Arms Control In The 80s AUTHOR Major Timothy C. Jones, USAF CSC 1989 SUBJECT AREA - National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: ARMS CONTROL IN THE 80s I. Purpose: To report on developments in the arms control arena in the 1980s and to outline how the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) have benefited from our INF experience. II. Problem: Since the first atomic bombs were used in armed conflict, man has sought effective ways to control these powerful weapons. Arms control has progressed tremendously in the 1980s. This paper examines: where we are in arms control(the INF Treaty); where we are going(the START Treaty); and how INF has impacted START. III. Data: Recently, the US and the USSR agreed to eliminate Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles(INF). The Treaty has good points and bad. It is the first treaty to eliminate an entire class of weapons. It is the first treaty between the US and the USSR to allow on-site inspection. The USSR agreed to destroy more deployed systems than the US. Finally, the Treaty represents a blunting in the shift of public opinion from West to East by reconfirming the policy of "Peace Through Strength." There are potential pitfalls with INF, however. Elimination of nuclear weapons may not be "good" because of the large threat posed by the Warsaw Pact forces and the question of "linkage" to NATO. Though precedents were set in INF, there is no obligation by the USSR to apply those precedents to another treaty. Finally, INF was highly politicized--a dangerous way to negotiate and approve a treaty. At the START negotiations, it would appear we have used what we learned in our INF negotiations. We have "tough" leaders and negotiators. We are in an excellent position, both economically and militarily, to negotiate. Nuclear weapons will be reduced--not totally eliminated. Finally, our new President is doing a good job of "depoliticizing" START. IV. Summary: This has been a dynamic decade for arms control. INF has provided an important, if imperfect, foundation for a START Treaty. Our leadership and negotiators have used the INF experience to craft what appears will be a favorable START agreement. V. Significance: Negotiations on arms control should be measured by whether they enhance our national security interests. This seems to be happening in the START negotiations. ARMS CONTROL IN THE 80s OUTLINE We are at a unique juncture in the development of arms control. Where do we currently stand? Where are we going? How has our performance impacted on where we are going? I. The Significance. . .and Pitfalls. . .of INF A. First treaty to eliminate a class of nuclear weapons. B. First treaty between the US and USSR to allow on-site inspection. C. "Unequal reduction"--the USSR gives up more than the US. D. Reconfirms the effectiveness of negotiating from a position of strength. E. Elimination of nuclear weapons is not necessarily good. 1. Weapons are deployed to counter a large threat that is still there. 2. INF tends to "de-link" the US from NATO. 3. Escalation to intercontinental nuclear war could happen quicker. F. Soviets may or may not use similar negotiating positions, developed at INF, in other negotiations. G. INF was too politicized. II. Strategic Arms Reductions Talks A. To understand START, you must look at SALT. 1. SALT I--an agreement. 2. SALT II--no agreement. B. START born with the Reagan administration; goal is to reduce--not just limit-- strategic arms. C. Various START proposals and revisions to those proposals. D. The current Joint Draft Treaty. 1. Over three hundred pages of text agreed to. 2. Last hurdle is verification. III. INF and START A. Leadership and negotiators have been "tough." B. "Peace Through Strength" policy, realized in the strategic offensive forces modernization program, allowed our negotiators great flexibility. C. No entire elimination of a class of weapons. D. "Unequal reduction"--maybe. E. The President has taken some of the pressure off. ARMS CONTROL IN THE 80s Since the end of World War II, great effort has been exerted to control nuclear arms. The noted political scientist, Bernard Brodie, wrote in 1948 "The impact of the atomic bomb on United States policy has thus far been evidenced most clearly in the almost frantic effort to secure the adoption of a system of international control of atomic energy. "(l) The United States has participated in negotiations, primarily with the Soviet Union, for over four decades. These negotiations have yielded a number of agreements. But, in spite of the number of agreements, most analysts conclude that man's efforts at effective arms control has been disappointing. Today, in the late l980s, we find ourselves at a unique juncture. A time when we have just concluded a major arms control agreement. A time when our nation is strong. A time when our adversary seems conciliatory. A time when negotiation on a strategic arms control pact is progressing. With this unique time in mind, I will stop to take a look at where we are in the arms control process by examining the recently ratified Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles(INF). I'll then examine where we are going with the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks(START). Finally, I'll briefly outline how START has benefitted from our INF experience. THE SIGNIFICANCE. . .AND PITFALLS. . .OF INF The recently ratified treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles(INF) has some significant implications for further developments in the arms control arena. The treaty, which eliminates certain missiles, is more than just the first major treaty since SALT I to be ratified. It contains three precedent setting breakthroughs plus it reconfirms the effectiveness of an old negotiating tactic. These results should make future talks more productive. The first significant point is INF is the first treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. SALT I's two