5.6 BOUNDING ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
NEPA requires the inclusion of hypothetical accident scenarios in the EIS/EIR discussion. An accident is considered bounding if no reasonably foreseeable accident can be found with greater consequences. An accident is reasonably foreseeable if the analysis of occurrence is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason (40 C.F.R. 1502.22(b)(4)). Consequence criteria are discussed in detail below.
Many research activities at LLNL and SNL, Livermore require the use of radioactive materials, hazardous chemicals, and high explosives, all of which have the potential, under certain circumstances, to be involved in an accident. These materials are received at the sites, transferred onsite, and often shipped offsite. Activities using these materials onsite involve specialized facilities with appropriate safety equipment and procedures to reduce the possibility or the severity of accidents.
A number of specific accident scenarios within an accident category were developed and analyzed to formulate the potential consequences that set the upper limit for all similar accidents at both LLNL and SNL, Livermore. An example of an accident category is Transportation Accidents Involving Radioactive Materials. Accident scenarios were developed for specific facilities or operations to estimate the consequences of releases of radioactive materials, releases of hazardous chemicals, and detonation of high explosives. Additionally, transportation accident scenarios involving radioactive materials, hazardous chemicals, and high explosives were also considered. The analysis also postulated a multiple-building accident initiated by a severe earthquake. The various accident scenarios developed are summarized in Table 5.6-1. The methods used in the analysis and descriptions of each accident scenario are discussed in detail in Appendix D.
| CEDE | = | Committed Effective Dose Equivalent |
| U-AVLIS | = | Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation |
| Ci | = | Curie |
| HTO | = | Tritium oxide |
| HEPA | = | High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter |
| Am241 | = | Americium-241 |
| TRU | = | Transuranic materials |
| LSA | = | Low-specific-activity |
| TRUPACT-11 | = | Container designed to transport TRU waste |
| RADTRAN | = | Computer code to analyze transportation of radioactive material |
| ERPG-3 | = | Emergency Response Planning Guidelines level-3 |
| ICF | = | Inertial Confinement Fusion |
| AIRDOS | = | Computer code to analyze airborne radioactive contamination |
| IDLH | = | Immediately-Dangerous-to-Life-or-Health |
| HE | = | High explosive |
| NH3 | = | Ammonia gas |
| HCl | = | Hydrogen chloride gas |
| Octol | = | A form of high explosive |
| Cl2 | = | Chlorine gas |
| H2O4 | = | Sulfuric acid |
| LX-10 | = | A form of high explosive |
In performing the accident analysis, specific source terms were determined for accidents involving radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals. Onsite and offsite exposures were calculated as appropriate, and health effects or risks were predicted using risk estimators recommended by the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) (Table 5.6-2).
For chemical exposures, predicted concentrations were compared to human toxicity data. The analysis used conservative assumptions to prevent underestimating possible releases and their consequences. For example, the calculations do not account for the extensive safety training, procedures, and administrative controls implemented at LLNL and SNL, Livermore, or any existing mitigating design features. Additionally, the analysis did not account for any mitigating measures likely to be taken in response to a serious accident, such as emergency response activities that would normally provide an effective safety factor.
Land in the path of the plumes resulting from accidents would be evaluated for contamination. It is anticipated that residential, commercial, and industrial uses could continue without unacceptable exposures. This is because the majority of the predicted exposures are from inhalation during plume passage immediately after the event and not from activities that cause particles to be resuspended. Agricultural land use could be curtailed until it was demonstrated that agricultural products would meet FDA standards (FDA, 1982) because of biological transfer. No long-term restrictions on land use would be anticipated after remediation or damage repair is completed (if required).
Table 5.6-1 Chemical, High Explosive, and Radiological Accident Scenario Summary
| Building | Name | Scenario Description | Source Term | Assumptions | Results |
| 332a | Plutonium Facility | Inadvertent plutonium criticality | 1018 fissions results in 7913 Ci of noble gases and iodines | Building ventilation operable (2 HEPA filters in series); ground-level release | Exposure: 400 rem CEDE out to 15 m; 37
rem CEDE onsite (100 m); 2.0 rem CEDE at southern site boundary (400 m); 0.38
rem CEDE at western site boundary (900 m); 440 person-rem to the general public Effects: Fatalities likely in the affected laboratory; 1 in 40 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 700 chance of an individual at the southern site boundary, and 1 in 5×106 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 968b | Tritium Research Lab | Tritium release during earthquake | 50 g (500,000 Ci) tritium gas | 1 percent of total release is converted to HTO (re-emission) | Exposure: 4.2 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
0.37 rem CEDE at site eastern site boundary (400 m); 0.92 rem CEDE at western
site boundary (850 m); 4220 person-rem to the general public
Effects: 1 in 300 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 4000 chance of an individual at the eastern site boundary, and 1 in 5×105 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 332 | Plutonium Facility | Release of plutonium into laboratory | 2.1×10-4 Ci of fuel grade plutonium mixture | Building ventilation operable (2 HEPA filters in series); ground-level release | Exposure: 0.078 rem CEDE onsite (100m);
6.6×10-3 rem CEDE at southern site boundary (400m); 1.6×10-3
