U. S. Strategy Concerning The Use Of Nuclear Forces AUTHOR Major John F. Scheiner, USMC CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: US STRATEGY CONCERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR FORCES Thesis: Does our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces really promote its objectives of peace, security and freedom? Issue: Addressing the issues dealing with US strategy on the use of nuclear force is complicated and often confusing to even learned scholars within this field of academia. But the base problem concerning our strategy upon which all other problems can be founded is it does not promote its stated objectives of peace, security and freedorn. Historically the US has changed little since WWII in its core interest and the objectives of its national strategy. But with advances in technology and nuclear weapons development the US must continue to change in response to changing world situations. All of the associated problems in this area have extensive and far reaching effects that will affect all nations not just those waging the war. To the present deterrence has worked quite well. But how long can we expect it to last, how long must we live under the threat of nuclear war, and why do we have a national strategy that supports the thought of and accepts mutually assured destruction? Problems still exist and often rage between the professional and academic fields in regards to this strategy. The professionals most often support the secular approach while the academicians usually opt for the philosophical side. On the academic side of strategy moral issues usually are the most controversial followed closely by credibility issues, and issues dealing with a total lack of training for the military strategist who in reality may be the military leader who employs the nuclear weapon. On the secular side problems such as an accidental war precipitated by a quick launch response, the nuclear winter phenomena, and the unwinnable war fact based on the deterrent effect of Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD, present many problems for the strategist. Finally, our strategy does not address client states and third world countries which could act as catalysts or hosts for entry into an accidental nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR. Conclusion: It is extremely difficult and maybe impossible to define US strategy on the use of nuclear forces. It is even harder to formulate when startinq with a definition that is based on abstract philosophy, scenario dependant planning, and subjective thought from a battlefield commander But when considering the final outcome of such a strategy, ie, MAD, we must, regardless of the degree difficulty find a better way. US STRATEGY CONCERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR FORCES OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Does our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces really promote it's objectives of peace, security and freedom? I. Introduction. A. Complex nature of problem B. Objectives of our national strategy. C. Definition of strategy. D. Historical view. II. Present policy. A. World situation influencing evolving US strategy. B. Present strategy does not foster peace, security and freedom.. C. Prospective future and direction of US strategy has changed, can change, and must change. D. Present policy affects all nations and the associated problems must be dealt with and the questions answered. III. Problems with present US strateqy. A. Conflict between the professional and the academician B. Quick launch C. Nuclear winter. D. Doesn't address low intensity conflict and third world countries. E. No winners and no survivors with present strategy. F. MAD, a disconcerting basis for a strategy. G. Lacks credibility. H. No training for the military strategist IV. Conclusion. A. Difficulties in capsulizing just actually what our strategy is. A. Is this an unsolvable problem? B. Dialoque between East and West must continue. C. Strategic objectives must be met. US STRATEGY CONCERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR FORCES In trying to address US strategy on the use of nuclear forces it becomes readily apparent that there is an ongoing, and often raging confrontation between the professional and academic communities in regards to the formulation and evolution of policy concerning strategy. It is also extremely frustrating to find out that no singly exhaustive, categorically conclusive document exists which states exactly what our policy is. The subject is technically complex, philosophically abstract and most often presents obtuse theoretical constructs that can over whelm even learned scholars from the associated fields of nuclear technology. Writers of this strategy appear to have an uncanny ability to jargonize the language to such a degree that it presents an almost unimposing, sanitized view of the truly awful consequences of the use of nuclear forces. As a veteran in the field, Fred Ikle, passionately writes: The jargon of American strategic analysis works like a narcotic. It dulls our sense of moral outrage about the tragic confrontation of nuclear arsenals. It fosters the current smug compliance regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence. It blinds us to the fact that our method of preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the dark ages - the mass killing of hostages. (12:IX) The complexities, the jargonized language, the confusion and the different lines of thought all create an even more imposing task for the strategist in trying to address and achieve, through policy, the stated objectives of our strategy. The objectives of our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces are peace, security and freedom. (12:1-24) Herein though is where the problems lies. Does our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces really promote it's objectives of peace, security and freedom? Initially our strategy was sound and it did promote the