Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report for Continued Operation of Lawrence

A.2 LLNL SITE 300

Established in 1955, LLNL Site 300 is a remote explosives testing ground for the theoretical and developmental weapons work performed at LLNL. Located approximately 15 miles southeast of the LLNL Livermore site, LLNL Site 300 occupies approximately 7000 acres in Alameda and San Joaquin counties. Most adjacent land in the sparsely populated area is used for sheep and cattle ranching. The terrain varies from rolling hills to canyons, from 525 to 1750 ft above sea level. The Physics International Company, another explosives test facility, borders LLNL Site 300's eastern boundary (LLNL, 1991i).

Activities at LLNL Site 300 are designed to test non-nuclear high-explosives. These tests include:

Weapons and explosives detonations.
Recovering blast data.
Conducting destructive and nondestructive materials tests.
Analyzing the chemistry involved in detonation.
Studying the compatibility and reaction of explosives with metal components.
Fabricating explosive components.
Developing high-energy explosives.
Particle beam studies.

Current facilities at LLNL Site 300 are located in six areas. As shown in Figure A-9 and Figure A-10, these areas include two remote weapons test ranges; physical, environmental, and dynamic test areas; chemistry area; process area; and the general services area.

A.2.1 LLNL Site 300 Programs

The primary user of this site is Defense Systems (see Section A.1.1 for description). Defense Systems has three program elements: Nuclear Design, Nuclear Test-Experimental Science, and Military Applications (LLNL, 1991i).

To support Defense Systems and its program elements, LLNL Site 300 has the following major test and support areas:

Explosives Processing. Formulation of experimental high explosives and pressing, machining, and assembly of explosive components. Many of these processes are done remotely.
Environmental and Dynamic Weapons testing. Non-nuclear weapon assemblies are subjected to environmental and dynamic conditions which simulate the actual weapon environments.
Explosives testing including hydrodynamic tests of devices, and of explosive effects on components, structures, and weapon assemblies.
Advanced Test Accelerator, for development work on future high-power sources.
Cheap Access to Orbit (CATO) (formerly Super High Altitude Research Project or SHARP). Gas gun for development and testing of advanced launch systems.

A.2.2 Scientific and Institutional Support

As described in Section A.2.1, the primary user of this site is the Defense Systems Program. The scientific and institutional support groups associated with the Defense Systems Program are described in Section A.1.2.

A.2.3 Existing Infrastructure

Infrastructure for LLNL Site 300 includes drainage, parking, pathways, telephones, lighting and landscaping, as well as utilities and roadway system. LLNL will continue to maintain, expand, and upgrade this infrastructure under the proposed action and the no action alternative described in Section 3 of this document. Figure A-9 and Figure A-10 illustrate the site map and major roadways. Utilities are supplied to LLNL Site 300 facilities as follows (LLNL, 1991i):

Domestic water is supplied by onsite wells at a rate of approximately 31.9 million gal per year, or approximately 87,400 gal per day.
Metered electrical power is supplied by Pacific Gas and Electric lines.
Sanitary sewage is disposed of as follows: (1) sewage is piped from the general services area to an oxidation pond at the rate of approximately 3500 gal per day; and (2) sewage from other areas of the site is disposed of in septic tanks, leachfields, or cesspools at each building.
Compressed air is supplied to process areas from a central plant or from individual compressors.
The site has telephone service and microwave links to the LLNL Livermore site.

A.2.4 Existing Facilities

The facilities located at LLNL Site 300 are shown in Figure A-9 and Figure A-10. The description of operations is limited to "select facilities." The facilities associated with waste management, security, health services, and emergency response are also briefly described. Facilities were selected because of their potentially hazardous operations or inventories. An overview of all other facilities is included in Table A-6.

The select facilities at LLNL Site 300 are described in sections A.2.4.1 through A.2.4.20, and are listed in Table A-5 with information on area, use, and the principal types of hazards present. Hazards are indicated as radiological, chemical, or other. Examples of radiological hazards include low-level ionizing radiation, which could cause cancer, cause genetic defects, and cause noninheritable birth defects. Examples of chemical hazards include chemicals that may be toxic, flammable, corrosive, poisonous, and/or carcinogenic. Examples of "other" hazards include high explosives, nonionizing radiation, the storage and handling of compressed gas cylinders, and electrical hazards. Figure A-11 highlights the select facilities. Facilities for which detailed descriptions are not presented are summarized in Table A-6

Each selected facility is described with location, square footage, and operations; hazards assessment; and generated wastes and effluents. The discussion on generated wastes and effluents is kept to a minimum. For a more detailed discussion on waste generation and waste management, please refer to Appendix B.

A.2.4.1 Building 801

The Flash X-Ray (FXR) accelerator complex, Building 801, is part of the explosive test facility operations at LLNL Site 300. This 17,522 sq ft two-level building is located in the northeast quadrant of the site called the East Firing Area, and contains office, laboratory, and service shop areas.

This complex consists of an outdoor detonation firing table composed of gravel-covered pads on which stands made of concrete, wood, or steel are placed. During an experiment, an explosive device is placed on the test stand and fired. The firing debris may consist of components of the explosive assembly, wood, plastic, wiring, and gravel. This debris is potentially contaminated with unexpended high explosives, beryllium, and depleted uranium (LLNL, 1990v).

The building houses a linear induction accelerator designed to accelerate charged particles and generate x rays, a high-speed camera facility, and a Laser-Doppler Interferometry operation. These facilities are used to measure the velocity of explosively driven surfaces. Also present are other electronic and mechanical systems capable of diagnosing various aspects of the high explosives tests.

Hazards Assessment

The common hazards associated with the firing facilities are handling and firing explosives, high voltages, toxic and radioactive materials, high levels of ionizing radiation, firing malfunctions and misfires, grass fires, lasers, cranes and machine tools, and high-pressure systems (LLNL, 1990v). There is also the possibility of personnel exposure to the flash x ray and electron beam (LLNL, 1988j) and the high-power laser radiation while operating the Argon-ion laser (LLNL, 1988k). The high-speed rotor cameras, if allowed to revolve at too high a speed, will come apart, scattering parts of the beryllium rotor around the camera room.

The hazards in the photoprocessing operations are various laboratory reagents, photochemicals, and chemicals in spent developers, fixers, and rinsewaters. When film is processed, developer and fixer are automatically replenished; the waste generated is captured in separate barrels.

Formal operational safety procedures have been prepared for the facility as a whole; these are supplemented for the peculiarities of individual tests and reviewed by the Hazards Control Department. All explosives are handled, transported, and test fired only while strictly following these procedures. All work with radioactive materials and with toxic materials conforms to established health and safety guidelines. Additional restrictions are imposed during the grass fire season.

In the explosive firing facilities personnel safety is enhanced by positive key-control of the various phases and aspects of the operation, including enabling the firing console. Personnel are excluded from areas of x-ray flux by fences, barriers, and interlocked access doors and gates. The interferometer room is also interlocked. Equipment is electrically isolated from the shot assembly. A muster is used for positive control of personnel access to the test area.

Personnel are not allowed to enter the firing table area after a shot until specific conditions are met, including waiting for a prespecified period of time in case of malfunction or misfire. If beryllium or depleted uranium has been fired, respirators are worn until the area is wetted down. Finally, table gravel is changed if the beryllium and radioactivity levels are above the "derived working limits" (500 mg/g for beryllium, 5000 pCi/g for alpha emitters, and 10,000 pCi/g for beta or gamma radiation).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The firing table debris consists of gravel and fragments of wood, metal, and glass; larger debris consists of tent poles, wood, steel, aluminum, concrete, plastic, glass, burlap bags, cables, and other inert testing materials. These wastes may be contaminated with depleted uranium or thorium as low-level radioactive contaminants. Small amounts of metal components (e.g., lead, beryllium, copper, barium, vanadium, etc.) may also be present. In the past tritium had been a contaminant and may also occur in the future.