rem CEDE at western site boundary (900m); 10 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 20,000 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 2×105 chance of an individual at the southern site boundary, and 1 in 2×108 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 331b | Hydrogen Research Facility | Tritium release during earthquake | 3.5 g (35,000 Ci) tritium gas | 1 percent of total release is converted to HTO (re-emission) | Exposure: 0.28 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
2.6×10-2 rem CEDE at southern site boundary (400 m); 0.060 rem
CEDE at western site boundary (900 m); 290 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 5000 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 50,000 chance of an individual at the southern site boundary, and 1 in 6×106 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 251b | Diagnostic Chemistry | Am241 release during earthquake | 7.5×10-4 Ci Am241 | All 5 curies at risk are Am241; unhardened building shell fails completely; ground-level release | Exposure: 3.1 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
0.14 rem CEDE at the western site boundary (600 m); 430 person-rem to the
general public
Effects: 1 in 400 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 10,000 chance of an individual at the western site boundary, and 1 in 5×106 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 612 Area | Waste Storage | TRU fire after spill | 3.0×10-3 Ci Am241 | TRU container at maximum limit of 6 Ci Am241; 10-meter-high homogeneous release | Exposure: 3.7 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
2.0 rem CEDE at southern site boundary (200 m); 0.12 rem CEDE at western site
boundary (1.6 km); 1670 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 400 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 700 chance of an individual at the southern site boundary, and 1 in 106 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 493 | Separation Support Facility for U-AVLIS | Uranium fire | 5 kg of natural uranium (3.5×10-3 Ci) | 0.1 percent of 5000 kg released during fire; 30-meter-high homogeneous release | Exposure: 0.41 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
0.15 rem CEDE at northern site boundary (300 m); 3.9×10-2 rem
CEDE at western site boundary (1300 m); 560 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 3000 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 9000 chance of an individual at the northern site boundary, and 1 in 3×106 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 625b | Waste Storage and Shipping | Multiple-building earthquake | 7.2×10-3 Ci Am241 | 8 drums each containing 6 Ci Am241; all crushed by falling crane; ground-level release | Exposure: 30 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
4.2 rem CEDE at eastern site boundary (300 m); 0.27 rem CEDE at western site
boundary (1600 m); 4030 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 50 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 300 chance of an individual at the eastern site boundary, and 1 in 5×105 of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| Offsite | Transportation of LSA Waste, Scenario 1 (mixed nuclides) | Truck accident carrying a Low Specific Activity (LSA) waste shipment offsite, involved in a category 6 (NRC, 1977) class accident with at least a 30-minute fire | 1.4×10-2 Ci Pu239 3.4×10-1 Ci U238 3000 Ci H3 8.0×10-3 Ci Am241 6.0×10-3 Ci TB32 2.0×10-1 Ci U235 1.0×10-1 Ci U233 40 Ci P32 |
Category 6 (NRC, 1977) or above accident, H3 as HTO and other nuclides; 10-meter-high homogeneous release (Fire) | Exposure: 109 person-rem Effects: 1 in 106 chance of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| Offsite | Transportation of LSA waste, Scenario 2 (tritium oxide) | Truck accident carrying a Low Specific Activity (LSA) waste shipment offsite, involved in a category 6 (NRC, 1977) class accident with at least a 30-minute fire | 30,000 Ci H3 (HTO) | Category 6 (NRC, 1977) or above accident, H3 as HTO; 10-meter-high homogeneous release (fire) | Exposure: 843 person-rem Effects: 1 in 2×106chance of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| Offsite | Transportation of TRU | Truck accident carrying three fully loaded TRUPACT-II containers offsite, involved in a category 8 (NRC, 1977) class accident with at least a 2-hour fire | 1100 plutonium equivalent curies | Category 8 (NRC, 1977) accident, three fully loaded TRUPACT-II containers, population density of 10,000 persons per square mile | Exposure: RADTRAN 4.93×104
person-rem AIRDOS 3.52×104 person-rem Effects: 1 in 3×104 chance of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 298b | Fusion Target Fabrication Facility | Tritium release during earthquake | 5 g (50,000 Ci) tritium gas | 1 percent of total release is converted to HTO (re-emission) | Exposure: 0.40 rem CEDE onsite (100 m);
0.20 rem CEDE at northern site boundary (150 m); 0.11 rem CEDE at western site
boundary (750 m); 420 person-rem to the general public Effects: 1 in 3000 chance of an individual onsite, 1 in 7000 chance of an individual at the northern site boundary, and 1 in 5×106 chance of a member of the general public incurring a health effectc |
| 514 Area | Waste Treatment | Sulfuric acid spill | 21 g H2O4 as mist | Released over 45 minutes at maximum possible rate | Exposure: 2.4 mg/m3 at
southern site boundary (90 m) [NOTE: ERPG-3 is 30 mg/m3]
Effects: Serious injury to operators, mild transient effects offsite |
| 518 | Gas Cylinder Dock | One 100 lb chlorine container release | 100 lb Cl2 gas | Inventory since 1989 representative of future gas usage | Exposure: 14,000 mg/m3 at
southern site boundary (10 m) [NOTE: ERPG-3 is 60 mg/m3]
Effects: Lethal concentrations are likely near point of release and potential for death or serious health effects across southern site boundary to 750 m from point of release |
| Tracy Municipal Airporta | Transportation of HE by Air | Aircraft crashes | 2200 lb LX-10 and 300 lb of aircraft fuel | Aircraft fuel fire detonates LX-10 | Exposure: 200 psi overpressure out to 31
ft; 1 psi overpressure out to 490 ft Effects: Crew is killed; unshielded personnel would be killed out to 31 ft; property is damaged out to 490 ft |