objectives of peace, security and freedom. It was originally built around deterrence and the fact that the United States was the only nation that had a viable nuclear capability. But in the past two decades the Soviet Union proliferated its own nuclear forces to such an extent that we were forced to adopt a new national policy on the use of strategic nuclear forces with two principal elernents: the first being deterrence and the second being Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD. The United States adopted this policy when it became evident that we couldn't over power the USSR with nuclear weapons and the policy hasn't changed since. On the surface it may appear that this strategic policy meets the objectives of peace, security and freedom but upon close examination it becomes evident that we've either got to change our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces or change the objectives of that strategy. Presently this is a problem: they don't match up and they never will. Initially though, a definition of strategy must precede any discussion on the subject. Strategy is the art and science of employing the political, psychological, economic and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to an adopted policy in either war or peace. This includes the command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions and circumstances. Strategy is how the principal elements of national power, both diplomatic and informational, economic and military, can be employed to support our national interests and promote the objectives of peace, security and freedom. (12:1) Strategy is an indivisible triangle of public opinion, political goals and military force that, just as the physical tools of war change, must also change if it is to be an effective means to further our nation in regard to its strategic objectives. Historically, the United States has remained remarkably consistent in it's core interests and the objectives of its national strategy. In actuality, little has changed since World War II and the advent of the atomic age. In reference to changes in our strategy on the use of nuclear forces it would be more accurate to state that our strategic force structure, policy and strategy guiding it, and the employment of its weapons is postured for given scenarios. In essence the formation of our strategy is an informal ongoing process by which statements made by politicians, action, or reactions to world situations whether they be political, diplomatic, economic or militaristic, and the voicing of public opinion, all modify our strategy at a rate consistent with the occurrence of these events. But what is important here is the fact that our national strategy did change to accommodate the advances in, and the evolution of world technology, and it must continue to change in response to a changing world situation. The associated problems with a strategy of this type have extensive effects and neqative ramifications for every citizen of the United States and Russia which ultimately will affect the entire world. In fact by its very nature it places every human being in the world in harms way. Because of the magnitude and devastating power of nuclear forces the associated problems have far reaching effects that relate to social, economic, environmental, psychological, political and geographical areas that are of concern to the world, not just those holding the nuclear forces. These problems are numerous and must be brought to light. When one looks at the history of arms control it looks good because we have done just that, controlled our nuclear arms in that none have ever been released in an armed conflict since those that were dropped in World War II. This is impressive but problems still exist in trying to answer the questions one must ask concerning how long will arms control last; how long must man live under the threat of nuclear war; and why do we have a national strategy that supports the thought of, and accepts Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD. To say there is no alternative or to ask the almost rhetorical question "what would you do," is resigning a nation to an existence of controlled fear, fear of annihilation, which is exactly what MAD stands for. Human nature and the workings of our minds have an uncanny ability to glaze over things which it finds painful, it fears, or something it can not deal with: this is a natural defense mechanism which can create a false sense of security and euphoria. The problems here are that in dealing with a national strategy that supports MAD we can not afford to let our minds wander into any such false state of illusionary security, of which it appears we have done just that. Additionally nations must ask themselves if what they are fighting for is worth the mass annihilation of everything they have stood for; or alternately, should they hold hope for the future that a moral, livable solution will be found rather than settling for the finality and ease of a pragmatic, annihilistic decision. A decision that possibly would be rendered under stress, confusion and the uncertainty of war These concerns raises a lot of difficult questions for all nations and its people to answer. For the individual American the answer is easy. Since day one in most of our lives we have been taught, subsequently learned, and now profess in our beliefs that yes, I shall die for my country, and that is admirable. But ask the same individual to knowingly sacrifice his family in an attempt to achieve political and strategic goals that are ultimately unachievable due to the universally accepted fact that there will be no winners in nuclear war, and just possibly a different answer will surface. Not by any stretch of the imagination do I believe that this was intended as one of our national strategic objectives. But realisticly looking at a deterrent strategy based on MAD, one can only draw the conclusion that, regardless of the plethora of variables involved, the final outcome of such a strategy