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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress

Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief
October 20, 1993
-ti- 
Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress
By Shirley A. Kan, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
CONTENTS:
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
   Why Target China?
   Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation
          Possible Motives and Policy Constraints
      Missile and Related Technology Transfers
          CSS-2 IRBM
          M-9 SRBM
          M-11 SRBM
      Nuclear Technology Transfers
          Pakistan
          Algeria
          Iran
          Iraq
          Syria
      Nonproliferation Cooperation and Compliance
          MTCR Guidelines
          Compliance with the MTCR
          The NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
   Policy Issues for Congress
      Unilateral Policies
          No Nonproliferation Conditions on MFN
          M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions
          Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act
      Bilateral Approach
          Resuming Security Dialogue
      Multilateral Options
          International Lending
          Five Power Talks and F-16s for Taiwan
          Nonproliferation Regimes
LEGISLATION
Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation
SUMMARY
The Pentagon's Sept. 1,1993 Bottom- Up Review listed proliferation
as the top new danger faced by the U.S. One problem has been
Chinese sales, with China supplying CSS-2 intermediate range
ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, Silkworm anti-ship missiles to
Iran and Iraq, and ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and
perhaps others. China developed for export the mobile, solid-fuel
M-9 and M-11 short range ballistic missiles that violate the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), reportedly with Pakistan,
Syria, and Iran as interested buyers. China also has nuclear
cooperation deals with Pakistan and Iran.
Since 1991, facing international criticism of its proliferation
activities, U.S. sanctions, and possible conditions on low MFN
tariffs, China has responded with greater willingness to
acknowledge its missile and nuclear transfers and to join
international agreements. China acceded to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 9, 1992. Beijing also
promised in November 1991 to abide by the MTCR (when in June 1991
U.S. sanctions for missile related transfers to Pakistan were
lifted). Washington effectively waived the sanctions on Mar. 23,
1992, explaining that the step was warranted by China's agreement
to abide by the MTCR and to apply it specifically to the M-9s and
M-11s.
Questions arose, however, about Chinese compliance with the MTCR,
violations of which trigger U.S. sanctions as required by law. On
Aug. 24, 1993, the Administration determined that China in 1992
transferred M-11 missile related equipment to Pakistan, and imposed
sanctions on missile-related trade with Chinese and Pakistani arms
sales entities. Many are concerned that transfers of
missile-related materials, equipment, technology, and personnel
training -- if not complete missiles -- may be contributing to
local production or improvement of ballistic missiles in Pakistan,
Syria, and Iran. Such transfers are difficult to prove and make
indigenous programs more self-sustaining.
Another question is China's cooperation with international
nonproliferation regimes. Despite China's accession to and apparent
compliance with the NPT, concerns remain about (1) its long-term
programs of nuclear energy cooperation with Iran and Pakistan
(which are suspected of providing civilian covers for weapons
programs there); (2) its suspected continued cooperation with
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program; and (3) its failure to join the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and require full-scope safeguards that
strengthen the NPT/IAEA safeguards (which failed in Iraq).
Bill Clinton had criticized former Presi- dent Bush for rejecting
human rights, trade, and nonproliferation conditionality for
China's MFN status. Although Representative Pelosi and Senator
Mitchell introduced MFN conditionality bills (H.R. 1890; S. 806),
they supported President Clinton's May 28, 1993, Executive Order to
renew MFN in 1993 with human rights considerations for an MFN
renewal in 1994, but address proliferation separately. Other
unilateral tools include the just imposed MTCR-related sanctions;
targeted export bans on supercomputers or satellites; or other
sanctions (S. 1172 (McCain/Lieberman); S. 1064 (Glenn)/H.R. 2358
(Lantos)). A bilateral approach would resume the security dialogue.
Multilateral options may affect international lending; the Perm
Five talks (H.R. 2333 (Hamilton)); and nonproliferation regimes
(H.R. 2076 (Stark)). Strengthening IAEA safeguards is one example
of such efforts.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Aug 24, 1993, the Administration determined that China
transferred M-11 missile related equipment (not missiles) to
Pakistan (in violation of the MTCR). It also imposed limited
Category II sanctions on missile technology trade with 1 Pakistani
and 11 Chinese arms exporting entities, as required by law.
However, the Oct. 20, 1993 Washington Post reported that the
National Security Council has been reviewing the decision to
implement the sanctions, due to industry objections. The net impact
on U.S. businesses is uncertain. China's response has been limited
to a threat to end its commitment to the MTCR. The primary effect
of the sanctions is on the export of U.S. (e.g., Hughes and Martin
Marietta) and foreign satellites (containing U.S. components) to
China for launch before sanctions are lifted, as satellite
components are in the MTCR Annex. (China has three contracts to
launch U.S.-built satellites in 1994-95.) However U.S. commercial
launch service providers (e.g, McDonnell Douglas and General
Dynamics) may benefit from a lack of Chinese competition.
Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord indicated on
Aug. 31, 1993 that Washington is ready to negotiate a waiver for
the sanctions, which might require a more formal commitment by
Beijing to the MTCR. Meanwhile, the Pentagon's Sept. 1, 1993
Bottom-Up Review listed proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction as the top new danger facing the United States.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Throughout the 19808, Chinese arms sales practices, especially in
nuclear exports, were troubling to U.S. policymakers. Chinese
assurances also were vague and unsatisfactory. Washington was less
critical of Beijing in part due to its strategic importance in
counterbalancing Moscow. However, the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the
end of the Cold War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War changed
perceptions. First, the decline of China's strategic importance has
supported arguments for a tougher U.S. policy toward China. Also,
revelations about Iraq's missile, chemical, and nuclear weapons
programs after the Persian Gulf War heightened concerns that
international nonproliferation regimes may be inadequate in
restricting the spread of weapons technology, especially dual-use
supplies. Third, new disclosures in 1991 about Chinese missile and
nuclear technology transfers to Pakistan and the Middle East
further added impetus to criticisms of the Bush Administration's
approach toward China.
Why Target China?
China and North Korea are currently the main concerns regarding the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Since the
early 1980s, the United States has urged Chinese restraint in
missile sales and un-safeguarded nuclear exports (reportedly to
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, North Korea, India, and Pakistan).