| Site 300 | Firing Table | Bounding explosion during HE test | 1000 lb Octol | Delayed or inadvertent ignition occurs while personnel are unshielded | Exposure: 200 psi overpressure out to 24
ft; 1 psi overpressure out to 370 ft
Effects: Unshielded personnel would be killed or seriously injured; no offsite impact |
| Interstate 580 | Transportation of HE by truck | Truck accident | 22 lb of LX-10 | Fuel fire detonates LX-10 | Exposure: 200 psi overpressure out to 6
ft; 1 psi overpressure out to 15 ft
Effects: Unshielded personnel would be killed out to 6 ft |
| 131b | Engineering Building | Multiple-building earthquake | 150 lb NH3 gas | One 120 lb container plus 30 lb | Exposure: 580 mg/m3 at
western site boundary (335 m) [NOTE: ERPG-3 is 710 mg/m3]
Effects: Serious health effects onsite out to 600 m beyond western site boundary |
| 151b | Nuclear Chemistry | Multiple-building earthquake | 5 lb HCl gas | Inventory since 1989 representative of future gas usage | Exposure: 52 mg/m3 at
western site boundary (550 m) [NOTE: ERPG-3 is 152 mg/m3] Effects: Mild transient health effects out to 600 m beyond western site boundary |
| 166 | ICF Facility | Handling accident | 2 lbs arsine gas | Operator drops cylinder during installation | Exposure: 0.14 mg/m3 at 27 m
from point of release [NOTE: OSHA PEL is 0.2 mg/m3] Effects: Workers exposed; no offsite impact |
| 322b | Plating Shop | Multiple-building earthquake | 10.3 kg hydrogen cyanide | Contents of plating tanks mix over 45 minutes | Exposure: 125 mg/m3 at
western site boundary (275 m) [NOTE: IDLH is 54 mg/m3]
Effects: Potential for serious health effects (including death) near the point of release; slight symptoms out to 600 m beyond western site boundary |
a Bounding event
b Multiple-building event
c Includes fatal cancers, and severe genetic effects occurring at an estimated rate of 7.3×10-4
effects per rem (ICRP, 1991).
Table 5.6-2 Risk Estimators for Health Effects from Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
| Effect | Risk Factor* (probability per rem per 70 years) |
| Fatal cancer | 5.0×10-4 |
| Fatal, nonfatal, and severe genetic effects | 7.3×10-4 |
* Source: ICRP, 1991.
5.6.1 RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Selection Process
The selection process for radiological scenarios divided the hypothetical accidents into those associated with a specific location and those associated with transportation, and then applied a multistep screening process to determine bounding events.
For accidents associated with specific locations, the screening process reviewed the building hazard classifications, the inventories, and the physical properties of radionuclides such as type, quantity, physical form, and storage conditions. Nine scenarios at eight locations were identified in this process and are listed in Table 5.6-1 and described in full in Appendix D. The bounding accident is the Inadvertent Criticality at Building 332.
Radiological transportation scenarios were divided into two categories: materials and waste. The accident scenario for waste shipments bounds accidents for material shipments. Two accidents were identified involving waste shipment. Two low-specific-activity shipments were modeled and are listed in Table 5.6-1 and presented in Appendix D. Additionally, an accident involving the shipment of transuranic waste was identified. This accident was analyzed in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and summarized in Appendix D.
Additionally, DOE and the Laboratories' staffs reviewed the accident scenarios to identify new scenarios for inclusion and to verify the accuracy of the selection process.
Exposure Limits and Protective Action Thresholds
The radiation exposure limit for workers is set by DOE Order 5480.11 at 5 rem per year. Exposures are, however, required to be kept As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). The similar limit for the general public is set at a factor of 10 lower because the public is a diverse group including children and the elderly, as well as healthy men and women in their young and middle years. These limits are readily met by controlling the operations involving potential radiation exposure so that workers and the public are protected.
In the case of accidents, however, regulations allow emergency workers to receive higher doses for short periods of time. This exception allows these workers to take necessary actions to rescue injured persons and to protect the surrounding population. Even so, precautions are taken to minimize exposures to emergency workers. The general limit for emergency team workers is 25 rem whole body or 75 rem to the thyroid. In cases where a lifesaving mission must be undertaken, one-time exposures up to 75 rem whole body may be acceptable.
The need for any protective action for the offsite public from radiation exposure from an onsite accident is based on predicted and measured radiation dose rates. Emergency response actions are based on the guidance provided in a series of Protective Action Guides (PAGs) developed by the EPA. For example, the Protective Action Guides require no protective action when the projected doses are less than 1 rem to the whole body or less than 5 rem to the thyroid. Radiation levels, however, should be monitored, and an advisory to seek shelter may be issued.
The Protective Action Guides suggest that for whole-body doses of 1 rem and thyroid doses of 5 rem, the responsible officials should consider initiating protective action, particularly for the more sensitive populations (children and women of childbearing age). For whole-body and thyroid doses higher than 5 rem and 25 rem, respectively, the Protective Action Guides require mandatory evacuation, control of access to the contaminated area, and monitoring of radiation levels, unless these actions would have greater risk than the projected dose.
For this analysis, the radiation doses estimated for the various accident scenarios are those that would be received by the population if no protective actions were taken. Both LLNL and SNL, Livermore personnel are trained in the protective actions to be taken after a release of radioactive or other hazardous material. These response activities would also be closely coordinated with those of Alameda County (see Appendix J for more discussion of emergency response).
