Does South Africa Have A Nuclear Bomb In Its Basement?
AUTHOR Major James L. Cobb, Jr., USA
CSC 1990
SUBJECT AREA History
Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomb in Its Basement?
In August 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite
detected what appeared to be a nuclear test facility in the
Kalahari Desert near Namibia. This was to be the first
inclination to the outside world that the South Africans
could be ready to join that elite nuclear weapons club. But
despite this incident, and that of others mysterious
occurences, the South Africans deny their capability. The
fact that the U.S. and other major powers allow them to
maintain that plausible denial stimulates a great deal of
confusion.
This paper will attempt to shed some light on that
confusion. Through a historical review of the South African
nuclear program, using Robert Jasters three requirements for
nuclear capability as a model, this study will show that
South Africa has indeed joined the elite ranks of the
nuclear capable club. By illustrating their scientific and
technical skill to design a weapon, their access to
sufficient quantities of weapons-grade material and the
delivery systems available through their modern military
complex, this paper shows that South Africa may indeed have
a "bomb in the basement."
The study also addresses the several sightings that
have been reported, which point towards possible South
African nuclear testing having occured. These sightings,
coupled with the lack of real challenge to the South African
denials, lead one to believe that it is by design that they
are allowed to maintain the label of non-proliferation. In
conclusion the paper offers several implications for U.S.
policy in dealing with a nuclear capable South Africa.
Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomd in Its Basement?
Outline
Thesis Statement: Historical evidence shows that South
Africa has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. But,
that it has been allowed to maintain plausible denial by the
U.S. and other major nuclear powers.
Introduction:
Three requirements for nuclear capability
Historical review of RSA nuclear program:
Uranium Mining
Import of Nuclear Technology
Uranium Enrichment Program
RSA Nuclear Power Plant
Access to Weapons-Grade Material
Weapons Design:
South African Mining Technology
Weapons Delivery Capability
Highly Advanced Military R&D
South African Nuclear Testing
Conclusions: Implications for U.S. Policy
Does South Africa Have a Nuclear Bomb in Its Basement?
Introduction
In the study of the region of southern Africa one
cannot discount the important impact the Republic of South
Africa has upon regional security. Though South Africa may
carry little influence in world affairs today, in the
thirty-five years of unbroken rule by the
Afrikaner-dominated National party, its leaders have never
accepted the notion of South Africa as a remote, third-rate
power in the backwater of international politics. The South
Africans have continually thought in strategic terms and
have projected an image of South Africa as a regional power,
with a significant strategic role to play in global affairs
as well
In August 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite
detected what appeared to be a nuclear test facility in the
Kalahari Desert near Namibia. Thus the first hint of
possible South African nuclear prolifertion, as a means to
solidify this role and support their image, appeared before
the outside world. But, to this day, the aspect of the
Republic of South Africa having joined the ranks of the
elite nuclear weapons club remains an unconfirmed mystery.
Does South Africa has the capability to develop a weapon?
Have the South Africans already done so? If so, why has the
U.S. and the International community allowed the South
Africans to keep secret "a bomb in their basement?"
In assessing whether a country has developed nuclear
weapons, or possesses the potential to do so, we must first
establish the requirements for nuclear weapons capability.
According to Robert Jaster, " a country's nuclear weapons
capability rests on three basic requirements: sufficient
quantities of weapons-grade material; the scientific and
technical skills to design a weapon; and a means of
delivery of the weapon."(1)
Through a historical examination of its nuclear
program and technical development, with emphasis on its
uranium industry, nuclear power program and uranium
enrichment process, this study will look at the nuclear
weapons capability of South Africa. It will evaluate
briefly their weapons design capability and discuss South
Africa's weapons delivery capability. I believe that the
historical evidence will show that South Africa has joined
the ranks of the nuclear weapons club and is allowed to
retain deniability by the U.S.
In order to properly evaluate the South African
government's scientific and technical skills, and its access
to sufficient weapons-grade material let us look at the
history of South Africa's nuclear program.
A Look at the South African Nuclear Program
As a nuclear power, South Africa has grown to be one
of the most formidable of all second level nations in the
international system. This section will examine the history
of its nuclear development program, and its growing nuclear
infrastructure, emphasizing those aspects that influence its
ability to produce nuclear weapons. It will trace its
uranium mining industry, its progress towards reactor
development, and indigenous uranium enrichment program,
which are all important parts of the basic weapons
development infrastructure.
