A European View On Nuclear Deterrance

AUTHOR Major Fred W. Hoogeland, RNLMC

CSC 1989

SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the first months of my year in Command and Staff

College, the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons was

frequently discussed. It became rapidly clear to me that most

American students were far from showing some understanding of the

European aversion against nuclear weapons. Conversely I discovered

that I did not have a realistic appreciation of the difficult

choice in (nuclear) options the United States faces in case Western

Europe needed the help from the US in a major armed conflict.

The European aversion against nuclear weapons is founded

in a realistic fear, the fear that the use of any type of nuclear

weapon, be it tactical or of intermediate range, will destroy their

home country. The Americans on the other hand are much in favour

of multiple (nuclear) options. The options provide a flexibility

to respond to Soviet aggression at any desirable level. It also

enables them to assist the Europeans in case of Soviet aggression.

ICBM's as only means to settle a major conflict is an

impossibility as the use of them would ensure total (mutual)

destruction.

The reasons as to how such a major share of the European

population was and still is motivated in demonstrating against

nuclear weapons, --be it simple fear or religion--, are clearly

illustrated in chapter three and four. It would be too easy to

dismiss demonstrations by peace-movements or other organizations

as pacifism and/or anti-militarism. Besides that, as so many

millions participated in activities of peace-movements and similar

organizations, governments in Europe's democratic nations cannot

afford to ignore these signals.

Especially today, when Soviet leadership is proposing

significant reductions, the combination with the Western European

aversion towards nuclear weapons, may prove a very serious threat

to the unity among the members of NATO. The outcome could well be

that, not only will the Europeans try to remove every nuclear

device of their soil, but also that they will appear reluctant --

to say the least-- to produce a credible substitute for the

extinction of a number, or all nuclear devices.

A European View on Nuclear Deterrence

Outline

The different viewpoints of Western Europe and the USA on

nuclear deterrence will remain in the foreseeable future. This

ambiguity within the NATO alliance can be managed, provided the

European allies are prepared to produce a valid conventional

substitute for their understandable aversion against nuclear

weapons. Recent developments however do not support this condition.

I The uncompromising dilemma between the United States and their

European allies

II Limited nuclear war

III Reasons for differing views

IV The peace-movement

V The present and the future

VI Conclusions

I: THE UNCOMPROMISING DILEMMA BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES

In the annual report to the Congress of fiscal year 1990,

flexible response is mentioned as the foundation of US nuclear

deterrence. This "new" flexible response doctrine:

"...increased the number of options available to the

president, and provides the capability, either to respond

to Soviet aggression at the level at which it was

initiated or to escalate the conflict to a higher level.

Flexible response has enhanced deterrence, multiplying

the uncertainties confronting the Soviet leadership. "1

It is no secret that several European nations differ from

this official view of the US. The official position of the Dutch

government for instance on nuclear weapons is as follows:

...The truth of the matter is, that nuclear weapons, by

their very nature, render war highly unlikely, if not

impossible, as a means of settling disputes between

states. Nuclear weapons are above all political weapons:

they play their role in peacetime and are in reality

unsuitable for fighting a war. Nuclear weapons are a

political means for the prevention of war." and: "Each

category of these weapons should be considered in terms

of its political significance for the prevention of war."2

The quotations from the annual report to Congress

as well as the one from the Netherlands Defence White Paper are

both from members of NATO, but the considerable difference is

clear. Bluntly put, the US favours (the use of) a variety of

options, whereas several European members of NATO regard nuclear

weapons as unsuitable for fighting a war, they are thus only useful

as a political means for the prevention of war. Europeans prefer

not to have any nuclear weapons on their soil, and this is

understandable because they live on the potential battleground.

Wargames that are played between the parties of a major conflict

in Europe seem to justify this. In an exercise called "Carte

Blanch" in West Germany, tactical (nuclear) weapons were used only

by the NATO allies. The results showed that the German people would

be devastated in this sort of nuclear war through the effects of

blast and fallout. Over two days, 355 devices were exploded, mostly

over West German territory, Even without the effects of residual

radiation this would have left up to 1.7 million West Germans dead

and 3.5 million severely wounded.3

By contrast the Americans stress the importance of having

credible "responses on each level of violence. Of course there

are reasons for this concept. If the US would only have the

disposal of strategic systems (ICBM's), it would not be likely that

the Americans would come to assist the Europeans in case of a

Russian offensive, simply because the use of ICBM's would result

in immediate retaliation by the Soviet Union, i.e. total

destruction of the USA. Moreover, not only American citizens would

suffer; the vulnerability of the ICBM systems practically forbids

their use in all but the "very last" stage of an all out nuclear

war.

