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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Does South Africa Have A Nuclear Bomb In Its Basement? AUTHOR Major James L. Cobb, Jr., USA CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA History Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomb in Its Basement? In August 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite detected what appeared to be a nuclear test facility in the Kalahari Desert near Namibia. This was to be the first inclination to the outside world that the South Africans could be ready to join that elite nuclear weapons club. But despite this incident, and that of others mysterious occurences, the South Africans deny their capability. The fact that the U.S. and other major powers allow them to maintain that plausible denial stimulates a great deal of confusion. This paper will attempt to shed some light on that confusion. Through a historical review of the South African nuclear program, using Robert Jasters three requirements for nuclear capability as a model, this study will show that South Africa has indeed joined the elite ranks of the nuclear capable club. By illustrating their scientific and technical skill to design a weapon, their access to sufficient quantities of weapons-grade material and the delivery systems available through their modern military complex, this paper shows that South Africa may indeed have a "bomb in the basement." The study also addresses the several sightings that have been reported, which point towards possible South African nuclear testing having occured. These sightings, coupled with the lack of real challenge to the South African denials, lead one to believe that it is by design that they are allowed to maintain the label of non-proliferation. In conclusion the paper offers several implications for U.S. policy in dealing with a nuclear capable South Africa. Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomd in Its Basement? Outline Thesis Statement: Historical evidence shows that South Africa has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. But, that it has been allowed to maintain plausible denial by the U.S. and other major nuclear powers. Introduction: Three requirements for nuclear capability Historical review of RSA nuclear program: Uranium Mining Import of Nuclear Technology Uranium Enrichment Program RSA Nuclear Power Plant Access to Weapons-Grade Material Weapons Design: South African Mining Technology Weapons Delivery Capability Highly Advanced Military R&D South African Nuclear Testing Conclusions: Implications for U.S. Policy Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomb in Its Basement? Introduction In the study of the region of southern Africa one cannot discount the important impact the Republic of South Africa has upon regional security. Though South Africa may carry little influence in world affairs today, in the thirty-five years of unbroken rule by the Afrikaner-dominated National party, its leaders have never accepted the notion of South Africa as a remote, third-rate power in the backwater of international politics. The South Africans have continually thought in strategic terms and have projected an image of South Africa as a regional power, with a significant strategic role to play in global affairs as well In August 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite detected what appeared to be a nuclear test facility in the Kalahari Desert near Namibia. Thus the first hint of possible South African nuclear prolifertion, as a means to solidify this role and support their image, appeared before the outside world. But, to this day, the aspect of the Republic of South Africa having joined the ranks of the elite nuclear weapons club remains an unconfirmed mystery. Does South Africa has the capability to develop a weapon? Have the South Africans already done so? If so, why has the U.S. and the International community allowed the South Africans to keep secret "a bomb in their basement?" In assessing whether a country has developed nuclear weapons, or possesses the potential to do so, we must first establish the requirements for nuclear weapons capability. According to Robert Jaster, " a country's nuclear weapons capability rests on three basic requirements: sufficient quantities of weapons-grade material; the scientific and technical skills to design a weapon; and a means of delivery of the weapon."(1) Through a historical examination of its nuclear program and technical development, with emphasis on its uranium industry, nuclear power program and uranium enrichment process, this study will look at the nuclear weapons capability of South Africa. It will evaluate briefly their weapons design capability and discuss South Africa's weapons delivery capability. I believe that the historical evidence will show that South Africa has joined the ranks of the nuclear weapons club and is allowed to retain deniability by the U.S. In order to properly evaluate the South African government's scientific and technical skills, and its access to sufficient weapons-grade material let us look at the history of South Africa's nuclear program. A Look at the South African Nuclear Program As a nuclear power, South Africa has grown to be one of the most formidable of all second level nations in the international system. This section will examine the history of its nuclear development program, and its growing nuclear infrastructure, emphasizing those aspects that influence its ability to produce nuclear weapons. It will trace its uranium mining industry, its progress towards reactor development, and indigenous uranium enrichment program, which are all important parts of the basic weapons development infrastructure. The South African nuclear program began as a result of the post-World War Two influx of western nuclear development projects. In 1946, South Africa initiated its national nuclear program with the appointment of the Uranium Research committee by South African President Jan Smuts. This committee's findings were instrumental in producing the South African Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which established a charter for the South African Atomic Energy Board founded in March of 1949.