DOD Doctrine
SORT: 5230.16
DOCI: DODD 5230.16
DATE: 19931220
TITL: DODD 5230.16 Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance,
December 20, 1993
Refs: (a) DoD Directive 5230.16, subject as above, February 7, 1983
(hereby canceled)
(b) Federal Preparedness Circular 8, "Public Affairs in Emergencies," June
22, 1989 NOTE: Available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500
C Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20429 END NOTE:
(c) DoD Directive 5100.52, "DoD Response to an Accident or Significant
Incident Involving Radioactive Materials," December 21, 1989
(d) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
(e) through (h)1 see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive:
1. Reissues reference (a) to update DoD policy, responsibilities, and
procedures for the prompt release of information to the public in the
interest of public safety, and to prevent public alarm in the event of
accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear
components, radioactive material, nuclear weapon launch or transport
vehicles (when a nuclear weapon is aboard), or nuclear reactors under DoD
control.
2. Updates DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures during an
improvised nuclear device (IND) incident.
B. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Unified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities
(hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term
"Military Departments," as used herein, refers to the Airy, the Navy, the
Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
C. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
D. POLICY
It is DoD policy:
1. To establish efficient and effective procedures for the release of
information to the public in the event of nuclear accidents, IND
incidents, or nuclear weapon significant incidents. These procedures
include exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the
presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specified location.
2. That in a nuclear weapon accident occurring in the United States, its
territories or possessions, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) and the On-Scene Commander (OSC) are required to
confirm to the general public the presence or absence of nuclear weapons
or radioactive nuclear components, when necessary, in the interest of
public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm.
Notification of public authorities is also required if the public is, or
may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the
weapon or its components.
3. That in a nuclear weapon significant incident that has the potential of
escalating to an accident, the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO),
National Military Command Center (NMCC), may confirm to appropriate
authorities, or the ATSD(PA) may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons
in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public
alarm.
4. That during a nuclear weapon accident overseas, the ATSD(PA) or the
theater Commander in Chief (CINC), with concurrence of the foreign
government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission, may confirm the
presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the
interest of public safety. Notification of public authorities is also
required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or
other danger posed by the weapon or its components.
5. That in a nuclear weapon significant incident overseas having the
potential to escalate to an accident, the ATSD(PA) or the theater CINC
with concurrence of the foreign government, through the appropriate Chief
of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in the
interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm.
6. That information releases relating to improvised nuclear devices will
follow the same general guidelines as for accidents or significant
incidents. However, the Defense Senior Representative must have the
concurrence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as lead Federal Agency
(on U.S. territory or possessions) or of the foreign government and
Department of State as lead Federal Agency through the appropriate chief
of U.S. mission.
7. With the exception of releasing information in the event of nuclear
accidents and nuclear weapon significant incidents, to respond to any
public requests about the location of nuclear weapons as follows: "It is
U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear
weapons at any general or specific location." This response shall be
provided even when such location is thought to be known or obvious.
Regarding the release of information on nuclear capable ships, submarines,
and naval aircraft, the following statement shall be used: "It is general
U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack
submarines, and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or
absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines, or
aircraft." There is no exception to policy governing release of
information about IND incidents.
8. That if asked why the United States has a "Neither Confirm Nor Deny"
policy, the response should be as follows: "The basis for the security
requirement inherent in the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying
the presence or absence of nuclear weapons is to deny militarily useful
information to potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness
of nuclear deterrence, and contribute to the security of nuclear weapons,
especially against the threats of sabotage and terrorism."
E. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall:
a. When notified of an accident or significant incident involving nuclear
weapons, nuclear components, nuclear reactors or radioactive materials in
the custody of or under the physical control of the Department of Defense
do the following:
(1) Establish communications, as appropriate, with public affairs officers
(PAOs) of the Unified Commands, the Military Departments, Defense Nuclear
Agency (DNA), Department of Energy (DoE), and Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). The U.S. Chief of Mission and the U.S. Department of State
(DoS) PAO shall be notified and consulted on accidents overseas or on
accidents and significant incidents near a U.S. border.
(2) Provide initial PA guidance, make news releases, respond to news media
inquiries, and hold news conferences at the national level in coordination
with appropriate DoD officials (to include the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy) and the Director, DNA), the DoE, the FEMA, and
if overseas or near a U.S. border, with the DoS.
(3) Ensure that the DoD OSC is advised immediately of all news releases
and news conferences held at the national level addressing accident
response or recovery operations.