This situation opens up the theoretical option that the

Soviet Union might use medium, or intermediate range ballistic

missiles against Europe but not fire ICBM's against the US,

provided the US would not use their ICBM's against Soviet

territory. That poses the enduring European nightmare: a nuclear

war limited to Europe.4-

II: LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

Especially in Western Europe there is a growing belief that

any nuclear war is highly unlikely to be controlled or limited.

This appears to be in conflict with the ("new") flexible response

of the US as mentioned in the former chapter.

Already as early as 1951, Gordon Dean, the chairman of the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), spoke of a revolution in atomic

warfare:

"...What we are working toward here is a situation where

we will have atomic weapons in almost as complete a

variety as conventional ones, and a situation where we

can use them in the same old way. This would include

artillery shells, guided missiles, torpedoes, rockets and

bombs for ground support amongst others and it would

include big ones for big situations."5

It sounds convenient and rather reassuring and indeed, for lack of

sufficient (quality as well as quantity) conventional defence in

Western Europe, NATO adopted the flexible response concept in 1962,

which relied on an early (first) use of nuclear weapons, to make

up for deficiencies in conventional forces.

Since 1982 things have changed and despite the numerical

superiority of the W.P. forces, NATO armies at present (still)

possess a credible conventional deterrence. Defence with the threat

of a limited use of nuclear weapons, is in the long run only

credible in aggression in which the use of those weapons, is

actually intended. Only to counter that sort of aggression, NATO

needs tactical nuclear weapons. If however, in defence of a

conventional attack in Europe,tactical nuclear weapons would be

used, this would in all probability mean a major destruction of

Europe.6 It will be clear, that in this concept, even the use of

tactical nuclear weapons is perceived by Europeans in a strategic

sense, changing tactical nuclear weapons into strategic ones for

that matter. Thinking along this line, the government of the

Netherlands explained her "restructuring" in the Netherlands

Defence Budget 1989 as follows:

"...thought will be given to a possible shift from very

short range nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery) to

nuclear weapons with a longer range, within the 500 km

upper limit. The range of the successor to the LANCE will

be extended considerably, thus reducing vulnerability and

enabling targets to be covered up to a distance of

several hundreds of kilometres into the adversary's

hinterland."7

All this fits the concept stated in the first chapter, i.e.,

nuclear weapons are unsuitable for fighting a war and are thus only

useful as a political means for the prevention of war. In

advocating her "shift," (to the longer range weapons), the

Netherlands wants to stress this view towards (political) nuclear

deterrence, the effect being, that the threshold is gradually

raised to an extremely high level.

It will be clear that in the official Netherlands position

on nuclear weapons, there can only be a limited allowance for the

US point of view on multiple options, the way it was first

formulated by former Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger and

later by his successor Harold Brown. Both attempted to explain how

selective options reinforced deterrence without making nuclear war

more likely.8

Let us see how one of the more recent "options" --be it

this time to destroy nuclear (incoming) missiles--, is perceived

by quite a few Europeans:

From the Soviet perspective, the Strategic Defence

Initiative (SDI) is perceived as a fundamental change in the

strategic balance between East and West. It is regarded as an

additional (American) strategic option. Europeans opposing SDI do

so mainly for two reasons:

1. a lesser shared risk by the USA compared to Europe.

2. it lowers the nuclear threshold.

ad 1: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly states

that "an armed attack against one or more of them (the

parties) in Europe or North America shall be considered

an attack against them all. .." One of the first thoughts

resulting from this article is that of shared risks.

Those risks should be shared equally, i.e. not an "all

risk" concept for most members and a considerably "less

risk" for other members. Or, using the words of

ambassador Max Kampelman in his address to the students

of the Amphibious Warfare School and those of the Command

and Staff College on March 1 1989: "There cannot be

security for one nation if it cannot be provided for

all."

ad 2: The effect of SDI can be regarded as a possibility to

limit damage, to make it calculable and thus, make

(limited) nuclear war a (survivable) possibility. In

doing so, the consequence for the nuclear threshold is

one of a distinct lowering. Instead of adding to

deterrence, its effect is perceived as the opposite.

