To B-2 Or Not To B-2: That Is The Question AUTHOR Major Larry O. Spencer, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues -TEXT- Click here to view image EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TO B-2 OR NOT TO B-2: THAT IS THE QUESTION THESIS: Once the facts are distinguished from the misinformation, it becomes clear that with some modification to the procurement plan, America desperately needs the B-2 bomber. ISSUE: The media has been very successful portraying the B-2 bomber as a complete waste of taxpayer dollars. However, much of this media-hype is simply not based on fact. The technology of Stealth involves the scientific pursuit of near-invisibility to radar detection. Thus, the B-2 incorporates radar-evading attributes that make it the only current weapon system capable of penetrating Soviet airspace. The strategic triad, which is the backbone of U.S. deterrence, includes aging land, sea and air systems. However, it's the bomber "leg" of the Triad that is most lacking in capability. And, the current START negotiating positions give an edge to the bomber fleet because one aircraft, regardless of the number of warheads it carries, is counted as one nuclear delivery vehicle. Therefore, under START, the nation with the most capable bomber fleet maintains an edge in nuclear deployment. Also, the Soviet land-based ICBM's are being converted to mobile capable systems. Therefore, in the event of a nuclear exchange, the bomber force may be our only hope of locating and destroying these mobile targets. Further, with the capability to strike any target on the globe with a single refueling, the B-2 is a potent conventional deterrent as well. Nevertheless, criticism of the cost of the B-2 cloud-out these tremendous capabilities. But, when placed in perspective the B-2 consumes less of the DoD budget than its' predecessors, the B-1B and B-52. So, the issue becomes, after separating the misinformation and media-hype from the facts, should America buy the B-2 bomber? CONCLUSION: Without question the B-2 is an expensive weapon system. However, the facts show that the benefits derived from the B-2 greatly outweigh the investment. But, taking the current budgetary constraints into consideration, the current procurement plan of 132 bombers should be reduced by 50 per cent in which at least a portion of the savings should be invested into the next generation bomber. In short, America should buy the B-2 bomber with a reduced procurement package. TO B-2 OR NOT TO B-2: THAT IS THE QUESTION OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. Once the facts are distinguished from the misinformation, it becomes clear that with some modification to the procurement plan, America desperately needs the B-2 bomber. I. Stealth Technology A. Pursuit of near-invisibility B. Special production techniques II. B-2 Capabilities and the Strategic Triad A. B-2 range and payload B. Conventional deterrence C. Current Triad systems D. B-2s ability to enhance Triad E. Soviet defensive systems III. Arguments Against the B-2 A. Cost comparisons B. Other alternatives IV. Why should America Buy the B-2? A. Technological breakthrough B. Stabilizing deterrent C. Cost effective V. Conclusion A. Should reduce procurement plan B. Benefits outweigh costs TO B-2 OR NOT TO B-2: THAT IS THE QUESTION The B-2 program is perhaps the most controversial military procurement question of our time. A journalist's dream come true, the B-2 bomber would win first place in a contest held for the most criticized weapon system in the Department of Defense (DoD). To be sure, the media has been very successful portraying the B-2 bomber as the largest military "pork barrel" in recent times--an appalling waste of tax payer money! And, I must admit that even as an Air Force officer I too fell prey to this blitz of skepticism. However, a review of the facts of the B-2 showed that much of the criticism is based on misinformation and media-hype. And, once the facts were separated from the chaff, it became clear that with some modification to the procurement plan, America desperately needs the B-2 bomber. Whether you currently are a member of the "B-2 bashing" club or you simply don't think we can afford such an expensive system, it's important to first get an understanding of just what the B-2 bomber is before a final judgement can be made. And, any discussion of the B-2 should first deal with the concept of stealth. Simply put, stealth is the scientific pursuit of near-invisibility to radar detection.(6) Although this concept has only recently come to the forefront since the unveiling of the B-2, early stealth technology actually can be traced back to at least 1912 when to disguise its' presence a heavily muffled airplane was carefully camouflaged by the Army.