
Weapons Proliferation Initiative Seeking More Partners
23 June 2006
State's Joseph calls for more Asia, African, Latin support for the initiative
Washington – While more than 70 countries currently support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), it needs additional partners from Asia, Africa and Latin America, says the State Department leading arms control official.
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph told representatives of 66 PSI supporting nations attending a key meeting in Warsaw, Poland, June 23, that the three-year-old initiative is “a standard of good nonproliferation behavior.” He also said it is a “vital component in the fight against the proliferation” of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. (See related article.)
Joseph gave a positive assessment of the progress of the initiative first proposed by President Bush in Krakow, Poland, in 2003. “We are here because we understand the need to defeat the WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threats posed by states like Iran and North Korea, terrorist groups like al-Qaida, and the facilitators willing to buy and sell sensitive technology for these states and groups,” he said.
Joseph said the Warsaw meeting afforded PSI participants the opportunity to take stock of the initiative’s rapid development as well as a chance “to reinforce the strong message of deterrence to proliferators.”
The initiative was conceived as a series of ongoing, voluntary activities and not as a membership organization. With that in mind, governments have participated in PSI in various ways and have undertaken varying levels of constructive engagement, Joseph said.
Some participating countries have taken part in the 23 air, land or maritime training exercises conducted to date, while other nations have been an integral part of actual interdictions such as the 2003 boarding of the ship BBC China, which was en route to Libya with a cargo of uranium enrichment centrifuge parts. (See related article.)
Joseph said that PSI participants are broadening and deepening their engagement in the initiative, contributing according to their existing capabilities and laws by “using their diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement and intelligence tools to combat the trade in proliferation, creatively, within the context provided by a shared commitment” to the agreed on PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.
“PSI countries have put all of these assets to work in a multinational, flexible, yet targeted fashion,” he said.
NEW PSI TOOLS AND PARTNERS NEEDED
Joseph urged his audience to consider what new tools are needed “to ensure that the PSI remains a dynamic initiative.” He suggested the need to deny financing to proliferators and the need to develop mechanisms to interdict payment between proliferators and their suppliers.
The under secretary called on PSI supporters to do more to enlist additional partners from Asia, Africa and Latin America. He said significant amounts of global commerce travel through strategic crossroads, such as the Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal, and major air routes crisscross the globe, thereby requiring vigilant partners who are willing to share information in a timely way to prevent illicit WMD trade, technology or expertise from reaching the wrong hands.
Much of PSI’s evolution relies “on the sustained commitment and innovative efforts of each of the participating nations,” Joseph said. “Maintaining readiness to respond to proliferation efforts “must be a shared objective of all PSI states,” he said. “Regular participation in training exercises that test capacities and legal authorities is a positive way to maintain our operational readiness against what are creative and clever adversaries,” he added.
He urged participants to explore the limits of existing national legal authorities, address potential liability questions in advance and “overcome the difficulties in sustaining the political will to enforce laws proactively against states of proliferation concern.”
PSI’S RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT
Joseph said there is reason to be proud of PSI’s record of achievements so far, pointing to around two dozen instances when the United States and PSI partners in Europe, Asia and the Middle East have prevented “transfers of equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of concern.” He cited specific examples of PSI cooperation having “stopped the export to Iran’s missile program of controlled equipment and dual-use goods.” In one instance, he said, a PSI partner “stopped the export of heavy water-related equipment to Iran’s nuclear program.”
Not all of PSI’s successes are discussed openly. “It is inevitable that much of our wok is done quietly and with cooperation in sensitive channels outside the public spotlight,” he said. “Discreet actions often help us stay one step ahead of the proliferators and give them less insight into steps they can take to evade detection,” Joseph added.
The under secretary also emphasized the importance of information gathering and sharing for PSI’s success. “We have learned through both our PSI successes and failures,” he said, “the importance of gathering expertise from all of our relevant agencies and to integrate a wide range of operational capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to information of proliferation activity.” Further, he said, the United States has heard from other partner governments, including Poland, Canada and Portugal that pursuing this initiative has similarly “helped them establish regular interagency coordination.”
Joseph’s parting words for PSI partners: think innovatively, enforce aggressively and engage regularly.
For more information, see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
The full text of Joseph’s prepared statement is available on the State Department’s Web site.
(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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