Electromagnetic Pulse-From Chaos To A Manageable Solution
AUTHOR Major M. CaJohn, USMC
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA C4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE-FROM CHAOS TO A MANAGEABLE SOLUTION
I. Purpose: Alert our military and civilian personnel that elec-
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) is an enemy to our survival, and investigate
how we can defeat this foe with current equipment and technology.
II. Problem: Although EMP has been known to exist for many years,
its catastrophic impact on our strategic and tactical communications
systems and weapons, as well as our civilian communications systems
are not widely understood or accepted. Acceptance of this problem
is being absorbed in the military establishment; however, the civ-
ilian sector is slow to respond.
III. Data: Escalation between the United States (US) and Russia
reach an insolvable solution. Russia launches a nuclear missile
attack; however, before the US can retaliate Russia explodes a high
altitude nuclear weapon which renders the US's retaliatory capabil-
ities useless. All aspects of EMP and the systems it attacks are
described in detail. The effects of EMP are explored from the
naivete of our scientists to the comparison of EMP to lightning.
Interest grows within our country to defeat this enemy and the
leading agency is the military. The military establishes testing
facilities to learn about the effects of EMP. The results of
these testing facilities are hardened programs for our strategic
communications systems and weapons. The Army established a program
that ensures all new equipment will be designed to be EMP hardened.
The military has made significant strides in the strategic field
and is attacking the problem in the tactical arena. However, the
civilian community is lacking in a commitment to defeat EMP.
Solutions to the problems of EMP are proposed using today's
equipment and technology.
IV. Conclusions: EMP can be defeated. The military has a sound
and viable program in its strategic communications systems and
weapons; however, the military must emphasize an EMP training and
field expedient program in its tactical communications systems until
EMP hardened equipment is procured. The civilian sector has no EMP
program and must get one to ensure it can survive an EMP
environment.
V. Recommendations: Military leaders must stress and implement an
EMP training and field expedient technique program. The military
must continue to procure strategic and tactical equipment that is EMP
hardened. Government agencies must encourage our civilian sector to
build new communications systems that will withstand an EMP
environment.
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE-FROM CHAOS TO A MANAGEABLE SOLUTION
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Although electromagnetic pulse will disrupt or
destroy essential communications systems, it is possible to
establish a manageable and survivable communications system, which
will ensure the United States can survive a nuclear attack.
I. Nature of EMP
A. What does a nuclear weapon produce
1. Surface burst (EMP)
2. High altitude EMP (HEMP)
3. Source region EMP (SREMP)
4. System generated (SGEMP)
II. Effects of EMP
A. Initially no scientist anticipated the serious effects of EMP
B. Detonation of a nuclear device over Johnston Island produced
disastrous effects in Hawaii
C. Concerns of EMP on high tech communications
D. Compare EMP with lightning
III. Remedies for the effects of EMP
A. The growth of interest in the U.S.
B. U.S. builds test facilities to counter EMP
C. Two ways to protect communications systems from EMP
IV. Current EMP hardening programs
A. The Army's program
B. Strategic systems that are being EMP hardened
1. Communications systems
2. Aircraft
3. Weapons
V. Problems remaining
A. Civilian industry has no regard for EMP
B. Military's lack of tactical communications systems that is
EMP hardened
VI. Proposed solutions
A. FEMA conducts a study for the civilian sector
1. Must make recommendations
2. Must have a cost estimate
B. Military must stress
1. Training
2. Practice field expedient measures
VII. Summary
A. EMP is a threat to unprotected communications systems
B. Military must establish sound EMP management and main-
tenance programs to neutralize the effects of EMP
C. Problems can be conquered, but need more emphasis by our
nation's leaders in the civilian and military communities
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE - FROM CHAOS TO A MANAGEABLE SOLUTION
Tension between the United States and the Soviet Union reaches
new heights as both countries counter each others offensive moves.
The Soviet Union initiates the first move when it masses thirty
divisions along East Germany's western border during a time when
there are no field exercises scheduled. The United States counters
this move by placing the Fifth and Seventh Corps on alert and
placing them in their forward defensive positions, and the United
States begins the mechanism to mobilize its reserve. The Soviets
counter this act by massing another twenty-five divisions along
Yugoslavia's western border, which gives them the capability to
strike quickly and deeply into Italy. The United States counters
this by deploying the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Air Cavalry
divisions to bolster the Italian defense.