Bounding Case Accident Involving Radioactive Releases and Impacts
The bounding radiological accident scenario for individual LLNL and SNL, Livermore facilities is an inadvertent nuclear criticality yielding 1018 fissions within Building 332 (Plutonium Facility). In a review of 41 recorded inadvertent criticalities that have occurred nationally, only 10 have had estimated yields of 1018 fissions or greater (Stratton and Smith, 1989). Of these 10, 3 occurred in aqueous processing plants, 2 occurred in heavy-water-natural-uranium systems, 4 occurred in water-moderated reactors or reactor prototypes, and 1 occurred in an aircraft engine prototype reactor. All involved a combination of physical parameters and/or processes that are found in reactor or nuclear materials processing facilities, but are not present in the research and plutonium metals fabrication activities in Building 332. No criticality accidents have occurred in DOE plutonium metals fabrication facilities. Previous safety analyses have analyzed the consequences of an inadvertent criticality yielding 1018 fissions without postulating a method of initiation. The estimated frequency of occurrence is less than 1×10-6/year and, in fact, such an event may not be possible under the operational conditions and procedures existing in Building 332. However, despite the extremely low probability of occurrence, the consequences of this accident have been analyzed with the initiator left undefined.
The acute radiological consequences onsite and at the site boundary are calculated to be higher than those of any other radiological accident that could occur on the sites. For onsite personnel, the radiation dose would be 37 rem at a distance of 100 m, and the immediate exposure ("prompt dose") for unshielded personnel would be greater than 450 rem out to 13 m, possibly causing death. Using the risk estimators presented in Appendix C and shown in Table 5.6-2, the 100-m dose has a probability of 20 chances in 1000 of causing the development of a fatal cancer.
The effective dose equivalents at the site boundary nearest to the release (East Avenue at 400 m) and the western boundary (Vasco Road at 900 m) would be 2.0 and 0.38 rem, respectively. The 2.0-rem dose is in the lower range of the levels at which the EPA begins to recommend protective actions, including seeking shelter, controlling access to the contaminated area, monitoring radiation levels, and initiating evacuation unless local authorities judge it impractical. However, it is noted that the computer modeling used to estimate this 2.0-rem dose level is less refined and significantly more conservative than those used to calculate the lower values reported in the Safety Analysis Report (LLNL, 1990c) for the facility.
The collective population dose was also estimated. The population around the Laboratories was divided into 16 sectors (each 22.5 degrees wide), which radiate 50 miles out in pie-shaped wedges from a central point at the LLNL Livermore site and SNL, Livermore. From 1990 census data (Educational Data Systems, 1991), the sector with the highest population (the western sector) contained 1.4 million people. The wind was therefore assumed to blow to the west (towards the highest population sector). In reality, the wind blows in that direction only 5 percent of the time per year. The wind direction of the highest probability is to the northeast, which occurs 22 percent of the time per year. Plume concentration is inversely proportional to wind speed. Therefore, a very low wind speed of 1 m/second was selected. In reality, the lowest wind speed that is thought to occur for very stable conditions is about 2 to 3 m/second. However, using this higher wind speed would reduce the plume concentration, so conservatively it was not used. A very short release time of less than 15 minutes (which implies no wind meander) was also assumed. If the wind changes direction during the period of release (meanders), the entire centerline of the plume cannot pass over a single point, and, therefore, average air concentrations for that point can be lower by a factor of 3.
These meteorological conditions maximize estimated dose for an individual exposed to the densest part of the plume, and mathematically this results in a linear plume with a width of about 5 degrees. However, a plume this narrow may not conservatively estimate population dose. Additionally, census data could not be divided into 72 sectors to match plume width with sector width. Therefore, it was conservatively assumed that everyone in the western sector resided within 2.5 degrees of the plume centerline. Population dose then equals the individual's dose evaluated at 10 discrete distances times the population at those same distances (see Appendix D for the population data). Using this method, the inadvertent criticality would result in a conservative population dose (first-year and 70-year collective effective dose equivalent) of 440 person-rem. This is estimated to result in less than one additional case of fatal cancer over 70 years for the population of 1.4 million people. The population dose resulting from a release that occurred under average meteorological conditions and applied to actual lower population density could be 100 times less severe.
Natural background radiation to the same population is expected to deliver a 70-year collective effective dose equivalent to 29.8 million person-rem, with 10,000 cases of fatal cancer expected over 70 years. The inadvertent criticality accident would have a significant impact on onsite workers; however, the 440 person-rem exposure is not considered a significant offsite impact with respect to health effects.
An assessment was performed for this accident to estimate the maximum number of health effects associated with the postulated event and hence to bound the number of severe health effects from any other postulated radiological accident at LLNL or SNL, Livermore. Three wind directions were chosen for analysis. The first direction was toward the nearest site boundary, the second in the direction that maximized both onsite and offsite effects, and the third in the direction that would have the potential for the greatest number of severe health effects.