(5:49) Stealth began to influence modern day military planning during the Arab-Israeli war where 40 U.S. built airplanes were easily tracked and shot-down by Soviet built SA-6 radar-guided missiles. As a result, the importance of undetectability was recognized and the quest for radar-evasion capable airplanes was seriously started. The term often used to describe the detectability of an airplane is the "signature" emitted while travelling through the atmosphere. These signatures include infrared waves from engine heat, sound waves, and the reflected radio waves used by radar detection systems. The concept of stealth attempts to "manage" radar signals by absorbing or rerouting the radar waves in directions least likely to be detected by an enemy receiver.(6) To achieve these stealth qualities the flat surfaces and sharp angles on the B-2 are sharply reduced, making the visibility of the airplane as measured by its radar cross section (RCS) almost nil. To put this in perspective the RCS of a B-52 measured from in front of its' nose is about 60 square meters. However, the B-2 cross section is less than .06 square meters which is roughly the radar signature of a hawk.(6) Thus, a radar technician monitoring incoming aircraft may not be able to distinguish between the B-2 bomber and a bird. In addition to a negligible RCS the B-2 stealth technology goes even further. A July 1988 Popular Science article by Steven Ashley and C.P. Gilmore estimates that the leading and trailing edges of the B-2s wings are constructed to minimize reflection. This is accomplished first because the wings are covered with multilayered materials that absorb incoming radar signals. And second, the edges are constructed of a series of thumb-size hexagonal honeycomb tubes that are filled with radar-absorbing material which increase in density from the outermost edge to the innermost. As a result, an incoming radar signal that first strikes the B-2 is partly absorbed by the multilayered covering. Then, as the radar signal continues to penetrate it is progressively absorbed while the remaining signal that strikes the angled surface at the rear of the airplane is reflected in a zigzag pattern back through the cell, continuing to be absorbed along this even longer path.(5:48) So, not only does the B-2 present a smaller target for radar to detect but it also absorbs those signals that do make contact, making it virtually undetectable to enemy radar. Next, let us turn our attention to the capabilities of this weapon system and how it can contribute to national defense. In a 2 May 1989 Aerospace Daily publication General Bernard P. Randolph, Air Force Systems Command, Commander, reported that the B-2 bomber has an unrefueled high-altitude range of 6,000 nautical miles and a payload of 50,000 pounds, giving it a potent conventional as well as nuclear capability. The aircraft is fitted with large, side-by-side weapons bays and rotary launchers for either SRAM missiles or gravity bombs. It can also carry 80 500-pound bombs on conventional racks, as well as other conventional weapons including sea mines. That means with only one air refueling the B-2 can literally cover any point on the globe on a non-stop mission carrying a full conventional or nuclear payload. Also, the B-2 was designed to operate with minimal support equipment and a landing gear track of just 40 feet, which is roughly the runway space required for a 727 airliner.(1) Thus, if necessary the B-2 can land at most modern airfields. As compared to the B-1B bomber, the B-2 will fly longer at high and low altitudes on less fuel. Also, the B-2, with its' two-man crew is expected to weigh 60,000-70,000 pounds less than the four-man crew B-1B when loaded with the same amount of weapons at takeoff.(4) To illustrate the practicality of these capabilities, consider the 1986 raid on Libya as an example. This operation required over 100 combat and support aircraft including two carrier battle groups, over 100 aircrew members and was initiated from foreign soil which required a very careful notification and coordination process. In contrast, a small force of B-2s with KC-10s for refueling could have delivered the same payload, been initiated from U.S. soil, and saved millions of dollars in the process, not to mention hundreds of lives that would not have been exposed to danger.(1) To be fair in this comparison I realize although the B-2 may indeed represent a milestone in technology, current economic constraints dictate that the U.S. may not be able to afford this "luxury edition" in our bomber fleet when the less expensive "models" can do the job--or can they? Therefore, let us now take a look at what our current systems look like. Suffice it to say that Soviet President Mikhial Gorbachev has done a masterful job swaying the attitudes of the West away from the "Evil Empire" perception of the past. And, the recent reforms in Germany and Poland certainly point toward a more peaceful European environment in the future. However, at the expense of sounding like a pessimist, I don't believe the recent reforms are cause to take a laissez-faire approach to defense. In fact, one could argue that President Gorbachev's peace movement is nothing more than an engagement in political warfare. To set the record straight, I am not suggesting that President Gorbachev is pulling a fast-one on the West, however, few would agree that the