NBC Defense, A Current Dilemma CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: NBC Defense, A Current Dilemma Author: Major V. J. Riley, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The senior leadership of the Marine Corps needs to ensure that Marines are trained efficiently and concurrently for NBC, and that the development and procurement of NBC defense equipment receives adequate budgetary support; then, any Marine expeditionary force should be adequately prepared for combat in an NBC environment. Background: The Marine Corps has just returned from Southwest Asia from what many consider to be one of its most successful wars in history. The question that still lingers is: would we have been as successful if the Iraqi's had used Nuclear, Chemical, or Biological weapons against our forces? Would the outcome have been the same if expeditionary forces had not had six months to prepare? NBC training within many units lacks direction, as it competes for the limited time available to commanders to ensure tactical proficiency of their units. Procurement of NBC equipment has been retarded as the Corps has developed and purchased a myriad of sophisticated weapons systems that will carry it into the 21st century. As the increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is seen worldwide, the Marine Corps can expect NBC warfare to become a reality. This selective disregard for NBC warfare throughout the Corps may lead to costly defeat which could be avoided if Marines were properly prepared. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should focus on preparation, training and procurement, for future combat in an NBC environment. NBC DEFENSE, A CURRENT DILEMMA THESIS: The senior leadership of the Marine Corps needs to ensure that Marines are trained efficiently and concurrently for NBC, and that the development and procurement of NBC defense equipment receives adequate budgetary support; then, any Marine expeditionary force should be adequately prepared for combat in an NBC environment. I. Current training in the Marine Corps A. Individual training B. Unit training C. Joint training D. Concurrent training II. Failure to train properly A. 29 Palms, California B. The Basic School, Quantico, Virginia III. Current equipment A. Individual protective suits 1. OG-84 2. Mark IV B. M17 Protective Mask C. MPS problems 1. OG-84 2. M258A1 skin decontamination kit 3. Medical Supply Blocks (AMAL) 4. M8 Chemical Alarm IV. Survivability in future conflicts NBC DEFENSE, A CURRENT DILEMMA One of these days it's going to happen, we're going to have to fight a chemical war. When that happens, we need to be ready as we can possibly be and we need to be as well trained. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Commander- in-Chief Central Command Conflict has broken out in the Middle East. Iraq, utilizing large columns of mechanized forces, has seized the country of Kuwait and is poised on the Saudi border. Indications are that Iraqis may continue the attack along the coast to seize the vast oil fields of the region. During their consolidation of Kuwait, the Iraqis had relocated chemical weapons and missile launchers to range major cities in the area. Saudi Arabia has requested support from the United States in an attempt to secure its borders from invasion and prevent possible chemical attack. Deemed to be an area of vital interest, U.S. forces are rapidly deployed to establish a hasty defensive front along the Saudi border. This scenario was the first chapter in what was to become one of the most successful coalition wars to be fought in modern history. This success could have easily resulted in this country's greatest defeat, given our inability to wage war in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Prior to its attack on Kuwait, Iraq had become the largest producer of chemical weapons in the third world, with an annual production of thousands of tons of blister and nerve agents. This stockpile of weapons was of considerable concern for the coalition forces based on Iraq's prior willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. During the war with Iran, Saddam not only used chemical weapons against the Iranians but also his own Kurdish population. To further enhance his position in the region, Saddam conducted aggressive research in the development and fielding of numerous delivery systems for his expanding chemical arsenal. (1:Q2) Biological and nuclear weapons were also of concern during this period. By the beginning of the war, Iraq had become the most advanced and aggressive producer of biological weapons in the Arab world with the concentrated development of two agents-botulinum toxin and anthrax bacteria. (1:Q3) Additionally, Baghdad was pursuing nuclear weapons technology; though not possessing a weapon,it may have been able to construct a crude device within six months to a year, using the uranium in the French and Soviet- supplied reactor fuel. (1:18) These additional threats had never been experienced by Marine forces and there existed no resident knowledge within the ranks at any level. CURRENT TRAINING IN THE MARINE CORPS In World War I, U.S. forces were neither adequately equipped or trained for chemical warfare. As a consequence, over 25% of all U.S. casualties were from gas. Less than 10% of all British and Dominion casualties, on the other hand, were caused by gas. Elisa D. Harris Senior Research Analyst The Brookings Institution The training to