The United States considers China's transfers of dangerous
technology contrary to U.S. nonproliferation and regional stability
interests. After the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown that spoiled
China's image, Beijing showed greater willingness to acknowledge
its missile and nuclear transfers, and to join international
nonproliferation regimes. In 1992, China signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to abide by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Nevertheless, Chinese arms sales are still troubling for several
reasons: 1) Sales of Ballistic Missiles to Contentious Regions.
China has shown both willingness and capability to transfer
ballistic missiles that can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or
biological warheads to increase their utility as terror weapons.
China is the only supplier to have transferred intermediate range
ballistic missiles to a developing country (Saudi Arabia). Also,
China's list of interested missile buyers includes countries in the
contentious Middle East and South Asia regions with suspected
nuclear arms programs. Ballistic missiles are considered
destabilizing weapons, because potential target countries generally
lack defenses against missiles and may launch preemptive strikes
against enemy missiles or seek their own missiles.
2) Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Technology. Beijing has also
shown the willingness and capability to supply materials and
technology (reportedly including personnel training) to states
believed to be pursuing covert missile and nuclear weapons
projects. These transfers are more troubling because of their
contribution to indigenous missile manufacturing capability, thus
lessening dependence on foreign assistance. It is also difficult to
confirm that a dual-use item is being used for a weapons program,
because technology, once transferred, would become part of the
indigenous weapons production capability of a country. Chinese
leaders may be seeking to transfer dual-use missile and nuclear
technology and know-how (as opposed i;o actual weapons) as an
effort to lessen the chance of Western reprisals. Sensitive
technology transfers are especially worrisome since International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections found that Iraq built up
its extensive nuclear weapons program even while a party to the NPT
with Iraqi declared nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards. Also,
analysts are concerned about inadequate international controls on
dual-use technology that allowed Iraq to acquire dual-use nuclear
equipment before the Persian Gulf War. Moreover, some experts
miscalculated that in early 1991 Iran was at least 5 to 10 years
from producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. LAEA
inspectors in September 1991 found that the timetable was probably
12 to 18 months.
3) Record of Secrecy. Although China, after media disclosures,
provided details about its nuclear transfers, experts find Chinese
transfers troubling because of their secrecy and association with
suspected nuclear bomb programs. During the Iran-Iraq War, China
covertly sold Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and Iraq, while
issuing official denials. Since the 19808, China's Foreign Affairs
Ministry has issued vague -- and perhaps uninformed -- assurances
of responsible arms exports and denials of wrongdoing only to later
contradict them with admissions and elaborations.
Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation
Possible Mothres and Policy Constraints. Many analysts believe that
sensitive Chinese arms sales are controlled by only a few very
influential military and political officials in the Central
Military Commission and Politburo -- and not the weaker Foreign
Ministry from whom the Department of State has sought assurances.
Diminished military-to-military ties since the Tiananmen crackdown
have reduced U.S. ability to exchange views with key Chinese
officials. It is also believed that in addition to national
defense, intelligence, and foreign policy interests, Chinese arms
sales policy reflects personal interests of the top leaders' family
members who oversee arms sales companies. Since the early 19808,
China has been expanding its missile and nuclear related sales,
including deals for nuclear power projects in developing countries.
This policy suggests a Chinese effort in part to earn foreign
exchange and to make up for lost arms sales earnings with the end
of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. During the 1980s, China emerged among
the top five arms suppliers to the Third World, becoming Iran's
single largest arms supplier. There are strong economic motives for
realizing the nationalistic goal of modernization, especially in
defense.
In addition, Chinese sales indicate a pattern wherein countries
denied preferred Western assistance due to export controls turn to
China as a willing and capable supplier of sensitive technology.
This position may provide greater Chinese strategic political
influence in the Middle East and South Asia, and serve Beijing's
foreign policy goals of asserting independent clout and checking
U.S. influence on domestic and international forces. Other possible
Chinese interests include balance of power concerns in South Asia
and the Middle East, cheaper oil supplies, and Islamic influences
over ethnic minorities in northwestern China. Moreover, in some
cases, China is reportedly supplying technology and personnel
training while not transferring complete weapons. It is uncertain
whether Beijing shares Western nonproliferation interests. The
Chinese may be trying to satisfy missile contracts despite its
nonproliferation agreements. Finally, observers have pointed to
inherent problems that dual-use technology transfers pose for
effective national and multilateral export controls, and the
weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards system and the informal MTCR.
Missile and Related Technology Transfers
CSS-2 IRBM. In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, China secretly sold
an estimated 36 CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)
to Saudi Arabia with a price tag believed to be $3-3.5 billion,
according to published reports. The range of the Saudi CSS-2s is
considered to be about 2,800 km (1,740 miles) -- enough to reach
Iran, Iraq, and Israel. The Saudis reportedly approached China for
missiles after the Reagan Administration failed to persuade
Congress to lift the limit of 60 F-15 fighters that could be sold
to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh said it acquired the missiles as deterrence
against possible missile attacks from Tehran.
The missiles are named DF-3 by the Chinese ("DF" for Dong Feng, or
East Wind) and designated CSS-2 by the United States ("CSS" for
Chinese Surface-to-Surface). According to Jane's, the CSS-2 IRBM is
a single-stage missile using storable liquid fuel, first deployed
by the Chinese in 1971, with a range between 2,500-3,000 km (1,553-
1,863 miles). While the Chinese designed the CSS-2 missiles to
carry nuclear warheads, Saudi Prince Bandar (Saudi ambassador to
Washington who secretly negotiated the deal in Beijing) assured the
United States that the Chinese had modified the missile to carry a
large conventional warhead. The Chinese also issued similar
assurances. Then- Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian on Apr. 6,1988,
confirmed that China sold "some non-nuclear, conventional
surface-to-surface missiles" to Saudi Arabia and said that "the
Saudi government made a commitment to us of no transfer, no first
use of these missiles, and to use these missiles entirely for
defensive purposes." While insisting that the missiles contributed
to peace and stability, Wu also said that China supported Arab
states against any threat of a preemptive Israeli attack on the new
missiles, thus admitting that the missiles could be destabilizing.
Indeed, in early 1988, Israel threatened a preemptive strike
against the CSS-2s, recalling the Israeli attack on an Iraqi
nuclear reactor in June 1981.
