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05 May 2003

U.S. Says Nuclear Disarmament Goal Still Requires Gradual Approach

(NPT Article VI obligations can be met in various ways) (4520)
The United States supports --- unambiguously --- Article VI of the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the goal of nuclear
disarmament, according to a May 1 information paper distributed by the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.
Article VI reflects the determination of the parties to the NPT that
further progress is made toward comprehensive arms control as well as
measures to promote nuclear disarmament. (The full text of the NPT
Treaty may be viewed on the Web at:
http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm#treaty)
To this end, the paper states that the United States has no plans to
redeploy any of the strategic nuclear warheads that are being taken
out of operational service under the terms of the 2002 Moscow Treaty,
which was signed by the U.S. and Russia. The bilateral treaty ---
which advances the NPT commitment of the United States and Russia --
calls for each side to reduce its strategic warheads to a level of
1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012.
The United States has not manufactured any new nuclear weapons in more
than a decade and the Defense Department has not identified any new
nuclear weapons requirements. It has dismantled more than 13,000
nuclear weapons since 1992. Additionally, the United States has not
produced fissile material for nuclear weapons in more than 10 years.
The paper also predicts that significant progress will be reported
during the June 2003 Evian Summit in France on the 2002 G-8 Initiative
to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
But the new paper sought to dampen expectations on progress toward the
13 steps outlined in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document.
"No country believed it would be possible to implement all those steps
by 2005 and none believed that all NWS (Nuclear Weapons States) would
make identical progress," it states. "However, what does not change is
the legal undertaking in the NPT related to Article VI."
Achieving the overall goal of nuclear disarmament requires a
step-by-step approach, the paper explains, and Article VI never
established timelines or specific milestones toward that goal.
"We think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 (nuclear
disarmament) steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill
their Article VI obligations," the paper states, adding, "The
fundamental test is whether the United States or any other state is
moving in the direction set out in Article VI."
The Bush administration's new nuclear policy, in the form of the
Nuclear Posture Review, calls for a reduced reliance on nuclear
weapons (see:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html). The
U.S. strategic posture embraces nuclear and non-nuclear offensive
systems, active and passive defense systems and a revitalized defense
infrastructure. Reliance on nuclear weapons will be reduced through
modernization of conventional forces, fielding of missile defenses and
other measures, according to the paper.
The paper was released during the second session of the Preparatory
Committee for the Seventh NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005.
The United States circulated it as a way to spotlight ongoing
disarmament programs, describe current policy implementing Article VI,
clarify certain issues, and stimulate further discussion.
Following is the text of the May 1 information paper:
(begin text)
Information Paper from the United States
Concerning Article VI of the NPT
Provided to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the
2005 NPT Review Conference
Geneva, Switzerland
May 1, 2003
Article VI
The United States is pleased to offer information on its policies and
actions that contribute to the goals of Article VI. We believe that
regular exchanges of information among NPT parties during the review
process are a useful means to facilitate our discussions. This paper
addresses both ongoing actions and offers clarification on certain
issues.
A. U.S. COMMITMENT TO ARTICLE VI
1. The Moscow Treaty
On May 24, 2002, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin
signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this
Treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic
nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012.
The United States Senate unanimously approved the Treaty on March 6,
2003.
The Moscow Treaty will require a two-thirds decrease in both
countries' strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. This decrease will
bring their nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels in decades.
In the U.S.-Russian Joint Declaration on the New Strategic
Relationship, agreed upon at the same time as the Moscow Treaty, the
United States and Russia agreed to 'seek broad international support
for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by
implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons....' The Moscow Treaty represents an important
contribution toward this goal.
Following the successful completion in 2001 of reductions under START
(the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) from over 10,000 deployed
strategic warheads to under 6,000, the Moscow Treaty represents
another major step in U.S. fulfillment of its NPT Article VI
obligations. In two decades, the United States and Russia will have
eliminated or decommissioned more than three-quarters of their
strategic nuclear warheads. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
57/68 of November 22, 2002, recognized that the agreed strategic
reductions in the Moscow Treaty advance the NPT commitment of the
United States and Russia.