deterrence that has served us so well the past 40 years should suddenly be abandoned. And, the key to that successful deterrence has been the Strategic Triad. The strategic triad consists of a combination of land-based, sea-based, and bomber transported nuclear weapons. And, simply put, this combination presents such a dilemma for the Soviets that they dare not risk an offensive attack against the U.S. for fear of a massive retaliation. Whereas the concept of deterrence is not a new one, most are unaware that a large portion of the U.S. strategic triad assets are 20-30 years old. For example, 233 of SAC's 330 long-range bombers are B-52s built in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Likewise, SAC's inventory of 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) includes 450 Minuteman 2s, which first entered service in 1965, and 500 Minuteman 3s which first became operational in 1970. Periodic improvements have kept these systems reasonably up to date, however, recent technological and political developments have raised concerns about the survivability and potency of these aging weapons. Until the mid-1980s Soviet technology dictated that more than 60% of their nuclear force consist of silo-based ICBMs. However, with the fielding of the first road-mobile SS-25 missiles in 1985, the balance has begun to shift toward a greater percentage of mobile nuclear weapons. According to DoD estimates, close to 60% of the Soviet nuclear force, including bombers, submarine launched missiles, and land ICBMs will be mobile by the mid-1990s if current trends continue. On the political side, within the current Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) framework, a bomber is counted as a single delivery vehicle with a single warhead. Since each B-2 will carry up to 20 nuclear bombs, only one of which will count within the framework of START, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) observed that a force of 132 B-2s, each carrying 20 bombs, "equates to a total B-2 delivery inventory of 2,640 bombs, of which 2,508 do not count against our START totals....thus, if all 132 stealth bombers are deployed....the B-2 would provide almost 30% of our total retaliatory capability."(7) Also, a START agreement based on current U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions would give the total bomber force the responsibility to carry over 1/2 of all nuclear weapons when considering the Air Launched Cruise Missile. And, with the Soviet trend towards mobile-based nuclear systems the bomber force becomes critical as the only "leg" of the Triad that can visually locate or update target positions for destruction once launched. That is, if it can penetrate Soviet airspace. The Soviets currently have the largest and most expensive (over $350B over a 20 year period) air defense system in the world. This system includes 10,000 radars, 3,000 airborne interceptors and fighters, 8,000 surface to air missile launchers and a sophisticated airborne warning and control system. However, that impressive array of defenses is largely ineffective against an aircraft with B-2 capabilities.(2) Additionally, for those that don't foresee a nuclear war with the soviets as probable, the B-2 is also an invaluable conventional weapon as well. If it is true as many believe that future U.S. conflicts will involve low intensity "Vietnam Style" jungle warfare, the B-2 could prove itself invaluable in that role. Commander Everett Alvarez Jr., the first POW captured in Vietnam stated in his book, Chained Eagle, when commenting on the 1972 bombing raids against the North: "Wave after wave of day and night (bombing) raids took their toll on the morale of the AAA (Vietcong) units, which were equipped mostly with ineffective light weapons and machine guns. Towards the latter part of the year they were exhausted, moaning and groaning about the futility of their tasks and showing every sign that they no longer wanted to man their posts. It was heartening to see the proof of our belief that only massive use of air power would make the enemy knuckle under."(3) Thus, in the jungle environment of Vietnam where thousands of U.S. ground troops courageously fought the enemy, Commander Alveraz's perspective from the enemy side showed that it was the massive strategic bombing that hurt the enemy the most. So, if the B-2 can be a successful nuclear deterrent, it stands to reason that it would provide at least an equally successful deterrent value in a conventional capacity. Now, having discussed many of the attributes of the B-2 let's turn our attention to the opponents point of view. Of all the criticism of the B-2 I've heard and read, the primary one seems to be that of cost. And as a result, the focus on cost per copy has clouded the issue and not placed the B-2 procurement in proper perspective. First of all, research and development (R&D) costs for any program is dependent upon the amount of new technology involved. Therefore, it is only natural that the development of the B-2 would not come cheaply. Also, we stand to gain R&D benefits for years to come with the B-2 as once perfected, all future fixed-wing combat aircraft will take advantage of stealth technology. Second, a little known fact is that about 3/4 of the R&D cost of the B-2 is already invested as is about 1/3 of the total program cost. And, since most of the remaining investment is in production, the most valid cost comparisons should be based on flyaway costs. The flyaway cost of the B-1B is about $228M using FY89 dollars as compared to $274M for the B-2. When examining the cost of bomber procurement as a percent of the DoD budget over the procurement period (as shown in table 1) the B-2 consumes 1.3% of the budget for fiscal years (FYs) 1987-96 as compared to 1.6% for the B-1B for FYs 1982-86 and 1.4% for the B-52 for FYs 1952-61.