E-07) | 6.18E-10
(3.09E-05) | 1.18E-10
(5.90E-06) | 1.18E-07
(5.90E-03) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Intermediate-Level Non-Tritium Vault.
Table F-11. Representative bounding radiological accidents for low-level waste under alternative B.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | Container breach at the ILNTVd
| 2.00E-02
| 6.47E+01 | 2.30E+00 | 3.31E-02 | 1.68E+03 | 1.04E-03
(5.18E-02) | 1.84E-05 (9.20E-04) | 3.31E-07 (1.66E-05) | 1.68E-02 (8.40E-01) | |
| 12 | Large fire at CIFe | 2.34E-04
| 2.55E+00 | 8.15E-02 | 1.40E-03 | 9.58E+01 | 2.39E-07
(1.02E-03) | 7.63E-09
(3.26E-05) | 1.64E-10
(7.00E-07) | 1.12E-05
(4.79E-02) | |
| 15 | Tornado at the ILNTVd | 2.00E-05
| 4.07E-04 | 7.73E-02 | 1.18E-02 | 1.18E+01 | 3.26E-12
(1.63E-07) | 6.18E-10
(3.09E-05) | 1.18E-10
(5.90E-06) | 1.18E-07
(5.90E-03) | |
| 24 | Explosion at CIFe - tank farm | 3.40E-07
| 1.28E+00 | 4.07E-02 | 7.01E-04 | 4.79E+01 | 1.74E-10
(5.12E-04) | 5.54E-12
(1.63E-05) | 1.19E-13
(3.51E-07) | 8.14E-09
(2.40E-02) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Intermediate-Level Non-Tritium Vault.
e. Consolidated Incineration Facility.
Table F-12. Hazardous waste facilities identified by alternative.
(moderate treatment configuration) | ||||
| Hazardous wasteHazardous waste storage facilities | ||||
| M-Area Air Stripper | ||||
| Recycle unitsa | ||||
| Containment buildingb,c | ||||
| Non-alpha vitrification facilityb | ||||
| Consolidated Incineration Facility |
a. Recycle units include silver recovery, refrigerant recycle, lead melter, and solvent distillation. These units do not have quantitative or qualitative accident analyses available. Accidents for recycle units are assumed to be bounded by the accident scenarios selected for this alternative.
b. Proposed facility.
c. Accidents for the containment building are assumed to be the same as those identified for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building identified in the technical report presenting accident analyses for solid wastes (WSRC 1994c).
d. Facility operates until proposed facility comes on line.
F.5.4 MIXED WASTE
The following evaluation addresses the impacts of
postulated Accidents associated with the alternatives
considered in this eis for the management of mixed waste.
F.5.4.1 Facilities and Accidents: Mixed Waste
The accident analyses considered facilities and processes
that support the management of mixed waste.
The facilities were identified from the mixed waste information
provided in Chapter 2. Table F-13 lists the facilities associated
with each of the alternatives. Descriptions of these facilities
are provided in Appendix B. For each facility, a list of postulated-accident
scenarios was developed to support the accident analysis for each
mixed waste alternative. Accidents for RCRA disposal
are assumed to be the same as those identified for the Hazardous
Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility vaults. The design of these
vaults (concrete vaults with temporary steel covers) and their
operations (waste containers are transferred from trucks to the
vaults via overhead crane) are similar to that of the intermediate-level
waste vaults. The postulated-accident scenarios for the intermediate-level
nontritium vaults are assumed to bound the impacts of postulated
Accidents for RCRA disposal.
Table F-14 lists potential Accidents .
This information was extracted from the technical reports supporting
this eis (WSRC 1994b, c, and e). While all the accidents listed
in Table F-14 are supported by quantitative analyses, they are
not listed in this table because accident impacts for proposed
facilities are mainly qualitative.
Table F-13. Mixed-waste facilities identified by alternative.
(moderate treatment configuration) | ||||
| Organic waste storage tank | ||||
| F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility |
| |||
| Mixed waste storage facilities | ||||
| Solvent storage tanks
S29-S30 and S33-S36 | ||||
| Aqueous and Organic waste storage tanks | ||||
| SRTC mixed waste storage tanks exchange | ||||
| M-Area Vendor Treatment Facility | ||||
| RCRA disposala | ||||
| Process Waste Interim Treatment Facility (Bldg. 3411M) | ||||
| Containment buildingb,c | ||||
| Non-alpha vitrification facilityb | ||||
| Soil sort facilityb | ||||
| Consolidated Incineration Facility | ||||
| Dilute Effluent Treatment Facility (Bldg. 341-M) |
a. Accidents for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) disposal are assumed to be the same as those identified for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility vaults identified in the technical report (WSRC 1994c).
b. Proposed facility.
c. Accidents for the containment building are assumed to be the same as those identified for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building identified in the technical report presenting accident analyses for solid wastes (WSRC 1994c).
d. Facility operates until proposed facility comes on line.
F.5.4.2 Accident Analysis for the Mixed Waste No-Action Alternative
This section addresses the impacts of postulated
accidents associated with the noaction alternative
for treating mixed waste. The postulated accidents provide a baseline
for comparison of the effects of the postulated accident associated
with the action alternatives.
Table F-14. List of potential Accidents associated with the management of mixed waste.
frequency | (rem) | |||
| Container breach at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Excessive open containers at the containment building | ||||
| Release due to multiple open containers at the containment building | ||||
| Excessive inventory at the containment building | ||||
| Earthquake at the containment building | ||||
| Drum spill and tritiumtritium release at the containment building | ||||
| Tornado at the containment building | ||||
| Release due to one open container at the containment building | ||||
| Evaporation/dispersal of two to ten containers at the containment building | ||||
| Earthquake at the SRTCc storage tanks | ||||
| F2 tornado at Building 316-M | ||||
| Earthquake (0.04g) at Building 316-M | ||||
| F3 tornado at Building 316-M | ||||
| High wind at the containment building | ||||
| Large fire for entire CIFd | ||||
| F4 tornado at Building 316-M | ||||
| Drop/Spill/Leak at the SRTCc storage tanks | ||||
| High wind at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| Earthquake at CIFd | ||||
| Explosion at CIFd - rotary kiln | ||||
| Tornado at the eaV/ILNTVb | ||||
| High velocity straight winds at CIFd | ||||
| Explosion at the containment building containment buildingreleasing 50 percent of tritiumtritium inventory | ||||
| Fire at the containment building containment buildingreleasing 50 percent of tritiumtritium inventory | ||||
| Release at Building 341-1M Building due to earthquake | ||||
| Explosion at CIFd - backhoe housing | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| Rainwater flooding at the containment building | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFh liquid release due to straight wind | ||||
| Aircraft crash into the containment building | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe liquid release due to straight wind | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to earthquake |
Table F-14. (continued).
frequency | (rem) | |||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Explosion at CIFd - tank farm tank | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Explosion at CIFd - tank farm sump and diked area | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to earthquake | ||||
| Design basis ETFe liquid release due to straight wind | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to straight wind | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to tornado | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Design basis ETFe liquid release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to leaks | ||||
| Release at DETFf due to earthquake | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to overflow | ||||
| Design basis ETFe liquid release due to tornado | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to earthquake | ||||
| Normal processing with tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to a siphoning incident | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to spill | ||||
| Normal processing other than tritiumtritium ETFe airborne release due to siphoning incident | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to transfer error | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to corrosion damage | ||||
| Design basis ETFe airborne release due to a siphoning incident |
a. The dose given is for the offsite maximally exposed individual using 99.5 percentile meteorology.
b. Intermediate-level nontritium vault.
c. Savannah River Technology Center.
d. Consolidated Incineration Facility.
e. F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility.
f. Dilute Effluent Treatment Facility (Bldg. 341-M).
