Full Compliance Essential to Nonproliferation Success, U.S. Says
31 August 2005
Four regimes have violated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, State's DeSutter says
Washington -- Full compliance with the nonproliferation objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is essential if international confidence in the treaty's security benefits is to be maintained, a State Department official says.
Paula A. DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, addressed the question of whether multilateral diplomacy is a viable means of preventing nuclear proliferation at a conference organized by the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen August 26.
She pointed out that under the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), "at least four NPT non-nuclear member countries were or are using the NPT as cover for the development of nuclear weapons" -- Iran, North Korea, Iraq and Libya. The first two still have active programs, while the latter two do not.
DeSutter termed this situation "a crisis of NPT noncompliance" and said full compliance with NPT nonproliferation objectives is essential, or else "confidence in the security benefits derived from the NPT will erode." The eventual result, she said, would be "an ever-growing number of states possessing nuclear weapons," with greater accessibility to nuclear technology and know-how for terrorists and rogue states.
The proposed U.S. solution, she said, is President Bush's nonproliferation action plan, which contains seven specific initiatives, including the need to criminalize proliferation-related activities. (Additional information on the president’s plan is available on the White House Web site.)
Some of these proposals have been acted on, she noted: The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1540, which DeSutter called "an essential step in reducing the dangers of illicit proliferation networks and of terrorist efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction." She also called the creation of a Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors an important step.
Beyond those, DeSutter recommended these additional presidential proposals:
• Make adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory for those desiring nuclear supplies. This will "strengthen the means to verify NPT compliance," she said.
• Restrict further the export of sensitive technologies, especially enrichment and reprocessing technology. She said this is "a key loophole in the NPT."
• Strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative to either prevent or intercept illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials.
• Expand the "Global Partnership" to secure and eliminate sensitive materials, including weapons of mass destruction, broadening U.S. and Russian cooperative threat reduction efforts.
"The NPT has at its core a fundamental bargain, DeSutter said. "[T]he nuclear weapons states agree that non-nuclear weapons states may have access to technology and non-nuclear weapons states agree to forgo the development of nuclear weapons." It is the U.S. view, DeSutter said, that any right to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy is "conditioned upon the fulfillment of the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations."
"The language of … the NPT is explicit and unambiguous," DeSutter said. "[S]tates asserting their right to receive the benefits of peaceful nuclear development must be in compliance with the nonproliferation obligations they undertook when they signed the NPT. No state in violation … should receive the benefits …. All nuclear assistance to such a state, bilaterally or through the IAEA, should cease."
The transcript of DeSutter's remarks is available on the State Department Web site.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