(2) South Africa's early interests were confined to mining and export of one of its most abundant natural resources, uranium. South Africa's uranium industry started in 1952 when it began exporting uranium to its World War Two allies, the United States and Great Britain. Uranium Mining: The start of it all. As stated, South Africa's early emphasis was on the mining of uranium ore for export purposes. Uranium is a fuel mineral which was derived originally as a by-product of the gold mining industry in the Witwatersrand Geological System of South Africa and is now mined in its raw state. During the early stages of their development of viable nuclear programs, the United States and Great Britain needed to establish a secure source of uranium. For this they turned to South Africa, which at the time was a member of the Commonwealth and estimated to have access to 25 percent of the non-Communist world's uranium reserves. Through U.S. and British investments, South Africa was able to construct uranium processing plants, which enabled them to begin exporting processed uranium in 1952. Between 1953 and 1971, the United States alone imported more than 40,000 tons of South African uranium, valued at $450 million. (U.S. government purchase contracts with South Africa ended in 1966) (3) Production in South Africa reached a high of 64,000 tons in 1959, fell in the 60's and 70's, and climbed again to peak production in the 80's. They maintain their production levels through nineteen active processing plants and contribute approximately 15 percent of the current world production levels.(4) South Africa's increasingly autonomous nuclear position is based on its control of a large local uranium resource. These resources are directly related to its ability to develop nuclear weapons.(5) Nuclear Technology and Reactors in South Africa South African scientists have been able to establish a very strong nuclear technological base. This has been a direct result of the outstanding technical assistance and training received in the use of nuclear materials from the United States and other western powers. The cooperation came about as a result of the 1957 "Atoms for Peace" program of President Dwight Eisenhower. This agreement between the United States and Republic of South Africa emphasized the dissemination of information on instruments of nuclear power.(6) In 1959, the government of South Africa adopted its Atomic Energy Research and Development program. This program outlined a five year research and development plan which included electrical power production and a more efficient utilization of the country's major nuclear resource, uranium.(7) Under this program, and as a result of the "Atoms for Peace" agreement, South Africa purchased its first research reactor, the United States designed SAFARI 1 (South African Fundamental Atomic Reactor Installation), and the highly enriched uranium needed to fuel it. In addition, the agreement enabled South Africa to send ninety-four of its finest nuclear scientists and technicians for training at various nuclear installations throughout the United States.(8) By 1961, South Africa had begun construction on its new nuclear research and development center at Pelindaba, near Pretoria. This center combined the newly established Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Southern University Nuclear Institute. It provided the modern nuclear research facilities required by its newly recruited staff of scientist. This scientific staff integrated considerable South African expertise, drawn from its industrial sector, with that of a large number of western scientists recruited through organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.(9) The SAFARI 1 research reactor came on line at Pelindaba in 1965. A somewhat large reactor for research, it could also be utilized for simulated power plant operations. A second reactor, Pelindaba Zero, was built and developed by South Africans as part of their reactor design and development research. It went into service in 1967.(10) Reactor research and design were just hints at the beginning of progress being made in South African nuclear technology. These reactors played a critical role in the development of the South African nuclear program by serving as the vehicles through which they might conduct important nuclear experiments. Important experiments such as the generation and control of neutrons, and testing the properties of materials under neutrons bombardment, would be critically important in the development of a nuclear weapon. As a result of these early achievements, South Africa made great strides in developing their own diversified programs and autonomous nuclear capability. One such program, which would later play an important role in their possible weapons development, is indigenous enrichment of uranium.(11) Uranium Enrichment Program The effective early development of the South African nuclear program, including that of indigenous uranium processing, acquisition of western nuclear technology and the activation of its own research reactor, enabled it to take its biggest step towards nuclear autonomy; that of acquiring the means to enrich its own uranium. In July 1970, Prime Minister John Vorster announced the development of a unique and economical process for the commercial enrichment of uranium by South Africa. In August 1973 the government revealed that, using this method, it had produced several tons of weapons-grade fuel for its experimental reactor at Pelindaba.(12) The government's decision to develop an independent enrichment capability had both a plausible commercial and strategic objective. Raw uranium exports, though profitable, were far less valuable than the low-enriched uranium needed for fueling the nuclear power plants coming into operation throughout the world. In 1975, Dr. Abraham Roux, then head of the South African Atomic Energy Board, announced plans to build a large scale enrichment plant. There was talk of building a facility which would produce about 5,000 tons per annum and bring in about $250 million annually for export of nuclear fuel.