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | Container breach at the ILNTVd
| 2.00E-02
| 6.47E+01 | 2.30E+00 | 3.31E-02 | 1.68E+03 | 1.04E-03
(5.18E-02) | 1.84E-05 (9.20E-04) | 3.31E-07 (1.66E-05) | 1.68E-02 (8.40E-01) | |
| 11 | Earthquake at the SRTCe Storage Tanks | 2.00E-04
| 6.00E+00 | 1.92E-01 | 8.06E-03 | 3.60E+01 | 4.80E-07
(2.40E-03) | 1.54E-08
(7.68E-05) | 8.06E-10
(4.03E-06) | 3.60E-06
(1.80E-02) | |
| 14 | F3 tornadof at Building 316-M | 2.80E-05
| 4.78E-04 | 1.15E-01 | 1.18E-01 | 7.98E-02 | 5.35E-12
(1.91E-07) | 1.29E-09
(4.60E-05) | 1.65E-09
(5.90E-05) | 1.12E-09
(3.99E-05) | |
| 46 | Design basis ETFg airborne release due to tornado | 3.69E-07
| 2.17E-03 | 6.91E-05 | 3.90E-05 | 3.44E-04 | 3.20E-13
(8.68E-07) | 1.02E-14
(2.76E-08) | 7.20E-15
(1.95E-08) | 6.35E-14
(1.72E-07) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Intermediate-Level Non-Tritium Vault.
e. Savannah River Technology Center.
f. F3 tornadoes have rotational wind speeds of 254
to 331 kilometers (158 to 206 miles) per hour.
g Effluent Treatment Facility.
Table F-16. Representative bounding radiological accidents for mixed wastes under alternative B.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | Container breach at the ILNTVd
| 2.00E-02
| 6.47E+01 | 2.30E+00 | 3.31E-02 | 1.68E+03 | 1.04E-03
(5.18E-02) | 1.85E-05 (9.20E-04) | 3.31E-07 (1.66E-05) | 1.68E-02 (8.40E-01) | |
| 4 | Release due to multiple open containers at the containment building | 3.00E-03
| 3.91E-01 | 5.76E-01 | 8.13E-03 | 3.80E+02 | 4.69E-07
(1.56E-04) | 6.91E-07 (2.30E-04) | 1.22E-08 (4.07E-06) | 5.70E-04 (1.90E-01) | |
| 14 | F3 tornadoe at Building 316-M | 2.80E-05
| 4.78E-04 | 1.15E-01 | 1.18E-01 | 7.98E-02 | 5.35E-12
(1.91E-07) | 1.29E-09
(4.60E-05) | 1.65E-09
(5.90E-05) | 1.12E-09
(3.99E-05) | |
| 32 | Aircraft crash at the containment building | 1.60E-07
| 1.52E+01 | 5.41E-01 | 8.32E-03 | 3.99E+02 | 9.73E-10
(6.08E-03) | 3.46E-11 (2.16E-04) | 6.66E-13 (4.16E-06) | 3.19E-08 (2.00E-01) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Intermediate-Level Non-Tritium Vault.
e. F3 tornadoes have rotational wind speeds of 254 to 331 kilometers (158 to 206 miles) per hour.
F.5.4.2.1 Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
From the list of potential radiological Accidents
presented in Table F-14, the representative bounding accident
scenarios were identified for the noaction alternative using
the binning process described in Section F.4.1. Figure F-5
shows the highest-risk accident scenarios for the various
frequency ranges for the no-action alternative. As shown in Figure
F-5, the accidents associated with mixed waste
are analyzed over a broad spectrum of consequences and frequencies.
The accident scenarios postulated for the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment
Facility generally present lower consequences, while accident
scenarios postulated for vault disposal facilities generally present
higher consequences. Table F15 lists the representative
bounding accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers
for exposed workers and the public.
Accident Scenario 1 -Container breach at
the intermediate-level nontritium vault (two containers, noncombustible
waste): This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.2.2
and is assumed to be representative of a mixed waste
accident for vault disposal.
Accident Scenario 11 -Earthquake at the Savannah
River Technology Center storage tanks: The
earthquake (greater than 0.2g) is assumed to impose reaction
loads on the above-grade confinement structure and damage the
structure. The below-grade structures, including the tank cells,
are expected to respond with the ground motion, so major damage
is considered unlikely. Similarly, because of their wall thickness
[1.27 centimeters (0.5 inch) stainless steel], short height [3.35
to 3.96 meters (11 to 13 feet)], and small diameter [3 to
3.66 meters (10 to 12 feet)], it is unlikely that the tanks
would rupture. However, in this scenario, the tank and cell exhaust
filtration is assumed to be disrupted. This disruption is accounted
for by assuming that the inventory of two 13.6-cubic-meter (3,600gallon)
high-activity waste tanks is available for airborne release. It
is estimated that 0.1 percent of the radionuclides contained
in the tank becomes airborne.
Accident Scenario 14 -F3 tornado at Building
316-M: Building 316-M (mixed waste storage building)
is an outdoor storage area on a concrete base, with a roof and
no sidewalls. Waste is stored in approved containers, generally
55-gallon drums and large steel boxes. Based on a similar analysis
for the Burial Ground, an F3 tornado [a tornado with rotational
windspeeds of 254 to 331 kilometers (158 to 206 miles) per hour]
is assumed to rupture 25 percent of the drums. It is assumed
that 100 percent of the drum contents could be scattered.
Accident Scenario 46 -Design basis F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility airborne release due to tornado: This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.1.2.1.
F.5.4.2.2 Impacts from New or Proposed Facilities
Table F-13 identifies no new or proposed facilities
for the hazardous and mixed waste no-action
alternative.
F.5.4.3 Accident Analysis for the Mixed Waste Under Alternative B
This section addresses the impacts of postulated Accidents associated with alternative B for mixed wastes.
F.5.4.3.1 Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
This section presents potential effects from postulated
radiological Accidents at facilities identified
in Table F-13 for the management of mixed waste
under alternative B. Figure F6 shows the highest-risk
accident scenarios for the various frequency ranges. As shown
in Figure F-6, the accidents associated with mixed waste are analyzed
over a broad spectrum of consequences and frequencies. The accident
scenarios postulated for the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility
generally present lower consequences, while accident scenarios
postulated for vault disposal facilities generally present higher
consequences. Table F16 lists the representative bounding
accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers for
exposed workers and the public for alternative B. DOE assumes
that conclusions regarding representative bounding accident scenarios
could change based on the minimum, maximum, and expected waste
forecasts. The accident analyses for the accident scenarios are
based on a conservative assumption of peak utilization of facilities
[i.e., the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would
only affect how long the facilities (e.g., the Consolidated Incineration
Facility)] would operate.
Therefore, while the consequence or frequency for postulated accidents
do not change, the expected duration of risk from a facility-specific
accident scenario could be longer or shorter, depending on the
case. The number of new facilities needed to meet the mixed waste
management requirements could be affected by the minimum, maximum,
and expected waste forecasts. Thus, the consequence or frequency
for specific accident scenarios could be increased or decreased,
depending on the case. Impacts for the three cases are addressed
in the representative bounding accident descriptions.
The representative bounding Accidents
and their impacts under the alternative B are briefly described
below:
Accident Scenario 1 -Container breach at
the intermediate-level nontritium vault (two containers, noncombustible
waste): This accident scenario is described in Section F.5.2.2
and is considered to be the representative bounding accident for
the anticipated accident range.
