CHAPTER 7
Issues relating to Dr Kelly's
meeting with Mr Gilligan in the Charing Cross Hotel on 22 May
2003
229. These issues are the following:
(a) What did Dr Kelly say to Mr Gilligan in the
course of the meeting?
(b) At the time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan
and discussing the dossier with him was Dr Kelly having a meeting
which was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules
of procedure which applied to him?
(c) At the time of the meeting or subsequently to
it did Dr Kelly realise that the meeting was unauthorised and
in breach of the Civil Service rules of procedure which applied
to him?
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(a) What did Dr Kelly say to
Mr Gilligan in the course of the meeting?
230. In his evidence to the Inquiry Mr Gilligan
said that in the course of his meeting with Dr Kelly on 22 May
in the Charing Cross hotel he made notes on his personal organiser
(an electronic notebook). The version of his notes which Mr Gilligan
first referred to in his evidence was as follows (Exhibit JP/15):
20030522 kelly 22.5.03 transformed wk befo €
re pub to make it sexier
the classic was the 45 mins. mst thn €gs
inndossier wre dbl sc but that was single-source one source €e
said it took 4 minutes to set up a missile assembly, that wa -
€s misinterpreted
most people in intel werent happy with it, €
beause it didnt refect the considere view they were putting f€orward
real info but unr, incl agaisnt ur wishes
no €t in orig draft - dull, he asked ifanything
else cd go in
u f €rom africa - not nuke xpert but was
v suspect, documents certa €inly forges,
10-15 yrs go there was a lot of info, with the
c €oncelment anddeception op there was far less infomration
it w €as small because you dnt conceal a
lg prog, and because it was € actually quite hard toimport
things. the sanctions were effect €tive, they did limit programme
in one of the ja €n - chemical reactors
not destroyed by unscom, gla lined chamb €er to promote chme
rections - were being used again by the ira €qis, recovered,
taken
at al muthanna, not properly destoyed b €y
un, recovred y iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used for no-ba €nned
purposes.
the 18 chem missiles wre reportedby blix, but
€downplayed blix thought they wre leftovers
i thin it 30pc €likely that iraq had active
cw prog in the 6 m to a year like €lier that ther was bw
not much coming out of detainees, desp €ite
financal inventives … they are in qt gd conds in me
there €has been prolif - not in terms of
people walking across the i€raqi border with 20 shells, but
supply chain knowedge, -plans
€isg headed by a major general, below him
2 one starts, british €an australian
we dont have a gt deal of knowldege than we ha
€d before
1500 - 100 brits, 10-20 aussies - not all experts,
ab €out 20 of the brits are
it is a big handicap not to be able t €o
draw on the eertise of russian and german et exprts
kelly cont real debate as to w €hether the
mobile labs are what they appear to be - i is an od €d pieceof
kit, feeling is it cdbe made into a fermenter, but i €s it
a fermenter
enormosu qual of documents to be explouted- €
saadi and taha were taken out of the problm …
because they €interfaced with the un
weve got 10-20 in custody..
why didnt € they use them? in the early
stges, you just have to look at t €he weather conds, by the
end the c2 was in total disarray.
hi €s prog was small - he couldnt have killed
very many people, ev €en if everything had gone right for
him - not really md in tru €e meaning of ord
british 1-star is john deverell, kelly will Y
be senior brit inspector Y%
231. This was an abbreviated note. In order
to assist the Inquiry Mr Gilligan expanded this note in order
to give a fuller version of abbreviated words and to correct obvious
typographical errors. This expanded version was as follows:
transformed week before publication
to make it sexier
the classic was the 45 mins most things
inn dossier were double source
but that was single-source. one source said it took 45
minutes to set up a missile assembly, that was misinterpreted..
most people in intelligence weren't
happy with it, because it didn't reflect the considered
view they were putting forward
real info but unreliable, included
against our wishes
not in original draft - dull, he asked
if anything else could go in
uranium from Africa - not nuke expert
but was very suspect, documents certainly forgeries,
10-15 years ago there was a lot
of information, with the concealment and deception
operation there was far less information
it was small because you don't
conceal a large programme, and because it was actually
quite hard to import things. the sanctions were effective,
they did limit programme
in one of the january - chemical reactors
not destroyed by unscom, glass lined chamber to promote
chemical reactions - were being used again by the Iraqis,
recovered, taken
at al mutahanna, not properly destroyed by un,
recovered by Iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used
for no-banned purposes
the 18 chemical missiles were reported
by blix, but downplayed..blix thought they were leftovers
I think it 30percent likely
that iraq had active chemical weapons programme
in the
likelier that there was biological
weapons
not much coming out of detainees, despite financial
incentives.. they are
there has been proliferation - not in
terms of people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shells,
but supply chain knowledge, - plans
iraq survey group headed by a major
general, below him 2 one starts, british and australian
we don't have a great deal of knowledge
than we had before
1500 - 100 brits, 10-20 aussies - not all experts,
about 20 of the brits are
it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on
the expertise of russian and german et experts
real debate as to whether the mobile labs are
what they appear to be - it is an odd piece of kit,
feeling is it could be made into a fermenter, but is it
a fermenter
enormous qual of documents to be explouted
saadi and taha were taken out of the problem..because
they interfaced with the un
we've got 10-20 in custody
why didn't they use them? in the early
stages, you just have to look at the weather conditions,
by the end the c2 was in total disarray.
his programme was small - he couldn't
have killed very many people, even if everything had gone right
for him - not really mass destruction in true meaning
of word
british 1-star is john deverell, kelly will be
senior brit inspector
232. In his evidence Mr Gilligan said that
on the next day, 23 May, he made a manuscript note of his conversation
with Dr Kelly:
[12 August, page 29, line 20]
A. The first thing I did was I sat down and did
a sort of manuscript note of my full recollection of the conversation,
because the trouble with making notes on one of these little keyboards
is, as you see, they are abbreviated, so while it was still in
fresh in my mind I actually sat down and did a full manuscript
note of what I remembered my questions had been and what his answers
had been; and the answers, the sentences are slightly fleshed
out a little. Some of the sentences in the notes were abbreviated
and these sentences fleshed them out. So that was the first thing
I did.