The United States puts its maritime strategy into action by
deploying four aircraft carrier battle groups into the Norwegian
Fjords. The Soviets counter this show of force by bringing all
their nuclear attack submarines and missile launching submarines into
their "homeland" protective waters.
Each country's leaders use the "hot line" attempting to defuse
this major crisis. The leaders of the super powers agree to launch
a spy satellite to collect information and monitor each country's
moves. In accordance with the space agreement the satellites are
registered with the United States Space Command and both satellites
are launched at the prescribed time.
Three days later the tension between the two super powers ebbs.
Then at 0500 Eastern Daylight Time the United States early warning
satellites suddenly detect several Russian nuclear missile launchings
from two Typhoon submarines (one on each coast). An alert is sent
to the United States military commands around the world. The
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) now tracks the
incoming missiles and predicts their impact points within the Con-
tinental United States.
The President of the United States is awakened and appraised of
the situation. The president initiates a telephone conference call
between the various unified and specified commands. Meanwhile, the
Russian spy satellite, 500 kilometers over the central United
States, explodes with a 400 kiloton force generating a high energy
electromagnetic pulse covering the entire United States. The
president orders a massive retaliation by the United States' triad
forces, but nothing happens.
The United States triad of Air Force bombers and missiles, and
the Navy's Trident submarines stand by awaiting orders to launch;
however, their communications systems are inoperative. Both
military and civilian communications systems are crippled or de-
stroyed by the electromagnetic pulse. Although electromagnetic pulse
will disrupt and destroy essential communications systems; it is
possible to establish a manageable and survivable communications
system, which will allow the United States to survive a nuclear
attack.
The effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warrant increased
efforts to neutralize their potential to create chaos with communi-
cations systems. EMP, is a killer of unprotected electrical and
electronics equipment. Its effect of inducing extremely large and
very rapid surges of voltage and current through electrical
conducting materials offer unique leadership and engineering
challenges to our country.
With its current nuclear strategy of flexible response and
controlled escalation, the United States places great reliance upon
its command, control, and communications systems. However, the most
vulnerable component of the United States is the same command, con-
trol and communications systems that is so essential. This weakness
in our command, control and communications systems is exactly what
the Soviets will attack. Indications are that the Soviets will
probably use a high-altitude nuclear burst to generate enough EMP
to completely destroy or incapacitate the civil and military
communications systems, missiles, aircraft control systems and
radar systems(12:2-6-8). This analysis further indicates that EMP
effects are integrated into Soviet strategic and tactical planning,
especially at the outset of any nuclear exchange, as the Soviets
always plan to use nuclear weapons at their choosing and not as a
retaliatory response (13:2-4).
The U.S. military was slow to realize the vulnerability of its
command, control and communications systems. Nevertheless,
improving this communications network is now the number one
priority among all new strategic programs.
In this paper, I will describe the nature of EMP, its effects
and remedies for them. In addition, I will highlight two problem
areas and pose solutions to them. The EMP threat is solvable, as
there is enough scientific and engineering knowledge currently
available to insure the survivability of communications systems from
EMP effects.
The detonation of a nuclear weapon produces several direct
outputs in the form of neutrons, electrons, fission fragments, bomb
debris, alpha particles, gamma photons and x-rays. In addition,
the interaction of the gamma rays and x-rays with the atmosphere
creates the indirect weapon effects of electromagnetic pulse
(2:116-121).
EMP is a pulse of electromagnetic energy of extremely short
duration. Initially called radio flash, EMP is similar to the
simultaneous transmission of a large number of radio waves varying
from one KHz to 100 MHz and peak field amplitudes produced are very
large on the order of 50 kilovolts (kv) per meter (4:72 and 9:1-20).
The formation of EMP results from the collision of the gamma
photons emitted from a nuclear detonation and interacts with atoms
in the outer atmosphere. This results in the ejection of electrons
and the creation of a strong ionized area referred to as the source
field region. This complicated process occurs in a few billionth's
of a second (nanoseconds) and last one millionth of a second
(millisecond), which produces a strong electric field that radiates
away from the source region (4:72-74). This radiated field is EMP.
A number of parameters including the yield, its height-of-burst,
asymmetries in the earth's atmosphere, and location of the burst
relative to the earth's magnetic declination directly affects both
the shape or coverage area and the strength of the EMP (9:1-1-2-11).