The South African nuclear program began as a result of
the post-World War Two influx of western nuclear development
projects. In 1946, South Africa initiated its national
nuclear program with the appointment of the Uranium Research
committee by South African President Jan Smuts. This
committee's findings were instrumental in producing the
South African Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which established a
charter for the South African Atomic Energy Board founded in
March of 1949.(2) South Africa's early interests were
confined to mining and export of one of its most abundant
natural resources, uranium. South Africa's uranium industry
started in 1952 when it began exporting uranium to its World
War Two allies, the United States and Great Britain.
Uranium Mining: The start of it all.
As stated, South Africa's early emphasis was on the
mining of uranium ore for export purposes. Uranium is a
fuel mineral which was derived originally as a by-product of
the gold mining industry in the Witwatersrand Geological
System of South Africa and is now mined in its raw state.
During the early stages of their development of viable
nuclear programs, the United States and Great Britain needed
to establish a secure source of uranium. For this they
turned to South Africa, which at the time was a member of
the Commonwealth and estimated to have access to 25 percent
of the non-Communist world's uranium reserves. Through U.S.
and British investments, South Africa was able to construct
uranium processing plants, which enabled them to begin
exporting processed uranium in 1952. Between 1953 and 1971,
the United States alone imported more than 40,000 tons of
South African uranium, valued at $450 million. (U.S.
government purchase contracts with South Africa ended in
1966) (3)
Production in South Africa reached a high of 64,000
tons in 1959, fell in the 60's and 70's, and climbed again
to peak production in the 80's. They maintain their
production levels through nineteen active processing plants
and contribute approximately 15 percent of the current world
production levels.(4)
South Africa's increasingly autonomous nuclear
position is based on its control of a large local uranium
resource. These resources are directly related to its
ability to develop nuclear weapons.(5)
Nuclear Technology and Reactors
in South Africa
South African scientists have been able to establish a
very strong nuclear technological base. This has been a
direct result of the outstanding technical assistance and
training received in the use of nuclear materials from the
United States and other western powers. The cooperation
came about as a result of the 1957 "Atoms for Peace" program
of President Dwight Eisenhower. This agreement between the
United States and Republic of South Africa emphasized the
dissemination of information on instruments of nuclear
power.(6)
In 1959, the government of South Africa adopted its
Atomic Energy Research and Development program. This
program outlined a five year research and development plan
which included electrical power production and a more
efficient utilization of the country's major nuclear
resource, uranium.(7)
Under this program, and as a result of the "Atoms for
Peace" agreement, South Africa purchased its first research
reactor, the United States designed SAFARI 1 (South African
Fundamental Atomic Reactor Installation), and the highly
enriched uranium needed to fuel it. In addition, the
agreement enabled South Africa to send ninety-four of its
finest nuclear scientists and technicians for training at
various nuclear installations throughout the United
States.(8)
By 1961, South Africa had begun construction on its new
nuclear research and development center at Pelindaba, near
Pretoria. This center combined the newly established
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the
Southern University Nuclear Institute. It provided the
modern nuclear research facilities required by its newly
recruited staff of scientist. This scientific staff
integrated considerable South African expertise, drawn from
its industrial sector, with that of a large number of
western scientists recruited through organizations such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency.(9)
The SAFARI 1 research reactor came on line at Pelindaba
in 1965. A somewhat large reactor for research, it could
also be utilized for simulated power plant operations. A
second reactor, Pelindaba Zero, was built and developed by
South Africans as part of their reactor design and
development research. It went into service in 1967.(10)
Reactor research and design were just hints at the
beginning of progress being made in South African nuclear
technology. These reactors played a critical role in the
development of the South African nuclear program by serving
as the vehicles through which they might conduct important
nuclear experiments. Important experiments such as the
generation and control of neutrons, and testing the
properties of materials under neutrons bombardment, would be
critically important in the development of a nuclear weapon.
As a result of these early achievements, South Africa made
great strides in developing their own diversified programs
and autonomous nuclear capability. One such program, which
would later play an important role in their possible weapons
development, is indigenous enrichment of uranium.(11)
Uranium Enrichment Program
The effective early development of the South African
nuclear program, including that of indigenous uranium
processing, acquisition of western nuclear technology and
the activation of its own research reactor, enabled it to
take its biggest step towards nuclear autonomy; that of
acquiring the means to enrich its own uranium. In July
1970, Prime Minister John Vorster announced the development
of a unique and economical process for the commercial
enrichment of uranium by South Africa. In August 1973 the
government revealed that, using this method, it had produced
several tons of weapons-grade fuel for its experimental
reactor at Pelindaba.(12)
The government's decision to develop an independent
enrichment capability had both a plausible commercial and
strategic objective. Raw uranium exports, though
profitable, were far less valuable than the low-enriched
uranium needed for fueling the nuclear power plants coming
into operation throughout the world.