The firing table debris is characterized to segregate the low-level radioactive waste from hazardous waste. The low-level radioactive wastes are placed in containers and transported to the Building 804 waste staging area. Any nonradioactive contaminated undetonated high explosive is taken to Building 829 for open burning. All hazardous wastes are transported to Building 883.

The hazardous wastes generated from the photoprocessing operations, the flash x ray, and the interferometry operations include solvents, lubricating fluids, dielectric fluids, and photographic wastes. These nonradioactive wastes are temporarily stored in the work place waste accumulation area and transferred to the outside waste accumulation area located in the Building 801 complex. The containers at the waste accumulation area are inspected weekly and properly labeled. The waste is temporarily stored (less than 90 days) in this area and shipped by the Hazardous Waste Management to the LLNL Livermore site (LLNL, 1990g).

A.2.4.2 Building 804

Building 804 is a 3733 sq ft facility located in the northeastern quadrant of LLNL Site 300. This facility is currently used exclusively as an area for the staging of low-level radioactive wastes before the wastes are shipped to a proper disposal site.

These low-level radioactive wastes are generated at firing tables where test assemblies are detonated. The debris consists of gravel and fragments of wood, metal, and glass; larger debris consists of tent poles and pieces of wood, steel, aluminum, concrete, plastic, glass, burlap bags, cables, and other inert testing materials. These parts are contaminated with depleted uranium, and on some occasions thorium is also present (LLNL, 1990u).

Hazard Assessment

Wastes stored at this facility consist primarily of low-level radioactive wastes and, infrequently, mixed waste. The low-level radioactive wastes consist of depleted uranium and, on rare occasions, small amounts of thorium. Mixed wastes also contain metal components.

Proper control of the packaging and handling operations is essential for the safety of all personnel and protection of all equipment. Some operational and safety features are characterization of firing table waste in order to segregate low-level radioactive waste from mixed waste; specification of containers for shipment and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes at the Nevada Test Site; procedures for sampling and analysis, containerization, staging, and certification of wastes; record keeping requirements; and radiation measurements conducted by the Health and Safety technician. The external radiation measurements are reported to the Building 801 firing area supervisor for inclusion on the computerized record keeping system and are also noted on each container (LLNL, 1990u).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This facility is used primarily for storage of low-level radioactive wastes before shipment to a disposal site. There are no wastes generated.

A.2.4.3 Building 809

The Radiography and High Explosives Machining Facility, Building 809, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300. This 2583 sq ft facility houses heavy and light laboratories, storage areas, space for mechanical equipment, and an office.

Building 809 is part of an overall complex (including Buildings 806-A, 806-B, 807, 809, and 828) for the machining, fabrication, disassembly, and inspection of explosives and inert materials (LLNL, 1989j). The following sections for Building 809 machining operations also apply to these other buildings in the complex.

Building 809 is also used for radiographic inspection of explosives, fissile materials, and other components. The radiographic equipment in Bay 2 includes a Norelco 50 to 150 kilo-electron- volt (keV) x-ray machine, a General Electric 1000-keV x-ray machine, a Norelco 100 to 300 keV x-ray machine, and radiographic sources and x-ray machine transferred from the LLNL Livermore site as required (LLNL, 1988l). Bay 1 has a Bostomatic Milling machine used for the machining of high explosives (LLNL, 1988l).

Hazards Assessment

The major hazard associated with machining explosives is the possibility of ignition from the forces involved. The rotating equipment also presents the risk of injury to personnel, as does the toxic nature of the chemicals in the explosives (LLNL, 1989j).

The authorized materials at this facility include several types of explosives and mock explosives. All explosives are delivered to and shipped from the Building 809 loading dock. The maximum amount of explosives in Bay 1, room 109, is set at 100 lb (45 kg), but the actual amount is kept at a minimum and only the explosives required for machining are permitted (LLNL, 1989j).

The hazards associated with the radiographic operations in Bay 2 include possible exposure of personnel to an x-ray beam, exposure to radioactive sources, and possible handling accidents involving explosives. The authorized materials in this bay and the two associated storage magazines include explosives, depleted and natural uranium, thorium, cobalt, beryllium in metallic form, and fissile materials. The explosives limit for Bay 2 is 500 lb (227 kg). Storage magazine M-9 has a limit of 3000 lb (1360 kg) of explosives, and the magazine M-809 has a limit of 100 detonators. Fissile materials are not kept at the magazines; special procedures are required for their use and storage.

Operational Safety Procedures are in force in the Building 809 Complex to help ensure personnel safety (LLNL, 1988l, 1989j). All drilling and dry machining of the explosives is done remotely, under controlled temperature conditions, and with limited operating speed. During remote operations all personnel and the process security post operator are alerted. The gate to the area is locked, and warning lights and alarm systems are double checked. All personnel are retired to the control room. The number of persons present is limited.

Scrap and other waste is not allowed to accumulate, and is put into containers. High explosives machining operations can occur in one bay during operation of the x ray in the other. These machines are operated from the control room with safety interlocks controlling entry into the x-ray bay. Fissile materials authorized for radiographic inspection are handled in the second bay only; no explosives are present at the same time.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

Wastes generated from Building 809 include high explosives–contaminated wastewaters and sludge, solid high explosives wastes, and high explosives–contaminated packaging and clothing.

The wastewaters are generated from wet machining processes and from the washdown of floors and equipment. These waters are temporarily stored in tanks and are passed through a clarifier-weir system before being discharged to the surface impoundment system located south of Building 817. The water in the impoundment system is evaporated (see section A.2.4.19).

The sludge and clarifier filters along with the high explosives–contaminated packaging are taken to Building 829 for open burning of the wastes (see section A.2.4.9).

A.2.4.4 Building 817

The high explosives pressing and oven complex, Building 817, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300 called the Process Area. This complex contains several buildings, 817 A through H, and houses several laboratories, mechanical equipment areas, an office, and a storage space. This complex is used for the preparation and isostatic pressing of bulk explosives and mock high explosives (LLNL, 1988d).

Building 817A serves as a control room and office, Building 817B is the high explosives pressing facility, Building 817C is a service magazine, and Building 817F is the oven facility used for heating and annealing explosives. The oven building contains two ovens, a scrub water tank and pump unit, an insulated transport cart, and handling trays.

Hazards Assessment

The hazards at this complex are those associated with the handling of explosives. Explosives in the form of molding powders are handled in the process equipment, and if handled inappropriately can collect in the wastewater and ventilation systems (LLNL, 1988d).

In order to produce high-density parts, most of the explosives are heated in a hot water oven before pressing. Two large presses are used to make billets weighing as much as 100 lb. The basic hazards in this operation are handling powders, heating and compacting materials under pressures up to 30,000 lb, and handling the pressed parts.

The authorized materials at this complex include explosives and mock high explosives. The amount of explosives is limited to 200 lb (90 kg) at Building 817B; 2000 lb (900 kg) at Building 817C; and 250 lb (112 kg) at Building 817F. Fissile and nonfissile radioactive materials are permitted only after review and approval of a special operational safety procedure (LLNL, 1988d).

The pressing building and the oven building contain a vacuum system, a dust collection system, and roof exhaust systems. These systems are made necessary by the work with powder explosives.

All operations in the Building 817 Complex are controlled by Operational Safety Procedures (LLNL, 1988d). All pressing is done remotely while the operators are in the control room in Building 817A. Other access is precluded by flashing lights, physical barriers, and interlocks. Explosives are permitted only in approved and posted areas, and an insulated cart is used to transfer hot material from the oven and from pressing operations. The area is kept clean by frequent washing and by decontamination of equipment, tools, fixtures, and other parts that may have become contaminated.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

High explosives–contaminated wastes are generated from this complex. The high explosives wastewaters are passed through the clarifier and drained to the surface impoundment ponds south of the complex. The explosives–contaminated wastes are stored in plastic-lined containers, and scrap explosive pieces are wrapped, boxed, and labeled.

The clarifier filters, contaminated wastes in containers, and the scrap explosive pieces are taken to the Building 829 area for open burning (see section A.2.4.9).