(13) However, by 1978, national and global economic conditions had changed. The slowdown by the late 70's in the growth of the global nuclear power generating capability raised doubts about future market demands for nuclear fuel.(14) Furthermore, the prospect of sudden rising costs in plant construction, which would have doubled the original project estimate, placed the building of a large scale production plant beyond local financing capability. As a result of its policy of apartheid the RSA Government experienced trouble in securing international financial backing and had to settle for a smaller scale commercial model. Had South Africa achieved its originally planned large scale enrichment capability, the country most certainly would have further increased its strategic importance to the western world.(15) South Africa Builds a Nuclear Power Plant Another important step taken by South Africa on its path to a mature nuclear power capacity occurred in 1974 when a decision was made to construct a commercial-size light water reactor(LWR) at Koeberg, near Capetown. The South African government invited nine international firms, experienced in building LWRS, to compete for the project. The plan called for construction to begin in 1976 and the plant to come on line in 1980. Angry protests, within those countries whose firms were bidding on the project, delayed awarding the contracts and the start of the project. Despite this international stir, a French consortium won the contract to build the two 925-megawatt reactors. Though Koeberg 1 was scheduled to come on line in 1984, it faced several setbacks, the most critical being an attempt, in December 1982, by the military wing of the African National Congress(ANC), to sabotage the plant. Fires caused by the bombings resulted in extensive damage to the construction site and necessitated costly repairs. Another untimely delay was a result of President Carter's decision to suspend the United States long term contract to supply low-enriched uranium to the South African government. Any further shipments of uranium would depend on the RSA's adherence to two stipulations: First, South Africa was to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Secondly, it was to submit all nuclear facilities to the international safeguard inspections of the IAEA. Because the South Africans refused to submit to these demands, they had to search elsewhere for the needed uranium fuel. The fuel was finally located on the open market, with a little assistance from two prominent U.S. firms who served as their brokers. Koeberg 1 was finally fueled and went critical in March 1985. The second reactor, Koeberg 2, reached full power in early 1986.(16) Having presented a brief outline of the history and technical development of the South African nuclear program, this study will now turn its attention to the critical components of nuclear weapons capability. Weapons-Grade Material Weapons-grade material is derived from two different sources, either plutonium or enriched uranium. South Africa does have the capability to produce spent fuel, from which weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted. The question is, how do they go about extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel? There are two possible answers to this question: Either South Africa has enlisted the aide of another nuclear nation to reprocess the spent fuel for plutonium extraction.(17) or it has developed the capability to reprocess its own spent fuel. Given the sophisticated state of the South African chemical industry, and its research facility at Pelindaba, the latter appears most plausible. Indeed Ted Greenwood noted, "there seems little doubt that almost any nation with a modest chemical industry could, on its own, build a reprocessing plant large enough to supply plutonium to a small explosive program".(18) The second possible source of weapons-grade material, that of enriched uranium, appears to be readily available since the South Africans have operated an unsafeguarded, uninspected enrichment plant for more than a decade. Though unconfirmed, it appears likely that they possess the ability to enrich their own supplies of raw uranium to weapons-grade level. Ronald Walters argues that "the South African regime could have produced a considerable stock pile of enriched uranium and that they purchased their initial supply, needed for the fueling of the Koeberg project, on the open market to disguise their own production capability."(19) Regardless, clearly South Africa has access to a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade fuel needed to develop a nuclear weapons program. Weapons Design Because of the tight security of the South African nuclear program, the evaluation of their capability to design a nuclear weapon must be based on speculation. It is believed that a country whose mining industry has nurtured an expertise in the technology of explosives, and whose growing armaments industry has achieved virtual self-sufficiency, would have little difficulty in this area of development. Its scientific and engineering community has had unencumbered access, until recently, to U.S. and European nuclear laboratories, graduate faculties, think tanks, and professional associations. Furthermore, although official nuclear technological exchange at the state level has been severed for the most part, there still remain exchanges between personal and professional contacts abroad.(20) It is also suspected that through its growing relationships with other second level nuclear states, such as Israel and Taiwan, the South Africans may gain access to important weapons design information.(21) So it would appear that the South Africans do not lack for design capability. Weapons Delivery Note that although a regime may have the ability to develop a nuclear explosive device, and may have even successfully tested it, the device still lacks credibility as a weapon if the regime lacks the capability to deliver it to a given target. The South African government has in its current military order of battle several nuclear-capable delivery systems. It possesses numerous, viable aircraft delivery systems such as the French Mirage 5, the British Canberra B-12 and the British Buccaneer Bomber. It also possesses the Israeli-designed Jerico missile and may have access, through Israel, to the U.S. designed Lance missile system.