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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

[CRS Issue Brief for Congress]

91023: Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Issues in the 104th Congress

Updated November 1, 1996

Zachary Davis
Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background
The Wherewithal for Nuclear Weapons
The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: The Role of Congress
North Korea's Noncompliance with its NPT and IAEA Obligations
Former Soviet Weapons and Materials: Nunn- Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
Iran's Nuclear Program
Other Potential Hot Spots
The Clinton Administration's Nonproliferation Policy
Federal Organization for Nonproliferation
Counterproliferation
Export Controls
Recent Congressional Interest
Analysis
The NPT
Tradeoffs

LEGISLATION

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

RELATED CRS ISSUE BRIEFS

CRS Issue Brief 91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

CRS Issue Brief 90149, Pakistan Aid Cutoff

CRS Issue Brief 94054, Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Threat Reduction: Issues and Agenda

CRS Issue Brief 92056, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress


SUMMARY

Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major goal of U.S. policy since the United States developed and used the atomic bomb against Japan in 1945. This goal has taken on new importance for U.S. national security in light of several post-Cold War events. One was the breakup of the Soviet Union, which left thousands of nuclear weapons and an unknown amount of nuclear materials scattered throughout the former Soviet territories. The United States is providing assistance (through the Nunn-Lugar programs) to prevent former Soviet nuclear weapons or the materials used to make them from falling into the wrong hands.

Another post-Cold War nonproliferation event was Iraq's success in clandestinely developing nuclear weapons despite being a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Third, North Korea diverted plutonium to a secret bomb program, threatened to withdraw from the NPT, and blocked inspections. The United States signed an agreement with North Korea to freeze its current nuclear program in October 1994.

Other events strengthened nonproliferation efforts. These include the agreement by Argentina and Brazil to allow inspection of their nuclear activities; South Africa's joining the NPT after dismantling six nuclear weapons and agreeing to international inspection of all of its nuclear activities; France and China joining the Nonproliferation Treaty as nuclear weapons states in 1991; and successful enforcement of nonproliferation commitments in Iraq.

Five states now have declared nuclear arsenals -- the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China. Three are credited with having some nuclear weapons -- India, Israel, and Pakistan. India tested a nuclear explosive in 1974, but denies having a nuclear arsenal. North Korea probably has enough plutonium to make one or two weapons. Among the new republics of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to return nuclear weapons to Russia and joined the NPT as non-weapons states. Still, the safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union is far from satisfactory, as illustrated by continued reports of nuclear smuggling. The United States is a leader of international nonproliferation efforts. These efforts include support for the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and several multilateral export control groups. In May 1995, 175 parties to the NPT made the treaty permanent by extending it for an indefinite period.

For the 104th Congress, the most immediate nonproliferation issues were: (1) smuggling of nuclear materials from Russia and the FSU; (2) Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran; (3) implementation of the agreement to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program; (4) strengthening nuclear and dual-use export controls; (5) strengthening the IAEA inspection system; and (6) defining counterproliferation policy.

Longer term issues include: (1) the India-Pakistan nuclear arms race; (2) nuclear developments in Iran; (3) plutonium-use policy; (4) China's nuclear exports; (5) Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal; and (6) disposal of fissile materials from dismantled Russian and U.S. warheads.


MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In September, the President signed H.R. 3230 (P.L. 104-201), which includes support for the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other nonproliferation measures.


BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background

At present five nations have announced nuclear arsenals -- the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and China; three are credited with undeclared nuclear arsenals -- Israel, Pakistan, and India (which tested a nuclear explosive in 1974). North Korea probably has enough plutonium to build one or two bombs, but has not revealed the full extent of its nuclear activities.

Some expect a new surge of proliferation in the post-Cold War era as nations that once enjoyed the protection of the United States' or former Soviet Union's "nuclear umbrellas" may want powerful new weapons to increase their security. The safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, the India Pakistan nuclear arms race, North Korea's violations of the NPT, continuing suspicions about Iran's nuclear activities, and the availability of weapons-usable materials and technologies are leading reasons for concern.