233. However Mr Gilligan said in evidence
that he could not now find that note and that he thought he had
mislaid it. Mr Gilligan said that he had offered the Today programme
the story about Dr Kelly and that the programme wanted a summary
of Dr Kelly's main quotes and he then sent to a producer of the
Today programme a note of Dr Kelly's main quotes on 28 May which
was as follows:
Q. What about the Blair dossier {Sept
2002}? When we last met {in
spring 2002} you said the dossier wouldn't
tell us anything we didn't already know.
A. Until the week before it was just the same
as I told you. It was transformed in the week before it was published,
to make it sexier.
A. The classic was the statement that WMD were
ready for use within 45 minutes. Most things in the dossier were
double-source but that was single source. And we believed that
the source was wrong. He said it took 45 minutes to construct
a missile assembly and that was misinterpreted {in
the dossier} to mean that WMD could be deployed
in 45 minutes. What we thought it actually meant was that they
could launch a conventional missile in 45 minutes. There was no
evidence that they had loaded missiles with WMD, or could do so
anything like that quickly.
Q. So how did this transformation happen?
Q. What do you mean? They made it up?
A. No, it was real information. But it was included
in the dossier against our wishes because it wasn't reliable.
It was a single source and it was not reliable.
He said Downing Street had asked if there was
anything else on seeing the dull original dossier and had been
told about this and other things.
Other examples - he mentioned the African uranium,
although said he had no personal knowledge of that because he
doesn't do nuclear.
Other quotes: "What you have to understand
is that 10-15 years ago there was a lot of information. With the
concealment and deception operation {by
the Iraqis} there was far less material."
"I believe it is 30 per cent likely there
was a CW programme in the six months before the war, and more
likely that there was a BW programme, but it was small because
you couldn't conceal a larger programme. The sanctions were actually
quite effective. They did limit the programme."
"Most people in intelligence weren't happy
with it {the dossier},
because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting
forward."
On the aftermath: "We don't have a great
deal more information yet than we had before. We have not get
(sic) very much out of the detainees yet."
234. After Mr Gilligan had first given evidence
to the Inquiry on 12 August it emerged from an inspection of his
personal organiser carried out by two computer experts, Professor
Anthony Sammes instructed by the Inquiry and Mr Edward Wilding
instructed by Mr Gilligan who gave evidence on 18 September, that
there were two versions of his notes of his conversation with
Dr Kelly. It appeared that the note on his personal organiser
to which Mr Gilligan had referred when he had first given evidence
and which is set out in paragraph 230 above was not the first
note which he had made but that there was an earlier note which
was as follows (Exhibit JP/11):
20030521 kelly 22.5.03 in one of the jan - €chemical
reactors not destroyed by unscom, gla lined chamber €to promote
chme rections - were being used again by the iraqis €, recovered,
taken at al muthanna, not properly destoyed by u €n, recovred
y iraqis, taken to fallujah, and used for no-banne €d purposes.
the 18 chem missles wre reportedby blix, but
do €wnplayed …blix thought they wre leftovers
i thin it 30pc lik €ely that iraq had active
cw prog in the 6 m to a year likely €that ther was
not much coming out of detainees, despite finan
€cal inventives …they are
the dossier was transformed in the € wek
before it was published, to make it sexier
the classic w €as the 45 mins …one
source said it to took 4 minutes to set up a € rocket launcher
… and that was misinterpreted
i alwsy said t €he programme was small
most people in intel werent happy with €
it, beause it didnt refect the considere view they were putti
€ng forward
10-15 yrs go there was a €lot of info, with
the concelment anddeception op there was far € less infomration
iraq survey group- 1500 - six months to 2 y €ears
war was a tragic failure of diplomacy, no direct
ffort t €o engg iraq
it was a football for everyone
it was small becau €se you dnt conceal a
lg prog, and because it was actually quit €e hard toimport
things
the sanctions were effective, they di €d
limit programme
there has been proliferation - not € in
terms of people walking across the iraqi border with 20 sh€ells,
but supply chain knowedge,-plans
isg headed by a major €general, below him
2 one starts, british an australian
we don €t have a gt deal of knowldege than
we had before
1500 - 100 b €rits, 10-20 aussies- not all
experts, about 20 of the brits ar €e
it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on
the eertise €of russian and german et exprts
real debate as to whether th €e mobile labs
are what they appear to be - i is an odd pieceof € kit, feeling
is it cdbe made into a fermenter, but is it a feY rmenter
kelly cont enormosu qual of do €cuments
to be explouted
saadi and taha were taken out of the € problem
…because they interfaced with the un
weve got 10-20 €in custody
why didnt they use them? in the early stges,
you j €ust have to look at the weather conds, by the end
the c2 was i €n total disarray.
his arsenal was small - he couldnt have kil €led
very many people, even if everything had gone right for hi €m
british 1-star is john deverall, kelly will be
senior brit Y inspector Y4
235. There are two significant differences
between these two versions of the note. The earlier version is
dated in the top left hand corner 20030521 indicating that it
was made on 21 May 2003, and it does not contain the name "Campbell",
whereas the later version to which Mr Gilligan referred when he
first gave evidence is dated in the top left hand corner 2003
05 22 and contains the name "Campbell".
236. When he was recalled on 18 September
to give evidence to explain these two versions of the notes Mr
Gilligan's evidence was as follows:
[18 September, page 192, line 14]
Q. Can you tell us when JP15 was created, first
of all?
A. Yes. JP15 was created at the meeting with
David Kelly. There were two saves of this file in the organiser.
The one on the left that you see which has the date of the 21st
on it, and the one on the right which has the date of the 22nd,
indicating that the organiser's clock crossed midnight during
the meeting. The one on the right, the 22nd, is the final saved
version of the notes taken at that meeting.
Q. When did you create that document?
A. At the end of the meeting with David Kelly,
when I was agreeing the quotes I would use with him. It was the
result of the checks I did with Dr Kelly at the end of the meeting.
It overwrote the version of 21st May.
[18 September, page 197, line 1]
MS ROGERS: Can I just ask you this: as you are
taking notes during the conversation, are you getting down every
word verbatim?
Q. So on the text on the right-hand page we see
the words "[most things in] dossier were [double source]
but that was single-source", and on the left-hand side of
the page in the paragraph marked 1 those words are not there but
there are three dots.
Q. Can you explain the change?
A. Yes. Essentially this is me going over the
quotes I wanted to use with David Kelly. I read them to him and
he expanded on them for me in a couple of points. For instance,
in that section about the 45 minutes, you will see that the original
text says "the classic was the 45 [minutes] … one source
said it took 4" should be 45 minutes "to set up a rocket
launcher … and that was misinterpreted".