The CSS-2 sale was negotiated in 1985 and the missiles were first
delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1987, with much deception to
avoid discovery by Western intelligence, according to a Mar. 29,
1988, Washington Post report. The Chinese allegedly shipped the
CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia along with other weapons bound for Iraq.
U.S. intelligence discovered the IRBMs in January 1988 when trucks
carrying some of the weapons supposedly destined for Iraq were seen
traveling south, instead of north, from Saudi ports. China may have
been primarily motivated by both the enormous profits from this
unique missile deal and greater political influence in the Middle
East. Beijing's diplomatic rivalry with the Taipei government may
also have motivated the sale, as Saudi Arabia had been one of the
few remaining countries to maintain diplomatic relations with
Taiwan. The CSS-2 deal signaled the development of increasingly
friendly Sino-Saudi ties, which culminated in the establishment of
diplomatic relations on July 21,1990, with Taiwan losing Saudi
recognition.
M-9 SRBM. For several years, Washington has been concerned about
reported Chinese attempts to sell Syria (or other countries, such
as Iran) the M-9 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Syria is
believed to have signed a contract and paid a deposit for the M-9s
in 1988. The M-9 is estimated to have a range of 600 km (375 miles)
and exceeds the Category I range and payload limits of the MTCR
guidelines (300 km and 500 kg). A June 23,1988, Washington Post
report said that Syria may have turned to the Chinese after failing
to obtain Soviet SS-23 ballistic missiles that were subject to
elimination under the U.S-U.S.S.R. INF Treaty. The June 11,1991,
Washington Post revealed that U.S. concern stems from intelligence
that: Syria and Pakistan provided financial support for the
M-series missiles, sightings of Syrian and Pakistani military
officials at missile development and testing sites, and recent
acceleration in Chinese missile flight tests. The Far Eastern
Economic Review reported on Aug. 22, 1991, that Western
intelligence had recently sighted up to 24
transporter-erector-launcher trucks (TELs) for the M-9 missile in
Syria, and that Syria provided much of the research and development
funds for the M-9s. (See Compliance with the MTCR.)
M-9 flight tests reportedly began in June 1988. The M-9 SRBM is
reported by Jane's to be a single-stage missile with an inertial
(not terminal) guidance system, which means the missile is
programmed before launch and receives no external guidance after
launch. According to the 1988 SIPRI Yearbook, the M-9 is also
China's first solid fuel land-based ballistic missile -- a
considerable technical improvement over liquid- fueled missiles
that are more dangerous and time-consuming to operate. The M-9 is
supposedly fully mobile (using TELs), and is advertised as having
a rapid reaction time (just 30 minutes to prepare for operation).
The M-9 is considered conventional or nuclear capable, and more
accurate (circular error probable (CEP) of about 650 meters) than
the modified Scud-B ballistic missiles launched by Iraq during the
1991 Persian Gulf War, reported the Apr. 8, 1991, Defense News.
China has developed the M-9 missile for export, with China
Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) -- one
of the two Chinese companies targeted by U.S. sanctions from June
1991 to March 1992 -- marketing the missile abroad.
M-11 SRBM. The United States has been concerned about the possible
Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to Pakistan. Reports also name Iran
as an interested buyer. President Bush, in October 1990, suspended
economic and military aid to Pakistan because he could no longer
certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear
explosive device. Many are concerned about a potential
nuclear-armed clash between Pakistan and India (with its own
missiles) over the Kashmir area.
On Apr. 5, 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported that China was in
the process of selling Pakistan a new missile with a range of about
180 miles (290 km) and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Evidence indicating a Chinese sale of M-11 SRBMs to Pakistan was
U.S. intelligence sighting of TELs for the M-11s inside Pakistan,
according to the next day's Washington Post. The Chinese may have
also delivered dummy missile frames for practice launches. On June
25,1991 and again on Aug. 24, 1993, Washington determined that
Chinese arms sales companies transferred missile technology to
Pakistan in violation of the MTCR and imposed U.S. sanctions as
required by law. (See M- 11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions.) Transfers
of the M-11s or related equipment violate the MTCR. A CPMIEC
marketing brochure reportedly said that the M-11 is a 31-foot-long
missile capable of carrying an 800 kg warhead up to 180 miles (290
km). The Chinese first revealed the M-11 SRBM in 1988 and
reportedly successfully flight-tested it in 1990. Jane's Defence
Weekly reported on Apr. 9,1988, that the M-11 missile is a
single-stage, solid-propellant missile with an inertial mid-course
(not terminal) guidance system. The M-11 is also fully mobile and
can be reloaded and ready for firing in about 45 minutes by a crew
of fewer than 10 people.
Nuclear Technology Transfers
Pakistan. Pakistan, which has not signed the NPT, is believed to be
pursuing a nuclear weapons development program that includes
Chinese technical assistance. On Feb. 6, 1992, the Foreign
Secretary of Pakistan admitted that his country now has the
components and know-how to build "at least one" nuclear explosive
device. On Dec. 1, 1992, "NBC News" reported that Pakistan can
assemble and drop "at least seven" nuclear weapons within hours. On
Feb. 24, 1993, CIA Director James Woolsey testified that, prior to
joining the NPT in 1992, China "probably provided some nuclear
weapons related assistance to Islamabad," and that "it's unclear
whether Beijing has broken off contact with elements associated
with Pakistan's weapons programs." On July 28, 1993, Woolsey
testified that China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is "of
greater concern" than that with Iran.
The Reagan Administration had convincing evidence that China was
helping Pakistan to operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant and
had given Pakistan a nuclear bomb design, the June 22 and 23,1984,
New York Times reported. The Aug. 9, 1990 Nucleonics Week disclosed
that China designed the nuclear system for a Pakistani research
reactor (Parr-2), added in 1989, which uses highly enriched uranium
fuel. Also, according to the San Jose Mercury-News of Nov. 21, 1990
and the New York Times of Nov. 22, 1990, the FBI conducted a
counter-intelligence investigation that began about 1986 into
Chinese theft at Lawrence Livermore national laboratory, with China
subsequently using the stolen information to build a nuclear device
(which some published sources identified as an experimental neutron
bomb that was detonated in September 1988) and transferring some of
the secrets to Pakistan. China also assisted in fuel fabrication
for the rebuilt and upgraded Parr-1 research reactor, whose
capacity was doubled from five to ten megawatts in 1991, the Jan.