fight and win in a nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) environment is a perishable skill. All Marines receive basic training in NBC at different times in their careers. Units undergo yearly training, the depth and importance of which is dictated by their higher command. At present, however, there exists no standard testing or progression of instruction to ensure mastery of NBC skills beyond the basic level that are required to ensure survival in a contaminated environment. (15:1) Where some testing is performed, the focus is at a very rudimentary level as a means of "checking off" a requirement that more often than not falls into the "too difficult to do category." Individual NBC training conducted by units is, for the most part, unimaginative and is treated as an afterthought to fill the requirement on the units' monthly report. Training that is conducted is neither uniform with respect to expected results or consistent within similar type units. NBC play exercised during unit operations, for the most part, is either given cursory treatment, not integrated at all, (8:1) or is so disjointed during play that it makes little or no sense.(11:1) This problem has not just surfaced, but has been the focus of countless after-action- reports. Once identified in an after-action report as being deficient, the feeling exists that since we have acknowledged the problem it will, in fact, go away. There is no evident solution to this issue short of the commander becoming personally involved. This usually fails to happen, owing to the press of tactical events related to the situation /play of the battle problem. The lack of real-world NBC scenarios during large scale battle problems and tactical exercises has led to a myriad of problems, none of which are apparently being corrected. Even with recent operations in the Gulf still being documented, the Corps as a whole has failed to grasp just how lucky it was. If the Iraqis had used chemical weapons, the war would have taken on a totally different hue. The lightning movement towards Kuwait city may never have happened. Numerous units had little or no experience at armor vehicle decontamination. Logistics units had only limited knowledge of the water requirements of decontamination sites. Transportation was not available to move additional NBC equipment and water required by assault units. (1:Q8) Medical facilities in the rear each had its own procedures for accepting chemical casualties, none of which were the same. (18:1) These problems would have had solutions long before operations started in Southwest Asia if in the summer of 1990 they had been acknowledged and solved during earlier legitimate individual and unit training. Headquarters elements above the battalion level rarely involve themselves in simulated NBC scenarios beyond passing or receiving radio transmissions that pertain to the tactical play of problem. This insensitivity towards NBC could degrade command and control if commanders and staffs themselves became exposed, causing confusion on the battlefield. By neglecting unit and individual training, headquarters elements fail to develop SOP's and when exposed will sustain greater casualties and remain ineffective for a longer period of time. Current evidence shows that there is a serious problem with joint level battlefield reporting involving NBC incidents or warfare. No uniform, short, concise report that can be rapidly passed currently exists. Dissimilar reports make consolidation of information difficult, untimely and inundate already burdened communication systems. A failure to process time- sensitive information could spell disaster. (19:1) As the world experiences the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the Corps expands its involvement in the joint arena, the issue of joint NBC warfare and incident reporting mandates close attention. To correct these major training and reporting deficiencies would require little additional time. But, it would require a focus on concurrent vice separate training, and would necessitate rethinking the importance of NBC throughout the Marine Corps. Unlike subjects that require considerable time dedicated solely to that particular area for proficiency, NBC training can be incorporated into any other type of training with favorable results. Numerous exercises take place throughout the year involving everything from amphibious landings, combined arms and command post exercises, to helicopter assaults. Each of these evolutions lends itself to concurrent NBC training, adding little if any additional time and operational expense. An example would be our Army brothers-in-arms who continually train for combat in an NBC environment. It is not unusual for an Army unit to go to the field with soldiers wearing or carrying their NBC protective suits and to spend considerable time utilizing that equipment in the accomplishment of their tactical missions. Recent conversations with personnel at 29 Palms, California, and The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, shows that the Corps continues to fail in its approach to NBC. For example, 29 Palms is a premier location to enhance Marine training through the use of an NBC battle scenario. Both troops and staffs could come away from this training with a true understanding of how an NBC-type war could be fought and how it would impact on their abilities to accomplish assigned missions. The concept of NBC training is currently being