On the other hand, proliferation could hold constant or decline in the post-Cold War era. Positive developments include: extension of the NPT by its members in May 1995; agreement by the new republics of the former Soviet Union to join the NPT as nonweapons states; the agreement between Argentina and Brazil to end their nuclear weapons efforts and join the Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty -- the Treaty of Tlatelolco; South Africa's joining the NPT in 1991 after dismantling six nuclear weapons and opening up its nuclear facilities to international inspection; ratification of the NPT by France and China; and steps to tighten international controls on nuclear commerce.

The Wherewithal for Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are made from plutonium and/or uranium-235 (U-235). Plutonium is made by exposing natural uranium (U-238) to neutrons in a nuclear reactor and then extracting the plutonium using a chemical separation process (called reprocessing). Weapons-grade U-235 is made by increasing the concentration of U-235 from the 0.7% in natural uranium to 90% or more, using various isotope separation processes. Separation, or "enrichment," processes use electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS), gaseous diffusion, centrifugation of gaseous uranium (uranium hexafluoride, UF6), and lasers to produce uranium rich in the U-235 isotope. The United States ended production of enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in 1964 and shut down its production of plutonium for weapons in 1988. Russian officials have pledged to shut down their plutonium production reactors but have not yet done so. President Clinton called for all countries to end production of enriched uranium and plutonium for explosives in his speech to the UN on Sept. 27, 1993, and supports a treaty to end further production.

The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the combined international effort to contain further spread of nuclear weapons. It is made up of treaties, international organizations, multilateral and bilateral agreements, and unilateral actions intended to prevent further proliferation. The United States was and continues to be a leading proponent of the regime.

Major components of the regime include:

(1)The NPT, which entered into force in 1970. It commits non-nuclear weapons members not to acquire or make them, and to allow international inspection of all their nuclear activities to verify this commitment. The members of the NPT decided in May 1995 to make the treaty permanent. It now has over 180 members, with only a few holdouts remaining.

(2)The IAEA, an international organization established in Vienna in 1957. Its verification system was greatly expanded by the NPT, which requires its non-weapons parties to negotiate inspection agreements with the IAEA to verify the peaceful use of their nuclear materials.

(3)International export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal committee of nuclear supplier nations that maintains multilateral guidelines for nuclear exports, and the Zangger Committee, an NPT affiliate that maintains a "trigger list" of exported nuclear items that must be safeguarded in the recipient state. The NSG and Zangger guidelines were strengthened in 1992 to prevent a repeat of Iraq's nuclear shopping spree. Also, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts exports of nuclear-capable missiles.

(4) Export control and licensing laws (and regulations) for transfers of nuclear technology or materials, including dual-use technology that can contribute to nuclear weapons development.

(5)Laws requiring sanctions for violations of nonproliferation commitments.

(6)The Convention on Physical Security for Nuclear Materials (1987), which sets international security standards for storing, using, and transporting nuclear materials.

(7)Arms control agreements that satisfy expectations among the non-nuclear weapons states that the nuclear weapons states should reduce their arsenals as they agreed in Article VI of the NPT. Many countries conditioned their support for a long extension of the NPT on progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty.

U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: The Role of Congress

U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy consists of treaty commitments, informal undertakings, executive branch statements and actions, and legislation. It imposes conditions and restrictions on U.S. nuclear exports and cooperation. For a country to receive U.S. nuclear technology, it must have an agreement for nuclear cooperation with the United States. U.S. nuclear exporters must obtain export licenses from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and/or authorization from the Department of Energy (DOE). To import nuclear technology from the United States, non-nuclear weapons states must agree to open all of their peaceful nuclear activities to inspection by the IAEA (full-scope safeguards). U.S. policy also maintains controls over what a recipient state may do with U.S.-supplied materials and technology, including used reactor fuel. These controls are maintained by the DOE via "subsequent arrangements" attached to agreements for cooperation.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) provide the statutory basis for U.S. nonproliferation policy. They require the cutoff of U.S. nuclear cooperation with states that violate nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States or non-nuclear weapons states that test a nuclear explosive. Section 309(c) of the NNPA requires the Department of Commerce to control exports of nuclear dual-use goods (items that have both civilian and military applications). Other dual-use items are subject to controls established in the Export Administration Act (EAA).