In 1975, Dr. Abraham Roux, then head of the South
African Atomic Energy Board, announced plans to build a
large scale enrichment plant. There was talk of building a
facility which would produce about 5,000 tons per annum and
bring in about $250 million annually for export of nuclear
fuel.(13) However, by 1978, national and global economic
conditions had changed. The slowdown by the late 70's in
the growth of the global nuclear power generating capability
raised doubts about future market demands for nuclear
fuel.(14) Furthermore, the prospect of sudden rising costs
in plant construction, which would have doubled the original
project estimate, placed the building of a large scale
production plant beyond local financing capability. As a
result of its policy of apartheid the RSA Government
experienced trouble in securing international financial
backing and had to settle for a smaller scale commercial
model. Had South Africa achieved its originally planned
large scale enrichment capability, the country most
certainly would have further increased its strategic
importance to the western world.(15)
South Africa Builds a Nuclear Power Plant
Another important step taken by South Africa on its
path to a mature nuclear power capacity occurred in 1974
when a decision was made to construct a commercial-size
light water reactor(LWR) at Koeberg, near Capetown. The
South African government invited nine international firms,
experienced in building LWRS, to compete for the project.
The plan called for construction to begin in 1976 and the
plant to come on line in 1980. Angry protests, within those
countries whose firms were bidding on the project, delayed
awarding the contracts and the start of the project.
Despite this international stir, a French consortium won the
contract to build the two 925-megawatt reactors.
Though Koeberg 1 was scheduled to come on line in 1984,
it faced several setbacks, the most critical being an
attempt, in December 1982, by the military wing of the
African National Congress(ANC), to sabotage the plant.
Fires caused by the bombings resulted in extensive damage to
the construction site and necessitated costly repairs.
Another untimely delay was a result of President
Carter's decision to suspend the United States long term
contract to supply low-enriched uranium to the South African
government. Any further shipments of uranium would depend
on the RSA's adherence to two stipulations: First, South
Africa was to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty(NPT). Secondly, it was to submit all nuclear
facilities to the international safeguard inspections of the
IAEA. Because the South Africans refused to submit to these
demands, they had to search elsewhere for the needed uranium
fuel. The fuel was finally located on the open market, with
a little assistance from two prominent U.S. firms who served
as their brokers. Koeberg 1 was finally fueled and went
critical in March 1985. The second reactor, Koeberg 2,
reached full power in early 1986.(16)
Having presented a brief outline of the history and
technical development of the South African nuclear program,
this study will now turn its attention to the critical
components of nuclear weapons capability.
Weapons-Grade Material
Weapons-grade material is derived from two different
sources, either plutonium or enriched uranium. South Africa
does have the capability to produce spent fuel, from which
weapons-grade plutonium can be extracted. The question is,
how do they go about extracting the plutonium from the spent
fuel?
There are two possible answers to this question:
Either South Africa has enlisted the aide of another nuclear
nation to reprocess the spent fuel for plutonium
extraction.(17) or it has developed the capability to
reprocess its own spent fuel. Given the sophisticated state
of the South African chemical industry, and its research
facility at Pelindaba, the latter appears most plausible.
Indeed Ted Greenwood noted, "there seems little doubt that
almost any nation with a modest chemical industry could, on
its own, build a reprocessing plant large enough to supply
plutonium to a small explosive program".(18)
The second possible source of weapons-grade material,
that of enriched uranium, appears to be readily available
since the South Africans have operated an unsafeguarded,
uninspected enrichment plant for more than a decade. Though
unconfirmed, it appears likely that they possess the ability
to enrich their own supplies of raw uranium to weapons-grade
level. Ronald Walters argues that "the South African regime
could have produced a considerable stock pile of enriched
uranium and that they purchased their initial supply, needed
for the fueling of the Koeberg project, on the open market
to disguise their own production capability."(19)
Regardless, clearly South Africa has access to a
sufficient quantity of weapons-grade fuel needed to develop
a nuclear weapons program.
