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Document Outline

PREFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CHAPTER I
- THREAT AND NBC DEFENSE POLICY
CHAPTER II
- NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS
CHAPTER III
- THEATER NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER IV
- LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B - REFERENCES
APPENDIX C - ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
GLOSSARY
- PART I"ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
- PART II"TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
FIGURES

Pages 1--85 from JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense

Page 1 2

Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Defense

10 July 1995 1
1 Page 2 3
PREFACE
i
3. Application
a. Doctrine and guidance established in
this publication apply to the commanders
of combatant commands, subunified
commands, joint task forces, and
subordinate components of these
commands. These principles and guidance
also may apply when significant forces of
one Service are attached to forces of another
Service or when significant forces of one
Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is
authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)
will be followed except when, in the judgment
of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between
the contents of this publication and the
contents of Service publications, this
publication will take precedence for the
activities of joint forces unless the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in
coordination with the other members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more
current and specific guidance. Commanders
of forces operating as part of a multinational
(alliance or coalition) military command
should follow multinational doctrine and
guidance ratified by the United States. For
doctrine and procedures not ratified by the
United States, commanders should evaluate
and follow the multinational command's
doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

1. Scope
This publication provides guidelines for
the planning and execution of NBC
defensive operations. It focuses on the NBC
threat; national policy; and strategic,
operational, and logistic considerations
peculiar to the preparation and conduct of
NBC defense.

2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under
the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to
govern the joint activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in
joint operations as well as the doctrinal
basis for US military involvement in
multinational and interagency operations.
It provides military guidance for the
exercise of authority by combatant
commanders and other joint force
commanders and prescribes doctrine for
joint operations and training. It provides
military guidance for use by the Armed
Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
It is not the intent of this publication to
restrict the authority of the joint force
commander (JFC) from organizing the
force and executing the mission in a
manner the JFC deems most appropriate
t o e n s u r e u n i t y o f e ff o r t i n t h e
accomplishment of the overall mission.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2
2 Page 3 4
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Preface
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Intentionally Blank 3
3 Page 4 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS
iii
PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................vii
CHAPTER I
THREAT AND NBC DEFENSE POLICY

CHAPTER II
NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS

CHAPTER III
THEATER NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER IV
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

°Purpose..................................................................................................................IV-1
°Overview ...............................................................................................................IV-1
°Logistic Operations...............................................................................................IV-1 4
4 Page 5 6

CHAPTER V
MEDICAL SUPPORT

CHAPTER VI
TRAINING AND READINESS

°Purpose..................................................................................................................VI-1
°Overview ...............................................................................................................VI-1
°Joint NBC Training ...............................................................................................VI-1
°Readiness Reporting .............................................................................................VI-3

APPENDIX
A Nuclear,Biological,and Chemical Defense Planning Responsibilities,
Guidance,and Operations Appendix to an OPLAN ....................................A-1

ANNEX
A Treaty Obligations History ......................................................................A-A-1
B Responsibilities for NBC Defense Planning ...........................................A-B-1
C Planning Guidance for NBC Defensive Operations ...............................A-C-1
D Nuclear,Biological,and Chemical Defense Operations;
Riot Control Agents and Herbicides Appendix to an
Operations Annex..................................................................................A-D-1

B References .......................................................................................................B-1
C Administrative Instructions ............................................................................C-1 5
5 Page 6 7

v
Table of Contents
GLOSSARY

Part I-Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................GL-1
Part II-Terms and Definitions ............................................................................GL-3

Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)- capable
nations, including developing nations, may use these
weapons to achieve political or military objectives.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be used in
isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power.
The number of nations capable of developing and
possessing WMD is steadily increasing and the potential
for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism
to conflict or war. Nuclear threats occur within a given
theater of war and could proceed without the exchange of
strategic nuclear weapons. Biological threats can cause
lethal, disabling, contagious, or noncontagious type
casualties. Chemical warfare achieves surprise and
causes mass casualties which hinders the momentum of
an opposing force, disrupts command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence, and

degrades combat potential.

An effective orchestration of US strategic and theater
nuclear forces and conventional resources must be
implemented to provide direction, intelligence, and
employment of US forces in countering enemy NBC war
making capabilities. This strategy supplements the
geographic combatant commander's theater strategy
in attaining campaign objectives including interagency
coordination, dissemination of information, command and
control, and a basis for US national NBC policy.

Describes the Threat and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) Defense Policy

Covers NBC Defense Operations Fundamentals
Provides Theater NBC Defense Considerations
Describes Logistic and Medical Support Operations
Covers NBC Training and Readiness Considerations

National Military Strategic NBC Considerations
Threat Overview
The threat of the use of
weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)
occurs across the range
of military operations.

The national military
strategy for nuclear,
biological, and chemical
(NBC) operations is
based on defense and
deterrence. 8
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NBC defense operations
present many unique
challenges to commanders
including a clear
understanding of the
effects of WMD and the
implementation of the
principles of NBC
defense.

NBC defense operations
may be required
throughout the range of
military operations.

Effects of a nuclear detonation are primarily in three
areas: thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear radiation.
Corollary effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, can
break down electronics system protection, disrupt
communications, and have significant psychological
impacts on friendly forces. A biological threat is the
capability of an enemy to plan and deploy a biological
material, such as a microorganism or toxin, intended to
cause disease, injury, or death in people, plants, or animals
or deterioration of materiel. Chemical agents and
compounds are classified according to physical state,
physiological action, and use. The terms persistent and
nonpersistent describe the time an agent stays in an area.
Threat forces classify chemical agents according to their
physiological effect on the body. They identify six major
types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, psychochemical, and
irritants.

US forces must be prepared to conduct operations in
an NBC environment with minimal degradation. At
the theater operational level, NBC defense involves
protection for forces and the means to remove or cope
with operationally significant hazards, conceal intentions
in the area of responsibility, and provide adequate health
service support to preserve the fighting capability of the
forces. Avoidance; protection (including hardening,
protecting personnel, mission- oriented protective posture
(MOPP), physical defense measures, and reacting after the
attack); and decontamination are the primary principles
of NBC defense. These are combined with a proactive
theater- level program of intelligence, psychological
operations, deception, and obscuration.

Because of the complexity and potential adverse impact of
NBC warfare on US and multinational theater operations,
it is imperative that all facets of NBC defense be
considered in formulating courses of action. Theater
strategic considerations include theater strategy, theater
strategic protection, joint operation planning and execution
system, force requirements, risk assessment, operation
planning guidance, and operational readiness.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects
Theater Strategic Considerations
Operations in an NBC Environment 9
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An unbroken chain of communications must extend from
the National Command Authorities through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders,
commanders of Service and functional components, and
all subordinate commanders. This is especially critical
in a theater where the threat of NBC warfare exists.
NBC defense force assets, multinational forces
considerations, protection of US civilian personnel in
theater, and protection of enemy prisoners of war are also
considerations for NBC defense.

The geographic combatant commander must plan for
logistic support operations for joint NBC defense. Within
a theater, the geographic combatant commander exercises
directive authority over logistic operations. Adequate
logistic support is vital to all combat operations. It must
provide for sustainability, anticipation, integration,
continuity, improvisation, responsiveness, reconstitution of
destroyed units, and stock of NBC equipment. Services
support includes ways to cope with decontamination of
equipment; clothing exchange and showers; equipment
recovery and evacuation, mortuary affairs policy, standards,
and procedures; and emergency destruction and evacuation
of US nuclear munitions and captured NBC munitions.
Supply support includes general supply operations and
water production for decontamination. Transportation, host-nation
support, multinational support and friendly forces
considerations, nuclear survivability and NBC
contamination survivability standards, and environmental
considerations are also incorporated in logistic support and
are imperative to NBC defense.

Defensive measures should be included in medical
support planning such as military surveillance; protection
of personnel at risk against exposure, infection,
intoxication, or inhaling a chemical agent; and early
detection. The use of NBC weapons can result in a large
number of casualties and also require special handling that
can drain medical resources. Because of this, the geographic
combatant commander must plan to use directive authority

Theater Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence

Command, control,
communications,
computers, and
intelligence are an
integral part of all
aspects of NBC defense.

Logistic support for NBC
defense operations is
vital throughout the full
range of military
operations.

The geographic
combatant commander
should plan for medical
support in the portions of
campaign plans and
orders that address NBC
defense in the theater.

NBC Logistic Support
Medical Support 10
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Training, readiness
reporting, and
environmental concerns
must be considered when
planning for NBC
defense support.

to ensure the proper coordination of health service to
the force, to include adequate shelter, food, medical
prophylaxis, and fluids. The Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center can assist with the theater threat
assessment by evaluating the state of a potential adversary's
biological warfare. Patient evacuation within the combat
zone is normally the responsibility of the respective
component command. Movement of patients within the
theater is the responsibility of the geographic combatant
commander. The management and treatment of
contaminated casualties will vary with the tactical situation
and the nature of the contaminant. Preventive medicine
services help determine the health hazards associated with
nuclear fallout and biological contamination. Each medical
unit must have a plan that can be put into effect immediately.
Decentralization is also necessary and all medical units
should have comparable sets of medical items and
decontamination equipment. The impact on health
services support caused by contaminated battlefields will
result in a difficult environment in which to operate.
Stress from MOPP, reduced visual and tactile senses from
protective equipment, reduced communication capability,
and a sense of isolation are all detrimental to military
operations.

Although individual training and exercises to test
proficiency remain under the purview of the Services, NBC
defense should be integrated into individual and
collective programs at all levels and into higher echelon
operational and tactical exercises, command post and other
command, control, communications, and computers system
exercises, and joint and multinational training exercises.
The objectives of this training are to develop and evaluate
the readiness of US and multinational military forces
and mission- essential civilians to operate in an NBC
environment and to ensure proficiency with defensive
NBC equipment, materials, and procedures. Joint and
multinational exercises include exchange programs,
reciprocal unit exchanges, personnel exchange
programs, individual exchanges, and combination
programs which help prepare personnel and enhance
training for NBC defense. The need for readiness
reporting is important for the geographic combatant
commander to exercise directive authority for logistics or
if NBC would materially affect the course of action or
organization of the theater.

Training and Readiness 11
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Executive Summary
This publication provides guidance for the conduct of NBC
defensive operations across the range of military operations.
Theater level NBC defense considerations are discussed.
The potential threat, logistic and medical support concerns,
and NBC training and readiness issues are covered.

CONCLUSION 12
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CHAPTER I THREAT AND NBC DEFENSE POLICY
I- 1
1. Purpose
This chapter provides a discussion of the
potential threat and threat doctrine that should
be considered for the planning and conduct
of joint nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) defense operations. This chapter also
recaps the US national policy guidance and
objectives for NBC defense that form the basis
for NBC doctrinal precepts.

2. Overview
The threat of the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) occurs across the range
of military operations. NBC- capable
nations, including developing nations, may
use these weapons to achieve political or
military objectives. WMD may be used in
isolation or as an adjunct to conventional
combat power. If used, they pose the problem
to US forces of creating an asymmetrical
battlefield.

3. Worldwide Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The number of nations capable of
developing and possessing WMD is steadily
increasing. Developing nations are receiving
these weapons or means to develop them
through technological transfer, overt or covert
direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups
or governments. The potential for their use
can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism
during peace to escalation during conflict or
war.

a. NBC- Capable Nations. An NBC-capable
nation is defined as one that has the
capability to produce or acquire and
employ one or more types of WMD to
achieve political and military objectives.
Inherent in this capability are varying degrees
of abilities to conduct research and
development, improve technology, stockpile,
and effectively prosecute a war in an NBC
environment.

b. Planning Considerations. The
implications of proliferation of WMD on
planning are significant. The proliferation
of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
programs has been stimulated by perceptions
of the political- military utility of CBW
weapons. Chemical warfare (CW) and
biological warfare (BW) are perceived as
excellent force multipliers. Both are perceived
as deterrents to regional aggression. It is
projected that there will be an increase in the
number of CBW- capable countries, albeit
at a slower rate than over the past 20 years, as
well as an increase in the number and
effectiveness of agents and improved delivery
systems available.

4. Threat Employment Concepts

The political and military nature of the
threat has changed with the end of the Cold
War. Many of the former Soviet- influenced
doctrinal precepts learned by potential
enemies possessing NBC capabilities still

"We must also stop the spread of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
technology. There are few developments more frightening than that of
unstable, sometimes irrational . . . regimes being able to press a button and
deliver weapons of terror across great distances."

Vice President George Bush August 2, 1988 14
14 Page 15 16
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Joint Pub 3- 11
remain. Threat employment concepts are
shown in Figure I- 1.

a. Nuclear: Premise of First Use
° Threat doctrine postulates that
limited nuclear operations may
occur within a given theater of war
and that such limited nuclear conditions
could proceed without the exchange of
strategic nuclear weapons. Regardless
of changing political conditions, two
consequences are possible. First, this
premise provides rationale for an
enemy to use nuclear weapons.
Second, focusing on the potential
results of a limited nuclear war that
could bring either victory or, at a
minimum, result in a stalemate, may
provide the enemy with an incentive
to use nuclear weapons first.

° The operational and tactical use of
nuclear weapons would be directed
against friendly strong points, air and
naval power, and critical centers of
gravity. Subsequently, enemy doctrine

envisions that large- scale conventional
armored and mechanized forces in
"nuclear dispersed" formations would
strike deep into friendly defenses and
pass through nuclear- created gaps to
destroy friendly command, control,
communications, computers, and
intelligence (C4I) facilities and other
critical targets. Once within the friendly
operational area, the threat objective
would be to split, isolate, and destroy
friendly forces.

b. Biological: Premise of Selective or
Unpredictable Use

° Threat doctrine considers biological
agents as WMD. Such agents, including
infectious microorganisms and toxins, are
capable of widespread, mass infection or
intoxication. These agents, depending
on intended use, can cause lethal,
disabling, contagious, or noncontagious
type casualties. These agents could be
effectively employed against large rear
area objectives or against C4I or other
critical targets.

° Certain factors may significantly
increase the probability of use. Should
a potential threat consider that initiating
BW was worth the risk, the employment
of biological agents may provide a way
of causing asymmetry on the
battlefield. Further, genetic engineering
can selectively improve toxicity,
lifespans, or dissemination efficiencies;
defeat detection and warning systems; or
make verification of use virtually
impossible.

c. Chemical: Premise of Conventional
Weapons

° It is possible that threat employment
doctrine may consider chemical
munitions, including riot control agents
(RCA), to be conventional weapons.

THREAT EMPLOYMENT
CONCEPTS

NUCLEAR: Premise of First Use
BIOLOGICAL: Premise of Selective or
Unpredictable Use
CHEMICAL: Premise of Conventional
Weapons

Figure I- 1. Threat Employment Concepts 15
15 Page 16 17
I- 3
Threat and NBC Defense Policy
° Primary uses of chemical warfare are
to achieve surprise and cause mass
casualties, particularly against an
unprepared adversary. Chemical
weapons can be used to hinder the
momentum of an opposing force,
disrupting C4I, and degrading combat
potential, to include the use of CW
agents to restrict the use of terrain,
facilities, and equipment.

5. Asymmetrical Battlefield
Because of the proliferation of WMD,
future campaigns may be fought on an
asymmetric battlefield. Where the threat of
enemy NBC attack exists, the constraint on
the US retaliatory capability may increase the
likelihood that an enemy NBC attack will take
place. The enemy who can choose from
various options and controls the timing
enjoys strategic, operational, or tactical
advantage in executing the war plan and
achieving the desired end state. Joint force

NBC defense readiness to fight a campaign
in an NBC environment must not only be
maintained to ensure force survival if attacked,
but to serve as a major deterrence to any
enemy perceiving an advantage by initiating
NBC use.

6. National Military Strategic
NBC Considerations

The national military strategy for NBC
operations is based on defense and
deterrence. Accordingly, this strategy
demands an effective orchestration of US
strategic and theater nuclear forces and
conventional resources in providing
direction, intelligence, and employment
of US forces in countering enemy NBC war
making capabilities, as shown in Figure I-2.
This strategy supplements the geographic
combatant commander's theater strategy in
attaining campaign objectives.

a. Strategic Direction and Integration.
This guidance is expressed through
revised national (and alliance) military
strategy, derived from national security

The proliferation of the Soviet- made SCUD missile system has increased the likelihood that
joint forces, when deployed, will be required to fight in an NBC environment.

