E.5.0 IN SITU VITRIFICATION ALTERNATIVE
This section analyses the risk resulting from potential accidents associated with the In Situ Vitrification alternative. The In Situ Vitrification alternative would involve the following activities:
- Construct and operate a tank farm confinement facility that would support in situ vitrification of tank waste including MUSTs;
- Waste transfer system upgrade construction (W-314);
- Continue evaporating liquid through the 242-A Evaporator;
- Fill tank voids with sand prior to in situ vitrification; and
- Construct Hanford Barriers over tank farms.
E.5.1 CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS
The construction activities associated with the In Situ Vitrification alternative are discussed in Appendix B of the EIS. It should be noted there are no radiological or chemical consequences associated with construction accidents. Occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities resulting from potential construction accidents are calculated as follows.
The number of construction personnel was estimated at an average 2.25E+04 person-years (Jacobs 1996). The total recordable injuries and illnesses, lost workday cases, and fatalities during the 22 years of construction were calculated using the incidence rates from Table E.1.2.1 as follows:
Total Recordable Cases = (2.25E+04 person-years) · (9.75E+00 incidences/100 person-years) = 2.19E+03
Lost Workday Cases = (2.25E+04 person-years) · (2.45E+00 incidences/100 person-years) = 5.51E+02
Fatalities = (2.25E+04 person-years) · (3.2E-03 fatalities/100 person-years) = 7.19E-01
E.5.2 TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS
Transporting activities associated with this alternative include:
- Transporting construction material from offsite for the tank farms confinement facility and the waste transfer system upgrade;
- Transporting earthen material from onsite borrow site for the waste transfer system upgrade and to fill tank voids;
- Transporting aggregate from onsite borrow site for concrete;
- Transporting process chemicals for off-gas treatment;
- Transporting earthen material from onsite borrow site for the Hanford Barrier; and
- Employees commuting to work each day.
E.5.2.1 Radiological Cancer Risk
All operations would be conducted within established operating parameters for the tanks and would not involve transporting radioactive materials by container. Therefore, there would be no radiological cancer risks from transportation.
E.5.2.2 Chemical Exposure
Anhydrous ammonia would be transported to the Hanford Site by rail to support the off-gas treatment process. The toxicological impacts of anhydrous ammonia were analyzed in Green (Green 1995). The annual quantities and annual shipments for in situ vitrification are similar to those analyzed in Green (Green 1995). The toxicological impacts are summarized in Table E.5.2.1. Table E.5.2.1 compares the concentration of the postulated chemical release to exposure limits discussed in Section 1.1.7. The general public exposure to anhydrous ammonia would exceed the ratio of exposure to ERPG-3 by 1.24E+01 and propane would exceed the ratio of exposure to ERPG-1 by 3.67E+00 for corrosive/irritant chemicals. Based on the magnitude of the anhydrous ammonia exceedance, potential lethal effects would be expected.
E.5.2.3 Occupational Injuries and Fatalities
Truck and Rail Transportation
Injuries and fatalities resulting from direct impact of transportation accidents are analyzed in this subsection. Truck and rail transportation activities to transport materials and supplies to the Site for this alternative were estimated in the In Situ Vitrification engineering data package (WHC 1995f) and are summarized in Table E.5.2.2. The total distance was calculated by multiplying the number of trips by the round-trip distance.
Table E.5.2.2 Summary of Transportation Activities for the In Situ Vitrification Alternative
The number of fatalities and injuries were calculated by multiplying the total distance traveled in each zone, shown in Table E.5.2.3, by the appropriate unit risk factors shown in Table E.1.3.1. The distance traveled in the population zones were calculated using the methodology previously discussed in Section E.1.3. The expected injuries and fatalities resulting from transportation accidents associated with the In Situ Vitrification alternative are summarized in Table E.5.2.4.