undisputedly refutiates and undermines the very essence of the intended objectives of peace, security and freedom. President Reagan stated it well: We must never forget that freedom is never really free; it is the most costly thing in the world. And freedom is never paid for in a lump sum. Installments come due in every generation. All any of us can do is offer the generation that follow a chance for freedom. In the final analysis, this is the assurance that our National Security Strategy seeks to provide. (12:V) A policy of strategic deterrence based on the threat of MAD does not achieve this. The oldest though and ostensibly the foremost problem with our strategy on the use of nuclear force is the difference between the philosophical world encompassing the academician, the clergy and the philosopher; and, the secular world inclusive of the professional, the pragmatist and the realist. Neither of these categories are either totally conclusive or exclusive. In reading J. W. Coffey's article (2:59-67), one gets the idea that secularism is the only approach to the use of nuclear forces. This view is not only wrong it is dangerous. If confronted it is easy to say we'll shoot back or threaten to shoot back when dealing with conventional forces, and admittedly this is an effective deterrent policy. But when the resultant factors of a very secular nuclear exchange promise to irrevocably destroy the very societies of both or all belligerent nation, one better do a little soul searching and hope that the philosophical, intangible, spiritual thoughts can save the day. It has been said that the United States has the soul of a church. This is evidenced by the facts that as a nation we are a (GOD fearing people honoring and defending the rights of individuals to worship as they wish. We have imprinted our currency with pictures of the Holy Trinity, literally coined the phrase "IN GOD WE TRUST", and our pledge of allegiance to the flag states "ONE NATION UNDER GOD". This all supports the belief that we are a conscientious and moralistic country. But then upon close scrutinization of our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces one might be forced to agree with the German, American and French Roman Catholic episcopacies and their respective pastoral letters on the subject of war and peace in the nuclear age. The Pastoral letters do validly, although maybe controversially, address critical issues dealing with varying degrees of tolerance toward deterrence as a provisional phenomenon. They note that the United States and Russia are for all practical purposes morally equivalent. That the men in positions of leadership in each of these countries are not the impediments to peace itself but the weapons they hold, the nuclear forces which are the principal evils in confusing and blurring the issues of peace, are. (2:59-67) Deterrence is supported to the limited extent that it is a means unto itself for the total disarmament of all nuclear weapons. The essence of the letters indicates that we have some soul searching to do in this area, which raises the question and problem of, are we really moralistic in regards to our strategy on the use of nuclear forces? Morally though this is where the problem lies. The United States purports one thing strategically when in fact if deterrence should fail we can merely threaten what moralistically we will in fact never be permitted to carry out; subsequently, reducing our deterrence to nothing more than a danqerous bluff. The following sums this point up: Can weapons designed to deter and to prevent war be meaningfully used in a war pursuant to the principle of the proportionality of means? Is not the danger of escalation from their use -howvever limited- so great that one cannot imagine any situation in which one could accept responsibility, after consideration of all factors, to use atomic weapon. (2:63) Another such problem is the dilemma that exists between guaranteeing retaliation and preventing an accidental war. To guarantee retaliation a quick launch capability must exist. The US seems to have incorporated a quick launch capability during the inception of it's first Single Integrated Operational Plan, SIOP, of 1960. This embodied the first US master strategy for fighting a nuclear war. A quick launch capability is nothing more than launching what would appear to be a retaliatory strike precipitated by reported warnings of an impending nuclear strike by hostile forces that would place the US under nuclear attack. This appears attractive only if the possibility exists that our preemptive strike negates or drastically reduces the hostile forces capability to retaliate, thus securing our own victory. (8:36-39) But this creates a false sense of security in that it would appear foolish to assume that a hostile force in control of its own nuclear strike force doesn't also possess a quick launch capability: meaning that our quick launch retaliatory strike will do nothing more than precipitate a quick launch retaliatory strike by OPFOR that would ultimately reduce our own nation to a mass of radiated rubble. This is the most serious drawback to quick launch, an inadvertent war caused by what could have been a warning given as the result of a mechanical malfunction, human error in interpreting an adversary's intent, or confusion and ambiguity in light of crisis management. Quick launch requires an almost immediate decision on whether to attack or not. This is based on information received that has had less than 5 minutes to be thoroughly analyzed and cross checked through a complex system of HUMINT, sensors, computers and software, with a final determination and assumption that no errors were made. The National Command Authority, NCA, will be severely limited in time for consultation within its own hierarchy as will the president who would be even further restricted and very possibly deprived, because of time constraints, of any consultation with his advisors. Even if quick launch were used only under actual attack