The purpose of US nuclear forces is to help deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These forces protect many allies and assure their security. It is critical, however, that allies and adversaries understand the US policy governing the use of these weapons, since they can provoke serious political, economic, military, and environmental consequences.

Only the President of the United States or his successor can authorize the release of a nuclear weapon. Command and control over nuclear forces must be error free and clearly defined. The chain of command for the release of nuclear weapons starts when a commander requests authority to employ nuclear weapons to achieve a military objective.

Treaties and customs that represent the collective views of the belligerents have been developed throughout history. These principles protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace. These treaties and customs make up the law of armed conflict.

This law does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. However, any weapon used must be considered a military necessity, and measures must be taken to avoid collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Since nuclear

Nuclear operations can be successful in achieving US military objectives if they are used in the appropriate situation and administered properly.

The law of armed conflict forces us to think about the consequences of nuclear weapons before we employ them.

Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations The Law of Armed Conflict 6
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Our national military policy is first and foremost to deter aggression by means of a strong nuclear and conventional capability. If deterrence fails, forces must be prepared to end the conflict on favorable terms to the United States, its interests, and its allies.

The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range from producing a political decision to influencing an operation.

Nuclear weapons should change the perceptions of the enemy leaders about the ability to win, demonstrate to enemy leaders that loss outweighs their potential gain, achieve prompt resolution of the conflict, preclude the enemy from achieving its objectives, ensure success of the effort by US and multinational forces, and counter enemy weapons of mass destruction.

The threat of nuclear exchange by regional powers and the proliferation of WMD have grown following the end of the Cold War. Currently, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads are the primary threat in theaters. The potential for US operations in this lethal environment increases as nations continue to develop and obtain WMD.

Theater nuclear support may be provided by a geographic combatant commander's assigned forces, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), or another supporting combatant commander (CINC). The US nuclear arsenal contains a wide range of systems that can be tailored to meet desired military and political objectives. Naturally, each system has advantages and disadvantages when applied in a theater nuclear support context, such as range, weapon yields, lead time, accuracy, recallability, and vulnerability to enemy defense systems.

Nuclear weapons have many purposes, but should only be used after deterrence has failed.

The US must be more prepared than ever for the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

There are many nuclear support systems available for the geographic combatant commander.

US Policy and Military Doctrine
Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nuclear Support Forces 7
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Executive Summary
The President, the sole authority for release of US nuclear weapons, will release these weapons based on recommendations from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, geographic combatant commanders, and allies. To maintain control over the execution of this release, a viable command, control, communications, and computer system is essential.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for promptly requesting nuclear support. Subordinate commanders responsible for target nominations submit requests to the geographic combatant commander. Execution procedures must be flexible and allow for changes in the situation. Operations with multinational forces require appropriate doctrine and procedures for taskings, conflict resolution, target selection, and analysis.

Command and control systems must be configured to support the complex requirements of nuclear operations. During or after an enemy WMD attack, command and control (C2) of friendly forces can become difficult. Their C2 facilities may be degraded or destroyed, or the personnel operating these systems may become incapacitated.

Control of US nuclear weapons has been established to preclude unauthorized or inadvertent use by US or allied forces, foreign powers, or terrorists, while not degrading the operational readiness of these weapons. Control is managed via dedicated media message delivery systems within a given theater or region, which provide specific direction for the employment of nuclear weapons. There are also several additional command and control nuclear safeguards in place.

Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) must plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. Nuclear operations planning should be integrated into operation plans to maximize effects needed to achieve the CINC's desired objectives.

The employment of nuclear weapons is restricted to situations where military gain is commensurate with political objectives and the law of armed conflict.

Proper command and control during the complexities of nuclear warfare is critical to the operation's success.

For nuclear employment to be successful, advanced planning and integration are essential. It is important that planners be mindful of the law of armed conflict and the political objectives at hand.

Command and Control of Nuclear Operations
Planning and Employment 8
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Containment and a demonstrated will to employ additional nuclear weapons toward a specific goal are the desired methods of approach. The relative effectiveness of all weapons must be weighed and employment of nuclear weapons must offer a significant advantage. Preclusion limitation analysis must be performed to avoid casualties among friendly forces and civilians.

The possibility and extent of collateral damage must also be determined. Methods for reducing collateral damage include: reducing weapon yield, improving accuracy, employing multiple weapons, adjusting the height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero.

Advanced planning is critical to the successful use of nuclear weapons. Planners should consider the level of effort required for conventional targeting, the length of time that a target must be kept out of action, logistic support and anticipation of delays, the effect on all forces, and any national and theater level constraints.

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them. Targeting occurs and is performed at all levels of command within a joint force. JFCs establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Geographic combatant commanders should consider the following factors in determining how to defeat the individual targets composing the overall threat: inability of friendly forces to destroy targets using conventional means, number and type of individual targets, vulnerability of targets, required level of damage for each target, optimum timing, enemy's ability to reconstitute, avoidance of collateral damage, and environmental conditions.

Enemy combat forces and facilities that may be likely targets for nuclear strikes include WMD and their delivery systems, ground combat units, air defense facilities, naval installations, combat vessels, nonstate actors, and underground facilities.

Targeting is the analysis of enemy situations to identify specific weaknesses that, if exploited, will accomplish an operations goal through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying critical enemy forces or resources.

Targeting 9
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Operation planning should include the possibility that an enemy will use WMD. The plan should address active and passive defense measures to counter the potential use of these weapons. Enemy aircraft, theater missiles, and artillery are most likely to strike friendly forces. Operations must be planned and executed to destroy or eliminate enemy WMD delivery systems and supporting infrastructure before they can strike friendly forces.

Command guidance must be provided early in the planning process for use of nuclear weapons. Commanders and staff officers should understand effects, employment procedures, capabilities, and limitations of nuclear weapons systems. Command guidance may consist of a statement of desired results, circumstances leading to the request for nuclear execution, and the delivery systems available. It may also include the level of acceptable risk, restriction on fallout, and criteria for collateral damage, as well as criteria for intelligence collection and combat assessment.

Nuclear support is coordinated through geographic combatant commander channels. When preparing for nuclear support plans, USSTRATCOM will coordinate with supporting Service components and the geographic combatant commander to prevent fratricide and ensure unity of efforts. Special operation forces (SOF) in an area of nuclear operations should be given consideration to avoid any casualties or collateral damage to the SOF.

Nuclear weapon supply levels and expenditures are tightly controlled and the National Command Authorities and combatant commander control the distribution. Distribution is affected by the mission, planning, survivability, availability, safety, security, and time and distance considerations. It is important for the commanders and staff officers to understand the capabilities and limitations of the nuclear weapon logistics system. Planning of nuclear weapons support should include support of tactical operations, simplicity and uniformity in procedures, minimum handling of weapons, and security of classified material.

It is important during peacetime to set up a strategy for war that is functional immediately, and one that will achieve the objectives in wartime.

The goals of nuclear execution must be clear to commanders and staff officers involved in the operation.

Support coordination is essential to maintain unity in nuclear support plans.

In order to comply with the law of armed conflict, nuclear weapons are distributed with caution, based on many factors.

Enemy Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Command Responsibilities and Staff Procedures

Support Coordination 10
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Friendly forces should receive advanced warning of nuclear strikes to ensure that they are not placed at unnecessary risk. Attacks are announced through a strike warning (STRIKEWARN) message. STRIKEWARN messages will be disseminated as rapidly as possible over secure networks, by the executing commander. When secure networks are not available, unit signal operation instructions will aid in disseminating the messages.