parts, the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles(ABM) and the "Interim Agreement" to limit intercontinental-ballistic missiles, had done just that--"limited" classes of weapons. With INF, both countries are not just limiting but are actually destroying deployed systems. This destruction of the INF systems results in a net loss in the nations' nuclear arsenals. This agreement to eliminate weapons has serious implications for other talks with the Soviets. The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks are being affected by the INF breakthrough. Both countries now know that each is willing to eliminate deployed weapons. Other talks on biological, chemical and space weapons could also benefit from this new precedent. A second point which makes INF unique is the verification concept. For any treaty to be effective, each side must have confidence that the other is meeting the terms of the agreement. Verification has been a traditional problem with all treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union. INF marks a significant development in verification in that on-site inspection, formerly anathema to the Soviets, has been agreed upon. Certainly the ability of each country to have its own representatives present to personally verify the terms of the treaty will build confidence, enhance the "national technical" means of verification, and have carry-over benefits for future treaties. The third breakthrough is that the two nations have agreed to unequal force reductions. The Soviets are destroying 693 SS-23's,22's,20's,and 4's; while the United States is destroying only 244 Pershing and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. What makes this type reduction important is the Soviets have now demonstrated that they are not opposed to the principle of unequal force reductions. The "unequal reduction" principle is essential to the success of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Talks (CAFE). In these talks, the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations are trying to achieve reductions in their respective conventional forces. With the Warsaw Pact's large "numbers" advantage in almost every category of conventional military power, NATO has been asking the Soviet led negotiating team to embrace the concept of unequal reductions. INF has now paved the way for the Warsaw Pact to be more flexible in its negotiations on balanced reductions. Finally, the INF Treaty represents both a blunting of the recent shift in public opinion from West to East, and a reconfirmation of the concept of negotiating from a position of strength. Coupling the Reagan Administration's hard-line approach to the Soviet Union in the early `80's("the Evil Empire") with the ascendancy of the politically savvy Mikhail Gorbachev to the Kremlin's leadership, public opinion on arms control had shifted. There was building pressure on the United States and the other NATO countries to "do something about the arms race." The Reagan Administration held firm to its position: NATO land-based nuclear forces had to be modernized if they were to be viable in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. The NATO countries agreed with the Administration and deployment of the new systems began. The Soviets recognized that once the West had shown the unity and the will to withstand the public criticism that deployment brought about, they would have to negotiate or be faced with a more formidable threat on their Warsaw Pact border. In the West, the realization of the Treaty bears out the correctness of the NATO decision to deploy the modernized force. The United States had obtained exactly what it had set out for: "...mutual elimination of all longer range INF missiles(2)." Adverse public opinion had been blunted and concessions from the Soviets had happened because of the United States being able to negotiate from strength. As can be seen, the INF treaty is not important just because it reduces the number of nuclear weapons in Europe. Possibly the most important point for future arms control developments is that it establishes new ground on which the superpowers agree: it is possible to eliminate, not just limit or reduce, weapons; on-site inspection is an acceptable form of treaty verification; and the concept of unequal reductions is feasible. The Treaty also reconfirms the importance and validity of negotiating from a position of strength. Because of these developments, INF is an important stepping stone in the long arms control pathway. The INF Treaty is not without pitfalls, however. Arms control in the nuclear age is deadly serious business. A single miscalculation by a government in making an "arms deal" could ultimately result in that country being annihilated in a thermonuclear war. The most important measure that should be applied to an arms control agreement is "does the agreement enhance United States security?" I think the United States needs to take a hard look at that measure. The INF Treaty was much heralded in the news and in academia as a great triumph for both countries. I've already cited several reasons for this. Let's take a look at a few of these. As previously stated, the first, and most often mentioned, point of the treaty is this is the first treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Unlike SALT I, both countries are not just limiting but are actually destroying deployed systems. On the surface, it would seem that less nuclear weapons are better--but is this really true? We deployed INF weapon systems in Europe for two reasons: one was to offset the large imbalance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; the other was to offset what Strobe Talbott referred to as "a new class of missiles that Leonoid Brezhnev's Soviet Union had arrayed against Western Europe. " (3) We successfully got the Soviets to eliminate their "new class of missiles." However, we are still faced with a large conventional imbalance. Now