A.2.4.5 Building 819

The Decontamination Facility, Building 819, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300. This 811 sq ft facility is used for pesticide mixing and equipment (vacuum pump) repair. Pesticides are mixed in a small room measuring 6 ft x 6 ft (LLNL, 1991r). Next to the building, under a canopy, is an area used for steam cleaning and maintenance of equipment.

Hazards Assessment

The pesticide chemicals are toxic, and care must be taken to prevent uptake by personnel. No pesticides are stored in this facility, and only the amount to be mixed in the closed system is permitted here.

Operational Safety Procedures (LLNL, 1989t) provide that the Hazards Control Team survey the work area regularly to detect and help correct unsafe conditions; personnel wear pesticide cartridge respirators and natural rubber gloves when working with pesticides, and take a shower after the work is completed; personnel wear organic vapor respirators and rubber gloves when working with solvents; the pesticides are stored in locked areas; and empty pesticide containers are disposed of properly.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The rinsewaters from cleaning of pesticide containers are stored in tanks and cannot be discharged into the Building 819 drainage system. The tanks are handled by Hazardous Waste Management for proper treatment and disposal. The empty pesticide containers are rinsed thoroughly and inspected by the San Joaquin County Agricultural Commissioner before disposal at a local municipal landfill (LLNL, 1989t, 1991r).

The washwaters generated from the steam cleaning operations are stored in a retention tank (LLNL, 1991r). When a tank is full, its contents are sampled and analyzed. Wastewater is transferred to the LLNL Livermore site.

The vacuum pump wastes include contaminated rags and small quantities of oils and aqueous solutions. The aqueous solutions are stored in portable retention tanks. When full, these tanks are transported to the LLNL Livermore site waste management facilities. If the liquid in the tanks is sewerable, it is sent to the sewer; if not, it is transferred to an offsite treatment facility (LLNL, 1991r).

A.2.4.6 Building 822

The storage facility, Building 822, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300 called the Process Area. This 296 sq ft building consists of four storage cells (A, B, C, and D) which are used for the storage of controlled materials such as explosives, radioactive materials (natural and depleted uranium), sealed sources, mock high explosives, beryllium, precious metals, and classified parts. Cell C is primarily used for the storage of detonators (LLNL, 1991f).

Hazards Assessment

The storage of explosives is not a high-risk operation (LLNL, 1989q). The explosives are properly packaged and controlled by periodic inspections. There is no compatibility problem in this facility because the explosives and detonators are not stored together, and explosives of the same storage group are allowed to be stored together (LLNL, 1991f).

There is a very low risk of initiation of the detonators in cell C because there is no energy source in the storage units. All the detonators are packaged in nonpropagating shipping/storage containers that are certified as safe for transportation. There is no possibility of an explosion or injury to personnel (LLNL, 1991f).

Safety features within this building include alarms and warning signs. The cell doors are secured by combination locks and have alarms. The access to the cells is limited to authorized personnel.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This facility is used primarily for the storage of controlled materials; therefore, no wastes are generated.

A.2.4.7 Building 823

The Linear Accelerator (LINAC) Radiography Complex, Building 823, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300 called the Process Area. This 2751-sq-ft complex consists of two buildings: 823A contains office space, a darkroom with a radiographic film processor, control panels for a transportable 9 MeV Linear Accelerator radiographic unit, a real-time imaging system, and remotely controlled staging. 823B contains staging and real-time imaging systems, and a doubly encapsulated CO-63 isotope source in a lead-shielded radiographic projector (the isotope source is no longer operational and is being stored in 823B until it is sent back to the manufacturer for disposal). This complex provides the means for radiographic inspection of weapon test components, test assemblies, hydro-shot assemblies, and Nuclear Explosive–like Assembly. After x-ray film has been exposed in 823B, it is processed through the automatic film processor in 823A. (LLNL, 1988a).

Building 823B is surrounded on two sides with an earth berm which provides radiation shielding for the office/control building located east of the berm. A Varian 9 million-electron-volt LINAC is used within 823B to beam into the open space directly to the west. This unit has also been designed to be transportable; however, in Building 823 it remains in a fixed position.

Hazards Assessment

The potential hazards in the Building 823 Complex arise primarily from the intense levels of radiation associated with the generated x-ray beam, the high voltages associated with the power supplies, and the handling of test units containing explosives, radioactive, or toxic materials. The 9-MeV LINAC is capable of producing a potentially lethal beam of up to 3000 radiation pulses per minute at 1 meter (LLNL, 1988a).

The authorized materials in this facility include explosives, natural and depleted uranium, and beryllium in metallic form. Fissile materials are allowed only after review and approval by the management, and after proper operational safety procedures are applied. The amount of explosives is kept at a minimum; the maximum amount allowed in the complex is 1000 lb (454 kg) (LLNL, 1988a).

The Operational Safety Procedures outline these personnel and operational safety controls (LLNL, 1988a): explosives in powder form are not permitted at this facility, nor are explosives permitted at the facility when fissile materials are present; the number of personnel is limited to five when explosives are present; protection from inadvertent exposure to x radiation is provided by physical barriers, warning lights and chimes, safety interlocks, signs, and remote area monitoring; before starting an x-ray operation all personnel are required to evacuate the fenced enclosures; a remote area monitor in the LINAC Building that indicates radiation levels on a local readout meter and on a duplicate meter in the control room will actuate the warning lights and chimes when radiation levels become high; and flashing magenta lights and pulsed chimes indicate an x-ray exposure in progress. No one is allowed to enter the barricaded or fenced area at this time. The operating area is circled by a security fence and all gates are locked during operation of the machine.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The wastes generated from this facility include photochemicals, spent fixers and developer, and photochemical rinsewaters. The photochemical rinsewaters are stored in retention tanks and shipped to the LLNL Livermore site for disposal. The spent fixers and developers are handled by the materials management group and taken to the LLNL Livermore site for silver recovery.

A.2.4.8 Buildings 825, 826, and 827

The Chemistry Area Complex consists of Buildings 825, 826, and 827, and is used for processing, development, and testing of explosives. Building 825 and 826 are located in the southeastern quadrant of LLNL Site 300 and have areas of 1224 and 1742 sq ft, respectively. The 827 complex, consisting of Buildings 827A, B, C, D, and E, with office, laboratory, and storage areas, is located in the south-central section of LLNL Site 300 and has a total area of 7744 sq ft (LLNL, 1989e).

Building 825 houses mechanical presses for pressing explosives, a Monel detonation sphere and its associated vacuum gas sampling system to measure detonation products both from heavily confined and unconfined charges, and a control room (LLNL, 1989e).

Building 826 houses a vertical temperature-controlled mixer for mixing explosives; binders, plasticizers, and other compounds; and a 2-ton mill for mixing extrudable (paste) explosives. A 50-cubic-inch deaerator loader is used for processing the extrudable explosives. Three-roll mills are employed in Building 826 to reduce agglomerates and incorporate the explosive particles with a liquid medium (LLNL, 1989e).

The Building 827 Complex includes a laboratory for mixing high explosives and processing them remotely on a laboratory scale (50 g or less). The laboratory also contains three vacuum ovens for drying materials, small ball mills for reducing particle size, and slurring coating equipment. Equipment found in the adjacent buildings include a hammer mill and a fluid energy mill for reducing particle sizes, a 50-pound loader for processing extrudable explosives, a blender for blending, and slurry kettles for preparing plastic bonded explosives in the form of beaded molding powders (LLNL, 1989e).

Building 827E is used for environmental testing of inert devices, explosives, and explosive devices. Gases generated during testing are also sampled at this facility. Equipment used includes an environmental chamber and associated control and interlock modules, electrical resistance measurement devices, a gas-sampling oven, and a computer system (LLNL, 1989e).

Hazards Assessment

Hazards in the LLNL Site 300 Chemistry Area are generally those associated with the handling of explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, and oxidizers; initiation of burning or detonation of these materials through impact, frictional heat or sparks, heat, shock, electrical arcs, or sparks from static electricity; and exposure to toxic effects of explosives through inhalation of dusts or vapors and absorption by skin contact or ingestion.

