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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

International Conference on

Nuclear Technology and Sustainable Development

5-6 March 2005, Tehran, Iran

 

A WMD-FZ in the Middle East:

Policy Agenda for a New Regional Security System

Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

 

 

Overview of WMD-FZ Issues

 

Scope of a WMD-Free Zone

  • Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
  • Delivery vehicles
  • Related materials and dual-use technologies
  • Conventional weapons (especially those suitable for pre-emption)

 

Verification and Enforcement

  1. International and National Inspections
    • Issues of transparency
    • Credibility of inspections
    • Preventing misuse for intelligence purposes
    1. Types of Inspections
      • NPT-type inspections (with consent of inspected party)
      • Additional Protocol, complementary access inspections (e.g., environmental sampling
      • CWC-type challenge inspections (but with protections of military and civilian proprietary information)
      • UNSCOM and UNMOVIC-type inspections (no right of refusal)
      • Bilateral inspections agreed to by members of WMDFZ regime
    1. Issues of Non-Compliance and Enforcement
      • Enforcement through national pressure
      • Regional enforcement mechanisms
      • UNSC sanctions and enforcement
      • Unilateral great power enforcement

    Incremental Confidence-Building Measures

    1. Military and Political CBMs (similar to CSCE)
      • Military staff meetings, transparency of threat perceptions
      • Pre-notification of exercises
      • Hot line communications channels
      • Transparency of military deployments
      • Reduced alert levels
      1. Civilian and Technological CBMs
        • Strengthen verification capabilities and mutual confidence through cooperation on environmental, climate, natural disaster monitoring
        • Re: BWC, WHO-type early alert network on natural and man-made biological threats
        • Cooperation and transparency in securing and reducing non-military radiological materials at research reactors and medical facilities

       

       

      Long-Term Implementation

        • Multilateral mechanisms for control and secure supply of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and capabilities
        • New technologies for and modes of verification
        • Transparency of WMD activities, including
            1. Register of nuclear scientists and engineers
            2. Import-export end use certification of sensitive technologies
            3. Modalities of national inspections (including quotas)

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       



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