Strategic Direction and Integration.
Strategic Intelligence.
Employment of Military Forces.

Other Strategic NBC Considerations:
Interagency Considerations.
Dissemination of Information.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC NBC
CONSIDERATIONS

Figure I- 2. National Military Strategic NBC Considerations 16
16 Page 17 18
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Joint Pub 3- 11
strategy, relative to the attainment of
strategic objectives. Within the context of
a NBC environment, it is derived from the
national policy of non use of biological
and chemical weapons and close control
of nuclear weapons in warfare. This
guidance may account for the potential of
an asymmetrical battlefield, which may be
imposed on the combatant commander.
The threat potential of using or the actual
use of NBC weapons may change the
strategic direction and integration. It
focuses on the following: acquiring and
communicating worldwide and regional
n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i c NBC
information, reassessing the worldwide and
regional NBC strategic environment as
required, revising and providing national
military strategic direction, and providing
appropriate command and control warfare
as required.

b. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic
intelligence on the NBC threat is required
to enhance or modify policy and military
planning at the national, international, and
theater levels. This includes planning and
coordinating strategic intelligence activities
for assessing NBC threats; assessing enemy
NBC capabilities and vulnerabilities;
proliferation, intentions, and indications;
and warning measures.

c. Employment of Military Forces. At
the national military strategic level, the
employment of military forces primarily
connotes the forces' ability to conduct
both strategic operations and protection
of the strategic forces and delivery means
against NBC attack. Strategic operations
(firepower and forces) will be utilized
against one or more of a selected series of

enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration
of their strategic NBC force, national
command and control (C2) facilities,
strategic centers of gravity, NBC war
making capacity, and the will to conduct
NBC war. Protection for friendly
strategic forces and means involves
safeguarding US strategic centers of
gravity and our strategic force potential.
Measures include active security and
defense, operations security (OPSEC)
considerations, and the conduct of
deception operations.

d. Other Strategic NBC Considerations
° Interagency Coordination. Combatant
commanders should establish close
coordination relationships with US
departments and agencies both
within and without their sphere of
command and control. In particular,
networks should be established
with diplomatic missions and
supporting country teams within the
theater. These sources may provide
valuable intelligence and information
on the likelihood of enemy intent to
use NBC weapons. They may also
produce data on the political and
psychological implications, as well
as military aspects of effectively
countering NBC weapons beyond
that provided by intelligence sources
subordinate to the geographic
combatant commander.

° Dissemination of Information. NBC
defense, RCA, and herbicide operations
are of significant national, international,
and public interest. 17
17 Page 18 19
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Threat and NBC Defense Policy
°° The special nature of NBC warfare
mandates that combatant commanders
prepare thorough and detailed plans
for the immediate and accurate
dissemination of information
concerning the use and effects of
NBC weapons. These plans should
provide for the dissemination of
information concerning an enemy
NBC first strike, the appropriate
warning of US forces in the event of
a US or allied nuclear strike, and
contingencies for defensive NBC
operations by US forces.

°° Planning should consider multi-level
target groups. These range from
the political level of both involved and
noninvolved nations, to the affected
civil populace, and to US forces
engaged in the theater.

°° Combatant commanders should
ensure that an integrated effort is
undertaken in the information
gathering and dissemination process
to provide an accurate and
complete depiction of the NBC
warfare situation. Such effort
would include intelligence, public
affairs, legal, medical, civil affairs,
and psychological operations
resources.

°° Annex F to the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) prescribes
procedures for the release of all
NBC defense, RCA, and herbicide
information to the public. This
policy does not apply to requests
for information made under the
Freedom of I n f o r m a t i o n A c t .

Release of information may be
subject to OPSEC considerations and
specified conditions as stipulated by
the National Command Authorities
(NCA).

7. Command and Control
Combatant commanders, subordinate
joint force commanders (JFCs), and
Services will implement Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
procedures outlined in Emergency
Action Plan, Volume V, to accomplish the
following:

a. Immediately alert the NCA, through
the CJCS, of indications that a nuclear,
biological, or chemical attack may be
imminent or has occurred.

b. Request authority to use nuclear
weapons, RCAs, and herbicides as
appropriate.

c. Route requests and authentication
procedures for the use of nuclear
weapons, RCAs, and herbicides as
d e s c r i b e d i n t h e J o i n t S t r a t e g i c
Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

8. Basis for US National NBC Policy

Treaties, international agreements, laws,
and statements provide a historical
perspective and basis for the formulation
of current US policy to curtail the
proliferation of, and deter or ban the use
of, NBC weapons. These are addressed in
Annex A to Appendix A, "Treaty
Obligations History." 18
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"This is a complex problem that requires an experienced hand and a determined approach. First, we've got to deal with those nations that have
used the gas. . . We must restore the prohibition against the use of those terrible weapons. The barriers against chemical warfare, breached during
the Iran- Iraq War, must be repaired and raised even higher.
Second, we've got to prevent those nations approaching the threshold from proliferating. That calls for careful intelligence and controls on the technical
capabilities that allow production of the weapons . . .
Third, we've got to prevent the most ominous proliferation of all. The eventual combination of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles could put new
destructive power in the hands of governments with terrorist records.
At the end of the First World War, the so- called war to end all wars, mankind sought safety in collective security. Part of that security was to outlaw the
use of certain weapons- chemical weapons- as a sign of our civilization. Collective security failed eventually under Hitler's blows. One of the first
signs of the breakdown of civilization was the use of gas in Ethiopia.
From that time until our own, despite World War II, and countless conflicts, somehow the ban on the use of chemical weapons remained intact. Yet
now, just as we look up, look forward to a new decade and perhaps a whole new era of peace- the alarm bell has sounded. I've heard that bell and I
know what it means. And if I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons."

Vice President George Bush
Address at the University of Toledo, October 21, 1988 19
19 Page 20 21
CHAPTER II NBC DEFENSE OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS
II- 1
1. Purpose
This chapter provides a discussion of
NBC defense fundamentals applicable to
the theater of operations.

2. Overview
NBC defense operations present many
unique challenges to commanders. A
clear understanding of the effects of WMD,

coupled with the implementation of the
p r i n c i p l e s of NBC d e f e n s e , can
significantly reduce these challenges.

3. Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects

This section describes the lethality and
range of effects of weapons and agents
in an NBC environment. Figure II- 1
illustrates these effects.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND AGENTS EFFECTS

CHEMICAL Persistent
Nonpersistent

BIOLOGICAL Microorganisms
Toxins Enemy Biological Weapons
Employment

NUCLEAR Thermal Radiation
Blast Nuclear Radiation
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Psychological Effect

Figure II- 1. Weapons of Mass Destruction and Agents Effects

"The effects of the successful gas attack were horrible. I am not pleased
with the idea of poisoning men. Of course the entire world will rage about it
first and then imitate us. All the dead lie on their backs with clenched fists;
the whole field is yellow."

Rudolph Binding A Fatalist at War, (of the first German use of lethal gas), April 1915 20
20 Page 21 22
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Joint Pub 3- 11
a. Nuclear. Effects of a nuclear
detonation are primarily in three areas:
thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear
radiation. Corollary effects, such as
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), can break
down electronics system protection, disrupt
communications, and have significant
psychological impacts on friendly forces.

° Thermal Radiation. Thermal
radiation, consisting of heat and light,
results from the nuclear detonation.
Thermal radiation can cause
widespread injuries in the form of
skin burns and retinal damage
(flashblindness). Thermal radiation
can also cause fires and damage or
destroy heat sensitive and optical
systems. The type of weapon burst (air,
surface, or sub- surface) and the
atmospheric conditions influence both
the range and intensity of thermal
damage.

° Blast. Blast, consisting of shock
waves, high overpressures, and
severe winds can demolish buildings,
equipment, and uproot trees. Even
though the shock front achieves
sufficient strength to devastate most
land features, the type of nuclear burst
determines the severity of destruction.
Blast is not an instantaneous effect.
A finite amount of time will elapse
between the "flash" and the arrival of
the shock wave relative to a person's
distance from the point of detonation
(ground zero). This time will allow
individuals to find some protection,
whether it be in a building, vehicle, or
dropping to the ground if caught in the
open.

° Nuclear Radiation. The most wide-spread
and longest lasting weapon
effect comes from the emission of
radioactive products. These appear in
two forms: initial and residual

radiation. Initial radiation, which is
emitted during the first minute after
detonation, produces deadly gamma
rays and neutrons. Residual radiation
is most prevalent in ground bursts
where the detonation heaves up land,
buildings, and other materials that are
later dispersed as radioactive fallout.
In the case of an air burst, residual
radioactive emissions are extremely
limited.

° Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). If the
high currents and voltage signals
induced by an EMP event are delivered
to unprotected electronic devices, the
devices can be permanently damaged
or temporarily degraded. Radio
communications will be subject to a
wide variety of possible disruptions
during and after a nuclear exchange.
These interruptions may range from
minor disruptions lasting just a few
minutes to essential communication
links being rendered useless.
Hardening techniques include:
electromagnetic shielding, proper
grounding, circumvention circuits to
sense an EMP and "turn off" or isolate
critical circuits, filtering of broad
bandwidth EMP signals, use of voltage
and current limiting devices, and
proper device selection and design to
tolerate EMP surges.

° Psychological Effect. In addition to
causing massive physical destruction,
explosion of a nuclear weapon can
cause tremendous psychological
effects that can impact on a unit's
ability to fight. Immediately after an
attack, personnel may show alertness
or evidence denial or disbelief.
Following weapon detonation, some
survivors will remain effective, others
will be dazed and stunned, and some
will be in a state of panic or acute
confusion. 21
21 Page 22 23
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NBC Defense Operations Fundamentals
During the intervening years between WW I and WW II, the Americans and the British initially were persuaded to investigate the possibility of nuclear weapons
primarily out of fear that the Germans were working on them and were likely to
have such a weapon before anyone else- with dire consequences indeed. President Roosevelt was alert to this possibility; and added urgency came with

the Japanese attack and the German and Italian declarations of war in December 1941. During early March 1942, Roosevelt was advised that the scientific
investigation had proceeded to the point that it may be possible, with a major
industrial effort, for a weapon to be completed as soon as the end of 1944. Consequently, a decision on whether to make such a commitment would have to

be made soon. Roosevelt decided on June 17, 1942, that the United States would go forward with a major atomic program.

Two issues concerning the development of the atomic bomb surfaced after Roosevelt's decision. First, in terms of industrial infrastructure, there was
the practical matter of actually going forward with the project. One of the major issues here was how to acquire sufficient U- 235 to make a bomb. The
government secretly took what looked like the most reasonable way, namely,
it started massive work on three likely possibilities simultaneously. In addition, the government built a fourth plant to manufacture plutonium, a

new type of material correctly believed likely to be usable in atomic bombs. After acquiring vast amount of land to build the necessarily huge secret
laboratories and facilities for all this massive program went forward in the
fall of 1942. By late 1944, the few Americans privy to the secret were assured that enough fissionable material would be available for several bombs in the

summer of 1945- only six months later than originally predicted.
The second issue was that of relations on this subject with America's British
and Russian allies. By a coincidence, Winston Churchill was in the United States and talked with Roosevelt about atomic weapons at Hyde Park three

days after the President's June 17, decision. In that conversation- of which no real record survives- the two appear to have agreed to cooperate on atomic
matters. That cooperation was, however, limited as the Americans became
increasingly skeptical about British security to outsiders and reticence with the Americans. At the end of 1942 Roosevelt approved a policy of limiting

the sharing of secrets, a policy Churchill protested at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

The Americans relaxed their restrictions somewhat in view of Britain's contribution to the whole enterprise, but even a new agreement arrived at by
Churchill and Roosevelt at Quebec on August 19, 1943, did not remove all differences. A coordinating committee in Washington helped, a great deal of
information was provided to the British, and the agreement to use in combat
any atomic weapons only after consultation was fully adhered to, but some friction remained.

A major aspect of Roosevelt's reticence had been the preference for the United
States rather than others to profit from any potential post- war benefits which
might be derived from the great investment being made in the nuclear field by the American taxpayer, some two billion dollars by 1945. Of equal if not greater

ALLIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS 22
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Joint Pub 3- 11
importance, however, were American doubts about British security. These
doubts concerned not leaks to the Axis powers but to Soviet espionage which
the administration correctly believed was operating in both Great Britain and the United States.

Roosevelt consistently opposed any sharing of nuclear information with the
Soviet Union, seeing no prospect of Soviet knowledge of the subject being of
use during the war and vastly more suspicious of and concerned about Soviet intentions after the war. There was no sign either of Soviet willingness to

exchange important secret information about any subject whatever with the Western Allies, nor of any prospect that there would be wartime cooperation
in weapons development, atomic or conventional. There were, however, lots
of signs that Soviet espionage networks were continuing their activity in the United States, and presumably also in Britain, that these were trying to

penetrate work being done in the atomic field, and that all this was likely to be exclusively of post- war application.

Roosevelt recognized the enormous contribution which the Soviet Union was making in the war against Germany, and with his broad knowledge of the war
appreciated this fact more than many Americans then or later; and he very much hoped that wartime cooperation might continue into the post- war era.
Like Churchill, however, he saw no reason to take the Soviets into American
confidence about a weapons system of potentially great significance in the post- war years, especially since he expected that the United States would

dismantle most of the conventional forces it had built up during the war at the conclusion of hostilities as it had done after World War I, and in fact
proceeded to do after World War II.
Roosevelt did live to learn that the Germans had dropped out of the race to
build atomic weapons, but this in no way caused him to order the vast secret
American effort to be relaxed. The available evidence supports the conclusion that he had expected any bombs built in time for use against Germany to be

dropped on that country and any not ready in time to be dropped on Japan, in both cases in the hope of bringing a long war to a quick end.

President Harry Truman was briefed on both the atomic bomb project and on Soviet espionage efforts as soon as he took office. He adhered to the outlines
of his predecessor's policies, becoming, if anything, less willing to share information with America's allies. The accidents of chronology resulted in
his presiding over the completion of the first nuclear weapons, so that the
decision on their first use had to be made by him. Many believe that Roosevelt, had he lived, would not have decided differently.

SOURCE: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms,
Cambridge University Press, 1994.

b. Biological. A biological threat is the
capability of an enemy to plan and deploy
a biological material to produce casualties
in humans or animals or damage plants or
other material. A biological agent is a

microorganism or biological toxin intended
to cause disease, injury, or death in people,
plants, or animals or deterioration of material.
A biological threat is the capability of an
enemy to deploy these types of agents. 23
23 Page 24 25
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° Microorganisms. Pathogenic
microorganisms are infectious
agents that cause disease in personnel,
animals, or plants by entering the body
through the lungs, digestive tract, skin,
and mucous membranes of body
openings. Once they enter the body,
microorganisms multiply, overcoming
the body's natural defenses, and
produce disease.

° Toxins. Toxins are poisonous
substances produced as by- products
of microorganisms, plants, and
animals. Some toxins can be
chemically synthesized, and some can
be artificially produced with genetic
engineering techniques. Toxins exert
their lethal or incapacitating effects
by interfering with certain cell and
tissue functions. The signs and
symptoms of toxin poisoning can be
confused with both chemical poisoning
and infectious diseases.

° Enemy B i o l o g i c a l Weapons
Employment. Delivery systems for
biological warfare agents most
commonly generate invisible aerosol
clouds with particles or droplets that
can remain suspended for extensive
periods. The major risk is retention
of inhaled particles. To a much lesser
extent, particles may adhere to an
individual or to clothing. Vectors,
which are organisms (e. g., insects) that
transmit pathogens, may be involved
in the spread of a disease. The
effective area covered varies with
many factors, including wind speed,
humidity, and sunlight. In the absence
of direct evidence of an attack, the first
clue would be mass casualties fitting
a clinical pattern compatible with
one of the biological agents; however,
diagnosis may be difficult because of
the possible use of multiple pathogens.
Toxins, although nonliving, affect the

body in a manner similar to CW
agents. However, toxins are generally
much more potent. Mucous
membranes, including the eyes, are
also vulnerable to many biological
warfare agents. Potential targets of
biological agents include the
following:

°° Rear area command centers and key
facilities.

°° Troop assembly areas.
°° Ports of debarkation or supply
points, airfields, and industrial centers
prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

°° Naval operations near land.
°° Forward combat areas and logistical
areas.