Other hazards are the use of flammable solvents for cleaning, and use of bottled gases. These hazards are mitigated through the use of the Chemistry Job Summary for all experiments and operations with explosives and mock materials and the prior approval High Explosives Technology Form, which requires information on sensitivity, stability, compatibility, and toxicity of the explosive prior to operations involving the material. The Chemistry Job Summary also requires detailed work instructions and disposal instructions for the waste explosives.

Other safety features employed include restrictions on other operations during weighing, packaging, or transferral of explosives; use of personnel protective equipment; restricted personnel access; remote control of operations; use of personnel alarms; audible alarms and control room indicators; closed-circuit television for observation of operations; restricted disposal of process wastewater; administrative restrictions on storage, checking, and assembly of detonators; a key-locked switch for the discharge unit for firing detonators; and fire suppression and detection systems.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The wastes from the chemistry area include high explosives-contaminated process wastewater, clarifier sludge, waste high explosives, reactives, contaminated trash, and chlorinated solvents. Process wastewater passes through a clarifier-weir system before flowing to retention tanks. Water is trucked to the 806/807 clarifier where it is discharged and flows into the surface impoundment ponds located south of Building 817. The clarifier sludge and the high explosive waste are burned at the open burning facility at Building 829.

There are two waste accumulation areas located in Buildings 827E and 827D. The wastes stored in these areas include corrosives (acids and bases), solvents, oxidizers, and reactive and ignitable wastes (LLNL, 1991ag).

A.2.4.9 Building 829

The High Explosives Open Burn Facility, Building 829, is located in the south-central section of LLNL Site 300. It consists of three burn pits, a waste accumulation area, a diesel-fuel burn unit called the "Iron Horse," and a 252-sq-ft bunker that provides personnel protection and remote camera monitoring of burn operations. The complex is used to treat process wastes generated at LLNL Site 300 and from the high explosive research operations at the LLNL Livermore site (LLNL, 1989v).

The existing burn areas are located approximately 325 ft due west of the Building 829 remote personnel protection bunker. These pits were constructed by excavating soil to a depth of 3 to 5 ft. The accumulated explosives wastes are remotely ignited and allowed to burn until treatment is complete. This operation is monitored by closed circuit television with operators under cover in the Building 829 bunker.

The burn cage (Pit 1) is used for treatment of explosive-contaminated materials such as paper and cardboard. Pit 2 has been closed since 1984 (LLNL, 1989v); a discontinued practice of the treatment of liquids containing explosive compounds, water, and solvents were burned there. The open burn unit (Pit 3) is used for burning fragments of dry bulk high explosive wastes (LLNL, 1989j).

The diesel-fuel burn unit (the Iron Horse) is used to contain and treat cloth clarifier bags containing wet shavings and small fragments of high explosive compounds recovered from the high explosives machining and pressing processes. The Iron Horse is a unit approximately 3 ft wide, 5 ft high, and 5 ft long with wire mesh doors on each end. The unit is supported on four 3-ft-high metal legs and is equipped with a burner system. To ensure complete treatment of the materials, a combustion source is directed on them. The treatment is monitored on closed circuit television.

Only one burn unit is used at a time. Burns last up to 90 minutes with only one per day. In 1990, the Iron Horse was used 31 times, the open burn unit 5 times, and the burn cage 11 times. The amount of waste treated in 1990 at this facility is shown in Table A-7 (Knezovich and Daniels, 1991; LLNL, 1991ad).

Hazards Assessment

The hazard associated with the storage, handling, and transportation of high explosives wastes is the potential for detonation. The hazards associated with the treatment of high explosives wastes are high temperatures, potential for detonation, and emissions from the burning operations.

Safety and operational procedures are followed to avoid accidents. These procedures provide requirements for the packaging and receiving of high explosive wastes, burning of approved explosives, removal of spent materials from the pits, notifying the LLNL Protective Force and Fire Departments and the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District prior to operation, burning only under certain meteorological conditions, wearing of protective clothing, boots, and safety glasses, burning of waste in only one burn unit at a time, remote ignition, and monitoring of the burn by a TV camera from a fully enclosed remote location (LLNL, 1988c).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

Wastes generated from this facility include emissions (various gases and particulates) and solid fine ashes in the burn pits and the Iron Horse. The ash is placed and stored in 55-gal drums (LLNL, 1988c). In 1990, approximately 1175 lb of ash were generated.

Burning high explosives waste generates carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen, and nitrous oxides emissions. It can also generate toxic emissions such as ammonia, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen chloride, acetaldehyde, acrolein, formaldehyde, manganese, phenols, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), and benzene.

The burning of high explosive samples may also generate gases such as hydrogen, nitric oxide, cyanogen, chlorotrifluoroethylene (Bloom, 1990; Ornellas, 1980), dioxins, furans, and vinyl chloride (LLNL, 1991t). Analysis of these emissions will be included in the LLNL permit application to operate a RCRA-regulated treatment and storage facility.

A.2.4.10 Building 834 Complex

The Environmental Test Complex, Building 834, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300 and consists of 13 buildings labeled 834A through 834M. The total gross area of these buildings is 10,970 sq ft. This complex is used primarily for the thermal testing (cycling, shocking, and soaking) of test specimens which may contain explosives, radioactive or toxic materials, and mock high explosives (LLNL, 1987a).

The complex consists of eight test buildings 834E, F, G, H, I, J, L, M; three mechanical equipment buildings 834B, C, D; a storage building 834K, and a control building 834A. The test buildings, also known as the test cells, are located behind large earth berms. The control building and the mechanical equipment buildings are designed to withstand any accidental detonation of explosives from the test cells in the complex (Odell and Pfeifer, 1981b).

The principal operation associated with this test complex is the thermal testing of specimens that may contain explosives, radioactive, and/or toxic materials. During testing a component is exposed to a given temperature for a specified time. It is cycled between cold and hot temperatures for hours or days, and it is thermally shocked by introducing hot or cold air over the specimen. The test cells are also used for testing of pressure vessels at elevated or reduced temperatures.

Hazards Assessment

A variety of materials and equipment is tested in this complex. Authorized materials used include high explosives, mock high explosives, natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, and beryllium in metallic form. Trichloroethylene is used extensively in this complex as a thermal conditioning agent.

The operating limit for high explosives is 100 lb (45 kg) in cells 834E, G, H, J, and M. Test cell 834L has a one-pound (0.5 kg) limit, and cells 834M 1 and 2 have a 5-pound (2.2 kg) limit (LLNL, 1987a).

All operations in the Building 834 Complex are controlled by Operational Safety Procedures (LLNL, 1987a, 1987i). These provide that explosives and explosives-contaminated materials are permitted only in test cells. No drilling, machining, sawing, or sanding of explosives and no operation requiring blending and mixing of explosives with other materials (such as plastics, binders, adhesives, or metal dusts) is permitted.

All testing operations in the test cells are performed remotely; this includes high-pressure and mechanically shocked systems. No one is allowed in a test cell when the temperature of the explosive is above 120·F. A minimum of two containment barriers is required during transportation and during static testing of fissile materials; three are required during dynamic testing. During dynamic testing of radioactive materials a continuous air monitor with a remote alarm in the control room is required. Personnel entering test cells must wear safety shoes, glasses, and gloves, and they must wear cotton gloves when handling hot or cold test specimens. When trichloroethylene has leaked from the thermal conditioning equipment, the room must be thoroughly ventilated before work starts.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This complex is used primarily as a test facility, and there are no hazardous wastes generated or effluent. Occasionally, scrap and solid waste are left after testing is completed, and occasionally trichloroethylene leaks when bleeding lines or performing other maintenance on the thermal conditioning system. When trichloroethylene has leaked, the room is thoroughly ventilated before work commences. The quantity of solid waste generated is less than one cubic meter per year (Odell and Pfeifer, 1981b).

