To the Rt Hon Lord Falconer of
Thoroton, the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs.
CHAPTER 1
The sittings of the Inquiry
1. On 18 July 2003 I was requested by the
Rt Hon Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs, to conduct an Inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly.
My terms of reference were:
"urgently to conduct an investigation into
the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly."
Lord Falconer further requested me to deliver my
report to him.
2. Mr Lee Hughes, a senior civil servant
in the Department for Constitutional Affairs, was appointed as
Secretary to the Inquiry. I requested Mr James Dingemans QC and
Mr Peter Knox to act as counsel to the Inquiry, Clifford Chance
LLP were appointed to act as solicitors to the Inquiry and the
responsible partner, Mr Michael Smyth, assigned Mr Martin Smith,
a senior associate, to act for them. The names of counsel and
solicitors appearing for parties represented at the Inquiry are
set out in appendix 1.
3. I held a preliminary sitting of the Inquiry
on 1 August and I stated:
[1 August, page 1, line 16]
At the commencement of the Inquiry I wish to
state the objectives which it should seek to achieve. First of
all, my primary task is to investigate the circumstances surrounding
the death and that will involve a detailed and careful examination
of the relevant facts. Secondly, my terms of reference require
me to conduct the investigation urgently, and that means that
I must proceed with expedition, and I have no doubt that it is
in the public interest that I should do so. Thirdly, I must ensure
that the procedures at the Inquiry are fair to those who give
evidence.
4. I also stated that the Inquiry would
be held in two stages. The first stage would consist of calling
witnesses to give evidence in chronological order as to the sequence
of events insofar as that was possible. The witnesses would be
examined by counsel to the Inquiry in a neutral way to elicit
their knowledge and understanding of the facts and they would
not be examined by counsel representing them or cross-examined
by counsel representing other parties.
5. There would then be a period of adjournment
after which the second stage of the Inquiry would commence. In
the second stage I would ask persons, who had already given evidence
and whose conduct might possibly be the subject of criticism in
my report, to come back to be examined further by counsel to the
Inquiry and, subject to my permission, by their own counsel and,
subject also to my permission, to be cross-examined by counsel
for other parties. I also stated that in the second stage I might
call witnesses who had not been called in the first stage and
against whom there might be no possible criticism.
6. The first stage of the Inquiry commenced
on 11 August 2003 and concluded on 4 September 2003. The second
stage of the Inquiry commenced on 15 September 2003 and concluded
on 25 September 2003, save that the Inquiry sat on 13 October
2003 to hear further evidence from a witness who had been ill
during the second stage.
7. During the period of adjournment between
the first and second stages of the Inquiry I caused the solicitor
to the Inquiry, Mr Martin Smith, to write to a number of witnesses
informing them of possible criticisms of them arising from the
evidence heard in the first stage and informing them that if they
wished to dispute these possible criticisms they would have the
opportunity to submit written representations and to make oral
submissions at the second stage of the Inquiry. They were also
informed that they would have the opportunity, if they wished,
to give further evidence relating to those possible criticisms
on examination by their own counsel and that they might be subject
to cross-examination by legal representatives for other interested
parties and counsel to the Inquiry. They were also informed that
if, as a result of hearing further evidence in the second stage
of the Inquiry, I was minded to make other possible criticisms
which might affect them, they would be informed in the course
of the second stage in order to allow them to deal with those
new matters.
8. In the course of the second stage a number
of witnesses were examined by their own counsel, and some of them
were cross-examined by counsel for other interested persons or
bodies and by counsel to the Inquiry. At the commencement of the
second stage counsel to the Inquiry made an opening statement
and at the close of the second stage counsel for the interested
parties and counsel to the Inquiry made closing statements.
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The terms of reference
9. My terms of reference were "urgently
to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
the death of Dr Kelly". In my opinion these terms of reference
required me to consider the circumstances preceding and leading
up to the death of Dr Kelly insofar as (1) they might have had
an effect on his state of mind and influenced his actions preceding
and leading up to his death or (2) they might have influenced
the actions of others which affected Dr Kelly preceding and leading
up to his death. There has been a great deal of controversy and
debate whether the intelligence in relation to weapons of mass
destruction set out in the dossier published by the Government
on 24 September 2002 was of sufficient strength and reliability
to justify the Government in deciding that Iraq under Saddam Hussein
posed such a threat to the safety and interests of the United
Kingdom that military action should be taken against that country.