24,1991, Nucleonics Week said. Moreover, China has given Pakistan
enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel two nuclear weapons, nuclear
arms control specialists Gary Milhollin and Gerard White wrote in
the May 12,1991, Washington Post. They also stated that Chinese
scientists have been sighted at the Kahuta complex (in which gas
centrifuges are used to produce weapons-grade uranium), and that,
in 1986, China sold Pakistan tritium (used to achieve fusion in
hydrogen bombs and to increase the yield of tritium boosted nuclear
bombs). China is also believed by Western intelligence to have
given a design for a 25- Kt solid-core implosion device to
Pakistan, Nucleonics Week reported May 23,1991.
On Dec. 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build a 300-MW nuclear
power reactor for Pakistan. The project will cost Pakistan the
below-market price of $500 million (with Pakistan paying for local
spending and China providing foreign exchange), and China will also
transfer nuclear technology, according to the Jan. 23, 1992, Far
Eastern Economic Review. Japan, Germany, and France have reportedly
denied supporting systems and components, according to Nuclear
Suppliers Group policy. In 1990 and 1991, Germany and France (which
has declined to sell Pakistan a reactor) began to require
full-scope safeguards (IAEA inspections not only of transferred
materials, but also of all other declared nuclear facilities of the
recipient country). China, in contrast, does not require full-scope
safeguards. Pakistan has refused IAEA safeguards on its nuclear
fuel cycle program, but requested IAEA safeguards for the Chinese
reactor. Chinese officials claim construction can be completed (in
about 7 years) despite the Western ban on supplies. Work reportedly
started on Aug. 1, 1993.
Algeria. In contrast to long-suspected nuclear cooperation with
Pakistan, China's program to help Algeria (not a party to the NPT)
build a nuclear reactor was secret until April 1991. The Washington
Times on Apr. 11, 1991, first reported about the Chinese
construction of a nuclear reactor in Algeria as part of a weapons
program, generating renewed concerns about covert nuclear
technology transfers to the Middle East. U.S. intelligence found
that the nuclear reactor under construction may be used potentially
to produce nuclear bomb fuel, according to the Apr. 20, 1991
Washington Post. The report further stated that intelligence
experts were suspicious about the military nature of the reactor
because: it is believed to be larger than the size required for
nuclear research, there are no electrical power generation
facilities, a Soviet-made surface-to-air missile battery is nearby,
and the facility is located at a remote site (at Ain Oussera about
155 miles south of Algiers in the Sahara Desert south of the Atlas
Mountains). According to Nucleonics Week of Apr. 18, 1991, some
U.S. intelligence estimates of the size of the cooling towers
suggest a possible upgraded power level as great as 60 megawatts.
Algeria said Apr. 30, 1991 that the reactor would only generate
electrical power and produce radioactive isotopes for medical
research, would be fueled by low-enriched uranium, and would have
a maximum thermal output of 15 megawatts.
The Chinese initially did not admit to their nuclear assistance to
Algeria. On Apr. 14,1991, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied the
Washington Times report without reference to a nuclear reactor.
Then on Apr. 30, the Chinese issued a revised response, saying that
the agreement on nuclear cooperation for China to provide a nuclear
reactor to Algeria had been signed in 1983 and that the reactor
would be used only for peaceful purposes since its power would be
10-16 megawatts. The statement also claimed that since China did
not join the IAEA until 1984, it did not have to seek IAEA
safeguards on the deal with Algeria. In fact, China applied to join
the IAEA in September 1983. Observers are concerned about the
covert nature of the deal from 1983 until the public disclosure and
other suspicious aspects of the reactor site. Nevertheless, the
Bush Administration did not express great concern about the Chinese
reactor in Algeria, especially since Algeria promised to request
IAEA safeguards. The State Department said, in April 1991, that it
was aware of the cooperation but had no reason to conclude that the
assistance was knowingly part of a weapons program.
Iran. According to published reports and Chinese admissions, China
-- Iran's largest single arms supplier during the Iran-Iraq War --
concluded covert agreements in 1989 and 1991 with Iran to provide
nuclear technology. Iran also is believed to have substantial
nuclear collaboration with Pakistan, long a recipient of Chinese
nuclear assistance. Moreover, Iran and Syria agreed to establish
joint military industries and to develop surface-to-surface
missiles, according to Middle East Today of Oct. 3, 1991. CIA
Director James Woolsey testified on July 28, 1993 that as "Iran's
principal nuclear supplier," China has provided nuclear technology
that have been consistent with the NPT, but "of concern"
nevertheless because of Iran's nuclear weapons program.
There had been reports of Chinese-Iranian nuclear cooperation
coupled with public denials. Nucleonics Week of May 2, 1991
reported that U.S. and European intelligence found that since
1988,15 Iranian nuclear engineers from Iran's nuclear research
center at Isfahan have been secretly trained in China; that a
secret Iranian-Chinese nuclear cooperation agreement dates from
after 1986; and that China transferred technology for reactor
construction and other projects at Isfahan. On June 26,1991, a
similar account appeared in the Washington Post about "Beijing's
Tehran Connection." The Chinese embassy on July 2 responded that
"China has struck no nuclear deals with Iran." The Washington Times
reported on Oct. 16,1991 that China Nuclear Energy Industry
Corporation experts were building a nuclear reactor in Iran as part
of a secret weapons program. The Chinese, on October 21, denied the
story as "groundless." In early July 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng
not only visited Tehran, but especially stopped at Isfahan, China
officially announced. An Arabic newspaper in London reported on
July 11,1991, that Li promised nuclear cooperation and went to
Isfahan to visit Chinese nuclear scientists and the military
complexes there.
In February 1992, an IAEA team visited Iran and found that a
Chinese-supplied calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation
equipment) and small nuclear reactor were not part of an Iranian
weapons program as reported by the press in October 1991. The IAEA
mission (on a pre-arranged and limited visit, not a special
inspection) looked at six Iranian sites - with the Chinese calutron
and reactor -- and found no proof there, at the time, that any
Iranian nuclear activity violated peaceful principles. The team
found that the Chinese-supplied calutron is different from the
calutrons used by Iraq to enrich uranium. The one in Iran was found
to be a standard electromagnetic separator configured for natural
zinc and used to produce stable isotopes, with no enrichment
capability (at the time). The inspectors also said that the mini
neutron reactor is still under construction, although the fuel has
been supplied, and the LAEA will be implementing safeguards.
