CHAPTER 11
Other Matters
Did Mr Gilligan give adequate
notice to the Government on 28 May 2003 of the allegations to
be reported in his broadcasts on WMD on the Today programme on
29 May?
452. On this issue there was a conflict
between the evidence of Mr Gilligan and the evidence of Mrs Wilson,
the chief press officer of the MoD. When he gave evidence on
12 August Mr Gilligan said:
[12 August, page 55, line 22]
Q. So who was the person who had contacted someone
to talk from the Government side about this story?
A. Well, the contact with - deciding how the
programme should get a Government response is the responsibility
of the office team. They said they would speak to the MoD about
Ingram. Now I think one of the producers on the team - each item
is assigned a producer and the assigned producer spoke to the
Ministry of Defence and told them about the story. As I say,
I also spoke to the MoD. I spoke to Kate Wilson, who is the chief
press officer at the MoD, on my mobile phone about 7.30 and I
told her.
Q. And what did you tell her?
A. I cannot remember exactly what I told her
because it was a mobile phone and I did not take notes of my conversation.
Q. You have no notes of that conversation?
A. No, but I took her through the story in outline.
Q. And what was the gist of the outline that
you gave to her?
A. I cannot remember the exact words I used,
to be absolutely honest, because so much has happened since then
and it was one of the dozens and dozens of calls I made that day
to MoD press officers. I know I took her through the outline
of the story. I said that Ingram would be asked about it the
next day.
[12 August, page 61, line 22]
A … I would not have spent seven and a half
minutes discussing another reporter's story. I did not know what
the cluster bomb story was; and I would not have done it anyway.
You know, it would have been a breach of protocol to talk to
a Government press officer about another reporter's story. I
think it is correct to say - I did not ask the MoD press office
to go away and seek specific responses to these specific points.
I simply wanted to forewarn them about what was going to be in
the broadcast so that Adam Ingram was equipped to discuss it the
following day. But I certainly did not spend the whole time talking
about cluster bombs.
Q. Did you put some of the specific allegations
that you made in the broadcast? In the early morning broadcast,
the 6 o'clock broadcast, you have referred to the Government knowing
that the 45 minute claim was wrong before it was put in. Did
you put that allegation to the Ministry of Defence press officer?
A. I do not believe I did put those specific
words, no. As I say, I cannot remember exactly what I said.
I gave them an outline of the story, a summary of the story.
But I cannot remember exactly what I said to them.
Q. Did you put the other perhaps major allegation,
that Downing Street had ordered the dossier to be sexed up and
more facts to be discovered as broadcast; did you put that to
the MoD press officer?
A. Yes, again I may not have used those exact
words because I cannot remember which words I used. But I put
the gist of the story, which was that the dossier had been exaggerated
at Downing Street's behest.
453. When she gave evidence on 16 September
Mrs Wilson said:
[16 September, page 130, line 10]
Q. Did you have any contact with Mr Gilligan
on that day [28th May]?
A. Yes. I spoke to him at about 7.30.
Q. Did you know Mr Gilligan beforehand?
A. Yes. I have known him since I first started
doing press office work in 1996.
Q. At 7.30 what was said?
A. He called me to say that they were looking
for an interview with Adam Ingram the next morning which was about
cluster bombs, which was quite a topical issue. We talked through
various issues around the subject of cluster bombs, things like
the detonation rates of different weapon systems and things like
that. At the end of the conversation I asked him whether there
was anything else running on the programme and he said he had
something he was working on on WMD and a dodgy dossier. He said
that was not a matter for the MoD, so I did not pursue it.
Q. How long do you think this conversation lasted?
A. I have heard since that it was about 7 minutes.
That sounds about right.
Q. It accords with your recollection?
Q. How many minutes, estimating, do you think
you were talking about the cluster bombs for?
A. At a guess - it was most of the conversation,
6 minutes or so. It was only when I asked him at the end of the
conversation whether he was working on anything else, which is
standard practice, so that I could brief the Minister if there
was anything else he needed to know about, he mentioned the WMD
story.
Q. So far as you can recollect, what exactly
did he say about the WMD story?
A. He said he had - he was working on a story
about WMD and the dodgy dossier, which I took at the time to be
the February dossier.
Q. Did you make any notes of that conversation?
A. I did not make any notes of the conversation.
The reason I did not is because I was working from a Q and A
document on cluster bombs. I tend to make notes if I have something
new or different that I need to go away and look into or research.
There was not anything new or different in what he was talking
about so I did not make any notes.