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the United States to cut off economic and military aid to countries that supply or receive unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing technology (the Glenn-Symington amendments, Sections 669 and 670). This was applied to Pakistan but was waived for foreign policy and national security reasons after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. To waive the cutoff requirement, Section 620 of the FAA (the Pressler amendment) requires the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that assistance will advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives. President Bush made the last certification in 1990 and aid was subsequently cut off. Administration officials and some Members favor the removal of statutory prohibitions on U.S. assistance such as the Pressler amendment, but this remains controversial. Legislation in the 104th Congress (the Brown amendment) resumed some aid to Pakistan.

Another law, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, requires sanctions against countries that have wilfully aided or abetted the acquisition of nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons materials. Sanctions include denial of loans or credits from international financial institutions.

Although the role of Congress has been limited, another controversial issue is the development and use of plutonium as an energy resource. Plutonium can be used as reactor fuel, but it can also be used to make bombs. The U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation with Japan and Europe do not interfere with their plutonium activities.

At the end of 1995, the U.S. agreement for nuclear cooperation with Euratom -- the European nuclear agency -- expired. A new agreement was approved March 10, 1996, after completing a 90-day congressional review period; the agreement officially took effect April 12, 1996. Some provisions of the new agreement were controversial, because some Members and nonproliferation groups, as well as environmental groups, argued they did not comply with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Specifically, critics of the agreement opposed giving long-term consent to European and Japanese reprocessing of U.S.-origin reactor fuel to make plutonium.

The Carter Administration tried to discourage plutonium use for nonproliferation reasons. The Reagan Administration changed the policy for countries with advanced nuclear power programs that were not deemed proliferation risks (Europe and Japan), but opposed it for others (South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan). The Bush Administration followed the same policy, but took steps to strengthen U.S. nonproliferation policy in the wake of the Gulf war and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Clinton Administration has not revived the anti-plutonium policy of the Carter Administration, but opposes "excess stockpiling" of separated plutonium and supports a ban on production of plutonium and HEU for explosives.

North Korea's Noncompliance with its NPT and IAEA Obligations

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but delayed inspections until 1992. In February 1993, North Korea denied access by IAEA inspectors to two sites which IAEA (and U.S. intelligence ) believed held evidence of clandestine nuclear work and refused to comply with a request for access from the IAEA's Director General, Hans Blix. On March 12, 1993, North Korea notified the United Nations Security Council that it was withdrawing from the NPT, which permits withdrawal after 3 months notice. It subsequently suspended its withdrawal, but claimed to have "unique status" under the NPT, and continued to block inspections. Former CIA Director James Woolsey and Secretary of Defense William Perry warned that North Korea probably had enough plutonium for two bombs and that the fuel unloaded from the 25 MW(th) reactor could contain enough plutonium for several more bombs (see CRS Issue Brief 91141).

In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea to exchange its existing nuclear reactors and reprocessing equipment for modern light water reactor technology that is somewhat less suited to making bombs. North Korea is also receiving shipments of heavy oil to compensate for energy that might have been generated from the reactor it agreed to shut down. The deal requires North Korea to eventually resolve outstanding safeguards violations, including its undeclared plutonium. Many details of the deal are still being negotiated.

South Korea would actually build the reactors and pay for about 60% of the deal. Japan and others would apparently pay for the rest. The United States is paying for the oil shipments and has agreed to pay for and provide safe storage of existing spent nuclear fuel rods. An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor construction project. Negotiations on the construction of the reactors have periodically broken down due to North Korean objections to the central role of South Korea in the project.

A key issue for Congress is the implementation of the agreement and the extent of the U.S. contribution. Some Members oppose using U.S. funds, but most apparently are not prepared to block implementation of the agreement. (See CRS Issue Brief 91141 and CRS Report 95-853, The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework to End North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program.)

Former Soviet Weapons and Materials: Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs

Large quantities of nuclear weapons, weapons materials, and technology in the former Soviet Union are potential proliferation problems. So far, reports of complete weapons being sold have not been confirmed, but many thefts and illegal transfers of nuclear materials have reportedly occurred. A few of these transfers have involved small quantities of weapon-grade material. Also, Russian nuclear and missile experts have apparently accepted offers of employment in countries of concern.