Nonetheless, skeptics point out that: (1) Iran could still evade
international discovery of any hidden nuclear weapons activity as
Iraq had done extensively; and (2) Iraq had started out with a
small calutron and then developed numerous and larger ones. The
Iranians reportedly said that they reluctantly turned to China
after failing to obtain preferred Western assistance due to export
controls.
The LAEA visit was prompted by an Oct. 30, 1991, Washington Post
report saying that Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb and that
China is secretly providing a calutron for uranium enrichment, a
nuclear reactor to be located at Isfahan, and training for Iranian
nuclear engineers. On the same day, Senators Cranston and Biden
expressed concern that Bush Administration officials in June 1991
had testified that they have "no reason to conclude that the
Chinese are assisting Iran in developing nuclear weapons." The Oct.
31, 1991 Washington Post, however, alleged that U.S. intelligence
had warned about China's nuclear technology transfers to Iran
before June. On Nov. 4, 1991, China admitted that Chinese and
Iranian companies signed "commercial" contracts in 1989 and 1991 to
transfer respectively an electromagnetic isotope separator
(calutron) and a small nuclear reactor, for "peaceful purposes."
China also plans to export two 300-MVV nuclear reactors to Iran
that would include technical training. Iran has asked that Germany
or another Western country resume construction of two nuclear
reactors at Bushehr damaged by Iraqi air attacks in 1987 and 1988.
Western countries, suspecting a civilian cover for a weapons
program, have refused. On Sept. 10,1992, China and Iran finalized
an agreement on "nuclear energy cooperation," when Iranian
President Rafsanjani visited Beijing accompanied by top-level
military and atomic energy officials. China estimates that the
projects will take 10 years to complete, but, as with the Chinese
nuclear reactor for Pakistan, supporting Western components and
equipment are being denied to Iran. Iran, an NPT-signatory, has an
IAEA safeguards agreement to submit all declared nuclear materials
to inspections. However, Iraq had shown the weaknesses of the IAEA
safeguards system. The United States suspects a tenacious,
long-term Iranian nuclear weapons program and opposes even dual-use
nuclear technology transfers to Iran. Suspicions arise partly from:
(1) oil- and gas-rich Iran does not need nuclear power plants; (2)
it is allegedly engaged in a $2 billion-a-year military buildup
including the nuclear program; and (3) Iran in 1991-1992 sought and
almost acquired for plutonium production a large,
completely-Chinese nuclear research reactor (25-30 MW) together
with key fuel cycle facilities from Argentina, revealed Nucleonics
Week (Sept. 24, 1992). U.S. pressure halted these shipments --
which are unnecessary for a peaceful nuclear program, with MFN
status for China a factor, said Nucleonics Week (Oct. 1, 1992). The
May 27, 1993, New York Times reported that the Clinton
Administration plans a new approach to isolate Iran, including
trying to persuade China to cancel nuclear deals.
Iraq. China, already a major arms supplier to Iraq, reportedly also
transferred dual-use nuclear technology and know-how to that
country. China helped Iraq build sophisticated magnets for
stabilizing uranium enrichment centrifuges, according to Middle
East Markets (a Financial Times newsletter), the Washington Times
reported on Dec. 14, 1989. Iraq reportedly sought Chinese
assistance only after failing to obtain the special magnets from
British sources. China also sold Iraq low-enriched uranium from a
Chinese military reprocessing plant in the late 19708, according to
Nucleonics Week (May 9, 1991). The Nuclear Control Institute
obtained a declassified U.S. intelligence document released on July
1, 1991, showing that China during 1984-1986 conducted for Iraq a
feasibility study on building a clandestine nuclear reactor.
Chinese aid was apparently limited (perhaps due to Iraq's success
in obtaining Western technology before Desert Shield/Storm), but
with international sanctions since late 1990, Iraq may give more
consideration to Chinese technology.
Syria. On Nov. 29, 1991, China explained that it plans to sell a
small (30-kilowatt) nuclear reactor to Syria as an IAEA technical
assistance program. The IAEA first denied the Syrian request
because Syria, though a party to the NPT, refused to sign a
safeguards agreement. In February 1992, however, the IAEA said
Syria agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities.
Since May 1992, the IAEA has had a safeguards agreement for the
Chinese-supplied reactor and fuel.
Nonproliferation Cooperation and Compliance
MTCR Guidelines. In April 1987, Canada, France, West Germany,
Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States established the
MTCR as a set of guidelines to control the export of equipment and
technology that could contribute to a missile system capable of
delivering nuclear weapons (i.e., a missile capable of delivering
a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead to 300 km (186 miles)). "Membership"
has expanded to 23 countries. The United States originally sought
the cooperation of its allies in recognition of the limited
effectiveness of unilateral American restraint. The Soviet Union
and China were not approached to speed the negotiation process. The
MTCR is not a treaty or executive agreement, and has no
organization that monitors compliance or coordinates activities
(like the IAEA). U.S. statutes on sanctions in part enforce the
MTCR. States adhering to the MTCR have agreed to use the guidelines
in deciding whether to export a specified set of items. The
guidelines apply to certain items and technologies listed in the
MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex. Category I of the Annex covers
the most sensitive items and technologies, including complete
missile systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to
a range of at least 300 km, their complete subsystems, and related
production facilities and equipment. Category II lists usable
components, equipment, material, and technology (such as for
propulsion and guidance).
On Jan. 7, 1993, MTCR members issued new guidelines to cover
delivery systems (except manned aircraft) capable of delivering all
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons). The MTCR now strongly calls for denying transfers of
Category I items, and any missiles (regardless of payload capable
of a maximum range of at least 300 km) and Category II items judged
to be intended for delivering any weapon of mass destruction.
Without that judgement, the MTCR calls for restraint in Category II
transfers. China has not promised to adhere to the new guidelines;
nevertheless, the old guidelines cover the M-9 and M-11 missiles.
Compliance with the MTCR. In Beijing in November 1991,
then-Secretary of State James Baker said the Chinese agreed to
observe the MTCR guidelines and parameters, and that the Americans
"understand that this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles." As
part of the bargain, China required that the United States lifts
the June 1991 sanctions. The Chinese Foreign Minister sent a
written message (requested letter received on Feb. 1, 1992, but not
yet made public) to Baker, reportedly confirming the commitment to
the MTCR and to not transfer the M-9s and M-11s. China promised to
abide by the MTCR, but is not a "member" or formal "adherent."