(4) Delegate, when appropriate, overall PA responsibility to the Military
Department or Unified Commander having primary responsibility for the DoD
accident response.
b. Issue, as necessary, a DoD PA regulation and other discretionary
instructions and guidance to ensure timely and uniform implementation in
the Department of Defense of approved exceptions to the policy of neither
confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a
specific location.
c. When notified of an IND incident:
(1) Establish communications with PAOs of the lead Federal Agency. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for incidents in
the United States, its territories and possessions. The DoS is the lead
agency for acts not under FBI responsibility.
(2) Establish communications with PAOs of the Military Departments, the
DNA, the DoE, the FEMA, the applicable Unified Command, and other
appropriate Federal Agencies.
(3) Act in support of the lead Federal Agency PAO by ensuring DoD PAO
representation in the joint information center (JIC) established by the
lead Federal Agency. Such support shall include jointly coordinating all
press releases and media events.
(4) Ensure the Defense Senior Representative (DSR) is advised immediately
of all news releases and press conferences held at the national level
addressing IND incident response operations.
(5) Delegate, when appropriate, overall DoD PA responsibility to the
Military Department or Unified Command having primary responsibility for
the DoD response to an IND incident.
d. Coordinate with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as
appropriate, when litigation is likely due to the conditions surrounding a
nuclear accident or incident.
2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the Unified Commands, and the Directors
of the Defense Agencies shall implement this Directive and shall ensure
that the following PA aspects are included in their contingency planning:
a. Comprehensive PA planning for DoD nuclear accident, IND incident and
nuclear weapon significant incidents, and comprehensive PA operations,
including adequate personnel and administrative, communications, and
logistical support for a potential DoD response force.
b. Procedures to be followed by potential OSCs under the DoD Component's
command in the United States, its territories and possessions. These PA
procedures shall be in the form of a checklist and shall include the
subjects in the example in enclosure 4.
c. Precoordinated contingency releases for nuclear weapon accidents.
Examples of contingency releases in enclosure 5 are appropriate for
inclusion in PA plans. Actual releases shall pertain to the area and
situation where they are needed; however, they should follow the examples
in enclosure 5.
d. News media support at a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident
site. If the DoD OSC designates the site a national defense area (NDA),
news media representatives shall be supported as on a military
installation. Briefings shall be given to news media representatives
informing them of the appropriate information that can be disclosed during
a nuclear accident and the procedures to be followed. A handout that
provides the same information as the briefing shall be given to news media
representatives.
e. Periodic training or at least annual briefings that include the PA
aspects of a nuclear accident or incident. Briefings shall cover this
Directive and implementing instructions of the applicable DoD Component,
command, and unit. Such training is recommended for personnel who are
directly involved in operations or events or have the potential of
becoming involved. However, training shall include members from the
Military Department police agencies, base, or station security personnel;
nuclear weapons security force; and intelligence, operations, and PA
personnel. In areas outside the United States, its territories, and
possessions, members of the U.S. diplomatic mission, DoS, shall be invited
to attend the annual briefings.
f. Provision for informing emergency response personnel, key local
leaders, civilians, and State officials on radiation and other hazards
that may or may not exist. For nuclear weapon or nuclear component
accidents, IND incidents, and nuclear weapon significant incidents,
notification may be accomplished early in the response process through
telephone calls from or visits by the OSC or designees. As the response
force increases, this may be accomplished with a Community Emergency
Action Team (CEAT) comprising PA, medical, legal, security, communication,
administrative, logistics, or other appropriate personnel from DoD and
civil resources. As these resources become available, they shall function
under the direction of the OSC or the DSR, or the lead Federal Agency. The
CEAT shall be physically located in the JIC to facilitate coordination.
Activities of the CEAT shall be coordinated through the senior FEMA
official (SFO), under relationships established by Federal Preparedness
Circular 8 (reference (b)), with similar activities of other agencies to
ensure a unified approach in working with the community. In overseas
areas, the OSC or DSR may constitute a CEAT that shall coordinate through
the appropriate Unified Commander, or designee, and Chief of U.S. Mission
and host-government authorities. For military nuclear reactor or
radiological material accidents, State and local officials can be informed
via the FEMA in the United States, its territories and possessions, as
appropriate; or through the Unified Commander, or designee, and Chief of
U.S. Mission in overseas areas with host-government authorities who have
this responsibility.
g. Expeditiously inform the ATSD(PA) on the PA aspects of military nuclear
reactor or radiological material accidents.