JFCs should establish a dynamic system to conduct combat assessment operations across the joint operations area. This assessment will be required immediately following a nuclear strike in order to collect data on the enemy to determine if the strike inflicted the desired damage. Poststrike reconnaissance process must assess damage to enemy forces, identifying targets for restrike, and obtain information on residual damage.

This publication provides guidance for theater nuclear forces employment. It is written for those who provide strategic direction to, or employ, joint forces. This publication covers operational doctrine for theater nuclear operations, command responsibilities, staff procedures for theater nuclear operations, and guidance on target planning for theater nuclear operations.

Strike warnings must be announced to the field immediately to ensure the safety of friendly forces.

Warnings and Assessment

CONCLUSION 11
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CHAPTER I ROLE OF US THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
I- 1
1. General
a. US nuclear forces help deter the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat. Nuclear forces deter attacks against the American homeland and contribute to theater deterrence as instruments of national power. The US nuclear umbrella protects many allies as well and helps assure their security. Because the use of one such weapon in a conflict will provoke serious political, economic, military, and environmental consequences, US policy governing the use of these weapons must be clearly understood by friends as well as adversaries. Deterrence is only achieved when both capability and will are explicitly defined, demonstrated, and known by all parties.

b. Only the President of the United States or his successor can authorize the release of a nuclear weapon. Command and control over nuclear forces must be error free and the chain of command linking the National Command Authorities (NCA) with the nuclear force must be clearly defined. When a geographic combatant commander engaged in a military confrontation determines that nuclear weapons can achieve a military objective that cannot be achieved by conventional means, the commander may request authority to employ nuclear weapons. The President, however, ultimately has approval authority over all combatant commander (CINC) decisions involving the deployment and execution of nuclear missions.

2. The Law of Armed Conflict Throughout the history of war, treaties and customs have developed which generally represent the collective views of the belligerents. Their principles protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace by limiting the amount of force and the manner in which force is applied. Together, these treaties and customs are known as the law of armed conflict. Neither the law of armed conflict nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both recognize the need for a reasonable connection between the destruction of life and property and the defeat of the enemy's forces. That having been said, neither the law of armed conflict nor any other customary or conventional international law prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. However, to comply with the law, a particular use of any weapon must satisfy the long- standing targeting rules of military necessity, proportionality, and avoidance of collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Nuclear weapons are unique in this analysis only in their greater destructive potential (although they also differ from conventional weapons in that they produce radiation and electromagnetic effects and, potentially, radioactive fallout). In some circumstances, the use of a nuclear weapon may therefore be inappropriate. Treaties may impose additional

"The highest priority of our military strategy is to deter a nuclear attack against our Nation and allies. Our survival and the freedom of action that we need to protect extended national interests depend upon strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces and their associated command, control, and communications."

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995 12
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Joint Pub 3- 12.1
Decisively change the perception of enemy leaders about their ability to win

DESIRED RESULTS FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Demonstrate to enemy leaders that, should the conflict continue or escalate, the certain loss outweighs the potential gain

Promptly resolve the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and our allies

Preclude the enemy from achieving its objectives

Ensure the success of the effort by US and/ or multinational forces

Counter enemy weapons of mass destruction

restrictions on nuclear weapons. Additional treaty information regarding nuclear weapons can be found in Joint Pub 3- 12, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations."

3. US Policy and Military Doctrine

Nuclear forces employed in support of a geographic combatant commander are bound by the same policy constraints as strategic nuclear forces. Our national military policy is first and foremost to deter aggression by means of a strong nuclear and conventional capability. Should deterrence fail, our forces must be prepared to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies. Units capable of delivering nuclear weapons should be integrated with other forces in a combined arms, joint approach. When used, nuclear weapons should produce the results shown in Figure I- 1.

The purpose of using nuclear weapons can range from producing a political decision at the strategic level of war to being used to influence an operation in some segment of the theater. Operations employing nuclear weapons will have a greater impact on a conflict than operations involving only conventional weapons.

4. The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

a. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced the possibility of a large scale nuclear exchange. However, the loss of the stability inherent in a clearly bipolar world has increased the likelihood of a nuclear exchange by regional powers. In addition, the threat to the United States, its allies, and its deployed forces due to the proliferation of WMD has grown following the end of the Cold War. The flow of advanced technology to potential or actual hostile nations has led to a proliferation of systems (missiles and

aircraft) capable of delivering WMD. The possibility of a WMD exchange in a regional conflict has risen dramatically, threatening our forward- deployed forces and challenging our long- range power projection capabilities.

b. The current threat in theater consists primarily of short-, medium-, and

Figure I- 1. Desired Results from the Use of Nuclear Weapons 13
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I- 3
Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations
intermediate- range missiles capable of
carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical
warheads. Future threat systems may
exhibit greater capabilities, such as increased
accuracy, range, and destructive power.
Additionally, aircraft systems and cruise
missiles capable of delivering WMD will
also pose a threat.

c. As nations continue to develop and
obtain WMD and viable delivery
systems, the potential for US operations
in such a lethal environment increases.
In addition to proliferation of WMD
among rogue states, proliferation may
also expand to include nonstate actors
as well.

5. Nuclear Support Forces
Theater nuclear support may be
provided by a geographic combatant
commander's assigned forces, US
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
or from another supporting CINC.
Weapons in the US nuclear arsenal (see
Figure I- 2) include: gravity bombs
deliverable by dual- capable aircraft
(DCA) and long- range bombers; the
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/ Nuclear
(TLAM/ N) deliverable by submarines;
cruise missiles deliverable by long- range
bombers; submarine- launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM); and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM). These systems
provide the NCA and the geographic
combatant commander with a wide
range of options which can be tailored
to meet desired military and political
objectives. Each system has unique
advantages and disadvantages when
applied in a theater nuclear support
context. Specific weapon data can be
found in Joint Pub 3- 12.2, "Nuclear
Weapons Employment Effects Data."

a. Gravity bombs deliverable by DCA
and long- range bombers.

° Advantages
°° Aircraft increases range (when
properly supported by tankers) and
provides flexibility and recall

°° Weapons may be employed against
mobile targets

°° Various weapon yields available -
from very high to very low

°° Aircraft can be launched from the
continental United States

Gravity Bombs
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles
(Nuclear)
Cruise Missiles
Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

WEAPONS IN THE US NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Figure I- 2. Weapons in the US Nuclear Arsenal 14
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I- 4
Chapter I
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
° Disadvantages
°° Crew at risk in high threat
environment

°° Lead time required for planning and
transit

°° Significant combat support and
ground support infrastructure may be
required, depending on scenario

°° Equipment may have to be
released from other operation plan
(OPLAN) tasking

b. TLAM/ N. (Specifics can be found
in NWP 28.)

