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06 May 2003

Semmel Stresses Importance of Safeguards to NPT Lifespan

(Cites Korea, Iran as examples of oversight failure) (2730)
Weak safeguards "could undermine the security and economic benefits"
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), says
U.S. State Department official Andrew Semmel, thereby leading "to its
erosion and demise."
"Potential violators must be deterred by the high cost of evading
safeguards and the prospect of being caught," he said in remarks May 5
to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT
Review Conference in Geneva.
Although the improvement of safeguards has been a goal of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the discovery of
Iraq's nuclear program at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, both
North Korea and Iran avoided detection and have been deeply engaged in
the development of secret nuclear programs, said Semmel, deputy
assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation. He says
that more needs to done about safeguards.
One possible answer is the IAEA Additional Protocol, which Semmel
describes as "the IAEA's most important tool against clandestine
activities," and which establishes a new standard of compliance that
could result in better detection of violators. President Bush has
forwarded the Additional Protocol to the U.S. Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification, and the United States supports its
universal adoption.
Sufficient resources for IAEA staff and operations -- which have not
been made available in recent years -- must be provided, Semmel added,
noting that global security and the integrity of the NPT must be given
the high priority that they deserve and require.
Semmel also stressed the importance of stronger enforcement of nuclear
export controls and the employment of special measures to counter
terrorist attempts to gain access to nuclear material, as well as
penalties such as suspension of civilian nuclear assistance to states
that are lax in their protection efforts.
Following is the text of Semmel's remarks:
(begin transcript)
Statement by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Andrew K. Semmel
Alternate Representative of the United States of America
To the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
For the 2005 NPT Review Conference
Articles III and VII
IAEA Safeguards, Nuclear Export Controls and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Geneva, Switzerland
May 5, 2003
IAEA Safeguards
The United States has made clear in previous remarks the absolute
importance of ensuring compliance with NPT obligations. Articles I and
II constitute the basic nonproliferation undertakings of the NPT.
Article III is designed to provide confidence to the international
community that non-nuclear-weapon state parties are not using nuclear
material for nuclear weapons, and that all parties export nuclear
material and equipment in ways consistent with NPT objectives. As
such, Article III implementation plays an indispensable role toward
ensuring the Treaty fulfills its nonproliferation objectives.
The vast majority of countries join the NPT because it contributes to
their national security. But to do this, IAEA safeguards must be
strong and rigorously enforced. A lack of confidence in IAEA
safeguards could also erode the willingness of states to engage in
peaceful nuclear cooperation. As a result, many countries could find
themselves deprived of important benefits for their economic and
social development.
It's that simple. Weak safeguards could undermine the security and
economic benefits of the Treaty, leading to its erosion and demise.
The interests of developing and developed countries do not diverge in
that respect. Effective safeguards are essential for furthering our
common interest.
Another reason to support strong safeguards is based on the need for
fair play and equal treatment. States that honor their obligations and
gain peaceful nuclear benefits as a result have a right to insist that
all NPT parties play by the same rules. A party that does not play by
the rules should not be allowed to enjoy the same benefits as those
who do. The IAEA safeguards system needs to be strong so that it can
either discourage a state from breaking the rules or sound the alarm
against those that do.
Peaceful nuclear cooperation, equal treatment, and above all, global
security provide ample reasons to ensure that the IAEA safeguards
system gets the support it needs. The IAEA must receive the financial
resources and political support necessary to vigorously enforce the
NPT. Potential violators must be deterred by the high cost of evading
safeguards and the prospect of being caught. Safeguards must be so
effective that they force an NPT party contemplating diversion of
nuclear material or the construction of a clandestine facility to give
up the effort.
The improvement of safeguards has been a major theme of the IAEA since
Iraq's nuclear weapons program was discovered after the Gulf War in
1991. Yet much more needs to be done. North Korea displayed contempt
for the IAEA when it brushed off requests for information on its
enrichment program, and, ultimately, expelled IAEA inspectors. Iran
did not extend full cooperation to the IAEA for many years, and
recently the world discovered why. Iran was constructing a secret
nuclear program and was clearly seeking to avoid the searching eyes of
the IAEA. Despite calls from many countries, Iran still has not made a
decision to sign and ratify an Additional Protocol.
This must not continue. The IAEA needs strong political support from
all NPT parties in good standing. There must be real consequences for
countries that block the IAEA from doing its job. The IAEA Secretariat
must have the full backing of its Board of Governors and other members
when it seeks information about the true nature of a nuclear program.