Weapons Design
Because of the tight security of the South African
nuclear program, the evaluation of their capability to
design a nuclear weapon must be based on speculation. It is
believed that a country whose mining industry has nurtured
an expertise in the technology of explosives, and whose
growing armaments industry has achieved virtual
self-sufficiency, would have little difficulty in this area
of development. Its scientific and engineering community
has had unencumbered access, until recently, to U.S. and
European nuclear laboratories, graduate faculties, think
tanks, and professional associations. Furthermore, although
official nuclear technological exchange at the state level
has been severed for the most part, there still remain
exchanges between personal and professional contacts
abroad.(20)
It is also suspected that through its growing
relationships with other second level nuclear states, such
as Israel and Taiwan, the South Africans may gain access to
important weapons design information.(21) So it would
appear that the South Africans do not lack for design
capability.
Weapons Delivery
Note that although a regime may have the ability to
develop a nuclear explosive device, and may have even
successfully tested it, the device still lacks credibility
as a weapon if the regime lacks the capability to deliver it
to a given target.
The South African government has in its current
military order of battle several nuclear-capable delivery
systems. It possesses numerous, viable aircraft delivery
systems such as the French Mirage 5, the British Canberra
B-12 and the British Buccaneer Bomber. It also possesses
the Israeli-designed Jerico missile and may have access,
through Israel, to the U.S. designed Lance missile
system.(22)
Available evidence suggests that the South Africans are
engaged in joint missile development programs with several
European countries(23) and have managed to maintain control
of all information relating to the products of these
programs. Further information, gathered by the intelligence
community, points to South African plans to expand its test
facilities to accommodate longer range missiles. This could
mean the possibility of a very long range delivery
capability.(24)
The South African Defense Force(SADF) also possesses a
very fine small tactical nuclear delivery capability in its
field artillery forces, the South African G-5 towed and G-6
self-propelled 155mm Howitzer systems being the most
notable. These systems possess both conventional and
nuclear delivery capability with a maximum range of 75
kilometers. U.S. Artillery experts describe it as one of
the finest systems ever designed. This weapon provides the
SADF with the ability to deliver a small tactical nuclear
projectile (between approximately .5-3 kt yields) to within
50 meters of its desired target.(25)
Having discussed briefly the history of the South
African nuclear development program, it is apparent that it
has experienced impressive growth. Not only have they
obtained the technology to expand their nuclear program to
possibly include a weapons capability, but they also
apparently have access to sufficient weapons-grade material
to support it. The question of weapons design capability,
though not conclusively proven, can be answered through very
qualified speculation. Without a doubt, they currently
possess delivery systems that can accurately deliver a
nuclear weapon within their region of influence.
This study will now examine the evidence supporting the
hypothesis that they have already developed and tested a
nuclear explosive device.
What of South African Nuclear testing?
The testing of a nuclear device through explosion is by
far the most clear cut sign that a country possesses weapons
capability. There have been three recorded incidents over
the past decade which have focused attention on the
possibility of South African nuclear weapons testing.
The first incident, a sighting of what appeared to be a
nuclear test facility in the Kalahari Desert near Namibia,
was detected by a Soviet reconnaissance satellite in August
1977. The facility was later confirmed, with 99 percent
assuredness, by U.S. satellite photographs to be a nuclear
test site. Western nuclear powers, particularly the United
States and France, initiated immediate diplomatic pressures
on the Pretorian government to dismantle the facility and
render an explanation. he South African government
responded with "ambiguous denials" of it being a test
facility and vague explanations for its existence.(26)
One justification for the facility, given by Robert
Jaster, was that the government of South Africa prepared the
test facility merely to provoke a reaction from the United
States. South Africa's leaders saw an opportunity to use
nuclear test preparations as a bargaining position to win
concessions from the proliferation-sensitive Carter
administration.(27)
Richard Betts, in "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa,"
explains that the facility could have very well been "just
part of a mining operation," as was suggested by the South
Africans in their explanations to the western powers.
However the South African government did take advantage of
the attention gained by this incident to bargain with the
West.(28)
The second incident occurred on the night of 22
September 1979, when the U.S. Vela satellite detected the
distinctive flash of a nuclear explosion in the Indian
Ocean-Antarctic region near the coast of South Africa. The
news of the sighting did not break until 25 October, when an
ABC News broadcaster revealed it as information leaked to
him from a government source.(29)
The State Department's immediate response was that, "it
had an indication of the possibility that a low-yield
explosion did occur... no corroborating evidence as of
yet... continuing to assess whether such an event had taken
place." A panel of experts was hastily established by the
White House Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press. It was
charged with responsibility for examining alternative
explanations for the Vela sightings. Despite convincing
evidence, the panel stated in its findings that the alleged
nuclear explosion was "technically indeterminate".(30)
Many questions arose from the panel's findings.