° Advantages
°° Heavily defended areas may be
penetrated without risk to crew

°° Highly mobile platforms in
international waters may serve as launch
sites

°° Weapons are highly accurate
°° Launching platform is recallable
°° Basing issues simplified; overflight of
third party nations alleviated (depending
on launch location)

°° Maximum stealth and surprise can be
maintained prior to launch

° Disadvantages
°° Weapons not recallable in flight
°° Lead time required to generate and
transit needed to desired launch point

°° System may be vulnerable to modern
air defense systems

°° Terrain factors limit employment
flexibility

°° Weapon yield may be too large for
certain theater targets

°° Launch platform must receive updated
data transfer device in order to update a
mission plan

c. Cruise missiles launched from long-range
bombers

° Advantages
°° Weapon can penetrate heavily
defended area without risk to crew

°° Weapon can be launched from
international airspace

°° Bomber aircraft range is significant A submarine- delivered TLAM/ N provides
maximum stealth and surprise prior to launch. 15
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I- 5
Role of US Theater Nuclear Operations
°° Weapon system is recallable prior to
launch from bomber

° Disadvantages
°° Weapon yield may be too large for
certain theater targets

°° System may have to be released from
Single Integrated Operational Plan
(SIOP) commitment

°° Missile is not recallable in flight
°° System may be vulnerable to modern
air defense systems

°° Terrain factors limit employment
flexibility

d. SLBMs
° Advantages
°° Weapon can penetrate heavily
defended areas without risk to crew

°° Weapon can be launched in
international waters

°° Weapon can be on target in minimal
time

°° Maximum stealth and surprise can be
maintained prior to launch

°° System provides flexible targeting
capability

°° Weapon has multiple warheads

° Disadvantages
°° Weapon yield may be too large for
certain theater targets

°° Multiple warheads present more
planning challenges

°° Missile is not recallable in flight
°° System must be released from SIOP
commitment

e. ICBMs
° Advantages
°° Weapon can penetrate heavily
defended areas without risk to crew

°° Weapon can be on target in minimal
time

°° Planning time is short
°° Weapon has multiple warheads
° Disadvantages
°° Weapon yield may be too large for
certain theater targets

°° System requires release from SIOP
°° Missile is not recallable
°° Booster may fall on US or Canadian
territory

°° Multiple warheads present more
planning challenges 16
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Joint Pub 3- 12.1
In a theater nuclear role the use of ICBM capability presents planning challenges, but such capability can be on target in minimal time, if required. 17
17 Page 18 19
CHAPTER II COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
II- 1
1. General
National policy requires centralized
execution authority of nuclear weapons. The
President is the sole authority for release
of US nuclear weapons. The President's
decision to authorize release of these weapons
is based on recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), geographic
combatant commanders, and allies. The
President will monitor all aspects of their
execution. Release and related instructions
will be transmitted from the NCA via CJCS
in accordance with established emergency
action procedures (EAPs). To maintain this
control, a viable command, control,
communications, and computers (C4)
system is essential.

2. Command Responsibilities
a. The geographic combatant commander
is responsible for promptly requesting
nuclear support. The commander must be
able to ascertain the military situation; assess
intelligence inputs and pass information and
conclusions to higher levels of control; and
finally, upon receipt of execution instructions,
control assigned forces to achieve the desired
objectives. Subordinate commanders
responsible for target nominations submit
requests to the geographic combatant
commander.

b. Execution procedures must be flexible
and allow for changes in the situation.
Commanders must ensure that constraints and
release guidance are met. The commander
controlling the nuclear strike package must
maintain communications with the
delivery unit and establish a chain of
succession that will avoid loss of control
resulting from the loss of a headquarters.

c. Operations with multinational forces
require multinational doctrine and procedures
for taskings, conflict resolution, target
selection, and analysis. The US element
commander in a multinational command
will provide guidance and publish
directives on the use of nuclear weapons
by US forces in such commands.

d. The Nuclear Supplement to the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) describes
situations which could lead to a request for
the selective release of nuclear weapons.
The commander's request must contain
sufficient information to ensure complete
understanding of the situation at the highest
level of government.

e. Employment guidance for nuclear
weapons is outlined in theater- specific plans,
the CJCS EAP, and the Nuclear Supplement
to the JSCP.

"The measure of command and control effectiveness is simple: either our
command and control works faster than the enemy's decision and execution
cycle or the enemy will own our command and control."

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3 Command and Control 18
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Joint Pub 3- 12.1
3. C4 Considerations
Since the geographic combatant
commander may exercise control for allocated
nuclear weapons and will provide planning
requirements to the CJCS regarding nuclear
attack plans, command and control systems
must be configured to support the complex
requirements of such operations. During or
after an enemy WMD attack, command
and control (C2) of friendly forces can
become difficult. Command and control
facilities may be targeted and their operation
degraded or destroyed. For example, during
a nuclear strike, along with the associated

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO)
Spurred by the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in the mid- 1960s a number of Latin
American states sought to establish a nuclear- weapon- free zone in the region.
In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing such a zone, was opened for signature. Under the pact, parties agree not to manufacture, test, or acquire

nuclear weapons or to accept such weapons on their territory deployed by others. Two protocols to the treaty apply to countries outside the region.
Protocol I requires those nuclear- weapon states with territories in Latin America
to honor the treaty's denuclearization requirements with respect to those territories. Protocol II prohibits nuclear- weapon states from using or

threatening to use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. (Transit of nuclear weapons on the high seas is not affected.) In addition, the treaty establishes
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL),
to undertake special inspections at the request of parties.

Under the treaty's entry- into- force provisions, the accord becomes effective once it has been ratified by all eligible countries in the region and once all of
the relevant states outside the region have ratified the protocols pertaining to
them. As of mid- 1992, twenty- two states had ratified the pact and waived the provision requiring unanimity. Brazil and Chile had ratified the treaty but had

not waived this requirement, while Argentina had signed but not formally ratified the accord, and Cuba had neither signed nor ratified the pact. In late
1990, Argentina and Brazil each announced its intent to bring the treaty into
force, and Cuba subsequently announced that it would join the treaty once Argentina and Brazil did so. With France's ratification of Protocol I in February

1992, all of the states outside the region had ratified the treaty's protocols
pertaining to them.

SOURCE: Spector, Leonard A., A Historical and Technical Introduction to the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Carnegie Endowment, June 1992

physical damage, C2 facilities and
equipment may suffer the effects of
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which could
degrade or destroy unshielded electronic
equipment and result in severe degradation
of C4 systems. Also, if personnel operating
these systems are incapacitated, a drastic
degradation in C2 capabilities could result.
More specific guidance can be found in Joint
Pub 3- 11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense."
The maintenance of viable C2 systems and
associated redundancies is critical to
theater nuclear operations. 19
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II- 3
Command and Control of Nuclear Operations
4. Control of Nuclear Weapons
a. Control of US nuclear weapons has been
established to preclude unauthorized or
inadvertent use either by US or allied forces,
foreign powers, or terrorists while, at the same
time, not degrading the operational readiness
of these weapons.

b. Control is managed via dedicated
media message delivery systems
standardized for joint operations within a
given theater or region, which provides
specific direction for the employment of
nuclear weapons. Nuclear command and

control messages are transmitted to forces
following the guidance in the Emergency
Action Procedures of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volumes I through VII;
Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
(USCINCSTRAT) Emergency Action
Procedures; and the Nuclear Supplement to
the JSCP.

c. Examples of additional command and
control nuclear safeguards are permissive
action link (PAL), coded switch set controller
(CSSC), sealed authentication systems, the
personnel reliability program (PRP), and
sensitive keys.

Recalling dual- capable aircraft requires viable command and control systems that are configured to support complex theater nuclear requirements. 20
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Intentionally Blank 21
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CHAPTER III PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT
III- 1
1. General
When directed by the NCA, joint force
commanders (JFCs) plan for the
employment of nuclear weapons by US
forces in a manner consistent with national
policy and strategic guidance. The
employment of such weapons signifies an
escalation of the war and is an NCA decision.
USSTRATCOM is tasked by the Nuclear
Supplement of the JSCP to provide specific
support to geographic combatant commanders
for their nuclear planning. Additional
guidance is also provided by geographic
combatant commander OPLANs and CJCS
EAPs. Nuclear operations planning should
be integrated into operation plans to maximize
effects needed to achieve the CINC's desired
objectives. Use of nuclear forces should be
restrictive, with tight limits on area and time
of use so that the adversary will recognize the
"political signal" and not assume that the US
has moved to general nuclear war.