Nonetheless, at issue is China's compliance with the MTCR, since
any violation would still require U.S. sanctions under the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) and Export Administration Act (EAA). On
Aug. 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration determined that China
violated the MTCR by transferring M-11 components to Pakistan. (See
M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions.) Before that, there were reports
of transfers that raised concern among some analysts that China has
circumvented its agreement to abide by the MTCR, by shipping
components, technology, and materials that directly or indirectly
contribute to covert, local missile production programs in Iran
(e.g., Tondar-68), Syria (e.g., Scuds), Pakistan (e.g., Hatf-3s),
and perhaps other countries -- instead of delivering complete
missiles. In addition, there is a concern that China could aid the
improvement of missiles, including modifications of parts of
M-series missiles for longer-range missiles and conversions from
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into SRBMs (e.g., the 8610).
Recently, a new concern has arisen over possible Chinese
retransfers of anti-ballistic missile systems, with Beijing's
purchase of Russian S-300 systems and reported acquisition of U.S.
Patriot missile technologies.
On Jan. 15, 1992, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates
testified that Iran has turned to China for battlefield and cruise
missiles. Gates has also testified that Saudi Arabia is expanding
its CSS-2 support facilities and that Egypt could begin operations
at a missile production facility at any time. (Sino-Egyptian
military ties date to 1976.) On Jan. 31,1992, the New York Times,
citing senior Administration officials, revealed that U.S.
intelligence reports indicated that China recently delivered to
Syria 30 tons of chemicals needed to build a solid-fuel missile and
planned to transfer 60 tons more in March or April. The same
reports also said intelligence analysts found China had already
delivered to Pakistan guidance units that could be used to control
the flight of the M-11 missile. Jane's Defence Weekly (Feb. 1,
1992) reported that China has helped Iran to develop a new version
of the M-11 missile called Tondar-68 with a range of 1,000 km (621
miles). According to the Feb. 22, 1992, Washington Post, an
intelligence briefing on Capitol Hill (prompting Senator Biden to
call for a closed session of the full Senate) disclosed that China
has contracts to sell missile and nuclear related technology worth
over $1 billion to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and other countries in
the Middle East, including a recent contract to sell to Iran
components that could be used to develop a medium-range ballistic
missile. On Mar. 5,1992, William Safire wrote in the New York Times
that Chinese engineers are suspected to be in Syria covertly
helping Syria to build missiles locally. China "recently"
transferred to Iran sensitive gyroscopes "used in" missile guidance
systems, according to an intelligence report cited by the Wall
Street Journal on Mar. 18, 1992. The May 19, 1993, Flight
International, citing Israeli intelligence sources, reported that
Iran is developing a medium to long range solid-fuel missile
believed to be based on the Chinese M-9 program, with Iranian funds
(according to a signed agreement).
The NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Since 1984, China has
said that it does not advocate, encourage, or engage itself in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it requests IAEA
safeguards as a condition for its nuclear exports since joining the
IAEA in 1984. Nevertheless, China made secret, un-safeguarded
nuclear transfers. China also refused to sign the NPT, calling it
"discriminatory." With China shunned by Western countries after the
June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, however, Premier Li Peng personally
announced on Aug. 10, 1991 (when then-Japanese Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu made the first visit to China by a Group of Seven
leader since the crackdown), that China "has in principle" agreed
to sign the NPT. Chinese officials promised then-Secretary of State
Baker in Beijing in November 1991 that China would sign the NPT by
April 1992. China acceded to the NPT on Mar. 9, 1992.
On Feb. 24,1993, CIA Director James Woolsey testified that Chinese
nuclear deals with Algeria and Syria appear consistent with NPT
obligations. On July 28, 1993, Woolsey testified that China's
nuclear cooperation with kan is NPT-consistent but "of concern,"
and the nuclear relationship with Pakistan is "of greater concern."
Moreover, China does not require full-scope safeguards (IAEA
inspections of all other declared nuclear materials and facilities
in addition to the imported supplies). Also, China does not belong
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral effort to
harmonize and strengthen the export controls of supplier countries
on all (including dual-we) nuclear technology. With 27 members,
including Russia, the NSG agrees on up-to-date international norms
to supplement the limited IAEA safeguards on fissile materials.
Policy Issues for Congress
While China in 1992 signed the NPT and promised to abide by the
MTCR, concerns remain about Chinese (1) compliance with current
commitments and (2) cooperation with international nonproliferation
regimes. The U.S. policy response has been crucial but
controversial -- with trade interests at times conflicting with
security concerns about missile and nuclear proliferation.
Unilateral Policies
No Nonproliferation Conditions on MFN. The United States continues
the longstanding policy of engagement with China, including normal
MFN trade treatment. Responding partly to congressional pressures,
the Bush Administration in 1991 had imposed targeted sanctions in
response to Chinese MTCR-violations, while keeping the MFN status
to preserve U.S. leverage and promote economic and political reform
in China. Bill Clinton had criticized former President Bush for
rejecting legislative efforts to link renewal of China's MFN tariff
treatment to human rights, trade, and nuclear and missile
nonproliferation. On May 28, 1993, President Clinton (in renewing
China's MFN status) issued a Report to Congress and an Executive
Order (E.O.) that specified human rights conditions for renewal of
MFN in 1994, but called for continuing to address weapons
proliferation (and trade) issues separate from MFN. The E.O. stated
that the Administration shall pursue other legislative and
executive actions to ensure that China adheres to the NPT, MTCR,
and other nonproliferation commitments.
On May 28,1993, Senator Mitchell and Representative Pelosi
supported the White House's E.O., instead of their legislation for
conditions on human rights, trade, and nonproliferation (S. 806 and
H.R. 1890). On May 28 and June 8, 1993, Senator DeConcini and
Representative Solomon introduced S. 1066 and H.J.Res. 208 to deny
China MFN status. The House rejected (105-318) H.J.Res. 208 on July
21,1993.