When I read back that quote he said "the
classic was the 45 minutes" was fine; and then he said: Yes,
most things in the dossier were double source but that was single
source, and he asked me to change "rocket launcher"
to "missile assembly", so - which I did. And the rest
of the quote is as he originally gave it.
Q. Looking at the second paragraph on the right-hand
page, can you look over to the left-hand side and about a third
of the way down you see the words "most people in [intelligence]
weren't happy". So will you put a 2 beside that? We know
that there are no changes there. Paragraphs 3 and 4 and 5 do not
appear on the left-hand page. Can you explain why it is that they
do not appear on the left but they do appear on the right?
A. Yes. This is the passage about Campbell, among
other things. I cannot remember how far into the conversation
that Campbell came up. This suggests it came up near the end,
in the quote checking process, but I cannot be absolutely sure
about that. What I do know is that when we were going over the
checks then the words that appear there were spoken by David Kelly.
We expanded on this section. He said - this is when he made the
point about it being real information but unreliable and "included
against our wishes".
LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, does that mean that
the name "Campbell", whether it was first uttered by
you or by Dr Kelly, only arose when you were going through, at
the end, with Dr Kelly, what he had already told you?
A. I cannot remember why I did not note it in
the first version. It may be that he was going too fast, I did
not get it down the first time. But what happened at the end was
that the - that when we were going over the quotes I was asking
him whether there were - whether I could use the Campbell quote,
as I mentioned in my earlier evidence, and he said the words that
appear in those notes.
LORD HUTTON: May it have been that the word "Campbell"
was not uttered by you or by Dr Kelly until you were going over
what he had previously told you at the end of your discussion?
A. That may be the case; but again, at this distance
of four months I cannot remember. I was going on the JP15 note,
which is the only sort of extant version in the organiser.
LORD HUTTON: But why does "Campbell"
then appear towards the start of that note?
A. This is - the notes are - the notes are in
the order of - in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly, the quotes.
Clearly the key quote of the exchange from my point of view was
"transformed the week before it was published to make it
sexier" and the second most important quote was "the
classic was the 45 minutes". Those were the first two quotes
I sought to check with David Kelly. So there the second, the JP15
version, shows the order in which I discussed them with Dr Kelly
when I was checking them.
237. After the two computer experts and
Mr Gilligan (for the second time) had given evidence on 18 September
the computer experts at the request of the Inquiry made efforts
by a specially devised computer software programme to access Mr
Gilligan's personal organiser in order to show the sequence in
which the files were generated regardless of their position in
the memory as their recorded date. However it has not been possible
for them to arrive at any positive conclusion on this matter.
238. Mr Gilligan said in his evidence
on 12 August that it was he who introduced the term "sexier"
into the conversation:
[12 August, page 25, line 16]
A. We started by talking about other things and
then we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it?
When we last met you were saying it was not very exciting. He
said: Yes, that is right, until the last week it was just as I
told you. It was transformed in the week before publication. I
said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes, to make it sexier.
Then I said: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples?
And he said the classic - he did not use the word example, he
said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that WMD could
be ready in 45 minutes, and most things in the dossier were single
source.
But Mr Gilligan was definite in his evidence that
it was Dr Kelly and not he who introduced the name "Campbell"
into the discussion:
[12 August, page 26, line 24]
Q. Then there is the entry which is just a single
word, "Campbell". Was there any question that gave rise
to that entry?
A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation
happen?
A. And then the answer was that, one word.
Q. He said just "Campbell"?
Q. And what question led to the next entry?
A. Well I was surprised and I said: What, you
know, Campbell made it up? They made it up? And he said: No, it
was real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier
against our wishes.
LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan,
looking at the first paragraph, you put the question: Was it to
make it sexier? And Dr Kelly replied: Yes, to make it sexier?
A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted
my words.
LORD HUTTON: Now are you clear in your recollection
that you asked how was it transformed, and that the name Campbell
was first spoken by Dr Kelly?
LORD HUTTON: It was not a question by you: was
Campbell involved in this?
A. No, it was him. He raised the subject of the
45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell.
239. In his letter to his line manager,
Dr Wells, dated 30 June 2003 Dr Kelly wrote:
The issue of 45 minutes arose in terms of the
threat (aerial versus land launch) and I stated that I did not
know what it refers to (which I do not). He asked why it should
be in the dossier and I replied probably for impact. He raised
the issue of Alastair Campbell and since I was not involved in
the process (not stated by me) I was unable to comment. This issue
was not discussed at any length and was essentially an aside.
240. Ms Olivia Bosch, who had been a UN
Inspector in Iraq in 1996, was a trusted friend and colleague
of Dr Kelly and she frequently spoke to him on the telephone.
In her evidence she told the Inquiry what Dr Kelly had said to
her about his meeting with Mr Gilligan:
[4 September, page 10, line 11]
It was another time towards mid May he told me
he had an unauthorised meeting with Andrew Gilligan, someone he
had met a couple of times before but did not know that well. And
he said he was - he was taken aback by the way Andrew Gilligan
tried to elicit information from him. I said: yes, but that is
what journalists do. He understood that, but he said he had never
experienced it in the way that Gilligan had tried to do so, by
a name game was the term.
Q. Just pause there for a moment. Did he explain
what he meant by "name game"?
Q. Well, what did he say?
A. Okay, and this was with reference to the September
dossier and I do not recall exactly what aspect of it. It was
the name game bit was what reminded - what sticks in my mind.
He said that Gilligan wanted to play a name game as to who was
responsible for inserting information into the dossier, and that
if I understand correctly Gilligan said to him: I will name you
some names. Apparently David had said that Gilligan very quickly
- the first name he mentioned very quickly and immediately was
Campbell. David told me he could neither confirm nor deny. David
said as he was a civil servant he could not provide Government
names, least of all to a journalist. We kind of laughed there.
Nor could he deny as Gilligan would continue listing names or
could continue listing names until the right name came up.
Q. Did Dr Kelly then say what he had actually
said to Gilligan?
A. Yes, then he said what he actually said. Because
he could not confirm or deny but he thought he had to give an
answer so he said "maybe".