3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
a. Notify the ATSD(PA), in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.52
(reference (c)), to provide timely, accurate information on the progress
of an accident response.
b. Invoke exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the
presence or absence of a nuclear weapon before the OSC arrives at a
nuclear weapon accident site in accordance with procedures in enclosure 3
when it is necessary immediately to implement public safety actions or to
reduce public alarm. This action shall be taken with available information
and the Chief, or designee, of the responsible Military Department shall
be informed. Precoordinated information required by local and State
officials to ensure public safety and health, and necessary to aid law
enforcement personnel to secure the weapon, shall be retained in the NMCC.
The DDO shall give this information to State and local officials (if time
permits, via the FEMA) when required to reduce the hazard to life, health,
or property before the initial response force arrives.
c. Refer news media inquiries received at the NMCC to the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs duty officer.
4. The Commanders of the Unified Commands shall implement this Directive
and develop nuclear weapon accident, IND incident, nuclear weapon
significant incident, and nuclear reactor or radiological accident PA
planning guidance, including:
a. Provisions and procedures to expeditiously inform the ATSD(PA); Chief
of U.S. Mission, DoS; and the host government of emergency news releases;
and the use of the host government's public release facilities.
b. Contingency plans, announcements, and methods of release developed by
Unified Commanders, or designees, in consultation with the Chief of U.S.
Mission in the country concerned.
c. Provisions for clearing contingency announcements and methods of
release with host governments, when required by international agreement.
This process shall be accomplished by the theater CINC through the Chief
of U.S. Mission in the country concerned.
5. The Heads of the DoD Components shall comply with this Directive and
shall establish notification procedures as required by DoD Directive
5100.52 (reference (c)).
F. PROCEDURES
DoD-prescribed procedures on nuclear weapon accidents and significant
incidents, nuclear components, radioactive material, and DoD nuclear
reactor and radiological accidents are in enclosure 3.
G. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of
implementing documents to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs within 120 days.
William J. Perry Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures - 5 1. References 2. Definitions 3 Procedures on Accidents and
Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Components,
Nuclear Reactors, or Radioactive Materials 4. Model PA Checklist for DoD
OSC or Designee at an Accident Involving Radioactive Materials 5.
Contingency Releases for Nuclear Weapon Accidents
REFERENCES, continued
(e) Public Law 93-288, "Disaster Relief Act of 1974," May 22, 1974, as
amended
(f) Joint Pub 102, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms," December 1, 1989
(g) Section 142 of Public Law 83-703, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," August
30, 1954, as amended
(h) Executive Order 12148, "Federal Emergency Management," July 20, 1979
DEFINITIONS
1. Area Commander. A Military Service-designated commander with authority
in a specific geographical area.
2. BENT SPEAR. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff term used in the
Department of Defense to identify and report a nuclear weapon significant
incident involving a nuclear weapon or warhead, nuclear components, or
vehicle when nuclear loaded. This term includes a significant incident as
defined in DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference
3. BROKEN ARROW. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff term to identify
and report an accident involving a nuclear weapon or warhead or nuclear
component. (See definition 23, below, nuclear weapon accident.)
4. Classified National Security Information. Information or material
subject to the control of the U.S. Government encompassing both U.S.
national defense and foreign relations that has been determined under E.O.
12356 (reference (d)) to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure and that is so designated.
5. Combined Information Bureau (CIB). A facility established in a foreign
country near the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant
incident and staffed by U.S. and host-nation PA personnel. Space may also
be allocated for the media. Normally, press briefings will be conducted at
the CIB.
6. Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT). A team comprising PA, medical,
legal, security, communication, administrative, logistics, or other
appropriate personnel from DoD and civil resources whose function is to
inform emergency response personnel, key local leaders, civilians, and
State officials on radiation and other hazards that may or may not exist.
A team of response and local experts that operates out of the JIC and is
available to assist the local community.
7. Coordinate. To bring into common action so as not to duplicate
unnecessarily or omit important actions. The act of coordination does not
involve direction of one agency by another.
8. Custodial Commander. A commander responsible for maintaining custody,
guardianship, and safekeeping of nuclear weapons and their components and
of source and special nuclear materials.
9. Defense Senior Representative (DSR). A general or flag officer provided
by the responsible Military Department or CINC who acts as the DoD single
point of contact on-site in the event of an IND incident. The DSR
exercises operational control over all responding DoD assets unless
otherwise specified. The DSR provides assets, advice, and assistance to
the lead Federal Agency, and coordinates actions with the DoE senior
official.