III: REASONS FOR DIFFERING VIEWS

In the former chapters, it has been indicated that the

foremost reason for a differing opinion on nuclear policy and

nuclear options is caused by the fact that Europe is the potential

battlefield for any major conflict, be it conventional and/or

nuclear. This of course gives a distinctly different perspective

than a situation where the involvement in a conflict takes place

5000 km away from the home-country, as is the case for the US.

Those who actively oppose nuclear weapons, can be divided

into two major groups:

1. those, who (even unilaterally) want to abolish all nuclear

weapons, whatever their size or purpose.

2. those, who for the time being accept the presence of nuclear

armies as a reality, but will in a responsible way, actively

seek to extinct every single category of nuclear armies.

Within the solidarity of the NATO alliance, the Dutch

government supports the latter view.

It is no secret that a large share of the population of

Holland has been, and still is very much opposed to all forms of

nuclear weapons. Public demonstrations by pacifists as well as

supporters from the "Anti Cruise-Missile Committee", have given

the government a hard time in dealing with these public sentiments.

However, the official position to support NATO's dual-track

decision (zero option for INF weapons), has never been challenged

by the government. On the contrary, in maintaining her views, not

only in theory but also in practice (continuing of all preparations

for the stationing of the cruise-missiles unless...), Holland

played a considerable role in driving back the importance of

nuclear weapons on both sides.

What motivated and still motivates those, who oppose all

nuclear weapons? Obviously a sufficient answer is hard to give;

however, a few causes can be indicated:

1. Fear; fear for utter destruction, death and suffering. Fear

is a bad advisor for governments, nations and public opinion

alike. Fear disturbs rational thinking. But fear does exist

and, in public protest against nuclear wars, it does

constitute an important social factor that cannot be ignored.

2. The second major motivation is that of religion. Except for

the Roman Catholic Church, both the Reformed Church and the

Presbyterian Church condemned views of tolerance of nuclear

weapons, be it as actual fighting weapons or as a political

means. As the Christian Democrats have been in government for

the past seven years, it will be evident that there has been,

and still is,a definite influence of the churches and their

constituency on political life in both parliament and

government.

3. The third reason is more difficult to describe; it refers to

those who are not possessed by fear, and are intellectually

very well able to understand the "need" for nuclear weapons,

but still say no. As an aid to the minister of Defence of the

Netherlands, I asked Dr. Hans van Mierlo during the hectic

times of anti-cruise-missile demonstrations in 1982, what his

constituency thought of the official government position

(including his) on INF weapons. He answered: "you would not

believe it, there I stand, speaking to my constituency, trying

desperately to convince them of the necessity of their support

(of the dual-track decision) and then they look at me, tell

me they understand very well what I mean and conclude saying:

"but we don't want them (the cruise-missiles). "9

As Holland already in an early stage took the lead in the

so called peace-movements, this paper justifies a closer look at

how it all started.

IV: THE PEACE-MOVEMENT

In the evolution of the peace-movement, three phases can

be distinguished: In the first phase, (peace) activities on a

larger scale only occurred in Holland. For this reason some people

believe that the ideas spread from there as an "infectious

disease". The disease was called "Hollanditus". In 1977 the action

group "Stop de neutronenbom" gained tremendous support for its

goal. In April 1978, parliament was offered a petition with 1,2

million signatures. When president Carter stopped the production

of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), the action group lost its

momentum.

Also in 1977 the IKV (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, meaning:

peace consultation between churches), started a campaign with the

slogan (translated) "Help kick the nuclear weapons out of the

world, to start in the Netherlands." By her actions, the IKV

provided the incentive for a discussion not only among the

churches, but in the entire society. Rapidly most of the larger

unions and the socialists parties supported the basic idea i.e.:

unilateral actions to come to mutual disarmament. The IKV soon

found itself the centre of the Dutch peace-movement.

The second phase is marked by the start of similar

peace-movements in other countries, notably Great-Britain and

West-Germany. In Great-Britain three facts contributed to the

foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1980:

a brochure issued by the government on measures in case of a

nuclear war, the dual-track-decision, and plans for the British

Trident submarine. In the FRG, people were triggered by possibility

of a limited nuclear war in Europe, and became more and more

convinced that Germany would be the battlefield for such a war. The

"Krefelder" Appeal had no problem in convincing two million people

to sign a petition for a withdrawal of the dual-track-decision

(1980). In other European nations, the peace-movement existed on

a smaller scale (Belgium, Italy and the Scandinavian countries).