Q. So in other words what had happened is Gilligan
had come up with the name Campbell and then Dr Kelly had said:
maybe?
LORD HUTTON: Did you understand if Mr Gilligan
had given more names - you said he came up almost immediately
with that name.
A. Right. It is part of this name game that Campbell
- sorry, that Gilligan had quickly put up Campbell. It did not
give David time really to think about what was going on in that
way.
LORD HUTTON: Did you understand that was the
first name?
A. Yes, the very first name.
MR KNOX: I just want to get this right: did Dr
Kelly say he had given Gilligan this explanation about not being
able to name civil servants or did Dr Kelly say: he said Campbell,
I said maybe, and the reason I did that is because I am a civil
servant.
A. I am not clear. He might have said to Gilligan
that he cannot give names but I am not clear. I cannot remember
exactly.
Q. You cannot remember precisely what he said
he had said to Gilligan?
A. Yes, right on that. In terms of this kind
of process.
241. Having heard and considered Mr Gilligan's
evidence about how there came to be two versions of his discussion
with Dr Kelly on his personal organiser, and how he lost his manuscript
note which he made the next day, and how his memory of his discussion
with Dr Kelly is not now entirely clear, I have considerable doubt
as to how reliable Mr Gilligan's evidence is as regards what Dr
Kelly said to him and, in the state of the evidence, including
the absence of any conclusive evidence from the two computer experts,
I am unable to come to a definite conclusion as to whether or
not Mr Gilligan's account of how he made the two versions of the
notes of his discussion with Dr Kelly is correct. It may be that
his account of how he came to make the two versions of his discussion
on his personal organiser in the course of his meeting with Dr
Kelly is basically correct. It may be that the fact that the first
version is dated 21 May and the second version is dated 22 May
is due to the clock on the personal organiser being slow and that
the clock changed from 21 May to 22 May in the course of the meeting.
242. On the question whether in their
discussion Mr Gilligan first suggested the name "Campbell"
to Dr Kelly or whether it was Dr Kelly who first spoke the name
"Campbell" to Mr Gilligan, it may be that it was Dr
Kelly who first spoke the name "Campbell", having regard
to the evidence of Ms Susan Watts, whom I regard as an accurate
and reliable witness. In a telephone conversation which she had
with Dr Kelly on 7 May 2003 she made a shorthand note that Dr
Kelly said to her regarding the 45 minutes claim " …mistake
to put in … A Campbell seeing something in there …
NB single source … but not corroborated … sounded
good." I think it is also reasonably clear from the transcript
of Ms Watts telephone conversation with Dr Kelly on 30 May that
he accepted in that conversation that he had mentioned the name
of Alastair Campbell to her in relation to the 45 minutes claim
in their earlier telephone conversation on 7 May. The relevant
parts of the transcript are:
SW: But what intrigued me and which made, prompted
me to ring you, (huh) was the quotes yesterday on the Today programme
about the 45 minutes part of the dossier
DK: yep. We spoke about this before of course
…
DK: I think you know my views on that.
SW: Yes, I've looked back at my notes and you
were actually quite specific at that time - I may have missed
a trick on that one, but err
SW: you were more specific than the source on
the Today programme - not that that necessarily means that it's
not one and the same person …but, um in fact you actually
referred to Alastair Campbell in that conversation …
DK: err yep yep … with you?...
DK: I mean I did talk to Gavin Hewitt yesterday
- he phoned me in New York, so he may have picked up on what I
said … because I would have said exactly the same as I said
to you …
SW: Yes, so he presumably decided not to name
Alastair Campbell himself but just to label this as Number 10
…
SW: ok … just back momentarily on the 45
minute issue …I'm feeling like I ought to just explore that
a little bit more with you …the um … err. So would it
be accurate then, as you did in that earlier conversation, to
say that it was Alastair Campbell himself who …?
DK: No I can't. All I can say is the Number Ten
press office. I've never met Alastair Campbell so I cant ….
(SW interrupts: they seized on that ?) But … I think Alastair
Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible
for it.
Therefore the fact that Dr Kelly had mentioned the
name of Alastair Campbell to Ms Watts in relation to the 45 minutes
claim in their telephone conversation on 7 May tends to suggest
that it might have been Dr Kelly who introduced the name "Campbell"
into his discussion with Mr Gilligan.
243. In his evidence Mr Gavin Hewitt, whom
I also regard as an accurate and reliable witness, said that he
spoke on the telephone to Dr Kelly on the afternoon of 29 May
about the dossier and that Dr Kelly said to him "No. 10 spin
came into play". As Dr Kelly made this comment to Mr Hewitt
on 29 May it may be that when Mr Gilligan suggested to him that
the dossier had been transformed to make it "sexier",
he replied "yes, to make it sexier".
244. However two of the most serious allegations
reported in Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on the 29 May were the claim
that "actually the Government probably knew that that the
forty five minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to
put it in" and the claim that "the reason it [the 45
minute figure] hadn't been in the original draft was that …
it only came from one source and most of the other claims were
from two, and the intelligence agencies say they don't really
believe it was necessarily true because they thought the person
making the claim had actually made a mistake, it got, had got
mixed up". Mr Gilligan's notes of his discussion with Dr
Kelly contained no entries which suggest that Dr Kelly made either
of these allegations to Mr Gilligan. In relation to the allegation
that the 45 minutes claim had not been inserted in the original
draft of the dossier because it only came from one source, Mr
Gilligan accepted in answer to his own counsel that the allegation
was wrong:
[17 September, page 7, line 21]
Q. In terms, also, of the reason for the non-inclusion
of the 45 minutes, you say in this part of the broadcast, it is
at the top of BBC/4/223, which I think is up, that the reason
for the non-inclusion was that it had only come from one source.
A. Yes. As I have said in my witness statement,
that was wrong, although I do not attribute that particular view
to David Kelly in fact. But that is clearly incorrect. The reason
it came in late, which is now accepted, was that it simply was
a matter of the timing when it arrived.
Q. It arrived late, but it was single sourced?
245. In relation to the allegation that
the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong
even before it decided to put it in the dossier, Mr Gilligan also
accepted in cross examination by Mr Sumption QC for the Government
that his words were imperfect and he should not have said them:
[17 September, page 14, line 20]
Q. Mr Gilligan, I would like to ask you first
about your 6.07 broadcast, where you said that the Government
probably knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong even before
they put it in. You made a point a few minutes ago about the difference
between dishonesty and spin. If a Government puts into a dossier
which it lays before Parliament a statement which it probably
knows to be wrong, is that an allegation that they are dishonest,
in your book?