Similarly, the IAEA safeguards staff must have no doubt that we expect
them to pursue information wherever it leads and not to shrink from
bringing bad news to the Board. Differences should not be "papered
over".
The Additional Protocol is the IAEA's most important tool against
clandestine activities. It can provide greater assurance to other
countries about the peaceful nature of nuclear programs. It
establishes a new standard of ensuring compliance with the NPT: one
that can detect a violation or potential violation more readily than
is possible under existing safeguards agreements. It allows the IAEA
to focus more attention and resources on detecting undeclared nuclear
activity. Implementation of the Additional Protocol will clearly
strengthen the NPT.
The United States supports universal adoption of the Additional
Protocol. Last May, President Bush forwarded the U.S. Additional
Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We
are hopeful the U.S. Senate will hold hearings and act soon.
The IAEA and Japan have undertaken an ambitious program to encourage
conclusion of these agreements. Some progress is being made. However,
there are only 32 Protocols in force almost six years after the IAEA
Board of Governors adopted the model agreement. The remaining NPT
parties, including the United States, should exert a maximum effort to
have a Protocol in force before the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Some countries with sizable nuclear programs are holding back -- their
reasons are not always clear. Those who have not negotiated an
Additional Protocol should act now. Responsible members of the global
nonproliferation regime need to exercise leadership and overcome
promptly any remaining obstacles to concluding these agreements. NPT
parties with programs that raise serious questions must be pressed to
choose between their current policies and steps that would help
restore confidence in their nuclear programs including acceptance of
the Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol must become the
standard for NPT parties.
We need to consider other ways to encourage acceptance of the
Protocol. Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger
Committee should consider adoption of the Additional Protocol as a
condition of nuclear supply by 2005. Advanced nuclear countries should
establish programs, in coordination with the IAEA, that provide
technical assistance for implementation of the Additional Protocol to
countries that need it.
Last week the IAEA noted that 47 NPT parties remain delinquent in the
completion of their NPT safeguards agreements. We urge them to take
action promptly. For those with no nuclear programs, it may seem like
a pointless exercise. Yet, it is a Treaty obligation and the IAEA has
a simplified procedure for states with no nuclear program. Even the
smallest of nations can take an action that contributes to
strengthening the NPT.
As you know, the IAEA budget has been held to zero real growth since
the mid-1980s. However, global conditions have not remained static.
There has been a huge increase in IAEA safeguards responsibilities
over the last ten years, but the resources to meet those demands have
not kept pace.
The IAEA has proposed an increase of $21.5 million in the safeguards
budget for 2004-05. We support this increase and would urge all NPT
parties to do the same. It is a prudent investment in our common
security. Without this increase, the IAEA has warned that it may no
longer be able to guarantee credible safeguards. As the IAEA stated to
this meeting last week: "The risk is real that the ability of the
Agency to discover in time evidence of a covert nuclear weapons
program will erode unless the Agency receives the necessary
resources."
This is another challenge that we need to meet. There are always
competing needs for scarce resources, but global security and the
integrity of the NPT must be given the high priority that they deserve
and require. IAEA inspectors travel the world on behalf of NPT
parties, looking for information that could give us an indication of
imminent danger. The value of that service has no price tag - but a
failure to meet the IAEA's safeguards needs will surely cost each of
us more than the relatively modest increase the Director General has
proposed. Each of us needs to find the extra funds to meet the
increase in our budget assessments that would occur as a result. This
issue is too important for politics as usual.
But money alone will not bring the increased security we seek. The
strength of the NPT and IAEA rests with the determination of their
members to stop nuclear proliferation by ensuring strict compliance,
thorough verification, and aggressive enforcement. The leadership and
safeguards staff of the IAEA should have no doubt that we, as
responsible NPT parties, expect them to carry out their duties with a
similar commitment.
Nuclear Export Controls
Article 111.2 requires NPT parties to ensure the application of
safeguards on exports of nuclear material and specialized nuclear
equipment to non-nuclear-weapon states. It establishes the principle
that NPT parties should ensure their nuclear exports do not in any way
contribute to nuclear proliferation. This responsibility must be
enforced vigorously.