[16 September, page 215, line 11]
Q. But Mr Gilligan's recollection is that he
rings you, not about somebody else's story but about his own story,
and that he outlines that he has a source who says the dossier
is exaggerated.
A. Well, when we first complained to Richard
Sambrook, Richard Sambrook's response said that Andrew Gilligan
acknowledged that he had spoken to me about cluster bombs but
felt he had added something on the end. I am very clear that
he spoke to me about cluster bombs; and I am very clear that he
only asked me about the WMD accusation when I asked him if he
had anything running. He did not tell me what the accusation
was.
Q. He does mention that there is a WMD story?
A. Yes. I have always been clear. He said he
was working on something on WMD and the dodgy dossier.
Q. And you do not ask him any questions about
it?
A. He said specifically it was not a matter for
the MoD, and I agreed with him.
Q. In terms of referring to a dossier, I think
you accept that there is a reference to a dossier which you took
to be a reference to the February dossier?
Q. There is certainly a reference to a dossier.
Q. And to a dossier being exaggerated?
A. No, just to the dodgy dossier.
LORD HUTTON: You think Mr Gilligan referred to
the dodgy dossier? Did he use the word "dodgy"?
MS ROGERS: You think he did?
A. No, I am clear he did.
Q. In terms of the intelligence community being
unhappy with the dossier, you think he did not mention that at
all?
A. No, I am clear. You have seen the briefing
that we did get. If Andrew had mentioned exactly what the allegations
were, when we spoke to No.10 we would have told them. We would
have had the denial the night before and it would all have been
perfectly straightforward. The only reason why I would not have
mentioned it to No.10 is because I would not have known about
it.
Q. You are, in a sense, working backwards that
No.10 was not told, therefore you cannot have been told because
if you had been told you would have mentioned it?
A. No, I am working forwards. I am very clear
that when I spoke to Andrew Gilligan the conversation was about
cluster bombs. At the end of the conversation I asked him, he
did not volunteer to me, that he was working on something on WMD
and the dodgy dossier but he said it was not a matter for the
MoD. So I do not see how that can be classified as checking the
story with MoD.
Q. Leaving aside whether it is checking the story
with MoD. Speaking about a dossier being exaggerated and referring
to the 45 minutes intelligence -
A. He did not mention that.
Q. And he did not mention any unhappiness with
the intelligence community, so far as you recall?
A. No. He said WMD and the dodgy dossier. He
mentioned it in passing, because that was not what the conversation
was all about.
Q. Do you think that it would have been better
to have made a note of this conversation at the time?
A. No. I wish I had, but it is not my normal
practice. If I had known that it would be claimed that he had
checked the story then obviously I wish I had, and I wish I had
recorded the conversation, but it was not my normal practice to
do that.
454. When he gave evidence again on 17 September
Mr Gilligan said:
[17 September, page 13, line 3]
LORD HUTTON: Did you give any details of the
story you were going to run?
A. Yes, I gave the gist of the allegations, which
is that the dossier had been exaggerated and that there was concern
in the Intelligence Services about the inclusion of the 45 minutes
claim or the ready in 45 minutes claim, and that people in intelligence
did not think it reflected the considered views they were putting
forward.
MS ROGERS: It is right that you have no notes
of that conversation?
A. No. Indeed, I do not think Ms Wilson has
either.
Q. All we know is it lasted 7 minutes 24 seconds.
A. Yes, 7 and a half minutes. I understand Ms
Wilson has said I spoke about cluster bombs. I may have spoken
briefly about cluster bombs but the cluster bombs story was not
my story. I did not know what it was.
Q. Had you spoken to Ms Wilson about cluster
bombs on previous occasions?
A. I may have done, certainly. But on this
occasion the cluster bombs story was another reporter's story.
I did not know what the story was.
Q. It is Ian Watson who is the cluster bombs
story.
Q. Had you done any work on Ian Watson's story?
A. No, I do not think I would have spent 7 and
a half minutes talking about another reporter's story.
[17 September, page 47, line 19]
MR SUMPTION: Mr Gilligan, you accept that the
department concerned was No.10. You accept, as I understand it,
that you never gave advance notice to No.10?
Q. Could you look, please, at BBC/5/153. This
is a letter from Richard Sambrook to Ben Bradshaw shortly after
the interview which was referred to in your evidence-in-chief
a few minutes ago. One of the things that Mr Sambrook says when
he recites the facts about this advance notice to the Ministry
of Defence is: "At 6.30pm Andrew Gilligan spoke to Kate O'Connor
[that is the same as Kate Wilson], the MoD press officer, about
the cluster bomb interview and added there would be another story
running on WMD." Was that an accurate statement?