This controversy and debate has continued because of the failure,
up to the time of writing this report, to find weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. I gave careful consideration to the view
expressed by a number of public figures and commentators that
my terms of reference required or, at least, entitled me to consider
this issue. However I concluded that a question of such wide import,
which would involve the consideration of a wide range of evidence,
is not one which falls within my terms of reference. The major
controversy which arose following Mr Andrew Gilligan's broadcasts
on the BBC Today programme on 29 May 2003 and which closely involved
Dr Kelly arose from the allegations in the broadcasts (1) that
the Government probably knew, before it decided to put it in its
dossier of 24 September 2002, that the statement was wrong that
the Iraqi military were able to deploy weapons of mass destruction
within 45 minutes of a decision to do so and (2) that 10 Downing
Street ordered the dossier to be sexed up. It was these allegations
attacking the integrity of the Government which drew Dr Kelly
into the controversy about the broadcasts and which I consider
I should examine under my terms of reference. The issue whether,
if approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee and believed by
the Government to be reliable, the intelligence contained in the
dossier was nevertheless unreliable is a separate issue which
I consider does not fall within my terms of reference. There has
also been debate as to the definition of the term "weapons
of mass destruction" (WMD) and as to the distinction between
battlefield WMD and strategic WMD. Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on
29 May related to the claim in the dossier that chemical and biological
weapons were deployable within 45 minutes and did not refer to
the distinction between battlefield weapons, such as artillery
and rockets, and strategic weapons, such as long range missiles,
and a consideration of this issue does not fall within my terms
of reference relating to the circumstances surrounding the death
of Dr Kelly.
10. I further consider that one of my primary
duties in carrying out my terms of reference is, after hearing
the evidence of many witnesses, to state in considerable detail
the relevant facts surrounding Dr Kelly's death and also, insofar
as I can determine them, the motives and reasons operating in
the minds of those who took various decisions and carried out
various actions which affected Dr Kelly.
11. In order to enable the public to be
as fully informed as possible I have also decided, rather than
set out a summary of the evidence, to set out in this report many
parts of the transcript of the evidence so that the public can
read what the witnesses said and can understand why I have come
to the conclusions which I state.
12. Whilst I stated at the preliminary sitting
on 1 August that I did not sit to decide between conflicting cases
advanced by interested parties who had opposing arguments to present,
it has been inevitable in the course of the Inquiry that attention
has focussed on the decisions and conduct of individual persons,
and therefore I think it is right that I should express my opinion
on the propriety or reasonableness of some of those decisions
and actions.
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The facts
13. I propose to commence by stating the
facts which I consider have been established by the evidence which
I have heard and by the documents put in evidence and many of
these facts have not been in any real dispute. After stating the
facts, I propose to turn to consider the issues which arise from
those facts and to express my opinion in relation to them.
14. At the outset I state, for reasons which
I will set out in greater detail in a later part of this report,
that I am satisfied that Dr Kelly took his own life by cutting
his left wrist and that his death was hastened by his taking Coproxamol
tablets. I am further satisfied that there was no involvement
by a third person in Dr Kelly's death.
15. I also consider it to be important to
state in this early part of the report that I am satisfied that
none of the persons whose decisions and actions I later describe
ever contemplated that Dr Kelly might take his own life. I am
further satisfied that none of those persons was at fault in not
contemplating that Dr Kelly might take his own life. Whatever
pressures and strains Dr Kelly was subjected to by the decisions
and actions taken in the weeks before his death, I am satisfied
that no one realised or should have realised that those pressures
and strains might drive him to take his own life or contribute
to his decision to do so.
16. The facts which I consider have been
established by the evidence given in the course of the Inquiry
are the following and I shall return to discuss some of these
facts in greater detail in later parts of this report.
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Dr Kelly's employment in the Civil
Service
17. Dr Kelly was a biologist by training,
who held degrees from a number of universities and he was a very
highly qualified specialist in the field of biology. In 1984 he
joined the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and was appointed to head
the microbiology division at the chemical and biological defence
establishment at Porton Down in Wiltshire. The nature of Dr Kelly's
employment within the Civil Service later became somewhat complex.
In April 1995 the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA)
was established as an agency of the MoD and Dr Kelly's personnel
management and employment formally passed from the MoD to DERA.