For this assessment one receptor point was modeled at the plume centerline at 775 m, corresponding to the maximum distance from Building 332 where personnel exposed to the plume would receive doses that exceed 0.5 rem. The plume width at 775 m was assumed to be 60 m (~2óy). It was conservatively assumed that the resulting doses at these receptors would be the same in any direction without regard to protection or dispersion from obstacles such as buildings and trees. Additionally, the entire population in the path of the plume was assumed to be outdoors and exposed to the plume for the entire duration of plume passage. Two receptor arcs at 40 m (prompt dose >= 50 rem corresponding to elevated health effect risks) and at 250 m (prompt dose >= 0.5 rem) were also modeled. Shielding provided by Building 332's concrete walls, which would normally attenuate the prompt dose, was not considered. An estimate of potential fatalities in Building 332 was computed using the average expected population in the building (19), an estimate of personnel in the Radioactive Materials Area (RMA) based on square footage ratio ((20,800)/30,647×19 » 13), and an estimate of the "LD50" zone or area exposed to >= 450 rem (Turner, 1986). In this estimate, the attenuation by the concrete walls was considered. About 2100 square feet of laboratory would be exposed to >= LD50, which predicts that one person would be exposed to potential lethality. However, since procedures require two people to perform most operations (this requirement mitigates the likelihood of personnel error causing this accident), up to four people would be exposed to >= LD50. The consequences are summarized in Table 5.6-3.
Note that if a different criterion for the radiological consequences were used, then the bounding accident scenario would be different. For example, if total acute population dose were the criterion, the bounding accident would then become the multiple-building event initiated by a severe earthquake. This accident is discussed in section 5.6.4.
Preventative Measures
The prevention of nuclear criticality is one of the principal safety considerations at LLNL. In addition to engineered safety features such as workstation separation and the use of safe geometric configurations, administrative controls and safety procedures are strictly enforced. These controls and procedures include limits on the quantity of fissile material that is present at any workstation, verification that a critical mass is not likely to occur, and glovebox cleanup procedures. The Criticality Safety Group of the Health and Safety Division of the Hazards Control Department advises Laboratory personnel on fissile materials that may present a criticality concern. Mitigating features such as criticality alarms, emergency-response procedures and drills, emergency exits, the building ventilation system, and the shielding provided by building construction would all help reduce doses to personnel outside the room and the building.
Table 5.6-3 Estimation of Fatalities and Exposure to Elevated Health Effects Risks from the Postulated Inadvertent Criticality (Building 332)
| Distance from Point of Postulated Accident (m) | Health Effect | Direction of Plume Travel/Number of People Affected | ||
| 270o (worst-case direction offsite) | 180o (nearest site boundary) | 180o (worst-case direction onsite) | ||
| 13 | 50% chance of fatality in the absence of medical care (>= 450 rem) | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 40 | Elevated Risk of incurring a health effect* (>= 50 rem) | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| 250 | Nominal Risk proportional to exposure of 7.3×10-4 health effects* per rem (>= 0.5 rem from prompt dose) | 964 | 964 | 964 |
| 775 | Nominal Risk proportional to exposure of 7.3×10-4 health effects* per rem (>= 0.5 rem from passage of the plume) | 853 | 910 | 910 |
* Defined as fatal and nonfatal latent cancers, and genetic defects.
5.6.2 CHEMICAL ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Selection Process
The selection process for chemical scenarios divided the hypothetical accidents into two categories, those associated with a specific location and those associated with transportation, and applied a multi-part screening process to determine bounding events.
For accidents associated with specific locations, the screening process began with a document review to develop a list of chemicals that could be screened. The chemicals were screened based on hazard, quantity, physical characteristics, dispersion potential, and special factors such as the potential for causing cancer. Six scenarios were identified in this process and are listed in Table 5.6-1 and described in full in Appendix D. The bounding accident (chlorine handling accident, Building 518) is also discussed in that appendix.
Chemical transportation scenarios were divided into two categories: material and waste. No accidents were identified for either case, given the regulations and existing procedures and policies.
Additionally, DOE and the Laboratories' staffs reviewed the accident scenarios to identify new scenarios for inclusion and to verify the accuracy of the selection process.
Protective and Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
The adverse effects of exposure vary greatly among chemicals. They range from physical discomfort and skin irritation to respiratory tract tissue damage and, at the extreme, death. For this reason, allowable exposure levels differ from substance to substance. Occupational exposure limits intended to protect average, healthy workers are established for 10- to 15-minute exposures, at concentrations that should not be exceeded at any time; and for 1- or 8-hour time-weighted averages. These occupational exposure limits do not apply to the general population, which may contain more sensitive subpopulations, such as children, the elderly, and the infirm.
The standards used to determine bounding case scenarios are the Immediately-Dangerous-to- Life-or-Health (IDLH) concentrations of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The IDLH limits are exposure guidelines established for selecting respirators to protect workers from chemical exposure. An IDLH condition is a situation that poses an immediate threat, but one from which an individual could escape within 30 minutes without escape-impairing or irreversible health effects.
The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) of the American Industrial Hygiene Association (American Industrial Hygiene Association, 1989) are used as the standard of comparison for exposure to the public. The ERPGs (described in Figure 5.6-1) provide emergency response planners with estimates of the potential hazards associated with accidental releases of various toxic chemicals. The comparison to ERPGs is made when possible to provide estimates of the area where health effects would be the greatest.
Human toxicity data are used in evaluation of health effects. These include:
- LClow - The lowest concentration of a chemical in air reported to have caused death.
- TClow - The lowest concentration of a chemical in air reported to have caused toxic effects.
Data such as these were used to determine consequences of public exposures due to accidental releases. For the bounding chemical accident (chlorine handling accident, B-518), an overlay showing gradients of concentration with distance was used to estimate the number of deaths (when compared to toxicity data) and determine the zone of concern.