Accident Scenario 4 -Release due to multiple
(2 to 10) open containers at the containment building: The consequences
of this accident scenario are bounded by the worst unmitigated
accident scenario where the ventilation and scrubber systems of
the containment building are assumed
to fail. This accident scenario is considered the representative
bounding accident for the unlikely accident range. Under the minimum,
maximum, and expected waste forecasts, the containment building
is expected to operate from 2006 to 2024. From 1994 to 2006 --
when the containment building is not operational -- the highest-risk
accident in this frequency range would be Accident Scenario 18:
Earthquake at the Savannah River Technology
Center Storage Tanks.
Accident Scenario 14 -F3 tornado at Building
316-M: This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.4.2.1
and is considered the representative bounding accident for the
extremely unlikely accident range. Utilization of this facility
is expected to be the same under the minimum, maximum, and expected
waste forecasts.
Accident Scenario 32 -Aircraft crash at the
containment building: An aircraft could breach only that part
of the containment building into which
it crashes. DOE assumes that the consequences associated with
this event are the same as for the worst unmitigated accident
event for the entire containment building. Thus, whether one or
all segments in the containment building are breached due to an
aircraft crash, the consequences listed for this scenario are
considered to be bounding. This accident scenario is considered
the representative bounding accident for the beyond-extremely-unlikely-accident
range. Under the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts,
the containment building is expected to operate from 2006 to 2024.
From 1994 to 2006, the next highest risk accident in
this frequency range would be Accident Scenario 50: Explosion
at the Consolidated Incineration Facility
tank farm sump and diked area.
F.5.4.3.2 Impacts from New or Proposed Facilities
Table F-13 identifies three proposed facilities under
alternative B for which no quantitative accident analyses exist.
Accidents associated with the soil sort facilityare
described in Section F.5.2.3.2 and with the non-alpha vitrification
facility in Section F.5.2.5.
F.5.4.4 Accident Analysis for Mixed Waste Under Alternative A
The facilities listed in Table F-13 for alternative A
are identical to those that support alternative B, except that
alternative A does not include the non-alpha vitrification
facility. Since this facility
was not involved in the representative bounding accident, the
effects from the postulated radiological accident scenarios for
alternative A are identical to those described in Section
F.5.4.3.
F.5.4.5 Accident Analysis for Mixed Waste Under Alternative C
The facilities listed in Table F-13 for alternative
C are similar to those that support alternative B for mixed waste,
except that the Consolidated Incineration Facility
does not operate for the entire 30-year period under alternative C.
Since this facility was not involved in the representative bounding
accident, the effects from the postulated radiological accident
scenarios for alternative C are identical to those described
in Section F.5.4.3.
F.5.4.6 Impacts to Involved Workers from Accidents Involving Mixed Waste
The mixed waste Accidents
that have the highest risks involve the containment building.
The accident initiators (aircraft crash, explosion, or tornado)
are considered to be more dangerous to the worker than the resulting
release of contaminants. The other accident scenarios (transfer
errors or container damage) are not expected to cause serious
injury to workers, because the operators will be equipped with
a breathing supply via an air compressor airflow. An emergency
supply of breathing air is provided for each worker from high
pressure breathing air cylinders permanently connected to the
breathing air systems.
F.5.4.7 Impacts from Mixed Waste Chemical Accidents
Because the mixed waste facilities
contain radioactive materials with a hazardous chemical component,
the results of the mixed waste accident scenarios bound the chemical
hazards at hazardous waste facilities. This section discusses
the chemical hazards for mixed wastes, as well as those for hazardous
wastes.
A chemical hazards analysis was performed for the
Consolidated Incineration Facility
as part of a safety analysis report. The basis for this analysis
was that the chemical inventory would be such that an unmitigated
release of all the material in one section of the facility would
result in concentrations of chemicals at 100 meters (328 feet)
less than one-half the concentration that is immediately dangerous
to life and health (IDLH). The Consolidated Incineration Facility
is considered a low hazard facility. The criteria for being a
low hazard facility include the requirement that the nonradiological
consequences associated with the highest accident frequencies
are no greater than the specified IDLH value at 100 meters
and 10 percent of the specified IDLH value at the SRS boundary.
As reported in the technical report (WSRC 1994c), if releases
are maintained below the IDLH onsite criterion, the releases are
automatically below the IDLH offsite criterion. Since chemical
inventories are controlled such that the worst-case nonradiological
consequences can be no greater than 50 percent of the specified
IDLH value at 100 meters (328 feet), both criteria are satisfied
for the Consolidated Incineration Facility. As a result, further
analysis is not necessary.
Preliminary chemical hazards analyses were performed
for the E-Area mixed waste storage building,
the NArea mixed waste and hazardous waste
storage buildings, and the B-Area hazardous waste storage building
to determine the hazard categorization for each facility. The
NArea mixed waste and hazardous waste storage buildings
have an inventory that bounds the EArea mixed waste storage
building and the BArea hazardous waste storage building.
The N-Area chemicals requiring further analysis to determine the
potential consequences of their accidental release are listed
in Table F-17. This table provides the maximum onsite and
offsite airborne concentrations resulting from a postulated release
of chemical inventory.
The Organic Waste Storage Tank associated with the Defense Waste Processing Facility would be the primary facility for the storage of benzene mixed waste. Benzene that has been separated from a precipitate slurry by distillation in the Defense Waste Processing Facility would be transferred approximately 112.7 meters (370 feet) to the Organic Waste Storage Tank in an above-ground pipe. Consequently, an explosion could occur in either the inner or outer tank or as a result of a benzene leak during a transfer. An explosion in either tank would occur if the oxygen concentration in the tank vapor space reaches the minimum required for combustion and the benzene vapor is ignited. A benzene release from the transfer line would form a pool on the ground, which would evaporate and form a vapor cloud. If ignited, the explosion of the vapor cloud could cause the Organic Waste Storage Tank to explode.
In a tornado scenario, the Organic Waste Storage
Tank is assumed to catastrophically fail as the result of a tornado-generated
missile. As the benzene leaves the tank, "splashing"
occurs, causing a fraction of the benzene to become an aerosol.
The released benzene forms a pool [122 meters by 122 meters (400
feet by 400 feet)] bounded by the drainage ditch that surrounds
the organic waste storage tank site. The tornado
is assumed to remain in the vicinity of the pool for one minute.
The evaporation rate from the pool during this minute is based
on a tornado wind speed of 177 kilometers (110 miles) per hour.
Following the tornado, evaporation from the pool
continues over the next 4 minutes under normal wind conditions
of 10 miles per hour. It is assumed that after 5 minutes from
the initial failure of the Organic Waste Storage Tank, the released
benzene has completely drained to the drainage ditch. It is also
assumed that normal wind conditions continue for the remainder
of the event. Table F18 presents the results for the
two postulated Organic Waste Storage Tank chemical accident scenarios.
Safety documentation does not analyze potential events
involving hazardous materials at MArea facilities. Using
the methodology described in Section F.4.2 for M-Area facilities,
it was determined that the inventory of sulfuric acid located
in the Dilute Effluent Treatment Facility (341M) would be
the only chemical present in sufficient quantities to warrant
further evaluation. This accident scenario assumed an unmitigated
liquid spill of the entire inventory of sulfuric acid at 341-M,
with a resulting pool covering 77 square meters (829 square feet)
at a depth of 1 centimeter (0.39 inch). The evaporation rate for
this liquid spill was estimated to be 2.01E-05 grams per second
at standard pressure and temperature. The results of this chemical
analysis are presented in Table F-19.
Table F-17. Mixed/hazardous waste chemical hazards analysis results.