In 1996 Dr Kelly was appointed on secondment to the Proliferation
and Arms Control Secretariat (PACS) within the MoD and he worked
as an adviser to PACS and to the Non-Proliferation Department
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on Iraq's chemical
and biological weapons capabilities and on the work of the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
Dr Kelly was also responsible for providing advice to the Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) of the MoD and to the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS) on Iraq. Dr Kelly's secondment was principally funded
by the FCO for whom Dr Kelly carried out a substantial proportion
of his work. From 1991 to 1998 Dr Kelly made 37 visits to Iraq
in the course of his duties and took very few holidays. In 2001
the part of DERA which employed Dr Kelly became part of Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) which is a Trading Fund
of the MoD and DSTL became Dr Kelly's employer during the remainder
of his secondment to the MoD which continued until his death.
18. In the mid 1990s Dr Kelly became dissatisfied
with his salary and grading after DERA had created a new salary
and grading structure and moved away from the general Civil Service
structure. It appears that Dr Kelly had not been properly assimilated
within the DERA salary scales and it appears that this may have
happened because he was working abroad so much. Dr Kelly sought
assistance on a number of occasions from the officials who were
then his line managers. They intervened on his behalf and Dr Kelly
was eventually regraded and advanced to a higher grade in February
2002. One of his line managers, Dr Shuttleworth described Dr Kelly
as being concerned and frustrated but not bitter about his salary
and grading.
19. In the early 1990s Dr Kelly became involved
in the analysis of information about the biological and warfare
programme of the Soviet Union and he went to Russia as a member
of the Anglo American team visiting biotechnology facilities in
different parts of Russia and played a leading role in that inspection.
His work in Russia was most successful and he was highly respected
by both the British and American members of the team.
20. In 1991 Dr Kelly became one of the chief
weapons inspectors in Iraq on behalf of the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) and from 1991 onwards was deeply involved
in investigating the biological warfare programme of the Iraqi
regime. These investigations resulted in 1995 in UNSCOM making
a breakthrough and forcing the Iraqi regime to admit that it did
have a biological warfare programme. During the 1990s Dr Kelly
built up a high reputation as a weapons inspector, not only in
the United Kingdom but internationally, and he was described in
evidence by the journalist and author, Mr Tom Mangold, who knew
him well, as the "inspector's inspector". The contribution
made by Dr Kelly and the importance of his work was recognised
by the Government and in 1996 he was appointed Companion of the
Order of St Michael and St George (C.M.G.), the material part
of the citation for the award stating:
…he devised the scientific basis for the
enhanced biological warfare defence programme and led strong research
groups in many key areas. Following the Gulf War he led the first
biological warfare inspection in Iraq and has spent most of his
time since either in Iraq or at various sites in the former Soviet
Union helping to shed light on past biological warfare related
activities and assisting the UK/US RUS trilateral confidence building
process. He has pursued this work tirelessly and with good humour
despite the significant hardship, hostility and personal risk
encountered during extended periods of service in both countries.
In 1991 he was appointed adviser to the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM). His efforts in his specialist field have had consequences
of international significance.
21. It appears that in May 2003 Dr Kelly
was being considered for a further award (which might well have
been a knighthood as he had already been awarded the C.M.G.) because
a minute to Heads of Department in the FCO dated 9 May 2003 requested
recommendations for the Diplomatic Service List and on 14 May
an official wrote the following manuscript note on the minute:
How about David Kelly? (Iraq being topical).
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The Government's Dossier on Weapons
of Mass Destruction
22. On 24 September 2002 the Government
published a dossier entitled:
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH
This dossier contained a foreword by the Prime Minister:
The document published today is based, in
large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery.
It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of
the UK's three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of
Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government
departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments
to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide
range of foreign policy and international security issues.
Its work, like the material it analyses,
is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish
this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the
British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current
and serious threat to the UK national interest.
In recent months, I have been increasingly
alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions,
despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite
the UN Security Council's Resolutions expressly outlawing it,
and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop
WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the
region, and the stability of the world.
Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not
easy. Saddam's is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes
in the world. So I believe people will understand why the Agencies
cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the judgments
in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we know.
We cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw intelligence. I
and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the intelligence
and are satisfied as to its authority. I also want to pay tribute
to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary
work that they do.
What I believe the assessed intelligence
has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce
chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts
to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend
the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that,
as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try
to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.
The picture presented to me by the JIC in
recent months has become more not less worrying. It is clear that,
despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently
well to prevent Saddam from developing these weapons.
I am in no doubt that the threat is serious
and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has
to be stopped.
Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only
against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence
reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability,
and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital
to his strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional
domination. And the document discloses that his military planning
allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an
order to use them.