°° Any area that presents a likely
target for a terrorist or insurgent group.

c. Chemical. Chemical agents and
compounds are classified according to
physical state, physiological action, and use.
The terms persistent and nonpersistent
describe the time an agent stays in an area.
Threat forces classify chemical agents
according to their physiological effect on
the body. They identify six major
types: nerve, blood, blister, choking,
psychochemical, and irritants.

° Persistent. Persistent chemical agents
affect the battlefield for an extended
period of time. The exact duration of
the threat from a persistent agent is
dependent upon several factors,
including its concentration, the
temperature, wind, amount of sunlight
and precipitation. Threat forces are
known to stockpile persistent agents.
Persistent chemical agents are used to
produce immediate or delayed 24
24 Page 25 26
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casualties. Immediate casualties
occur when the victim inhales the vapor
or aerosol or, in some cases (Lewisite,
Phosgene Oxime), when the agent
produces rapid effects on the skin or
eyes. Delayed casualties occur when
the vapor or aerosol is absorbed
through the skin. Persistent agents
are u s e d f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g
purposes:

°° Contaminate rear area supply
depots, airfields, or port facilities.

°° Defend avenues of approach.
°° Neutralize personnel.
°° Protect flanks.
°° Degrade unit efficiency.
°° Restrict the use of terrain and
facilities.

° Nonpersistent. Nonpersistent agents
affect the battlefield for relatively
short periods of time. They are more
dependent upon the local weather and
climatic conditions than persistent
agents because of their inherent
physical and chemical properties.
Threat forces currently stockpile
blood, choking, psychochemical, and
nerve agents such as Tabun, Sarin, and
Soman. Although G- series nerve
agents are classified as nonpersistent
agents, some G agents may persist for
hours to days when a thickening agent
is used. Nonpersistent agents should
be expected against friendly units
along the forward line of own troops
and against units in contact with the
attacking echelon. These agents are
used to immobilize, injure, or hinder
activities of the unit under attack. For
example, the threat may use a blood
agent at a critical moment in battle to

force troops into a higher mission
oriented protective posture (MOPP)
level. Forcing troops into a higher
MOPP level reduces morale and
degrades performance. Another
advantage is that the threat would not
need to decontaminate the area before
occupying it. Nonpersistent agents
act through the respiratory system
or through skin absorption. Non-persistent
agents are used to achieve
the following results:

°° Create favorable fighting conditions
for the initiator.

°° Produce immediate casualties on
targeted population before an assault
by an initiator.

°° Degrade and suppress enemy forces
by forcing them into a higher MOPP
level.

°° Allow occupation with minimum
decontamination.

4. Operations in an NBC Environment

A capability to defend against NBC
attack and to survive and sustain combat
operations in an NBC environment requires
intelligence forewarning and highly trained,
properly equipped forces throughout the
theater of operations. US forces must be
prepared to conduct operations in an
NBC environment with minimal
degradation. At the theater operational
level, NBC defense involves protection
for forces and the means to remove or cope
with operationally significant hazards,
conceal intentions in the area of
responsibility (AOR), and provide
adequate health service support to
preserve the fighting capability of the
forces. Health service support will be
addressed in Chapter V, "Medical Support." 25
25 Page 26 27
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NBC Defense Operations Fundamentals
a. Operational Stress. Physical and
mental demands of military operations can
have profound effects on the performance
of individual Service members and units. This
is particularly true when the stress of combat
is intensified by heat, continuous operations,
and NBC protective clothing worn as part
of a unit's MOPP.

b. Principles of NBC Defense. NBC
defense for the theater requires cognizance
of the principles of NBC defense-
avoidance, protection, and decontamination
-coupled with a proactive theater- level
program of intelligence, psychological
operations, deception, and obscuration.
Theater- level intelligence assets gather
information on the state of the AOR and
enemy capabilities and intentions.
Psychological operations support deterrent
measures and, in the event of the failure of
deterrence, enhance reactive measures as a
force multiplier. Deception at the theater
level supports large- scale maneuvers.

Obscuration increases survivability of
large- scale operations and port and airfield
operations. If the enemy uses NBC
weapons, an effective NBC defense
program gives our forces an advantage in
operational tempo. This advantage causes
the enemy to cease NBC warfare or
continue the conflict on less favorable
terms. Nuclear weapons cause casualties
through blast, heat, and radiation effects.
Biological and chemical weapons cause
serious injury or death and restrict the use
of terrain or equipment. NBC weapons also
degrade force effectiveness by causing
military personnel to don cumbersome
protective clothing and equipment. To
counter these effects, NBC defense, as
shown in Figure II- 2, adheres to the three
principles: avoidance, protection, and
decontamination.

° Avoidance. Passive and active measures
used in avoiding NBC attack are keys
to NBC defense.

AVOIDANCE
PROTECTION

DECONTAMINATION

Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense
This principle consists of: hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming MOPP, physical defense measures,
and reacting to attack

Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent
exposure or failure of protection

PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE

Figure II- 2. Principles of NBC Defense 26
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°° Passive measures include training,
camouflage and concealment (including
the use of smoke and obscurants),
hardened positions, and dispersion.

°° Active avoidance includes
contamination detection, marking, alarms,
warning, reporting, and control measures.

° Protection. This principle consists of:
hardening of positions, protecting
personnel, assuming MOPP, physical
defense measures, and reacting to attack.

°° Hardening. Overhead cover,
bunkered positions, armored- like
sections of ships, or tanks are
examples. This measure pertains
primarily to nuclear weapons in the
NBC defense context.

°° Protecting Personnel. Ordinary
clothing can provide some protection
against the thermal effects of a
nuclear detonation, but more
sophisticated protection is required
against biological and chemical
weapons. These measures may include
medical prophylaxis (pre- treatments)
protective masks or protective
ensemble, antidote, or other medical
treatments. (1) Nuclear. Other
measures to protect personnel from
nuclear effects include implementing
passive measures, warning others,
locating and identifying burst location,
and limiting exposure. (2) Biological
and Chemical. Other biological and
chemical measures include providing
individual and collective protection
measures or relocation of personnel to
toxic- free areas.

°° Mission- Oriented Protective
Posture (MOPP). When considering
the use of MOPP, the commander
should balance protection with
degradation of the forces' ability to

perform their mission. Normally, the
JFC will leave the decision of MOPP
level to the component commander,
who usually will decentralize the
decision to the various area
commanders or captains of their
vessels.

°° Physical Defense Measures. The
optimum conditions for the enemy to
employ biological aerosols or chemical
attacks exist in the late evening or early
morning. When threat conditions exist,
it is recommended that during the hours
of darkness as many personnel as
possible remain inside any available
fixed or improvised collective
protective shelters (CPSs) or wear
their protective masks. (1) The entry
of Service members or materials into a
CPS means that suitable precautions must
be taken or infectious or toxic agents
could be carried in on clothing or
surfaces. However, biological aerosol
particles that have settled on hard surfaces
are unlikely to create a hazard because
they are not readily re- aerosolized. The
main risk comes from clothing of
exposed persons and from flexible or
friable surfaces. Clothing or protective
equipment that has been exposed
to chemical agents, especially
nonpersistent chemical agents, may emit
vapors within the protected area and
should be removed before entry. (2)
In the case of personnel who may have
been exposed to a biological aerosol
while outside the facility, a potential
hazard will only be created by particles
deposited on the outer layers of their
clothing (and possibly their hands, head,
and hair if these were not covered). If
possible, they should remove their outer
clothing and wash their hands, face, and
hair. (3) Use of Individual Protective
Equipment. The mask is the most
effective protection against biological
and chemical agents. Wearing a 27
27 Page 28 29
II- 9
NBC Defense Operations Fundamentals
respirator provides virtually complete
protection against a biological aerosol
attack. Effective respirator filters will
remove any biological aerosol particles
that are present in the air and will protect
against all known weaponized chemical
agents. (4) Use of Improvised Refuges.
The term "improvised refuge" is used to
describe systems that offer only limited
protection and can be created even when
a supply of filtered air is not available.
The simplest form of improvised refuge
is a room or space with the doors and
windows that can be closed off. Further
benefit can be obtained by using a space
within a space. Thus, inner rooms of
buildings provide better protection than
outer rooms, especially if the opening is
toward the lee side of the building.
Further protection can be achieved if
doors, windows, and other openings
can be sealed, but this may seriously
reduce the habitability of the space.

°° After an Attack. Following an attack,
personnel should take immediate
action to reduce the impact of the
attack and restore the fighting power to
continue the mission. Different procedures

would be prescribed for nuclear,
biological, or chemical attacks.

° Decontamination. Decontamination
stops the erosion of combat power and
reduces the possibility of additional
casualties from inadvertent exposure
or failure of protection. The extent of
and time required for decontamination
depends on the tactical situation, mission,
degree of contamination, and other
alternatives to decontamination, such as
deferring the use of the equipment. Forces
should ordinarily decontaminate only
that materiel needed for completion of
the mission. Depending on agent type
and weather conditions, decontamination
may not be required because of natural
weathering effects (temperature, wind, and
sunlight). Non- mission essential equipment
would have the decontamination deferred,
or natural weathering could be used.

5. Operations and Sustainment Assessment

a. Operations Tempo. The operations
tempo may be profoundly affected by the
introduction of NBC weapons. Some of the

Operations in an NBC environment require that aircrews be fully experienced in accomplishing their mission while using Chemical Protective Clothing and
Equipment. 28
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Joint Pub 3- 11
sustainment considerations that should be
reviewed by the combatant commander are
outlined in Chapter IV, "Logistic Support
Operations."

b. Reconstitution. The component
commanders' capabilities for force
generation may be severely hampered with
introduction of NBC weapons because of
the disruption of normal personnel and
materiel replacement processes in theater. In
addition, the scale of the requirement for
reconstitution may be dramatically
increased, especially in a biological or nuclear
environment. The number of anticipated
casualties, even if afforded some protection,
would severely tax reorganization and
reconstitution systems.

c. Military Performance in Chemical
Protective Clothing and Equipment. The
use of protective equipment will cause serious
degradation of friendly forces' capabilities
to perform their mission. The wearing of
chemical protective clothing and equipment
will increase the risk of heat stress.
Commanders must consider adequate water
intake, fatigue, and heat acclimatization.

° The conditions of sustained or continuous
operations often require Service
members to stay awake for extended
periods of time. MOPP decreases
sensory awareness, making it harder for
Service members to stay awake.
Additionally, wearing chemical
protective clothing reduces the
individual's ability to recognize and
communicate efficiently. Combat often
requires that individuals change their
habits (such as caffeine and nicotine use,
nutrition, personal hygiene,); MOPP may

require even more extreme changes in
personal habits. These changes can
intensify the feelings of isolation and
confusion that are common on the
battlefield and increase the individual's
vulnerability to combat stress.
Commanders at every level can prepare
their Service members to fight
effectively in MOPP by engaging in
realistic training that builds confidence
and cohesion.

° All Service members can expect deficits
in performance because of the
awkwardness of chemical protective
clothing and equipment. Several
factors may increase the probability that
individuals will experience heat or
combat stress while in MOPP.
Inexperienced individuals unfamiliar
with MOPP or those who are new to the
unit are more likely to be affected.
Service members who work shifts of
indefinite length (who do not know
when they will get relief from MOPP)
are also more susceptible. Commanders
are encouraged to stress training
involving visual tasks, especially
weapons use, ma n u a l d e x t e r i t y
tasks and communication tasks, while
in MOPP because certain jobs are more
likely to be affected than others (e. g.,
tasks that require clear vision; precise
hearing; fine motor skills; social and
emotional support; or communication
by facial expression, gestures, and
inflections in voice). Service
members who have trained often and
realistically in MOPP should be able
to compensate for the constraints it
places on communication, vision, and
movement. 29
29 Page 30 31
CHAPTER III THEATER NBC DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS
III- 1
1. Purpose
This chapter provides considerations for
the planning and conduct of joint NBC
defense operations at the theater level.

2. Overview
NBC defense operations may be required
throughout the range of military operations.
Because of the complexity and potential
adverse impact of NBC warfare on US and
multinational theater operations, it is
imperative that all facets of NBC defense
be considered in formulating courses of
action (COA). This chapter outlines the
theater strategic and operational
considerations.

3. Theater Strategic Considerations

See Figure III- 1.
a. The Range of Military Operations.
The strategic environment within each
theater consists of a variety of conditions-
political, economic, social, ideological,
psychological, military- and a range of
NBC threats that may elicit a response
from across a range of military operations
to respond to those conditions and threats.
The following discussion is intended to
assist commanders in defining needs,
devising strategies, and projecting resources
when planning for the conduct of NBC
defense operations. A detailed description
of the states of the range of military

"We can't dis- invent nuclear weapons. We believe that nuclear weapons
are an essential instrument to prevent any kind of war simply by keeping the
risks high enough. I do not see a situation in which we would de- nuclearize
Europe." Manfred Woerner

Secretary General, NATO, 1991
operations can be found in Joint Pub 3- 0,
"Doctrine for Joint Operations."

° Operations Other Than War Not
Involving the Use or Threat of Force.
Within this state, US forces may
conduct joint training exercises in a
simulated NBC environment to
demonstrate survivability, continued
combat effectiveness, and retaliatory
resolve; conduct peacekeeping
operations; conduct disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance in the wake of
NBC accidents or isolated incidents
caused by the actions of terrorists or
belligerent groups; or execute a show
of force to dissuade the use or further
use of such weapons.

° Operations Other Than War Involving
the Use or Threat of Force. The use
of WMD in a conflict situation could
give one party a decisive edge in the
attainment of its objectives. Within this
state, military power in response to
threats may be exercised in an indirect
manner while supportive of the other
elements of national power. Limited
objectives may be achieved by the
short, focused, and direct application
of force. Availability and use of
WMD may allow one party to achieve
a significant advantage over the
other. Conflict also describes situations
in which opposing political factions
engage in actions to gain control of or
destabilize the political leadership
within a nation. The use of WMD in 30
30 Page 31 32
III- 2
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Joint Pub 3- 11
such clashes or crises, depending on
geographic or environmental conditions,
could cause a spillover effect or
collateral damage to nations that are
not part of the conflict. As the amount
of forces, frequency of battles, number
of nations, and levels of violence increase
and are sustained over an extended period
and when the sovereignty of a nation is
threatened, conflict approaches the
threshold of a state of war and the
propensity to conduct NBC operations
may increase. Terrorist activities
involving the use of WMD may also
increase during hostilities short of war.

° War. It is within this state that the
introduction of WMD could have the
most severe and damaging effects on
operational readiness. The probability
of larger numbers of both forces and

WMD being employed is greater;
therefore, the capability to inflict
casualties may increase significantly.
Enemy forces may perceive a need to use
WMD before their capability is destroyed
by US preemptive strikes.

b. Theater Strategy. At the theater
operational level of war, NBC defense
encompasses those actions performed
by combatant commanders and their
subordinate commanders to provide
protection for forces and the means to enable
these forces to accomplish the strategic
objectives of the combatant commander. The
key considerations reviewed by the
combatant commander in the NBC defense
context include an assessment of the NBC
threat in theater, an assessment of theater
NBC readiness posture, an assessment of the
risk associated with operating in an NBC

THEATER STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
The Full Range of Military Operations.
Theater Strategy.
Theater Strategic Protection.
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

Force Requirements.
Risk Assessment.
Operational Planning Guidance.
Operational Readiness Considerations.

Figure III- 1. Theater Strategic Considerations 31
31 Page 32 33
III- 3
Theater NBC Defense Considerations
environment, and NBC impact on joint
operation planning and force requirements.

c. Theater Strategic Protection.
Combatant commanders determine
wartime missions based on the in- theater
threat and the environment and direction from
higher authority. Mission analysis helps to
identify specified tasks and determine
implied tasks. Theater strategy is based on
the combatant commander's intent, which is
derived from the mission, intelligence
evaluation, and characteristics of the theater.
The potential for NBC warfare in the theater
influences the theater protection posture.

d. Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES). The JOPES
provides the rationale for the initiation of
joint operation planning as described in
Joint Pub 5- 03.1, "Joint Operation Planning
and Execution System," Volume I: (Planning
Policies and Procedures), and Joint Pub 5-
03.2, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System," Volume II: (Planning and Execution

"I am directing that the United States eliminate its entire world- wide inventory of ground- launched short- range, that is theatre nuclear weapons. We will bring home
and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short- range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, insure that we preserve an effective air- delivered nuclear capability
in Europe. That is essential to NATO's security. In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us- to destroy their entire inventory of ground- launched
theatre nuclear weapons; not only their nuclear artillery, and nuclear warheads for short- range ballistic missiles, but also the theatre systems the US no longer has-
systems like nuclear warheads for air- defense missiles, and nuclear land mines. Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the
United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land- based naval
aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from US ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line
is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons . . . As we implement these initiatives, we will closely watch how the new Soviet
leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to be met with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does
not, then an historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies,
and to respond as necessary."