lost in the deserts of California due to a failure of some units to deploy with their gas masks. Ostensibly the masks are difficult to repair and maintain. The Basic School trains the Marine Corps' newly commissioned officers. It is here that current doctrine and future concepts and ideas are taught to what will be the leadership of the Corps into the next century. Field exercises here are conducted for the most part with the absence of either gas masks or chemical protective suits. Why do we train our young leaders with a lack of respect for NBC weapons? The answer, as related by several instructors there, is concern that if the equipment is utilized in the field they will not be able to properly maintain it. If this is truly the thought process being used here, it is not difficult to understand why NBC training receives little attention in the Fleet Marine Forces. Nobody truly cares. If previous exercises had involved realistic NBC training with an eye toward possible problems, critical areas of concern could have been properly addressed prior to combat in Southwest Asia. But several of these areas still need to be addressed, as do additional problems that have been uncovered. To neglect an opportunity to train in a realistic environment is to perform a disservice to Marines. Trainers throughout the Corps must become multi-dimensional in their thinking; no longer can NBC be looked at as a once-a-year aggravation, a task to be accomplished and then forgotten. CURRENT EQUIPMENT Equipment utilized in Southwest Asia often performed with less-than-optimum results. Usage during continual training exercises there, along with constant use in the defense, has provided a rationale for additional research and development. Performance data gathered from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm should be carefully digested, not relegated to a file somewhere and forgotten. The Marine Corps should not again make the same mistakes in NBC warfare defense. The current individual protective suits (OG-84) used by the Marine Corps are bulky and extremely heavy. When carried in the ALICE pack medium, standard issue, with associated rubber boots and gloves, there is little additional room in the pack for other equipment. If carried on the outside of the pack, there is a fear of ripping the moisture barrier bag that protects the suit. When carried in a large ALICE pack or rucksack, because of added room, the OG-84, boots and gloves, along with the other equipment required to be carried by the infantryman, often pushed the weight of a pack to in excess of 100 pounds. This "Combat Load" did and will continue to limit the mobility of the infantryman. Several after-action reports have stated that Marines in Southwest Asia (SWA) when given a choice between the OG-84 and the British Mark IV NBC suit, ultimately chose the OG-84 for its durability. In contradiction, the Mark IV suits were actually very popular and in great demand. The Mark IV is extremely light and is vacuum packed in two bags of tough clear plastic. Because of its small size, it fits into the outside pockets of the ALICE pack along with all of its associated rubber gear. The Mark IV suit significantly reduced the overall weight carried by infantrymen and provided additional space in the pack for other equipment. Given the shortage of protective chemical suits in SWA, even up to and just before ground operations began, the average Marine had little personal experience with the British Mark IV suit. The data being presented in after action reports is that the OG-84 chemical suit was the garment of choice because, of its durability in the desert. If, in fact, it was "the choice," it was due to the information provided to the Marines through their chain of command and not on personal experience. In two different regiments operating in SWA, one of the topics that received continual attention was the availability of the Mark IV suits and the fact that units had to wait considerable time before supply requests could be filled. The suits became such an issue that our Battalion personally liaisoned with a local British Army unit to acquire their additional suits until ours could arrive. With limited motor transport assets in SWA to support the battalions, the NBC officer was likely restricted to operating two five-ton trucks and trailers, if he was lucky. When these vehicles were loaded with decontamination equipment and chemical decontaminate, there was only limited additional space available to carry approximately 250 spare 0G-84's and associated rubber gear. These additional suits were to be utilized by the battalion as replacements for those contaminated as a result of a chemical attack. This limited number of available replacements allowed only a portion of the battalion to decontaminate themselves in a timely manner. The remainder of the battalion would be required to wait for additional suits to be brought forward from the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) log trains. When this same limited space was repacked with British Mark IV"s the battalion could carry in excess of 1000 complete suits, enough for the entire unit. The M17 protective mask, utilized by a majority of Marines, was found to have a failure rate in excess of 37% when tested by the Marine Corps Test facility at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. These tests were conducted on masks that belonged to units that were preparing to deploy to SWA