I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme
lengths, indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and
avoid giving them up.
In today's inter-dependent world, a major
regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in question.
Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using WMD,
I believe the international community has to stand up for itself
and ensure its authority is upheld.
The threat posed to international peace and
security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive
regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we face up to the threat,
not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose
resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer
term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.
The case I make is that the UN Resolutions
demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since
the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this
programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their
job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible
for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international
community will have to act.
I believe that faced with the information
available to me, the UK Government has been right to support the
demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We must
ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has, or get
hold of the weapons he wants.
The Executive Summary stated:
4. As well as the public evidence, however,
significant additional information is available to the Government
from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in
this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything.
However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities.
It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing
weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for
Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only
as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including
against his own population, and is determined to retain them,
in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).
5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.
6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
- military plans for the use of chemical and biological
weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these
weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
Chapter 3 headed: "THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998-2002"
stated:
1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam
Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes
account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly
available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence
about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities
since 1998. The main conclusions are that:
- Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical
and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements
in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons
within forty five minutes of a decision to do so.
Recent intelligence
5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available
from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence
and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological
weapons. The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership
has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons.
This intelligence covers:
- Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological
weapons: Intelligence indicates that as
part of Iraq's military planning, Saddam is willing to use chemical
and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population.
Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy
chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes of an
order to do so.
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The rules governing the disclosure
of information by civil servants
23. The rules governing the disclosure of
information by civil servants in the MoD are set out as follows
in Volume 7 of the MoD Personnel Manual:
Section 6: Disclosure of Information
6.1 Principles governing disclosure of information
This section describes the principles governing
the public disclosure of information by serving or former members
of the Department and sets out the rules that apply those principles
to specific cases. The activities governed by this section are:
public lectures and speeches, interviews with
or communications to the press or other media, film, radio and
television appearances and statements to non-Governmental bodies,
including MOD-sponsored conferences and seminars; …..
You must not make comment on, or make disclosure
of:
classified or "in confidence" information;
relations between civil servants and Ministers,
and advice given to Ministers;
politically controversial issues; … …
information that would conflict with MOD interests
…..
anything that the MOD would regard as objectionable
about individuals or organisations;
24. Paragraph 10 of Annex A to the Civil
Service Code states:
Civil servants should not without authority disclose
official information which has been communicated in confidence
within the Administration, or received in confidence from others.
Nothing in the Code should be taken as overriding existing statutory
or common law obligations to keep confidential, or to disclose,
certain information. They should not seek to frustrate or influence
the policies, decisions or actions of Ministers, Assembly Secretaries
or the National Assembly as a body by the unauthorised, improper
or premature disclosure outside the Administration of any information
to which they have had access as civil servants.
25. The DSTL procedure for conduct rules
(which say on the title page that DSTL is part of the MoD) state:
8.4.1 It is important to dispel any impression,
however unfounded, that there is a conflict of interest between
a particular activity and the responsibilities of an employee.
There is no exhaustive list of activities that fall into this
category, but it is in everyone (sic) interest for individuals
to seek approval before indulging in any such activity and to
ensure that records are kept.
8.4.2 Examples of activities that may conflict
with the responsibilities of employees are:
- press announcements (these should be referred
to Head of Corporate Affairs);
- broadcasts and media interviews and public speaking
(these should be referred to Head of Corporate Affairs);
- lecturing or speaking at conferences and seminars,
especially on matters of political sensitivity. The procedure
for public disclosure of Dstl official information is to be followed.
Employees should not attend political conferences in their official
capacity without prior permission from their Department Manager;
- completing external questionnaires (e.g. those
asking for detailed information about the organisation). Any doubts
should be referred to Head of Corporate Affairs;
- publishing books, writing papers for publication.
Applications to publish are to be made on a completed Dstl application
for permission to publish (Form 199 - reference 10).
26. One of Dr Kelly's roles in the course of
his work was to speak to the media and institutions on Iraq issues
and parts of his Performance and Development Assessment for the
year April 2002 to March 2003 dated 12 April 2003 are as follows:
Statement of your roles and responsibilities:
Adviser to Proliferation Arms Control Secretariat,
MOD and Non-proliferation Department, FCO on Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons capabilities, UNMOVIC activities, and CWC/BWC
issues. Adviser to DIS and SIS on Iraq.
Adviser to UNMOVIC on chemical biological weapons
and inspector training.