Based on analysis of the various combinations of the preceding
parameters there are four significant types of EMP.
The first, surface burst electromagnetic pulse (EMP), occurs
when the nuclear burst explodes on the earth's surface or up to two
kilometers above the surface. The radiated wave is only propagated
to a distance of ten to twenty kilometers from the burst point due
to the higher density of the lower atmosphere. Although the area
over which the low-altitude EMP produces a damaging effect is
relatively small, it is significant on the tactical nuclear
battlefield (9:1-10-1-11).
The second type, high-altitude EMP (HEMP), is the most
significant and, potentially, the most hazardous to our security.
The explosion of a nuclear burst at an altitude greater than 30 to
over 500 kilometers above the earth's surface will produce the above
scenario. Due to the very thin to non existent atmosphere
at these altitudes, the gammma rays emitted from the explosion
will travel radically outward for long distances. Those
gamma rays traveling toward the earth's atmosphere are stopped by
collisions with atmospheric molecules at altitudes between 20 and
40 kilometers. These collisions generate Compton recoil electrons
which interact with the earth's magnetic field to produce a downward
traveling electromagnetic wave. This high altitude burst will not
generate any other nuclear effect at the earth's surface (9:1-5).
However, this type of nuclear explosion also produces a vast
ground coverage. Significant HEMP levels occur at the earth's
surface out to where the line of sight from the burst contacts the
earth's surface. Consequently, a nuclear burst over the central
part of the United States at an altitude of 500 kilometers would
produce an EMP field that would incapacitate all communications
systems in the continental United States (9:1-8).
The third type of EMP is source region EMP (SREMP). This is
produced by a nuclear burst within several hundred meters of the
earth's surface (the fireball touches the ground). SREMP is
localized three to five kilometers from the burst. The generation
of EMP by a surface blast begins with the gamma rays traveling
radically outward from the burst. This action causes the Compton
electrons to move radically outward and leaves behind immobile
positive ions. This produces an electric field and lasts two to three
nano seconds. The final result is a tremendous surge on current in
the air on any communications equipment and the SREMP renders the
equipment useless (9:1-10-13).
The last type of EMP is system generated EMP (SGEMP). SGEMP
results from the interaction of x-rays or gamma rays striking an
atom on a metal object. A nuclear blast in outer space sends gamma
rays or x-rays out in all directions. If these rays were to strike
an unprotected satellite or missile traveling above the atmosphere,
these rays would knock out electrons from the atoms of the metal
skin. This action would induce an EMP field that would make the
satellite and the missiles useless (9:1-17-1-21 & 5:75-76).
Although the EMP effect was known to exist during the
detonationtion of conventional explosives prior to the first atomic
explosion and was predicted in nuclear weapons' tests, the extent and
potentially serious nature of EMP were not realized for several
years. Several incidents related to the 1963 detonation of a 1.4
megaton nuclear device 250 miles above Johnston Island highlighted
the potential effects of EMP. Immediately following the detonation,
the island of Oahu, Hawaii, which was located 800 miles from ground
zero, experienced several power outages, the activation of hundreds
of burglar alarms and the short-circuiting of thirty strings of
streetlights (1).
EMP is of great concern today. As the field of electronics has
evolved from the vacuum tube era to today's integrated microcircuits
which can handle only minute quantities of voltage current, its sus-
ceptibility to EMP has increased significantly. Consequently, this
results in modern communications and electronics equipment being
highly vulnerable to the power surges of EMP.
The significance of these power surges is demonstrated when
comparing EMP with lightning. Both involve a sudden pulse of energy
and both are attracted to intentional or unintentional collectors or
antennas. However, EMP and lightning differ in four crucial ways:
(1) EMP pulses much more rapidly. Pulse time for
EMP maybe a few billionths of a second; the comparable interval
for lightning pulse involves millionths of seconds (8:A-2).
(2) Each field strength can differ radically. Lightning
maybe a few thousand volts per meter; EMP can involve 50,000 volts
per meter (8:A-2).
(3) EMP pulses are of short duration--usually less than a
thousandth of a second as opposed to lightning pulses that last
hundreds of a milliseconds (8:A-2).
(4) Lightning occurs at much lower frequencies and in
bands well below the frequencies used by the military communications
systems. However, EMP concentrates in some of the bands most
frequently used by the military's tactical communications
systems (8:A-2).