Speculations were made of possible White House coercion
during the conduct of the investigation. At that time,
there were numerous statements, made by several sources,
that South Africa, working in conjunction with Israel, had
detonated said atomic device on the night in question.(31)
Had it been determined conclusively that South Africa (in
collusion with Israel) had indeed tested a nuclear device,
it might have greatly altered U.S. foreign policy towards
both countries.
There are several other explanations for the United
States' desire to have South Africa remain a non-member of
the nuclear weapons club: 1.) That President Carter's
election campaign, already consumed with the negative
domestic implications of the Iranian hostage crisis, might
not with stand another blow of such magnitude to his
administration. 2.) The negative effect such a situation
would have had on the U.S. attempts to coerce South Africa
into agreeing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. 3.) The
negative world reaction to the U.S. because of its support
in the development of the South African nuclear program. 4.)
That pressure would have been applied, by the other Southern
African nations, to the United States to provide proper
nuclear deterrence capability, which might result in a
direct confrontation with the South Africans.(32) 5.)
Finally, is the consideration of the administration of the
impact the confirmed disclosure of South African nuclear
weapons capability might have had on the ongoing attempts to
reach a peaceful solution in Zimbabwe.(33)
On this occasion the South Africans were prepared to
offer several explanations for the sighting. Vice-Admiral
A. C. Walters, chief of the South African Navy, suggested
that it was the result of an accident aboard a Soviet
nuclear submarine that was reportedly cruising the waters in
that area. The Soviets denied the allegation, suggesting
that South Africa was "attempting to distract attention from
itself." Another explanation, offered by a chemist in the
nuclear physics division of the South African Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research, stated "that the
explosion was that of a missile of undetermined origin which
was observed to have landed in that area 16 years earlier."
(34)
The third incident occurred the eve of 16 December
1980, just before the Reagan inauguration, and was not
announced until well over a month after his official
installation into office. Because this was not a flash, but
rather a heat source of intense, but brief duration, the
Department of Defense quickly concluded it was the result of
a meteor. This explanation of course received some raised
eyebrows, but there appeared little further pursuit of the
matter. Some concluded that it was a test of the waters by
South Africa to see how the new Reagan Administration would
react. The lack of response may have signaled the
possibility of more favorable relations with the new
Administration.(35)
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Policy
In reviewing the current state of South Africa's
nuclear program this study has attempted to analyze South
Africa's capabilities for nuclear weapons development. To
determine its capabilities we discussed what Robert Jaster
established as three basic requirements: sufficient
quantities of weapons grade material; the scientific and
technical skills to design a weapon; and a means of
delivery. Through the information available, this study
has shown that the Republic of South Africa does adequately
meet these requirements to the extent that it can be termed
nuclear capable.
But what options are available to the United States
policy regarding non-proliferation in dealing with South
Africa. One suddenly realizes that the U.S. is placed in a
very difficult and precarious position.
Several factors combine to make this case so difficult.
Because of its internal policies, South Africa is known as a
"pariah state." A state regarded as an international
outcast. A nation isolated from normal relationships both
in its own region and throughout the world community. U.S.
opposition to apartheid and its need to keep official
distance from South Africa's apartheid regime, rules out the
option of offering South Africa a credible security umbrella
that might keep it from developing or going public with a
nuclear deterrent.
The continuing uncertainty over the status of South
Africa's nuclear development might make it difficult for
policy makers to judge the options available. South
Africa's continued official ideology of survival, regardless
of the cost, through a "total national strategy" against the
"total onslaught" strains its relationship with the U.S. and
hampers the interests of non-proliferation. Because this
concept has been so readily accepted by the leadership and
its electorate, it is extremely difficult to persuade South
Africans to modify or abandon this orientation.
Because of this position, the United States has very
little incentives to offer South Africa in return for
adherence to non-proliferation. A nuclear embargo by the
West, most notably the U.S. and France, has been one of
measures taken. However, an embargo only places limitations
on the future growth of their nuclear program and has little
effect on its current capability. Stronger measures can
only force South Africa to turn to other "pariah states" or
other second level nations for support and exchange. This
could result in further proliferation in countries which
might not otherwise have access to nuclear capabilities.