A. I think the allegation here that I was trying
to convey was that the claim in the form in which it was made
was considered to be wrong, considered to be unreliable and considered
to be misinterpreted by many in the intelligence community; and
that form being that Saddam's military planning allows some WMD
to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
Q. But when you said that the Government probably
knew that it was wrong, you were actually saying, whether you
intended to or not, that they were dishonest, were you not?
A. The allegation I intended to make was of spin,
but as I say, I do regard those words as imperfect and I should
not have said them.
Q. And the reason why you should not have said
them is that they did, in fact, accuse the Government of dishonesty,
whether or not that was your intention.
A. I think that is probably right, yes. But I
really did try and repeatedly make it clear on subsequent occasions
that I was not accusing the Government of lying or fabrication.
I said that the intelligence was real. I said at 7.32 - I said
on subsequent broadcasts on 31st May that I was not accusing the
Government of lying or fabrication or of making this up. I said
it also repeatedly to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to the Spectator
and in The Mail on Sunday.
Q. I think you accepted on the last occasion
that you gave evidence here, and more or less accepted this morning,
that that particular allegation, that the Government probably
knew that the 45 minutes figure was wrong, was something that
you could not support?
A. It was not sufficiently supported. It did
not have no support. David Kelly did not say it in terms but he
did say that the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes
was unreliable. He said it was wrong. He said it was included
"against our wishes". And the conclusion I drew from
that was that the wishes had been expressed and the wishes had
been made known, which is something we do now know to be the case.
Q. You accept, I think, that it was expressed
by you as something that your source had said, whereas in fact
it was an inference of your own?
A. Yes, that is right, that was my mistake.
Q. The same is true, is it not, of the word "ordered";
that was not something that Dr Kelly had said, it was Gilligan
speaking not Kelly, was it not?
A. Yes. It was my interpretation of what he had
said.
246. When questioned by Mr Dingemans QC,
counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Gilligan said:
[17 September, page 77, line 12]
Q. I will not repeat my earlier questioning nor
indeed the earlier cross-examination. Can I just take you to some
passages of the 29th May broadcast at the start and ask whether
you contend these were accurate representations of what Dr Kelly
had told you? BBC/1/4, if I may. The first part I want to draw
your attention to is in the first paragraph: " … what
we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing
up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably erm
knew that that 45 minutes figure was wrong, even before it decided
to put it in." Do you now accept that was not based on what
Dr Kelly had told you?
A. I accept that it was not the - I accept that
it was not the right form of words to use because it gave listeners
the impression that he had said that in terms. He did not say
it in terms.
Q. And he did not suggest that to you?
A.Well, he said that the statement that WMD were
ready for use in 45 minutes was unreliable, it was wrong, it was
misinterpreted and he said that it had been included "against
our wishes". I concluded from that that the wishes had been
made known, but it was wrong to ascribe that statement that they
had been made known to Dr Kelly.
Q. The bottom of the page: " … and
the reason it hadn't been in the original draft was that it was,
it was only erm, it came from one source and most of the other
claims were from two, and the intelligence agencies say they don't
really believe it was necessarily true …" That was not
the reason it had not been in the original draft, do you now accept
that?
Q. And Dr Kelly gave you nothing to suggest that
was the reason.
A. That is correct, and I did not ascribe it
in fact to him either.
Q. The next page. Just before "End of first
recording": "Clearly, you know, if erm, if it, if it
was, if it was wrong, things do, things are, got wrong in good
faith but if they knew it was wrong before they actually made
the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious." Suggesting
that Dr Kelly had suggested to you that the claim was false.
A. I think the operative word here is "if".
This does suggest that I am not suggesting it is true. But, you
know, as I have said to you before, the statement that - the statement
"probably knew it was wrong" was - was not something
that Dr Kelly had said in terms.
Q. If you knew that this was not right you would
have said so. It was not your suggestion that they knew that it
was wrong, was it?
A. No, my error in this was in ascribing that
- you know, expressing my understanding as something which Dr
Kelly had actually said in terms, which he had not.
Q. And neither had he suggested it?
A. Well, he said things which had led me to conclude
it, but he had not suggested it directly, no.
Q. Scrolling down the page, Mr Humphrys picking
up on what you are saying, fourth line down: "Now our defence
correspondent, Andrew Gilligan, has found evidence that the Government's
dossier on Iraq that was produced last September, was cobbled
together at the last minute with some unconfirmed material that
had not been approved by the Security Services." Dr Kelly
did not say that to you, did he?
A. No. These were not my words, these were John
Humphrys' words. I would not have said those words and did not
write them for him.
Q. That was Mr Humphrys' understanding of your
earlier broadcast no doubt.
A. I do not believe it was -
Q. He is hardly likely to have made it up.
A. The cues - the things that the presenter says,
the cues are actually written by the presenters before the programme
even starts, so he would not have heard the earlier broadcast
at the time that he devised this particular cue.
Q. BBC/1/6 towards the bottom of the paragraph:
"Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if
the weapons had been that readily to hand, they probably would
have been found by now but you know, it could have been an honest
mistake, but what I have been told is that the Government knew
that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before
they wrote it in their dossier." Dr Kelly never told you
that, did he?
A. No. Again, my error there was expressing that
understanding, and I defend the use of "knew it was questionable"
but expressing it as something which Dr Kelly had told me in terms,
which he had not - but it was not the main thrust. It was not
the main import of the broadcast. The broadcast was summarised
probably most - in its essentials by the news bulletin piece which
I wrote, and that did not mention any "Government knew"
type things.
[17 September, page 83, line 22]
MR DINGEMANS: So there are those errors you accept
in your transmission on 29th May?
Q. In fact, on 29th May there was an allegation
made against the Government of conscious wrongdoing; do you accept
that?
A. My feeling on this was that it was an allegation
less serious than that; that it was part of a political debate.
As I say, I mean, the Ministry of Defence press log is - has got
- I have just got a - I mean, the stories in the newspapers in
the morning of 29th May, that was before a word had been spoken
by me, included the Independent splash "Labour rebels threaten
to report Tony Blair for misleading Parliament"; the Mirror
"War of Lies"; the Guardian "Tony Blair faces growing
crisis over failure to uncover WMD"; The Times "Inquiry
into arms dossier claim". So this was seen -
Q. So you thought you would join in?
A. This was seen as part of -
Q. Is that right, Mr Gilligan?
A. This was seen as part of a continuing debate.
It was not something we created. It was not something we started.