2. Employment Guidelines
The employment of nuclear weapons is
restricted to those situations where the
military gain is commensurate with
political objectives and the law of armed
conflict. Complete destruction of enemy
forces is not necessarily required to achieve a
desired objective; rather, containment and a
demonstrated will to employ additional
nuclear weapons toward a specific goal are
the preferred methods. Their suitability is
based on the following considerations (see
Figure III- 1):

a. Relative Effectiveness. The relative
effectiveness of nuclear and nonnuclear
weapons must be weighed. The employment
of nuclear weapons must offer a clearly
significant advantage over nonnuclear
munitions. When nuclear weapons will
produce only a marginal gain in effectiveness
over nonnuclear weapons, there may be no

"The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons;
and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting."

Mahan, 1890

Figure III- 1. Nuclear Weapons Employment Suitability Guidelines
Relative Effectiveness
Nuclear Collateral
Damage

Enemy Responses
Advance Planning
Execution Planning to
Deconflict Friendly
Casualties

Other Considerations

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT SUITABILITY
GUIDELINES 22
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III- 2
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
reason to use them since their employment is
likely to have geopolitical and military
implications beyond the immediate situation.

b. Nuclear Collateral Damage. Such
damage includes dangers to friendly forces,
civilians, and nonmilitary related facilities,
creation of obstacles, and residual radiation
contamination. Since the avoidance of
casualties among friendly forces and civilians
is a prime consideration when planning theater
nuclear operations, preclusion limitation
analysis must be performed to identify and
limit the proximity of a nuclear strike to
civilians and friendly forces. The amount
of damage varies with the protective posture
of civilians and friendly units, delivery system
accuracy, weapon yield, and height of burst.
Additionally, these operations may create
obstacles that inhibit both friendly and enemy

movement (e. g., tree blow down, fires, area
contamination, and rubble). Determining the
possibility and extent of collateral damage
is a joint force command level and
USSTRATCOM responsibility. Joint
Pub 3- 12.2, "Nuclear Weapons Employment

Effects Data," provides avoidance tables.
Specific techniques for reducing collateral
damage include:

° Reducing Weapon Yield. Balance the
size of the weapon needed to achieve the
desired damage against the associated
danger to areas surrounding the target.

° Improving Accuracy. Accurate delivery
systems are more likely to strike the desired
aimpoint, reducing both the required yield
and potential collateral damage.

° Employing Multiple Weapons.
Collateral damage can be reduced by
dividing a large target into several small
ones and using smaller weapons rather
than one large one.

° Adjusting the Height of Burst (HOB).
HOB adjustments, including the use of
subsurface detonations, are a major
means of controlling collateral damage
and fallout. The HOB has a significant
influence on the radius of damage.

The employment of cruise missiles on specific targets in a theater scenario needs to be carefully analyzed to avoid detrimental collateral damage. 23
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III- 3
Planning and Employment
c. Enemy Responses. In developing
plans, commanders and their staffs should
consider the enemy's capabilities and likely
responses to nuclear operations.

JOINT TASK FORCE ONE - 1946

The operations of Joint Task Force One in conducting the [South Pacific atomic
bomb] tests have set a pattern for close, effective cooperation of the Armed
Services and civilian scientists in the planning and execution of this highly technical operation. Moreover, the tests have provided valuable training of

personnel in joint operations requiring great precision and coordination of effort.

It is impossible to evaluate an atomic burst in terms of conventional explosives. As to detonation and blast effects, where the largest bomb of the past was
effective within a radius of a few hundred feet, the atomic bomb's effectiveness can be measured in thousands of feet. However, the radiological effects have
no parallel in conventional weapons. It is necessary that a conventional bomb
score a direct hit or a near miss of not more than a few feet to cause significant damage to a battleship. At Bikini the second bomb, bursting under water,

sank a battleship immediately at a distance of well over 500 feet. It damaged an aircraft carrier so that it sank in a few hours, while another battleship sank
after five days. The first bomb, bursting in air, did great harm to the
superstructures of major ships within a half- mile radius, but did only minor damage to their hulls. No ship within a mile of either burst could have escaped

without some damage to itself and serious injury to a large number of its crew.
Although lethal results might have been more or less equivalent, the
radiological phenomena accompanying the two bursts were markedly different. In the case of the airburst bomb, it seems certain that unprotected personnel

within one mile would have suffered high casualties by intense neutron and
gamma radiation as well as by blast and heat. Those surviving immediate effects would not have been menaced by radioactivity persisting after the

burst.
In the case of the underwater explosion, the airburst wave was far less intense
and there was no heat wave of significance. Moreover, because of the absorption of neutrons and gamma rays by water, the lethal quality of the first

flash of radiation was not of high order. But the second bomb threw large masses of highly radioactive water onto the decks and into the hulls of vessels.
These contaminated ships became radioactive stoves and would have burned
all living things aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation.

Observations during the two tests have established the general types and range of effectiveness of air and shallow underwater atomic- bomb bursts on
naval vessels, army materiel, including a wide variety of Quartermaster stores,
and personnel. From these observations and from instrumental data it will now be possible to outline such changes, not only in military and naval design,

but also in strategy and tactics, as future events may indicate.
SOURCE: Preliminary Statement, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Evaluation Board on Bikini Atomic Tests, August 2, 1946

° Offsetting the Desired Ground Zero
(DGZ). DGZ offset may achieve the
desired weapon effects while avoiding
collateral damage. 24
24 Page 25 26
III- 4
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
d. Planning. Advance planning is
critical to the successful use of nuclear
weapons. Targeting guidance and plans must
be current, be tied to national and theater
intelligence assessments, satisfy specified
objectives, and meet existing or expected
release conditions. Planners should consider:

° Level of effort required for
conventional targeting. If the target is
heavily defended such that heavy losses
are expected, a nuclear weapon may be
favored over a conventional attack.

° Length of time that a target must be
kept out of action. A nuclear weapon
attack will likely put a target out of action
for a longer period of time than a
conventional weapon attack.

° Logistic support and anticipation of
delays caused by the "fog and friction"
of war. Such delays are unpredictable
and may range from several hours to a
number of days.

e. Execution Planning. The effects of
nuclear weapons can significantly affect all
types of forces. This is increasingly likely
the closer forces are to the detonation and,
in particular, when forces are within line of
sight of the detonation. Commanders
tasked with execution planning should
deconflict force locations, plan around
effects on communications, and ensure
that they have the means to inform all
other commanders in time to avoid
friendly casualties.

f. Other Considerations. Geographic
combatant commanders and their staffs
must also be aware of any national or
theater level constraints (legal, political,
or military) imposed on the use of nuclear
weapons and plan accordingly.