10. EMPTY QUIVER. A reporting term to identify and report the seizure,
theft, or loss of a U.S. nuclear weapon.
11. FADED GIANT. A reporting term to identify an event involving a nuclear
reactor or radiological accident.
12. Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Federal official appointed by
the President upon declaration of a major disaster or emergency under
Public Law 93-288 (reference (e)) to coordinate the overall Federal
response.
13. Formerly Restricted Data. Information removed from the restricted data
category upon a joint determination by the DoE (or antecedent agencies)
and the Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to
the military use of atomic weapons and that such information can be
adequately safeguarded as classified defense information. (For foreign
dissemination, however, such information is treated in the same manner as
restricted data.)
14. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). A device incorporating radio-active
materials designed to result in either the dispersal of radioactive
material or in the formation of nuclear yield. Such devices may be
fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may result from the
sabotage, seizure, theft, or loss of a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon.
15. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. An event resulting from a
deliberate act, involving nuclear weapons or nuclear materials that
included the sabotage, seizure, theft, loss of a nuclear weapon or
radiological nuclear weapon component, or the fabrication and employment
of an IND or a credible threat of either.
16. Initial Response Force (IRF). An element (whose capabilities are
delineated in the Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing),
belonging to DoD or DoE installations, facilities, or activities, that
would take emergency response actions necessary to maintain command and
control on-site pending arrival of the Service or Agency response force.
Functions that the initial response force is tasked to perform (within its
capabilities) are rescue operations; accident site security; fire
fighting; initiation of appropriate explosive ordnance disposal
procedures; radiation monitoring; establishment of command, control, and
communications; and PA activities.
17. Installation. See Joint Pub 102 (reference (f)). For PA purposes, any
Federal installation in active status.
18. Joint Information Center (JIC). A facility established at the scene of
a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident to coordinate all PA
activities. The JIC shall include representation from the Department of
Defense, the DoE, the FEMA, and other Federal Agencies, as well as State
and local governments.
19. Lead Federal Agency. The Federal Agency that owns, authorizes,
regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the radiological
activity causing the emergency and that has the authority to take action
on site.
20. National Defense Area (NDA). An area established on non-Federal lands
located within the United States, its possessions or territories for
safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment
and/or material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-
Federal lands under the effective control of the Department of Defense and
results only from an emergency event. The OSC or DSR at the scene shall
define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning
signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever
possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision
regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.
21. National Security Area (NSA). An area established on non-Federal lands
located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for
safeguarding classified information and/or restricted data, equipment, or
material belonging to the DoE. Establishment of a national security area
temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of
the DoE and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoE
representative having custody of the material at the scene shall define
the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The
landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible;
however, operational necessity shall dictate the final decision regarding
location, shape, and size of the national security area.
22. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality
resulting in damage to the reactor core or an event such as loss of
coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the
reactor core.
23. Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons
or nuclear components that results in any of the following:
a. Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces or
U.S. supported Allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system.
b. An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation.
c. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear
component.
d. Radioactive contamination.
e. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
f. Public hazard, actual or perceived.
24. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpected event involving
nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or a nuclear weapon transport or
launch vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or on board that
does not fall into the nuclear weapon accident category but that:
a. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component to
the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or
recertification by the DoE is required.
b. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons
security.
c. May result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or
inadvertent release of classified information.
d. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and warrants that senior
national officials or agencies be informed or take action.
25. On-Scene Commander (OSC) for Nuclear Accidents. The flag or general
officer designated to command the DoD response efforts at the accident
site.
26. On-Site. That area around the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or
significant incident that is under the operational control of the
installation commander, facility manager, or DoD OSC or DoE team leader.
The on-site area includes any area that has been established as an NDA or
NSA.
27. Photograph. Any plate, negative, print, videotape, live television
transmission, or other form of graphic representation, including any
sketch or drawing.
28. Primary Commander. The Unified Commander in Chief whose forces have
possession of nuclear weapons.
29. Radiological Accident. A loss of control over radiation or of
radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, or property,
or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding
exposure limits for ionizing radiation.
30. Radiological Assistance. That assistance provided after an accident
involving radioactive materials to:
a. Evaluate the radiological hazard.
b. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid.
c. Minimize safety hazards to the public.
d. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation or radioactive materials.
e. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.
f. Minimize damaging effects on property.
g. Disseminate technical information and medical advice to appropriate
authorities.
31. Responsible Military Department. See DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference
(c)).