President George Bush Broadcast Address to the Nation, Washington, Sept. 27, 1991

Formats and Guidance). The JSCP
provides guidance to the combatant
commanders, other members of the Joint Staff,
and directors of Defense agencies to
accomplish assigned strategic tasks. It is the
initiating document for deliberate joint
operation planning. A key part of the
planning process is the assessment of threat
NBC capabilities and intentions. If this
assessment indicates an NBC potential, an
operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order
would address measures necessary to counter
the use of such weapons and provide broad
guidance regarding NBC defense posture for
the joint forces. The crisis action planning
system requires a flexible adaptation of the
basic planning process. Previously
established joint operation plans are used
whenever possible, with appropriate
modifications to the courses of action. The
method by which the basic planning system
is modified for crisis action planning is
described in Joint Pub 5- 03.1, "Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System,"
Volume I: Chapter V. 32
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Joint Pub 3- 11
e. Force Requirements. Force
development r e m a i n s a S e r v i c e
responsibility; however, the complex nature
of NBC defense warrants special interest by
the combatant commander and the staffs. The
COA developed under JOPES, the campaign
plan, or supporting operation plans will provide
guidance to the Services and United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

to ensure inclusion of units like biological
use verification labs or teams, NBC
decontamination and reconnaissance units, as
well as multispectral smoke capability.

f. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is a
very integral and pivotal role for the
combatant commander. Such an assessment
in an NBC context is the deliberate process
of calculating the possible loss of manpower
and materiel to an anticipated NBC threat.
It is a subjective measurement, usually
expressed in a percentage, but qualified. For
instance, the assumption could be added that,
"We can expect 50 percent casualties to
unprotected personnel in the event of
persistent chemical attack." In the case of
friendly nuclear targeting or attack, the risk

to friendly personnel is expressed in adjectival
ratings and is included in the NBC messages.
See the Joint Uniform Message System
outlined in Joint Pub 6- 04.10, "Description
of US Message Text Formatting Program."

g. Operation Planning Guidance.
Responsibilities for NBC planning are shown
in Annex B to Appendix A. Considerations

for operational planning guidance are included
in Annex C of Appendix A. A sample NBC
appendix to an OPLAN is shown at Annex
D of Appendix A.

h . Readiness Considerations.
Readiness is the ability of US military
forces to fight and meet the demands of the
national military strategy. Readiness is the
synthesis of two distinct but interrelated
levels: a. unit readiness- The ability to
provide capabilities required by the combatant
commanders to execute their assigned
missions. This is derived from the ability of
each unit to deliver the outputs for which it
was designed. b. joint readiness- The
combatant commander's ability to integrate
and synchronize ready combat and support

When considering the impact of threats, Commanders must assess the problems associated with operating large port facilities in an NBC environment, particularly
in terms of possible loss of manpower and materiel. 33
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III- 5
Theater NBC Defense Considerations
forces to execute his or her assigned missions.
To maintain NBC defense readiness in support
of joint operations, combatant commanders
should, at a minimum, accomplish the
following:

° Assess enemy NBC capability and
intent.

° Include appropriate NBC defense
annexes to OPLANs.

° Direct component commanders to
assess whether automatic masking
procedures should be directed and what
conditions should apply.

° Provide NBC protection guidance.
° Assess available warning means and
associated dissemination channels.

° Assess readiness of joint forces under
NBC conditions.

° Have r e s p o n s i b l e component
commanders determine requirements
for chemical units (for example, smoke,
decontamination, NBC reconnaissance).

° Determine host- nation support
(HNS) needs for NBC defense and
consult with allies and coalition
partners.

° D e t e r m i n e h o w t o s u s t a i n
operations under NBC conditions
(for example, survival of critical
fixed sites, mission- essential
personnel, resupply of chemical
defense equipment, treatment of
casualties).

° Assess resiliency of the C4I system
under NBC conditions.

° Determine NBC defense requirements
for all personnel.

° D e t e r m i n e s p e c i a l m e d i c a l
requirements (collective protection,
biological defense pre- deployment, and
theater immunization requirements,
theater prophylaxis stockage levels and
distribution, and Food and Drug
Administration approvals for
Investigational New Drug use).

4. RCAs and Herbicides
Annex F (Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents;
and Herbicides) to the JSCP provides
guidance for the use of riot control agents
and herbicides. The following is an extract
from the JSCP.

a. Use in Wartime
° The US has renounced first use of
herbicides in war except under
regulations applicable to domestic use
or for control of vegetation within US
bases and installations and around
their immediate perimeters.

° The US has renounced the first use of
RCAs in war. US forces will only use
RCAs in war in defensive modes to save
lives as approved by the President.

° In wartime, use of RCAs outside the
war zone is authorized as prescribed for
peacetime as described in paragraph 4b.

° For RCA and herbicide use, war is
any period of armed conflict no
matter how it may be characterized,
including declared and undeclared war,
counterinsurgency, and any other uses
of armed forces in engagements between
US military forces and foreign military
or paramilitary forces. Armed conflict
is conflict between states in which at
least one party has resorted to the use
of armed force to achieve its aims. It
also may involve conflict between a 34
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III- 6
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Joint Pub 3- 11
state and uniformed or non- uniformed
groups within that state, such as
organized resistance groups.

° Commanders must recognize that, while
the US does not consider herbicides and
RCAs to be chemical weapons, some
other countries do not draw a distinction.
Commanders must consider
international ramifications and rules
of engagement before recommending
the use of herbicides or RCAs.

b. Use in Peacetime
° The Secretary of the Army, as Executive
Agent for the Department of Defense for
civil disturbance operations, has
promulgated instructions governing the
use of RCAs in civil disturbances in
the US, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and US possessions and territories.

° RCAs may be used on US bases, posts,
embassy grounds, and installations for
protection and security purposes, riot
control, installation security, and
evacuation of US noncombatants and
foreign nationals. The US- controlled
portions of foreign installations are
considered US installations.

° Chemical aerosol- irritant projectors
may be used by military law
enforcement personnel for the
performance of law enforcement
activities. They may be used in the
following areas:

°° On- base and off- base in the United
States and its territories and possessions.

°° On- base overseas.
°° Off- base overseas in those countries
where such use is specifically authorized
by the host- country government.

° RCAs may be used off- base (world-wide)
for the protection or recovery of
nuclear weapons under the same
conditions as those authorized for the use
of lethal force. (See DOD Directive
5210.56.)

° RCAs may be used in training. A
review of current treaties and/ or Status-of-
Forces Agreements between the host
country and US forces may be required
in determining whether or not training
with RCAs is authorized.

° Herbicides may be used within US bases,
posts, and installations for control of
vegetation. Use of herbicides off- base
overseas must be in accordance with host-country
laws and agreements, US
Environmental Protection Agency
requirements, or Service regulations,
whichever are the most stringent.

c. Authority
° Only the President may authorize the
following:

°° Use of RCAs in war, including
defensive military modes. However,
advance authority to use RCAs for
protection or recovery of nuclear
weapons has been delegated to the
Secretary of the Defense.

°° Wartime use of herbicides, including
installation vegetation control.

° The Secretary of Defense may authorize
the following:

°° Use of RCAs or herbicides in
peacetime.

°° Use of RCAs in wartime for the
protection or recovery of nuclear
weapons. 35
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III- 7
Theater NBC Defense Considerations
° Combatant commanders and
Service component commanders may
authorize the following:

°° The use of RCAs in peacetime on US
installations for riot control, installation
security, civil disturbance operations, and
noncombatant emergency evacuation
operations. The US- controlled portions of
foreign installations are considered US
installations.

°° The movement and storage of RCAs
and herbicides, as necessary, to support
requirements, provided US control is
maintained.

°° The off- base use of RCAs in
peacetime for the protection or recovery
of nuclear weapons under the same
situations as authorized for the use of
lethal force.

°° The use of herbicides in peacetime
within and, when authorized by the host-country
government, around US bases for
control of vegetation.

°° The use of chemical aerosol- irritant
projectors by military law enforcement
personnel during peace- time for the
performance of law enforcement
activities in the following areas: (1) On-base
and off- base in the US and its
territories and possessions. (2) On- base
overseas. (3) Off- base overseas in those
countries where such use is specifically
authorized by the host- country
government.

°° Authority for use of RCAs in
peacetime situations not covered by
the above (for example, to save lives in
counterterrorist operations) will be
addressed in plans and requested by the
combatant commanders for Secretary of
Defense approval.

5. Theater Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence
C4I are an integral part of all aspects
of NBC defense. An unbroken chain of
communications must extend from the
National Command Authorities through the
CJCS to the combatant commanders,
commanders of Service and functional
components, and a l l subordinate
commanders. This is especially critical in a
theater where the threat of NBC warfare exists.

a. Command and Control. Command in
this instance generally means the commander's
vested authority. When coupled with control
as in C2, the expression expands to mean the
process commanders use to plan, direct,
coordinate, and control forces to ensure
mission accomplishment. These terms hold
special significance in an NBC environment
because the process of commanding and
controlling becomes more complicated and
critical in an NBC environment.

b. Communications. Communications
encompass the systems that support the
command and control process. These
systems take on a special significance under
NBC warfare because of the inherent
complexity of such warfare and the direct
vulnerability of the communications
systems. For instance, the basic ability for
voice communications is hampered by
MOPP because of difficulty in talking
through a protective mask. Similarly, EMP
directly impacts radio transmissions and
sometimes even renders radios useless.
This could occur at the very time when radio
transmissions take on a new importance
because NBC activity precipitates a need
for additional reports. Full use should be
made of digital data link message standards
to facilitate warning. Communications also
encompass the array of warning systems
necessary in theater to provide adequate 36
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III- 8
Chapter III
Joint Pub 3- 11
notice to the forces of an NBC attack
imminent or in process. Reports are as
outlined in Joint Pubs 6- 04.21, 6- 04.22, and
6- 04.23, "US Message Text Formatting
Program." The level of authority for approval
of use of RCAs and herbicides also drives the
architecture of communications in theater.

c. Computers. The speed and complexity
of the modern battlefield, especially with
NBC weapons present, make computers
imperative in executing C2. Consideration
must be given to protecting computers from
the effects of WMD use.

d. Intelligence. To protect the forces,
and specifically NBC forces and assets,
commanders at all levels must ensure
that all sources of intelligence (signals
intelligence, imagery intelligence, human
intelligence [HUMINT], measurement and
signature intelligence, open source
intelligence, technical intelligence, and
counterintelligence) are considered and fully
involved in the determination of the
enemy's intentions, capabilities, and
vulnerabilities. Additionally, the JFC J2 staff
section should assist commanders in the
development of unit- essential elements of
information. A key aspect to the timely
dissemination of intelligence is the
availability of a dedicated communications
system. Only with the access to real- time, all
source intelligence disciplines can a
commander adequately defend personnel and
equipment. (For further details, see Joint Pubs
2- 0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support
to Operations;" 2- 01, "Joint Intelligence
Support to Operations;" and 2- 01.2, "Joint
Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Counter- intelligence Support to
Operations.")

6. NBC Defense Force Assets
NBC defense force considerations or
force developments remain a Service and

Commander in Chief, US Special
Operations Command responsibility.
Combatant commanders remain aware of the
salient factors that pertain to NBC force
requirements and USSOCOM or Service
components' r e s p o n s e s to t h e i r
requirements through JOPES. The need for
the combatant commander to take special
cognizance in a potential NBC environment
is because of the limited quantities of NBC
specialties available through sourcing in the
time- phased force and deployment data. The
criticality of these types of specialties, for
instance, was apparent in identifying
laboratory specialist units for biological
verification teams in Operation DESERT
STORM.

a. NBC Reconnaissance. NBC
reconnaissance assets might become
critical in- theater because of the "near-real-
time" need for NBC intelligence to
protect the forces properly. In addition to
conventional tactical NBC reconnaissance
elements, special operations forces have
chemical reconnaissance detachments that
are uniquely equipped and trained to infiltrate
deep into enemy rear areas to confirm or deny
the enemy's NBC capability before it is
employed. JFCs should work to streamline
NBC reconnaissance tasking and reporting
to ensure timely dissemination of NBC
intelligence.

b. Decontamination. Depending on the
level of use of NBC weapons in a theater,
there may be a need for a surge capability
for decontamination units. Current forces
are configured to cope with only sporadic use
of NBC weapons.

c. Battle Management. Combatant
commanders successfully execute the
campaign plan under NBC conditions
through battle management at the
operational level. Battle management for
component commanders is equally important 37
37 Page 38 39
III- 9
Theater NBC Defense Considerations
for combat, combat support, and combat
service support units of all Services. It
encompasses not only the NBC related actions
but also all other actions that permit
continuation of theater operations.

7. Multinational Forces Considerations

In most scenarios, the combatant
commander will be working with multi-national
forces in the prosecution of a
conflict or military operations other than
war. As such, it is imperative that full
consideration be given to multinational
concerns. One of the most important
c o n c e r n s i s d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
implementation of an effective NBC
warning system. This system must
transcend communications interoperability
and language barriers in near- real- time. In
many instances, this requirement will
necessitate transfer of equipment and
exchange of liaison personnel.

8. Protection of US Civilian Personnel in Theater

The geographic combatant commander,
or subordinate JFC, has the intrinsic
responsibility to provide protection to US
civilians in the AOR/ joint operations
area, consistent with capabilities and
operational mission. The responsibilities
in this area are normally discharged by the
Service component sponsoring the civilians
in theater. These responsibilities may
include, but not be limited to, the issuance
of protective equipment, medical
prophylaxis training on this equipment,
instructions regarding movement, and
procedures in the event of attack.

a. Issue of Protective Equipment.
Protective equipment will be made
available to US civilians consistent with
supply availability and their risk of

exposure. In the event of shortages of
masks or protective overgarments,
limitations may have to be made on
movement. Sufficient quantities of the
necessary protective equipment should
be obtained as the theater matures.

b. Training. Civilian personnel need
to be adequately trained on the proper
use of protective equipment. Normally, this
training would only include measures
necessary for individual protection.

c. Instructions. Operating procedures
and orders should include instructions
regarding the expected actions by US
civilians. This may include protective
equipment to be worn or carried, restrictions
on locations that cannot be visited, or
protected areas in which they are required
to remain.

d. Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO).
NEO plans should be developed and
exercised regularly. NEOs are conducted
under the overall direction of the Department
of State which will outline which categories
of civilian personnel are to be included. For
instance, in the event of a high probability
of hostilities, family members may be
evacuated but necessary technical personnel
and members of the media may remain.

9. Protection of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)

US forces must safeguard EPW or
civilian internees from attacks to
include NBC. This will place additional
requirements in training, liaison,
decontamination, and logistical support on
US forces. EPW may not have adequate
protective equipment and must be issued
and trained in the use of US equipment.
NBC defense equipment in possession of
EPW may not be compatible with US filters
and other associated replacement parts. 38
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Intentionally Blank 39
39 Page 40 41
CHAPTER IV LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS
IV- 1
"Peace isn't breaking out. We just fought a war [in the Persian Gulf]. If
anything, the ability to retaliate quickly and accurately anywhere in the world
is more important now than in the past as weapons of mass destruction
proliferate. . . You can't let down your guard."

Hans Mark
(Former Secretary of the US Air Force)
Chancellor, University of Texas, 1991

1. Purpose
This chapter provides l o g i s t i c
support considerations f o r t h e
planning and conduct of joint NBC
defense operations.

2. Overview
Logistic support for NBC defense
operations will be performed during any state
of the range of military operations. The

combatant commander must plan for
logistic support operations for joint NBC
defense. The combatant commander should
cover all these aspects of logistic support in
the portions of campaign plans and orders that
address NBC defense in the theater.