Bounding Case Accident Involving Chemical Releases and Impacts
The bounding chemical accident was determined to be a handling accident involving one 100-lb cylinder of liquefied chlorine gas (Appendix D, section D.3.3.1). In this scenario the operator is assumed to have uncapped the container to inspect the valving and then dropped the container, damaging the valve and releasing the entire 100 lb of chlorine gas over a 30-minute period. A release of this type is estimated to have a probability of 1×10-7 per year. A chemical accident of this magnitude has not previously been analyzed at LLNL or SNL, Livermore. Although the estimated probability of occurrence is extremely low, analysis of the consequences would provide an upper bound for chemical releases from LLNL Livermore and SNL, Livermore.
For this scenario, the number of fatalities was estimated in three wind directions. The three wind directions are (1) the direction that maximized the estimated fatalities (315o), (2) the direction toward the nearest site boundary (toward East Avenue, 180o), and (3) the direction that maximized onsite and offsite consequences (toward Greenville Road, 90o·).
The first wind direction is towards the onsite craft shops (315o). It was estimated that 270 workers in this direction would receive an exposure significant enough to be lethal if not given immediate medical attention. No offsite fatalities would be expected.
The nearest site boundary (East Avenue, 10 m) is at a wind direction of 180o. The chemical plume would pass across East Avenue and into the SNL, Livermore buffer. The number of onsite fatalities in this direction was estimated at six, with an unknown number of fatalities offsite. Although there is the potential for offsite fatalities in this wind direction, no number could be determined because the estimate would be based purely on conjecture.
The wind direction that maximizes onsite and offsite consequences is 90·. It was estimated that 74 fatalities would occur onsite, with an unknown number of fatalities offsite. However, due to the presence of a private dwelling near where the chemical plume would cross Greenville Road, it was assumed that at least one offsite fatality would occur. No fatalities would be expected farther than 750 m from the point of release, where the plume falls below ERPG-3.
Currently, the use of chlorine in greater than 20-lb cylinders at the LLNL Livermore site is rare. LLNL is developing administrative and safety procedures for the use of chlorine in greater than 20-lb cylinders. The use of 100-lb chlorine cylinders is analyzed at the LLNL Livermore site as an upper bound of consequences. The maximum consequences of a chlorine accident involving a 20-lb cylinder are one-half those for the 100-lb cylinder.
Concentrations of chlorine above the ERPG-2 level would exist as far out as 4.1 km from the site boundary. Persons at this location would be expected to experience irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair their ability to take protective action. At locations further out, effects to persons would likely include mucous membrane irritation.
The ERPG-1 concentration level is exceeded out to a distance of 9.1 km from the site boundary. This suggests that persons exposed at distances greater than 9.1 km from the site boundary would experience only mild, transient adverse health effects such as slight irritation of mucous membranes.
Preventative Measures
Chlorine is stored in standard containers approved by the DOT. The condition of the container is controlled by the shipper, who is responsible for inspecting the containers for corrosion of the pressure-relief plugs. It is the operator's responsibility to ensure that the container cap is in place. Containers are also inspected on arrival at Building 518. LLNL operators are trained in the safe handling and storage of chemicals. The special service unit of the LLNL Fire Department has cylinder overpacks (called "bottle buggies") to provide emergency containment for leaking gas cylinders. The special service unit can respond in a short time period (a few minutes) to contain a release from a leaking gas cylinder.
5.6.3 HIGH EXPLOSIVE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Selection Process
The selection process for high explosive scenarios divided the hypothetical accidents into two categories—those associated with a specific location and those associated with transportation—and applied a multistep screening process to determine bounding events.
For scenarios associated with specific locations, building hazard classifications were reviewed to identify buildings that use high explosives. Inventories and the potential for impact on personnel were compared to determine the bounding event. This process looked at large and small quantities of high explosives to ensure that small quantities did not pose a threat to more personnel than did larger quantities. One accident was identified and is listed in Table 5.6 and described in full in Appendix D.
Accidents involving the transportation of high explosives were identified for both truck and air shipments. These two scenarios are listed in Table 5.6-2 and described in full in Appendix D. The shipment of high explosives by air is the bounding scenario for high explosives.
Additionally, DOE and the Laboratories' staffs reviewed the accident scenarios to identify new scenarios for inclusion and to verify the accuracy of the selection process.
Protective Actions and Emergency Response
No Emergency Response Planning Guidelines have been established for accidents involving detonation of high explosives; however, Health and Safety Manual (LLNL, 1988b), U.S. Department of Transportation regulations (49 C.F.R.), California Highway Patrol Regulations, and DOE 5400 series orders all provide guidance and restrictions on the handling and transportation of high explosives on and offsite.
The standards used in this EIS/EIR analysis are overpressures that characterize the shock waves associated with detonation of energetic materials and the consequential effect on property and individuals. Typically, 1.0 psi (pounds per square inch) overpressure will damage the average wooden structure to the point of rendering it uninhabitable, 10 psi will destroy the average structure, and 200 psi is lethal to an exposed individual.
Bounding Case Accident Involving High Explosives and Impacts
The bounding accident for high explosives is the crash of an aircraft carrying 2200 lb of the explosive LX-10 and 300 lb of aviation fuel. If a fuel fire causes the detonation of the explosives, the resulting blast force would be 1 psi or more out to a distance of 490 ft in all directions, with a 1-psi overpressure causing enough damage to a standard dwelling to render it uninhabitable. The crash would result in the death of the aircraft crew and property damage within 490 ft of the point of impact. It was assumed that this accident happened on final approach to the Tracy Municipal Airport.