(22) Available evidence suggests that the South Africans are engaged in joint missile development programs with several European countries(23) and have managed to maintain control of all information relating to the products of these programs. Further information, gathered by the intelligence community, points to South African plans to expand its test facilities to accommodate longer range missiles. This could mean the possibility of a very long range delivery capability.(24) The South African Defense Force(SADF) also possesses a very fine small tactical nuclear delivery capability in its field artillery forces, the South African G-5 towed and G-6 self-propelled 155mm Howitzer systems being the most notable. These systems possess both conventional and nuclear delivery capability with a maximum range of 75 kilometers. U.S. Artillery experts describe it as one of the finest systems ever designed. This weapon provides the SADF with the ability to deliver a small tactical nuclear projectile (between approximately .5-3 kt yields) to within 50 meters of its desired target.(25) Having discussed briefly the history of the South African nuclear development program, it is apparent that it has experienced impressive growth. Not only have they obtained the technology to expand their nuclear program to possibly include a weapons capability, but they also apparently have access to sufficient weapons-grade material to support it. The question of weapons design capability, though not conclusively proven, can be answered through very qualified speculation. Without a doubt, they currently possess delivery systems that can accurately deliver a nuclear weapon within their region of influence. This study will now examine the evidence supporting the hypothesis that they have already developed and tested a nuclear explosive device. What of South African Nuclear testing? The testing of a nuclear device through explosion is by far the most clear cut sign that a country possesses weapons capability. There have been three recorded incidents over the past decade which have focused attention on the possibility of South African nuclear weapons testing. The first incident, a sighting of what appeared to be a nuclear test facility in the Kalahari Desert near Namibia, was detected by a Soviet reconnaissance satellite in August 1977. The facility was later confirmed, with 99 percent assuredness, by U.S. satellite photographs to be a nuclear test site. Western nuclear powers, particularly the United States and France, initiated immediate diplomatic pressures on the Pretorian government to dismantle the facility and render an explanation. he South African government responded with "ambiguous denials" of it being a test facility and vague explanations for its existence.(26) One justification for the facility, given by Robert Jaster, was that the government of South Africa prepared the test facility merely to provoke a reaction from the United States. South Africa's leaders saw an opportunity to use nuclear test preparations as a bargaining position to win concessions from the proliferation-sensitive Carter administration.(27) Richard Betts, in "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa," explains that the facility could have very well been "just part of a mining operation," as was suggested by the South Africans in their explanations to the western powers. However the South African government did take advantage of the attention gained by this incident to bargain with the West.(28) The second incident occurred on the night of 22 September 1979, when the U.S. Vela satellite detected the distinctive flash of a nuclear explosion in the Indian Ocean-Antarctic region near the coast of South Africa. The news of the sighting did not break until 25 October, when an ABC News broadcaster revealed it as information leaked to him from a government source.(29) The State Department's immediate response was that, "it had an indication of the possibility that a low-yield explosion did occur... no corroborating evidence as of yet... continuing to assess whether such an event had taken place." A panel of experts was hastily established by the White House Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press. It was charged with responsibility for examining alternative explanations for the Vela sightings. Despite convincing evidence, the panel stated in its findings that the alleged nuclear explosion was "technically indeterminate".(30) Many questions arose from the panel's findings. Speculations were made of possible White House coercion during the conduct of the investigation. At that time, there were numerous statements, made by several sources, that South Africa, working in conjunction with Israel, had detonated said atomic device on the night in question.(31) Had it been determined conclusively that South Africa (in collusion with Israel) had indeed tested a nuclear device, it might have greatly altered U.S. foreign policy towards both countries. There are several other explanations for the United States' desire to have South Africa remain a non-member of the nuclear weapons club: 1.) That President Carter's election campaign, already consumed with the negative domestic implications of the Iranian hostage crisis, might not with stand another blow of such magnitude to his administration. 2.) The negative effect such a situation would have had on the U.S. attempts to coerce South Africa into agreeing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. 3.) The negative world reaction to the U.S. because of its support in the development of the South African nuclear program. 4.) That pressure would have been applied, by the other Southern African nations, to the United States to provide proper nuclear deterrence capability, which might result in a direct confrontation with the South Africans.(32) 5.) Finally, is the consideration of the administration of the impact the confirmed disclosure of South African nuclear weapons capability might have had on the ongoing attempts to reach a peaceful solution in Zimbabwe.