100 meters (328 feet) (mg/m3)c |
|
|
| |||
| Arsenic | 1.03E+03 | 4.5E-01 | 2.8E-04 | 6.00E-01 | 1.00E+00 | 1.00E+02 |
| Benzene | 3.0E+03 | 6.7E+02 | 4.2E-01 | 1.60E+01 | 1.60E+02 | 9.58E+03 |
| Beryllium | 1.0E+01 | 4.4E-03 | 2.8E-06 | 5.00E-03 | 1.00E-02 | 1.00E+01 |
| Cadmium | 6.0E+03 | 2.7E+00 | 1.7E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 5.00E+02 |
| Chromium | 6.1E+03 | 2.7E+00 | 1.7E-03 | 1.50E+00 | 2.50+00 | |
| Lead | 3.6E+05 | 1.6E+02 | 1.0E-01 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 7.00E+02 |
| Mercury | 3.4E+04 | 1.5E+01 | 9.4E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.00E-01 | 2.80E+01 |
| Methyl chloride | 6.5E+02 | 2.9E+02 | 1.8E-01 | 2.07E+02 | 4.13E+02 | 2.07E+04 |
| Methylethylketone | 8.0E+03 | 1.8E+03 | 1.1E+00 | 8.85E+02 | 2.95E+03 | 8.85E+03 |
| Nickel | 2.8E+01 | 4.4E-02 | 2.8E-05 | 3.00E+00 | 5.00E+00 | |
| Silver | 1.1E+03 | 4.7E-01 | 3.0E-04 | 3.00E-01 | 5.00E-01 | |
| Trichloroethane | 7.8E+04 | 3.5E+02 | 2.2E-01 | 1.91E+03 | 5.46E+03 | 1.64E+04 |
| Xylene | 3.3E+03 | 1.6E+01 | 9.9E-03 | 4.34E+02 | 8.69E+02 | 4.34E+03 |
a. The chemicals presented in this table are those for which concentration guidelines were available.
b. Kilograms. To convert to pounds, multiply by 2.2046.
c. Milligrams per cubic meter of air.
d. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
e. No equivalent value found.
Table F-18. Chemical hazards Accidents analysis results for the Organic Waste Storage Tank.
description |
|
| |||||
| Explosion at the OWSTc | 2.70E-04 | 1.40E+04 | 6.10E+02 | 5.70E+00 | 1.60E+01 | 1.60E+02 | 9.60E+03 |
| Tornado at the OWST | 1.00E-04 | 1.02E+04 | 1.21E+03 | 1.54E+01 | 1.60E+01 | 1.60E+02 | 9.60E+03 |
a. Milligrams per cubic meter of air.
b. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
c. Organic Waste Storage Tank.
Table F-19. Chemical hazards analysis results for the 341-M facility.
|
|
|
| |||||
| Sulfuric acid | 1.52E+04 | 9.10E-06 | 7.70E-07 | 2.70E-07 | 2.00E+00 | 1.00E+01 | 3.00E+01 |
a. To convert to pounds, multiply by 2.2046.
b. Milligrams per cubic meter of air.
c. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
F.5.5 TRANSURANIC AND ALPHA WASTE
The following sections address the impacts of postulated
Accidents associated with the alternatives considered
in this eis for the management of transuranic and alpha waste.
F.5.5.1 Facilities and Accidents: Transuranic and Alpha Waste
The accident analyses considered all facilities and
processes involved in the management of transuranic and alpha
waste. The facilities were identified from the
transuranic waste information provided
in Chapter 2. Table F-20 lists the facilities associated
with each of the alternatives. Descriptions of these facilities
are provided in Appendix B. For each facility, a list of postulated
accident scenarios was developed to support the accident analysis
for transuranic waste for each alternative.
Table F-21 lists potential accidents. This information
was extracted from the technical reports supporting this eis (WSRC
1994b, c, and e). While all the accidents listed
in Table F-21 are supported by quantitative analyses, accident
impacts for proposed facilities are not listed in the table because
they are mainly qualitative.
Table F-20. Transuranic and alpha waste facilities identified by alternative.
(moderate treatment configuration) | |||||||||||
| Low-activity waste vaults | |||||||||||
| Transuranic and alpha waste storage pads | |||||||||||
| Experimental Transuranic Waste Assay Facility/ Waste Certification Facility |
| ||||||||||
| RCRA disposala | |||||||||||
| Alpha vitrification facilityb | |||||||||||
| Consolidated Incineration Facility | |||||||||||
| Transuranic waste characterization/certification facilityb,c |
| ||||||||||
frequency | (rem) | |||
| Deflagration in culvert during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| Fire at the eaV/LAWVc | ||||
| Fire in culvert - TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Drum breach due to culvert overturn during TRU retrieval activities | ||||
| Container breach at the eaV/LAWVc | ||||
| Fire from all causes - TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Vehicular crash - TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Drum rupture on the TRUb storage pads (internally induced) | ||||
| Drum breach/fall of unlined drums during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| Fire in the TRUb waste characterization/certification facility w/o HEPAd bypass | ||||
| Drum breach/fall during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| Multiple drum deflagration during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| Vehicle crash/fire on the TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Explosion with fire in the TRUb waste characterization/ certification facility | ||||
| Large fire for entire CIFe | ||||
| Vehicle crash during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| Earthquake at CIFe | ||||
| Explosion at CIFe - rotary kiln | ||||
| High winds - TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Drum fire due to vehicle crash during TRUb retrieval activities | ||||
| High velocity straight winds at CIFe | ||||
| Tornado at the eaV/LAWVc | ||||
| Earthquake - TRUb storage pads | ||||
| F2 tornado on TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Explosion at CIFe - backhoe housing | ||||
| Earthquake at the TRUb waste characterization/certification facility | ||||
| High wind at the eaV/LAWVc | ||||
| F3 tornado on TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Fire in the TRUb waste characterization/certification facility w/ HEPAd bypass | ||||
| High winds on the TRUb storage pads | ||||
| Explosion at CIFe - tank farm tank | ||||
| Explosion at CIFe - tank farm sump and dike area | ||||
| Criticality in the TRUb waste characterization/certification facility | ||||
| HEPAd filter bypass in the TRUb waste characterization/certification facility |
a. The dose given is for the offsite maximally exposed individual using 99.5 percentile meteorology.
b. Transuranic.
c. E-Area Vaults low-activity waste vault.
d. High efficiency particulate air.
e. Consolidated Incineration Facility.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | ||||||||
| 1 | Deflagration in culvert during TRUd drum retrieval activities
| 1.00E-02
| 1.12E+02 | 3.97E+00 | 5.72E-02 | 2.90E+03 | 8.96E-04
(8.96E-02) | 1.59E-05 (1.59E-03) | 2.86E-07 (2.86E-05) | 1.45E-02 (1.45E+00) | |
| 3 | Fire in culvert at the TRUd waste storage pads (one TRU drum in culvert) | 8.10E-04
| 4.74E+02 | 1.69E+01 | 2.43E-01 | 1.23E+04 | 3.07E-04
(3.79E-01) | 5.48E-06
(6.76E-03) | 9.84E-08
(1.22E-04) | 4.98E-03
(6.15E+00) | |
| 13 | Vehicle crash with resulting fire at the TRUd waste storage pads | 6.50E-05
| 8.59E+01 | 3.06E+00 | 4.40E-02 | 2.23E+03 | 4.47E-06
(6.87E-02) | 7.96E-08
(1.22E-03) | 1.43E-09
(2.20E-05) | 7.25E-05
(1.12E+00) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Transuranic.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | ||||||||
| 1 | Deflagration in culvert during TRUd drum retrieval activities | (anticipated) | 1.12E+02 | 3.97E+00 | 5.72E-02 | 2.90E+03 | 8.96E-04
(8.96E-02) | 1.59E-05 (1.59E-03) | 2.86E-07 (2.86E-05) | 1.45E-02 (1.45E+00) | |
| 3 | Fire in culvert at the TRUd waste storage pads (one TRU drum in culvert) | (unlikely) | 4.74E+02 | 1.69E+01 | 2.43E-01 | 1.23E+04 | 3.07E-04
(3.79E-01) | 5.48E-06
(6.76E-03) | 9.84E-08
(1.22E-04) | 4.98E-03
(6.15E+00) | |
| 13 | Vehicle crash with resulting fire at the TRUd waste storage pads | (extremely unlikely) | 8.59E+01 | 3.06E+00 | 4.40E-02 | 2.23E+03 | 4.47E-06
(6.87E-02) | 7.96E-08
(1.22E-03) | 1.43E-09
(2.20E-05) | 7.25E-05
(1.12E+00) | |
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Transuranic.
(increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence)b | |||||||||||
|
|
| (rem) | (rem) | (person-rem) | |||||||
| 1 | Deflagration in culvert during TRUd drum retrieval activities | (anticipated) | 1.12E+02 | 3.97E+00 | 5.72E-02 | 2.90E+03 | 8.96E-04
(8.96E-02) | 1.59E-05 (1.59E-03) | 2.86E-07 (2.86E-05) | 1.45E-02 (1.45E+00) | |
| 3 | Fire in culvert at the TRUd waste storage pads (one TRU drum in culvert) | 8.10E-04
| 4.74E+02 | 1.69E+01 | 2.43E-01 | 1.23E+04 | 3.07E-04
(3.79E-01) | 5.48E-06
(6.76E-03) | 9.84E-08
(1.22E-04) | 4.98E-03
(6.15E+00) | |
| 12 | Vehicle crash with resulting fire at the TRUd waste storage pads | 6.50E-05
| 8.59E+01 | 3.06E+00 | 4.40E-02 | 2.23E+03 | 4.47E-06
(6.87E-02) | 7.96E-08
(1.22E-03) | 1.43E-09
(2.20E-05) | 7.25E-05
(1.12E+00) | |
| Explosion at CIFe - tank farm | 3.40E-07
| 1.28E+00 | 4.07E-02 | 7.01E-04 | 4.79E+01 | 1.74E-10
(5.12E-04) | 5.54E-12
(1.63E-05) | 1.19E-13
(3.51E-07) | 8.14E-09
(2.40E-02) | ||
a. Point estimate of increased risk per year is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor ¥ annual frequency.
b. Increased risk of fatal cancers per occurrence is calculated by multiplying the consequence (dose) ¥ latent cancer conversion factor.
c. A conservative assumption of 99.5 percentile meteorology was assumed for determining accident consequences for the exposed population within 80 kilometers. A less conservative meteorology (50 percentile) was used to determine the accident consequences for exposed individuals.
d. Transuranic.
e. Consolidated Incineration Facility.
F.5.5.2 Accident Analysis for Transuranic and Alpha Waste No-Action Alternative
This section addresses the effects of postulated
Accidents associated with the no-action alternative
considered for transuranic wastes. The
postulated accidents provide a baseline for comparison of the
effects of the postulated accidents associated with the other
alternatives.
F.5.5.2.1 Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
From the list of potential radiological Accidents
presented in Table F-21, the representative bounding accident
scenarios were identified for the no-action alternative. Figure
F-7 shows the highest-risk accident scenarios for the
four frequency ranges. As shown in Figure F-7, the accidents associated
with the transuranic waste storage pads
and the low-activity waste vaults are scattered over the three
highest accident frequency ranges. However, there are no accidents
identified in the technical reports for the beyond-extremely-unlikely
accident range. Table F-22 lists the representative bounding accidents,
accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers for exposed workers
and the public.
Accident Scenario 1 -Deflagration in culvert
during transuranic drum handling activities: The culverts are
concrete containers used to store up to 14 transuranic waste drums.
Transuranic waste drum handling activities
would require the movement of some culverts and other waste containers
to gain access to the waste drums. Because the drums inside a
culvert are not vented, a flammable mixture of hydrogen and air
could exist (due to the radiolysis of the polyethylene wrappings
inside the drum). Ignition of this flammable gas mixture would
most likely occur due to a shift in the material while moving
the culverts. Although the curie content of the drums inside the
culverts is much higher than that in drums stored directly on
transuranic waste storage pads,
it is assumed that the amount of curies released to the atmosphere
due to a drum deflagration inside a culvert would be mitigated
somewhat by the culvert. This accident scenario is considered
the representative bounding accident for the anticipated accident
range.
Accident Scenario 3 -Fire in a culvert at
the transuranic and alpha waste storage pads
(one drum): Culverts are concrete containers used to store
up to 14 transuranic 55-gallon drums. Transuranic drums stored
in concrete culverts potentially generate hydrogen gas through
radiolytic decomposition of organics that could be in the drums.
As a consequence, a fire hazard is associated with the storage
of transuranic and alpha waste in drums. A postulated fire in
a concrete culvert is assumed to involve only one drum, since
other drums are sealed with gaskets and the lids are secured with
metal ring clamps.
Figure F-7. Accidents
that were analyzed for the no-action alternative for transuranic
waste facilities.
Accident Scenario 12 -Vehicle crash with
resulting fire at the transuranic waste
storage pads: The frequency
of a vehicle crash into a transuranic pad impacting waste containers
is estimated as
2.60E-03 event per year. Approximately 2.5 percent of vehicle
crashes result in fires. Therefore, the frequency of a vehicle
crashing into a transuranic pad and causing a fire is estimated
to be 6.50E-05 event per year. It is estimated that a vehicle
crash into a transuranic pad followed by a fire would affect 7
pallets (28 drums) of transuranic waste.
F.5.5.2.2 Impacts from New or Proposed Facilities
Table F-20 identifies no new or proposed facilities
under the no-action alternative for transuranic waste.
F.5.5.3 Accident Analysis for the Transuranic and Alpha Waste Under Alternative B
This section addresses the impacts of postulated
Accidents associated with alternative B considered
for the transuranic waste stream.
F.5.5.3.1 Impacts from Postulated Radiological Accidents
This section presents potential effects from postulated radiological Accidents at facilities identified in Table F-20 for alternative B. Figure F-8 shows the highest-risk accident scenarios for the four frequency ranges. As shown in Figure F-8, this alternative consists of many more accident scenarios than the no-action alternative. There are no accidents listed in the technical reports for the beyond-extremely-unlikely accident range. Table F-23 lists the representative bounding accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers for exposed workers and the public. Although alternative B has additional facilities associated with it, the representative bounding radiological accident scenarios are the same as those for the no-action alternative (Table F-23). However, DOE assumes that the conclusions regarding the representative bounding accident scenarios could be affected by alternative B minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts. The accident analyses for the accident scenarios are based on a conservative assumption of peak utilization of facilities, [i.e., the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would only affect how long the facilities (e.g., the Experimental Transuranic Waste Assay Facility/Waste Certification Facility), would operate]. Therefore, while consequences or frequencies for postulated accidents do not change, the expected duration of risk from a facility-specific accident scenario could be longer or shorter, depending on the case. However, the number of new facilities needed to meet the transuranic waste management requirements could be affected by the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts. Thus, the consequences or frequencies for specific accident scenarios could be increased or decreased, depending on the case. Impacts for these cases are addressed in the representative bounding accident descriptions in Section F.5.5.2.1.
