Cooperation Vital to Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling, U.S. Says
26 May 2006
Congressional hearing focuses on container security, Megaports programs
By Jeffrey Thomas
Washington File Staff Writer
Washington -- International cooperation is vital to the prevention of nuclear smuggling, U.S. officials from the departments of State, Homeland Security and Energy told a congressional panel May 25.
“The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the United States, and the success of our efforts to detect and deter nuclear smuggling is very much dependent on whether our foreign partners share a common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it,” said David Huizenga of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
The hearing was convened by a panel of the Homeland Security Committee of the House of Representatives.
Huizenga and other Bush administration officials discussed international efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials, including U.S. programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Megaports. They focused particularly on how better to enlist the cooperation of other countries.
Committee members stated their concerns about problems such as corruption, foreign inspection protocols, the operation of nuclear detection equipment, and its vulnerability to tampering.
CSI AND MEGAPORTS
CSI, which is operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is designed to prevent the smuggling of terrorists or terrorist weapons in ocean-going cargo containers. Specially trained U.S. customs agents are deployed in major non-U.S. ports to identify U.S.-destined cargo containers that pose a potential risk. Those containers receive a pre-screening inspection by local customs officials prior to departure.
The Megaports Initiative complements CSI. Created by the NNSA, the goal of Megaports is stopping illicit shipments of nuclear and other radioactive material through the installation of radiation monitoring equipment at non-U.S. borders, seaports, airports and nuclear facilities, mostly in the former Soviet Union, according to Huizenga.
In fiscal year 2005, CBP processed more than 431 million passengers, more than 121 million land border passenger vehicles, 1 million aircraft, 113,325 vessels, and more than 25 million sea, rail and truck containers, according to Jayson Ahern, CBP’s assistant commissioner for field operations.
He added that in the same period, more than 11.3 million seagoing containers arrived at U.S. seaports, and all those thought to pose a risk -- 90,000 -- were examined by means of radiation screening, nonintrusive X-ray inspection or physical examination.
Currently 44 non-U.S. ports participate in CSI, covering 75 percent of maritime containerized cargo shipped to the United States. CBP expects that these numbers will rise to 58 ports and 85 percent of maritime containerized cargo by the end of 2007.
It will not be possible to bring all 704 ports that ship to the United States into CSI because of the expense, Ahern said.
CBP has 225 radiation portal monitors deployed at U.S. seaports screening 57 percent of sea-borne containers for radiological materials. The ultimate goal is to screen 100 percent of all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances for radiation, Ahern said.
He said 14 ports currently are participating in the Megaports program. Ten more countries are close to signing Megaports agreements, and another 10 “are in various stages of discussions.” The Megaports program aims eventually to scan at least 40 percent of global traffic at 70 seaports around the world.
CHALLENGES TO MEGAPORTS
Some members of the committee wanted to know why more countries have not joined the program.
Part of the reason is that Megaports is “significantly more intrusive” than CSI, explained Vayl Oxford, director of the domestic nuclear detection office in the Department of Homeland Security.
For example, Megaports requires host countries to notify U.S. officials of detections or seizures made as a result of the equipment provided by the United States, a commitment that might “touch on sensitive national security and sovereignty matters,” Huizenga explained. Oxford characterized the “challenge of negotiating with our foreign partners” as “key.”
He told the committee: “If we cannot talk to the right people and get agreements into place, progress overseas will slow dramatically. Therefore, we need to change the way we approach our partners overseas and we need to change who we approach.”
Francis Record, acting assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, told the committee the State Department is developing a new nuclear smuggling initiative designed to assess and address country-specific risks. “These assessments address the capabilities of host governments to prevent, detect, and prosecute illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material,” he said.
If problems are identified, a U.S. interagency team engages with officials in the at-risk country to agree on a list of priority projects aimed at closing the capability gaps.
“In combating nuclear smuggling and terrorism, we cannot remain content with one-size-fits-all global approaches,” Record said. “We must ensure that our strategies, initiatives and plans are tailored to the specific conditions prevailing within our partner countries.”
The texts of the witnesses’ prepared statements are available on the Web site of the House Homeland Security Committee.
For further information, see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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