This fact is especially significant when considering EMP's
power density of 1,000,000 watts persquare meter versus the typical
signal strength of .001 watt per square meter which a radio receiver
is designed to accept. Accordingly, since EMP is capable of
delivering a signal a billion times stronger than the receiver is
designed to accept, one can see the urgency to find solutions to
this problem (11:J-3).
The system of degradation from EMP results in either a
permanent failure of a device or a component or a temporary impair-
ment which can deny use of the equipment for a period of time. A
burned-out transistor exemplifies the former; while a change in the
state of a switch represents the latter.
Most susceptible to EMP are those components with low voltage
and current requirements such as solid state devices, integrated
circuits, semi conductor devices, digital computers, digital
circuitry, alarm systems and electronic sensors. Generally, as the
size of the device decreases, its ability to absorb voltage and
current decreases, which results in increased susceptibility to EMP.
Vacuum-tube equipment, inductors, tube transmitters and receivers,
low current relays and switches are less susceptible. Equipment
designed for high voltage use such as motors, transformers, radars,
relays, lamps and circuit breakers are not susceptible (2:118).
Another necessary variable to consider is the collection of EMP
energy. Collectors may be cables, wires, antennas, pipe, conduit,
metal structures, railroad tracks - anything that acts as an
electrical conductor (8:5-4-5-8). The amount of EMP energy
collected depends on the electrical properties, size, and shape of
the material comprising the collector. EMP energy may be transferred
from the collector to the equipment directly by a physical
connection or indirectly through induction (8:5-8-5-10).
A vast array of collectors form a huge grid over the entire
United States. Its power cables, telephone lines, towers, antennas
and railroad tracks have the capability of collecting EMP energy and
transferring it to anything physically or electronically connected
to them. Thus, for example, any electronic device attached to a
telephone line or power line has the capability of receiving large
amounts of EMP (8:5-6-5-7).
Technology has sought remedies for the effects of EMP since
the early sixties. The interest resulted from increased scientific
awareness and advances in electronic technology. Not to be stymied
by the 1963 partial test ban treaty, United States' scientists
forged ahead by building devices which simulate EMP.
The Air Force built an EMP testing facility called TRESTLE in
1980 at Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico. This device tests the
vulnerability of all our new aircraft to EMP (2:119). The Navy's
EMP testing facility called EMPRESS I is at Point Patience on the
Patuxent River in Maryland. This device can only test frigates and
small destroyers to the vulnerability of EMP. However, the navy was
not satisfied with the limitations of EMPRESS I and is currently
building EMPRESS II, which will have the capability to test every
ship the navy has in its inventory for EMP (2:121). In addition, the
Department of Army's Harry Diamond Laboratories are devoted to the
study of EMP, and the Defense Nuclear Agency has several EMP simu-
lation facilities. These are just a few of the facilities and means
the military and government uses to study ways to neutralize the
effects of EMP.
Two main processes exist to protect electronic communications
systems from the effects of EMP. The first is shielding and the
second is acquiring EMP hardened equipment. There are several
different approaches to shielding. The first method, volume
shielding, is to shield the rooms or facilities in which equipment
is located and this creates a large volume in which the electro-
magnetic environment is negligible. Local shielding is another
method in which equipment cables and electronic boxes are shielded
within a room. This provides electromagnetic protection for each
piece of shielded equipment. Thus, the EMP induced currents on
equipment and cables are diverted away from sensitive components by
the cable shields. The shielding protects electromagnetic fields
against sensitive electronic equipment, because it reduces voltages
that would re-radiate into electronic equipment (9:3-1-3-14).
The second process is to receive electronic equipment that is
already EMP hardened, and maintain a strict system hardness main-
tenance program. The essential elements of system hardness
maintenance includes:
(1) Configuration management which prevents future system
changes from compromising system hardness (9:4-1-4-3).
(2) Maintenance, surveillance, test procedures and
equipment must be conceived as a part of the system hardening
process and must be implemented by the user (9:4-3-4-7).
(3) Training ensures that the measures designed into a
hardened system are not degraded by uninformed action or inaction
(9:4-8).
(4) Documentation must be completed in order to achieve
success (9:4-9).