32. Restricted Data. All data (information) on the following:
a. Design, manufacture, or use of nuclear weapons;
b. Production of special nuclear material; or
c. Use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. The term
does not include data declassified or removed from the restricted data
category under Pub. L. No. 83-703, Section 142 (Section 11w, Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended) (reference (g)) (Joint Pub 102, reference (f)).
33. Senior FEMA Official (SFO). A person appointed by the Director of the
FEMA to coordinate the Federal response to a civil emergency. (See E.O.
12148, reference (h).)
34. Service Response Force (SRF). A DoD response force appropriately
manned, equipped, and able to perform and coordinate all actions necessary
to control and recover from the effects of an accident or significant
incident. The specific purpose of a Service response force is to provide
nuclear weapon accident or significant incident assistance. Service
response forces are organized and maintained by those Services or Agencies
that have custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon
components.
35. U.S. Chief of Mission. The senior DoS official permanently assigned to
represent the U.S. Government within a foreign country, often the U.S.
ambassador to that country.
PROCEDURES ON ACCIDENTS AND SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, NUCLEAR COMPONENTS, NUCLEAR REACTORS, OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
A. NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS AND SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
1. The ATSD(PA) retains initial PA responsibility for nuclear weapon
accident and significant incidents in the United States, its territories
and possessions. In overseas areas, the appropriate theater CINC, in
coordination with the ATSD(PA) shall retain initial PA responsibility for
nuclear weapon accidents and significant incidents.
2. The presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components at any specified
location may not be confirmed nor denied except as follows:
a. In the interest of PUBLIC SAFETY in the United States, its territories
and possessions, confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons or
nuclear components must be made by the OSC. The DDO, NMCC, or the ATSD(PA)
may invoke this exception to policy before the OSC arrives, based on
available information and in coordination with the Chief, or designee, of
the responsible Military Department. Any statement confirming the presence
of nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of
injury from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation
exposure. If necessary, the statement may list the radiation hazards that
are unclassified, such as uranium or plutonium, but may not reveal
classified technical data about the weapon(s). The amounts of explosive or
radioactive material are examples of classified technical data. If injury
or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated. Public
authorities shall be notified immediately in a candid manner to enable
them to take public safety actions. Notification of public authorities
confirming the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear
components is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation
exposure or any other danger posed by the nuclear weapon or nuclear
components. Confirmation shall be made promptly when actions in the
interest of public safety must be taken, particularly when protective
action or evacuation of civilians may be required. These actions will
include releasing statements to the news media to expedite public safety
procedures. The ATSD(PA) shall be advised as soon as practical when
confirmation has been made directly by the OSC or DDO.
b. To reduce or prevent widespread PUBLIC ALARM in the United States, its
territories and possessions, the OSC may issue an official statement of
reassurance to the public that confirms or denies the presence of nuclear
weapons or nuclear components. Before the OSC arrives, the ATSD(PA) may
invoke this exception to policy with available information and inform the
Military Department responsible. The DDO shall implement this policy
through the appropriate local officials or by authorizing the DoD initial
response force commander to issue a statement in an emergency. The DDO
shall notify the responsible Military Department or Unified Commander if
this authority is granted. Any statement confirming the presence of
nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury
from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure.
If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated. The
confirmation may state also that the use of explosive ordnance disposal
teams is only a precautionary measure, and the evacuation of DoD personnel
is only a precautionary measure designed to limit the number of personnel
at the accident scene. A denial should characterize the accident or
incident as a nonnuclear event. The ATSD(PA) shall be notified in advance
if practical, or as soon as possible thereafter, if this exception to
policy is initiated to enable the ATSD(PA) to continue initial PA
responsibilities and to ensure the release of timely, accurate information
at the national level.
c. In overseas areas outside the United States (and its territories and
possessions), the ATSD(PA) or the Unified Commander or representative,
with concurrence of the foreign government through the appropriate Chief
of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapon components at the scene of an accident or significant incident in
the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent public alarm. The
ATSD(PA) shall be advised in advance, when practical, if exception to
policy is necessary. Notification of civil authorities of foreign
governments, through the Chief of the appropriate U.S. Mission, is
required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or
other danger posed by the weapon or its components. (Notification of
foreign governments is not considered an exception to the neither confirm
nor deny policy. It is U.S. Government policy to notify foreign
governments promptly of any U.S. incident that may create a hazard to
public health and safety.) Any statement confirming the presence of
nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury
from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure.