Q. I did not say you created it, Mr Gilligan.
I am asking you about 29th May. Did you think you would join in
with that morning's headlines?
A. No, that was not the intention. The intention
was to report what Dr Kelly had told me; and I regret that on
those two occasions I did not report entirely carefully and accurately
what he had said. My error was to ascribe that statement to him
when it was actually a conclusion of mine.
247. Therefore it is clear that Dr Kelly
did not tell Mr Gilligan that 10 Downing Street probably knew
that the 45 minutes claim was wrong before it decided to put it
in the dossier. The true position was that the 45 minutes claim
was inserted in an assessment by the assessment staff of the JIC
based on intelligence received by the SIS and the 45 minutes claim
was then inserted in the dossier with the full approval of the
JIC, and at the time of the publication of the dossier the JIC,
the assessment staff and the SIS believed that the intelligence
relating to the 45 minutes claim was reliable.
248. It is also clear that the reason why
the 45 minutes claim was not in the original draft of the dossier
was not that it only came from one source. The reason why the
45 minutes claim was not included in the original draft was because
the relevant intelligence was not received until 29 August 2002.
Back to Top
Issues (b) and (c)
(b) In meeting Mr Gilligan and
discussing the dossier with him was Dr Kelly having a meeting
which was unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules
of procedure which applied to him?
(c) At the time of the meeting
or subsequent to it did Dr Kelly realise that the meeting was
unauthorised and in breach of the Civil Service rules which applied
to him?
249. Referring to the list of Dr Kelly's
contacts with the press for the year April 2002 to March 2003
(see paragraph 26) counsel to the Inquiry put the following questions
to Mr Hatfield:
[11 August, page 59, line 4]
Q. He is talking here about on 11th and 12th
November 2002 there is the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands, "Protection
Network". He deals with that from 18th to 20th November.
Then he deals with the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, a conference, talking about invasion or inspections, that
is January and February 2003. That is shortly before the war.
"Media. "Attributable and unattributable briefings plus
interviews on Iraq, Russia, weapons, anthrax and smallpox. "Television
and radio: Channel 4, Australian Broadcasting Company, Canadian
Broadcasting Company, Tokyo Broadcasting Systems, CNN, CBS, ABC,
Radio Netherlands, BBC 4, BBC 24 hours/World Service, BBC local
radio (London, Wales)." Then the news media, he seems to
go through the whole of Fleet Street: Guardian, Daily Telegraph,
The Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,
Newsweek, Herald Tribune and Wall Street Journal. So he was having
extensive contact with them.
A. He had an extensive number of contacts with
them, yes.
A. But it does not also make clear over what
period, but nevertheless.
Q. It also appears to make clear that some of
the contact was on an unattributable basis.
Q. Is that something that is authorised, as it
were, by the Ministry of Defence?
A. Indeed, his own letter, which started the
events as far as I was concerned, makes it clear that they normally
were cleared. In fact, slightly unusually but nonetheless cleared
through the FCO press office usually rather than the MoD press
office. That clearly reflects a lot of it is briefing in relation
to his role in support of what he did in relation to UNMOVIC,
where the Foreign Office were in the lead. I would assume every
one of those listed on there had been cleared either on an individual
basis or if you like especially in relation to the appearances
at conferences on a block basis that: this is the sort of conference
you do and you know the rules.
Indeed, the general rules we started with make
it quite clear that, for example, contact with IISS does not have
to be cleared on an individual basis because it is an established
institution with which MoD deals. But there are rules about how
you behave at such conferences where you are speaking.
250. Sections of the Civil Service rules
of procedure relating to civil servants speaking to journalists
are set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25. Mr Patrick Lamb, the
deputy head of the Counter Proliferation Department in the FCO,
gave evidence as to how the system of authorising Dr Kelly to
speak to the press operated. In cross-examination by Mr Gompertz
for Dr Kelly's family he stated:
[24 September, page 79, line 19]
Q. Can I invite you to recollect your evidence
on a previous occasion? You said, in answer to Lord Hutton, that
in theory and properly he, Dr Kelly, should have approached the
press office about each and every request. I am looking at page
102 if you have it in front of you. I am sorry, I do not have
a copy to show you. In practice, you then said, as I think we
all know: ' … once a journalist has a number they will tend
to pursue that person or ring that person without - off the cuff.
Dr Kelly worked from home, to a very large extent; and so that
meant that often, I presume, he would receive calls at home having
exchanged a card with a journalist. And certainly there were instances
where, for reasons I perfectly understand, he had no opportunity
to seek prior authorisation or clearance. But in my experience
he was also very scrupulous about informing us after the event.
That in itself was helpful, very helpful in the event that something
arose following that particular interview' - Is that a fair summary?
A. I think that is an accurate reading of what
I said on that occasion.
Q. Thank you. Is it a fair summary of what happened?
A. It is a summary of what happened. Let me explain.
The point is that I recognise perfectly that Dr Kelly was attending
seminars, he was attending receptions, as I do, and there were
occasions when journalists will meet with him and those are not
occasions when this procedure can be followed, self-evidently.
There are also instances where Dr Kelly would have exchanged a
card or a telephone number with a journalist, a meeting with that
journalist may have been approved by the Foreign Office, and that
journalist rings Dr Kelly to clarify a particular point or pursue
some other item. I would not expect Dr Kelly to put down the phone
and say: sorry, I cannot speak about this issue until I have spoken
to the Foreign Office. There is an element whereby - as I said,
I believe, elsewhere in my evidence, there is an element of self-discipline
and judgment involved in all of these matters, and that self-discipline
is imposed on all of us involved, including Dr Kelly. I believe
that if he were contacted by a journalist say two or three months
after an initial contact, he should at that point have referred
that to the Foreign Office, because the whole point of getting
policy and press office agreement is to take account of events
as they are today and not events as they were two or three months
ago.
Dr Kelly, I think, understood very clearly that
he should not become involved on commenting on current UK Government
policy.