3. Targeting
Targeting is the process of selecting targets
and matching the appropriate response to
them by taking account of operational
requirements and capabilities. Targeting
includes the analysis of enemy situations
relative to the commander's mission,
objectives, and capabilities at the
commander's disposal, as well as the
identification and nomination of specific
vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will
accomplish the commander's purpose through
delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying
critical enemy forces or resources. As with
all actions of the joint force, targeting and
attack functions are accomplished in
accordance with international law,
international agreements and conventions, and
rules of engagement approved by the NCA
for the particular operation.

a. Targeting occurs and is performed at
all levels of command within a joint force.
Targeting is complicated by the requirement
to deconflict duplicative targeting by different
forces or different echelons within the same
force and to synchronize the attack of those
targets with other dimensions of the joint
force.

b. Joint force commanders establish broad
planning objectives and guidance for attack
of enemy strategic and operational centers of
gravity and interdiction of enemy forces as
an integral part of joint campaigns and major
operations. With the advice of subordinate
commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide
targeting guidance, and determine the
weight of effort to be provided to various
operations.

c. Targeting mechanisms should exist at
multiple levels. The NCA or headquarters
senior to JFCs may provide guidance,
priorities, and targeting support to JFCs. 25
25 Page 26 27
III- 5
Planning and Employment
d. The targeting process is cyclical. It
begins with guidance and priorities issued by
the NCA and CJCS in parallel with
appropriate allied command guidance and
priorities, to direct joint force and component
commanders and continues through its final
step of combat assessment. The process
consists of the following phases (see
Figure III- 2):

° NCA/ Commander's Guidance. Guidance
and objectives from the NCA, CJCS, and
joint force and component commanders
initiate the targeting cycle.

° Target Development. Development of
a target focuses on knowing the adversary

and identifying and nominating critical
elements of adversary target systems for
attack.

° Weaponeering Assessment. In this
phase, targeting personnel quantify the
expected results of lethal and nonlethal
weapons employment against prioritized
targets.

° Force Application. The next phase
integrates the results of earlier planning
phases conducted by USSTRATCOM
with the execution request by the
geographic combatant commander to
fuse target, weapon system, and
munitions types and nonlethal force
options.

Figure III- 2. Targeting Cycle Phases
TARGETING CYCLE PHASES
1 2

3 4

NCA/
Commander's
Guidance

Target
Development

Weaponeering
Assessment

Force Application 5

Execution
Planning & Force
Execution

6 Combat Assessment 26
26 Page 27 28
III- 6
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
° Execution Planning and Force
Execution. This phase involves final
tasking order preparation and
transmission and specific mission
planning and material preparation at the
unit level.

° Combat Assessment. The final phase is a
joint effort designed to determine if the
required target effects are being achieved
for each of the components, consistent
with the JFC's campaign objectives.
Nuclear combat assessment is
composed of two segments: battle
damage assessment (BDA) and
reattack recommendation.

Additional information on targeting can be
found in Joint Pub 2- 0, "Joint Doctrine for
Intelligence Support to Operations," Joint Pub
2- 01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to
Targeting," Joint Pub 3- 0, "Doctrine for Joint
Operations," and Joint Pub 3- 56.1,
"Command and Control for Joint Air
Operations."

4. Targeting Considerations
a. Geographic combatant commanders
may consider the following factors in

determining how to defeat the individual
targets composing the overall threat. No
single statement of damage criteria will cover
all situations. Planning should address the
considerations shown in Figure III- 3.

b. Planning the use of nuclear weapons
is based on knowledge of enemy force
strength and disposition, the number, yields,
and types of weapons available, and the status
and disposition of friendly forces at the time
that weapons are employed. Enemy combat
forces and facilities that may be likely
targets for nuclear strikes are:

° WMD and their delivery systems, as well
as associated command and control,
production, and logistical support units

° Ground combat units and their associated
command and control and support units

° Air defense facilities and support
installations

° Naval installations, combat vessels, and
associated support facilities and
command and control capabilities

The targeting process supports the application of the appropriate force at the appropriate location and time. 27
27 Page 28 29
III- 7
Planning and Employment
° International reaction and geopolitical
repercussions

b. Military
° Whether or not an alternative means
exists to achieve the objective

° Geographical area for employment
° Type of delivery system
° Types of targets to be attacked
° Timing and duration of nuclear weapon
employment

Inability of friendly forces to destroy targets using available conventional means
Number and type of individual targets
Vulnerability of those targets, to include target defenses

Optimum timing
Environmental conditions (surface, upper air, and space) in the target area vicinity

TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS
Enemy's ability to reconstitute or regenerate
Required level of damage for each target to achieve the overall objective

Avoidance of collateral damage
Figure III- 3. Targeting Considerations
° Nonstate actors (facilities and operation
centers) that possess WMD

° Underground facilities
5. NCA Considerations for Employment

a. Political
° Relationship to US vital interests, treaty
commitments, diplomatic agreements,
and area denial and escalation
implications

° Perception of US will and resolve 28
28 Page 29 30
III- 8
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
° Collateral damage constraints
° Target analysis
° The quantity, type, and yield of available
weapons

c. Legal. Law of Armed Conflict
Along with the above considerations,
additional factors may affect nuclear
employment - supplementary guidance on
these aspects can be found in the Nuclear
Supplement to the JSCP.

6. Enemy Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

When formulating courses of action,
operation planning should address the
possibility that an enemy will use WMD.
Planning should also evaluate nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) defensive
measures. Joint Pub 3- 11, "Joint Doctrine for
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)
Defense," and the appropriate Joint Pub 3- 01
series provide additional guidance. In theater,
the combatant commander must consider the
enemy's NBC weapon and delivery system
capability when considering courses of action.
If the enemy threat capability assessment
indicates an NBC potential, the campaign
plan should address active and passive
defense measures necessary to counter the
potential use of such weapons and provide
for guidance in defending against such a
threat.

a. Enemy aircraft, theater missiles, and
artillery are the most likely delivery
systems that could strike friendly forces.
The JFC must be able to conduct successful
counterforce operations, which include joint
theater missile defense, with the ultimate goal
of protecting friendly forces from such attacks.
Counterforce operations include counterair
operations conducted to attain and maintain

air superiority by destruction or neutralization
of enemy forces. Both air offensive and air
defensive actions are involved and may
include offensive and defensive operations
against theater WMD platforms. The joint
force commander will normally designate
both a joint force air component
commander (JFACC) and an area air
defense commander (AADC). The JFACC
functions as the supported commander for
counterair, strategic attack, theater airborne
reconnaissance and surveillance, and the
overall air interdiction effort. The AADC is
responsible for integrating the joint force air
defense effort. Operations must be planned
and executed to destroy or eliminate enemy
WMD delivery systems and supporting
infrastructure before they can be employed
against friendly forces. For these reasons,
offensive operations against enemy WMD
and delivery systems should be undertaken
once hostilities become inevitable or
commence.

b. The threat of WMD use extends across
the range of military operations. For this
reason, threat analysis, enemy capabilities,
and associated doctrine should be considered
when planning joint operations which could
involve NBC attacks. In all cases, friendly
forces should be prepared to conduct and
sustain operations in such an environment.
Nuclear weapons can cause casualties or
damage through blast, overpressure, thermal
radiation, proximity to initial nuclear
radiation, fallout radiation, and EMP.
Biological and chemical weapons cause
serious injury or death through their toxic
properties. WMD can also produce
casualties from the psychological effect of
their use. More specific guidance can be
found in Joint Pub 3- 11, "Joint Doctrine for
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Defense."

c. A JFC may not know exactly what
portion of his forces, allied forces, or 29
29 Page 30 31
III- 9
Planning and Employment
geopolitical assets in a theater may be
targeted by enemy operations. The obvious
targets would be those that support critical
friendly centers of gravity. Examples are
shown in Figure III- 4.