3. Logistic Operations
a. Combatant Commander Directive
Authority. Wi t h i n a t h e a t e r, the
geographic combatant commander exercises
directive authority over logistic operations.

° US military doctrine specifies that each
Service will provide its own logistical
support except when logistic support
is otherwise provided for by
agreements with national agencies or

allies, or assignments of common,
joint, or cross- servicing logistics.

° The g e o g r a p h i c combatant
commander has the authority to
issue and implement directives to

Joint force troops conducting maintenance operations in an NBC environment. 40
40 Page 41 42
IV- 2
Chapter IV
Joint Pub 3- 11
transfer logistic functions between or
among Service components within
the AOR under wartime or crisis
conditions. This authority is designed
to ensure effective execution of
approved OPLANS, pro v i d e
effectiveness and economy in
OPLANS, and prevent unnecessary
duplication of facilities and functions
among the Service components.

b. Logistic Support in an NBC Defense
Posture. The Department of Defense has
designated the US Army as the executive
agent for the DOD Chemical and Biological
Defense Research, Development, and
Acquisition Program. The US Army
implements this responsibility through a joint
Service agreement and chairmanship of a joint
Service review group and a joint panel on
chemical biological defense, reporting to the
joint logistic commanders. The US Army
also chairs a joint Service coordination
committee to assist in chemical defense
equipment logistic prioritization and
allocation of resources worldwide. Logistic
organizations provide support and
assistance to sustain forces. This support
is primarily in the functions of supply,
maintenance, transportation, civil
engineering and health services, and
services associated with non- materiel support
actions. Geographic combatant commanders
exercise C2 of the logistic effort through
Service component commanders so that they
can shift support effort to the critical place
and time. Logistic commanders must
initiate NBC defensive procedures to
limit exposure of their units and facilities to
NBC attacks and to protect personnel and
supplies from NBC contamination. Where
protection is not assured, NBC defense calls
for decontamination of critical support
materiel. Most logistic functions become
more difficult under NBC conditions.
Medical units must implement systems to
treat and evacuate larger numbers of
casualties, who may also require special

handling before, during, and after
treatment. The supply system must provide
needed protective clothing, shelters, and
munitions to support the operations. The
geographic combatant commander
identifies functions and services available
from host- nation (HN) assets. US units may
train and equip personnel from US,
multinational, and HN forces to ensure their
survival.

c. Logistic Support for NBC
Readiness. Logistics in an environment
in which NBC warfare is anticipated must
be considered from the aspect of the
overall logistics effort under NBC
conditions and logistic sustainment of the
NBC defense effort itself. Adequate
logistic support is vital to all combat
operations, which must continue under all
conditions. When developing a plan, the
combatant commander balances
requirements against limited resources.
The challenge is to accomplish the mission
with assets available. Logistical
considerations, shown in Figure IV- 1, often
drive the COA open to a commander.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR NBC READINESS
CONSIDERATIONS

SUSTAINABILITY. Anticipation.
Integration. Continuity.
Improvisation. Responsiveness.

STOCKS OF NBC EQUIPMENT.

Figure IV- 1. Logistic Support for NBC Readiness Considerations 41
41 Page 42 43
IV- 3
Logistic Support Operations
° Sustainability. The geographic
combatant commander must have the
ability to maintain logistic support
throughout the operation. Special
supplies and increased quantities may be
required for NBC units. The logistician
must plan for and achieve logistic
momentum, even in an NBC
environment. To meet the challenges, the
geographic combatant commander
should follow the sustainability
imperatives.

°° Anticipation. Logistic planners try
to foresee future operations as
accurately as possible and ensure
adequate sustainment to accommodate
any likely contingency. NBC defense
features high consumption rates of
fuel, fog oil, decontaminants, water,
protective clothing, vaccines and/ or
toxoids. The geographic combatant
commander and component logisticians
must understand the implications of
such requirements on the logistic
system's ability to sustain operations.
Logistics considerations must include the
possibility of a release of a biological
aerosol, for example, being more likely
to take place at night because of more
favorable meteorological conditions.
Although daytime attacks cannot be ruled
out, logisticians must plan for logistic
support and precaution procedures
especially during the hours of darkness.

°° Integration. Tactical and
operational plans must fully
integrate logistic considerations and
must include requirements for NBC
defense. Protection of supplies and
equipment is included. The effects of
contamination on main supply routes
(MSRs), supply points, and fixed sites
are incorporated into overall planning.

°° Continuity. All forces must
continuously receive supplies and

services to maintain their fighting
strength.

°° I m p r o v i s a t i o n . L o g i s t i c
organizations must improvise to
meet unforeseen emergencies.
Degradation of logistic operations
under NBC conditions will require
alteration of work schedules because
of increased times needed to handle
contaminated supplies and equipment,
as well as work in protective clothing.
Logistic planners should plan for
expedient covers and shelters to
p r o t e c t c r i t i c a l i t e m s f r o m
contamination. Logistic commanders
will prioritize and accomplish only
mission- essential tasks.

°° Responsiveness. The logistic
system must be versatile and able to
react rapidly. The hazards and
potential damage caused by WMD may
require relocation of support bases and
medical service support, major
r e d i rection o f s u p p l y f l o w,
reallocation of transportation and
construction means, or short- notice
transfer of replacement personnel or
units from one part of the theater to
another. Plans must be made for a
surge capability for NBC related
equipment for a theater in which the
use of WMD are anticipated.

° Stocks of NBC Equipment. Logistic
support for NBC readiness involves
two areas of concentration. The first
is logistic support for NBC defense
of all units. This is the supply and
transportation of adequate stocks of
chemical and biological defense
equipment to support the operation.
The second is sustainment of
chemical organizations (smoke,
decontamination, and reconnaissance
units) with NBC mission- essential
items. 42
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IV- 4
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Joint Pub 3- 11
If radar and related electronic devices provided major boons to post- war travel as
well as dramatic changes in the nature of warfare, another scientific development of the war years was to leave a very mixed and dubious legacy: the appearance of

atomic weapons. In the first decades of the twentieth century, physicists and
chemists had begun to unravel the inside of the atom, once thought to be a stable unit in the construction of matter in the universe, and had discovered instead that

it was made up of a variety of electrons, neutrons, and other particles. In the process of radioactivity some of these particles broke apart, and it was discovered
that this breaking process could be artificially stimulated by bombarding atoms
in devices which were the fore- runners of accelerators and cyclotrons. In 1938, the German chemist Otto Hahn discovered that when uranium was bombarded

by neutrons, instead of absorbing them, it split into two different elements each about half the atomic weight of uranium and in the process both creating energy
and releasing neutrons which might in turn split other uranium atoms as they
were hit, thus potentially creating a chain reaction in which enormous quantities of power would be released in a massive explosion of unprecedented dimensions.

If the process were unchecked, it offered the potential of incredible destructiveness; if it were controlled and slowed, it equally promised almost unlimited power which
could be used in the form of electricity.
Otto Hahn and another German scientist, the physicist Werner Heisenberg,
continued work on this process, trying to determine which material best lent itself to the fission process in a manner that made that process self- sustaining,

how much of this material would be needed to make a bomb, and how the
process of fission could be slowed down in the manufacturing process to keep it from destroying itself. The answer to the first of these three puzzles

had been discovered just before the beginning of World War II by the Danish scientist Niels Bohr; the Germans were never to find the correct answers to
the other two. The most suitable material was an isotope, or variant, of
uranium 236 known because of its atomic structure as uranium 235. Because there were only minute quantities of U- 235 in uranium as found in nature,

there was the problem of how to separate it from the rest, a question that made it all the more important to determine how much of this extremely rare
material would have to be assembled to make a single explosive device. The
Germans miscalculated by a great margin, and the resulting belief that huge quantities would be needed put a damper on all subsequent German efforts

to create an atomic bomb. Since the Germans expected to win the war quickly, the idea of a weapon which could only be made ready in several years of
arduous effort had little appeal.
This disregard of the potential of atomic weapons was reinforced by two
further grave miscalculations. The first of these involved the material needed to slow down the fission process. The Germans correctly recognized that an

isotope of water, usually referred to as heavy water, was excellent for this
purpose and were happy over their good fortune in capturing the only large factory in the world capable of manufacturing substantial quantities of it

when they occupied Norway in April 1940. The "Norsk Hydro" plant became the focus not only of German researchers but also of British and Norwegian
saboteurs and bombers. A series of commando raids and air raids in February,

HITLER'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT:
THE GREAT MISCALCULATION 43
43 Page 44 45
IV- 5
Logistic Support Operations
July, and November 1943 effectively disrupted the main German source of heavy water at a time when huge American facilities were already being
erected. Not only had the German scientists in their fixation on heavy water missed the potential major role of graphite in slowing the fission process,
but they had dramatically underrated the ability of the Western Allies.
When the last German charge d'affaires and his military attache in the United
States returned to Germany in 1942, they were received by Hitler in late May and treated to a lengthy monologue on the lack of any real war industry in the

United States and the absence of engineers and weapons specialists. Such
views were not confined to Hitler by any means; they were widely shared among German scientists and intellectuals in general. When in August of

1945 German scientists heard of the dropping of an atomic bomb, they at first refused to believe that the Americans and British could possibly have
succeeded where they had failed.
SOURCE: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms,
Cambridge University Press, 1994.

d. Reconstitution. On the NBC
battlefield, organizations may be subject to
catastrophic losses. When such losses occur,
each affected unit must be brought back to
operational effectiveness or replaced. The
reconstitution role of Service components
is to restore debilitated or destroyed units
from available assets. First, there must be
an assessment of the criticality of the function.
If the function is determined to be critical, it
must be resumed. Second, the unit must be
assessed for remaining capability in terms of
personnel and equipment. Using the surviving
assets as a base, component commanders
must determine what personnel and
equipment each unit will need to return to
an acceptable level of effectiveness.
Personnel may come from the replacement
system, medical channels, or other
organizations that perform less critical
functions. The required equipment may come
from the supply system, maintenance
facilities, or other organizations.

4. Services Support
a. Decontamination of Equipment.
Decontamination of equipment is performed
to prevent casualties, increase unit and

individual effectiveness, and limit the
spread of contamination. All personnel
perform operational decontamination of their
skin and equipment. Decontamination
companies provide units with
decontamination support required beyond
unit capabilities. Decontamination units
accomplish this through the use of large- scale
decontamination equipment. Decontamination
is provided for equipment; stockpiles of
materiel; and facilities, terrain, and MSRs
on a priority basis. Supported unit
commanders establish p r i o r i t i e s .
Decontamination companies decontaminate
higher priority materiel, facilities, and MSRs.
The natural weathering process, or the
supported unit with organic resources,
decontaminates lower priority items. Unit
plans for decontamination of large areas must
include maximum use of HN equipment
and materiel. Commanders should ensure
that all items of equipment that cannot be
decontaminated are identified during their
advance planning.

b. Clothing Exchange and Shower. A
personal clothing exchange and shower
services are available throughout all
levels of command. The standard is to 44
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IV- 6
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Joint Pub 3- 11
provide at least a weekly bath for personal
hygiene and an exchange of clothing for
each Service member. This will be done
on an accelerated basis in an NBC
environment, as determined by the Service
component.

c . Equipment R e c o v e r y and
Evacuation. The recovery and evacuation
of equipment is essential to sustaining military
operations. Even in an NBC environment,
units cannot consider equipment, especially
NBC protective equipment, expendable once
it becomes inoperative and contaminated.
The feasibility of recovering equipment that
is contaminated must be carefully considered
in every case. The item must be
decontaminated and recovered, if practical.
If the situation will not allow the equipment
to be decontaminated and the contamination
is severe enough to prevent recovery and
evacuation, the location will be noted and
reported for later recovery. Each Service
component should develop procedures for the
recovery and evacuation of contaminated
equipment.

d. Mortuary Affairs Policy, Standards,
and Procedures. In an NBC environment,
mass fatalities may result from a
combination of effects such as burns,
fragmentation, internal damage from nuclear
blast overpressures, radiation, disease from
biological warfare, and the consequences of
chemical agent exposure. The geographic
combatant commander will decide on the
disposition of remains. Contaminated
remains may have to be buried in place
following emergency burial procedures. If
there are decontamination capabilities that will
render remains harmless both internally and
externally, remains will be decontaminated
when time and available assets permit.
H o w e v e r, i f t h e y c a n n o t be
decontaminated, they are buried at the site
of recovery and the site is clearly marked
accordingly. In instances of mass fatalities,
the geographic combatant commander, on

advice of the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office
(JMAO), gives permission for mass burials
of fatalities. The JMAO will direct and
control later disinterments. For detailed
instructions on handling contaminated
remains, see Joint Pub 4- 0, "JTTP for
Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations," and
Service manuals FM 10- 63, AFM 143- 3, and
FMFM 4- 8.
e. Emergency Destruction and
Evacuation of US Nuclear Munitions and
Captured NBC Munitions

° Plans for destruction or disablement of
biological and chemical munitions must
minimize the risk of release of agents.
Options for emergency disposition of
these munitions, in order of preference
are:

°° Evacuation to safer location.
°° Render unserviceable in accordance
with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
procedures.

°° Mark and abandon (record the
location).

° The evacuation of NBC munitions
requires the establishment of
transportation procedures. In
accordance with Joint Pub 4- 0,
"Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint
Operations," the geographic combatant
commander will usually be supported by
technical representatives from the Army
Materiel Command and the United
States Transportation Command.
Department of Energy could also play a
role in this mission. The requirement for
the prior notifications contained in PL 91-
121 as amended are applicable. When
WMD are evacuated from an outside the
continental United States location, the
NCA will direct the appropriate
coordination with the host or allied nation
through the Department of State. 45
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IV- 7
Logistic Support Operations
° Enemy NBC munitions that are in
danger of being recaptured or that pose a
unique challenge to safety may require
destruction. Procedures similar to those
for friendly munitions will be followed.
Service EOD units will prepare technical
intelligence reports on all captured NBC
munitions and fuzing systems.

5. Supply Support
The g e o g r a p h i c c o m b a t a n t
commander is responsible for effective
coordination of supply support among the
Service components. When practical to
improve economy of effort, common item
support may be assigned to a Service
component commander, normally the
predominant user. The geographic combatant
commander is also responsible for the
allocation of critical supply resources within
the command.

a. General Supply Operations. Supply
points will issue protective masks and
overgarments as well as protective shelters
to help prevent or limit casualties from NBC
warfare. Supply units will package
protective clothing as complete sets of
MOPP equipment to support a predetermined
number of Service members. Decontamination
supplies may be issued in preconfigured
"push" packages.

b . Wa t e r Pro d u c t i o n for
Decontamination. Decontamination places
excessive demands on the water supply system.
Water support does not maintain contingency
stocks of water to accommodate the demands
of an NBC environment. Water supply units
will produce potable water and can
decontaminate water to acceptable levels for
decontamination of personnel and unit
equipment. Potable water is not required for
decontamination; however, potable water may
have to be used if nonpotable water is not
available. Units must use their organic
equipment to transport water.

6. Transportation
An NBC environment will increase the
importance of alternative modes and
routes. This makes centralized movement
control imperative. Highway regulation
point teams from movement control
centers will use NBC and intelligence
reports to monitor contaminated routes
and regulate traffic on MSRs. As
necessary, they will recommend diverting
supply convoys to alternate routes.
Coordination is made using the services of
the Joint Movement Center.

7. Host- Nation Support
NBC defense operations must be
coordinated with multinational forces and
HNs to augment US capabilities. Existing
HNS systems and capabilities should be used.
HNS forces for NBC warning, reporting,
and decontamination may be under the
control of US chemical units. The overall
goal is maximum effectiveness of NBC
defense efforts in the theater.

8. Multinational Support and Friendly Forces Considerations

Customarily, logistic support is a
national responsibility. US forces may
provide the support to or receive
support from an allied or coalition
nation. A factor that multiplied the
effectiveness of the logistic effort in
Operation DESERT STORM was the
support provided to different nations.

a . Ti m e l y C o o r d i n a t i o n o f
Requirements. The geographic combatant
commander will almost always be
providing support to or receiving
support from allied or coalition
nation( s). Agreements to provide or
receive support must be accomplished
as early as possible to aid detailed
planning. 46
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b. Standardization and Interoperability
of Logistic Support. In planning and
executing multinational operations,
the geographic combatant commander
and our allies can achieve cost savings
and increased effectiveness by
implementing standardization and
interoperability of allied logistic
support. An effective realignment of
logistic support from a national to an area
concept requires an alliance or coalition-wide
emphasis on standardization and
interoperability.