Congress has taken steps to address these problems by creating and funding the NunnLugar /Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. Since 1991, Congress has authorized nearly $2 billion to assist Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with the safe and secure storage, transportation, and dismantlement of nuclear (and chemical) weapons (see CRS Report 93-1057, The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement).

The United States also arranged to purchase 500 metric tons of enriched uranium from dismantled warheads to keep it out of circulation. The warhead materials are to be blended down and made into reactor fuel. The deal, however, has run into difficulties due to haggling over the price the United States would pay for the uranium and due to financial pressures stemming from the privatization of the government corporation charged with implementing the deal, the United States Enrichment Corporation.

Despite initial delays and obstacles, the Defense Department has made progress in using Nunn-Lugar funds to reduce proliferation dangers from former Soviet nuclear weapons. Some Members have questioned the Nunn-Lugar programs in light of Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran and its shaky compliance with chemical and biological weapons agreements. Most, however, view them as "defense by other means."

Iran's Nuclear Program

Top U.S. officials have warned repeatedly of Iran's "crash program" to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran has reportedly attempted to purchase nuclear materials from the FSU and nuclear equipment from many countries. The relatively successful embargo of nuclear sales to Iran is undermined by Russia's sales of reactors and possibly uranium enrichment technology. China also is negotiating reactor sales to Iran.

Iran is a member of the NPT and allows inspections of its nuclear program. Nevertheless, many observers suspect that Iran, which possesses substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, may use its civilian nuclear program as a pretense to establish the technical basis for a nuclear weapons option. If Iran acquires reactors and uranium enrichment and/or plutonium separation (reprocessing) equipment, it would probably take 7 to 10 years for Teheran to build its first nuclear weapons. (See CRS Report 95- 641, Russian Nuclear Reactor and Conventional Arms Transfers to Iran, May 1995).

Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Gone But Not Forgotten

Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had an extensive covert nuclear weapons program that was built under the guise of legitimate nuclear research and development. As a member of the NPT, Iraq had allowed inspections of its facilities by the IAEA, but successfully concealed the true nature of its nuclear program. After the war, U.N. Resolution 687 established a Special Commission and gave it authority to locate and remove Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) conducted extensive investigations of Iraq's nuclear program that revealed a multibillion dollar effort to build nuclear weapons. UNSCOM and the IAEA then eliminated Iraq's nuclear infrastructure and put in place a permanent monitoring system to warn of renewed nuclear activities.

The IAEA has improved its inspection system to provide warning if another country, such as Iran, were to have undeclared nuclear activities. These improvements appear to have worked in North Korea, but are not adequately funded to be fully implemented in all countries of concern,

Other Potential Hot Spots

Nuclear weapons programs in the Middle East and South Asia present ongoing challenges for U.S. nonproliferation policy. One goal is to prevent existing programs from fueling nuclear arms races. India and Pakistan, for example, appear to be engaged in a nuclear arms race. Both countries are advancing their undeclared nuclear capabilities, despite U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Their history of hostility and conflict raises concerns about the possible use of nuclear weapons if war breaks out. Both sides have nuclear-capable missiles.

In the Middle East, Israel and some of its neighbors have endorsed the concept of a nuclear weapons free zone, but do not agree on how such a zone could be established. Moreover, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are thought by many to have continuing interests in acquiring nuclear weapons.

In Asia, a major goal of U.S. policy is to prevent North Korea's nuclear program from causing other countries in the region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to renew their interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Other sources of concern include: Japan's stockpiling of plutonium, China's nuclear modernization program, and China's nuclear and missile exports -- especially to Pakistan, Iran, and Syria.

The Clinton Administration's Nonproliferation Policy

President Clinton unveiled his nonproliferation policy in a speech at the United Nations on September 27, 1993. The President affirmed that the United States will give top priority to nonproliferation in foreign and national security policy. The policy initially included negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty, strengthening the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), creating "specially tailored non-proliferation strategies" for problem states (North Korea, South Asia), negotiating an international ban on production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes, and reforming U.S. export controls to remove impediments for U.S. exporters of high-tech goods.

At the NPT Review Conference in May 1995, Clinton Administration officials reiterated U.S. commitments to reduce nuclear arsenals, with special emphasis on security assurances for NPT members, negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a fissile material cutoff treaty.

Federal Organization for Nonproliferation

The Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce; the ACDA; the intelligence community; and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are all involved in the formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.