conditions the chances of a meaningful victory are still highly remote. Quick launch depends on an accurately precise complex network of command and control. It must be presumed that our C3I systems will be those first targeted in a nuclear confrontation. Without C3I an effective quick launch will be delayed, disrupted or denied, ultimately ensuring a perverse success of our nuclear assault capability. It is also safe to assume that if the US had been struck by nuclear forces many of our nuclear force sites would have been targeted and subsequently destroyed. A conclusion from this scenario would point to the fact that a quick launch may very well have launched our only remaining nuclear forces under a command and control system that was degraded at best with little chance of successful target engagement. None of this promotes peace and security, objectives of our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces. One of the most frightening problems dealing with nuclear forces and one that creates the potential for far reaching effects that extend beyond the detonation of individual weapons is the phenomena known as nuclear winter. Our strategy is conspicuously void of addressables in this area even though the scientific community through it's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, SCOPE, assessed the global Environmental consequences of NUclear WAR, ENUWAR, and horrifically detailed the physical, atmospheric, ecological, and agricultural effects of a major nuclear war (6:42-44) Over the past several years scientists have documented what they believe to be life altering effects of a nuclear war such as the depletion of the ozone layer which filters lethal ultra violet rays from the sun; radio active fallout that would be transported hundreds of miles from the site of detonation at atmospheric levels in sufficient lethal quantities to kill human life; and global hemisphehc changes in climate with accompanying drops in temperature caused by ingestion by the atmosphere of massive amounts of soot, debris and smoke as a result of nuclear detonations and the fires they give rise to. This would spread over the globe at a rate consistent with the prevailing atmosphehc conditions and winds and is generally referred to as "nuclear winter." All of these phenomena are distinct but inseparable events which collectively form a chain of events that will render deadly results. A decrease in temperature of only 10 degrees centigrade could have significant environmental impact in the brief chilling or freezing periods accompanying the drop in temperature. In the lower latitudes an even smaller temperature decrease could prevent the formation of monsoons with a subsequent decrease in rain fall, ultimately killing off rain forest which account for a major portion of the worlds oxygen resupply. In the northern hemisphere where the bulk of the nuclear war is expected to take place the associated drops in temperature during a growing season would soon resemble temperatures characteristic of fall or early winter. This "could ultimately cause an interruption or possible cessation of that years growing season which means agricultural output would be greatly reduced or nonexistent. Radio active fallout coupled with decreased sunlight rainfall, and temperature, could very well reduce or negate any agricultural output for several growing seasons. Subsequently only the major grain producing countries that had enough food stored prior to the onset of hostilities would be able to survive if they lost a growing season. Those countries not directly involved with the nuclear war are at risk from the indirect effects of the war as stated above and as such are just as likely to lose their lives to these effects just as those who are engaged in the actual conduct of the war are subject to the wars direct effects of blast, immense heat and extreme radiation. ENUWAR estimates that roughly 3/4 of the world's population or 4 billion people will be exposed to and suffer from indirect effects immediately after a nuclear war. The bulk of the world would appear to be starving from famine rather than the widely accepted picture of that which we associate with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Our national strategy on the use of nuclear force doesn't address low intensity conflict and third world countries. This is the area that has given rise to most of the activity involving United States forces since the cessation of hostilities in South East Asia. These activities were usually precipitated by acts of terrorism and violence directed at the United States. This is the arena that hosts the most likely entry into an accidental war involving client states and regional misunderstandinqs that the United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn into. Viewed another way, if a problem exists such as accidental nuclear confrontation and the cause is also known, ie, battlefield nuclear war heads, logic would dictate that removal of the cause would subsequently remove any eventuality of the problems occurrence. Clausewitz submitted that a part of war is unknown and unpredictable. No one can predetermine or predict the results of a battlefield engagement or what hidden rage and emotion lie within the heart of the enemy. For that matter our own reactions and emotions under the fog of war and the stress of the battlefield are also unknown. Entering this into an equation it could be written as follows: (unknown + unpredictable + conventional weapons = conventional loss). But substitute nuclear weapons for conventional weapons and the equation's result could possibly be the cessation of life as its known today. The cost in this case is of an innumerable magnitude of order higher than the value. It is a no win situation and our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces doesn't appear to address this issue. The obvious problem and most widely accepted fact about the employment of nuclear forces is that there will be no winner. In fact the world as a