In the fall of 1981 it was clear by the number of people,

participating in organized protests, that the peace-movement could

not be ignored. (see table)

Major peace-demonstrations in 1981 and

1983 (including number of participants)

PLACE 1981 1983

Bonn 10 Oct. 300,000 22 Oct. 250,000

Rome 24 Oct. 300,000 22 Oct. 500,000

London 24 Oct. 250,000 22 Oct. 250,000

Brussels 25 Oct. 200,000 23 Oct. 300,000

Madrid 15 Nov. 500,000 22 Oct. 150,000

Amsterdam 21 Nov. 400,000

The Hague 29 Oct. 550,000

Hamburg,

West-Berlin

Stuttgart 22 Oct. 1,000,000

The third phase is characterized by the increasing interest of

citizens of the United States since the end of 1981. The most

prominent movement was the one that advocated to freeze research,

production, and stationing of nuclear weapons as a first step for

mutual disarmament. According to polls, already in April 1982 two

thirds of the population agreed on this proposal and so did an

increasing number of members of Congress. In June 1982 a

demonstration in New York was attended by more than 700,000 people;

it was clear how widespread the support for the peace-movement had

become. 10

V: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

What will the answer of the Europeans be on their aversion

to nuclear weapons? Of course the answer could be very simple:

continue to rely on the deterrent of the US, but at the same time,

strengthen and increase the conventional forces. (For the sake of

argument, both the British and the French nuclear weapons are

disregarded in this paper.) If the Europeans maintain their wish

to extinct all tactical, as well as medium range nuclear weapons,

and do not improve their conventional forces, the American

commitment to Europe's security would become almost unacceptable,

i.e., as all intermediate systems would have vanished, the only

(nuclear) assistance to Europe could be provided by ICBM's, which

in turn would evoke the Soviets to destruct American targets in

the USA. Conversely if the security commitment of the US would mean

destruction of Europe, the NATO alliance would fall apart.

Dr. Gregory Trevorton in this respect talks about "the ambiguity. "11

What are the facts?

1. It has become obvious that most NATO countries are reluctant

(to say the least) to increase their defence budgets. Instead

of the agreed upon 3% real annual growth, Holland for instance

showed a "real growth" over 1988 of 0.5%

2. The effects of Mr. Gorbachev's reduction proposals are

considerable: As early as January last, a member of the Dutch

parliament, vigorously pleaded for a freeze on defence

expenditures. He motivated his proposal by saying: "I wonder

how an increase of the defence budget can still be defended

in the light of the international developments" and: "asking

more money is the easiest way; health care has been

restructured (with a decreasing budget), why not defence?"12

This view in itself is not new, what is new however, is, that

the quoted member of parliament is the defence specialist of

the largest coalition partner of the Dutch government

(Christian Democrats). Also, despite the fact that the Dutch

government has committed itself to the modernization of the

LANCE (Chapter II) it has rumour that the Minister of Foreign

Affairs sides with the West German point of view i.e.

postponement of the decision to modernize the LANCE. 13

3. A number of European countries are, as a consequence of a

decreasing birthrate, no longer able to provide sufficient

manpower for their armed forces, this, despite a rigorous

system of conscription. Especially Germany (and to a lesser

extent the smaller European nations) encounters this problem.

Extension of the compulsory service (for men) as well as

promoting a large number of women in the armed forces, should

provide the answer.

4. With the eventual elimination of the INF weapons, the Soviet

Union appears to have a considerable advantage in conventional

forces. It is justified that the conventional NATO forces are

critically examined. The Centre for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS) has taken a first step towards

that goal. 14 In its report the most conspicuous vulnerabilities

are listed:

a The forces of a number of Alliance members lack the

ammunition and certain other sustainables needed to

carry on the fight for even two or three weeks.

b defences against chemical warfare attack are far

from adequate.

c the ready reserve units of a number of European

allies are far below strength.

Adding a fourth deficiency to this list in my mind is realistic:

It is hard to produce figures on the matter, but I am convinced

that a number of necessary military exercises are (being) cancelled

for lack of the necessary funding. "Loafing" in the Dutch army has

already drawn the attention of parliament. What this could mean for

the standard of training leaves little to the imagination.