9. Nuclear Survivability and NBC Contamination
Survivability Standard
Mission critical equipment should meet
all Nuclear Survivability (NS) and NBC
Contamination Survivability (NBCCS)
standards. NS and NBCCS standards are
designed to ensure that US equipment is
hardened to exposure to specific WMD
effects, compatible enough to be used in
MOPP IV, and decontaminatable so that it

can be purged of an absorbed agent and
returned to service without danger to the
equipment operators.

10. Environmental Considerations

Environmental considerations
differ among theaters because some
environments are more vulnerable to the
impact of NBC warfare than others. The
impact on the environment is not directly
proportional to the amount of flora and
fauna present. Some deserts have a more
delicate ecosystem than the most intricate
rain forest. A potential source of
contamination that must be addressed
during NBC defensive operations is the
spread of contamination during
maneuver, decontamination, or other NBC
operations. In peacetime, environmental
concerns are dealt within diplomatic circles,
but outside the US, DOD is required to
comply with environmental standards of
general applicability by Executive Order
13088. 47
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CHAPTER V MEDICAL SUPPORT
V- 1
"Even in theory the gas mask is a dreadful thing. It stands for one's first
flash of insight into man's measureless malignity against man."

Reginald Farrer
The Void of War

1. Purpose
This chapter provides medical support
considerations for planning and conducting
joint NBC defense operations.

2. Overview
Medical support for NBC defense
operations will be performed during any
phase of military operations. The
combatant commander should plan for these
medical aspects in the portions of campaign
plans and orders that address NBC defense
in the theater.

3. Health Service Support (HSS)
HSS remains a Service responsibility, as
outlined in Joint Publication 4- 02, "Doctrine
for Health Service Support in Joint
Operations." As more nations develop and
use WMD, the probability of US forces
encountering these weapons will increase.
Medical planning is one aspect of meeting
this challenge. Because of the large number
of casualties resulting from the use of such
weapons, and the special handling required
that can drain medical resources, the
combatant commander must plan to use
directive authority to ensure the proper
coordination of health service to the force,
to include adequate shelter, food, medical
prophylaxis, and fluids.

a. Defensive Measures. There are a
number of interrelated defensive measures
that should be included in the planning aspects
associated with HSS in an NBC environment.

These include military surveillance of key
sectors to deter an attacker disseminating
chemical or biological agents from a ship-,
aircraft-, or ground- based source; medical
defensive measures to protect personnel at
risk against exposure, infection, or
intoxication; physical defensive measures to
reduce the risk of personnel inhaling any
chemical agent or biological aerosol that may
be present; and early detection. Although
the detection of a biological aerosol is not itself
a countermeasure, effective detection plays a
key role in enabling other countermeasures
to be used efficiently.

b. Medical Management. The medical
management of casualties resulting from use
of WMD and, in particular, biological agents,
is a problem of managing large numbers of
individuals with infectious disease or
exposure to chemical agents and/ or toxins
and injuries resulting from nuclear
weapons. Medical units will require
augmentation to decontaminate incoming
casualties. Each element of the medical
treatment and evacuation process must be
evaluated, especially as it pertains to
multinational and HN interrelationships. The
fact that the source of the exposure may have
been artificially created by deliberate, hostile
means will not change the basic principles of
treatment. For instance, in the event of a
biological attack, the most important factor
in providing operationally relevant
information and adequate medical
m a n a g e m e n t w i l l be the r a p i d
establishment of an accurate, specific
identification of the agent. In contrast to
naturally occurring epidemics in which the 48
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disease incidence increases over a period of
weeks or months, an artificially induced
epidemic will peak in a few hours or days.
Since a biological attack may be silent or
nearly so, the first indication of a problem may
well be the appearance of a wave of casualties
in which medical personnel are unable to
differentiate natural disease epidemics from
overt or covert enemy attacks. Onset of illness
following exposure to toxic agents may range
from minutes or as long as 3 weeks. Some
potential biological agents are transmissible
among humans, so spread after the initial
attack may become an important planning
consideration.

° There are unique aspects of medical
management after biological attack
that require special alertness and
training. Timely identification and
communication of the threat is essential
for the theater force survival. Casualties
may not occur at the same time as they
would in the case of saturation bombing
or a massive surprise attack with nerve
agents. The degree of exposure to the
agent and host resistance causes the onset
of illness to be spread over a number of
hours or days. An increasing casualty
load is anticipated with relatively few
initial casualties and a greater number
over successive hours or days until a peak
is reached. An exception to this aspect
would be an attack with biological
toxin( s) that might create an immediate
and dramatic mass casualty situation.

° Decontamination and collective
protection for NBC attacks are
particularly important if the
situation necessitated a prolonged stay
in a presumptively infected area.
Medical management must provide
reasonably adequate shelter, establish
uncontaminated food and water intake,
and ensure specific treatment is available.
Demands for military medical support
to neighboring civilian populations

following such an attack will probably
be intense, especially if the attack
contaminated neighboring civilian
populations with concentrations of very
young, very old, and those already
suffering from underlying disease or
other forms of weakening stress.
Medical facilities security must also be
planned.

4. Medical Intelligence
T h e Armed Forc e s M e d i c a l
Intelligence Center can assist in the theater
threat assessment by evaluating the state of
a potential adversary's BW effort. Tactical
medical intelligence units conduct
investigations of disease resulting from
suspected enemy biological agent
employment and can provide limited analysis
of enemy drugs, serums, and antibiotics. It is
instrumental in gathering data from the
various medical units and nonmedical
units. The importance of medical alertness
cannot be overemphasized.

5. Preventive Medicine Principles

In an NBC environment, preventive
medicine services will be in great demand.
There is a possibility that many deaths would
occur if an effective biological agent attack
occurred. Demands for military medical
support to both military and civilian
populations will probably be intense.
Preventive medicine personnel must assist the
commander in determining the health
hazards associated with nuclear fallout
and biological contamination, such as safe
food and water sources, and in determining
when to use prophylaxis, immunization,
and other preventive measures associated
with NBC warfare. Preventive medicine
personnel must be aware of the NBC threat
in the theater and continually update the
informational data base on diseases,
potential disease vectors, and the susceptibility 49
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V- 3
Medical Support
One of the major weapons innovations of World War I, introduced by the Germans and imitated by the Allies, had been poison gas. The years between
the wars had seen both efforts at international agreement to ban poison gas and continued production and experimentation with it. Aside from
experimentation carried on in the Soviet Union with the approval of the latter,
the Germans simply kept up with other powers in the 1920s and 1930s until major breakthroughs led to the development of nerve gases on an increasing

scale during World War II. Tested on prisoners of war and on concentration camp inmates, nerve gases also claimed some victims as a result of accidents
and errors in the production process but were never employed at the front.
The decision by Hitler not to use the nerve gases was made on the basis of
several considerations. The one which we now know to have been false was the belief that the Allies also had nerve gases. Of great importance was the

evident reality of great Allied air strength obviously capable of making good
on the repeated public announcements that poison gas would be used in retaliation for any German use of it, either on the Eastern Front or anywhere

else. An equally significant restraint on the Germans was their lack of gas masks of any sort for much of the country's civilian population.

The British built up substantial stocks of phosgene and mustard gas, both widely used in World War I. They had been willing to use this weapon in 1940
if the Germans succeeded in establishing a substantial beachhead in an invasion. In 1944, Churchill would urge the use of gas either against the
sites from which the V- 1s and V- 2s were about to be launched or elsewhere
in retaliation for these new forms of indiscriminate bombardment, but contrary advice from his own military Chiefs of Staff and the objections of the

Americans prevented any such employment of poison gas.
The United States built up a very large stock of the gases used in World War
I for employment in case either the Germans or the Japanese turned to this weapon. Although the possibility of the use of gas in combat was considered

in the preliminary discussions of the invasion of Iwo Jima and the Japanese home islands in 1945, such projects were always vetoed by the President or
dropped by the military on their own. The shipment of chemical warfare
shells to the theaters of war for use if retaliatory employment proved necessary led to the greatest loss of life in a gas accident during the war. A

German air force bombing raid on ships in the harbor of Bari in Italy on December 2, 1943, led to the destruction of one ship (among seventeen) which
carried 100 tons of mustard gas in bombs; over a thousand Allied personnel
and Italian civilians being killed as a result.

Far larger numbers had been killed both accidentally and intentionally by the Japanese, who had built up a large poison gas program beginning in the last
months of World War I. They repeatedly used gas for experiments and in the
war against China. Perhaps because this employment was almost all carried out before Japan attacked the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, the

Western Powers chose not to retaliate in kind. This subject still awaits further investigation. The employment by the Japanese of a German- invented gas
grenade in the Imphal campaign in the summer of 1944 was seen as an isolated,

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE- WWI AND WWII 50
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V- 4
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Joint Pub 3- 11
and quite possibly unauthorized, incident. Improper safeguards and processes
left hundreds of former workers in the Japanese gas factory at Okunoshima in damaged health.

If a considerable amount of information about chemical warfare projects remains obscure, in part because records are still closed, this is even more
the case for biological warfare. Even the World War I attempts by the Germans to spread the cattle and horse disease anthrax in the United States and Canada
have been covered by a veil of obfuscation. Some work on biological warfare
agents was done in the inter- war years in several countries and continued into the war years.

There was a program during World War II for the development of biological
weapons in Great Britain, which had been inaugurated by Neville Chamberlain
in response to German threats of secret weapons and was pushed forward with Churchill's full support. With some material assistance from the United

States, this project was able to produce a small amount of anthrax (under the code name N) in 1943 and large amounts in 1944. The whole project was
designed for deterrence and, if necessary, retaliation should the Germans
resort to biological warfare. No quantities sufficient for use appear to have been made available during the war. There was substantial American research

on bacteriological warfare agents, again for any necessary retaliation. Little is known in open sources about Soviet work in this field, whatever it may
have been.
By far the most extensive work in the field of biological warfare appears to
have been done by the Japanese. Established already in 1932 in Manchuria, the Japanese center for research and experimentation was employing

thousands of workers in a massive installation operating under a 1936 formal
Imperial order by the late 1930s. Huge quantities of poisonous bacteria were produced and tried out on human guinea pigs in tests which began in 1932,

killed thousands, and were filmed for demonstrations to Japanese army officers. Delivering the biological warfare materials proved a major problem
when the Japanese tried them out in their war with China and this use
occasionally back- fired.

During the Pacific War, the experimentation was extended to American and British prisoners of war. Allied intelligence came to know about the Japanese
program at least in outline from 1942 onward, although the British, unlike
the Americans, discounted the evidence that was coming in. For obvious reasons, the Americans were especially concerned about the possible use of

the Japanese balloon campaign as a carrier of bacteriological materials. The biological warfare agents were, however, not used against the Western
Powers; in August 1945, the Japanese blew up the facilities, murdered the
surviving prisoners, and tried hard to cover up the whole episode.

SOURCE: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms,
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 51
51 Page 52 53
V- 5
Medical Support
of troops to these diseases. In NBC
conditions, diseases known to exist in the area
may be manifested but not transmitted to our
forces. The appearance of a disease or
vector not known to exist in the theater is
an indication that biological warfare agents
are being introduced into the area.
Following an effective NBC attack, the
application of general preventive medicine
principles will be important.

a. The tendency of individuals in an
emergency situation to become careless
regarding food and water sanitation, general
hygiene, and other common disease control
measures could be a significant cause of
secondary spread of disease. The problems
of maintaining safe water and food conditions
will differ for military personnel deployed
throughout the operational area and for the
civilian population.

b. Following an NBC attack, all food
except canned or otherwise well- protected
food should be thoroughly inspected to
ensure adequate protection was provided.
Foods determined to be safe must be protected
against secondary contamination. Protective
measures must be practiced by those who
transport, store, prepare, and serve food,
as well as by those who consume the food. In
addition, consideration must be given to
applying control measures necessary to
prevent contamination of food stuffs by
insects, rodents, and other vectors.

c. It is difficult to maintain satisfactory
personal and area field sanitation,
particularly in unfamiliar climates. Strict
measures are required for waste treatment and
sewage. Water surveillance and area water
sanitation control measures must be
instituted. The best insurance of water
sanitation is water purification or boiling.

However, water purification tablets and
military systems for boiling or purifying large
amounts of water for consumption and
hygiene purposes are not effective against
certain biological agents such as viruses,
spores, or toxins.

d. Washing with soap and water is the most
effective simple personal hygiene measure for
the control of communicable diseases. It is
the responsibility of each person to apply
standard individual protective and sanitary
measures as appropriate.

6. Patient Evacuation
Forward evacuation within the combat
zone is normally the responsibility of the
respective component command using
organic Service- assigned assets, e. g., Army,
Marine, Navy, SOF fixed- and rotary- wing
aircraft. Air Force fixed- wing aircraft with
specialized aeromedical evacuation crews can
assist with forward evacuation if the terrain,
distance, and other related factors are not
conducive to using organic assets. Movement
of patients within the theater is the
responsibility of the geographic combatant
commander. The Commander in Chief, US
Transportation Command is responsible for
establishing, operating, training, and
maintaining the common- user aeromedical
evacuation system for movement between
theaters and from theaters to the
continental United States. An NBC
environment forces the commander to
consider to what extent he/ she will commit
evacuation assets to the contaminated area.
If a task force is operating in a contaminated
area, most of the medical evacuation assets
will be operating there. There are three basic
modes of evacuating casualties (personnel,
ground vehicles, and aircraft) in the
combat zone. Cumbersome MOPP gear, 52
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Actions should be taken immediately to
ensure all personnel suspected of being
contaminated by a biological agent are cleaned
and kept free of disease- producing organisms.

8. Medical Facilities
Because of the medical unit location, threat
capabilities, and the unique aspects of NBC
operations, the following factors must be
considered:

a. WMD are capable of producing mass
casualties. Even though few chemical
casualties become fatalities, they require
intensive HSS. In the first few hours after an
NBC attack, medical facilities can be
swamped with casualties who require lengthy
hospitalization.

b. At the same time the patient load is
increasing, other factors combine to
complicate HSS operations. Operations in
MOPP gear reduce individual and
collective efficiency at a time when
manpower requirements increase. Patient
decontamination requires manpower and
will reduce the number of personnel available
to treat casualties. Heat stress in MOPP will
require more frequent rest breaks, further
reducing care capability. Establishing and
maintaining a facility with CPS and
continuously monitoring the air inside the
shelter for contaminants calls for additional
personnel. These procedures decrease the
ability to treat patients as efficiently and
effectively.

9. Impact on Health Services Support

The contaminated battlefield will be a
difficult environment in which to operate.
Stress from MOPP, reduced visual and
tactile senses from protective equipment,
reduced communication capability, and a
sense of isolation are all detrimental to
military operations. The HSS system has

climate, increased workloads, and fatigue will
greatly reduce personnel effectiveness. When
evacuation personnel are sent into a
radiologically contaminated area, the
operational exposure guide (OEG) must be
established. Based on the OEG, commanders
decide which evacuation assets will be sent
into the contaminated area. Every effort will
be made to limit the number of evacuation
assets that are contaminated. To ensure
contamination of evacuation assets is limited,
patients should be decontaminated before
transport.