Although military concern for EMP was initially lacking, sound
programs now exist to overcome the EMP threat. Basic guidance is
found in Army Regulation 70-60, which requires the establishment of
the most appropriate nuclear survivability criteria for each new
system, controls the granting of waivers of nuclear survivability
requirements, and insures the system survivability programs meet the
imposed requirements. This regulation requires specific nuclear
survivability criteria be defined during the concept phase of a
system's life cycle and that the Outline Development Plan and
contract documentation include appropriate considerations of nuclear
survivability (6: 1-G-1).
The military now has excellent programs for the fielding of EMP
survivable equipment. The following provides a brief status of
major communications systems that are EMP hardened. The Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS)III, the Air Force Satellite
Communications System (AFSATCOM) and the Navy's Fleet Satellite
Communications System (FLTSATCOM) are fully operational. Another
satellite system that will come on line in the 1990's will be the
Military Strategic Tactical and Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and all
our military communications satellites will be state of the art.
The 21 major switching centers of the Automatic voice Network
(AUTOVON) are in the process of becoming EMP hardened. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)is in the process of hardening all
its Emergency Broadcast Systems radio stations. This is a large
radio network system consisting of 600 radio stations.
The following provides a brief status of major EMP hardened
systems in aircraft and weapons. The E-3A Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS), the E-4B Airborne Command Post, the EC-l35
Airborne Command Post and the National Early Airborne Command Post
(NEACP) are EMP hardened or in the process of being EMP hardened to
protect the aircraft's electronic equipment. The B-1B bomber, the
Peacekeeper Missile (MX), the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),
the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and the sea-launched
cruise missile (SLCM) are weapons that were designed from conception
to be EMP hardened.*
Obviously, the strategic nuclear forces and the strategic
command, control and communications systems received the initial
EMP hardening emphasis. However, new tactical systems will have
EMP hardening and this will offer the combat soldier and Marine a
better chance to survive on the battlefield.
Two major problem areas concerning the survivability of
communications systems from EMP effects remain. First the civilian
industry shows no regard for EMP. This is easy to understand since
* The author served in a billet for the last three years that
allowed him in depth knowledge of EMP hardened communications
systems and weapons.
EMP hardening adds significantly to the cost of any new system. In
the case of an existing system to be retrofitted it would even be
greater (3:31-36). EMP would disrupt the vast electronic networks
which our major industries depend upon. In addition, public and
privately owned radio and television stations would be damaged. The
resulting chaos would present a serious threat to the implementation
of civil defense plans and recovery efforts.
The second problem concerns the lack of EMP hardening in the
military's current tactical equipment. While the capability exists
to retrofit EMP hardening to this equipment, sufficient funds are
not available. This situation leaves the command, control and comm-
unications systems of the tactical commander vulnerable to EMP until
the new generation of EMP hardened equipment is acquired (11:J-3).
The recommendations, which are offered as solutions to the two
problems, are based on the assumption that additional money will not
be made available to harden all required systems in either the
civil sector or the tactical military sector. The first recommen-
dation is that FEMA conduct a study of the effects of EMP on the
civilian sector and devise appropriate recommendations. This study
must consider lead time to "fix the problems, availability of
manual backup systems, use of spare equipment to repair damaged
systems and finally, how much it will cost the private sector to
avoid this potential communications chaos.
The second recommendation for the problem requires the military
to use unhardened tactical equipment for the next five years. This
is derived from a consideration of several important factors. A
number of field expedient techniques and planning considerations for
the mitigation of EMP are available in various publications and are
listed in Appendix A. Some of these considerations are not always
practical or feasible, and they are not as effective as factory
installed hardening; however, their use will reduce the effects of
EMP and increase the likelihood the systems will remain operational.
A second factor deals with planning and training. Tactical units do
not train in the use of the effects of EMP in garrison or field
exercises. This is a result from lack of command emphasis and
time constraints units face while in the field.
EMP poses a significant threat to unprotected electronics
systems. Although the increasing sophistication of microelectronics
results in greater susceptibility of modern systems to EMP, current
technology exists to neutralize its effects. To this end, the
military established a sound EMP system which has resulted in the
hardening of the strategic military systems. However, due to
insufficient funds being available serious problems exist in the
civil and tactical military communications systems. These problems
are not insurmountable, and the implementation of the proposed
solutions could contribute markedly to reducing the significance of
EMP.