Table E.5.2.3 Distance Traveled in Population Zones for the In Situ Vitrification Alternative
Employee Traffic
In addition to transporting materials and supplies to and from the Hanford Site by truck and rail, Site workers and other personnel required to perform the various activities would be driving to the Site in their vehicles. The total person-years to perform the activities was estimated at 4.88E+04 (Jacobs 1996).
Each person was assumed to work 260 days of the year. The round-trip distance traveled to work from the Tri-City area was estimated at 140 km (87 mi) with an estimated 1.35 passengers per vehicle (DOE 1994a). The total personnel vehicle distance was therefore calculated to be 1.32E+09 km (8.2E+09 mi).
To calculate the expected number of injuries and fatalities resulting from vehicle accidents, the injury/fatality rates discussed in Section 1.3 were used. The expected number of injuries and fatalities resulting from employee vehicle accidents was calculated as follows:
Injuries = (1.32E+09 km) · (7.14E-7 injuries/km) = 9.40E+02
Fatalities = (1.32E+09 km) · (8.98E-9 fatalities/km) = 1.18E+01
Cumulative Transportation Injuries and Fatalities
The cumulative nonradiological and nontoxicological injuries and fatalities incurred as a direct result of traffic accident impacts is the sum of the truck, rail, and employee vehicle accidents. The results are summarized in Table E.5.2.5.
E.5.3 OPERATION ACCIDENTS
The potential exists for accidents resulting from operation activities. The operations are discussed in Appendix B.
This analysis separates and analyzes operations according to the following modes of operation:
- Continued operations - These operations have been previously discussed in the No Action alternative;
- Treatment - An off-gas hood would be placed over the tank and a confinement enclosure installed over the hood and the tank farm. The void space in the tank is filled with sand from the Hanford Site. Electrodes are positioned in the tank and surrounding the tank, and the tank waste is vitrified in place as well as the soil column surrounding the tanks.
- Hanford Barrier - After vitrification, the off-gas hood and confinement enclosure are removed. A multi-layer barrier of earthen material would be placed over the tank farms.
The dominant accident scenarios analyzed in the following subsections were selected from the Accident Screening Table (Table E.5.3.1). The accidents listed in Table E.5.3.1 were taken from the accident analysis data package (Shire et al. 1995 and Jacobs 1996). The methodology of screening was previously discussed in Section 1.1.2.
Table E.5.3.1 Accident Screening Table for the In Situ Vitrification Alternative
E.5.3.1 Continued Operation Accidents - Tank Waste Transfers
The dominant continued operations accident during tank waste transfers is the "mispositioned jumper accident" previously discussed in the No Action alternative in Section E.2.2.1 and is summarized as follows:
Source-term - The source-term resulting from a spray release in Section E.2.2.1.1 was calculated to be 52 L (14 gal).
Probability - The frequency of a mispositioned jumper in Section E.2.2.1.2 was 1.1E-02 per year. The In Situ Vitrification alternative is based on 1 6 years of operations. Therefore, the probability for the In Situ Vitrification alternative was calculated to be 1.8E-01.
Radiological Consequences - The radiological consequences presented in Table E.2.2.2 are reproduced in Table E.5.3.2.
Table E.5.3.2 Dose Consequence from Mispositioned Jumper
Radiological Cancer Risk - The LCFs calculated in Section E.2.2.1.4 are the same for the In Situ Vitrification alternative; however, the LCF point estimate risk is not the same due to the difference in probabilities. The LCFs and the LCF risk are calculated in Table E.5.3.3. The bounding calculations show all 10 workers would potentially receive a fatal dose and assumably die directly after the exposure if the accident occurred. Approximately seven noninvolved workers would receive fatal cancers and there would be two fatal cancers to the general public. The nominal scenario calculations show there would be no LCFs.
Table E.5.3.3 Latent Cancer Fatality Risk from Mispositioned Jumper
Chemical Consequences
Potential acute hazards associated with a mispositioned jumper are identical to those summarized in Tables E.2.2.4 (toxic chemicals, nominal conditions), E.2.2.5 (toxic chemicals, bounding conditions), E.2.2.6 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, nominal conditions) and E.2.2.7 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, bounding conditions) for the No Action alternative.