(2) Therefore, taken in the proper perspective the B-2 program is no more expensive than previous strategic bomber procurements. General Larry Welch, Air Force chief of Staff, confirmed this when he stated in a Los Angeles Times news media breakfast on 28 October 1988: Every now and then somebody adds up all the costs of the manned bomber (B-2) and they say that's pretty expensive, and that's true. It is. But on a per warhead basis, that is if you add up the total cost of the bomber force and divide it by the total number of warheads carried on the bomber force, then the cost per warhead is competitive with any other system. The cost per warhead is slightly more than a silo-based ICBM, about the same as the submarine-based ICBM, and considerable less than a road mobile ICBM.(8) With the media filled of late with stories of budget cutting and deficit spending, many who support the B-2 as a system simply feel we can not afford the investment at this time. Therefore, what happens if we don't procure the B-2? Over the years (1960-1990) we have replaced a force of around 1600 bombers with a force of under 350 heavy bombers in the strategic nuclear role. If we stop production of the B-2, that force would fall to less than 200 because of the aging B-52s. That would leave us with less than 1/2 the penetrating bomber force required for an adequate post START force. Further, over 1/2 of the total bomber force would be 40 years old by the year 2000 and we would lose the capability to penetrate in the areas containing most of the important targets. In short, we cannot maintain an adequate strategic nuclear deterrent force if we let the bomber force atrophy. Still another argument is to simply produce more B-1Bs. While the B-1 can never match the capabilities of the B-2, producing 132 B-1s would cost about $37B as compared to $43B for 132 B-2s. However, as depicted in table 2, another $7B must be added to the B-1 cost to compensate for the loss of refueling capability. And again, that still buys a far less capable force. Also, adding enough B-1s just to compensate for the lower probability of penetrating Soviet airspace and locating targets would raise the B-1 requirement to at least 185 and the tanker additive requirement to about $9B for a total of $60B. And, in the long term, as Soviet defenses continue to become more capable, it would simply not be feasible to sustain our required bomber capabilities by just adding more B-1s.(2) So, the bottom line is the B-2 costs a lot of money, but it is money well spent when placed in perspective because it is no more expensive than other strategic systems and provides the added benefit of technological advancements that will help other systems in the future. Also, the alternatives of either not producing another bomber or continuing with the B-1B line is neither feasible or fiscally prudent. Therefore, the B-2 is the only cost effective future bomber option. The current B-2 procurement plan calls for 132 bombers at a cost of approximately $43 billion to bring our bomber force up to an acceptable deterrent level. However, with the current fiscal and political environment, it is difficult for even the strongest proponent of the system to justify the expense of the entire fleet. When considering that the U.S. government currently has an annual budget deficit of approximately $100 billion and the recent Soviet reforms, the high price tag adds fuel to the fire of the American publics' demand to cut defense--while the true cost to benefit advantages of the system are lost in the smoke. Therefore, as an alternative the procurement number should be reduced by around 50%, saving approximately $20 billion. Of course a force of only 65 B-2s will not provide the capability needed to keep pace with the current Soviet threat, however, if in fact the Soviets show positive signs of nuclear arms reduction, the requirement for retaliatory capability should decline in-turn. Additionally, since modern-day warfare is heavily dependent on technology, at least a portion of the $20 billion savings should be invested in R&D for the next generation bomber. That way, we won't put all our financial eggs in one basket by purchasing a system that for economic reasons will have to sustain us for at least the next 30 years. And, if by outside chance the Soviets develop a counter to the B-2 sooner than expected, that investment could prove itself invaluable to our defensive capabilities of the future. Now, to bring the discussion points into focus, there are several major reasons why America needs the B-2 bomber. First, beginning with the SR-71 and continuing with the B-1B, the B-2 is the third generation of an evolutionary aircraft that leverages competitive advantages in stealth technology with range and payload efficiency.