whole will be the loser. This fact is accepted by policy makers on both sides but never the less seems to be an issue that presents a problem that's unsolvable, so both sides disregard it and press on to tackle problems and issues they can effect a change on. That in itself is the basic and most serious problem. It may almost seem redundant but the problem is that policy and strategy makers have a problem they have no solution to. Consequently it appears to be ignored or at least neglected in the name of deterrence. This in itself does not instill confidence, feelings of peace and security nor does it promote a sense of freedom. Our military forces cannot win a nuclear confrontation any more than the Russians can, but the possibility does exist for that confrontation to start. The on going efforts to understand the effects of nuclear weapons have been extraordinary. But the time and effort spent trying to implement that knowledge has been less than admirable It has been unequivocally determined that nuclear war will introduce a multitude of imponderables which are impossible to simulate, impossible to train with and impossible to predict other than the fact of mutually assured destruction. The United States would gain absolutely no advantage other than surpise by starting a nuclear war with a nuclear armed adversary such as the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, perverse thinking has suggested that the inability to survive a nuclear attack may prompt an adversary to use nuclear weapons. (5:116-121) This idea seems to pervade the policies of both sides which skews thinking into furthering the thought that nuclear weapons are a viable alternative on the battlefield and just possibly a nuclear confrontation could be won. As such, the thinking goes, "we have no problem" which in fact is the problem and a deadly error in our strategy. The strategy for employing nuclear weapons is akin to no strategy at all for there are no winners. Our present defensive posture is based on the deterrent effect of a massive offensive capability embodied in our strategic nuclear policy in MAD. In reality, strategic warfare has come to mean nuclear holocaust, a disconcerting if not alarming basis for a strategy. This policy does not provide stability in the presence of large disturbances, nor does it provide a significantly increased nuclear threshold. To the contrary it plays to a low, to non existent nuclear threshold. This strategic policy is not postured to resist the temptations to escalate a conflict through the use of tactical nuclear war heads up to a level of employment utilizing strategic nuclear forces. There is also a line of thought that suggests during an escalating conventional war, the theory of "use them or lose them' may apply if it appears that United States or friendly forces may fall to OPFOR. Because of the offensive nature of our policy any or all defensive characteristics that might apply to our policy become negated. A defensively postured policy would be benign in comparison to the offensive nature of our present policy. Our policy is offensive in nature and as such so are the nuclear weapons that exist to support the policy; ultimately, rendering these weapons susceptible to hair triggering, accidental or inadvertent firings which promise to escalate to a major war, and finally, making them no matter how inaccessible they presently are, subject to terrorist attacks during actual time of war. (4:77-82) Once again, not a very comforting thought when the stated objectives of our policy on the use of nuclear forces are peace, security and freedom. An additional problem with our policy on the use of nuclear forces to be addressed in this writing has to do with the credibility. That in itself is the problem, our strategy is not credible. Ever since the Soviets developed their first fission and fusion weapons in 1949 the possibility of massive mutual retaliation has existed. This event caused consequent weakening and the final collapse of our initial massive retaliation strategy, some times known as the trip wire strategy because of the perceived need for a conventional force altercation to act as a catalyst to identify aggression in which the use of nuclear force may be indicated. (7:20-25) But with both sides in possession of weapons capable of total obliteration of the other side the policy of mutually assured destruction was adopted. Fleet Lord Mountbatten said "In the event of a nuclear war, there will be no chances, no survivors--all will be obliterated." Subsequently it can be further argued that as long as we maintain the policy of MAD and the chance exists that either side commits to the use of nuclear weapons, our policy is a gamble, which given the potential consequences, is unacceptable. Henry Kissinqer stated that "mutual suicide cannot be presented as a rational act." Accepting this line of thought it can be argued that initiating the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or NATO forces under the guise of MAD is militarily illogical and credible to neither side. The credibility of any policy lies in the essential ingredients of military capability, political will and public opinion. Without all three the policy will collapse. It is also fair to say that public opinion, which drives political will, will not support total obliteration and mutually assured destruction. A major over sight in our national strategy on the use of nuclear forces is the fact that small unit military leader get extensive training in the employment of conventional forces but none in the employment of nuclear forces or the strategy associated with it. General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command asks in a recent article where are our strategists: "We need strategists. In the Army and throughout the services. At all levels. We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid military advice to our political leadership, and we need young officers who can provide solid military advice--options, details, the