Toxic Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.4), the cumulative acute hazard ratios for the MEI worker, MEI noninvolved worker and MEI general public were less than 1.0, indicating that no adverse acute health effects would be expected for these three receptors. Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.5), the MEI worker was not evaluated because death would occur from exposure to radionuclides. The cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI noninvolved worker was 5.36E+00 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute health effects would be expected. This acute hazard ratio was primarily attributable to mercury (approximately 89 percent of the overall hazard ratio). No adverse acute health effects were predicted for the MEI general public under bounding conditions.
Corrosive/Irritant Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.6), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI worker was 2.70E+00 for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life-threatening. This acute hazard ratio was almost entirely attributable to sodium assumed to be equivalent to sodium hydroxide in corrosive/irritant effects. For the MEI noninvolved worker, the cumulative acute hazard ratio for ERPG-1 was 3.00E+00, indicating that only mild reversible irritant effects would be expected. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public under nominal conditions. Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.7), the MEI worker was not evaluated because death would occur from exposure to radionuclides. For the MEI noninvolved worker, the cumulative acute hazard ratio for ERPG-1 was 4.36, indicating that only mild reversible irritant effects would be expected. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public under bounding conditions.
Under both nominal and bounding conditions, the probability of a mispositioned jumper is 1.76E-01.
Corrosive/Irritant Impact from Chemical Exposure
For the MEI worker, the cumulative ratio of exposure to ERPG-2 values for corrosive/irritant chemicals was 1.93E+00, exceeds 1.0, and would be indicative of reversible acute effects. The MEI noninvolved worker cumulative ratio of exposure to ERPG-1 values was 3.10E+00. This acute hazard index is primarily attributable to sodium hydroxide (approximately 90 percent of the total hazard). The acute hazard index for the MEI general public was less than 1.0 for ERPG-1 comparisons and would not be indicative of acute effects.
E.5.3.2 Continued Operations Accident - Waste Storage Tanks
The dominant accident is a hydrogen deflagration in a waste storage tank previously discussed in the No Action alternative in Section E.2.2.2.1 and is summarized as follows:
Source-term - The source-term resulting from a hydrogen deflagration in Section E.2.2.2.1 was calculated to be 2.4 L (0.6 gal).
Probability - The frequency of the hydrogen deflagration in a waste storage tank in Section E.2.2.2.2 was estimated to be 7.2E-03 per year. The probability of the scenario based on 16 years of operation was therefore estimated to be 1.2E-01.
Radiological Consequences - The radiological consequences presented in Table E.2.2.8 are reproduced in Table E.5.3.4.
Radiological Cancer Risk - The LCFs calculated in Section E.2.2.2.4 are reproduced in Table E.5.3.5.
In the bounding scenario all 10 workers would potentially receive a fatal dose and would assumably die directly after the exposure. There would also be 10 LCFs attributed to the exposure to the noninvolved workers and 2 LCFs to the general public if the accident occurred. The nominal scenario calculations show there would be no LCFs.
Table E.5.3.4 Dose Consequence from Hydrogen Deflagration in Waste Storage Tank
Table E.5.3.5 Latent Cancer Fatality Risk from Hydrogen Deflagration in Waste Storage Tank
Chemical Consequences
Potential acute hazards associated with a hydrogen burn in a waste storage tank are identical to those summarized in Tables E.2.2.10 (toxic chemicals, nominal conditions), E.2.2.11 (toxic chemicals, bounding conditions), E.2.2.12 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, nominal conditions) and E.2.2.13 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, bounding conditions) for the No Action alternative.
Under bounding conditions, chemical impacts were not evaluated for the MEI worker because all workers would receive a lethal radiation dose as discussed previously.