(2) And, if we don't take advantage of this milestone in technology our adversary will. In short, the B-2 is a highly survivable bomber with the range and payload to reach any conceivable target with a single air refueling. With that same support, the B-1 has the range to cover less than one-half the target area or requires about three times the tanker support to cover an equal target area. Second, the bomber force is regarded by both the U.S. and the Soviets as the most stabilizing leg of the strategic triad. The reason is because once the ground and sea systems are launched, there is no return and world destruction is virtually assured. However, the bomber force can be launched as a show of positive intentions and then recalled when hopefully those heads of state involved recognized the impending disaster. Also, since the Soviet trend in land based ICBM's is towards mobile systems, the bomber force has the flexibility to adjust and/or visually locate hard ground targets if necessary. And, the B-2 is currently the only weapon system with the potential of penetrating Soviet airspace undetected. Third, The B-2 is a lethal conventional as well as nuclear deterrent. The range and payload capabilities of the B-2 render it able to respond to virtually any "hot spot" with a heavy punch in a short period of time. Also, this conventional capability is even more important when considering the payload efficiency of the B-2 could save millions of dollars and significantly reduce the number of lives exposed to danger. Fourth, when placed in proper perspective we simply can't afford not to purchase the B-2. Granted, even with a reduced procurement plan, $20 billion is a lot of money. However, when considering the benefits to be derived it is money well spent. Since the B-2 cost as a percent of the DoD budget is less than the B-1B or the B-52, the investment in economic terms is certainly reasonable by comparison. Also, since most of the R&D costs have already been expended as well as a significant portion of the production costs, the worst is already behind us. And, as discussed earlier, when put in practical terms, there is really no feasible alternative. Finally, our current Triad forces, particularly the bomber leg, are simply getting obsolete and must be replaced. A strong reason to update the bomber force is the current START proposal that gives an edge in nuclear capability to bombers. Thus, if START is ratified as currently configured, our bomber fleet will bear the burden of delivering over half of our total nuclear weapons. Additionally, a little known fact among opponents of the B-2 is that this system provides the best combination of accuracy and weapons yield of any system in the Triad.(2) Although the media harshly portrays the B-2 as an imprudent investment--an expensive toy for scarf-wearing pilots, much of that criticism is simply not founded in fact. Sure, the B-2 is expensive, but, when considering the capability we are buying, how can we expect otherwise. The freedom from a major war that America has enjoyed for the past 40 years is rooted in our strength and determination to maintain a potent military force. And, the procurement of the B-2 is crucial in maintaining the currency of our deterrent systems. The B-2s advanced capabilities provides a technological edge over our adversaries that is not likely to be countered in the near future. Also, current nuclear arms negotiations place a premium on the bomber force. Therefore, when weighing the attributes of the B-2 with the arguments against the system, I am convinced that the scales are overwhelmingly tipped towards procuring the B-2, although I recommend a reduced procurement plan. Thus, with all the facts finally in the open, it is clear that America needs the B-2 bomber. Click here to view image Bibliography 1. Aerospace Daily Randolph Details B-2 Range, Pay-load, Design, Rationale. 2 May 1989 2. Air Force Chief of Staff Briefing Entitled: The B-2 In Perspective (Undated) 3. Alvarez, Everett Jr. Chained Eagle. Donald I. Fine, Inc. 1989. 4. Amouyal, Barbara Despite Increased Range, B-2 Will Require Aerial Refueling. Defense News, 30 October 1989. 5. Ashley, Steven and Gilmore, C.P. Finally: STEALTH. Popular Science, (July 1988) 6. Atkinson, Rick The Story Behind the B-2 Bomber. The Washington Post, 8 October 1989. 7. Ropelewski, Robert R. Target Mobility, Arms Control, Challenge SAC Modernization. Armed Forces Journal International, Pages 67-72, (September 1989) 8. Welch, Larry General (USAF) During a Los Angeles Times News Media Breakfast Interview. 28 October 1988.
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