APPENDIX A
FIELD EXPEDIENT EMP MITIGATION TECHNIQUES AND
PLANNING CONS IDERAT IONS
1. Develop SOP's to provide for immediate actions to restore comm-
unications. In the absence of electronic communications, messenger
and pryotechnics can be used (10:3-3).
2. The keys to the maintenance of effective communications are:
planning for outages, proper maintenance of equipment, austerity and
redundancy (10: 3-3-3-4).
3. Use ultra high frequency (UHF) and super high frequency (SHF) comm-
unications equipment in preference to VHF equipment whenever
possible (7:4-11).
4. Avoid the use of broadband radios. Radios operating below UHF
are particularly sensitive to EMP (7:4-11).
5. Shut down and protect unneeded and redundant radio systems.
This will protect all radios that are not essential from the
possibility of EMP (7:4-11).
6. When possible, use antennas that have small radiating elements.
The smaller the radiating elements, the less susceptible to EMP
(7:4-11).
7. Keep cable and wire runs as short as possible. The wire will
act as an EMP conductor (7:4-12).
8. Keep cable runs as straight as possible--AVOID LOOPS. Loops
will pick up more EMP than straight runs (7:4-12).
9. Keep cables and wire on the ground where practical. Elevating
cables and wires will increase the EMP generated voltages and
currents (7:4-12).
10. Use shielded twisted pair cables where options in use of cable
exist. Twisted pair cables pick up significantly less EMP than
unshielded cable (7:4-12).
11. Shielding is effective for EMP. Sensitive communications
equipment can be protected from EMP if properly shielded in metal
containers (7:4-12).
12. An effective EMP shield requires that all openings be closed
with metal covers (7:4-12).
13. Maintain your EMP shields and shelters. Ensure all doors and
access panels are kept closed (7:4-12).
14. Electrically bond cable entry panels to the metallic shelters
and shields (7:4-13).
15. Keep exterior grounds short and of low impedance (7:4-13).
16. Establish good exterior grounds when possible (7:4-13).
17. Use a common ground for equipment. For large communications
systems usually found at regiment and above use a Tree system (7:
4-13).
18. Ensure all antenna guy lines are properly insulated (7:4-15).
19. Avoid the use of commercial sources of power. Commercial power
systems are very susceptible to EMP (7:-15).
20. Keep a supply of critical spares (7:4-15).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Clarke, George Major, U.S.A. Interview 2 February 1988. Maj.
Clarke formerly served with D.N.A. and D.I.A.
2. Guida, Richard A. Lt. Commander, USNR, "Nuclear Survivability"
U.S. Naval Proceeding, December 1985, pp. 116-121.
3. Rudie, Norman J., Dr. "Electromagnetic Pulse Effects and System
Hardening: Response of a System." Defense Science and
Electronics, June 1986, pp. 31-36.
4. Rudie, Norman J., Dr. "Electromagnetic Pulse Generation and
Coupling to Systems: A New Arena." Defense Science and
Electronics, May 1986, pp. 72-75.
5. Rudie, Norman J., Dr. "Radiation Effects: SGEMP Phenomena."
Defense Science and Electronics, July 1986, pp.75-76.
6. Army Regulation 70-60. "Research, Development, and Acquisition-
Nuclear Survivability of Army Material." Headquarters, Depart-
ment of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1 October 1984. pp. 1-G-1.
7. Field Circular (FC)50-15. "Nuclear Weapons Effects Mitigation
Techniques." Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1 March 1984. pp. 4-9-
4-15.
8. Field Circular (FC)50-16. "Electromagnetic Pulse Mitigation
Techniques." Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1 February 1984.
A-2; 5-4-5-10.
9. Field Circular (FC)50-17. "A technical Overview to Electro-
magnetic Pulse." Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1 June 1986.
pp. 1-1-1-20;3-1-3-14;4-1-4-9.
10. Field Circular (FC)50-20. "Nuclear Considerations for
Operations on the Airland Battlefield." Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. 1 February 1984. pp. 3-1-3-5.
11. Field Manual 24-18. "Tactical Single Channel Radio
Communications Techniques." Headquarters, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 30 September 1987. pp. J-1-J-4.
12. Field Manual 100-2-1. "The Soviet Army - Operations and
Tactics." Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington,
D.C. 16 July 1984. pp. 2-6-2-8.
13. Field Manual 100-2-2. "The Soviet Army - Specialized Warfare
and Rear Area Support." Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 16 July 1984. pp. 5-2-5-4.
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