For the last 25 years, procurement activity by states seeking nuclear
weapons has proven to be a severe test for the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group have steadily expanded their controls to meet the
growing threat. However, more concerted efforts are needed. Over the
past few months it has become clear that Iran and North Korea, two NPT
parties seeking nuclear weapons, have nonetheless successfully
obtained centrifuge enrichment technology. It seems clear that foreign
assistance was involved at some point in each of these countries'
programs.
Members of both export control groups are consulting about steps that
could be taken to tighten controls. In the meantime, we support the
distribution of "watch lists" to all supplier states as a means to
help block further procurement of nuclear weapons-related items by
North Korea, Iran or others.
Catch-all controls are essential and should be vigorously enforced.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should consider adding the concept
of "catch-all" to its requirements.
Supplier states should ensure they have adequate outreach programs to
alert nuclear industry to suspicious customers. Information exchange
among governments on front companies and end-users can reduce the risk
that transfers would end up in a nuclear weapons program. Strong
domestic enforcement, including stiff penalties for violators, would
help. In fashioning stronger national controls, supplier governments
must also consider whether special measures are needed to counter
terrorist attempts to seize nuclear material.
Other export control policies that can help strengthen the NPT include
consideration of banning transfers of nuclear-related dual-use items
to NPT parties under suspicion. Certainly, these countries should not
benefit from assistance to their civil nuclear programs. Such
cooperation leads to benefits they do not deserve and provides a means
to hide sensitive transfers with direct application to nuclear
weapons.
It is no longer acceptable for countries whose nuclear programs are at
variance with a peaceful nuclear program to receive foreign nuclear
assistance. NPT supplier states can make a significant contribution to
NPT enforcement by denying all nuclear-related commerce to such
countries unless and until they take the steps necessary to restore
confidence in their nuclear programs.
Moreover, it should be a standard condition of nuclear supply that any
violation of the NPT would lead to a suspension of civilian nuclear
assistance to the state committing the offense. The NSG Guidelines
address this question, but the Zangger Committee could do so, and
national policies should be adopted as well. If the offender is
cooperative and verifiably remedies the violation, resumption of the
assistance could be considered. But some understanding should be
adopted that enforces one of the most basic principles of the NPT --
the benefits go only to those who play by the rules, and not to those
who flaunt the rules.
Similarly, non-NPT parties should not be eligible for significant
nuclear benefits. The Nuclear Suppliers Group requirement for
full-scope safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon states implements that
principle. Virtually all NSG members have reinforced that position in
recent years. The NSG is looking at ways to implement that provision
with more transparency.
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Let me comment briefly on nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) treaties.
For more than 35 years there has been strong international support for
completion of NWFZ treaties. Article VII of the NPT makes clear that
the NPT does not affect the right of any group of states to conclude
these treaties.
NWFZ treaties go beyond the NPT by prohibiting the deployment or
storage of nuclear weapons by any state in the territories of regional
parties to the NWFZ Treaty. NWFZ treaties also have from one to three
Protocols, one of which includes an obligation for the five nuclear
weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
parties to the treaties. There also is a protocol for states outside
the region with territories in the region. Under this protocol, the
state agrees to apply the provisions of the treaty to such
territories.
The 1967 Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty predated the
NPT. In the wake of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, this Treaty
signified the desire of states in the region to establish a
denuclearized zone. The United States signed and ratified both
Protocols to the Treaty, completing action in 1981.
Other NWFZ treaties in force are the 1985 South Pacific Treaty and the
1995 Southeast Asian Treaty. The United States signed protocols to the
South Pacific Treaty in 1996. Consultations have continued for several
years between the nuclear weapon states and the Association of
Southeast Asian nations on the still unsigned Protocol to the
Southeast Asian Treaty.
In 1996, the states of Africa realized a long-sought goal by
completing a NWFZ treaty along with three Protocols. The United States
signed these Protocols in 1996. The African Treaty is not in force, as
the required number of ratifications has not been achieved. The United
States has not ratified the Protocols to the South Pacific and African
Treaties.
In September 2002 the nations of Central Asia concluded a draft NWFZ
treaty and protocol. In October and December of last year, meetings
were held at the United Nations between the five Central Asian states
and the five nuclear weapon states. These meetings led to several
comments and questions from some of the nuclear weapon states. We
anticipate there will be further discussions in the coming months.
In total, these NWFZ treaties encompass approximately 110 states in
five regions. The end of the Cold War provided impetus to these
treaties as three of the five have been concluded within just the past
eight years.
That completes my statement.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)