that we have INF, we have less ability to counter a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. What does this situation mean in terms of European NATO and Continental United States security? If you are a European or an American, you should be seriously concerned. As a European, by having INF weapons on your soil, you would be confident that should deterrence fail the United States would authorize the use of the INF weapons. Though not a pleasant thought, the war would be theater nuclear war. As an American, you would not have given the Soviet Union a reason to launch an intercontinental attack. With the removal of the INF weapons, one less layer of escalation is removed on the movement toward intercontinental thermonuclear war. The President's decision to employ US strategic offensive forces will have to be made sooner without the INF weapons. The traditional nuclear linkage question of the Europeans-- "Will a US President risk his nation's survival to save my city?"-- will have to be answered quicker with the removal of the INF weapons. Thus, a situation that is not security enhancing for either Europeans or Americans has been created by INF. Another significant point brought out recently is the precedent-setting nature of the Treaty. The Treaty's proponents point to several of its main accomplishments. First, as I have previously stated, the elimination of a class of weapons. Second, the "on-site inspection" form of treaty verification. Finally, the "unequal reduction principle" of the Soviets destroying more weapons than the United States. Arms control advocates argue that because the Soviets have agreed to these points, the Soviets will agree to similar proposals in future treaties. There is simply no diplomatic evidence to suggest the Soviets will behave this way. They have often "back-tracked" on their own proposals. This happened in the INF talks. The Soviets "walked out" of the talks in late 1983. When they returned, they "trotted out virtually all Moscow's old demands and added some new ones... ."(4) By overestimating the significance of a treaty, false hopes are fostered in the citizens. This false hope can result in a misperception of the threat--clearly this does not enhance our security. This leads me to my final point. We, the United States and our Western Allies, have allowed the arms control process to become too politicized. INF is a case in point. When the United States initially decided to modernize the intermediate range force, our NATO allies said we could do so only if we "in good faith negotiated for arms reductions"(5)with the Soviets. This immediately put pressure on the US government to begin arms talks. When the Soviets "walked out" of the talks in 1983, a wave of pressure, from both the Soviet government and Western citizens swept over the US administration. The message to our government was, "be more flexible." When the agreement was finally announced, again, popular pressure was applied. This time, the pressure was from our own citizens on the US Senate to quickly ratify a treaty which almost no one had read. The Treaty sailed through the Senate on the wave of pressure. To allow an atmosphere to exist where an arms control treaty can get through Senate ratification without a complete debate is not in our best national security interest. We must insist that our government, as a minimum, always use as the single measurement in arms control "will this enhance the Nation's security?" Elimination of weapons is not, in itself, security enhancing. Precedents from one agreement do not necessarily have any carry-over to other agreements. Highly charged politicization of the process is an extreme danger. This politicization can cause governments to reach agreements that are not in their country's best interest. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS With INF as the most recent brick in our arms control foundation, we are now busily constructing the main house of arms control--a treaty to severely restrict strategic systems. This treaty will be the product of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks(START). To understand how we came to START, a brief description of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is in order as START is an outgrowth of SALT. The SALT negotiations took place in the late l960s and the 1970s. The first agreements to come out of the SALT process --the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--are collectively referred to as SALT I. SALT I, signed in May, 1972, ensured that "each country... leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the other's retaliatory missile forces".(6) By limiting each country to only two anti-ballistic missile(ABM) sites. The ABM Treaty was to be renewed every five years since then--and it has. The Interim Agreement was essentially an effort to freeze "at existing levels the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers, operational or under construction, on each side and permit an increase in SLBM[sea launched ballistic missile] launchers up to an agreed level for each party only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers." (7) The idea of the Interim Agreement from an American perspective was to try and stem the "arms race" while more far reaching negotiations could take place. Unfortunately, what happened was that the United States codified its unilateral 1967 decision to cap its own strategic offensive forces while the USSR used the opportunity to enlarge and modernize their nuclear forces. Through the l970s, SALT negotiations continued. The talks were then referred to as SALT II. President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev laid the foundation for a SALT II Treaty at Vladivostok in 1974. President Carter, building on the Vladivostok Accords, proposed a SALT II Treaty shortly after his inauguration in 1977. Though the Soviets rejected the Presidents's initial offer, continued negotiations resulted in an