M-11s and MTCR-Related Sanctions. After months of policy debate,
the Administration on Aug. 24, 1993 determined that China shipped
M-11 related equipment (not missiles) to Pakistan and imposed
so-called Category II sanctions. However, the Oct. 20, 1993
Washington Post reported that the National Security Council has
been reviewing the decision to implement the sanctions, due to
industry objections. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State
Winston Lord indicated on Aug. 31, 1993 that Washington is ready to
negotiate a waiver for the sanctions, which might require a new
Chinese commitment to the MTCR, perhaps as a "formal adherent." (An
opportunity may be President Clinton's meeting with the Chinese
president at the November meeting of APEC (Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation) in Seattle.) U.S. law requires sanctions for 2 years,
but the President may waive the sanctions if it is "essential" to
U.S. national security. An advantage of granting China "membership"
may be greater Chinese commitment to missile nonproliferation.
Disadvantages of this step may include inapplicability of sanctions
to MTCR adherents and information sharing. However, a more formal
Chinese commitment without member status might entail a bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on the MTCR, specifying a denial of
certain missiles and technology, such as the U.S.-Russian agreement
signed Sept. 2,1993.
The Dec. 4, 1992, Los Angeles Times and Washington Post first
reported that intelligence analysts sighted Chinese M-11 SRBMs in
Pakistan "within the last two weeks," but intelligence officials
differ on whether the unconfirmed missile or missile component
delivery violated the MTCR. However, the New York Times of May 6,
1993, reported that in the first four months of 1993, the
intelligence community collected new "compelling evidence" that
China has violated the MTCR by shipping M-11 missiles or missile
equipment to Pakistan. On May 14,1993, intelligence officials
briefed Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on new
evidence they judged to be "strongly" suggesting that China
transferred M-11 missiles or missile equipment to Pakistan in
violation of the MTCR, reported the Washington Post on May 18,
1993. The President's May 28,1993, Report to Congress specifically
cited reports that "China in November 1992 transferred MTCR-class
M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan." (Emphasis added.)
The Administration said in August 1993 that evidence of a missile
equipment transfer is "unambiguous," but evidence on a missile
shipment is ambiguous. Some observers have questioned whether there
are misunderstandings on the Chinese commitment to the MTCR, but
the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Sept. 2,1993, that
"China understands well the commitments it has made."
With the MTCR depending on national legislation for legal validity
and enforcement, Section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) (P.L. 90-629) and Section 11B of the Export Administration
Act (EAA) (P.L. 96-72) require U.S. sanctions if the President
determined that a foreign entity, after Nov. 5, 1990, knowingly
"exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade of any MTCR
equipment or technology that contributes to the acquisition,
design, development, or production of missiles in a country that is
not an MTCR adherent..." "MTCR equipment or technology refers to
items listed in Category I or Category II of the MTCR Annex.
Category I sanctions (for missile shipments) would deny all U.S.
Government contracts and export licenses for Munitions List and
EAA-controlled items, and may also ban imports of the sanctioned
entities' products into the U.S. market (if the transfer
"substantially contributed to the design, development, or
production of missiles).
The Aug. 24, 1993, Category II sanctions on 1 Pakistani and 11
Chinese arms exporting entities are limited to the denial for 2
years of U.S. Government contracts and export licenses for missile
equipment or technology (MTCR Annex items). The net impact on U.S.
businesses is uncertain. China's response has been limited to a
threat to end its commitment to the MTCR. The primary effect of the
sanctions is on the export of U.S. (e.g., Hughes and Martin
Marietta) and foreign satellites (containing U.S. components) to
China for launch before sanctions are lifted, as satellite
components are in the MTCR Annex. (China has 3 contracts to launch
U.S.-built satellites in 1994-95.) However, U.S. commercial launch
service providers (e.g., McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics)
may benefit from a lack of Chinese competition. While U.S.,
European, and Russian companies provide launch services in addition
to the Chinese, China depends on satellite launching for money as
well as prestige.
A 1989 U.S.-China agreement allows the China Great Wall Industry
Corporation to launch nine U.S.-built satellites until 1994 and
requires China to charge prices "on par" with Western competitors
(about $40-50 million per geostationary orbit launch). The Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990-91 (P.L. 101-246) has
banned the export of Munitions List items and U.S.-built satellites
for Chinese launch (in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen
massacre), but the President may waive the ban.
The Aug. 24, 1993, sanctions on MTCR Annex items were imposed on
China under the so-called "Helms amendment" to the AECA (enacted by
the 102nd Congress). The language applies missile proliferation
sanctions under the AECA in the case of countries with non-market
economies (but excluding the former Warsaw Pact countries) to all
activities of the government relating to development or production
of missile equipment or technology, space systems or equipment,
military aircraft, and electronics. While narrowing "aircraft" to
"military aircraft," the amendment left "electronics" in original,
broad terms. Nonetheless, in introducing the amendment on July 29,
1991, Senator Helms specified the intention to sanction all "arms
exporting' entities.
Previously, in June 1991, then-President Bush had imposed these
MTCR-related sanctions on two Chinese arms trading companies as
well as targeted sanctions on exports of high-speed computers and
satellites for Chinese launch, after Chinese missile technology
transfers to Pakistan. These sanctions affected China Great Wall
Industry Corporation (which has offered satellite launch services
since 1986) and China Precision Machinery Import and Export
Corporation (which has marketed the M-series missiles abroad). The
imposition of the sanctions also reflected national security and
proliferation concerns about high technology transfers to China.
According to the Bush Administration, the June 1991 sanctions were
effectively lifted on Mar. 23,1992, after they successfully led the
Chinese to agree to abide by the MTCR.
Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act. In the FY1993 Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 102-484), Congress enacted the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act. It requires sanctions against countries that
transfer to Iran or Iraq any goods or technology (including
dual-use items and training or information) that "could" contribute
to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. The required sanctions include suspension of
economic and military assistance, and nuclear cooperation (less
relevant for China); and AECA and EAA MTCR-related sanctions.
On June 29, 1993, Senators McCain and Lieberman introduced S. 1172
to expand mandatory and discretionary sanctions that would be
imposed against foreign suppliers helping Iran or Iraq to acquire
weapons of mass destruction or the means of their delivery.
Additional mandatory sanctions include suspension of U.S. and
multilateral bank assistance; co-development, co-production,
military, and dual-use technical exchange agreements; and transfer
of Munitions List items. Meanwhile, S. 1064 (Glenn)/H.R. 2368
(Lantos) would require certain sanctions (e.g., affecting arms
exports and Eximbank loans) on any foreign or U.S. person assisting
a foreign country in acquiring a nuclear weapon or unsafeguarded
nuclear material.