A.2.4.11 Building 836 Complex

The Dynamic Test Complex, Building 836, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300 and consists of four buildings, 836A through 836D, totaling an area of 13,288 sq ft. This complex is used for the dynamic (vibration) testing of specimens containing explosives, radioactive materials, and/or toxic materials. A large hydraulic shaker and an electrodynamic shaker can be programmed by a digital computer to perform sine and random vibration and transient pulses. These tests can be performed at various temperatures in a thermal chamber (LLNL, 1990e).

The Dynamic Test Complex consists of a reinforced concrete control building (836A); a steel mechanical equipment and storage building (836B); and two earth-covered, reinforced-concrete test cells often referred to as the hydraulic shaker building (836C) and the electrodynamic shaker building (836D) (Odell and Pfeifer, 1981a).

Each shaker building houses a large reaction mass needed as a counterweight and its associated hardware. This equipment is used in the testing and evaluation of various weapons systems and mechanical equipment while they are subjected to vibration and shock environments. The complex has also been used for shock and vibration testing of rocket motors, seismic qualification of turbine-generated sets, and performance analysis of the rock bolts used in mine-tunnel construction (Odell and Pfeifer, 1981a).

Hazards Assessment

A variety of materials and equipment are tested in this complex. Authorized materials include explosives, mock high explosives, metallic beryllium, natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, encased beryllium oxide, and encased lithium hydride.

The amount of explosives permitted in each test cell is limited to 200 lb (90 kg). In the thermal and dynamic tests, there is a possibility of putting sufficient energy into the test to detonate the explosives (LLNL, 1990e).

Personnel and operational safety controls are in effect (LLNL, 1987i, 1990e). Tests with a moderate to high risk of reaction are done remotely. Remote procedure is required for tests involving mechanical shock or extrusion to the explosives and when the temperature of the explosives is above 170·F. These remote operations are controlled from a central control room protected from blast and fragments. During dynamic testing, musters limit the areas that personnel can enter. Continuous air monitoring is used during the test operation.

Fissile material and explosives are not permitted within a test assembly or within a facility at the same time. Explosives or explosive-contaminated material is only permitted in test cells. No operation is permitted that generates explosives dust or powder or that requires blending or mixing of explosives with other materials such as plastic, binders, glues, adhesives, or metal dust.

When a test cell has been flushed with nitrogen during a thermal conditioning test, the oxygen concentration must return to at least 19.5 percent before personnel are allowed to reenter.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This complex is used primarily for dynamic testing of equipment containing hazardous and toxic materials, and there are no wastes generated. Occasionally scrap and solid waste is left over when testing is completed. The quantity of this solid waste is less than one cubic meter per year (Odell and Pfeifer, 1981a).

A.2.4.12 Building 850

The Hydrodynamics Diagnostics Facility, Building 850, is part of the explosive test facility operations at LLNL Site 300. This 5840-sq-ft facility is located in the northwest quadrant of the site called the West Firing Area and consists of a control room, a firing bunker, several light laboratories, service shop areas, and an office and drafting area.

This facility contains an outdoor detonation firing table with gravel-covered pads on which stands made of concrete, wood, or steel are placed. During an experiment, the explosive is placed on the test stand and then fired. The firing debris may consist of wood, plastic, wiring, and gravel. This debris is potentially contaminated with high explosives, beryllium, and depleted uranium.

Other major equipment at this facility includes a 155-mm gun used to fire projectiles of various materials. Portable x-ray equipment and other electronic and optical equipment are often used as diagnostic tools (LLNL, 1989a).

Hazards Assessment

The common hazards associated with the firing facilities are the handling and firing of explosives, high voltages, toxic and radioactive materials, high levels of ionizing radiation, firing malfunctions and misfires, grass fires, cranes and machine tools, and high pressure systems (LLNL, 1990v).

Formal operational safety procedures have been prepared for the facility as a whole; these are supplemented for the unique requirements of individual tests and reviewed by the Hazards Control Department. All explosives are handled, transported, and test fired strictly following these procedures. All work with radioactive materials and with toxic materials conforms to established health and safety guidelines. Additional restrictions are imposed during the grass fire season.

Personnel safety is enhanced by positive key-control of the various phases and aspects of the operation, including the enabling of the firing console. Personnel are excluded from areas of x-ray flux by fences, barriers, and interlocked access doors and gates. The interferometer room is also interlocked. Equipment is electrically isolated from the shot assembly. A muster is used for positive control of personnel access to the test area.

Following the shot, personnel are not allowed to enter the firing table area until specific conditions are met, including waiting for prespecified periods of time in case of malfunction or misfire. If beryllium or depleted uranium has been fired, respirators are worn until the area is wetted down. Finally, table gravel is changed if the beryllium and radioactivity levels are above the "derived working limits" (500 mg/g for beryllium, 5000 pCi/g for alpha emitters, and 10,000 pCi/g for beta or gamma radiation).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The firing table debris consists of gravel and fragments of wood, metal, and glass; larger debris consists of tent poles, wood, steel, aluminum, concrete, plastic, glass, burlap bags, cables, and other inert testing materials. These wastes may be contaminated with low levels of depleted uranium and thorium. Small amounts of lead, beryllium, copper, barium, and vanadium may also be present. In the past tritium had been a contaminant and may also occur in the future.

The firing table debris is characterized to segregate the low-level radioactive waste from chemically hazardous waste. The former is placed in containers and transported to the Building 804 waste staging area. Any nonradioactive contaminated undetonated high explosive is taken to Building 829 for open burning. All hazardous wastes are transported to Building 883.

A.2.4.13 Building 851

The Hydrodynamics Diagnostics Complex, Building 851, is part of the explosive test facility operations at LLNL Site 300. This 13,681 sq ft complex is located in the northwest quadrant of the site called the West Firing Area, and houses an electron beam linear accelerator (LINAC), several laboratories, several shop areas, and offices.

This complex consists of an outdoor detonation firing table composed of gravel-covered pads on which stands made of concrete, wood, or steel are placed. During an experiment, an explosive device is placed on the test stand and fired. The firing debris may consist of wood, plastic, wiring, and gravel. The debris is potentially contaminated with unexpended explosives, beryllium, and depleted uranium (LLNL, 1989u, 1990v).

Building 851 is equipped for the radiography of explosives devices during destruction testing. The building also contains photoprocessing operations that involve both manual and automatic film and paper developing.

Hazards Assessment

The common hazards associated with the firing facilities are the handling and firing of explosives, high voltages, toxic and radioactive materials, high levels of ionizing radiation, firing malfunctions and misfires, grass fires, lasers, cranes and machine tools, and high pressure systems (LLNL, 1990v).

The hazards associated with the photoprocessing operations are laboratory reagents, photochemicals, and chemicals in spent developers, fixers, and rinsewaters. When film is processed the developer and fixer are automatically replenished; the waste generated is captured in separate barrels.

The hazard associated with the high speed photographic equipment is use of high speed rotors. Some camera rotors are made of beryllium; if these rotors are allowed to revolve at too high of a speed, they will come apart, causing damage and scattering parts of the beryllium rotor around the cameraroom.

Following a shot, personnel are not allowed to enter the firing table area until specific conditions are met, including waiting for a prespecified period of time in case of malfunction or misfire. If beryllium or depleted uranium has been fired, respirators are worn until the area is wetted down. Finally, table gravel is changed if the beryllium and radioactivity levels are above the "derived working limits" (500 mg/g for beryllium, 5000 pCi/g for alpha emitters, and 10,000 pCi/g for beta and gamma radiation).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The firing table debris consists of gravel and fragments of wood, metal, and glass; larger debris consists of tent poles, wood, steel, aluminum, concrete, plastic, glass, burlap bags, cables, and other inert testing materials. These wastes may be contaminated with low levels of depleted uranium and thorium. Small amounts of lead, beryllium, copper, barium, and vanadium may also be present. In the past tritium had been a contaminant and may also occur in the future.