A. Certainly the cluster bomb issue came up,
because that was the reason that Adam Ingram had been booked to
talk on the programme the next day. So I began by saying: Adam
Ingram, you know, is booked to talk on the cluster bomb subject
but I want to put another subject to him as well, and I described
the story, as the letter says.
Q. This statement was based on what you told
Mr Sambrook, was it not?
A. I am not sure it was, in fact, because the
time is wrong here, 6.30. It should have been 7.30. I am not
quite sure where this comes from.
Q. Mr Gilligan, there was no written record of
this conversation, so the only place where Mr Sambrook could possibly
have got it from was you.
A. I think I had spoken to the Controller of
Editorial Policy, Stephen Whittle, about this. I think Mr Whittle
had conveyed some of it to Mr Sambrook. Sometimes some of these
things get a bit lost in the telling.
Q. What is being said here and what I suggest
what you had told your superiors within the BBC is that you spoke
to Ms Wilson about the cluster bomb interview and added that there
would be another story on WMD.
A. Well, I certainly began by speaking about
the cluster bomb interview because that was the starting point
for Mr Ingram's appearance on the Today Programme the following
morning. I really had very little to say about the subject of
cluster bombs because I did not know what the story was, it was
another reporter's story. As I said earlier, I simply would not
discuss another reporter's story with the Ministry of Defence,
even if I had been able to. It is a breach of protocol.
LORD HUTTON: Mr Gilligan, can I ask you: what
was your purpose, then, for ringing Ms Wilson?
A. It was to give her an outline of the WMD story
so that Adam Ingram could be briefed to answer questions on it.
LORD HUTTON: Why did you refer to the cluster
bombs story? Was it just, as it were, as an introduction?
LORD HUTTON: Because you knew Adam Ingram was
coming on for that purpose.
A. Yes. And I said: you know Adam Ingram is
booked to talk about cluster bombs, we want to broaden the bid
to talk about the dossier; and I gave her an outline of the story.
MR SUMPTION: You also said to your superiors
within the BBC, did you not, that what you had said about WMD
was that it was not a matter for the MoD but for another Government
department. Do you remember that?
A. What I said to the MoD was that I was not
seeking a point by point response from the press office, I did
not want them to go away and come back with a point by point response
to the allegations that were made. I wanted them to notify Mr
Ingram so he would be prepared to answer on the subject the following
morning; and that was how both I and the programme team, which
included the day editor, Miranda Holt, and the overall editor
of the programme, Kevin Marsh, had decided how this story would
be handled. Similar calls were made by two others on the Today
Programme team on that evening, by Martha Findlay and by Chris
Howard.
Q. Let me remind you of my question: I did not
ask you what you had told the MoD, I asked you what you had told
your superiors within the BBC, which was rather different.
A. Well, my answer is the same because that -
you know, that is - as I have just said, that is what we had agreed,
what my superiors, in other words Miranda Holt and Kevin Marsh,
had agreed with me.
Q. Did you say to Mr Sambrook that you said something
to the MoD to indicate that the WMD story was not an MoD story?
Do you follow me?
A. Well, as I said, I told the press officer,
I told Kate Wilson that it was not - I did not seek a point by
point response from the MoD press office but I did hope that Adam
Ingram would be able to answer questions on it.
Q. Just focus on my question, please, Mr Gilligan.
Did you say to Mr Sambrook: I told the MoD that I was working
on a WMD story, but it was not a matter for the MoD? Did you
say that to him or words to that effect?
A. I cannot remember what I said to him, but
what I - if I indeed said that, and I am not sure I did, but what
I meant from that was that I had told them that it was not a matter
on which I was expecting a point by point response from the MoD
but one which I expected them to brief Adam Ingram on for his
appearance on the programme the next morning.
455. Neither Mr Gilligan nor Mrs Wilson
made notes of the conversation between them and it is not possible
to reach a clear conclusion as to what was said. A point which
supports Mr Gilligan's account is that it is unlikely that the
conversation which lasted for 7 minutes 24 seconds would have
been confined only to cluster bombs, which was not Mr Gilligan's
story. But, on balance, I think it is more probable than not
that Mr Gilligan failed to give Mrs Wilson a clear indication
of the allegations which he was going to make that the dossier
was exaggerated and that there was concern in the Intelligence
Services about the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim, because
if he had done so I think that Mrs Wilson would almost certainly
have alerted 10 Downing Street to those allegations.