Q. The words you use there, "self-discipline"
and "judgment", are an echo from a document I think
you prepared, CAB/1/115. If we can scroll down to paragraph 4
- having described the system, I am not going to go through it
because we have looked at this document before, but you say this:
"This system, which ultimately relied on self-discipline
and judgment on all sides, worked well and provided the media
with expert background briefing and led to no embarrassments for
HMG over the period 2000-2002." That is fair, is it?
A. It is fair, yes. It is an accurate reading
of what I said.
251. Mr Lamb also stated that sometime in
late May 2003 Dr Kelly briefly mentioned to him that he had spoken
to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts:
[24 September, page 64, line 14]
Q. Can I move on to the second topic I wish to
cover. When did you first become aware that Dr Kelly had spoken
to Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts?
A. I believe that this took place or rather I
believe he spoke to me some time in late May. I say this for two
reasons. I believe it had to be subsequent to his conversations
with Ms Watts, which I now know took place on 7th and 12th May.
I believe it had to be subsequent to his conversation with Mr
Gilligan which took place on 22nd May, because Dr Kelly referred,
very fleetingly and very briefly, to the fact that he had spoken
to both those journalists in a conversation that took place in
my office. He did not elaborate. He made no further comment or
explanation or exposition as to what had taken place, if anything.
And I noted, very specifically, those two names and that I remember
specifically - the only element of the conversation I now retain
is the fact, and retained even at the time, that he had spoken
to two named journalists and that I was unaware that he had sought
authorisation.
Q. Why did you not follow it up at the time that
Dr Kelly made those comments?
A. I did not follow it up at the time because
he did not specifically say to me that he wished to raise a matter
with me. He did not specifically say: I would like to discuss
with you what took place, or give me any run through as to what
had happened, as he had done previously in the case of the German
TV radio interview where he had gone through it in detail. Dr
Kelly, I should add, on that occasion, and because I was extremely
busy with covering two posts within the Proliferation and Arms
Control Department at that time and was dealing with another meeting
which I cannot refer to here but was a bilateral meeting with
another country, an issue that country had raised already at Prime
Minister level, I was the lead FCO official dealing with that
meeting, which took place eventually on 28th May, and running
with all the arrangements for it and preparations for it. That
is why I was extremely busy, as I now recall. It was that particular
issue that was dominating my attention. Dr Kelly, I think, could
and should have spoken to either of my three colleagues, possibly
four colleagues, to whom he could have drawn this - he could have
drawn this to their attention and any one of them would have realised
what needed to be done. He could and should primarily have spoken,
in my judgment, to the press office as well. He did not.
This was a fleeting reference and comment made
to me at a time when he knew and saw that I was busy. Dr Kelly
and I normally sat down at the table in my office when he came
to call. On this occasion my distinct recollection is of being
behind my desk, totally preoccupied with the work I was doing,
and of him standing in the doorway. It was most unusual for us
to have such an exchange. It was a very fleeting and brief exchange.
252. In her evidence, in describing a conversation
which she had had on the telephone with Dr Kelly, his friend and
colleague Ms Olivia Bosch said:
[4 September, page 9, line 4]
Q. What did Dr Kelly say about his relationship
with the press generally?
A. He seemed fairly relaxed about it. He seemed
to enjoy talking with the press and giving them background information.
He knew that they were seeking information to better understand
what some of the processes were that were going on in Iraq. And
if I refer to my second statement, where I mention that in terms
of an approach he said that the Foreign Office and Ministry of
Defence had different approaches. And I started - and I kind of
led - I said: do you mean that you do not talk - sorry: with respect
to the Ministry of Defence, is it that you do not talk to journalists
or the press unless there was a reason to do so, whereas the Foreign
Office was more relaxed? And in effect - and then I started -
that you could speak - he was saying: unless there was a reason
not to. So they had slightly different emphasis in terms of what
it was. But, on the whole, I understood that he recognised - and
he said he would need pre-authorisation for that but on occasion,
sometimes, he would speak on the telephone for a quick answer
or something like that that he might not get that pre-authorised,
but the Foreign Office was much more relaxed in his dealings with
them.
253. Mr Gompertz submitted that as Dr Kelly
was employed by DSTL and sometimes worked for the FCO and for
the MoD it was difficult for him to know from whom he should seek
authorisation to speak to the press. Dr Kelly's precise employment
situation in May 2003 was somewhat complex, and there could be
debate as to which of the sets of rules forbidding speaking to
journalists set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 applied to him.
But it is clear that one of those sets of rules applied to him
and that in making the comments which he probably did to Mr Gilligan
about the 45 minutes claim being single sourced and that there
was unhappiness in the intelligence community about the phraseology
employed in the dossier in relation to that claim, Dr Kelly was
in breach of one or other of those sets of rules.
254. Dr Kelly must have learned of some
of the matters on which he commented to Mr Gilligan when he had
discussions with Dr Jones and other DIS officials in the DIS offices
on 18 and 19 September 2002. In respect of the propriety of discussing
such matters with a journalist Sir Richard Dearlove stated in
his evidence in relation to Dr Kelly's conversation with Ms Watts
on 30 May:
[15 September, page 106, line 22]
A. Can I also say in respect of this recorded
conversation here?
A. As chief of the service, I am shocked to see
someone discussing one of our CX reports, which is what he is
discussing, with a journalist without authorisation.
Q. I appreciate he was not within your specific
area, which is why I have not asked you about it, but what would
your reaction have been to finding out about these discussions?
A. That it is a serious breach of discipline.
Dr Brian Jones stated:
[3 September, page 137, line 8]
Q. If members of your staff had given this sort
of information to journalists about the discussions that had taken
place in your branch relating to concerns about the dossier, what
would your reaction have been to that?
A. (Pause). I would have thought that they were
acting well beyond the bounds of what they should have been doing.
I would have been very disappointed and very annoyed.
255. Under Parts IV A and V of the Employment
Rights Act 1996 an employee is protected from being subjected
to any detriment by his employer if he makes a "protected
disclosure" of information as defined in that Act. I consider
that the information which Dr Kelly disclosed to Ms Susan Watts
on 7 and 30 May and to Mr Gavin Hewitt on 29 May and whatever
information he disclosed to Mr Gilligan on 22 May was not "protected
disclosure" of information within the meaning of the 1996
Act. In his evidence to the ISC Dr Kelly said:
ALAN HOWARTH: When you went to meet Andrew
Gilligan, at the Charing Cross Hotel, did you enter the discussion
with an agenda of your own, you've mentioned that you were anxious
to learn what you could from him, but did you also go to meet
him with a view to conveying any particular points to him.