  • The National Security Council is the hub of nonproliferation policy.
  • The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department and ACDA, negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation and represents U.S. nonproliferation interests with other states and international organizations such as the IAEA.
  • The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation strategy and policy, and also administers Nunn-Lugar programs.
  • The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national laboratories. DOE also administers some Nunn-Lugar-type programs to control fissile materials in the former Soviet Union.
  • The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to concurrence by the Department of State.
  • The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports as mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, which requires controls on "all export items, other than those licensed by the NRC, which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes."
  • The CIA has a Nonproliferation Center that coordinates intelligence aspects of nonproliferation policy.
  • ACDA is responsible for nonproliferation diplomacy such as extending the NPT and negotiating certain agreements.
Several interagency working groups coordinate the various responsibilities for nonproliferation policy.

It remains to be seen how elimination and/or reorganization of the Departments of Energy, State, ACDA, Commerce and CIA would affect nonproliferation policy. Some Members have called for reorganizing the nonproliferation bureaucracy; the intelligence authorization for 1997 requires a study of possible improvements, while the defense authorization bill creates a new NSC position to coordinate nonproliferation policy (Congressional Record, June 10, 1995, S7588).

Counterproliferation

Counterproliferation is a relatively new term that refers to the military aspects of nonproliferation policy. Broadly defined, counterproliferation includes former Soviet threat reduction, technology development and acquisition, intelligence activities, force modernization, defenses, enforcement of treaties, and intrusive monitoring and inspection. DOD shares interagency responsibility for various aspects of nonproliferation policy, but it is still unclear how counterproliferation relates to the diplomatic aspects of nonproliferation policy. The difficulties of using military force against nuclear targets in the cases of Iraq and North Korea sharpened debate on counterproliferation. A major issue for Congress is to determine if the United States needs new capabilities to counter proliferation threats, and if so, at what cost. (See CRS Report 94-73, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress.)

Export Controls

Export controls are a key component of nonproliferation policy, but their value is questioned by high-tech industries that argue that such controls put an unfair burden on U.S. companies and therefore harm the U.S. economy. The Administration and some Members support streamlining export controls, which are viewed as remnants of the Cold War. Others stress the importance of export controls for fighting continuing proliferation risks in the post Cold War era.

The main export control issue for the 104th Congress is rewriting the Export Administration Act (EAA). The 102nd and the 103rd Congresses attempted to do so but did not succeed. No agreement could be found on the proper balance between national security interests (nonproliferation) and economic interests (exports). However, the Clinton Administration loosened regulations without legislation, most recently in September 1995. The House passed a new EAA bill, HR 361, in July. (See CRS Report 96-492, Export Administration Legislation, August 27, 1996.)

Recent Congressional Interest

The 104th Congress has held hearings on nonproliferation in North Korea, South Asia, Russia, nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism, the US-EURATOM agreement, export controls, the NPT, counterproliferation, and government organization for nonproliferation policy. Legislation has been introduced on export controls, nuclear terrorism, North Korea, government reorganization, aid to Russia, and Iran's nuclear ambitions. (See Legislation Section, below.)

Analysis

Rhetoric aside, nonproliferation has not always been the top priority for U.S. foreign and national security policy. Nevertheless, it remains a vital national security interest. Other strategic and economic interests sometimes prevail over nonproliferation considerations. On the other hand, the United States is the leader of the world nonproliferation regime, and its policy and example are vital to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Without U.S. leadership, the regime would be weaker, there would be less enforcement of the NPT, and there would be fewer barriers to the acquisition of the nuclear materials and technology required to build nuclear weapons.

The underlying assumption of nonproliferation policy is that the spread of nuclear weapons is a threat to U.S. and international security. Whether proliferation threats are on the rise after the Cold War or in decline is difficult to assess. The future of international efforts to stop proliferation, however, hinges on U.S. leadership. If the United States lowers the priority of nonproliferation, other countries are likely to follow.

The NPT. The NPT provides the legal and institutional basis for international nonproliferation policy. While it does not guarantee that dedicated proliferators will not violate their commitments, its system of international safeguards can deter and detect proliferation. Strengthening the IAEA inspection system could reinforce existing technical barriers against proliferation. Also, enforcement of the NPT when cheating is discovered gives the treaty teeth.