(33) On this occasion the South Africans were prepared to offer several explanations for the sighting. Vice-Admiral A. C. Walters, chief of the South African Navy, suggested that it was the result of an accident aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine that was reportedly cruising the waters in that area. The Soviets denied the allegation, suggesting that South Africa was "attempting to distract attention from itself." Another explanation, offered by a chemist in the nuclear physics division of the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, stated "that the explosion was that of a missile of undetermined origin which was observed to have landed in that area 16 years earlier." (34) The third incident occurred the eve of 16 December 1980, just before the Reagan inauguration, and was not announced until well over a month after his official installation into office. Because this was not a flash, but rather a heat source of intense, but brief duration, the Department of Defense quickly concluded it was the result of a meteor. This explanation of course received some raised eyebrows, but there appeared little further pursuit of the matter. Some concluded that it was a test of the waters by South Africa to see how the new Reagan Administration would react. The lack of response may have signaled the possibility of more favorable relations with the new Administration.(35) Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Policy In reviewing the current state of South Africa's nuclear program this study has attempted to analyze South Africa's capabilities for nuclear weapons development. To determine its capabilities we discussed what Robert Jaster established as three basic requirements: sufficient quantities of weapons grade material; the scientific and technical skills to design a weapon; and a means of delivery. Through the information available, this study has shown that the Republic of South Africa does adequately meet these requirements to the extent that it can be termed nuclear capable. But what options are available to the United States policy regarding non-proliferation in dealing with South Africa. One suddenly realizes that the U.S. is placed in a very difficult and precarious position. Several factors combine to make this case so difficult. Because of its internal policies, South Africa is known as a "pariah state." A state regarded as an international outcast. A nation isolated from normal relationships both in its own region and throughout the world community. U.S. opposition to apartheid and its need to keep official distance from South Africa's apartheid regime, rules out the option of offering South Africa a credible security umbrella that might keep it from developing or going public with a nuclear deterrent. The continuing uncertainty over the status of South Africa's nuclear development might make it difficult for policy makers to judge the options available. South Africa's continued official ideology of survival, regardless of the cost, through a "total national strategy" against the "total onslaught" strains its relationship with the U.S. and hampers the interests of non-proliferation. Because this concept has been so readily accepted by the leadership and its electorate, it is extremely difficult to persuade South Africans to modify or abandon this orientation. Because of this position, the United States has very little incentives to offer South Africa in return for adherence to non-proliferation. A nuclear embargo by the West, most notably the U.S. and France, has been one of measures taken. However, an embargo only places limitations on the future growth of their nuclear program and has little effect on its current capability. Stronger measures can only force South Africa to turn to other "pariah states" or other second level nations for support and exchange. This could result in further proliferation in countries which might not otherwise have access to nuclear capabilities. For the United States, it is important that South Africa remain categorized as a nation which has yet to achieve nuclear weapons capability. By allowing South Africa room for plausible denial, the United States can avoid a direct confrontation with South Africa, and thus avoid being forced into providing a nuclear deterrent to other Southern African nations. Such a position could also help to avoid pressure from, or a possible confrontation with, the Soviets should they choose to take a more active role in the region. The United States is forced to walk a fine line in dealing with this issue. Of special importance is the need for the U.S. to maintain open communications with the RSA to promote stability in the region and attempt to control nuclear proliferation. The continued success achieved by the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union in their measures to reduce the numbers of their respective nuclear arsenals through the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, and the prospects of future reductions through a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, should serve as a fitting example of the need for continued communications. If the United States continues to follow a path of sanctions and divestment it might surely tighten the "Laager" position around South Africa. This will prevent us from truly protecting the vital interest of the Southern African states, which may be best served by keeping open our lines of communications with Pretoria in order to insure South Africa is never forced to use a "bomb from its basement." Endnotes: (1) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.", Orbis, Winter 1984, 829. (2) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 23. (3) Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 94; Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 24-25; Ronald Walters, "Uranium Politics and United States Foreign Policy in Southern Africa.", Journal of Southern African Affairs, July 1979, 286. (4) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 24-25. (5) Ibid; "Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand.", (Paris: OECD/IAEA, December 1983), 