If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated.
d. In a nuclear weapon significant incident, the DDO, NMCC, or the
ATSD(PA) and the Unified Commander or his representative may confirm the
presence of nuclear weapons in the interest of public safety or to reduce
or prevent public alarm. Confirmation must be with the concurrence of the
foreign government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission.
3. The DoD OSC, or designee, at a nuclear weapon or nuclear component
accident or significant incident site in the continental United States
shall expeditiously establish communication with the ATSD(PA) by ANY means
available, if an accident or incident affecting the public requires
implementation of public safety measures. Direct communication between the
ATSD(PA), or designee, and the OSC, or designee, ensures appropriate
coordination of PA policy matters for the Department of Defense and
provides timely, accurate information for public release at the national
level until the Military Department responsible for the weapon is
delegated PA responsibility by the ATSD(PA).
a. If a nuclear weapons accident or significant incident results or
appears likely to result, a JIC shall be established near the scene as a
focal point for public release of information in a timely, accurate
manner, guided by Federal Preparedness Circular 8 (reference (b)). The
OSC, or designee, shall establish the JIC in coordination with the DoE,
the FEMA, and State and local authorities without delay. If the SFO, or
designee, arrives at the accident scene before the DoD OSC, or designee,
the SFO, or designee, may establish and supervise a JIC until the OSC, or
designee, arrives. JIC capabilities shall be expanded when additional
personnel and resources arrive. The JIC shall have dedicated
administrative, communications, and logistical support for use by all
participating agencies. The JIC shall include a press center for media use
and press briefings.
b. The OSC, or designee, shall assume primary leadership and direction of
the JIC until such time as transition of JIC responsibility may occur, as
described in paragraph A.3.c. of this enclosure, below. To provide a
coordinated Federal response to the public, the OSC, or designee, shall
ensure that on-scene DoD PA activities, such as news releases, briefings,
or interviews, are coordinated in advance with the DoE, FEMA, and other
agencies represented in the JIC. Other DoD Components will advise the OSC.
Other agencies also are obligated to coordinate PA activities in advance
with the OSC, or designee.
c. The ATSD(PA) and the Director of Public Affairs for the FEMA, by mutual
agreement, may transfer JIC responsibility and authority from the OSC to
the SFO at any time. However, when a presidentially declared emergency or
disaster exists, the appointed FCO, or designee, shall assume leadership
and direction of the JIC. In all cases, the Department of Defense, through
the OSC, shall retain authority on security classification matters. When
JIC responsibility and authority are delegated to the SFO or FCO, all PA
matters about the Federal technical response shall be coordinated in
advance with the OSC, or designee.
4. If an accident or significant incident, with the potential to evolve
into an accident, happens outside the continental United States, the
Unified Commander or the OSC, or their designees, shall expeditiously
establish communication with the appropriate Chief of Mission and the
ATSD(PA), or their designees, by ANY means available if an accident or
incident requires implementation of public safety measures. In the absence
of international agreements that provide specific guidance, the OSC, or
designee, shall establish the CIB in coordination with the Chief of
Mission, the foreign government military and civilian national and local
authorities, and the DoE. The OSC or designee shall ensure that on-scene
DoD PA activities, such as news releases, briefings, or interviews, are
coordinated in advance with the Chief of Mission, the foreign government,
and the DoE.
5. Policy and responsibilities about DoD programs that provide information
to appropriate Federal, State, and local officials and news media on
radiological safeguards, emergency plans, and other unclassified nuclear
matters are outlined in DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)).
6. In the event of losses, seizures, or thefts of nuclear weapons,
materials, or components by terrorists or other dissident groups, or in
the case of seizures of nuclear storage sites, or any site or location
having a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system, the ATSD(PA) shall
approve and handle release of information for the Department of Defense.
However, this does not apply in overseas areas outside the United States,
its territories and possessions, where governmental agreements exist for
the release of this information.
7. Most information on nuclear weapons and their storage is classified
restricted data or formerly restricted data and is very sensitive; e.g.,
information about the design of nuclear weapons and components, disclosing
its physical state and chemical form, and the specific location of nuclear
weapons. The OSC and other responsible persons at the scene shall follow
the contingency releases to prevent compromise of classified information.
If declassification of other information is needed, it shall be referred
to the Department of Defense for consideration and coordination with the
DoE as required.
B. DOD NUCLEAR REACTOR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS
1. Detailed PA planning and guidance shall be incorporated in the DoD
Components' nuclear reactor and radiological accident plans and shall be
in effect for the United States, its territories and possessions, and in
overseas areas. This planning shall include provisions for notifying the
ATSD(PA) through the chain of command to ensure PA coordination for the
Department of Defense.