The firing table debris is characterized to segregate the low-level radioactive waste from chemically hazardous waste. The former is placed in containers and transported to the Building 804 waste staging area. Any nonradioactive contaminated undetonated high explosive is taken to Building 829 for open burning or detonation. All hazardous wastes are transported to Building 883.

The photoprocessors automatically develop and fix film, and the waste generated is captured in separate barrels. This hazardous waste is taken from the barrels to the containers at the waste accumulation area outside of the building. These containers are inspected weekly and properly labeled. These wastes in containers are temporarily stored (less than 90 days) in this area and shipped by Hazardous Waste Management to the LLNL Livermore site (LLNL, 1990g).

A.2.4.14 Building 854

The Dynamic Test Complex, Building 854, is located within the confines of the West Firing Area in the southwest quadrant of LLNL Site 300. This 17,500 sq ft complex consists of ten buildings, 854 A through H, 854 J, and 854 V, designed for the vibration and shock testing of assemblies containing hazardous materials at various temperatures (LLNL, 1989c).

Building 854H houses a vibration shaker; Buildings 854C, F, and J house different size HYGES shock-test apparatus (18-inch, 6-inch, and 24-inch); and building 854 E houses an Impact Tester.

Hazards Assessment

A variety of material and equipment is tested in this complex. Authorized materials include explosives, natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, and beryllium in metallic form. Other materials that require a special operational safety procedure include fissile materials or other radioactive materials (LLNL, 1989c).

The explosives tested in this complex have associated maximum limits. Buildings 854 C,E, and F have a weight limit of 80 lb; Building 854 H has a weight limit of 100 lb; and Buildings 854 J and V each have a weight limit of 200 lb.

Personnel and operational safety controls are described as follows (LLNL, 1989c):

Remote test operations are required for explosives that are at a temperature in excess of 170·F, and for tests involving mechanical shock or vibration to the explosives.
When explosives are present, the personnel limit is five persons.
Tests which contain explosives are performed under the local muster control.
When testing is in progress all personnel are required to take cover in Building 854 A or the H-cell.
Buildings 854E and F have a five pound limit for testing explosives.
The vibration shaker cell, Building 854H, is locked and controlled remotely during testing of explosives. If fissile materials are being tested, the high efficiency filter system is turned on and the air conditioning system is turned off prior to testing.
In the HYGES buildings, 854 C, F, and J, the pressure-filled cylinders and lines are operated according to high pressure safety procedures. High pressure nitrogen is used for the brake, cushion, and set chambers. Only oil free high pressure air and high pressure nitrogen is used in the fire chamber.
Pressure in all of the HYGE chambers is reduced to 0 psig before work is allowed on any part of the system. When entering the chamber the safety interlock panel is locked and all instrumentation leads in contact with explosives are disconnected.
Remote operations are monitored by a camera system.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This complex is used primarily as a test facility; therefore, no wastes or effluents are generated.

A.2.4.15 Building 857

The Materials Management Storage Facility, Building 857, is located in the southwest quadrant of the LLNL Site 300 West Firing Area. This 486-sq-ft facility is used to store historical samples of soil (LLNL, 1991q) and houses long-term operational test units containing explosives at controlled elevated temperatures (LLNL, 1984b).

Hazards Assessment

Historic samples contain radioactive materials that may present hazards if they are inhaled or ingested. These samples are packaged in sealed containers and stored in a dry, locked building area containing no other hazardous material, and access to this area is restricted. The samples are not allowed to be opened (LLNL, 1991q).

Personnel and operational safety controls are described below (LLNL, 1984b, 1991q, 1987i):

The building remains closed at all times and access is controlled by the LLNL Site 300 Controlled Materials Group.
No person is exposed to the 122·F temperature environment for longer than thirty minutes.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

This facility is used for the long term storage of historical sample materials, and there are no generated wastes or effluent.

A.2.4.16 Building 865

The Building 865 Complex, located in the northwest quadrant of LLNL Site 300, houses the advanced test accelerator. This 64,731-sq-ft complex includes seven buildings which contain shop areas, office areas, and computer areas. The advanced test accelerator is a large linear induction accelerator designed to produce a repetitively pulsed electron beam for charged particle beam research.

The advanced test accelerator consists of power conditioning and utility equipment on an upper level and the injector and accelerator system and its experimental areas on the lower (tunnel) level. Utility systems include water, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, oil, vacuum, and high pressure flowing gas systems (LLNL, 1989d).

Hazards Assessment

This facility does not use high explosives or radioactive materials; however, the pulsed electron beam can cause certain materials in the accelerator tunnel to become activated. Other hazards are associated with potential gas system rupture, high voltage power supplies, lasers, generation and release of toxic and radioactive gas, potentially uncontrolled fires, high noise levels, material handling equipment such as cranes, machine shop tools, liquid benzene, and commonly used solvents and chemicals (LLNL, 1989d).

Hazards are mitigated with personnel training; warning lights, horns, alarms, and signs; personnel protective equipment including alarming dosimeters; voice announcements; shielded penetrations; administrative limits governing radiation exposure; physical interlocks to prevent accelerator operation or cause shutdown; high efficiency particulate air filters; oxygen deficiency sensors; negative air pressure within the accelerator tunnel; fire detection and suppression systems including smoke alarms, water-line flow sensors, heat activated sprinklers, halon and standard fire extinguishers, and LLNL Site 300 Fire Department; radiation monitors; and operational safety features which define safety policies and operating regulations and which establish responsibilities and safety controls (LLNL, 1989d).

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The operations in Building 865 produce wastewaters from washdown of floors, oils, and freon. The amount of wastewaters produced can be as high as 2000 gal per month and is shipped to the LLNL Livermore site for treatment and eventual release to the sewer system, provided sewer discharge limits are met. The oil and freon wastes are sent to the Building 612 area at the LLNL Livermore site and are disposed of by a commercial contractor. The amount of waste oils is approximately 100 gal per month.

A.2.4.17 Building 883

The waste and product storage facility, Building 883, is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL Site 300. This permitted facility, which consists of a fenced, covered area measuring 1733 sq ft and is surrounded by a concrete berm, is used to store hazardous wastes generated from several facilities within LLNL Site 300. Generators identify and package waste, then transfer it to Building 883, where it is stored prior to shipment to the LLNL Livermore site or offsite for disposal.

Normal operations in the waste storage area include (LLNL, 1988h):

Receiving, classifying, and separating liquid and solid wastes into storage and process groups.
Consolidating small containerized wastes into shipping containers, and packaging them for shipment offsite.

Hazards Assessment

The hazards at this facility are personnel exposures to hazardous materials. The wastes are segregated into the following categories: aqueous wastes, flammable liquids, acids, caustics, oxidizers, flammable solids, other toxic materials, and PCB-contaminated materials. Stored wastes include ash from burning high explosives wastes, analytical chemicals, waste nitric and chromic acids, solvents, oils, paints, thinners, photographic chemicals, machine coolants, hardeners, adhesives, and coatings. There are no radioactive wastes stored in this facility.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

Building 883 is strictly a storage facility, and no wastes or effluents are generated.

A.2.4.18 Explosives Storage Magazines

All explosives at LLNL Site 300 are stored in vaults or bunkers called magazines. There are about 55 magazines located throughout the site, with floor areas typically ranging from 50 to 500 sq ft.

A magazine is defined as an approved structure specifically designed for the storage of explosives, excluding operating buildings. A storage magazine is used for the long-term storage of bulk explosives and assemblies. A service or ready magazine is used for short-term (maximum of 180 days) storage of explosives and assemblies currently being used in an operation. A magazette is a small magazine (not large enough for an entry) used to store explosives that require separate storage (LLNL, 1989q).

In addition to these storage magazines, a laboratory or building may contain a storage vault, which is typically a locked room or cabinet for short term storage of explosives that are currently being used in the operations.

Hazards Assessment

The storage of explosives is not a high risk operation. Proper packaging, explosives deterioration, and chemical compatibility are the major areas of safety concern. Packaging is controlled by periodic inspection of the magazines; compatibility problems are controlled by assignment of explosives into storage compatibility groups; and the storage review program is designed to control the use of explosives that have deteriorated.