7. Patient Decontamination and Triage

The management and treatment of
contaminated casualties will vary with the
tactical situation and the nature of the
contaminant. Each medical unit must have a
plan that can be put into effect immediately.
Decentralization is necessary- casualties
must not be forced to wait at a central point
for decontamination. All medical units
should have comparable sets of medical
items and decontamination equipment for
treatment of contaminated patients originating
in their area. Decontamination of the
patients serves two purposes: it prevents
the patient's system from absorbing additional
contaminants, and it protects medical
personnel treating the patient and other
patients from contamination.

a. Medical treatment facilities (MTFs)
will establish decontamination areas. When
casualties arrive at the MTF, they must be seen
at a triage point and directed to the proper
area. The triage officer must determine if the
patients have a surgical or medical condition
that requires priority over decontamination.

b. Ninety to ninety- five percent of all
decontamination can be accomplished by
removing the outer clothing and shoes. This
can usually be accomplished before admission
without interfering with medical treatment. 53
53 Page 54 55
V- 7
Medical Support
several unique aspects that must be
considered.

a. Contamination may be transferred to
the MTF if patients are evacuated to MTFs
without being decontaminated. Patients
must be decontaminated before they are
admitted into the CPS. This is required to
prevent the medical staff from becoming
casualties; ordinarily, the medical staff works
without protective equipment.

b. Many HSS assets are fixed or
possess limited mobility. They are often
located near command, control,
communications, and computers (C4)
activities and main supply routes; hence, they
must continue to operate within the
contaminated environment. Treatment
cannot cease while the unit relocates.

c. Oxygen Production and Resupply.
Production of liquid and gaseous oxygen
normally will not occur in an NBC
contaminated environment. Although
newer production plants have been designed
for potential operation in such a state,
generally production will be stopped until

air quality improves. Product transfer
operations (gaseous and liquid) will also be
curtailed unless medical and flight line
requirements demand such. Supply and
medical units must develop plans to
resupply critical gases and cryogenic
liquids in the contaminated area from
primary and alternate sources. These
sources include production and storage
organic to the unit, from other Services,
from HN support, and from commercial
contracts.

10. Special Medical Augmentation for
Operations in an NBC Contaminated
Environment
Decontamination operations are
extremely resource intensive. It is unrealistic to expect that medical personnel

will be able to manage both medical treatment and decontamination of patients.
For this reason, plans must address how
decontamination will be accomplished. Augmentation to provide decontamination

support must also be addressed in planning. 54
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Intentionally Blank 55
55 Page 56 57
acquaint personnel with defensive measures
but also stress proficiency in the individual's
primary skill area in an NBC environment.
Training is the only counter to the degradation
of job proficiency because of NBC protective
equipment. All personnel should be
included in this training. Rear area
personnel, air and ship crews, tank crews (with
filtered overpressure systems), and
particularly those in high- level command or
staff positions should not be exempt from
NBC training.

b. Joint and Multinational Exercises. All
appropriate joint and multinational
exercises should incorporate NBC
situations with prolonged operations in an

CHAPTER VI TRAINING AND READINESS

VI- 1
"Precisely because of the spread of dangerous military technologies, we
must also extend the arms control process beyond the narrow confines of
the superpowers. States like Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya are working to develop
the capacity to produce chemical arms and to acquire- in some cases
produce- the ballistic missiles to deliver them. The danger is real and we
have to get active now if we are to avert disaster."

President George Bush
August 2, 1988

1. Purpose
This chapter provides NBC training and
readiness considerations.

2. Overview
Training, readiness reporting, and
environmental concerns must be
considered when discussing support for
NBC defense.

3. Joint NBC Training
Although individual training and exercises
to test proficiency remain under the purview
of the Services, NBC defense will be
integrated into individual and collective
programs at all levels and into higher echelon
operational and tactical exercises, command
post and other C4 system exercises, and joint
and multinational training exercises. The
objectives of this training are to develop
and evaluate the readiness of US and
multinational military forces and mission-essential
civilians to operate in an NBC
environment and to ensure proficiency with
defensive NBC equipment, materials, and
procedures. Training considerations,
described below, are shown in Figure VI- 1.

a. Service Responsibilities. Each Service
will incorporate NBC defense training into
its overall training plan for units and
individuals. This training should not only

JOINT NBC TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS
SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES
JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS Reciprocal Unit Exchanges
Personnel Exchange Programs
Individual Exchanges Combination Programs

Figure VI- 1. Joint NBC Training Considerations 56
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VI- 2
Chapter VI
Joint Pub 3- 11
NBC environment. This joint training is the
responsibility of the JFC.

c. Exchange Programs. Exchange
programs provide a mechanism for
enhanced joint and multinational NBC
training. These exchange programs include
reciprocal unit exchanges, personnel
exchange programs, individual exchanges,
and combination programs.

° Reciprocal Unit Exchanges. These
programs allow each nation's forces to
train with other nations in NBC tactics,
techniques, and procedures. This
program is a good vehicle to familiarize
units in multinational NBC training.
To do so would be an extension of the
security assistance training programs.
The proficiency of the units must be

comparable to preclude exchanging fully
trained US forces for untrained HN
forces.

° Personnel Exchange Programs. This
is a one to three year program where a

person from the HN is exchanged with
a US member. This program, like
reciprocal unit exchanges, requires the
exchanged personnel to be of comparable
proficiency in their area of expertise.

° Individual Exchanges. This is similar
to the personnel exchange program.
However, it is different in that it is a
temporary duty program conducted in-theater.
This program gives
commanders greater flexibility
because the command will not lose
personnel for extended periods, and it
allows commanders to expose larger
portions of the force to the program.

° Combination Programs. Commanders
should consider combining security
assistance efforts with joint or

multinational exercises to obtain
maximum benefit for all concerned. For
example, exchange of key personnel
during exercises will gain more in terms
of interoperability than exchanges during
normal operational periods.

Exchange Programs include joint and multinational training in NBC tactics, techniques, and procedures to provide joint commanders greater flexibility in the
application of forces. 57
57 Page 58 59
VI- 3
Training and Readiness
4. Readiness Reporting

The need for readiness reporting is
important for the combatant commander
to exercise directive authority for logistics or
if NBC would materially affect COA or
organization of the theater.

a. NBC readiness reporting conforms
with CJCS and Service requirements.
Units designated as reporting units in
CJCS MOP 11 will report chemical and
biological defense equipment and training
status as a part of the Status of Resources
and Training System (SORTS) in accordance
with Joint Pub 1- 03.3, "JRS, Status of

Resources and Training System (SORTS),"
and Service directives. SORTS is the single,
automated report that provides the NCA,
Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and
Services with authoritative identification,
location, and resource information on
operational units within the Armed Forces
of the United States.

b. SORTS supports, in priority order,
the information requirements of users for
the following activities: crisis response
planning; deliberate or peacetime planning;
and management responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip forces used by the combatant
commands. 58
58 Page 59 60
VI- 4
Chapter VI
Joint Pub 3- 11
Intentionally Blank 59
59 Page 60 61

APPENDIX A NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE
PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES, GUIDANCE, AND
OPERATIONS APPENDIX TO AN OPLAN

A- 1
ANNEX
A Treaty Obligations History
B Responsibilities for NBC Defense Planning
C Planning Guidance for NBC Defensive Operations
D Nuclear,Biological,and Chemical Defense Operations;Riot Control Agents
and Herbicides Appendix to an Operations Annex 60
60 Page 61 62
A- 2
Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
Intentionally Blank 61
61 Page 62 63
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A TREATY OBLIGATIONS HISTORY
A- A- 1
1. Nuclear Treaties and Agreements
Although the potential use of nuclear
weapons remains a viable, strategic
deterrent option, treaties and international
agreements affect their proliferation,
control, and testing. These treaties and
agreements range from obligations with
environmental and technology transfer
considerations and bilateral agreements
between the United States and other
countries, including the former Soviet
Union, which focus on restraining the
development of nuclear warheads and
launchers, to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties I and II, which focus on reducing
and limiting strategic offensive nuclear
arms.

2. Geneva Protocol of 1925
This protocol prohibits the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and
of bacteriological methods of warfare. The
prohibition is accepted as part of
international law. The language bans the
use of chemical weapons in war. Most
parties interpret the protocol as a prohibition
only of the first use of chemical agents in
war. It does not ban the development,
production, and stockpiling of these
weapons. In 1974, the US Senate gave its
advice and consent to the ratification of the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 subject to the
reservation that the United States would not
be bound by the provisions with respect to
an enemy state if such state, or any of its
allies, fails to respect the prohibitions laid
down in the protocol. On 22 January 1975,
the President likewise approved the
protocol subject to the same reservation.

This reservation is the legal basis for the
US policy that the United States will not be
the first to use chemical weapons in warfare
and that the United States may use chemical
weapons in retaliation to an enemy's first
use of chemical weapons. The protocol
entered into force with respect to the United
States on 10 April 1975 upon depositing
the US ratification with France.

3. Reports to Congress (Public Law 91- 121, 19 November

1969)
This law directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit an annual report to Congress
setting forth the amount spent during the
preceding year for research, development,
testing, and evaluation of all lethal and
nonlethal chemical and biological agents.
It further mandates that none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this act
may be used for transportation, deployment,
storage, disposal, delivery systems, and
production of lethal binary chemical
munitions unless certain conditions should
occur and are so certified by the President
to Congress.

4. Presidential Statement on Chemical and Biological

Weapons (25 November 1969)

This statement reaffirms the renunciation
of the first use of chemical weapons and
extends the renunciation to the first use of
incapacitating chemicals. It also renounces
the use of lethal biological agents and
weapons and confines biological research
to defensive measures such as immunization
and safety. 62
62 Page 63 64
A- A- 2
Annex A to Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
5. Biological Weapons Convention (10 April 1972)
Under the terms of the convention, the
parties undertake not to develop, produce,
stockpile or acquire biological agents or
toxins "of types and in quantities that have
no justification for prophylactic, protective
and other peaceful purposes," as well as
weapons and means of delivery.

6. Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical

Herbicides and Riot Control Agents (Executive Order No.
11850, 8 April 1975)
This order renounces, as a matter of
national policy, first use of herbicides in war
except in specified defensive uses and first
use of riot control agents in war except in
specified defensive military modes to save
lives.

7. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985

(Public Law No. 98- 525, 1984)

This law directs that the President
establish a "Chemical Warfare Review
Commission." Its purpose is to review the
overall adequacy of the chemical warfare
posture of the United States with particular
emphasis on whether the US should produce
binary chemical munitions.

8. US- Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreements (1989- 90)

These agreements, which consist of the
1989 Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) and the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (December 1990), establish the
national commitments to the destruction
and nonproduction of chemical weapons
and measures to facilitate the multilateral

convention on banning chemical weapons.
The "1989 MOU" or "The Wyoming
MOU" was a confidence building measure
that was divided into two phases. Phase I,
which began in December 1989, included
a basic exchange on the size, composition,
and location of CW stockpile facilities, as
well as reciprocal visits to CW production,
storage and destruction sites, and civil
chemical industries. Phase II will include
a detailed data exchange and a series of
inspections. The second agreement, signed
1 June 1990, is known as the "Bilateral
Destruction Agreement."

9. Statement by the President
on Chemical Weapons Initiative (13 May 1991)

This statement commits the United States
to the success of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)- a multilateral treaty
that bans the production, possession,
transfer, and use of chemical weapons. Its
salient point was the formal forswearing of
chemical weapons use for any reason,
including retaliation, against any state, to
be effective once the convention enters into
force.

10. The Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993

The CWC, originally signed by 65
nations in Paris in January 1993, bans the
acquisition, development, production,
transfer, and use of chemical weapons
throughout the world. It also provides for
the destruction of all chemical weapons
stocks and production facilities within 10
years after the agreement takes effect.
Further, it requires the monitoring of
national chemical industries to ensure
compliance, through both routine and so-called
challenge inspections. The
convention will take effect for the United
States in 1995, if ratified. 63
63 Page 64 65
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NBC DEFENSE PLANNING
A- B- 1
The following is a synopsis of the
responsibilities for NBC defense planning
at the various echelons in addition to
those outlined in Annex F, JSCP.

a. Combatant Commands
° Defensive posture necessary to
permit military operations in an NBC
environment consistent with the
anticipated threat.

° Implementation of nuclear detonation
detection and reporting, chemical and
biological detection and reporting,
and radiation monitoring as
prescribed in Joint Pub 1- 03.7, "JRS,
Nuclear Weapons Reports."

° Procedures for verifying enemy use
of CBW.

° Support of NBC defense operations
of multinational forces, as
appropriate.

° Acquisition and reporting of foreign
information and intelligence on NBC
activities.

° Primary and alternate means of
communications with operational

procedures to be used during and
immediately following a chemical or
biological attack.

° Targeting procedures for enemy NBC
means.

° Procedures for requesting the use of
RCAs and herbicides.

b. Services
° Support NBC defense, RCA, and
herbicide operations in accordance
with assigned functions and with
the plans and requirements
developed by the combatant
commanders.

° Ensure adequate NBC defense for
component forces.

° Inform the Chairman of the Joint
C h i e f s o f S t a ff a n d t h e
component commands of any
inability to support the plans and
requirements of u n i f i e d a n d
s p e c i f i e d commands.

c. Agencies. As directed in the
Intelligence Priorities for Strategic
Planning. 64
64 Page 65 66
A- B- 2
Annex B to Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
Intentionally Blank 65
65 Page 66 67
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A- C- 1
1. Purpose
This annex provides guidance to the
geographic combatant commander for the
preparation of plans for the conduct of NBC
defense operations and for the use of RCAs
and herbicides.

2. General
US policy is to deter WMD use by
attaining and maintaining the military
capabilities to deny an enemy a significant
military advantage from such use. Key
objectives are to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and technology and
eliminate the threat of both biological and
chemical weapons' use by achieving a
worldwide verifiable ban on their
development, production, and stockpiling.
Annex F to the JSCP contains current
guidance for NBC operations.

3. Intelligence
For potential enemy chemical and
biological capabilities, see Annex F to JSCP
and National Intelligence Estimates.

4. Capabilities
Not applicable.

5. Planning Guidance
In addition to the requirements contained
in the NBC Defense Operations appendix
to the Operations annex, plans will include
the following elements, as appropriate:

a. Rules of engagement (ROE).
b. A comprehensive estimated types and
quantities of RCAs and herbicides required

and the means necessary to move this
materiel. Include RCA and herbicides
requirements in a separate listing, if
applicable.

c. Procedures for the use of RCAs in
situations involving threats to the lives of
civilians. (Authorization for such use must
be obtained in advance in accordance with
Annex F, JSCP.)

d. A summary of special logistic matters
pertaining to NBC defense operations, such
as the following:

° Requirements for individual and
collective protection.

° Issuance of protective clothing.
° Medical support requirements, to
include immunization (vaccine and
toxoid) or chemical prophylaxis (e. g.,
Pyridostigmine Bromide).

° Transportation requirements.
° Escort requirements.
° Decontamination requirements.
° Shelter requirements.
° Guidance for civilians and dependents.
° OPSEC measures to protect RCAs and
herbicides during storage and
movement, as required.

° Detection and reconnaissance
requirements.

e. Provisions for the establishment and
operation of an NBC warning and reporting 66
66 Page 67 68
A- C- 2
Annex C to Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
system. The system will provide for the
flow of NBC strike data from lower
echelons to the NCA and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will interface
with multinational forces.

f. Positive, automatic procedures for the
verification of enemy use of NBC. An
absolute determination of enemy use of
NBC will affect ROE and definitely affect
the protective posture of friendly personnel
and allies. Service components may have
organic detection units and equipment but
the Army component, as executive agent for
chemical and biological warfare, will
normally deploy the necessary laboratories
and teams. Geographic combatant
commanders, subordinate JFCs, and their
staffs must emplace the necessary
communications and procedures to ensure
the timely flow of this crucial information.

g. NBC capability of multinational
forces. The US supports and encourages
an adequate multinational NBC defense
capability. Because of the degree of
sophistication of the protective equipment
and warning systems in an NBC
environment, it is imperative that the
combatant commander be aware of the
protective capabilities of the multinational
forces. Under certain circumstances, US
protective materiel may have to be made
available to the multinational force.

h. Information regarding foreign NBC
capabilities. Many of the components of
chemical weapons are quite innocuous by
themselves, so the NBC surveillance system
must be comprehensive. As can be

ascertained from the discussion of the threat
in Chapter I, many countries have the
potential to obtain NBC weapons.

i. Designation of a dedicated
communications system to transmit NBC
warning data. Warning messages should be
in strict compliance with the US Message
Text Formatting Program and kept as brief
as possible to facilitate transmission,
especially if an existing operations net is
used instead of a dedicated system. A
standardized theater alarm system, which
is integrated with the multinational system,
should be implemented. In the absence of
guidance, different area commanders or
Service components may devise their own
alarm system.

j. Guidance on targeting of enemy NBC
delivery means. This information is
normally treated as a priority matter in the
air operations center, fire support centers,
and other target planning cells in the theater.
The geographic combatant commander
normally will provide guidance regarding
the priority of such targets. It is difficult to
determine whether enemy artillery
positions, ships, or air bases are preparing
to launch an NBC attack. The use of special
handling procedures, special security
precautions, or protective clothing take on
great significance for intelligence operators
trying to discern enemy NBC plans.
HUMINT data fed to an all- source center
for analysis is often the most effective
targeting procedure.

k. The use of RCAs and herbicides as
described in detail in Annex F to the JSCP. 67
67 Page 68 69
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE
OPERATIONS; RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES
APPENDIX TO AN OPERATIONS ANNEX

A- D- 1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date

Appendix __ to Annex __ to ____________________ OPLAN (U)
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control Agents and
Herbicides (U).