The aircraft accident rate per departure for large commercial jets is 3.1×10-6 and the associated probability that a crash-caused fire exceeds 1-hour duration is 1×10-2. The probability of a detonation with respect to burn time was not determined, but is estimated not to exceed that of a fire with 1-hour duration. Although the transporting aircraft in this scenario is a turboprop, the increased probability associated with the lighter aircraft is estimated to be no more than 10 times higher. Finally, two shipments per year double the probability of a single departure. The overall probability of occurrence is therefore (3.1×10-6) × (1×10-2) × 10×2 = 6.2 × 10-7 per year.
Based on a fatal blast radius of 31 ft for 200 psi overpressure, the area of lethality would be 0.0003 km2. Assuming a rural population density of 6 persons/km2 (the glide path into Tracy Municipal Airport is currently over farmland), only the onboard crew would likely be subjected to a lethal blast force. Emergency response personnel would potentially be at risk, but the actual number would depend on the timing of their activities and the number of response personnel within the 0.0003-km2 area at the time of the detonation. No number is assigned as it would be too speculative.
Preventative Measures
High explosives are transported by approved carriers in cargo aircraft. The aircraft is flown by a qualified pilot, who must file an approved flight plan. The glide paths into the Tracy Municipal Airport are currently over farmland versus the developed areas of Tracy. High explosives are packaged for transport in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Transportation, and while this does not eliminate the possibility of an explosion, the packaging offers some protection from thermal and pressure stresses. Finally, air transportation is less accident prone than ground transportation (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1977).
5.6.4 MULTIPLE-BUILDING ACCIDENT SCENARIO
Selection Process
The accidents analyzed in this section were selected using the processes described for radiological and chemical accidents. The multiple-building initiating event assumed to occur is a large earthquake. The buildings identified in these processes were examined to determine their susceptibility to damage during a 0.8g earthquake (see Appendix I). Additionally, buildings found to survive the 0.8g earthquake were examined under 0.9g earthquake conditions. The accidents identified for the multiple-building event are identified in Table 5.6, fully described in Appendix D, and discussed below. Definition of the 0.8g and 0.9g earthquake events is provided in Appendix I. As a comparison, the January 24 and January 27, 1980, Livermore earthquakes, recorded as 5.4 and 5.6 Richter magnitude events, generated maximum measured peak ground accelerations of 0.26g. The October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, recorded as a 7.1 Richter magnitude event, generated maximum measured peak ground accelerations of 0.68g. The multiple-building scenario involves releases of radioactive materials and wastes from the Tritium Research Laboratory (B-968), the Hydrogen Research Facility (B-331), Diagnostic Chemistry (B-251), and the Waste Storage and Shipping Facility (B-625). Additionally, the scenario involves toxic chemical releases from the Engineering Building (B-131), the Nuclear Chemistry Laboratory (B-151), and the Plating Shop (B-322).
Protective Action and Emergency Response
The Protective and Emergency Response Planning Guidelines for these scenarios are the same as those discussed for radiological and chemical scenarios in sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, respectively.
Bounding Case Accident for the Multiple-Building Scenario and Impacts
The multiple-building accident scenario releases described in this section (and in more detail in Appendix D) are those that bound all other releases from the sites as a result of the multiple-building event. It is acknowledged that some smaller additional releases of similar materials from other buildings or areas may occur as a result of this event; however, the additional contribution to health effects risks from the smaller releases would be insignificant. In addition, the method used for combining the individual bounding scenario releases is extremely conservative. Each individual scenario assumes that on the day of the earthquake the maximum allowable quantity of material is in the building and in the worst at-risk position. The probability of this occurring for even one scenario is extremely low. The probability of this occurring for all scenarios is clearly much lower. Consequently, the elimination of additional smaller releases from consideration in the multiple-building accident scenario is more than offset by the conservatism of assuming that the bounding scenario releases occur concurrently.
The bounding facility-wide seismic accident scenario at the LLNL Livermore site and SNL, Livermore (Appendix D, section D.5) would have the highest offsite impacts if it occurred under existing conditions. Under the proposed action, no action, modification of operations, and shutdown and decommissioning alternatives, the offsite impacts are less. Increased quantities of at-risk tritium in Buildings 298 and 391 are more than offset by decreased quantities in Buildings 968 and 331.
Radioactive Materials. Should the severe seismic event occur under the worst-case existing conditions, this could result in the release of 50 g of tritium from Building 968, 3.5 g of tritium from Building 331, 7.5×10-4 Ci of americium-241 from Building 251, and 7.2×10-3 Ci of americium-241 from Building 625 as described in Appendix D, section D.2. The collective radiation dose that would result from this postulated release in the sector west of the site would be 4700 person-rem for the first-year effective dose equivalent and 9000 person-rem for the 70-year committed effective dose equivalent. The tritium contribution to these cumulative doses occurs during the first year only, because tritium has a short biological half-life (on the order of weeks). The transuranic contribution (from americium-241) to these cumulative doses occurs mostly during the first year and also continues for the life of the affected individual (but at lower subsequent levels). This dose contribution accumulates over the life of the individual because transuranic nuclides are generally bone-seekers (deposited in the bone or on the bone surface) and have long biological half-lives.
A dose of 9000 person-rem to a population of 1.4 million people could result in an additional 5 cases of fatal cancer over 70 years. This can be compared to the 70-year collective radiation dose from background radiation of 29.8 million person-rem with 10,000 cases of fatal cancer over 70 years.