Under the expected waste forecast, 14 additional
transuranic and alpha waste storage pads would
be required. However, for the minimum waste forecast (6 additional
transuranic and alpha waste storage pads), it could be assumed
that the frequency of this accident scenario occurring would be
less than the expected waste forecast, because fewer containers
are at risk due to a deflagration. For the maximum
waste forecast (1,173 additional transuranic and alpha waste storage
pads), it could be assumed that the frequency of this accident
scenario occurring would be much greater than the expected waste
forecast, because a great many more containers are at risk due
to a deflagration.
Accident Scenario 3 -Fire in transuranic
culvert at the transuranic and alpha waste storage
pads (one transuranic drum): This accident scenario is detailed
in Section F.5.5.2.1 and is considered the representative bounding
accident for the unlikely accident range.
Accident Scenario 12 -Vehicle crash with
resulting fire at the transuranic and alpha waste
storage pads: This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.5.2.1
and is considered the representative bounding accident for the
extremely unlikely accident range. Impacts regarding the alternative
B minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would be similar
in terms of decreasing and increasing risk, as discussed
in the preceding representative bounding accident description.
F.5.5.3.2 Impacts from New or Proposed Facilities
Table F-20 identifies one proposed facility for which
quantitative or qualitative accident analyses do not exist. This
facility is described below. Because the facility is proposed
and its design is not complete, quantitative analyses at this
point would provide non-meaningful risk information
(because the design could be changed) that could be compared to
the risk information available for existing facilities. However,
DOE will perform quantitative analyses throughout the design,
construction, and operation phases of proposed facilities in accordance
with requirements, and DOE will ensure that the risks associated
with operating these facilities are within established regulatory
guidelines.
Alpha vitrification facility
-The alpha vitrification facility
would prepare waste for vitrification, vitrify it, and treat the
secondary waste gases and liquids generated by the vitrification
process. The waste would include newly generated alpha-contaminated
waste and mixed waste, alpha-contaminated waste
and mixed waste in storage, and some mixed waste soils. This waste
would fall in the following treatability groups: 10 to 100 nanocuries
per gram nonmixed; 10 to 100 nanocuries per gram mixed; and greater
than 100 nanocuries per gram transuranic waste.
All waste would enter this facility in drums transported from
the transuranic waste characterization/certification facility.
The final vitrified and low-temperature stabilized waste forms
would be sent back through the transuranic waste characterization/
certification facility for final certification. The vitrification
facility would consist of a thermal pretreatment unit, a melter,
an afterburner, and an offgas treatment unit. The afterburner
would enhance destruction of any remaining hazardous organic compounds
prior to treatment in the offgas system. The offgas system would
scrub the gases and minimize the release of any hazardous materials
or particulates to the atmosphere. It can be assumed that the
Accidents initiated by the alpha vitrification
facility would be similar to those for the Defense Waste Processing
Facility vitrification
facility. However, the releases would be minor in comparison.
It is also assumed that the offgas treatment unit accidents would
be similar to those for the F/H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility.
F.5.5.4 Accident Analysis for Transuranic and Alpha Waste Under Alternative A
The facilities under alternative A are identical
to the facilities identified to support alternative B, except
that alternative A does not include the alpha vitrification
facility. Because the alpha
vitrification facility is a proposed facility and as such did
not contribute to the representative bounding Accidents ,
it is assumed that the impacts from the postulated radiological
scenarios for alternative A are the same as described in Section
F.5.5.3.
F.5.5.5 Accident Analysis for Transuranic and Alpha Waste Under Alternative C
This section addresses the impacts of the postulated
Accidents associated with alternative C considered
for the transuranic waste stream.
This section presents potential effects from postulated radiological Accidents at facilities identified in Table F-20 for alternative C. Figure F-9 shows the highest risk accident scenarios for the four frequency ranges. As shown in Figure F-9, this alternative consists of many more accident scenarios than the no-action alternative, with a substantial addition of accidents in the unlikely and beyond-extremely-unlikely accident frequency ranges. Table F-24 lists the representative bounding accidents, accident consequences, and latent fatal cancers for exposed workers and the public. DOE assumes that the conclusions regarding the representative bounding accident scenarios could be affected by alternative C minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts. The accident analyses for the accident scenarios are based on the conservative assumption of peak utilization of facilities [i.e., the minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would only affect how long the facilities (e.g., Experimental Transuranic Waste
Assay Facility/Waste Certification Facility)
would operate]. Therefore, while consequences or frequencies for
postulated Accidents do not change, the expected
duration of risk from a facility-specific accident
scenario could be longer or shorter, depending on the case. However,
the number of new facilities needed to meet the transuranic waste
management requirements could be affected by the minimum, maximum,
and expected waste forecasts. Impacts for these cases are addressed
in the representative bounding accident descriptions.
Accident Scenario 1 -Deflagration in culvert
during drum handling activities. This accident scenario is detailed
in Section F.5.5.3.1 and is considered the representative bounding
accident for the anticipated accident range.
Accident Scenario 3 -Fire in transuranic
culvert at the transuranic and alpha waste storage
pads (one transuranic drum): This accident scenario is detailed
in Section F.5.5.2.1 and is considered the representative bounding
accident for the unlikely accident range.
Accident Scenario 12 -Vehicle crash with
resulting fire at the transuranic and alpha waste
storage pads: This accident scenario is detailed in Section F.5.5.2.1
and is considered the representative bounding accident for the
extremely unlikely accident range. Impacts regarding alternative B
minimum, maximum, and expected waste forecasts would be similar
in terms of decreasing and increasing risk, as discussed
in the preceding representative bounding accident description.
Accident Scenario 31 -Explosion of tanks
associated with the Consolidated Incineration
Facility: This accident
scenario is detailed in Section F.5.2.3.1 and is considered the
representative bounding accident for the beyond extremely unlikely
accident range.
F.5.5.6 Impacts to Involved Workers from Accidents Involving Transuranic and Alpha Waste
While it is not a representative bounding accident
in this analysis, a criticality in the transuranic waste
characterization/certification facility
could be the most dangerous accident scenario for the involved
worker. Direct radiation could affect personnel in the facility,
depending on their proximity to the accident location and the
degree of shielding in place. Potentially lethal radiation doses
(approximately 400 rem) could be received by a person about 7
meters (23 feet) from an unshielded event producing 2.0E+17 fissions.
Because 2.0E+18 fissions are assumed for a criticality in the
transuranic waste characterization/certification facility, it
is estimated that the dose at 7 meters (23 feet) would be
approximately 4,000 rad. The 12-inch-thick concrete walls of the
waste preparation cell would reduce the radiation dose by a factor
of approximately 10, although cell windows would probably provide
less protection. Personnel adjacent to the walls of the waste
preparation cell could receive fatal doses.
If the high efficiency particulate air filters were
bypassed, as assumed in the transuranic waste
characterization/certification facility
fire scenario, the combustion products would be exhausted to the
atmosphere via the sand filter. Thus, DOE assumes no fatalities
to workers from radiological consequences. Additionally, operators
in the waste preparation cell of the transuranic waste characterization/certification
facility would be equipped with respiratory protection and would
follow facility-specific and SRS safety procedures.
Accident scenarios involving transuranic waste
drum retrieval operations are not expected to result in serious
injury or fatalities to involved workers due to radiological consequences.
There would be a containment structure for the vent and purge
station to protect workers from injury due to a deflagration in
a waste drum. Portable air monitors would be required for this
operation, in addition to a contamination control hut with a carbon
high efficiency particulate air filter exhaust, which would prevent
serious injury to adjacent workers due to exposure. Workers inside
the contamination hut would be required to wear protective equipment,
including respirators, when there is a potential for an airborne
contamination.