( ) References: List standing instructions regarding defense against NBC
weapons.

1. ( ) Situation
a. ( ) Enemy. Refer to Annex B.
(1) ( ) Capabilities. Estimate enemy capabilities to employ NBC weapons.
Summarize or refer to available delivery means, available munition stocks, defensive
equipment, order of battle, defensive support (such as decontamination of combat
support units), probable capabilities, areas the enemy is likely to subject to chemical
or biological threat, and similar data.

(2) ( ) Courses of Action (COAs). Identify the possible enemy COAs using NBC
weapons that could interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or affect the
implementation of the plan.

b. ( ) Friendly. Estimate the NBC defensive capability of multinational forces,
government agencies, and civilian populations that may affect the accomplishment of
the mission. Stipulate participation of allied forces, particularly whether they will be
using chemical munitions and agents.

c. ( ) Assumptions. List the assumptions on which NBC defense planning is based.
2. ( ) Mission. During war, the use of RCAs and herbicides requires a Presidential
decision. Such use should, therefore, be treated as an operational contingency that may
or may not be authorized. Planned NBC defense operations encompass several options
that the force commander should be prepared to undertake. Examples of mission
statements that may be included here are to: 68
68 Page 69 70
A- D- 2
Annex D to Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
a. ( ) Maintain the optimum posture for NBC defense against enemy employment
consistent with other mission requirements.

b. ( ) Employ RCA or herbicides in wartime, as required, only when authorized by
the President to support the concept of operations in the Basic Plan.

3. ( ) Execution
a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Describe NBC defense concept of operations.
b. ( ) Tasks. List the specific tasks assigned to each major subordinate commander.
c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. In the final subparagraph, provide guidance and
establish procedures applicable to NBC defense. Examples are the following:

(1) ( ) Determination of enemy use.
(2) ( ) Procedures for requesting additional allocations of RCAs and herbicides.
(3) ( ) Coordination of the safety of friendly forces, including safety criteria.
(4) ( ) Requirements and responsibilities for post- strike analysis.
(5) ( ) Procedures for warnings and reports of enemy chemical or biological weapons
employment.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics
a. ( ) Supply. List the procedures and responsibilities for supply of NBC defense
equipment. Include intratheater receipt, pre- positioning, requisitioning, issue,
accountability, and denial or evacuation procedures.

b. ( ) Storage and Transportation. List procedures, locations, and responsibilities for
storage and transportation of NBC defense equipment.

c. ( ) Support for Multinational Forces. List procedures and responsibilities for
providing NBC defensive logistic support to multinational forces, if applicable. Provide
for necessary multinational force familiarization or training.

d. ( ) Health Services. Outline procedures and responsibilities for providing health
services support in the NBC environment envisioned in the Basic Plan. Refer to Annex
Q for details of health service support.

5. ( ) Command and Control
a. ( ) Release Procedures. Explain specifically the procedure for obtaining conditional
release authority and approval for all RCA and herbicide operations. Provide for
appropriate delegation of authority to use RCA and herbicides upon approval. 69
69 Page 70 71
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations; Riot Control
Agents and Herbicides Appendix to an Operations Annex

A- D- 3
b. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Refer to Annex K
for general C4 requirements. Identify any special C4 requirements associated with
reporting enemy use of NBC weapons or the C4 of military RCA and herbicide
operations used by this command.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 70
70 Page 71 72
A- D- 4
Annex D to Appendix A
Joint Pub 3- 11
Intentionally Blank 71
71 Page 72 73
APPENDIX B REFERENCES
B- 1
1. DOD
a. Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
b. DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major
Components."

c. DOD Directive 5210.56.
d. "Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Reporting (FOUO)."
e. "Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress."
2. Joint
a. Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States."
b. Joint Pub 0- 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
c. Joint Pub 1- 01, "Joint Publication System: Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."

d. Joint Pub 1- 02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
e. Joint Pub 1- 3.3, "Joint Reporting Structure Status of Resources and Training System
(SORTS)."

f. Joint Pub 2- 0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."
g. Joint Pub 2- 01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations."
h. Joint Pub 2- 01.2, "Joint Doctrine, TTP for Counterintelligence (CI) Support to
Operations."

i. Joint Pub 3- 0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
j. Joint Pub 3- 12, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations."
k. Joint Pub 3- 12.1, "Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Weapons Employment."
l. Joint Pub 3- 12.2, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data."
m. Joint Pub 3- 12.3, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (Notional)." 72
72 Page 73 74
B- 2
Appendix B
Joint Pub 3- 11
n. Joint Pub 3- 07, "Military Operations Other Than War."
o. Joint Pub 3- 54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security."
p. Joint Pub 4- 0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."
q. Joint Pub 4- 02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations."
r. Joint Pub 4- 05, "Mobilization."
s. Joint Pub 5- 0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."
t. Joint Pub 5- 03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I:
(Planning Policies and Procedures)."

u. Joint Pub 5- 03.2, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II:
(Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)."

v. Joint Pub 6- 0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations."

w. Joint Pub 6- 04.10, "US Message Text Formatting Program, Description of US
Message Text Formatting Program."

x. Joint Pub 6- 04.20, "Catalog of US Message Text Formats."
y. "Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)."
z. "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)."
aa. Emergency Action Plan - CJCS, Volume V.
3. Multi- Service
a. FM 3- 6/ AFM 105- 7/ FMFM 7- 11H, "Field Behavior of NBC Agents."
b. FM 3- 10- 1/ NWP 18- 1/ AFM 355- 4/ FMFM 7- 11, "Chemical Weapons Employment."
c. FM 8- 285/ NAVMED P- 5041/ AFM 160- 11, "Treatment of Chemical Agent
Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries."

d. FM 8- 9/ NAVMED P- 5059/ AFP 161- 3, "NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects
of NBC Defensive Operations AMEDP- 6."

e. FM 10- 63/ AFM 143- 3/ FMFM 4- 8, "Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theater of
Operations." 73
73 Page 74 75
References
B- 3
4. US Army
a. FM 3- 3, "Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance."
b. FM 3- 3- 1, "Nuclear Defense."
c. FM 3- 4, "NBC Protection."
d. FM 3- 5, "NBC Decontamination."
e. FM 3- 7, "NBC Handbook."
f. FM 3- 100, "NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, and Smoke and Flame Operations."
g. FM 3- 101, "Chemical Staffs and Units."
h. FM 8- 10, "Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations."
i. FM 8- 10- 7, "Health Services Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Environment."

j. FM 8- 10- 8, "Medical Intelligence."
k. FM 10- 52, "Water Supply in Theaters of Operations."
l. FM 10- 52- 1, "Water Supply Point Equipment and Operations."
m. FM 16- 1, "Religious Support Doctrine: The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant."
n. FM 100- 5, "Operations."
o. FM 100- 6, "Large Unit Operations."
p. FM 100- 9, "Reconstitution."
q. FM 100- 10, "Combat Service Support."
r. FM 100- 16, "Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps."
s. FM 100- 30, "Nuclear Operations."
t. FM 101- 5, "Staff Organization and Operations."
u. AR 350- 42, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense."
v. TRADOC PAM 11- 9, "Blueprint of the Battlefield." 74
74 Page 75 76
B- 4
Appendix B
Joint Pub 3- 11
5. US Navy
a. NWP 1, "Strategic Concepts of the US Navy."
b. NWP 2, "Organization of the US Navy."
c. NWP 3, "Naval Technology."
d. NWP 62- 1( D), "Surface Ship Survivability."
e. NSTM, Chapter 070, "Shipboard Radiological Defense."
f. NSTM, Chapter 470, "Shipboard BW/ CW Defense and Countermeasures."
g. NBC, "Warfare Defense Ashore."
6. US Marine Corps
a. FMFM 7- 11D, "NBC Protection."
b. FMFM 7- 11E, "NBC Decontamination."
7. US Air Force
a. AFM 1- 1, "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force."
b. AFR 355- 1, "Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations."
c. AFR 355- 3, "Air Force Personnel Shelter Programs."
d. AFR 355- 8, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture: Minimizing Performance
Degradation During Chemical Warfare Operations."

e. AFR 360- 1, "Airborne Operability Planning and Operations."
f. AFR 360- 2, "Commanders Airborne Operability Planning Guide." 75
75 Page 76 77
APPENDIX C ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
C- 1
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the
Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,
VA 23651- 5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,
consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director, J- 5, Strategic Plans and Policy.

3. Change Recommendations
a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:
TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC// DAMO- FDQ//
FROM: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC// J5/ J7- JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and
Interoperability (J- 7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D. C. 20318- 7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this
publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an
enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested
to notify the Director, J- 7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in
this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED
NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 76
76 Page 77 78
C- 2
Appendix C
Joint Pub 3- 11
4. Distribution
a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication
centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,
Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or
foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)
to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C- AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
20301- 7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned
administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,
"Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

By Military Services:
Army: US Army AG Publication Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220- 2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220- 2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office
Distribution Division (Code 03443)
5801 Tabor Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19120- 5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704- 5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G- REP)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, D. C. 20593- 0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is
unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint
publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1- R. 77
77 Page 78 79
GLOSSARY PART I- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
GL- 1
AOR area of responsibility
BW biological warfare
C2 command and control
C4 command, control, communications, and computers
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
CBW chemical and biological warfare
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA course of action
CPS collective protection shelter
CW chemical warfare
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DOD Department of Defense
EMP electromagnetic pulse
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPW enemy prisoners of war

HN host nation
HNS host- nation support
HSS health services support
HUMINT human intelligence

JFC joint force commander
JMAO Joint Mortuary Affairs Office
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

MOPP mission oriented protective posture
MOU memorandum of understanding
MSR main supply route
MTF medical treatment facilities

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCCS NBC contamination survivability
NCA National Command Authorities
NEO noncombatant evacuation operations

OEG operational exposure guide
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security 78
78 Page 79 80
GL- 2
Glossary
Joint Pub 3- 11
RCA riot control agent
ROE rules of engagement

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System
USSOCOM US Special Operations Command
WMD weapons of mass destruction 79
79 Page 80 81
Glossary
GL- 3
avoidance. Individual and/ or unit measures
taken to avoid or minimize nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks
and reduce the effects of NBC hazards.
(Joint Pub 1- 02)

biological agent. A microorganism that
causes disease in personnel, plants, or
animals or causes the deterioration of
materiel. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

biological defense. The methods, plans,
and procedures involved in establishing
and executing defensive measures against
attacks using biological agents. (Joint
Pub 1- 02)

biological operation. Employment of
biological agents to produce casualties in
personnel or animals and damage to
plants or materiel; or defense against such
employment. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

biological threat. A threat that consists of
biological material planned to be
deployed to produce casualties in
personnel or animals and damage plants
or other materiel. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

campaign. A series of related military
operations aimed at accomplishing a
strategic or operational objective within
a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

chemical agent. A chemical substance
which is intended for use in military
operations to kill, seriously injure, or
incapacitate personnel through its
physiological effects. The term excludes
riot control agents, herbicides, smoke,
and flame. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

chemical ammunition. A type of
ammunition, the filler of which is
primarily a chemical agent. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

chemical warfare. All aspects of military
operations involving the employment of
lethal and incapacitating munitions/
agents and the warning and protective
measures associated with such offensive
operations. Since riot control agents and
herbicides are not considered to be
chemical warfare agents, those two items
will be referred to separately or under the
broader term "chemical," which will be
used to include all types of chemical
munitions/ agents collectively. The term
"chemical warfare weapons" may be used
when it is desired to reflect both lethal
and incapacitating munitions/ agents of
either chemical or biological origin. Also
called CW. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

combatant command. A unified or
specified command with a broad
continuing mission under a single
commander established and so designated
by the President, through the Secretary
of Defense and with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands
typically have geographic or functional
responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

combatant command (command
authority). Nontransferable command
authority established by title 10 (" Armed
Forces"), United States Code, section
164, exercised only by commanders of
unified or specified combatant commands
unless otherwise directed by the President
or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant
command (command authority) cannot be
delegated and is the authority of a
combatant commander to perform those
functions of command over assigned
forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives,
and giving authoritative direction over all
aspects of military operations, joint

PART II- TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 80
80 Page 81 82
GL- 4
Glossary
Joint Pub 3- 11
training, and logistics necessary to
accomplish the missions assigned to the
command. Combatant command
(command authority) should be exercised
through the commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally this authority is
exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and Service and/ or
functional component commanders.
Combatant command (command
authority) provides full authority to
organize and employ commands and
forces as the combatant commander
considers necessary to accomplish
assigned missions. Operational control
is inherent in combatant command
(command authority). Also called
COCOM. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

combatant commander. A commander in
chief of one of the unified or specified
combatant commands established by the
President. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

contamination control. Procedures to
avoid, reduce, remove, or render
harmless, temporarily or permanently,
nuclear, biological, and chemical
contamination for the purpose of
maintaining or enhancing the efficient
conduct of military operations. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

defoliating agent. A chemical that causes
trees, shrubs, and other plants to shed
their leaves prematurely. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

herbicide. A chemical compound that
will kill or damage plants. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

host nation support. Civil and/ or military
assistance rendered by a nation to foreign
forces within its territory during
peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war
based on agreements mutually concluded
between nations. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

joint force commander. A general term
applied to a combatant commander,
subunified commander, or joint task force
commander authorized to exercise
combatant command (command
authority) or operational control over a
joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub
1- 02)

munitions. Materiels used in war,
especially weapons and ammunition.
(Approved for inclusion in the next
edition of Joint Pub 1- 02)

nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that
when released dissipates and/ or loses its
ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15
minutes. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

nuclear, biological, and chemical capable
nation. A nation that has the capability
to produce and employ one or more types
of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons across the full range of military
operations and at any level of war in order
to achieve political and military
objectives. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

persistent agent. A chemical agent that
when released remains able to cause
casualties for more than 24 hours to
several days or weeks. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

riot control agent. A chemical that
produces temporary irritating or disabling
effects when in contact with the eyes or
when inhaled. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

subordinate command. A command
consisting of the commander and all those
individuals, units, detachments,
organizations, or installations that have
been placed under the command by the
authority establishing the subordinate
command. (Joint Pub 1- 02)

weapons of mass destruction. In arms
control usage, weapons that are capable

GL- 4 Joint Pub 3- 11 81
81 Page 82 83
Glossary
GL- 5
of a high order of destruction and/ or of
being used in such a manner as to destroy
large numbers of people. Can be nuclear,
chemical, biological, and radiological

Glossary

GL- 5
weapons, but excludes the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon where
such means is a separable and divisible part
of the weapon. (Joint Pub 1- 02) 82
82 Page 83 84
GL- 6
Glossary
Joint Pub 3- 11
Intentionally Blank 83
83 Page 84 85
Assess-ments/
Revision

CJCS Approval Two Drafts

Program Directive
Project Proposal

J- 7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
Includes scope of project, references, milestones,
and who will develop drafts

J- 7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent.
Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint
Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2 Program Directive
l
l

The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J- 7, will
solicit a written report from the combatant commands and
Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any
urgent changes or earlier- than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised

STEP #5 Assessments/ Revision
l
l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
J- 7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
J- 7 initiates Program Directive

l
l
l

STEP #1 Project Proposal
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.
The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: Joint Pub 3- 11 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JOINT PUB 1- 0
PERSONNEL and

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4- 0 JOINT PUB 5- 0 JOINT PUB 6- 0
LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMS PLANS

JOINT PUB 0- 2
JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF
JOINT WARFARE

JOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for
coordination with Services and CINCS
Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4 CJCS Approval
l
l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
PRA develops two draft pubs
PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

l
l
l

STEP #3 Two Drafts

ENHANCED
JOINT
WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE
JOINT PUB 2- 0
OPERATIONS
JOINT PUB 3- 0 84
84 Page 85
85

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Document Outline

Pages 1--85 from JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense

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