agreement. President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Treaty in 1979. Unlike SALT I however, SALT II was never ratified by the United States Senate. This happened for several reasons. First, there was a widely held perception in our country that the United States had become "second rate" militarily. This meant that the US negotiators could not negotiate from a position of strength. Because of this, there was considerable concern that the United States was not getting a "good deal." Another factor was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By not ratifying the Treaty, the Senate could express its displeasure with the Soviets over the invasion. Another problem was the intense election-year politicking. President Carter was being attacked by candidate Reagan for being "weak on defense." Senators wishing to distance themselves from President Carter on the defense issue found an easy and visible way through criticizing SALT II. Finally, SALT II "would have permitted substantial growth in the strategic forces of both sides, was unbalanced in its impact, and was inadequately verifiable in several provisions." (8) With the disappointment of the SALT years as a basis, newly elected President Reagan directed a review of American strategic objectives. As a result of this review, the President "decided that it would be better to seek significant reductions in the existing numbers rather than simply to make another attempt to limit further growth." (9) Thus, a new round of talks were initiated in 1982--the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. The initial proposal the United States made was in June, 1982. The proposal included: 1. Reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads by about one-third to a level of 5000 for each side; 2. Additional restrictions to ensure substantial cuts in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems; 3. Substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability and potential [throw-weight]; 4. An equal ceiling on heavy bombers below the US level in SALT II; and 5. Equitable limits and constraints on other strategic sys- tems, including limits on the number of cruise missiles that could be carried by bombers. (10) The Soviet proposals were more closely aligned with SALT II ideas. The Soviet proposals included: 1. The countries each would be allowed an aggregate of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles[ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers]; 2. A combined limit on nuclear charges (missile warheads and bomber weapons); and 3. Ban all ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of six hundred kilometers. (11) The American criticisms of the Soviet proposals centered on the concept that the Soviet proposals did not provide for "genuine reductions in the two countries' forces." (12) Though the delivery systems would be reduced, there was room for "substantial growth in ballistic missile warheads above[then] current levels."(13) Another point was the lack of acknowledgment of our relatively stable, bomber heavy emphasis versus their relatively unstable, missile heavy emphasis. Negotiations proceeded with the United States altering their proposals in June, 1983. This was done in light of the recommendations of the Commission on Strategic Forces (commonly known as the Scrowcroft Commission). The President further modified the proposal in October, 1983. These proposal changes are outlined in Figures one and two. In light of these 1983 proposals, the primary US position remained as a desire to reduce ballistic missile warheads (both sea-launched, SLBMs, and ground-launched intercontinental,ICBMs) to a total of 5000. Following an eighteen month walkout by the Soviets, negotiations resumed. When the Talks resumed, progress was made. We are now told there are "over three-hundred pages [agreed to by both sides] of a Joint Draft Start Treaty. "(16) How does this newest Joint Draft compare with the President's original objectives and the 1983 proposals? The President's original objectives for START were five fold: "equality, substantial reductions, stability, enhanced security, and effective verification. "(17) As can be seen from the above paragraphs and Figures one and two, the US negotiating positions adjured to this. Now, what of the new Joint Draft? Evidently the two sides have agreed to the following: Click here to view image 1. The two sides. . .will be limited to 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles each. This means that the sum of each side's deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 1600. 2. Each side is limited to 1600 accountable warheads on their delivery vehicles. 3. Within the limit of 6000 accountable warheads on each side, not more than 4900 of them can be placed on ballistic missiles. 4. With respect to the Soviet SS-18 heavy ballistic missiles, not more than 1540 warheads can be placed on 154 of them. These particular 1540 would count against the total Soviet warhead limit of 4900. 5. Each side is limited in its total ballistic missile throw-weight to an amount 50 percent below the Soviet's current level (a missile's throw-weight is the weight it can deliver on target at operational ranges). (18) (19) From the original proposals, it looks like the United States has the making of a favorable treaty. Certainly our objective to limit ballistic missile warheads to 5000 seems to have been achieved. The objective to reduce ballistic missile throw-weight is another plus for the US as the Soviets had an overwhelming superiority in this measure. The 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limitation reflects the US desire for "the principle of 50 percent reductions" (20) as oppose to the stated Soviet goal of 1800 delivery vehicles. INF AND START What has led to this apparent US success at the negotiating table? I think we have been adept at learning from the concerns previously mentioned in the section on INF. There