Hazardous Chemicals. Additionally, the bounding facility-wide seismic accident scenario at LLNL and SNL, Livermore (Appendix D, section D.5) may release toxic chemicals under the worst-case existing conditions. These releases may occur at Buildings 131, 151, and 322 as described in Appendix D, section D.3, as well as lesser releases at other locations.
Toxic effects from the ammonia, hydrogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide releases may result. The release of ammonia at Building 131 would result in a maximum concentration of 580 mg/m3 at 0.34 km (site boundary) from the point of release. The predicted average concentration at this location is 451 mg/m3 for 41 minutes. This average level of exposure to ammonia might produce symptoms ranging from eye, nose, and throat irritation to decreased blood pressure. Deaths are not expected as a result of this release.
The release of hydrogen chloride at Building 151 would result in a maximum concentration of 52 mg/m3 at 0.55 km (site boundary) from the point of release. The predicted average concentration at this location is 11 mg/m3 for 19 minutes. This average level of exposure to hydrogen chloride would not impair a person's ability to take protective action. Deaths are not expected as a result of this release.
The release of hydrogen cyanide at Building 322 would result in a maximum concentration of 125 mg/m3 at 0.28 km (site boundary) from the point of release. The predicted average concentration at this location is 54 mg/m3 for 51 minutes, with higher concentrations near the point of release. Lethal concentrations may be expected near the point of release; however, the average level of exposure to hydrogen cyanide at the site boundary may be tolerated without immediate or latent effects.
The combined health effects of exposure to these three chemicals may be worse than the effects due to the exposure to any single chemical.
5.6.5 COMPARISON SUMMARY OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS
Under the existing conditions, the potential exists for the accidental release of radioactive materials and hazardous chemicals, and the accidental detonation of high explosives at several facilities during ordinary operations, during transportation, and as a result of an event affecting more than one facility. These accidents are summarized in sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, and 5.6.4 (listed in Table 5.6-1) and described in detail in Appendix D. Below is a discussion of how the alternative actions affect the postulated accident scenarios; this information is summarized in Table 5.6-4.
Under all alternatives, the administrative limit for tritium at SNL, Livermore Building 968 would be reduced from 50 g to 0 g.
Currently LLNL's Building 331, the Hydrogen Research Facility, has an administrative limit for tritium of 300 g and an inventory of less than 20 g. Under the proposed action, the administrative limit would be reduced from 300 g to 5 g with the inventory reduced accordingly. A portion of the tritium operations in Building 331 may be moved to Building 298, the Fusion Target Fabrication Facility, and to Building 391, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Facility, known as the NOVA-Upgrade/National Ignition Facility. The three buildings would have a combined administrative limit of 10 g with no more than 5 g in any one building and no more than 5 g combined in Buildings 298 and 391. For these facilities, the administrative limit would therefore be reduced from 300 g in one facility (Building 331) to a total of 10 g among three facilities (Buildings 298, 331, and 391).
Under the modifications of operations alternative, LLNL's Building 322 would be reinforced to withstand the postulated earthquake, and/or the use of all cyanides in Building 322 would be eliminated. These actions would eliminate the release of hydrogen cyanide from Building 322 as a result of the postulated earthquake.
Under the no action alternative, the administrative limit for tritium would decrease from 300 g to 5 g and the tritium inventory from less than 20 g to 5 g at LLNL's Building 331. The maximum at-risk quantity of tritium would be 2 g. No other accidents are affected by the no action alternative.
Under the shutdown and decommissioning alternative, the maximum consequences are those postulated under the proposed action. As inventory reductions for radioactive and toxic materials are effected, the consequences would be reduced accordingly.
Table 5.6-4 Comparison of Postulated Accidents Under the Proposed Action and the Alternatives
| Postulated Accidenta | Proposed Action | No Action | Modification of Operations | Shutdown and Decommissioning |
| Inadvertent plutonium criticality (B-332) | Appliesb | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Tritium release during severe earthquake (B-968)c | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Release of plutonium into Laboratory (B-332) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Tritium release during severe earthquake (B-331) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Americium-241 release during severe earthquake (B-251) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Transuranic waste involved in fire after spill (B-612 area) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Uranium fire (B-493) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Transuranic waste (Americium-241) release during severe earthquake (B-625) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Truck accidents, trucks carrying low specific activity waste (2 scenarios) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Truck accident, truck carrying transuranic waste | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Tritium release during severe earthquake (B-298) | Applies | Not applicable (currently, no inventory) | Not applicable (currently, no inventory) | Not applicable (currently, no inventory) |
| Sulfuric acid spill (B-514) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Chlorine gas release (B-518) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Aircraft high explosive accident (Tracy Municipal Airport) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Site 300 high explosive accident (firing table) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Truck accident, truck carrying high explosive (Interstate 580) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Ammonia gas release during severe earthquake (B-131) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Hydrogen chloride gas release during severe earthquake (B-151) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Arsine gas release (B-166) | Applies | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
| Hydrogen cyanide release during severe earthquake (B-322) | Applies | Applies | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero or building reinforced. | Applies initially, not applicable after inventory reduced to zero. |
a
details.
b
the postulated accident as described in Appendix D apply to the alternative.
c
all other buildings listed in this table are at the LLNL Livermore site or LLNL
Site 300. While they are distinct operations managed and operated by different
contractors, for the purposes of this multiple-facility accident the three sites
are addressed together.
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