Toxic Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.10), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI worker was 1.57E+00 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute health effects would be expected. This acute hazard ratio was primarily attributable to TOC (approximately 87 percent of the overall ERPG-2 ratio). The TOC is assumed to be equivalent in toxicity to tributylphosphate, which is the most acutely toxic constituent of the organic analytes identified. Tributylphosphate was used as a surrogate because an inventory of the various chemicals that make up the TOC class is not available. For the MEI noninvolved worker, the cumulative acute hazard ratio for ERPG-3 was 9.38E+00, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life-threatening. This acute hazard ratio was also primarily attributable to TOC (approximately 90 percent of the overall ERPG-3 ratio). However, the MEI noninvolved worker is a hypothetical worker assumed to be located 100m (330 ft) from the source area. The first anticipated noninvolved worker population is located 290 m (950 ft) from the source area and had no cumulative acute hazard ratios greater than 1.0 for any of the ERPGs, indicating that no acute health effects would be expected for the nearest noninvolved worker population. Likewise, no acute health effects were predicted for the MEI general public under nominal conditions.
Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.11), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI noninvolved worker was 4.54E+02 for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life-threatening. This acute hazard ratio is primarily attributable to:
- Oxalate (approximately 37 percent of the total hazard ratio);
- Beryllium (approximately 13 percent of the total hazard ratio);
- Cadmium (approximately 14 percent of the total hazard ratio);
- Uranium (approximately 12 percent of the total hazard ratio); and
- TOC (approximately 8 percent of the total hazard ratio).
As discussed previously, this is a hypothetical receptor located 100m (330 ft) from the source. The cumulative acute hazard ratio for the nearest noninvolved worker population located 290 m (950 ft) from the source was 1.65E+00 for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life threatening for 335 workers. This hazard ratio was attributable to the same toxic chemicals listed above. This exceedance of the ERPG-3 criterion for the nearest noninvolved worker population would not be expected to result in irreversible health effects or place these workers in a life-threatening situation for the following reasons.
- ERPG-3 is defined as a concentration in which a receptor can be exposed for 1 hour without irreversible health effects. Because the Hanford Site has an in-place emergency response plan designed to evacuate workers within 1 hour of an accident, workers would be expected to evacuate their location and move to an area where potential exposures would be well below ERPG-3. Therefore, this worker population would not be exposed to airborne concentrations that would be either life threatening or result in irreversible health effects.
- The estimated air concentrations of chemicals as a result of this accident were based on very conservative meteorology, which results in movement of a plume directly toward the worker population at a relatively slow rate with minimal wind dispersion. If less conservative meteorological parameters were used, wind dispersion would cause the estimated air concentrations of chemicals to be substantially less, and the ERPG-3 criterion would not be exceeded.
- Only the bounding toxic chemical evaluation exceeded ERPG-3, while the nominal evaluation was well below 1.00E+00 for ERPG-3, suggesting that the noninvolved worker population would not receive an exposure that would result in any permanent health effects.
The next nearest noninvolved worker population is located 1,780 m (5,840 ft) from the source and contains 1,500 workers. The cumulative acute hazard ratio was less than 1.0 for all ERPGs, indicating that no acute health effects would be expected for this population of workers. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public.
Corrosive/Irritant Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.12), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI worker was 3.82E+00 for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible corrosive/irritant effects that could be life threatening. For the MEI noninvolved worker, the cumulative acute hazard ratio for ERPG-3 was 7.89E+01 and would indicate irreversible corrosive/irritant effects that could be life threatening for this hypothetical receptor. This hazard ratio was primarily attributable to sodium, which was assumed to be equivalent to sodium hydroxide in corrosive/irritant effects. For the nearest noninvolved worker population (290 m [950 ft]) composed of 335 workers, the cumulative acute hazard ratio for ERPG-1 was 1.38E+01, indicating that only mild reversible effects would be expected. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public under nominal conditions.
Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.13), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI noninvolved worker was 1.91E+02 for ERPG-3, indicating irreversible health effects that could be life threatening for this hypothetical receptor. This hazard ratio was primarily attributable to :
- Sodium as sodium hydroxide (approximately 75 percent of the total hazard ratio);
- Chromium (approximately 14 percent of the total hazard ratio); and
- Calcium (approximately 6 percent of the total hazard ratio).
For the nearest noninvolved worker population (290 m [950 ft]) composed of 335 workers, the cumulative acute hazard ratio was 1.74E+00 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute effects would be expected. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public under nominal conditions.
Under both nominal and bounding conditions, the probability of a hydrogen deflagration event in a waste storage tank is 1.15E-01.
E.5.3. 3 Treatment Accidents
Types of potential accidents with treatment include ventilation failure, fire, explosion, exothermic reactions, mechanical impacts, and criticality. From Table E.5.3.1 the credible accident identified as having the highest risk was Accident 4.4.4.3, "rupture off-gas duct". It was postulated that a double-ended break occurs in the off-gas line between the off-gas hood and the off-gas treatment facility. The initiating event was postulated to be an earthquake.
E.5.3. 3 .1 Scenario and Source-term Development for Off-Gas Rupture
Most radionuclides are volatilized at the vitrifying temperature and would be drawn into the off-gas hood and ventilation system by exhaust flow. The break would result in a release directly to the environment without the benefit of off-gas treatment.
The normal off-gas flow was calculated to be 300 m3/min. A respirable airborne concentration of 200 mg/m3 was assumed in the tank headspace because of the high temperature associated with the vitrification process. The airborne concentration was assumed to be less than 30 percent radioactive waste because of the presence of a frit. An SpG of 1.00 was assumed for the tank waste. The exposure time was assumed to be 16 hours. The respirable source-term was calculated as follows:
(300 m3/min) · (200 mg/m3) · (30 percent) · (1.0E-06 L/mg) · (960 min) = 17 L (4.6 gal)
E.5.3. 3 .2 Probability of Off-Gas Duct Rupture
The annual exceedance frequency of the earthquake was assumed to be 1.00E-03 in the accident data package (Shire et al. 1995 and Jacobs 1996 ). The probability for this scenario based on 16 years of operation was therefore estimated to be 1.6E-02.
E.5.3. 3 .3 Radiological Consequence of Off-Gas Duct Rupture
The radiological dose to the receptors from the previous source-term was calculated by the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) using the methodology previously discussed in Section 1.1.6. The results are presented in Table E.5.3. 6 .
Table E.5.3.6 Dose Consequence for Off-Gas Duct Rupture
E.5.3. 3 .4 Radiological Cancer Risk for Off-Gas Duct Rupture
The LCFs and the LCF point estimate risk were calculated for the receptors and presented in Table E.5.3. 7 .
Table E.5.3.7 Latent Cancer Fatality Risk from Off-Gas Duct Rupture
In the bounding scenario all 10 workers would potentially receive a fatal dose and assumably die directly after the exposure. T he calculations show there would be 36 fatal cancers to the noninvolved worker population and 5 fatal cancers to the general public population attributable to this exposure if the accident occurred. The nominal scenario calculations show there would be no LCFs.
E.5.3. 3 .5 Chemical Consequences of Off-Gas Duct Rupture
The chemical exposure to the receptors from the postulated accident was calculated in Appendix A of the accident data package (Shire et al. 1995 and Jacobs 1996) and summarized in the exposure column in Tables E.5.3.8 and E.5.3.9 for the nominal and bounding toxic effects, respectively, and Tables E.5.3.10 and E.5.3.11 for the nominal and bounding corrosive/irritant effects, respectively. The tables compare the concentration of postulated chemical releases to acute exposure criteria (ERPGs) discussed in Section 1.1.7.
Under bounding conditions, chemical impacts were not evaluated for the MEI worker because all workers would receive a lethal radiation dose, as discussed previously.