The Moscow Treaty reflects a new era and a strengthened U.S.-Russian
strategic partnership. Because of this partnership, it was not
necessary to incorporate hundreds of pages of cumbersome rules and
procedures into the Treaty. A Bilateral Implementation Commission will
be established and will meet at least twice a year. The START Treaty
-- which will remain in force in accordance with its terms -- will
also provide a foundation for confidence regarding the strategic
relationship.
Our two countries also have established a Consultative Group on
Strategic Stability that will serve as a broader forum to discuss
issues of strategic importance and to enhance mutual transparency.
This Group is chaired by the Foreign and Defense ministers of both
countries and includes other senior officials. Working Groups have
already begun to meet. The discussions to date have focused on
transparency in both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, and
on cooperative efforts in missile defense. We believe the activities
of this Consultative Group will further strengthen openness and
cooperation across a broad range of U.S.-Russian security issues.
2. Clarifying the Moscow Treaty
In 2001, the Bush administration decided to proceed with strategic
nuclear reductions based on the dramatic changes taking place in the
international security environment, including in our relationship with
Russia. The President announced that the United States would
unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear forces to the lowest
possible level consistent with our national security requirements and
invited Russia to reciprocate. President Putin made a similar
statement and the two leaders eventually decided to make the
reductions legally binding.
Our countries took an approach that led quickly to a treaty cutting
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads deeper than anything
proposed previously. In less than six months, the administration was
able to accomplish what had proven impossible for almost a decade --
to agree with Russia on deep strategic nuclear reductions.
In the post-Cold War international security environment, the
administration is confident that it is unnecessary to attach strict,
inflexible or overly detailed requirements to strategic arms control
agreements. The new mutual trust and openness in the U.S.-Russian
relationship, along with the various means of inspecting and
monitoring already available to both Parties, and our commitment to
pursue additional transparency, will provide the necessary confidence
in implementation of the Moscow Treaty.
By any measure, this Treaty is a meaningful accomplishment. It does
not require the destruction of nuclear warheads; but no arms control
treaty has ever done that. Some warheads removed from operational
service will be stored in active status, others will be stored but
disabled and not available for quick redeployment, and some will be
designated for retirement and dismantling.
The absence of treaty constraints on warhead disposition allows the
United States and Russia to proceed with warhead elimination in a
manner that is unhindered by artificial requirements. The Moscow
Treaty's flexibility regarding warhead disposition recognizes that the
United States and Russia have fundamentally different stockpile
maintenance practices. Key to the difference is that Russia continues
to produce new warheads while the United States currently has no
capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.
The Treaty does not preclude the redeployment of strategic warheads
removed from operational service. However, the United States has no
plans to do so. It does not seek to rearm. Barring unforeseen changes
in the global security environment, there is no reason we would want
to reverse these reductions. Still, there is a nuclear safety and
reliability reason to maintain the right to redeploy. The United
States has not manufactured a new nuclear weapon in more than a
decade. If an operationally deployed warhead is found to be unsafe or
unreliable, we must have the ability to replace it.
We have already begun reductions under the Moscow Treaty. Our 50
Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles at Warren Air Force
Base in Wyoming are being retired. All 50 missiles should be
deactivated within two years. As part of this process, the missiles
will be disassembled. Two of a planned four Trident submarines have
been removed from strategic service, with the next two scheduled for
removal by October 2004. The entire B-1 bomber force is dedicated to
conventional missions, and is no longer considered nuclear-capable.
These actions will leave the United States with approximately 1,100
fewer warheads in operationally deployed status by late 2007 than in
May 2002. After 2007, we plan to reduce further by decreasing the
number of warheads on ballistic missiles and reducing the number of
operationally deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases. These plans will
evolve over time.
The Moscow Treaty is a new approach for a new time. The United States
believes that the deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal called for in the
Moscow Treaty further demonstrate its ongoing commitment to the NPT.
3. Dismantlement
The United States has dismantled over 13,000 U.S. nuclear weapons over
the past 15 years. The pace of dismantlement has slowed in recent
years due in part to elimination of the backlog from retirements in
the 1990s and to the complexity of some weapon dismantlements.
However, the Department of Energy is seeking to accelerate
dismantlement efforts already underway at the Pantex facility prior to
the onset of major refurbishment work later this decade. Currently,
the W56 Minuteman II warhead is being disassembled. All B-53 strategic
bombs and some B-61 non-strategic bombs have been retired awaiting
dismantlement.