7. Geographic Combatant Commander Planning for
Theater Nuclear Operations
CINCs develop theater strategy in
conformance with national strategic plans and
develop theater strategies, campaign plans,
OPLANs, and other plans in coordination
with subordinate commanders, other
supporting commanders, and allies.

a. CINCs prepare for war by planning
and organizing for conflict during
peacetime. This peacetime planning is based
on higher level planning guidance and CINC
planning assumptions such as warning time,
enemy capabilities and intentions, and
location of the threat. The CINC is
responsible for defining theater objectives,
nominating targets, and developing the plans
required to support those objectives.
USSTRATCOM supports the CINCs
throughout the deliberate planning process
to develop tailored nuclear support annexes
to theater OPLANs.

b. CINCs direct the development of
campaign plans, subordinate campaign
plans, and major operation plans. Review
of these plans is a continuous process,
incorporating lessons learned from exercises
and operations, changes in available forces,
and reevaluation of the threat.

c. Component commanders responsible
for execution of major operations prepare
appropriate plans.

8. Joint Planning Process
Joint operation planning is a coordinated
set of two processes used by a commander
to determine the best method of
accomplishing the mission. In peacetime, it
is called the deliberate planning process.
In crisis situations, the crisis action planning

Figure III- 4. Friendly Targets of Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction

Critical command, control,
communications, and computer
nodes

Logistics and supply depots
Civilian population centers,
seats of government

Critical points of naval operations
to include ships and coastal
facilities that may support these
resources

Ground forces and associated
support facilities

Airfields and their associated
infrastructure and resources

FRIENDLY TARGETS OF ENEMY WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Regardless of the targets struck, the JFC
must be aware that the operations tempo
may be significantly affected by a WMD
attack. 30
30 Page 31 32
III- 10
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
process is used. Guidance for preparing and
coordinating plans for the employment of
nuclear weapons is provided in the Nuclear
Supplement to the JSCP. Guidance on the
joint planning process can be found in
Joint Pub 5- 0, "Doctrine for Planning
Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 5- 03.1,
"Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System, Volume I (Planning Policies and
Procedures)."

9. Nuclear Requirements
USCINCSTRAT will coordinate and
develop procedures, when required, for
the storage, security, movement,
deployment, and employment of nuclear
weapons within the theater.

10. Crisis Management
Because preplanned theater nuclear
options do not exist for every scenario,
CINCs must have a capability to plan and
execute nuclear options for nuclear
forces generated on short notice during
crisis and emergency situations. During
crisis action planning, geographic
combatant commanders evaluate their
theater situation and propose courses of
action or initiate a request for nuclear
support. The CJCS, in coordination with
USCINCSTRAT and appropriate
supporting CINCs, will initiate crisis
action procedures contained in the
Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP and the
USSTRATCOM supporting plan to
provide nuclear support to the supported
geographic combatant commander. 31
31 Page 32 33
1. Command Guidance
a. Since nuclear weapons can have a
significant impact on the conduct of operations
at all levels in a theater, command guidance must
be provided as early as possible in the planning
process. In the initial guidance, commanders
should provide information to their staffs and
components about employing nuclear
weapons as well as information on other forces
and conventional weapons. Additionally, the
geographic combatant commanders should
identify targets and target options to
USCINCSTRAT as early in the planning process
as possible. When requested by the geographic
combatant commander, USSTRATCOM will
develop theater nuclear support plans.

b. Commanders and their staff officers
should understand effects, employment
procedures, capabilities, and limitations of
available nuclear weapon systems. Target
analysts, along with USSTRATCOM
planners, can provide technical advice and
assistance to commanders and staffs.

c. Command guidance normally consists
of the items shown in Figure IV- 1.

2. Target Acquisition
a. In a conventional conflict, the primary
purpose of intelligence is to provide
commanders with sufficient information on
enemy locations and probable courses of
action so that they can apply combat power
at decisive points and critical times. This

CHAPTER IV COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES AND STAFF PROCEDURES

IV- 1
"Unless a staff officer is able to assist his commander in getting things done,
in addition to coordinating, planning and policy making, he is not serving his
full usefulness."

General Alexander M. Patch
Quoted in Ray S. Cline,
Washington Command Post, 1951

Figure IV- 1. Command Guidance for Nuclear Operations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

A statement of the desired results such as halting an enemy attack,
striking a particular enemy facility, or neutralizing a particular
enemy target set
Circumstances or decision points leading to a geographic

combatant commander's request for nuclear execution

The concept for the subsequent use of weapons if the initial effort
does not accomplish the desired results

Delivery systems available for planning
The level of acceptable risk to friendly troops and
noncombatants
Restrictions on fallout from a detonation

Collateral damage criteria
Criteria for intelligence collection, target priorities, and combat

assessment for a possible restrike, if necessary

Projection of limitations for subsequent deployment and
logistical support to conventional joint operations

COMMAND GUIDANCE
FOR NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS 32
32 Page 33 34
IV- 2
Chapter IV
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
Figure IV- 2. Information Required on Potential Targets

purpose remains the same in a nuclear
environment.

b. Target acquisition is an integral part of
the intelligence collection process. It
involves the timely detection, identification,
and location of a target in sufficient detail to
use weapons effectively. Intelligence systems
assist in target tracking and development of
intelligence for target analysis, target
refinement, weapons employment, and BDA.
The effectiveness of a nuclear strike is
enhanced by the accuracy, completeness,
and timeliness of intelligence. Thus,
intelligence collection efforts should
continuously seek specific information on
potential targets, such as that shown in Figure
IV- 2.

c. Because each target acquisition
technique has its inherent strengths and
weaknesses, intelligence collection should be
broadly based, obtaining information from all
available sources to include enemy doctrine
and tactics, policy, and strategy.

d. Additional information on target
acquisition can be found in Joint Pub 3- 55,
"Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance,
and Target Acquisition Support for Joint
Operations."

3. Integrated Intelligence Planning

Intelligence planning is a key element of
any operation. The collection, production,
and dissemination of intelligence to satisfy
the requirements of operational units is of
paramount importance. In developing the
initial and follow- on collection plans,
intelligence personnel must ensure that all
available intelligence assets, whether
national or organic, are tasked to cover the
designated target and provide early warning
of enemy use of WMD.

4. Joint Operation Planning
Joint operation planning is based on the
mission, the enemy, terrain, combat
forces constraints, logistic support
available, and time. During the estimate
of the situation, the commander develops
courses of action, compares and evaluates
them against possible enemy responses, and
recommends the best course of action. The
commander identifies the situations
where the use of theater nuclear forces
would result in a significant advantage

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

10.

Type
Location
Size
Shape
Composition
Concentration
Vulnerability
Regeneration/ Reconstitution

Dwell Time or Direction and Speed
of Movement
Target Defenses

INFORMATION REQUIRED ON
POTENTIAL TARGETS 33
33 Page 34 35
IV- 3
Command Responsibilities and Staff Procedures
over the enemy. Proper joint operation
planning increases the commander's
flexibility and facilitates the package approval
and release process.

5. Peacetime Planning
Given an operation plan within an area of
responsibility and/ or joint operations area and
a threat, it is advantageous to plan as many
potential operations as possible in peacetime.
The objective is to provide plans for nuclear
operations that are ready to be used
immediately should the need arise and yet
are flexible enough to accommodate the
dynamic environment that could develop
as a conflict matures. Joint force
commanders normally delegate authority for
execution planning, coordination, and
deconfliction to a commander possessing
sufficient command and control infrastructure,
adequate facilities, and joint planning
expertise. Component commanders,
including potential JFACCs, should develop
and evaluate plans for employment to include
airspace and frequency deconfliction and
communications planning.