Toxic Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.5.3.8), the cumulative acute hazard ratios for the MEI worker, MEI noninvolved worker and MEI general public were less than 1.0, indicating that no adverse acute health effects would be expected for these three receptors. Under bounding conditions (Table E.5.3.9), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI noninvolved worker was 1.54 for ERPG-1, indicating that only mild, transient acute health effects would be expected. No adverse acute health effects were predicted for the MEI general public under bounding conditions.
Corrosive/Irritant Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.5.3.10), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI worker was 1.09 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute irritant effects would be expected. This acute hazard ratio was almost entirely attributable to sodium assumed to be equivalent to sodium hydroxide in corrosive/irritant effects. For the MEI noninvolved worker and general public, the cumulative acute hazard ratios were less than 1.0 for all ERPGs, indicating that no acute health effects would be expected for these populations
Under bounding conditions (Table E.5.3.11), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI noninvolved worker was 1.16 for ERPG-1, indicating that only mild transient irritant effects would be expected. No acute health impacts were predicted for the MEI general public under bounding conditions.
Under both nominal and bounding conditions, the probability of an offgas duct rupture is 1.60E-02.
E.5.3.4 Beyond Design Basis Accidents
The beyond design basis accident is a seismic event resulting in the collapse of a SST. In the event of a 0.43 g earthquake, a SST could potentially collapse (LANL 1995). This event is not dependent on the remediation alternative but has the same annual frequency regardless of the alternative that is chosen. The length of time unremediated waste would remain in tanks that have not been backfilled would vary depending on the alternative and would affect the probability of the event. The probability of the event is the product of the annual frequency of the earthquake and the number of years the waste remains untreated in the unstabilized tanks.
At smaller annual frequencies, larger earthquakes could occur resulting in greater destruction and larger numbers of LCF to the onsite and offsite populations. In addition to population exposures from the collapsed SSTs, the impact to other Hanford Site facilities and operations would potentially add to the chemical and radiological risk. This would be a severe earthquake that would cause catastrophic structural damage in the Tri-Cities and the Hanford Site with expected extensive loss of life. There would be injuries and fatalities resulting from collapsed buildings and homes, fires, and traffic accidents. However, this section evaluates the radiological and chemical impacts resulting from the collapse of one SST.
E.5.3.4.1 Source-Term Development
It was conservatively assumed that the radiological and chemical contaminants in the headspace are available for release. The collapse of a portion of the dome and overburden compresses the vapor in the headspace as it descends, enhancing the vapor release rate by sudden a pressure difference. Assuming for each tank a respirable concentration of contaminants in the headspace of 100 mg/m3, a liquid SpG of 1.5, and a headspace volume of 1,000 m3 (Shire et al. 1995 and Jacobs 1996), the potential source-term contribution from the headspace release was calculated as follows:
(100 mg/m3) · (1 g/1,000 mg) · (1 L/1,000 g) · (1,000 m3) · (1/1.5) = 6.67E-02 L (1.8E-02 gal).
It was conservatively assumed that the liquids had been pumped from the tanks so that the tanks contained only solids and the MAR was 2,500 L (660 gal) for each tank. It was postulated that the fall of the dome and overburden generated an air movement sufficient to suspend a fraction of the MAR. Assuming the respirable release fraction to be 2.0E-03 (Shire et al. 1995 and Jacobs 1996), the potential source-term contribution was calculated as follows:
(2,500 L [660 gal]) · (2.0E-03) = 5.0 L (1.3 gal).
It was postulated that prevailing winds resuspend a respirable fraction of the MAR (2,500 L [660 gal]). A respirable release fraction of 4.0E-05/hr for 24 hours was assumed. The potential source-term contribution from resuspension was calculated as follows:
(2,500 L [660 gal]) · (4.0E-05/hr) · (24 hr) = 2.4 L (0.6 gal).
The combined source-term for the acute release is calculated as follows:
(6.67E-02 L) + (5.00E+00 L) + (2.4 L) = 7.4 L (2.0 gal).