A significant milestone was reached in January of this year when the
United States finished dismantling the nuclear weapons that it pledged
to dismantle under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative of
President George H.W. Bush. The last warhead type to be disassembled
under that initiative was a nuclear artillery round.
4. Fissile Material Measures
Measures related to fissile material get little public attention, but
can have a substantial impact on the irreversibility of nuclear weapon
reductions. They involve efforts to halt the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and to dispose of excess defense
material, including that removed from dismantled nuclear weapons.
The United States has not produced fissile material for nuclear
weapons in over a decade. The United States supports the negotiation
in the Conference on Disarmament of a multilateral Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty that would advance U.S. security. Moreover, we entered
into the bilateral Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) with
Russia in 1997 that codified the shutdown of 14 U.S. plutonium
production reactors, along with 10 such reactors in Russia. Further
progress was made recently on this agreement through an amendment
signed in March 2003 that calls for the complete shutdown of Russia's
last three plutonium production reactors and replacement of the
reactors' energy production with fossil fuel sources. The United
States will assist in this replacement effort. Moreover, unprecedented
monitoring activities have begun under the PPRA to provide confidence
that Russia will not use any weapon-grade plutonium produced after
1994 in nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia continue cooperation toward disposing of
some 700 tons of fissile material declared in excess to defense needs,
including material removed from nuclear weapons. Disposing of this
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium will advance critical
nonproliferation and threat reduction goals, as well as contribute to
the irreversibility of the nuclear arms reduction process.
More than 170 tons of Russian HEU has been converted to non-weapons
grade material for use in the United States pursuant to the 1993
U.S.-Russian agreement on the conversion of 500 tons of Russian HEU.
This material comes from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons and
literally represents a conversion of once deadly weapons-grade
material into a form usable in civilian applications. The United
States has identified 174 tons of excess U.S. HEU and is unilaterally
converting this material to peaceful uses. Thus far, approximately 30
tons have been converted with another 33 tons expected to be converted
by 2007.
The conversion of plutonium to a non-weapons usable form is a much
more difficult and expensive process. The United States is actively
pursuing implementation of the 2000 U.S.-Russian agreement that calls
for each side to dispose of 34 tons of weapons plutonium into forms no
longer useable in nuclear weapons. Additional excess material can be
placed under this agreement by either side as the material becomes
available. Among current priorities is to establish financial
arrangements and related organizational mechanisms for multilateral
support of Russia's disposition program, to allow the U.S. and Russian
programs to go forward roughly in parallel.
The vast majority of the 700 tons of excess fissile material is
subject to verification or to transparency measures pursuant to
U.S.-Russian negotiated arrangements. Both sides have also worked with
the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to develop practical
measures for IAEA verification of excess material. This 1996
Trilateral Initiative addresses novel techniques for verifying
materials still in classified or sensitive forms. It also includes the
development of a model verification agreement. The United States,
Russia and the IAEA concluded last year that they had fulfilled the
initial tasks established under this initiative.
Work is proceeding between U.S. and Russian experts on developing
measurement equipment and standards.
The United States has unilaterally placed some of its excess material
under IAEA safeguards. Notably, early last month the IAEA conducted
its 100th inspection of DOE (Department of Energy) facilities at Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington, that contain excess HEU
(Highly Enriched Uranium) and plutonium, respectively. The United
States has 12 tons of excess plutonium and HEU under safeguards. The
conversion of 63 tons of excess HEU to power reactor fuel is being
done under the auspices of the IAEA.
All of this work represents progress toward nuclear disarmament. These
measures help ensure that neither the United States nor Russia would
be able to rebuild their nuclear weapon stockpiles to previously high
levels. To date, the quantities of excess fissile material removed
from the military stockpiles of both sides and slated for disposition
are equivalent to eliminating irreversibly well over 30,000 nuclear
weapons.
Pursuant to the May 2002 Moscow Summit, the United States and Russia
have been looking at ways to increase the amount of excess material
that could be eliminated.
4. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
The United States has allocated over $8 billion for all
nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to states of the
former Soviet Union since 1992, with about $1 billion requested for FY
2004. This represents an enormous investment in a safer world through
cooperative programs designed to eliminate the threat of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
This effort includes more than 30 programs operated by the Departments
of Defense, Energy and State. They provide assistance in the
dismantling of bombers, missiles and launchers for the delivery of
nuclear weapons; in reducing nuclear materials and infrastructure; and
in increasing security for the storage in Russia of nuclear warheads
and fissile material. U.S. assistance has helped eliminate almost 900
ballistic missiles, more than 100 bombers, and nearly 50 ballistic
missile submarines. Security has also been upgraded at more than 60
sites in the states of the former Soviet Union where weapons-grade
fissile material is stored or used. Through the science centers in
Moscow and Kiev, we have also engaged former WMD scientists and
engineers in civilian research projects at more than 850 institutes.
Other recent activities include the removal of HEU fuel from Serbia
and the destruction of missiles in Bulgaria. We are also helping some
30 countries to establish effective export controls and border
security. These programs offer training and detection and enforcement
equipment. Program advisers serve overseas and directly engage foreign
officials on these matters.
Since September 11, there has been a new sense of urgency in
nonproliferation as nations around the world recognize the huge risk
presented by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or
their state sponsors. Last June at Kananaskis, Canada, President Bush
and other G-8 leaders launched the Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to address this
risk. They pledged to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for
nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety
projects, initially in Russia.
Since the June Summit, the G-8 have devoted much time and attention to
implement the initiative. We expect significant progress to be
reported at the Evian Summit in June 2003. Other countries have been
invited to participate through contributions to projects under the
scope of the Partnership. Several countries have expressed strong
interest and we hope others will do so. The Global Partnership builds
upon the decade-long U.S. CTR program.
In the Global Partnership statement, G-8 leaders also endorsed six
nonproliferation principles to prevent terrorist access to WMD.
Principle six invites states to manage and dispose of excess fissile
material, to eliminate chemical weapons, and to minimize stocks of
dangerous biological pathogens and toxins. Fulfillment of this
principle will help to reduce the threat of terrorist acquisition of
these items.
B. INTERACTION
Based on concerns-raised by others, we offer the following views on a
few issues related to Article VI. We believe this information is
responsive to those delegations that commented last year on the need
for more interaction among delegations on key questions.
1. Thirteen Steps
Some countries have expressed concern over what they believe to be a
lack of progress on the 13 steps from the Final Document of the 2000
NPT Review Conference. Some of them also view these steps as a rigid
framework within which all nuclear disarmament activities must take
place.
We believe it is important to recognize that the step-by-step process
inherent in Article VI implementation will take place amidst changes,
such as in the security environment or in governmental policies. No
country believed it would be possible to implement all those steps by
2005 and none believed that all NWS would make identical progress.
However, what does not change is the legal undertaking in the NPT
related to Article VI.
While the United States no longer supports all 13 steps, we
unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament.
This goal will not be reached quickly or without enormous effort by
all NPT parties. It can be achieved only through a step-by-step
approach. Article VI of the NPT reflects this reality and sets no
timelines or specific milestones. We think it is a mistake to use
strict adherence to the 13 steps as the only means by which NPT
parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations. The fundamental test
is whether the United States or any other state is moving in the
direction set out in Article VI.
For example, one of the 13 steps calls for implementation of START II
and conclusion of START III. START II/III were attempted during the
1990s, but neither was successful. The Moscow Treaty calls for
reductions beyond those in START II and comparable to those for START
III. And the Moscow Treaty was completed in a few months. Had we
pursued a START III Treaty using the traditional approach to arms
control, it could have been several years before the two sides reached
agreement. The Moscow Treaty has mandated real results -- a decrease
to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads -- where the START II and
START III processes had failed.
2. Diminished Role of Nuclear Weapons
The new nuclear policy adopted by President Bush is specifically
directed toward a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The United
States adopted a new strategic posture with three elements: offensive
systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), active and passive defense systems,
and a revitalized defense infrastructure.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's transmittal letter to the Congress
last year for the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that this "New
Triad" will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence
through modernization of conventional forces, the addition of missile
defenses, and other measures. This approach means that the United
States will no longer be as heavily dependent on nuclear forces for
deterrence as it was during the Cold War.