For the United States, it is important that South
Africa remain categorized as a nation which has yet to
achieve nuclear weapons capability. By allowing South
Africa room for plausible denial, the United States can
avoid a direct confrontation with South Africa, and thus
avoid being forced into providing a nuclear deterrent to
other Southern African nations. Such a position could also
help to avoid pressure from, or a possible confrontation
with, the Soviets should they choose to take a more active
role in the region.
The United States is forced to walk a fine line in
dealing with this issue. Of special importance is the need
for the U.S. to maintain open communications with the RSA to
promote stability in the region and attempt to control
nuclear proliferation. The continued success achieved by
the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union in
their measures to reduce the numbers of their respective
nuclear arsenals through the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
agreement, and the prospects of future reductions through a
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, should serve as a fitting
example of the need for continued communications.
If the United States continues to follow a path of
sanctions and divestment it might surely tighten the
"Laager" position around South Africa. This will prevent us
from truly protecting the vital interest of the Southern
African states, which may be best served by keeping open our
lines of communications with Pretoria in order to insure
South Africa is never forced to use a "bomb from its
basement."
Endnotes:
(1) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.",
Orbis, Winter 1984, 829.
(2) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 23.
(3) Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South
Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 94; Ronald
Walters, South Africa and the Bomb: Responsibility and
Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1987), 24-25; Ronald Walters, "Uranium Politics
and United States Foreign Policy in Southern Africa.",
Journal of Southern African Affairs, July 1979, 286.
(4) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 24-25.
(5) Ibid; "Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand.",
(Paris: OECD/IAEA, December 1983), 30.
(6) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 26.
(7) Ibid, 23.
(8) Kenneth Adelman and Richard Knight, "Can South
Africa Go Nuclear?", Orbis, Fall 1979, 634.
(9) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 23-24.
(10) Ibid, 26; Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for
South Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 92.
(11) Charles Kennard, "Valindaba- The Talking is Over",
(Research paper, Monterey, Naval Post-Graduate School,
1983), 6; Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South
Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 92.
(12) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 26-27.
(13) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.",
Orbis, Winter 1984, 828.
(14) Ibid, 829.
(15) Ibid, 831.
(16) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 56-57.
(17) Ibid, 105.
(18) Ted Greenwood, Harold Feiveson and Theodore
Taylor, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivation, Capabilities, and
Strategies for Control, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977, 83.
(19) Kenneth Adelman and Richard Knight, 11Can South
Africa Go Nuclear?", Orbis, Fall 1979, 640.
(20) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 105-107.
(21) Ibid.
(22) Dan Smith, South Africa's Nuclear Capability, New
York: United Nations Center Against Apartheid, 1980, 21.
(23) Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear
Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South
Africa., New York: The New York Times Books, 1978, 43.
(24) Ibid.
(25) United States Army, "Major Systems and Progress
Reports", Field Artillery Journal, Nov.-Dec., 1986, 23.
(26) Robert Jaster, "Politics and the Afrikaner Bomb.",
Orbis, Winter 1984, 843.
(27) Ibid, 844.
(28) Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South
Africa?", International Security, No. 4, 1979, 107.
(29) Azim Husain, "The West, South Africa and Israel: A
Strategic Triangle." Third World Quarterly, 4,1, January
1982, 58-59; Zdenek Cervenka, "The West and the Apartheid
Bomb", Africa, January 1982, 18-19.
(30) Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear
Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South
Africa., New York: The New York Times Books, 1978, 207. Dan
Smith, South Africa's Nuclear Capability, New York: United
Nations Center Against Apartheid, 1980, 10-11.
(31) Azim Husain, "The West, South Africa and Israel: A
Strategic Triangle." Third World Quarterly, 4,1, January
1982, 58-59; Zdenek Cervenka, "The West and the Apartheid
Bomb", Africa, January 1982, 18-19.
(32) This would have been of particular importance had
Israel direct involvement been validated. There would have
emerged extreme pressure on the U.S. to provide nuclear
parity to middle eastern nations such as Egypt.
(33) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 45-51.
(34) U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 1979, No. 2033,
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ME/6257/B/61, October 31, 1979; United States Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, SU/6259/A5/2, October 31,
1979.
(35) Ronald Walters, South Africa and the Bomb:
Responsibility and Deterrence, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), 42-51.
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