E.5.3.4.2 Probability of a Beyond Design Basis Earthquake
This earthquake has a calculated annual exceedance frequency of approximately 1.40E-04 (WHC 1996b). The probability for this scenario based on 16 years of operation was therefore estimated to be 2.2E-03.
E.5.3.4.3 Radiological Consequences from a Beyond Design Basis Earthquake
The radiological dose to the receptors from the previous source-term was calculated by the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) using the methodology previously discussed in Section E.1.1.6. The results are presented in Table E.5.3.12.
Table E.5.3.12 Dose Consequence from Seismic Event
E.5.3.4.4 Radiological Cancer Risk from a Beyond Design Basis Earthquake
The LCFs and LCF point estimate risk are presented in Table E.5.3.13.
Table E.5.3.13 Latent Cancer Fatality Risk from Seismic Event
In the bounding scenario, all 10 workers would potentially receive a fatal dose and assumably die directly after the exposure. There would also be 10 LCFs attributed to the exposure to the noninvolved workers and two LCFs to the general public if the accident occurred. The nominal scenario calculations show there would be no LCFs.
E.5.3.4.5 Chemical Consequences from a Beyond Design Basis Earthquake
Potential acute hazards associated with a beyond design basis earthquake are identical to those summarized in Tables E.2.2.16 (toxic chemicals, nominal conditions), E.2.2.17 (toxic chemicals, bounding conditions), E.2.2.18 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, nominal conditions) and E.2.2.19 (corrosive/irritant chemicals, bounding conditions) for the No Action alternative.
Under bounding conditions, chemical impacts were not evaluated for the MEI worker because all workers would receive a lethal radiation dose, as described previously.
Toxic Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.16), the cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI worker was 2.64E+00 for ERPG-1, indicating that only mild transient effects would be expected. For the MEI noninvolved worker, the cumulative acute health hazard was 2.59E+00 for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life threatening. This acute hazard ratio was primarily attributable to TOC (approximately 84 percent of the total hazard ratio). The TOC is assumed to be equivalent in toxicity to tributylphosphate, which is the most acutely toxic constituent of the organic analytes identified. Tributylphosphate was used as a surrogate because an inventory of the various chemicals that make up the TOC class is not available. The cumulative acute hazard ratio for the nearest noninvolved worker population consisting of 335 workers located 290 m (950 ft) away was less than 1.0 for all ERPGs, suggesting that no acute health effects would be expected.
Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.17), the cumulative hazard ratios for the MEI and nearest noninvolved worker (335 workers located 290 m (950 ft) away) were 2.15E+03 and 7.80E+00 for ERPG-3, respectively. These ratios were primarily attributable to:
- Uranium (approximately 47 percent of the total hazard ratio);
- Oxalate (approximately 24 percent of the total hazard ratio); and
- Mercury (approximately 13 percent of the total hazard ratio).
This exceedance of the ERPG-3 criterion for the nearest noninvolved worker population would not be expected to result in irreversible health effects or place these workers in a life-threatening situation for the following reasons.
- ERPG-3 is defined as a concentration in which a receptor can be exposed for 1 hour without irreversible health effects. Because the Hanford Site has an in-place emergency response plan designed to evacuate workers within 1 hour of an accident, workers would be expected to evacuate their location and move to an area where potential exposures would be well below ERPG-3. Therefore, this worker population would not be exposed to airborne concentrations that would be either life threatening or result in irreversible health effects.
- The estimated air concentrations of chemicals as a result of this accident were based on very conservative meteorology, which results in movement of a plume directly toward the worker population at a relatively slow rate with minimal wind dispersion. If less conservative meteorological parameters were used, wind dispersion would cause the estimated air concentrations of chemicals to be substantially less, and the ERPG-3 criterion would not be exceeded.
- Only the bounding toxic chemical evaluation exceeded ERPG-3, while the nominal evaluation was well below 1.00E+00 for ERPG-3, suggesting that the noninvolved worker population would not receive an exposure that would result in any permanent health effects.