2. Within the United States, its territories and possessions, the
appropriate DoD commander (area, on-scene, or custodial):
a. Shall immediately notify public authorities in the United States, its
territories and possessions, when a DoD nuclear reactor or radiological
accident presents an immediate danger to the public, particularly when the
evacuation of civilians is considered prudent. If time permits, the
appropriate DoD commander should issue to State and local officials any
recommendations on the need to take shelter or to evacuate. In cases of
imminent peril, it may be necessary for the DoD commander to issue,
directly to the public or through the news media, a warning for
individuals to take shelter or evacuate in those areas in immediate danger
of exposure. The ATSD(PA) and other PA components shall be advised
immediately of this notification.
b. May issue a public statement confirming a DoD nuclear reactor or
radiological accident to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. This
confirmation may be beneficial when the accident requires a special team
that attracts public attention or when evacuation of DoD personnel is
necessary to prevent injury from radiation exposure.
c. When a nuclear reactor accident occurs outside the United States, its
territories and possessions, the commander shall immediately inform the
Chief of the U.S. Mission in the country (or its territory) where the
accident occurs, as well as the Chiefs of U.S. Missions in countries whose
populations might be affected. He or she also shall inform the authorities
of the host-country's government through the Chief of U.S. Mission when
the local population is in immediate danger and public announcement is
necessary for public safety. Coordination procedures for these
eventualities shall be established in advance. The ATSD(PA) shall be kept
advised in all cases.
MODEL PA CHECKLIST FOR DOD OSC OR DESIGNEE AT AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
1. Expeditiously contact the ATSD(PA) by any means available. The ATSD(PA)
duty officer phone numbers are DSN 227-5131 or commercial (703) 697-5131
and are maintained on a 24-hour basis. As a backup, communication also may
be established through the NMCC.
2. If actions have not been taken by the FEMA or the DoE to establish a
JIC, immediately establish a JIC near the scene of the accident, but
outside the NDA and the OSC operational location. A press center shall
also be established. Notify the ATSD(PA) of the locations of the JIC and
press center and phone numbers. Also advise the ATSD(PA) how to contact
the PAO at the OSC operational location. PA representation in the JIC
shall include the Department of Defense, the DoE, the FEMA, other Federal
Agencies, and State and local governments. Ensure that all public
information is coordinated in the JIC before release.
3. When an accident occurs in overseas areas, immediately establish a CIB
near the accident site if the foreign government has not already done so.
The CIB should include representatives from the appropriate U.S. Embassy,
the Department of Defense, the DoE, and foreign national and local
military and civilian organizations. Ensure that all public information is
coordinated in the CIB before release. (Before CIB establishment, ensure
all information is coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, which will ensure
coordination with the foreign government.)
4. Activate a CEAT, as appropriate.
5. Immediately provide dedicated administrative, communications, and
logistical support to the JIC. Communication support to the JIC shall
include adequate dedicated telephone lines, fax capability, and copiers.
6. Immediately provide the press center with dedicated communications and
logistical support.
7. Do not disclose classified information, unclassified controlled nuclear
information, or critical nuclear weapons design information.
CONTINGENCY RELEASES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1
To notify the general public
"No Radiological Dancer to the Public"
(Confirms to reduce public alarm)
(Format of sample release to be used initially when no danger to the
public from contamination or blast exists, but when confirmation of the
presence or absence of a nuclear weapon or nuclear components
significantly prevents or reduces widespread public alarm that will result
from unusual activity at the incident site.)
A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying hazardous
material, classified cargo, or unarmed nuclear weapon(s)) crashed (or
other circumstances) at approximately (location and time).
The public is requested to stay out of the area (add, if true: under
surveillance by guards) to prevent any remote possibility of hazard from
the accident (or conventional high explosives detonation) and to avoid
hampering removal operations. There is no need for evacuation. (There is
no danger of nuclear detonation.)
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be
provided as they become available.
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2
To notify the general public
"When Public Is Possibly in Dancer"
(Confirms possibility of contamination in a nuclear weapon accident)
(Format of sample release to be used when nuclear weapons or nuclear
components have been involved in an accident and the possibility exists
for contamination due to fire or explosion, and details are unknown. The
release to the general public should only be used after the area has been
secured. Release can be modified as indicated below depending on
audience.)
Minimum Announcement
A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying unarmed
nuclear weapons or nuclear components crashed (or other circumstances) at
(location) at approximately (time).