between 7 August and 31 December 1990. Damaged masks that were repaired and retested still had a failure rate in excess of 36%. Masks that could not be repaired were replaced from current stocks. Failure rates on M17 masks that were randomly selected from depot storage had a failure rate of less than 1%. (1:3) Units that deployed to the Gulf prior to the testing of M17 gas masks were not provided the results of the tests. No effort was made to replace or test those masks already deployed. If the Iraqis had used chemical or biological weapons, a high probability existed that those units with untested masks could have needlessly sustained up to 30-40% casualties. Some of the masks in question were, in fact, being carried by lead Marine assault elements who, on the opening day of the war, were already taking pre-treatments for both chemical and biological threats. "The Army has spent 20 years and tens of millions of dollars developing a new mask; only a few hundred of these masks, the M40, were available for use in the Gulf." (2:5) When Dr. Richardson, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Chemical Matters, was asked by the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Chemical/Biological Defense Readiness, Training, and Equipment on the fielding of the M40 mask in the Marine Corps, he responded that fielding will commence this spring and may require five years to complete the program. This expeditious development and fielding of the M40 may give some insight into the level of intensity provided NBC warfare. U.S. Marine forces arriving in Saudi Arabia found that there was insufficient NBC equipment aboard the MPS ships, and that much of the equipment was unserviceable. Chemical protective suits (OG-84's), which are charcoal lined and have a limited life span once they are removed from their packages, are vacuum-packed to prevent exposure to the elements. (20:1) Seals were ruptured on a portion of this equipment, exposing it to petroleum-based vapors that rendered it useless for combat. Additionally, numerous other OG-84's were found to have expired shelf-lives, precluding their issue. (3:1) This degradation of equipment could well have limited the offensive capabilities of U.S. forces, given the chemical weapon systems available to the enemy and his propensity to use them. NBC officers that have returned from SWA are still confused as to the capabilities of the chemical protective overgarments provided. Because of a shortage of OG-84's and the failure of the U.S. industrial base to meet the shortfall on limited notice, the Marine Corps was forced to procure and field both the British Mark IV and Saratoga suits. Each protective overgarment possesses its own technical data for use in a NBC environment; no two suits were the same. Additionally some data was modified on specific suits as a result of further testing. When this information failed to reach units in the field, NBC officers were forced to rely on previous information, some of which was incorrect. To alleviate this problem, the Marine Corps needs to ensure that it has a sufficient number of overgarments in both war stocks forward deployed and in the United States. Another area of grave concern was the M258A1 Skin Decontamination Kit. These kits consist of small packages of towelettes soaked in chemicals used to remove blister agents. Many of these packages were found swelled from exposure to heat which rendered them useless. This decontamination kit is the only piece of gear a Marine has with which to remove chemical agents from his body and equipment in the field. Though it is common knowledge in the NBC community that exposure to high temperatures could render these M258A1 kits unserviceable, no precautions were taken to protect them from damaging heat. (4:1) Medical supplies blocks (AMAL's) embarked aboard MPS were deficient in many areas. The AMAL's off-loaded from MPS were not fully stocked and combat ready. A further problem arose when it was found that medication needed for the treatment of NBC casualties was not even included in the AMAL's. (5:1) Attempts to secure these necessary medicines through Marine Corps Medical Logistics Companies was frequently futile. (6:1) This lack of NBC medical supplies could have been disastrous if forces had encountered any type of chemical agents on the battlefield which had produced casualties. The ability to detect chemical agents is critical to a unit. A requirement to remain at a heightened level of NBC protection can rapidly degrade the capabilities of a force, especially when operating in extremes of temperatures. There are currently few detection devices available to a commander. MPS provides limited M8 Chemical Alarms. When provided, the M8 Chemical Alarm was of limited value. Developed to detect one agent only, it fails to cover the full spectrum of hazardous chemical agents. Even when deployed in a limited role, an inordinate amount of time is required to maintain the system in operating order. This required maintenance prevents the M8 from continuous monitoring on the battlefield. Even when fully functional the M8 produced a high false alarm rate if the filters are not cleaned every 30 minutes. Coupled with the fact that the M8 battery pack is cumbersome and replacements are unavailable. (7:1) This early warning system currently does not meet the needs of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is testing the Individual Chemical Agent Alarm (ICAD) and it should