results of analysis--to the generals and admirals. We need military strategists, officers, all up and down the line, because it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it (usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his conclusions." (3:2) Ultimately the President will make the decision to use nuclear weapons. But it won't be until such time as the tactical battlefield commander more than likely under fire and considerable stress, requests through his chain of command the approval and authorization to use nuclear weapons. In considering this scenario it becomes painfully conspicuous by it absence, that the United States lacks any type of formal training to foster strategic thinking in our military leadership. Admiral Crowe, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated this point by saying that we need uniformed people who are experts in their fields who can advise the National Command Authority concerning policy, strategy, resource allocation, and operations. These people need to be open minded, tested military tacticians, decision makers, knowledgeable in military history, and versed in bureaucratic decision making and the strategic interests of the United States in light of current world situation. (3:2) To capsulize just exactly what our strategy is concerning the use of nuclear forces is difficult at best. To articulate a specific definition in a single document stating exactly what our national policy is, is beyond rational thought and capability when you consider the fact that the definition will be based on abstract philosophical and political thoughts and concerns at the strategic level; campaign planning that is scenario dependant at the operational level; and subjective thoughts and analyses on the part of the battlefield commander at the tactical level. In trying to answer this question complications arise out of the thought that not only are the stakes and synergistic effects of the weapons extraordinarily high but the implications for the nation's security are inherently ambivalent. (1:1) It is generally accepted that we must maintain and stockpile a sufficient nuclear arsenal to ensure deterrence. But on the other hand it is also widely accepted that should a nuclear exchange result from a catalytic conventional war, the existence of American society would be irrevocably altered if not, for all practical purposes, totally destroyed. In wrestling with these issues it is too easy to put these into the "too hard category." It is also easy to sit down an come up with a list of problems with any policy. As a matter of fact I suspect that the formation of a policy is like the formation of a tactical plan, ie, if you had 10 separate tacticians planning the same mission you would get 10 different tactical plans. It is also very difficult to avoid the conclusion that just maybe an alternate strategy that is realistic and credible, which isn't based on total destruction and the altering of life as we know it today, isn't readily available. But with everything that is presently at stake and the future of the world and the human race, as we know them today, perched precariously at the brink of disaster, I don't believe we can with any conscientious thought abandon efforts to continue trying to find a better solution. A solution that is. acceptable to both the academician and the professional. Our military hierarchy must institute a strategic concepts training program that will enable it's leaders to handle the thorny issues mentioned by Admiral Crowe. Dialogue between east and west has to continue and it must yield an acceptable, verifiable policy that both sides and all people can enthusiastically embrace if the objectives of peace, security and freedom are to be enjoyed by all mankind. These are not easy problems and issues to deal with and never will be; consequently, when dealing with these we must remember the following: Nuclear war remains a special case for the strategist. It is the only contingency for which strategy aims largely, if not wholly, at the avoidance of employing military forces in pursuit of national ends. It is also arguably the least likely form of warfare in which the United States might engage, but its potential is also the most consequential. Since national destruction remains a possible result of engaging in nuclear hostilities the security dilemma is indeed a real factor that hangs like a Damoclean sword over this entire area of strategic concern. (11:145) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Belcham, Barry M. Rethinking the US Strategic Posture. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982. 2. Coffey, J W. "Deterrence and the Bishops: A Transatlantic Comparison." Strategic Review, 14 (winter 86), 59-67. 3. Galvin, John R. "What's the Matter With Being a Strategist." Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, 19(Mar 89), 2-10. 4. Fender, F W. "Yes We Can Leave MAD." Armed Forces Journal, 123 (Mar 86), 78-82. 5. Guida, R A. "Nuclear Survivability." US Naval Institute Proceedings, 111 (Dec 85), 116-121. 6. Harrwell, C A and Harwell M A. "Updating the Nuclear Winter Debate." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 43 (Oct 87), 42-44. 7. McKendrick, R Wing Commander, RAF and Rosland, J J , VADM, RN. "Flexible Response, Is There an Alternative?" Royal United Service Institute Journal for Defense Studies, 131 (Mar 86), 20-25. 8. Lebow, R N. "Dangers of a Quick Launch." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 43 (Nov 87), 36-39. 9. Snow, D M. "Realistic Self-Deterrence: An Alternative View of Nuclear Dynamics." Naval War College Review, 39 (Mar-Apr 86), 60-73. 10. Snow, D M. "Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World, American Policy in the 1980's. University of Alabama Press, 1981. 11. Snow, D M and Drew, D M, Col, USAF. Making Strategy:An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1988. 12. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, Jan 88.
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