The public is asked to stay out of the accident area in the interest of
safety due to the possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional
high-explosives detonation) and to avoid hampering recovery operations.
(There is no danger of nuclear detonation.)
Add the following for appropriate officials:
Fire, rescue, and other emergency services personnel should approach the
area with caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and
breathing apparatus. Any local official at the scene of the accident or
who has left the site who can provide details on the situation should call
this number: ( ). Current information from the accident scene will assist
response personnel in responding to the accident and providing additional
public safety guidance. If contact with the accident scene is established,
determine the following: condition of aircraft and/or vehicle (such as
burning, evidence of explosion, or extent of damage); condition of
accident site (such as fire or blast damage); or evidence of obvious cargo
(such as shapes or containers). Avoid handling any debris at the crash
site.
If the aircraft is transporting nuclear weapons containing insensitive
high explosives or weapons overpacked with accident resistant containers,
there is a much lower probability of a detonation and the fire should be
fought as long as there is a reasonable expectation of saving lives or
containing the fire. The weapons, or containers, if exposed, should be
cooled with water.
Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized personnel from
entering the site and picking up fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its
cargo. If any fragments already have been picked up, avoid further contact
or handling. Notify (authorities) for retrieval and proper disposition.
A U.S. (Military Department) team from (name of installation) is en route
to (has arrived at) the accident scene.
We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties or property
damage.
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be
provided as they become available.
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3
To the General Public
"When Public Is Probably in Danger"
(Does Confirm)
(Format of sample release to be used when a nuclear accident occurs.
Public safety considerations require this announcement because of the
likelihood of fire or conventional high-explosive detonation of the
weapon. The following statement should be made locally or by appropriate
higher authority if no local authority is available:)
An aircraft (other type of transportation) accident occurred (or other
circumstances) approximately (location and time). The accident involved a
nuclear weapon that contains conventional explosives and radioactive
material. There is no danger of a nuclear detonation, but there is a
danger from the conventional explosives that (are burning, may detonate,
have detonated). The public is requested to stay out of (indicate the
area) (under surveillance by guards) in the interest of safety and to
avoid hampering operations at the accident scene. An experienced response
team has been ordered to the scene.
(If appropriate, the following WILL be included in the release:)
Radioactive material in the form of dust may be scattered as a result of
the accident. The dust poses little risk to health unless taken into the
body by breathing or swallowing, although it is unlikely that any person
would inhale or swallow an amount that would cause illness. As a
precautionary measure, you are asked to remain calm and indoors. Turn off
fans, air conditioners, and forced-air heating units that bring in fresh
air from the outside. Use them only to recirculate air already in the
building. Eat and drink only canned or packaged food and drinks that have
been inside. If you must go outside, cover your nose and mouth and avoid
stirring up and breathing any dust. It is important to remember that your
movement could cause yourself greater exposure to any radioactive dust,
should it be present, and you could possibly spread contamination to
others.
(If plutonium is involved) One of the materials involved is plutonium,
which is both a toxic and radiation hazard and chemical poison if
ingested. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles that do not
have sufficient energy to penetrate buildings, clothing, or even the outer
skin. Therefore, short-term exposure to contamination outside the body
poses a negligible health risk. The precautions mentioned earlier should
be carefully followed to prevent ingestion.
(If uranium is involved) One of the materials involved is uranium.
Uranium, depending upon the type, may be a radiological hazard or a
chemical health hazard, similar to lead poisoning. Uranium gives off alpha
particles that cannot penetrate skin and pose no health risk when outside
the body.
The public is asked to stay out of the area (under surveillance or closed
off by guards) (and if true) until a monitoring team, now en route to the
accident site, can survey the ground and determine the exact area affected
by the accident. Any fragments found near the scene may be contaminated
and should be left in place. If fragments have been picked up, avoid
further handling and notify (authorities) for proper retrieval and
disposition.
Periodic announcements will be made as more information is known. It is
expected that these precautionary actions will be modified as more
information becomes available. A U.S. (Military Service) team from (name
of installation) is en route to (has arrived at) the accident scene.
We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties (or give the
number only of civilian and military casualties) or property damage.
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be
provided as they become available.
IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY:
Question: "Are nuclear weapons stored at (name of facility) or (name of
facility)?"
Answer: "It is U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence or
absence of nuclear weapons at any specific location.
If asked whether nuclear weapons are aboard a specific surface ship,
attack submarine, or naval aircraft:
"It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface
ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss
the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships,
submarines or aircraft."
---------------------------------
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