VI: CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapters, an attempt has been made to

describe some of the major differences that exist between the US

and Western Europe as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned. In

chapter V some facts and ideas have been given on the (deficiencies

of) the conventional forces of the European allies.

The conclusions appear to be rather grim. First of all

there is the "ambiguity": Europe does not want any (short range or

intermediate range) nuclear missiles on her soil for fear of utter

destruction. The US flavours multiple options to respond flexible

to any level of violence so as to prevent the violent exchange of

ICBM's which would annihilate most of the US. Today, as well as in

the foreseeable future, the two views apparently cannot be

compromised. To paraphrase the words of Dr. Gregory Treverton: "all

we can do is to manage the ambiguity". 15 To do this however, all

members of NATO have to recognize one indispensable condition, and

that is unity. If unity, i.e. a reasonable consensus, starts

lacking, the alliance may easily break down, or, to use older, much

older words: ... if a house be divided against itself, that house

cannot stand (St. Mark 3:25),

The second conclusion is the reluctance of most European

allies to share the burden of a proper conventional defence. It

will be clear that this conclusion is directly linked with the

former one (ambiguity), but it surely is reason for grave concern.

Spending money on defence is unpopular in every (democratic)

country, but the way some politicians in Western Europe demonstrate

an aversion against nuclear weapons on purely moral grounds, and

at the same time refuse to pay the price to make up for the

discrepancy leans towards hypocrisy.

The effects of nonstop activities of the peace-movement

and churches for that matter, cannot be ignored in a democratic

society; their influence on politics is as certain as it can be.

Politics as Clausewitz16 1 already stated: "will permeate all

military operations and ... it will have a continuous influence on

them." It will require almost super human efforts by leading

politicians to maintain a governing of the mind over that of

emotions in the near future.

FOOTNOTES

1. Annual Report to the Congress FY 1990 by Secretary of Defence

Frank C. Carlucci p.35.

2. The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984, Summary and excerpts

p.7 and 8.

3. The evaluation of nuclear strategy by Lawrence Freedman p. 109.

4. Nuclear Weapons in Europe by Dr. Gregory Treverton (Adelphi Paper

No 168) p.6.

5. The evaluation of nuclear strategy by Lawrence Freedman p. 109.

6. Menschen und Machte by Helmut Schmidt p. 118.

7. Explanatory Memorandum To The Netherlands Defence Budget 1989,

Abridged Version p.5.

8. US Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, technical and policy changes

by Stephen J. Cimbala p. 31; p. 34.

9. Hans van Mierlo was Minister of Defence from 1982 until 1983 in

a coalition government with the Christian Democrats and "Democrats

(19)66." He was the founder of the Democrats `66. The party's

program has always been characterized by "decency" and "rational

thinking."

10. G. Walraven, Winkler Prins Encyclopedisch supplement 1984

p.516; p.517.

11. Ibid 4, p.27.

12. De Volkskrant dated January 25, 1988.

13. Major Dutch Newspaper dated February 16, 1989.

14. Great Expectations, and Fundamental Questions by L. Edgar

Prince (Sea Power Nov. 1987) p.51.

15. Nuclear Weapons in Europe by Dr. Gregory Treverton (Adelphi

Paper No 168) p.27.

16. On War by Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret. p.87.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Berkhof G. C. en Volten P. M. E., Het militair strategisch denken

in de Soviet-Unie. "Ons Leger".

2. Carlucci Frank C., Annual Report to the Congress FY 1990.

3. Cimbala Stephen J., US Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, technical

and policy changes.

4. Clausewitz Carl von, On War, edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret, 1984 Princeton University.

5. Eenennaam B.J. van, De toekomst van de Europese veiligheid.

6. Explanatory Memorandum To The Netherlands Defence Budget 1989,

abridged version.

7. Freedman Lawrence, The evaluation of nuclear strategy New

York: St. Martin's Press 1988.

8. Kissinger Henri, Years of Upheaval, Little Brown and Company

1982.

9, Schmidt Helmut. Mensen en Mogendheden, Uitgeverij G.A. van

Oorschot Amsterdam, 1988.

10. Treverton G. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper No 168.

11. Walraven G. Winkler Prins Encyclopedisch supplement 1984.