Each magazine has an associated weight limit, and the weight limit signs are posted near the entrance to the magazine. An inventory record is kept for each storage magazine and reflects the actual weight stored in the magazine. All magazines are inventoried annually to verify that the weight of their contents is equal to or less than the posted weight limits (LLNL, 1989q).

The safety and operational controls are described below (LLNL, 1989q):

Explosives are the only materials stored in the magazines.
Propellants containing nitrocellulose vary widely with respect to stability, and the decomposition of some have led to incidents of spontaneous ignition. There is a special surveillance system program for these propellants. One sample from each lot or batch is designated as a control item and is inspected annually. Deteriorated propellants are sent to disposal.
Explosives devices such as actuators, detonators, squibs, and ammunition are never retained beyond the manufacturer's recommended shelf life.
No smoking is permitted in the magazine area out to a distance of 50 ft (15 m).
Most magazines are vented. Some magazines may require air conditioning or special ventilation systems because of the toxic nature of the explosives they contain.
Empty explosives containers are removed from the magazines. Packaging materials such as wood and paper are handled as explosives-contaminated waste and are removed from the magazine.
The magazine areas are equipped with emergency telephones. There are posted personnel limits for each magazine area and only qualified personnel are allowed.

Generated Wastes and Effluents

The magazines are used primarily for storage of explosives and explosives assemblies; no wastes are generated in them.

A.2.4.19 High Explosives Rinsewater Surface Impoundment Ponds

The non-hazardous rinsewaters from the high explosives machining, pressing, and formulation processes are diverted to the double-lined surface impoundment ponds located south of the Building 817 Complex. These waters contain very small amounts of high explosives, less than 10 parts per million (Woodward-Clyde, 1984), and are disposed of by surface evaporation in the ponds. The upper pond is 6-ft deep while the lower pond is 5-ft deep, and collectively they provide approximately 42,000 sq ft of surface area for evaporation.

Previously these rinsewaters were discharged to nine unlined lagoons for disposal by evaporation and filtration (LLNL, 1988b). These unlined lagoons were closed starting in 1985, and the rinsewater streams from the several buildings were diverted to the new surface impoundment system.

The estimated discharge of the rinsewaters from several buildings is 100,000 gal per month, and is produced at fluctuating flow rates (Woodward-Clyde,1984). Approximately 80 percent of the wastewater is generated from Buildings 806 and 807. A small wastewater stream is generated from Building 809. There are several minor wastewater streams generated from buildings that are relatively remote from the impoundment pond site. These wastewaters are stored in tanks located at Buildings 827-C, 827-E, 825, 826, and 828, and are periodically transported by tank trucks to the clarifier site west of Building 806 (LLNL,1989s).

All high explosives-contaminated wastewaters from the 805, 806 and 807 machining areas are discharged through the clarifier site, also known as the clarifier/weir system, located west of Building 806. These wastewaters pass through a conical clarifier and into a common concrete sedimentation tank, which in turn discharges to a series of three weirs. The wastewaters from the three weirs are discharged through a three inch diameter poly-vinyl chloride pipeline, approximately 2000 ft in length, to the two surface impoundment ponds located south of Building 817.

The two wastewater impoundment ponds are designed for zero discharge to the ground. The ponds are double-lined with a 24-inch compacted clay liner and a 60 mil High Density Polyethylene membrane liner. Between the two liners are 12 inches of permeable sand through which runs a system of 2-inch diameter perforated polyvinyl chloride pipes (known as the leachate collection pipes). This leachate collection system is used to verify that leaks are not occurring. The leachate collection system for the upper pond discharges to the lower secondary pond. The leachate collection system from the lower pond discharges directly to a drum contained within a concrete tank. This tertiary system provides a final check that no discharge is occurring from the ponds (Woodward-Clyde, 1984). Lysimeters have been installed beneath the entire pond system and monitoring wells are installed both upgradient and downgradient to monitor any potential ground water contamination.

The nine high explosive rinsewater lagoons that have been closed are 806/807, 807A, 807B, 817, 825 and 826, 827 C/D, 827E, and 828. These lagoons were closed in accordance with the closure plan approved by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board; they were filled with compacted backfill and clay soil. The compacted soil cap is a minimum of two feet thick and extends beyond the edges of all lagoons. This will ensure immobility of the high explosive compounds in the unsaturated zone beneath the lagoons (Ragaini, 1989). The clay caps are further covered with a minimum 18 inches of compacted topsoil seeded with local grass. The 825 lagoon is covered with a concrete slab and a holding tank, which are needed to continue the operations at Building 825.

A.2.4.20 Security, Medical, and Emergency Response Facilities and Services

The security facilities, Buildings 870, 877, and 882, are located in the southeastern section of LLNL Site 300. Building 870 is 3801 sq ft in area and houses both the protective services division and the fire department. Building 882 is 4937 sq ft and houses the protective services division communication center. Building 877, the security/medical facility, is a 3352-sq-ft facility which serves as the medical center for the site.

The LLNL emergency response capabilities for the LLNL Livermore site and LLNL Site 300 are described in Appendix J.

A.2.5 Program Projections, LLNL Site 300

This section describes the projects and program projections under the proposed action for the LLNL Site 300. Projects required to maintain the existing infrastructure (such as building maintenance, minor modification to buildings, general landscaping, road maintenance, and similar support activities) under the no action alternative are also described here. These projects are described in sections A.2.5.1, A.2.5.2, and A.2.5.3, respectively. The projects include new facilities and upgrades, operational, and maintenance projects. These projects are summarized in Table A-8 (New Facilities) and Table A-9 (Upgrades, Operational and Maintenance Projects). Figure A-12 shows the locations of these projects.

A.2.5.1 Funded Construction Projects, LLNL Site 300

The fiscal year (FY) next to the project name is defined as the year funding starts or started for project design. It is reasonable to expect that these projects would be funded in the fiscal year cited for each project.

LLNL Site 300 Facilities Revitalization–Phase I, Fiscal Year 1990

Projects in the LLNL Site 300 revitalization program will provide new facilities and equipment, along with an upgrade of existing facilities, to meet the needs of the growing scope and complexity of nuclear weapons research and development testing. This project will enable LLNL Site 300 to pursue weapons research and development at the current test program level and to respond effectively to an expanded test program when necessary (LLNL, 1982, 1989b, 1985, 1990b, 1990c, 1987h).

The six major components of the revitalization are defined as follows:

Diagnostic Equipment. Special diagnostic equipment will be purchased and made available for use at LLNL Site 300. This equipment includes items such as Fabry-Perot multibeam velocimeter, the Flash X-ray upgrade, Gamma Ray camera, imaging converter camera/laser illumination, computer control systems, beam size monitor, and diagnostic upgrades to Bunkers 801 and 851. The diagnostic equipment will be housed in Bunkers 801 and 851.
High Speed Optics Facility (Bunker 850). The interior of Bunker 850 will be remodeled to provide space for the maintenance, tuning, and modification of the high-speed optical diagnostic equipment and control system used for the recording test data in the firing bunkers.
Bunker Support Facility. This facility will be constructed as an addition to Building 802 and will provide necessary short-term storage space at a location convenient to both East and West Firing Areas.
Central Control Post Building 892 will combine the functions of two separate control facilities into a single facility capable of controlling access to both firing areas simultaneously. This consolidation will provide for a more efficient system of "muster" control on the site.
Roads Improvements project will reconstruct portions of several of the site's roads which have been damaged or were not designed for their present use.
Primary Water Supply will be from the City and County of San Francisco's Hetch Hetchy water supply system. Connection to the Hetch Hetchy Coast Range Tunnel will be made at the Thomas Shaft. Additional onsite water system improvements have also been included.

A.2.5.2 Budgeted Construction Projects, LLNL Site 300

LLNL Site 300 Tritium Use, Fiscal Year 1993

At LLNL Site 300, tritium use would resume at the firing tables with an administrative limit of 20 mg.