Communicating Iraq issues to the media and Institutions
| Objective | Communication of Iraq issues externally
| Date & initial |
| Your comments | To continue making contributions to the deliberations of International Institutions and providing informed contributions to the international media and press.
| |
| Managers' comments | David has lectured widely on Iraqi WMD issues, is much sought for attendance at international conferences and as appropriate has provided media briefings
| |
Annexed to Dr Kelly's Performance and Development Assessment for
April 2002 to March 2003 was the following list of attendance
at conferences and contacts with the media:
11th & 12th November 2002
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The
Hague, The Netherlands "Protection Network"
18th to 20th November 2002
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Conference
"Iraq: Invasion or inspections" 31st January and 1st
February 2003
Attributable and unattributable briefings plus interviews
on Iraq, Russia, Weapons, Anthrax and Smallpox.
Television & Radio: Channel Four, Australian Broadcasting
Company, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Tokyo Broadcasting Systems,
CNN, CBS, ABC, Radio Netherlands, BBC four, BBC 24hours/World
Service, BBC local radio (London, Wales).
News Media: Guardian, Daily Telegraph, The Times, New York
Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Herald Tribune,
and Wall Street Journal.
27. On 10 October 2002 Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent
Under-Secretary of State at the MoD, sent a minute to senior officials
in the MoD in relation to contacts with the media:
For a number of reasons the MOD and the Armed Forces are likely
to find themselves the subject of more than usual media interest
over the next six months. We ought to be as open as we can in
explaining what we are doing and why. Equally, there is some information
which must remain confidential if the Department and the Armed
Forces are properly to perform their functions. It would be timely
to restate the basic principles.
2. First, there are clear rules about seeking approval for
media interviews and other contacts which must be followed in
all cases. These are set out in DCI 313/99. In particular,
proposals for contact by 2 Star officers/officials and above must
be approved by Ministers. It is the responsibility of the officers/officials
concerned to ensure that DGCC and his staff and/or the Corporate
Communications and Media Ops staff embedded in TLB areas are informed
of proposed media contacts so that appropriate guidance and advice
can be provided. Unless there are very good reasons otherwise,
communications staff should be present during interviews.
3. Second, submissions to Ministers and others must include
a section on presentation covering both external and internal
audiences, that is drawn up in conjunction with DGCC staffs. In
particular, it must be explicitly acknowledged in the advice that
goes forward that D News (or DGCC himself) has been consulted
and is content.
4. Finally, a reminder of what CDS and I stated on 12 June
about unauthorised leaks to the media. These are counterproductive
and damaging to the reputation of the MOD in the eyes of the public
and other Government Departments. They are also unprofessional
and corrosive of trust and morale. In addition to being disciplinary
offences, they could also lead to prosecution after criminal investigation.
5. I look to DMB members, TLB Holders and all senior line
managers to enforce these guidelines.
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The Intelligence and Security Committee
28. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), a
Committee of Members of Parliament, in its Report of September
2003 described its functions as follows:
i. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is established
under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine the expenditure,
administration and policy of the United Kingdom's three intelligence
and security Agencies: the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
The Committee also takes evidence from the Security and Intelligence
Co-ordinator, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), as well as departments
and other organisations that receive secret intelligence from
the Agencies.
ii. The Prime Minister, in consultation with the leaders of
the two main opposition parties, appoints the ISC members. Nominations
for the membership of the Committee are put forward by the Government
and Opposition whips, in a broadly similar way to the nomination
of select committee members.
iii. The Committee reports directly to the Prime Minister
and through him to Parliament by the publication of the Committee's
Reports. The members are notified under the Official Secrets Act
1989 and, as such, operate within "the ring of secrecy".
The Committee sees significant amounts of classified material
in carrying out its duties and it takes evidence from Cabinet
Ministers and senior officials - all of which is used to formulate
its Reports.
iv. When laying a Report before Parliament, the Prime Minister,
in consultation with the Committee, excludes any parts of the
Report (indicated by the *** in the text) that would be prejudicial
to the continuing discharge of the functions of the three intelligence
and security Agencies. To date, no material has been excluded
without the Committee's consent.
It appears from that Report that the ISC decided about the start
of May 2003 to examine the intelligence relating to Iraq's Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) and paragraph 12 of its Report states:
On 8 May 2003, the Committee Chairman, the Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor,
MP, wrote to the Chairman of the JIC to request all the JIC Assessments
relating to Iraq and its WMD dating back to August 1990 and supporting
intelligence.
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