is no question that we have been in an excellent position to negotiate. This is true for two important reasons. First, we have had a tough set of negotiators and a tough President. As Ambassador Kampleman said, "the best negotiator is one who is willing to walk away from the table--without an agreement." (21) When the Soviets elected to suspend the START negotiations in 1983,the President "stayed the course. " (22) He did this in spite of intense domestic and international pressure to yield to soviet demands(i.e. he continued the deployment of the ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe). The United States negotiators went home and waited for the Soviets to return. Second, the Reagan Administration assumed a "policy of Peace Through Strength. " (23) This was the policy that allowed the Administration to pursue the demanding tasks of "restor[ing] a unity of purpose to the nation, rebuild[ing] its defenses, block[ing] Soviet advances abroad and sustain[ing) the cohesion of NATO." (24) The modernization of our strategic offensive forces resulted in our negotiating team being able to sit across from their Soviet counterparts and take or leave any position laid down. The Soviets new we were strong militarily and economically, and had the will to wait. The Soviets, because of their weak economy, were least prepared to continue an arms race. Another link with INF is the "less nuclear weapons are better" concept. Though with INF there is legitimate concern that elimination of that particular class of weapons may not enhance security, it would seem thus far in the START negotiations that this is not the case. No one class of weapons is being eliminated--only reduced. A real plus is the major limitations being placed on ballistic missiles. This particular reduction is important as they are very destabilizing in a crisis. (25) As far as the precedent setting nature of INF and carry-over to this Treaty, "the jury is still out." It would appear that the Soviets have again agreed to the "unequal reduction principle." This is especially pointed out in their agreement to reduce throw-weight. On the verification side, evidently we have yet to come to terms. As Ambassador Lehman points out, "Most of the remaining issues in START relate to veri- fication. "(26) Finally, false hopes and politicization. Clearly the Bush Administration is off to the right start here. Instead of pushing headlong into an immediate agreement, the President's policy is to take a go slow, careful, studied approach. His public comments have not driven public expectations up. This, I believe will serve us all well--the US negotiators will be able to work with less pressure, the Senate will be able to have more time to study and review the agreement before the formal, highly politicized public hearings begin, and the American people will end up with a better product. SUMMARY The 1980s have been a dynamic period in the quest for arms control. The INF Treaty has provided a strong, but not perfect foundation. The problems with INF: elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons(linkage to NATO, rapid conflict escalation, large conventional force imbalance), USSR negotiating positions and the excessive politicization; is being rectified by the START negotiating team and the new President. A successful START Treaty--one which enhances US security interests--would be a fitting capstone to this unique juncture. FOOTNOTES (1). Bernard Brodie, "The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker," Essays on Arms Control and National Security, ed. Bernard F. Halloran, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(Washington,DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 2. (2). US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(ACDA), Arms Control: US Objectives, Negotiating Efforts and Problems of Soviet Noncompliance, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 3. (3). Strobe Talbott, "The Road to Zero," Time, Dec. 14, 1987, p. 19. (4). Ibid., p. 23. (5). Lynn Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988, p. 721. (6). US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Text and Histories of Negotiations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 136. (7). Ibid., p. 148. (8). US Department of State, Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 29. (9). Ibid., p. 30. (10). Ibid., p. 30. (11). Ibid., p. 32. (12). Ibid., p. 34. (13). Ibid., p. 34. (14). ACDA, Arms Control: US Objectives, p. 5. (15). Ibid., p. 4. (16). Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, speech, Erskine Lecture Series, "Arms Control and America's Relationship with the Soviets," FBI Academy, Quantico, Va, Mar 1, 1989. (17). Henry W. Schaefer, Nuclear Arms Control (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), p. 26. (18). Dennis McDowell, "START and US Strategic Forces," Parameters, March 1989, p. 101. (19). Note: Confirming information was found on the agreed to content of the Joint Draft START Treaty in several publications. (20). Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II, "The Arms Control Legacy of the Reagan Administration: A Focus on START," Strategic Review, Fall 1988, p. 16. (21). Kampelman, "Arms Control" (speech). (22). President Ronald W. Reagan, numerous speeches, 1981-1989. (23). Lehman, "Arms Control Legacy," p. 15. (24). Ibid., p. 15. (25). Note: Ballistic missiles are considered "destabilizing" in a crisis because: 1. They are not recallable--less time for negotiation than long range bombers which can be launched, observed by the enemy, and recalled before the attack is consummated. 2. The ICBMs have the most throw weight, best accuracy and are the most vulnerable(since most are in fixed, known locations). During a crisis, they would be excellent first strike targets--there would be intense pressure to "use or loose" these weapons. (26). Lehman, "Arms Control Legacy," p. 17. 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