A.2.5.3 Proposed Construction Projects, LLNL Site 300

The following construction projects are proposed but not yet funded. It is reasonable to expect that these projects would be funded in the fiscal year cited for each project.

Contained Firing Facility, Fiscal Year 1994

This project is a facility consisting of three related structures for increasingly safe and environmentally compliant firing of explosive charges up to a 60 kg (the equivalent of 206 lb of TNT) limit of energetic high explosives. The three structures are a Firing Chamber, a support facility, and a diagnostic equipment facility. This project will be an addition to the existing Building 801 firing bunker (LLNL, 1990a, 1990bb).

The firing chamber will contain the effects of cased high explosive materials used in various laboratory experiments. The chamber will be steel-lined for shrapnel protection, and will have a variety of diagnostic and observation port penetrations for various tests. All major structural elements are to remain elastic to permit a large number of repetitive firings.

The support facility will provide a staging area for experiment preparation, storage area of equipment and materials used, and personnel areas for locker, toilets, and decontamination showers.

The diagnostic equipment facility is similar to the support facility and has nonbearing, tilt-up reinforced concrete panel walls supported structurally by a rigid steel frame system. It will contain all of the unique instrumentation and devices needed for monitoring, recording and performing the required experiments.

Flash X-Ray Upgrade II, Fiscal Year 1994

This is a construction project for a new Flash X-Ray accelerator providing increased flux on objects of study, and providing a multiple pulsing capability. The project requires a significant design effort to achieve the multiple pulsing, and includes both the construction of an accelerator and of a structure to house the accelerator. The structure would be used in conjunction with a containment structure, and would not be hardened to withstand the HE blast (LLNL, 1991e).

Fire Station No. 2 Replacement, Fiscal Year 1994

The proposed new fire station would serve LLNL Site 300 and replace the existing station which is over 30 years old. The new fire station would provide approximately 5500 sq ft of space, consisting of three apparatus bays with 14-foot high roll-up doors for an ambulance, pumper, and patrol vehicle, living quarters for five fire fighters, a day room, office, and a decontamination equipment area (LLNL, 1991e).

Cheap Access to Orbit Experiment, Fiscal Year (not available at this time)

The development of a two-stage gas gun that would propel projectiles into orbit has been proposed by LLNL. The experiment, known as Cheap Access to Orbit, has been scheduled for the LLNL Site 300 High Explosives Test Facility. As a potentially cost effective and practical method of placing metric-ton payloads into earth orbits, the gun would propel projectiles of lightweight nonexplosive alloys and polymer (aluminum, polymer and resin) weighing as much as 10 kg at velocities up to 7 km/s using methane and hydrogen as a propellant (LLNL, 1991d).

The Cheap Access to Orbit Gun would fire projectiles horizontally into an earthen berm that would be shielded with concrete. The projectile would be propelled approximately 50 ft before impacting the berm. Gun detonation will be initiated by an electric spark in the combustion chamber containing the methane air mixture. The experiment is to be fired on an average of once a week, with a total of approximately 50 firings each year. After the three-year course of the experiment is completed, the Cheap Access to Orbit system would be dismantled.

Because of the techniques proposed for operating this experiment, its impacts on the environment have been studied, including those impacts to flora and fauna. The system's location is proposed for LLNL Site 300 in an area not within flood plains or wetlands. In addition, effects related to routine operation of the Cheap Access to Orbit system that have also been studied include noise, air emissions, hazardous waste generation, and ground motion.

Explosives Waste Storage Facility, Fiscal Year (not available at this time)

The Explosives Waste Storage Facility (EWSF) Project consists of the rearrangement of four existing high explosives storage units (Magazines M1 through M4) to allow them to be used for the storage of explosives wastes. A new prefabricated metal building, to be located in a previously paved area, would be used for storing explosives contaminated solid wastes (including packing material, discarded paper and plastic labware) and ash from thermal treatment processes. Each of the four earth-covered magazines is capable of storing up to 10,000 lb of a single type of explosives or a maximum of 1000 lb of a mixture for several types of explosives (LLNL, 1992a).

Explosives Waste Treatment Facility, Fiscal Year (not available at this time)

The Explosives Waste Treatment Facility (EWTF) Project would construct an open detonation table and open burn units for the treatment of explosives wastes, which would replace the high explosive waste burning operations at the High Explosives Disposal Facility, Building 829. One burn unit would be a propane-fueled burn cage for treatment of clarifier filter bags filled with sludge containing explosive waste fines, small pieces of explosives, and reactive contaminated trash; and the other unit would be a burn pan with removable cover for burning waste explosives in the form of bulk pieces and powders (LLNL, 1992a).

Future plans include a project to construct three new explosive waste storage magazines and a prefabricated metal waste storage building in an area adjacent to the new Explosives Waste Treatment Facility. These earth-covered magazines would be designed exclusively for the storage of explosives waste. Each magazine would be capable of storing up to 10,000 lb of a single type of explosives or a maximum of 1000 lb of a mixture of several types of explosives. Once completed, these units would be used for all explosives waste storage in place of those described in the Explosives Waste Storage Facility Project (LLNL, 1992a).

Quantities of high explosives wastes to be burned at this new facility are expected to be equal to or less than the amounts currently treated in the High Explosives Disposal Facility, Building 829.

The annual quantities expected to be burned include 4000 lb of high explosives dry solid wastes (consisting of high explosives–contaminated solid materials and packaging, high explosives powders, and small pieces of high explosives) and 1000 lb of high explosives clarifier waste sludge (LLNL, 1991aa).

It is anticipated that lower quantities of wastes would be generated in the future as LLNL's waste minimization program continues to lead to reduction of the types and amounts of high explosives waste generated. Recycling, material substitution, and waste avoidance are key components of this program.

Alternatives to the construction of this new facility were considered but rejected by LLNL. Those alternatives, and the reasons for their rejection, including:

Continuation of only open burning (without open detonation) at a new facility in the Building 845 area. Although this alternative is feasible, the addition of an open detonation capability to that of open burning would result in a more efficient thermal treatment system because the higher temperatures and pressures of detonation lead to extremely efficient generation of completely oxidized molecular combustion products such as C02 and H20 (Ornellas, 1980). Also, open detonation would provide a safer method of treating larger pieces of bulk explosives. Large pieces of bulk explosives must be cut into smaller pieces prior to burning (to avoid accidental detonation) but can be safely detonated in one piece.
Termination of current open burning operations and shipment of high explosives waste offsite for treatment. Currently, and for the foreseeable future, no Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)–permitted offsite facilities are available. Even if such an offsite treatment facility were available, not all wastes might be acceptable because of permit limitations, the experimental nature of the explosives, formulations of explosives, and security constraints on disposing of some types of wastes.
Application of alternative treatment technologies. Research is currently underway at LLNL to develop a biological treatment system, a chemical deactivation process, and solar-assisted decomposition for the treatment of high explosives waste (Knezovich and Daniels, 1991). Other Department of Defense and Department of Energy facilities and contractor programs are also researching alternative treatment technologies. None of these technologies is expected to provide a viable alternative treatment method in the next 5-10 years.
Continuation of open burning at facilities at Building 829. Due to RCRA permit constraints, operation of this facility beyond November 1992 is not feasible.

Therefore, at this time there are no alternatives to open burning and open detonation at LLNL Site 300.

Cooling Tower Modifications, Fiscal Year (not available at this time)

In this project the cooling tower water discharges would be eliminated from discharging to surface waters. The methods applied would include discharges to existing leachfields, discharging to expanded leachfields, discharges to new leachfields, discharges to gravel pit, discharge by spray irrigation, and discharge through evaporation.

Several cooling towers already discharge to existing septic/leachfield systems. All other cooling towers would require modifications. The three towers, located at Buildings 801, 836A, and 865, would not require modifications due to the expected 75 percent reduction in discharges when Hetch Hetchy water comes on line, sometime in 1993.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)