This represents a very significant change. It is based on the
realization that the Cold War is over and the international security
environment is very different than it was before the breakup of the
Soviet Union. New threats today, particularly from state sponsors of
terrorism, require new approaches. Some of these threats may not be
deterred by our traditional Cold War posture -- and thus the need for
a new range of capabilities.
The Department of Defense has not identified any requirements for new
nuclear weapons. We have not produced a nuclear warhead in over a
decade. Certainly, cost and feasibility studies related to possible
nuclear modernization are undertaken. Such studies, however, in no way
represent a decision to proceed with development of a new warhead.
Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell have stated publicly that
there has been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and that
the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons
use. Indeed, by strengthening non-nuclear forces, specifically in the
area of high-accuracy and precision strike, we will be able to hold
targets at risk with an advanced conventional system that heretofore
required a nuclear weapon. The result is an increase in the threshold
for nuclear use. There has been no change in U.S. negative security
assurance policy. In addition, the United States does not target any
country on a day-to-day basis.
While the United States will not pursue ratification of the CTBT
(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), we continue to support the current
moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States has not conducted a
nuclear explosive test since 1992. We also support the establishment
of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests.
Proposals exist to decrease the time that it would take to resume
nuclear testing, were that ever to be necessary. But that fact says
nothing about the likelihood of a nuclear test. Nor does it relate to
the development of a new nuclear weapon.
The current test readiness would be more than adequate for that
purpose. For the foreseeable future, we believe that the stockpile
stewardship program can ensure the safety and reliability of our
nuclear stockpile, and that no nuclear tests will be required.
All states examine possible future threats, do contingency planning,
and study ways to respond to new threats. Such activities are
necessary to protect national security. The United States is no
exception. However, published reports that studies or contingency
planning may be ongoing do not in any way represent a change in
policy. Nuclear policies, in particular, are decided at the highest
levels of any U.S. administration.
Since the nuclear age began, all U.S. Presidents have demonstrated
prudence with regard to nuclear weapons. The United States has an
unparalleled conventional capability to defend our security. President
Bush's policies are further reducing the extent to which we need to
rely on nuclear weapons.
3. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
A third concern is the view that Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW)
should be a priority and be subject to legally binding agreements.
The United States and NATO long ago decided that reductions in NSNW
were appropriate. Over the past decade, the United States eliminated
all but one of its nuclear delivery systems from Europe. Overall
reductions in the number of U.S. NSNW have reached nearly 90 percent.
The Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of the Navy
have been denuclearized. The only remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe -- air delivered bombs -- have been greatly reduced. This
progress in NSNW reductions comes from unilateral action.
NATO's nuclear-capable delivery aircraft used to be able to launch in
minutes. That readiness time has been lengthened to months. NATO has
considerably reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons.
In recent years, the United States has looked at the prospect of
formal arms control treaties on NSNW and concluded that such an
approach is not possible. The nature of these weapons and their
delivery systems make it far more difficult to have confidence in
treaty implementation than is the case for strategic systems. Delivery
systems for NSNW are often dual-use, i.e. for conventional and nuclear
roles, which makes it very difficult to have confidence that they have
been retired from a nuclear role.
The United States is committed, however, to the pursuit of
transparency related to NSNW. The issue has been raised with Russia in
the bilateral consultative group established at last year's Moscow
summit. The NATO-Russia Council is also discussing confidence-building
measures related to NSNW.
CONCLUSION
The preamble of the Moscow Treaty notes that the United States and
Russia are "mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1,1968."
President Bush's signature on this Treaty provides a clear
demonstration at the highest level of the commitment of the United
States to its Article VI undertakings.
This paper has provided some details of U.S. actions that implement
Article VI. Moreover, we have tried to clarify some issues where there
is a potential for misunderstanding of U.S. policy. It is clear from
the foregoing that the United States is prepared not only to take
measures that reduce reliance on its own nuclear weapons, but also to
assist others in concrete efforts to move toward Article VI goals. We
continue to expend enormous resources and effort to reduce the risk to
all nations from weapons of mass destruction. The totality of these
efforts represents a solid record of achievement in implementation of
Article VI.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)