F.5.5.7 Impacts from Transuranic and Alpha Waste Chemical Accidents
A chemical hazards analysis was performed for the
transuranic and alpha waste storage pads. For
a discussion of the hazard analysis methodology, refer to Section
F.4.2. In the hazards assessment document prepared for the transuranic
waste storage pads,
specific Accidents were not analyzed. Instead,
the entire quantity of chemicals in each segment was assumed to
be released. Table F-25 lists the results of this chemical assessment.
Because the concentrations do not exceed the ERPG-1 limits, no
further analyses were performed. The preliminary chemical hazards
analysis performed in conjunction with the initial hazard categorization
of the transuranic and alpha waste storage pads provides a bounding
chemical analysis for the transuranic and alpha waste. The transuranic
waste storage pads are representative of the entire transuranic
and alpha waste inventory contained in E-Area. Other facilities
such as the transuranic waste characterization/certification facility,
alpha vitrification facility, and transuranic
waste retrieval activities involve the manipulation of the transuranic
and alpha waste inventory, including chemicals contained on the
transuranic and alpha waste storage pads.
While the chemical analysis did not address frequencies
associated with chemical releases, some qualitative statements
concerning the frequency of chemical releases can be made. Because
the chemical inventory contained on the transuranic and alpha
waste storage pads is widely dispersed, it is
difficult to identify a credible accident scenario that could
liberate the entire or even a large portion of the chemical inventory.
More probable are the accident scenarios identified in Section
F.5.3, which would release small amounts of hazardous chemicals
along with radionuclides.
A chemical hazards analysis was performed for the
Consolidated Incineration Facility.
The results of this analysis are described in Section F.5.4.7.
Table F-25. Transuranic and alpha waste storage pads chemical hazards analysis results.
100 meters (328 feet) (mg/m3)c |
|
|
| |||
| Beryllium | 3.74E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 5.00E-03 | 1.00E-02 | 1.00E+01 |
| Cadmium | 7.50E+05 | 3.33E+02 | 1.65E-01 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 5.00E+01 |
| Chloroform | 3.75E+04 | 8.33E+03 | 4.11E+00 | 1.47E+02 | 4.88E+02 | 4.88E+03 |
| Chromium | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E+00 | |
| Copper | 1.50E+05 | 6.67E+01 | 3.29E-02 | 3.00E+00 | 5.00E+00 | |
| Lead | 1.50E+06 | 6.67E+02 | 3.29E-01 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 7.00E+02 |
| Lead nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 7.00E+02 |
| Mercuric nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.00E-01 | 2.80E+01 |
| MercuryMercury | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.00E-01 | 2.80E+01 |
| Methyl isobutyl ketone | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+02 | 8.23E-02 | 3.07E+02 | 1.02E+03 | 1.23E+04 |
| Nickel nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 3.00E+00 | 5.00E+00 | |
| Silver nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 3.00E-01 | 5.00E-01 | |
| Sodium chromate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 3.00E+01 |
| Toluene | 3.75E+04 | 8.33E+03 | 4.11E+00 | 3.77E+02 | 7.54E+02 | 7.54E+03 |
| Trichlorotrifluoro-ethane | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 9.58E+03 | 1.15E+04 | 3.45E+04 |
| Uranyl nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 1.50E-01 | 2.50E-01 | 3.00E+01 |
| Xylene | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+02 | 8.23E-02 | 4.34E+02 | 8.69E+02 | 4.34E+03 |
| Zinc | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 3.00E+01 | 5.00E+01 | |
| Zinc nitrate | 3.75E+04 | 1.67E+01 | 8.23E-03 | 3.00E+01 | 5.00E+01 |
a. The chemicals presented in this table are those for which concentration guidelines were available.
b. Kilograms. To convert to pounds, multiply by 2.2046.
c. Milligrams per cubic meter of air.
d. Emergency Response Planning Guideline. See Table F-3.
e. No equivalent value found.
Table F-26. Conservative estimate of risk from seismic accidents.
(rem/yr) |
(rem/yr) | (rem/yr) | (rem/yr) | |||||
|
| ||||||||
a. See Table F-4.
b. See Table F-14.
c. See Table F-9.
d. See Table F-21.
F.6 Cumulative Impacts from Postulated Accidents
A severe seismic event was identified as the only
reasonably foreseeable accident that has the potential to initiate
simultaneous releases of radioactive or toxic materials from multiple
facilities at SRS. A design-basis earthquake, which has an estimated
ground acceleration of 0.2 times the acceleration of gravity (0.2g)
potentially could impact multiple facilities. An earthquake
of this magnitude is estimated to have a 2.0 × 10-4 annual
probability of occurrence (1 in 5,000 years). Analyses estimating
the cumulative impacts from multiple
facility releases caused by a severe earthquake at SRS have not
been included in the list of potential Accidents
(Tables F-4, F-9, F-14, and F-21). Such analyses would be based
on the assumption that the earthquake breaches all of the buildings
and their materials are released. Even accounting for release
fractions and taking credit for existing facility design parameters,
this type of analysis is considered too conservative because it
is not expected that an earthquake of 0.2g would cause
equivalent amounts of damage at multiple locations. Trying to
realistically estimate impacts from multiple facilities at different
locations would inherently include a margin of error of sufficient
magnitude to compromise the confidence in the resulting estimate.
The illustration below is based on the unlikely assumption
that an earthquake would cause each postulated accident scenario
initiated by an earthquake to occur simultaneously. However, the
analysis shows that the cumulative risk of these simultaneous
Accidents would be less than the highest-risk
accident (Table F-26). Table F-26 lists the risk of each earthquake-initiated
accident and the sum of those risks. The highest-risk event is
more than 10 times the cumulative seismic-event risk for each
corresponding waste type.
The synergistic effects of chemical hazards from
simultaneous releases from a common accident initiator were not
evaluated due to the scarcity of information about the effects
of concurrent exposure to various chemical combinations. DOE is
not aware of synergistic effects resulting from simultaneous exposures
to radiation and a carcinogenic chemical, such as benzene, each
of which is known to result in an increased incidence of cancer.
Indeed, synergistic effects of radiation and other agents have
been identified in only a few instances, most notably the combined
effects of radiation exposure and smoking
causing lung cancer among uranium miners. Radioactivity released
simultaneously with hazardous chemicals could affect the clean-up
or mitigation of the resulting hazard that could have a greater
impact than if the releases were separate.
F.7 Secondary Impacts from Postulated Accidents
The primary focus of accident analyses performed
to support the operation of a facility is to determine the magnitude
of the consequences of postulated-accident scenarios on public
and worker health and safety. DOE recognizes that Accidents
involving releases of materials can also adversely affect the
surrounding environment. To determine the greatest impact that
could occur to the environment from the postulated accidents,
DOE evaluated each radiological accident scenario to determine
potential secondary impacts.
F.7.1 BIOTIC RESOURCES
The consequences of a postulated accident on biotic
resources have not been studied. DOE believes that the area of
contamination from the postulated-accident scenarios would be
localized. Terrestrial biota in or near the contaminated
area could be exposed to small quantities of radioactive materials
and ionizing radiation until the affected areas could be decontaminated.
Effects on aquatic biota would be minor, since no waste management
facilities are near any major bodies of water.
F.7.2 WATER RESOURCES
No adverse impacts on water quality from the postulated-accident
scenarios are considered likely. Contamination of the groundwater
or surface water due to the postulated releases
would be minor. Contamination would migrate slowly to the groundwater,
so the clean-up efforts that would follow a release incident would
capture the contaminants before they reached groundwater.