6. Support Coordination
a. Nuclear support is coordinated through
geographic combatant commander and/ or
subordinate joint force commander channels.
US Air Force or Navy delivery systems can
provide nuclear support to Army or Marine
Corps operations. Coordination with the Air
Force component is made through the Air
Force air operations center (AOC) by the
collocated Army battlefield coordination
element. Coordination with the Navy and
Marine Corps components is made through
the naval and amphibious liaison element.
Coordination with special operations forces
(SOF) can be made through the special
operations liaison element.

b. When preparing nuclear support plans,
USSTRATCOM will coordinate with
supporting Service components and the
geographic combatant commander to prevent
fratricide and ensure unity of effort.
USSTRATCOM planners require input from
Service experts to ensure that appropriate
weapon yields, delivery methods, and safe
delivery routing are selected. Targeting

Theater nuclear support delivered by US Air Force and Navy systems is thoroughly coordinated among USSTRATCOM, the Services, and the
geographic combatant commander to ensure unity of effort. 34
34 Page 35 36
IV- 4
Chapter IV
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
conflicts should be resolved with direct
consultations between the supporting and
supported CINCs' staffs. Joint Pub 3- 12.2,
"Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects
Data," provides data and technical procedures
to analyze nuclear weapons effects.

c. Consideration must be given to special
operations forces operating in an area of nuclear
operations. Coordination with the joint force
special operations component commander is
crucial, since this commander controls SOF
operating in enemy territory. Such operations
must be deconflicted with the appropriate
planning element to avoid SOF being in the
vicinity of nuclear operations.

7. Control and Distribution
a. Nuclear weapon supply levels and
expenditure are tightly controlled. The NCA
and combatant commander control the
distribution of nuclear weapons based upon
the number of weapons assigned, operational
requirements, and the threat.

b. Distributing nuclear weapons requires
logistical as well as operational consideration.
Distribution is affected by the factors shown
in Figure IV- 3.

Additional information on distribution of
nuclear weapons can be found in CJCSM
3150.04 (formerly Joint Pub 1- 03.7), "JRS,
Nuclear Weapons Reports (U)," and Defense
Nuclear Agency guidance on nuclear logistics,
transfer, and reporting policies.

c. Commanders and staff officers should
know and understand the capabilities and
limitations of the logistics system. The
nuclear weapon logistics system is tailored to
operate in various environments. Planning
and controlling nuclear weapons support
should involve:

° continuous nuclear logistic support of
tactical operations

° simplicity and uniformity in procedures
° minimum handling of nuclear weapons
° security of classified or critical material
and installations

Figure IV- 3. Factors Affecting Nuclear Weapons Distribution

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

The Mission
Planning for Immediate and
Subsequent Requirements

Survivability
Availability
Safety
Security
Transportation Capability
Storage Facilities
Availability of Skilled
Personnel

Time and Distance
Considerations

FACTORS AFFECTING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISTRIBUTION 35
35 Page 36 37
IV- 5
Command Responsibilities and Staff Procedures
d. Security or operational considerations
may restrict the number of weapons on hand
when release authority is received. Procedures
should, if possible, be in place for obtaining
additional weapons, or tasking an alternate
unit to carry out all or a portion of the assigned
mission.

8. Security
a. Storage sites and movement
operations for nuclear weapons must be
secure. Effective security requires early
detection of threats, visual or electro- optical
assessment, and immediate response
capabilities if threatened. Security
equipment should be mutually supportive
and overlapping. Security forces must have
clearly defined and coordinated authority,
jurisdiction, and responsibilities. All elements
of the security program must be integrated
to include command, control, and
communications networks used to report
duress situations and nuclear incidents to
higher command elements.

b. Nuclear capable units have primary
responsibility for their own security. Plans
for the security of nuclear weapons must
address the principles of PRP, two- person
concept, provisions for custody and
accountability, PAL and CSSC procedures,
movement during combat, and storage.

9. Warning
a. Friendly forces should receive advanced
warning of nuclear strikes to ensure that they
are not placed at unnecessary risk. Surface
commanders and special operations
commanders should be informed of such
attacks through a strike warning
(STRIKEWARN) message or other means.
Normally, there is no requirement to warn
subordinate units when the target analysis
indicates that the risk to personnel will not
exceed negligible levels and insufficient time

exists to warn all personnel. However,
warning should be given if at all possible.

b. A warning given too early may alert the
enemy to the planned strike, thereby
decreasing effectiveness or possibly
triggering an enemy preemptive strike.

c. Aircraft are particularly vulnerable to
weapon effects, even at low overpressures.
Likewise, flash blindness is a significant
hazard to personnel in aircraft. Because
aircraft can move rapidly from areas of
negligible risk to areas of unacceptable risk,
all aircraft in the area of responsibility and/
or joint operations area should, to the
maximum extent possible, get advance
warning of nuclear operations. For strikes
on distant enemy targets, advance warning is
required only for the aircraft that may be
affected. If possible, consideration should be
given to not flying nonparticipating aircraft
during nuclear weapons employment. The
combination of EMP and high energy light
creates significant hazards over vast areas and
could cause adverse effects on aircraft and
crews.

d. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
aircraft may receive warning through the
senior air control facility. This notification
could be via the joint air operations center,
AOC, or regional air defense and/ or sector
air defense center. Army aircraft are warned
through unit command nets or airspace
control stations.

e. Warnings may be transmitted via the
Sector Operations Center or the Control
and Reporting Center so that these agencies
may transmit alerts to their airborne aircraft.
Perhaps the most useful method of long- range
communications is through airborne systems
such as the airborne warning and control
system and the airborne battlefield command
and control center. The AADC must remain
apprised of all friendly aircraft transiting areas
that are subject to nuclear operations. 36
36 Page 37 38
IV- 6
Chapter IV
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
f. Nuclear STRIKEWARN messages
will be disseminated as rapidly as possible
and, insofar as possible, over secure networks.
When secure networks are not available, unit
signal operation instructions contain
authentication procedures and encoding
instructions for disseminating STRIKEWARN
messages. Instructions should be easy to
use and provide sound operations security
(OPSEC). The STRIKEWARNs are
broadcast in the clear when insufficient time
remains for the enemy to react prior to the
strike.

g. The commander executing the strike
issues the initial warning. The subordinate
headquarters whose units will be affected by
the strikes are informed. The commander
ensures coordination with adjacent commands
and elements of other commands in the
vicinity, giving them sufficient time to provide
warning and to take protective measures.
When nuclear strikes are canceled, the
commander who issued the initial warning
will notify units previously warned as quickly
as possible.

h. Not all units will receive the entire
STRIKEWARN message. Some will only
receive specific instructions about protective
measures to take if they are in an area of risk.
The message will include:

° A statement that the message is a nuclear
warning

° A brief directive concerning the specific
protective measures to be taken,
including evacuation to an alternate
position, if required

i. Units will acknowledge STRIKEWARNs,
except when prevented by OPSEC
requirements.

j. Units outside the affected area are not
normally sent a STRIKEWARN message.
However, effective liaison may require
passing strike data to adjacent units as a matter
of procedure. Additionally, consideration
should be given to units operating behind
enemy lines. Information concerning the
strikes may also be of operational concern in
updating situation maps and locating
obstacles.