30. (6) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 26. (7) Ibid, 23. (8) Kenneth Adelman and Richard Knight, "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?", Orbis, Fall 1979, 634. (9) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 23-24. (10) Ibid, 26; Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 92. (11) Charles Kennard, "Valindaba- The Talking is Over", (Research paper, Monterey, Naval Post-Graduate School, 1983), 6; Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 92. (12) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 26-27. (13) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.", Orbis, Winter 1984, 828. (14) Ibid, 829. (15) Ibid, 831. (16) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 56-57. (17) Ibid, 105. (18) Ted Greenwood, Harold Feiveson and Theodore Taylor, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivation, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977, 83. (19) Kenneth Adelman and Richard Knight, 11Can South Africa Go Nuclear?", Orbis, Fall 1979, 640. (20) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 105-107. (21) Ibid. (22) Dan Smith, South Africa's Nuclear Capability, New York: United Nations Center Against Apartheid, 1980, 21. (23) Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa., New York: The New York Times Books, 1978, 43. (24) Ibid. (25) United States Army, "Major Systems and Progress Reports", Field Artillery Journal, Nov.-Dec., 1986, 23. (26) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.", Orbis, Winter 1984, 843. (27) Ibid, 844. (28) Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 107. (29) Azim Husain, "The West, South Africa and Israel: A Strategic Triangle." Third World Quarterly, 4,1, January 1982, 58-59; Zdenek Cervenka, "The West and the Apartheid Bomb", Africa, January 1982, 18-19. (30) Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa., New York: The New York Times Books, 1978, 207. Dan Smith, South Africa's Nuclear Capability, New York: United Nations Center Against Apartheid, 1980, 10-11. (31) Azim Husain, "The West, South Africa and Israel: A Strategic Triangle." Third World Quarterly, 4,1, January 1982, 58-59; Zdenek Cervenka, "The West and the Apartheid Bomb", Africa, January 1982, 18-19. (32) This would have been of particular importance had Israel direct involvement been validated. There would have emerged extreme pressure on the U.S. to provide nuclear parity to middle eastern nations such as Egypt. (33) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 45-51. (34) U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 1979, No. 2033, 24; United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ME/6257/B/61, October 31, 1979; United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, SU/6259/A5/2, October 31, 1979. (35) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 42-51. Sources Consulted: Adam, Heribert and Hermann Giliomee. Ethnic Power Mobilized, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979 Adelman, Kenneth and Richard Knight. "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?", Orbis, Fall 1979, 633-647. Baker, Pauline H. "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The Citadel Assumption Reconsidered.", African Studies Review vol. 20, no. 2, September 1977, 89-99. Betts, Richard K. "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, no. 4, 1979, 91-115. Bustin, Edouard. "South Africa's Foreign Policy Alternatives and Deterrence Needs.", in Onkar Marwah and Ann Shultz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975. Cervenka, Zdenek. "The West and the Apartheid Bomb", Africa, January, 1982. Chari, P.R. "South Africa's Nuclear Option", Indian International Centre Ouarterly, Jan.-Feb. 1976. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment. Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. Crocker, Chester A. South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping with Vulnerability , Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publishing, 1981. Greenwood, Ted, Harold Feiveson and Theodore Taylor. Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. Husain, Azim. "The West, South Africa and Israel: a strategic triangle.", Third World Quarterly, vol. 4, no.1, January 1982, 44-73. Jaster, Robert. "Politics and The Afrikaner Bomb.", Orbis, Winter 1984, 825-851. ---------. "South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military.", in William Fotz and Henry Biener, eds., Arms and the African, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. ---------. South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Paper no. 159, London: IISS, 1980. ---------. Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Kennard, Charles. "Valindaba-The Talking is Over.", research paper, Monterey, Ca.: Naval Post-Graduate School, 1983. Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Africa's Nuclear Capability", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.22, no.1, 1984, 19-43. Rogers, Barbara and Zdenek Cervenka. The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa., New York: The New York Times Books, 1978. Rotberg, Robert I., Henry S. Bienen, Robert Legvold, and Gavin G. Maasdorp. South Africa and its Neighbors: Regional Security and Self-Interest, Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1985. Smith, Dan. South Africa's Nuclear Capability, New York: United Nations Center Against Apartheid, 1980. United States Department Of State Bulletin. United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 31,1979. United States Army. "Major Systems and Progress Reports",Field Artillery Journal,Nov.-Dec., 1986. Walters, Ronald W. South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and Deterrence, Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987. --------. "United States Policy and Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa.", in Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, eds., United States Military Involvement in Southern Africa, Boston: South End Press, 1978. --------. "Uranium Politics and United States Foreign Policy in Southern Africa.", Journal of Southern African Affairs, July 1979.



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