F.7.3 ECONOMIC IMPACTS
With the exception of the economic effects generated
by severe-accident scenarios, such as those initiated by severe
earthquakes, limited economic effects would
occur as a result of accident scenarios postulated in this appendix.
Clean-up of contamination would be localized at the facility where
the accident occurred, and DOE expects that the current workforce
could perform the clean-up activities. In addition, DOE expects
that offsite contamination would be limited or nonexistent.
F.7.4 NATIONAL DEFENSE
The postulated-accident scenarios considered for
SRS waste management facilities would not affect national defense.
F.7.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
Contamination of the environment from the postulated
Accidents for SRS waste management facilities
would be limited to the immediate area surrounding the facility
where the accident occurred. It is unlikely that the postulated
accidents would result in offsite contamination.
F.7.6 THReaTENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES
Habitats of Federally listed threatened or endangered
species have not been identified in the immediate vicinity of
the SRS waste management facilities. Because the accident scenarios
postulated in this appendix would result only in localized contamination,
DOE does not expect these Accidents to affect
threatened or endangered species.
F.7.7 LAND USE
Because the Accidents postulated
in this appendix would result in only localized contamination
around the facility where an accident occurred, and no measurable
offsite contamination is likely, DOE expects no impacts on land
use.
F.7.8 TReaTY RIGHTS
The environmental impacts of Accidents
postulated in this appendix would be within the SRS boundaries.
Because there are no Native American lands within SRS boundaries,
treaty rights would not be affected.
F.8 Accident Mitigation
An important part of the accident analysis process
is to identify actions that can mitigate consequences from Accidents
if they occur. This section summarizes the SRS emergency plan,
which governs responses to accident situations that affect SRS
employees or the offsite population.
The Savannah River Site Emergency
Plan defines appropriate response measures for the management
of site emergencies (e.g., radiological or hazardous material
Accidents ). It incorporates into one document
a description of the entire process designed to respond to and
mitigate the consequences of an accident. For example, protective
actions guidelines are established for accidents involving chemical
releases to keep onsite and offsite exposures as low as possible.
Exposure is minimized or prevented by limiting the time spent
in the vicinity of the hazard or the release plume, keeping personnel
as far from the hazard or plume as possible (e.g., physical barricades
and evacuation), and taking advantage of available shelter. Emergencies
that could cause activation of this plan or part of it include
the following:
- Events (operational,
transportation, etc.) with the potential to cause releases above
allowable limits of radiological or hazardous materials.
- Events such as fires,
explosions, tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes,
dam failures, etc., that affect or could affect safety systems
designed to protect SRS and offsite populations and the environment.
- Events such as bomb
threats, hostage situations, etc., that threaten the security
of SRS.
- Events created by proximity
to other facilities, such as the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
(a commercial nuclear power plant across the Savannah River
from SRS) or nearby commercial chemical facilities.
Depending on the types of Accidents
and the potential impacts, emergencies are classified into one
of several categories in accordance with requirements defined
in the DOE 5500 series of orders. Incidents classified as "alerts"
are expected to be confined within the affected facility boundary.
Measurable impacts to workers outside the facility boundary or
members of the public would be expected from incidents classified
as alerts. Incidents classified as "Site Area Emergencies"
represent events that are in progress or have occurred and involve
actual or likely major failures of facility safety or safeguards
systems needed for the protection of onsite personnel, the public,
the environment, or national security. Because Site Area Emergencies
have the potential to impact workers at nearby facilities or members
of the public in the vicinity of SRS, these emergency situations
require notification of and coordination of responses with the
appropriate local authorities. Incidents classified as "General
Emergencies" are events expected to produce consequences
that require protective actions to minimize impacts to both workers
and the public. Under General Emergencies, full mobilization of
available onsite and offsite resources is usually required to
deal with the event and its consequences.
In accordance with the Savannah River Site Emergency Plan, drills and exercises are conducted frequently at SRS to develop, maintain, and test response capabilities and validate the adequacy of emergency facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and training. For example, drills for the following accident scenarios are conducted periodically in the facilities or facility areas: facility/area evacuations; shelter protection; toxic gas releases; nuclear incident monitor alarms (which activate following an inadvertent nuclear criticality); fire alarms; medical emergencies; and personnel accountability (to ensure that all personnel have safely evacuated a facility or area following an emergency). Periodic drills are also conducted with the following organizations or groups and independently evaluated by the operating contractor and DOE to ensure that they continue to maintain (from both a personnel and equipment standpoint) the capability to adequately respond to emergency situations: first aid teams; rescue teams; fire wardens and fire-fighting teams; SRS medical and health protection personnel, as well as personnel from the nearby Eisenhower Army Medical Center; SRS and local communications personnel and systems; SRS security forces; and SRS health protection agencies.
F.9 References
ACGIH (American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists), 1992, Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances
and Physical and Biological Exposure Indices, Cincinnati,
Ohio.
AIHA (American Industrial Hygiene Association Emergency
Response Planning Guidelines Committee), 1991, Emergency Response
Planning Guidelines, American Industrial Hygiene Association,
Akron, Ohio.
CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), 1990, 29 CFR 1910.1000,
Toxic and Hazardous Substances, Air Contaminants, Subpart Z,
pp. 6-33, July.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993, Recommendations
for the Preparation of Environmental Assessments and Environmental
Impact Statements, Office of Environment, Safety and Health
(EH25), Washington D.C., May.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994a, Preparation
Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility
Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-3009-94, Washington, D.C.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994b, Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Defense Waste Processing
Facility, DOE/eis-0082-S, Savannah River Operations Office,
Aiken, South Carolina.
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1987,
Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances, Technical
Guidance for Hazard Analysis, with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and U.S. Department of Transportation, USGP01991 517-003/47004,
Washington, D.C., December.
Homann, 1988, Emergency Precaution Information
Code (EPICodeTM),
Homann Associates, Incorporated, Fremont, California.
ICRP (International Commission of Radiological Protection),
1991, 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission
of Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 60, Annals of
the ICRP, 21, 1-3, Pergammon Press, New York, New York.
LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories),
1990, Design and Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy
Facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena Hazards, UCRL-15910,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
NAS (National Academy of Sciences), 1985, Emergency
and Continuous Exposure Guidance Levels for Selected Airborne
Contaminants, Volume 1-7, Committee on Toxicology (Board on
Toxicology and Environmental Health Standards, Commission on Life
Sciences, National Research Council), National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C.
NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health), 1990, NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,
Centers for Disease Control, Washington, D.C.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1992,
Toxic Chemical Hazard Classification and Risk Acceptance Guidelines
for Use in DOE Facilities, WSRC-MS-92-206, Revision 1, Savannah
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1993, Hazards Assessment Document, Effluent Treatment Facility - Balance of Plant, WSRC-TR-93-031, Revision 1, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, April 12.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994a,
Consolidated Annual Training Student Handbook, TICATA00.H0100,
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994b,
Liquid Waste Accident Analysis in Support of the Savannah River
Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement, WSRCTR940271,
Revision 0, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, July.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994c,
Solid Waste Accident Analysis in Support of the Savannah River
Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement, WSRCTR940265,
Revision 0, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, July.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994d,
Savannah River Site Emergency Plan,
Manual 6Q, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994e,
Bounding Accident Determination for the Accident Input Analysis
of the SRS Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement,
WSRC-TR-94-046, Revision 1, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South
Carolina.
WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994f,
AXAIR89Q Users Manual, WSRCRP94313, Savannah
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.
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