10. Combat Assessment
Joint force commanders should establish
a dynamic system to conduct combat
assessment operations across the joint
operations area. They normally establish a
single point of contact for this assessment at
the joint force level. This is normally the joint
force J- 2, in support of the joint force J- 3.

a. A combat assessment will be required
to be made as soon as possible following a
nuclear strike. Intelligence operations must
collect data on the enemy to determine if the
strike inflicted the desired damage. If
possible, combat assessment will be required
to include estimates of environmental impact,
including radiological contamination of soils,
water, and air, as well as contamination carried
from the target.

b. Poststrike reconnaissance after each
strike should use the most appropriate and
feasible resources available for intelligence
collection and BDA. The reconnaissance
process must assess damage to enemy forces,
identify targets for restrike, and obtain
information on residual damage (i. e., fires,
radiation, obstacles). Since there will be a
requirement to exploit the results of the strike
immediately, this information must be
processed and disseminated in a timely
manner. Unmanned aerial vehicles, fixed-wing
aircraft, space- derived information, and
other available assets may be used to obtain
assessment information immediately. 37
37 Page 38 39
APPENDIX A REFERENCES
A- 1
The development of Joint Pub 3- 12.1 is based on the following primary references:
1. Joint Pub 1- 01, "Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development
Program)"

2. Joint Pub 1- 02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"
3. Joint Pub 2- 0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations"
4. Joint Pub 2- 01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," (In Development)
5. Joint Pub 3- 0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations"
6. Joint Pub 3- 11, "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense"
7. Joint Pub 3- 12, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations"
8. CJCSI 3110.04 (under development), "Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP FY 96)"

9. DODD 5210.41, 23 Sep 88, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons" 38
38 Page 39 40
A- 2
Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
Intentionally Blank 39
39 Page 40 41
APPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
B- 1
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the
Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,
VA 23651- 5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,
consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J- 5).

3. Change Recommendations
a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:
TO: CSAF WASHINGTON DC// XOXD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC// J7- JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and
Interoperability (J- 7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D. C. 20318- 7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this
publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an
enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested
to notify the Director, J- 7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in
this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED
NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 40
40 Page 41 42
B- 2
Appendix B
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
4. Distribution
a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication
centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,
Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or
foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)
to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C- AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
20301- 7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned
administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,
"Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

By Military Services:
Army: US Army AG Publication Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220- 2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220- 2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office
Distribution Division (Code 03443)
5801 Tabor Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19120- 5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704- 5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G- REP)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, D. C. 20593- 0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is
unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint
publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1- R. 41
41 Page 42 43
GLOSSARY PART I- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
GL- 1
AADC area air defense commander
AOC air operations center

BDA battle damage assessment
C2 command and control
C4 command, control, communications, and computers
CINC commander of a combatant command; commander in chief
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSSC coded switch set controller

DCA dual- capable aircraft
DGZ desired ground zero

EAP emergency action procedure
EMP electromagnetic pulse

HOB height of burst
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JSCP joint strategic capabilities plan

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA National Command Authorities
NWP naval warfare publication

OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

PAL permissive action link
PRP personnel reliability program

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM submarine- launched ballistic missile
SOF special operations forces
STRIKEWARN strike warning

TLAM/ N Tomahawk land attack missile/ nuclear 42
42 Page 43 44
USCINCSTRAT Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL- 2

Glossary
Joint Pub 3- 12.1 43
43 Page 44 45
area air defense commander. Within a
unified command, subordinate unified
command, or joint task force, the
commander will assign overall
responsibility for air defense to a single
commander. Normally, this will be the
component commander with the
preponderance of air defense capability and
the command, control, and communications
capability to plan and execute integrated air
defense operations. Representation from
the other components involved will be
provided, as appropriate, to the area air
defense commander's headquarters. Also
called AADC. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

dual capable unit. A nuclear certified
delivery unit capable of executing both
conventional and nuclear missions. (Joint
Pub 1- 02)

executing commander (nuclear weapons).
A commander to whom nuclear weapons
are released for delivery against specific
targets or in accordance with approved
plans. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

joint force air component commander. The
joint force air component commander
derives authority from the joint force
commander who has the authority to
exercise operational control, assign
missions, direct coordination among
subordinate commanders, redirect and
organize forces to ensure unity of effort in
the accomplishment of the overall mission.
The joint force commander will normally
designate a joint force air component
commander. The joint force air component
commander's responsibilities will be
assigned by the joint force commander
(normally these would include, but not be
limited to, planning, coordination,
allocation, and tasking based on the joint
force commander's apportionment
decision). Using the joint force

commander's guidance and authority and
in coordination with other Service
component commanders and other assigned
or supporting commanders, the joint force
air component commander will recommend
to the joint force commander
apportionment of air sorties to various
missions or geographic areas. Also called
JFACC. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

National Command Authorities. The
President and the Secretary of Defense or
their duly deputized alternates or
successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

nuclear delivery unit. Any level of
organization capable of employing a
nuclear weapon system or systems when
the weapon or weapons have been released
by proper authority. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

nuclear yields. The energy released in the
detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured
in terms of the kilotons or megatons of
trinitrotoluene required to produce the same
energy release. Yields are categorized as:

very low - less than 1 kiloton.
low - 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons.
medium - over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons.
high - over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons.
very high - over 500 kilotons. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

permissive action link. A device included
in or attached to a nuclear weapon system
to preclude arming and/ or launching until
the insertion of a prescribed discrete code
or combination. It may include equipment
and cabling external to the weapon or
weapon system to activate components
within the weapon or weapon system.
(Joint Pub 1- 02)

GL- 3

PART II- TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 44
44 Page 45 46
GL- 4
Glossary
Joint Pub 3- 12.1
pre- ignition (nuclear weapons). The loss
of a nuclear warhead from the effects of
another warhead due to improper timing or
spacing. (Upon approval of this
publication, this term and its definition will
be included in Joint Pub 1- 02.)

targeting. 1. The process of selecting targets
and matching the appropriate response to
them, taking account of operational
requirements and capabilities. 2. The
analysis of enemy situations relative to the
commander's mission, objectives, and
capabilities at the commander's disposal,
to identify and nominate specific
vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will

accomplish the commander's purpose
through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or
destroying enemy forces or resources
critical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

weapons of mass destruction. In arms
control usage, weapons that are capable of
a high order of destruction and/ or of being
used in such a manner as to destroy large
numbers of people. Can be nuclear,
chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons, but excludes the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon
where such means is a separable and
divisible part of the weapon. (Joint Pub
1- 02) 45
45 Page 46 47
Assess-ments/
Revision

CJCS Approval Two Drafts

Program Directive
Project Proposal

J- 7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
Includes scope of project, references, milestones,
and who will develop drafts

J- 7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent.
Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint
Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2 Program Directive
l
l

l

The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J- 7, will
solicit a written report from the combatant commands and
Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any
urgent changes or earlier- than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised

STEP #5 Assessments/ Revision
l
l

l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
J- 7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
J- 7 initiates Program Directive

l
l
l

STEP #1 Project Proposal
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.
The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: Joint Pub 3- 12.1 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JOINT PUB 1- 0
PERSONNEL and

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4- 0 JOINT PUB 5- 0 JOINT PUB 6- 0
LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMS PLANS

JOINT PUB 0- 2
JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF
JOINT WARFARE

JOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for
coordination with Services and CINCS
Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4 CJCS Approval
l
l

l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
PRA develops two draft pubs
PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

l
l
l

STEP #3 Two Drafts

ENHANCED
JOINT
WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE
JOINT PUB 2- 0
OPERATIONS
JOINT PUB 3- 0 46
46 Page 47
47

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