The cumulative acute hazard ratio for the next nearest noninvolved worker population, composed of 1,500 people and located 1,780 m (5,840 ft) away, was 2.15E+00 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute health effects would be expected. The cumulative acute hazard ratio for the MEI general public was 1.76E+00 for ERPG-2, indicating that reversible acute health effects would be expected.
Corrosive/Irritant Impact from Chemical Exposure
Under nominal conditions (Table E.2.2.18), the cumulative acute hazard ratios for the MEI worker, MEI noninvolved worker and nearest noninvolved worker (335 workers at 290 m [950 ft]) were 2.47E+01, 5.10E+02 and 1.85E+00, respectively, for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life threatening. These ratios were almost entirely attributable to sodium, which was assumed to be equivalent to sodium hydroxide in corrosive/irritant effects. As discussed previously, this exceedance of the ERPG-3 criterion would not be expected to result in irreversible or life threatening health effects. For the next nearest noninvolved worker population, (1,500 workers at 1,780 m [5,840 ft]), the cumulative acute hazard ratio was 1.20E+00 for ERPG-1, indicating that only mild irreversible irritant effects would be anticipated. For the MEI general public, the cumulative acute hazard ratio was less than 1.0 for all ERPGs, and no acute health effects would be expected.
Under bounding conditions (Table E.2.2.19), the cumulative acute hazard ratios for the MEI noninvolved worker and nearest noninvolved worker (335 workers at 290 m [950 ft]) were 7.31E+02 and 2.65E+00, respectively for ERPG-3, indicating the potential for irreversible health effects that could be life threatening. These acute hazard ratios were primarily attributable to:
- Sodium (approximately 83 percent of the total hazard ratio); and
- Calcium (approximately 10 percent of the total hazard ratio).
As discussed previously, this exceedance of the ERPG-3 criterion would not be expected to result in irreversible or life threatening health effects.
For the next nearest noninvolved worker, and MEI general public, the cumulative acute hazard ratios were 1.74E+00 and 1.42E+00, respectively, for ERPG-1, indicating that only mild, transient irritant effects would be expected.
Under both nominal and bounding conditions, the probability of a seismic event is 2.25E-03.
E.5.3.5 Occupational Injuries and Fatalities from Operations
The number of operation personnel was estimated at approximately 2.64E+04 person-years (Jacobs 1996). The total recordable injuries and illnesses, lost workday cases, and fatalities were calculated as follows:
Total Recordable Cases = (2.64E+04 person-years) · (2.2E+00 incidences/100 person-years) = 5.80E+02
Lost Workday Cases = (2.64E+04 person-years) · (1.1E+00 incidences/100 person-years) = 2.90E+02
Fatalities = (2.64E+04 person-years) · (3.2E-03 fatalities/100 person-years) =8.43E-01
E.5.4 POST-REMEDIATION ACCIDENT
E.5.4.1 Deflagration in Storage Tank
After the tank waste was vitrified in-place and the organics destroyed in the process, the probability of a tank generating enough hydrogen to exceed the LFL is considered to be incredible.
E.5.4.2 Seismic Induced Rupture of Stabilized Tanks
As discussed in Section E.4.4.2, displacement on a fault resulting in an airborne release of the waste after remediation is considered incredible. The tanks would most likely crack, allowing increased infiltration to the groundwater.
E.5.5 SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS
The potential consequences from nonradiological and nonchemical accidents that include occupational and transportation impacts are summarized in Table E.5.5.1. The LCFs associated with representative accidents for each component of the alternative are summarized in Table E.5.5.2 along with the probability of the accident. The chemical hazards associated with representative accidents for each component of the alternative are summarized in Table E.5.5.3. The chemical hazard is expressed as an exceedance of the ERPG threshold values.
Table E.5.5.1 Summary of Potential Nonradiological/Nonchemical Accident Consequences
Table E.5.5.2 Summary of Potential Radiological Accident Consequences
Table E.5.5.3 Chemical Exposures Resulting from Potential Operations and Transportation Accidents
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