Tradeoffs. There are inherent tensions between nonproliferation, on one hand, and efforts to boost exports of certain high-tech goods or improve relations with certain countries on the other. The Clinton policy emphasizes the importance of both nonproliferation and exports, but does not reconcile the dilemma that sometimes requires a choice between the long-term security benefits of nonproliferation and shortterm profits. A shift in emphasis from national security interests towards economic interests could increase proliferation risks. Administration officials have stressed the need to maintain a balance between these two objectives.

Force and Diplomacy. The United States has a variety of tools available to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. In some cases, positive incentives affecting security or trade are effective in persuading countries not to pursue nuclear options. Japan, Germany, Ukraine, South Korea and (arguably) North Korea are examples of the use of U.S. security guarantees to head off nuclear weapons development. In other cases, negative incentives such as sanctions or the use of force are warranted, as in the case of Iraq. Nevertheless, the threat to U.S. security from nuclear proliferation has rarely been deemed urgent enough to justify a military response.


LEGISLATION

P.L. 104-132, S. 735
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act. Provides funds for efforts to combat nuclear, chemical and biological acts of terrorism. Passed Senate June 7, 1995. Passed House March 14, 1996, in lieu of H.R. 2703. Signed into law April 24, 1996.

P.L. 104-201, H.R. 3230
Department of Defense Authorization bills for FY1997. Contains support for NunnLugar /Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, counterproliferation, and new antismuggling and anti-terrorism efforts. House version passed May 15; Senate passed S. 1745 on July 10. The House adopted the conference report August 1 (H.Rept. 104-724). Signed into law September 23, 1996.

H.R. 361 (Roth)
Omnibus Export Administration Act. Revises nonproliferation export controls, including sensitive dual-use goods. Passed House, July 16, 1996.

H.R. 3540 (Callahan)
Foreign Operations Appropriations. Resumes aid to Pakistan which was cut in 1990 when President Bush could no longer certify -- as required by U.S. law -- that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons. The bill also provides $25 million for the deal to end nuclear weapons activities in North Korea. Passed House June 11, passed Senate July 26.

S. 102 (Glenn)
Nuclear Export Reorganization Act of 1995. Improves the organization and management of nuclear export controls. Introduced Jan. 4, 1995; referred to Committee on Governmental Affairs.

S. 1718 (Specter)
Intelligence Authorization for FY1997. Reported from Intelligence Committee April 30, 1996 (S.Rept. 104-258); Armed Services June 6 (S.Rept. 104-277); and Governmental Affairs (S.Rept. 104-337).


FOR ADDITIONAL READING

Allison, Graham, et al. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.

Bosworth, Stephen. Dealing with North Korea. Stimson Center, Nuclear Roundtable with Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), May 31, 1996.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Nuclear Black Market. June 1996.

Crossette, Barbara. "India Bucks the Test Ban Treaty." New York Times, Aug. 28, 1996.

Ikle, Fred. "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age." Foreign Affairs, v. 75. January/February 1996, p. 119.

Molander, Roger, and Peter Wilson. "On Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos." The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994: 19-39.

Reiss, Mitchell. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Schwarzenbach, David. Iran's Nuclear Program: Energy or Weapons? Natural Resources Defense Council, September 1995.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "US Aides See Troubling Trend In China-Pakistan Nuclear Ties." Washington Post, April 1, 1996.

Sokolski, Henry. "Curbing Proliferation's Legitimization." Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1995.

Spector, Leonard. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1995. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Nuclear Nonproliferation: US, International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited. GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, December 1994.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking System Makes Success Unlikely. GAO/AIMD-95-165, August 1995.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. "Bomb Prevention vs. Bomb Promotion: Exports in the 1990s," S.Hrg. 103-1028, May 17, 1994.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Nuclear Nonproliferation Factbook. S.Rept. 103-111, December 1994.

U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. "Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. S. Hrg. 104-422, Part I, Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, 1995.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Proliferation: Threat and Response. April 1996.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 for the year ending December 31, 1995.

CRS Reports

CRS Report 95-547. Davis, Zachary S., Steven Bowman, Robert Shuey, and Ted Galdi. Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.






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