be ready for fielding in the near future. If and when this does happen, and if enough units are procured to realistically meet the needs of the Marine Corps, then the Marine who is the potential target will be assured of early warning in a chemical attack. In the case of a biological attack, there still exists no alarm system available to provide any form of early warning. MPS was envisioned as possessing the capabilities to support combat operations on short notice in a variety of geographical locations at all levels of combat and operational intensity. Although this basic approach appears sound, additional planning and serviceability inspections of MPS assets must be accomplished to ensure adequate support. Currently, MPS has been given less than cursory NBC preparation to support forces that might deploy into potentially hazardous conflicts. The delay from the deployment of MPS in SWA to the outbreak of the war permitted Marines six months to correct discrepancies discovered in equipment. Most likely, this luxury should not be counted upon in future conflicts. With the continued proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by third world countries who are prepared to use them, theater commanders need to ensure deployed combat units are adequately protected. This requires that a "common sense" approach be used to determine what should be loaded aboard MPS and how it should be maintained to insure 100 percent combat readiness. The Corps-wide nonchalant attitude toward NBC can be corrected. The difficulty seems to lie in the fact that very few senior officers have been sufficiently concerned with NBC. To change their attitude clearly requires education or, perhaps, higher direction. Since NBC vies with so many other requirements for support, it tends to be overlooked and thus receives little attention until the possibility of this type of warfare looms. At that point, however, it can become the main focus. Training is intensified to prepare Marines who lack confidence in their own abilities to survive due to ignorance and non-proficiency. Equipment is tested for serviceability and often is found unusable. Then new equipment is fielded to fill major shortfalls that exist. The operation of new equipment is taught "on-the-fly" with little or no formal instruction. Unfortunately, little of substance can be done on such short notice. Therefore, Marines will enter conflicts lacking faith in their own abilities and the capabilities of their equipment. The senior leadership of the Marine Corps needs to ensure that Marines are trained efficiently and concurrently for NBC, and that the development and procurement of NBC defense equipment receives adequate budgetary support. Then, and only then, will any Marine expeditionary force be adequately prepared for combat in an NBC environment. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Unpublished Report on the War in Southwest Asia, Dated January 1992 2. U.S. Congress,House, Armed Services Committee, Elisa D. Harris. Senior Research Analyst The Brookings Institution. Chemical/Biological Defense Readiness, Training, and Equipment. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Readiness, 16 April 1991 3. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 01732- 61689 (02484), Submitted By FMFLANT, 10/17/90 4. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 01732- 24681 (02483), Submitted By FMFLANT, 10/17/90 5. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 91146- 70468 (02654), Submitted By RLT-2 Surgeon, Lt Blice, Date Unknown 6. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 92845- 50200(02428), Submitted By 10TH Marines, J.L. Holder, 09/28/90 7. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 21049- 52357 (02210), Submitted By MCRDAC, Colonel Hendrickson, 11/01/90 8. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 80136- 66946 (00018), Submitted By II MEF, 05/19/89 9. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 80136- 68913 (00019), Submitted By II MEF, 05/19/89 10. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 8015132183 (00080), Submitted By II MEF, 05/19/89 11. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 03100- 97437 (00474), Submitted By CG, 5TH MEB, 02/15/88 12. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 21547- 12003 (00641), Submitted By TEECG, MCAGCC, 02/15/89 13. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 30138- 67386 (00979), Submitted By TEECG, MCAGCC, Captain Osborn, 02/05/90 14. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 22961- 14245 (01114), Submitted By Captain Gallagher, 11/13/89 15. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 91143- 09349 (02373), Submitted By BSSG-4, NBC, 08/07/90 16. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 31740- 06869 (00546), Submitted By USCINCPAC, 03/31/86 17. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 31743- 59568 (00584), Submitted By USFK/EUSA, 12/22/86 18. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 51745- 49000 (03429), Submitted By CUSNCR N9, LCDR Avery 19. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 99999- 00093 (02183), Submitted By JCS, J7, 02/28/90 20. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 91153- 94666 (02470), Submitted By RLT-2 NBC Officer, CWO Detzel, Date Unknown 21. U.S. Marine Corps Lessons Learned. Number: 21049- 51956 (02206), Submitted By MCRDAC, Colonel Hendrickson, 11/01/90
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