Back to Top
Mr Campbell's evidence to the
FAC on 25 June 2003 about his involvement in September 2002 in
the preparation of the draft dossiers
456. The BBC has criticised parts of Mr
Campbell's evidence to the FAC on this subject. I have considered
in detail in this report, with reference to relevant documents,
the part which Mr Campbell played in the preparation of the draft
dossiers and therefore I consider that it is unnecessary for me
to express an opinion on this criticism.
Back to Top
Mr Gilligan's e-mail of 14 July
2003 intended for some members of the FAC
457. In his evidence Mr Gilligan acknowledged
that it had been quite wrong for him to have sent this e-mail
suggesting that Dr Kelly was Ms Watts' source and he apologised
for doing so:
[17 September, page 14, line 5]
Q. One final matter before I leave you to Mr
Sumption. We have heard, since you gave your evidence last time,
about an e-mail that you sent on 14th July to some members of
the Foreign Affairs Committee Select Committee. I hesitate to
have it called up, but it is BBC/12/22. Is there anything you
want to say about that e-mail to this Inquiry?
A. Yes. It was quite wrong to send it and I
can only apologise. I did not even know for sure that David Kelly
was Susan Watts' source. I was under an enormous amount of pressure
at the time and I simply was not thinking straight, so I really
do want to apologise for that.
Back to Top
Dr Kelly's meeting with the MoD
on 14 July 2003
458. As stated in paragraph 98 the handwritten
notes made by Dr Wells, Dr Kelly and Ms Heather Smith of the meeting
on 14 July 2003 contained the words "tricky areas" which
appeared to relate to:
(a) What Dr Kelly thought of Government Policy
on Iraq;
(b) Whether Dr Kelly thought he was Mr Gilligan's
source; and
(c) What disciplinary action was being taken against
Dr Kelly.
Mr Hoon had written to Mr Donald Anderson MP, the
Chairman of the FAC, on 11 July stating:
I am prepared to agree [to Dr Kelly appearing
before the FAC] on the clear understanding that Dr Kelly will
be questioned only on those matters which are directly relevant
to the evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not
on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of the Dossier.
On 11 July Mr Hoon had also written to Mrs Ann Taylor
MP, the Chairman of the ISC, in somewhat similar terms.
459. Therefore having regard to the boundaries
laid down by Mr Hoon (which Mr Anderson agreed to) I consider
that it was not impermissible for Mr Howard to tell Dr Kelly that
the three areas were "tricky" ones. I consider that
Mr Howard also told Dr Kelly that he was free to tell his own
story to the FAC and the ISC, but it is apparent from Mr Hoon's
letters that the MoD wished to confine Dr Kelly's evidence to
the matters referred to by Mr Hoon.
Back to Top
The manner in which Dr Kelly
was questioned when he gave evidence to the FAC on 15 July 2003
460. Some questions which Mr Andrew Mackinlay
MP put to Dr Kelly when he appeared before the FAC gave rise to
criticism from some members of the public. When he gave evidence
to the Inquiry Mr Mackinlay explained that some of his questioning
was prompted by his conclusion that Dr Kelly was not Mr Gilligan's
source:
[26 August, page 13, line 17]
MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you some questions about
your other questioning towards the end of the session? FAC/4/24:
"Andrew Mackinlay: Since you wrote to your superiors in the
way you have done, have you met Geoff Hoon?
"Andrew Mackinlay: Any ministers?
"Mr Pope: Any special advisers?"
You pick up the question: "Any special advisers?
"Andrew Mackinlay: Do you know of any other
inquiries which have gone on in the department to seek the source
- to clarify in addition to you or instead of you or apart from
you? None whatsoever?
Perhaps you can read out your next question?
A. "I reckon you are chaff; you have been
thrown up to divert our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall
guy? You have been set up, have you not?"
Q. Did you consider that to be a fair question?
A. Yes, I do think it is; and because it is against
a backdrop of where the Government had indicated they think that
Dr Kelly is the sole source. He then comes along to us. He has
convinced me and everybody else at this stage, because we have
made a quantum leap, he has convinced me that he is not the source
- the Gilligan source, very impressively, very impressively indeed.
I could take you through that if you like. I hope you will just
take from me by this stage I am, along with others, absolutely
convinced that he is not the source. I feel very angry for him
and for Parliament against the backdrop of what I just said, you
know, about misleading Parliament and so on.