DR KELLY: No, it was very much with the
intention of being in receive mode - to understand his experience
he had in Iraq.
I am further of the opinion that in relation to such
information there was no provision of the 1996 Act which operated
to relieve Dr Kelly from the duty imposed on him in relation to
the non-disclosure of information by the Civil Service rules of
procedure set out in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25. It is also clear
that after his meeting with Mr Gilligan on 22 May 2003 Dr Kelly
never sought to suggest that he had been entitled to discuss intelligence
matters with Mr Gilligan.
256. It may be that in his meeting with
Mr Gilligan Dr Kelly said more to him than he intended to say.
As Ms Watts said in her evidence, Dr Kelly could be gossipy and
chatty with a journalist. It may be that at the time of the meeting
Dr Kelly did not realise the gravity of the situation which he
was helping to create by discussing intelligence matters with
Mr Gilligan. His discussion with Ms Watts on 30 May suggests that
he treated an unauthorised discussion with a reporter about intelligence
matters in a somewhat lighthearted way:
DK: I mean I did talk to Gavin Hewitt yesterday
- he phoned me in New York, so he may have picked up on what I
said … because I would have said exactly the same as I said
to you …
SW: Yes, so he presumably decided not to name
Alastair Campbell himself but just to label this as Number 10
…
SW: are you getting much flak over that?
DK: me? No, not yet anyway I was in New York
… (laughs)
SW: yes good timing I suppose
DK: I mean they wouldn't think it was me, I don't
think. Maybe they would, maybe they wouldn't. I don't know.
257. But whatever Dr Kelly thought at the
time of his meeting with Mr Gilligan it is clear that after Mr
Gilligan's broadcasts on 29 May Dr Kelly must have come to realise
the gravity of the situation for which he was partly responsible
by commenting on intelligence matters to him. In his letter to
Dr Wells dated 30 June he wrote: "With hindsight I of course
deeply regret talking to Andrew Gilligan even though I am convinced
that I am not his primary source of information.", and I
have no doubt that this regret weighed on his mind during June
and July.
258. It is also clear that Dr Kelly himself
recognised that his meeting with Mr Gilligan was unauthorised.
In her evidence Ms Bosch said:
[4 September, page 10, line 4]
Q. You have mentioned one occasion when Dr Kelly
found his name in the press, which he was upset by, which perhaps
is the article I took you to. Did Dr Kelly around this time, April
or May, around that type of time, did he have any further discussion
with you about his contacts with the press?
A. Well, he mentioned in his - I am not sure
of the time sequence but if I go through here. It was another
time towards mid May he told me he had an unauthorised meeting
with Andrew Gilligan, someone he had met a couple of times before
but did not know that well. And he said he was - he was taken
aback by the way Andrew Gilligan tried to elicit information from
him. I said: yes, but that is what journalists do. He understood
that, but he said he had never experienced it in the way that
Gilligan had tried to do so, by a name game was the term.
[4 September, page 12, line 20]
LORD HUTTON: Ms Bosch, you said Dr Kelly told
you he had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan.
LORD HUTTON: Did he use the word "unauthorised"?
LORD HUTTON: How did he come to say that? Did
he just say to you: I had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan?
A. Yes, because we would just talk kind of freely
about journalists who you would see, whatever, and I believe that
he had come back - I do not know if it was that very night he
mentioned it or whatever. But we had - he had, in previous conversations,
mentioned authorised and unauthorised.
A. And he had mentioned this was an unauthorised
meeting.
A. So confiding, I suppose, in a way.
Back to Top
Summary of conclusions on the
issues relating to Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan in the
Charing Cross Hotel on 22 May 2003
259. The conclusions which I have come to
on these issues are the following:
(1) In the light of the uncertainties arising from
Mr Gilligan's evidence and the existence of two versions of his
notes made on his personal organiser of his discussion with Dr
Kelly on 22 May it is not possible to reach a definite conclusion
as to what Dr Kelly said to Mr Gilligan. It may be that Dr Kelly
said to Mr Gilligan that Mr Campbell was responsible for transforming
the dossier, and it may be that when Mr Gilligan suggested to
Dr Kelly that the dossier was transformed to make it "sexier",
Dr Kelly agreed with this suggestion. However I am satisfied that
Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that the Government probably
knew or suspected that the 45 minutes claim was wrong before that
claim was inserted in the dossier. I am further satisfied that
Dr Kelly did not say to Mr Gilligan that the reason why the 45
minutes claim was not included in the original draft of the dossier
was because it only came from one source and the intelligence
agencies did not really believe it was necessarily true. In the
course of his evidence which I have set out in paragraphs 244,
245 and 246, Mr Gilligan accepted that he had made errors in his
broadcasts in the Today programme on 29 May 2003. The reality
was that the 45 minutes claim was based on an intelligence report
which the Secret Intelligence Service believed to be reliable
and the 45 minutes claim was inserted in the dossier with the
approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the most senior
body in the United Kingdom responsible for the assessment of intelligence.
In addition the reason why the 45 minutes claim was not inserted
in the first draft of the dossier was because the intelligence
on which it was based was not received by the SIS in London until
29 August 2002. Therefore the allegations reported by Mr Gilligan
that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was
wrong or questionable and that it was not inserted in the first
draft of the dossier because it only came from one source and
the intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily
true, were unfounded.
(2) Dr Kelly's meeting with Mr Gilligan was unauthorised
and in meeting Mr Gilligan and discussing intelligence matters
with him, Dr Kelly was acting in breach of the Civil Service code
of procedure which applied to him.
(3) It may be that when he met Mr Gilligan, Dr Kelly
said more to him than he had intended to say and that at the time
of the meeting he did not realise the gravity of the situation
which he was helping to create by discussing intelligence matters
with Mr Gilligan. But whatever Dr Kelly thought at the time of
his meeting with Mr Gilligan, it is clear that after Mr Gilligan's
broadcasts on 29 May Dr Kelly must have come to realise the gravity
of the situation for which he was partly responsible by commenting
on intelligence matters to him and he accepted that the meeting
was unauthorised, as he acknowledged in a telephone conversation
with his friend and colleague Ms Olivia Bosch after his meeting
with Mr Gilligan.
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