Bilateral Approach
Resuming Security Dialogue. After the June 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown, the Bush Administration suspended military exchanges and
arms sales with China, among other sanctions. Congress, in P.L.
101-246, also imposed sanctions, including a suspension of export
licenses for Munitions List items, crime control and detection
equipment, and satellites. Some, however, advocate that Washington
restart a dialogue with Beijing and especially the Chinese military
on security issues, like proliferation.
Multilateral Options
International Lending. Congress may restrict only U.S. support for
multilateral development bank (MDB) loans. For example, U.S. law
requires anti-narcotics cooperation for U.S. support for MDB loans
to certain countries. After the violent suppression of protests,
the United States since early 1990 has supported only MDB loans to
China for basic human needs. U.S. influence is limited, however,
and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have resumed and
increased substantial lending to China. In H.Rept. 103-126 (Obey)
on H.R. 2295, the FY1994 foreign aid appropriations bill, the House
Committee on Appropriations recommended that the Secretary of the
Treasury develop a reform agenda for G-7 discussion aimed at
denying funds from international financial institutions to
countries that have not signed international agreements on
nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and
missiles. S. 1064 (Glenn)/E.R. 2358 (Lantos) would seek to prevent
the use of IFI funds for nuclear weapons acquisition.
Five Power Talks and F-16s for Taiwan. The Administration may also
pressure Beijing to resume arms control talks with Paris, Moscow,
London, and Washington. In his Jan. 13, 1993 nomination hearing,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed a multilateral
approach to the Chinese proliferation problem, citing the Five
Power talks. The President's May 28, 1993, report to Congress on
renewal of MFN for China stated that China has a special
responsibility to continue these talks. H.R. 2333 (Hamilton), the
FY1994-95 State Department Authorization Act, states that the
President should restart the Perm Five talks, even without China.
However, the Sept. 2,1992, U.S. decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16A/B
fighters has complicated the Sino-U.S. dialogue on
nonproliferation. China suspended its participation in the Arms
Control in the Middle East (ACME), or Permanent Five, talks,
arguing that Washington violated the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of
Aug. 17, 1982, on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Some analysts
believe some Chinese officials would increase proliferation
activities in retaliation for the F-16 sale or actual deliveries.
China had agreed, during the June 1991 bid for MFN, to join in
President Bush's initiative for the Five Power talks that were to
include bans on nuclear bomb materials and ballistic missiles in
the Middle East. At the third meeting in May 1992, China refused to
include missiles and missile technology in the guidelines on
weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral pressures are believed by
many observers to be more effective than unilateral U.S. actions,
such as in trade or export control policy. U.S. leadership to press
China to participate fully in strengthening international
nonproliferation regimes would capitalize on China's desire to be
treated as a "great power" and perceived as a responsible world
leader.
Nonproliferation Regimes. Recognizing limits to the effectiveness
of the NPT/IAEA safeguards system -- as shown by Iraq's advanced
nuclear weapons program, the U.N. Security Council has tried to
strengthen the LAEA's verification authority, particularly in Iraq.
Section 161 of H.R. 2333 (Hamilton) directs the President to urge
the IAEA to continue to improve its effectiveness. H.R. 2076
(Stark) was introduced to seek a comprehensive U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy.
In addition, U.S., Japanese, and European officials together may
urge China to also commit to the NSG and Australia Group (on
chemical and biological weapons). Chinese participation is also
required for regional arms control groups, such as the five-
country talks proposed for South Asia by Pakistan in June 1991. The
FY1993 foreign assistance appropriations act (P.L. 102-391)
required a report on nuclear non- proliferation efforts in South
Asia and nuclear and missile programs of China, India, and
Pakistan. The State Department submitted that report on Apr.
29,1993, stating that "concerns remain about whether China has
terminated its links to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and
about its missile export policies." Kenneth Adelman has urged
advancing a new international norm by expansion of the 1987
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty into
a worldwide treaty to ban ballistic missiles and missile testings.
Another forum is the new Cocom. At a November 1992 meeting, Cocom
was transformed into a 42-member Cocom Cooperation Forum that
includes former Soviet-bloc countries, refocusing export control
from communist to proliferation threats. Russian cooperation is
important as Russia is now selling China advanced weapons, and
missile and nuclear technology, which worry U.S. officials because
of China's enhanced capability to develop weapons for export,
testified CIA Director James Woolsey on Feb. 24,1993. On Dec.
18,1992, Russia and China signed an agreement on the sale of
Russian nuclear reactors, raising concern about re-transfer of
technology to Iran and Pakistan.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1890 (supersedes H.R. 1835) (Pelosi)
Extends to the People's Republic of China renewal of
nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain
conditions are met. Introduced Apr. 28, 1993; referred to
Committees on Ways and Means, and Rules. Referred to Subcommittee
on Trade on May 6,1993.
H.R. 2076 (Stark)
Establishes a policy of the United States with respect to nuclear
nonproliferation. Introduced May 11, 1993; referred to Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Referred on May 25, 1993, to Subcommittees on
Europe and the Middle East; Economic Policy, Trade, and the
Environment; Asia and the Pacific; and International Security,
International Organizations, and Human Rights.
H.R. 2333 (Hamilton)
Authorizes appropriations for State Department, USIA, and related
agencies. Referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 8,1993.
Reported to House (H.Rept. 103-126), June 11,1993. Passed House
(273-144), June 22,1993. Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, June 29,1993. (Also see S. 1281 (Pell).)
S. 806 (Mitchell)
Extends to the People's Republic of China renewal of
nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment provided certain
conditions are met. Introduced Apr. 22,1993; referred to Committee
on Finance.
S. 1054 (Glenn)/H.R. 2358 (Lantos)
Imposes sanctions against any foreign or U.S. person that assists
a foreign country in acquiring a nuclear explosive device or
unsafeguarded nuclear material, and for other purposes. Referred to
Committee on Foreign Relations, May 27, 1993.
S. 1065 (DeConcini)
Denies the People's Republic of China most-favored-nation trade
treatment. Introduced May 28,1993; referred to Committee on
Finance.
S. 1172 (McCain/Lieberman)
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Amendments of 1993. Introduced
June 29, 1993; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.



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