461. The Bill of Rights provides that the
affairs of Parliament (which include the proceedings of a Select
Committee of the House of Commons, such as the FAC) should not
be commented on other than in Parliament. Therefore it would
not be proper for me to express an opinion on the way in which
Dr Kelly was questioned before the FAC, but it is relevant to
record that on 16 October 2003 the Liaison Committee of the House
of Commons decided to review the working of Select Committees
in the light of this Inquiry.
Back to Top
The Walter Mitty remark by Mr
Thomas Kelly
462. In a conversation with journalists
about the start of August 2003 Mr Tom Kelly made a remark to the
effect that Dr Kelly was a "Walter Mitty" character.
On 5 August Mr Kelly issued a press statement in which he apologised
unreservedly to Mrs Kelly and her daughters for this remark.
In the course of his evidence to the Inquiry Mr Kelly twice repeated
his apology. On 20 August he said:
[20 August, page 204, line 18]
… as I said on the day after this article
appeared, I unreservedly apologise to the Kelly family that words
of mine intrude into their grief at that time. Whatever my motives,
it was a mistake that led to that intrusion and I have to take
responsibility for that mistake.
On 23 September he said:
[23 September, page 35, line 3]
… I fully accept that I should not have
used what was a too colourful phrase. I fully accept that in
doing so I ran the risk of misunderstanding; and I fully accept
that that must have caused the family much distress. It was not
what I intended and that is why I gave my unreserved apology at
the time, why I repeated it when I appeared at this Inquiry the
first time and why I repeat it again today.
463. The remark was a wholly improper one
for Mr Kelly to make and he has apologised for it unreservedly.
However I consider that it casts no light on the issue whether
there was an underhand strategy on the part of the Government
to leak Dr Kelly's name covertly.
Back to Top
Dr Brian Jones' letter to the
Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence dated 8 July 2003
464. On 8 July 2003 Dr Jones wrote to the
DCDI, who was Mr Martin Howard the successor to Mr Anthony Cragg
who had retired. In his letter Dr Jones stated:
The Foreign Affairs Committee appears to consider
it important that the Foreign Secretary told them, " …
that there had been no formal complaint from members of the security
and intelligence services about the content of the [September
2002] dossier." I believe his evidence was, in fact, that
he was not aware of any such complaint, and there is no
reason to suppose he should have become aware of mine. Nonetheless,
it is now a matter of record, and I feel very uneasy that my minute
could be uncovered at some future date, and that I might be judged
culpable for not having drawn attention to it.
Mr Howard replied on 23 July and stated:
I am grateful to you for drawing my attention
to this. I assume you are referring to the minute you wrote on
19 September to DIST, copy to Tony Cragg, my predecessor. I was
aware of this and regard it as an entirely proper expression of
your views at the time. The Defence Secretary and the former
CDI have also been briefed on your note as part of the preparations
for the evidence they gave this week to the Intelligence &
Security Committee. There is, therefore, no question of your
being found culpable in any way for what was, as I say, a perfectly
legitimate action.
These letters are set out in appendix 18.
465. This matter was considered by the ISC
and in the conclusions to its report of September 2003 it stated
at page 44:
R. The Agencies and the JIC reported that none
of their staff had concerns about the 24 September dossier. Two
individuals in the DIS wrote to their line managers to register
their concerns. We were told that these concerns were discussed
within the DIS in the normal way. CDI agreed the text of the
draft dossier, which was informed by intelligence that he, but
not the two individuals, had seen. We have seen that intelligence
and understand the basis on which CDI and JIC took the view they
did. The concerns were not brought to the attention of the Defence
Secretary or the JIC Chairman. (Paragraph 114)
S. We regard the initial failure by the MoD to
disclose that some staff had put their concerns in writing to
their line managers as unhelpful and potentially misleading.
This is not excused by the genuine belief within the DIS that
the concerns had been expressed as part of the normal lively debate
that often surrounds draft JIC Assessments within the DIS. We
are disturbed that after the first evidence session, which did
not cover all the concerns raised by the DIS staff, the Defence
Secretary decided against giving instructions for a letter to
be written to us outlining the concerns. (Paragraph 104 and
115).
T. It is important that all DIS staff should
be made aware of the current procedures for recording formal concerns
on draft JIC Assessments. We recommend that if individuals in
the intelligence community formally write to their line managers
with concerns about JIC Assessments the concerns are brought to
the attention of the JIC Chairman. (Paragraph 105 and 116)
As I have set out Dr Jones' evidence at some length
and as this matter has been considered by the ISC I consider that
it is unnecessary for me to express an opinion on it.
Back to Top
Back | Contents
| Next
|
