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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Washington File

28 April 2003

U.S. Urges Serious Consequences For Non-Proliferation Treaty Violators

(Wolf calls Iran's nuclear program a "fundamental challenge") (4160)
A leading U.S. government nuclear nonproliferation official urged
"serious consequences for those who violate their NPT commitments" and
described Iran's nuclear program as a "fundamental challenge" at an
international conference in Geneva April 28.
Speaking to the second session of the preparatory committee for the
2005 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf said, "The
time for business as usual is over. The time for resolute action is
here." He called for full compliance with the NPT by all member
states, noting that without it, "the security benefits of the Treaty
will erode." And without strict enforcement, he said, "international
confidence ... will dissolve, and the basis for peaceful sharing of
nuclear technology will be destroyed."
Wolf said that while "robust support" for the NPT is the starting
point in achieving nonproliferation objectives, "declaratory
statements must be backed up with political resolve" in order to
"confront those who undermine nuclear nonproliferation and to take
direct action to strengthen the barriers against possible offenders."
He said there "must be serious consequences for those who violate
their NPT commitments."
Wolf's remarks echoed the sentiments expressed in a statement to the
committee by Secretary of State Colin Powell that Wolf read at the
beginning of his remarks. "The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) must be relentless in pursuing suspected cases of
noncompliance," Powell said. "The NPT can only be as strong as our
will to enforce it, in spirit and in deed. We share a collective
responsibility to be ever vigilant, and to take concerted action when
the Treaty, our Treaty, is threatened," Powell's statement continued.
Wolf specifically focused on North Korea and Iran in his remarks.
Mentioning Pyongyang's October 2002 admission to having a secret
uranium enrichment program as part of its nuclear weapons program, he
said it is "deeply regrettable" that North Korea decided to violate
the NPT and then to withdraw from it -- an action that was "both
cynical ... and dangerous in its impact on security in Northeast
Asia." However, he noted that at meetings last week among North Korea,
China and the United States, the U.S. made clear its resolve to
achieve "verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of the North Korean
program, and called on all NPT members to tell Pyongyang: "Abandon
your nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT."
As for Iran, it poses "the most fundamental challenge ever faced by
the NPT," Wolf said. "Iran has been conducting an alarming,
clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we
believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program," he
said.
Wolf stated that no other NPT-member, non-nuclear state except Iran
has:
-- built an enrichment plant before their first power reactor was
finished;
-- irresponsibly committed to building a production-scale plant
without extensive research and development;
-- built a large-scale heavy-water production plant, even though its
declared program is based only on light-water reactors; and
-- has clandestinely sought to acquire laser enrichment technology.
"Iran is going down the same path of denial and deception that
handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq," Wolf
said. "I want to make this clear...this is not a bilateral issue
between Iran and the United States. This is an issue between Iran and
the rest of the world. Every NPT party has a stake in seeing the veil
of secrecy lifted on Iran's nuclear program," he said.
Following is a transcript of Wolf's remarks:
(begin transcript)
Statement by
Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf
Representative of the United States of America
To the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for
The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
April 28, 2003
As delivered
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear as the
Representative of the United States to this second meeting of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I
congratulate you on your selection. We appreciate deeply the effort
you have made to ensure a constructive outcome for this meeting.
At the outset, I have the honor to deliver a message from the
Secretary of State Colin Powell:
I begin his message:
I extend my personal best wishes to participants at the 2003 session
of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT). We meet at a time of considerable challenge to the NPT and to
international peace and security.
In recent months, one state declared its withdrawal from the Treaty.
Another party admitted to construction of secret nuclear facilities.
Others are procuring technologies that would enable them to produce
clandestinely the fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon.
NPT Parties -- weapon states and non-weapon states alike -- must take
strong action to deal with cases of noncompliance and to strengthen
the Treaty's nonproliferation undertakings. We cannot allow the few
who fail to meet their obligations to undermine the important work of
the NPT.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be relentless in
pursuing suspected cases of noncompliance. The IAEA needs our full
financial and political support to do its job. Universal adoption of
the IAEA Additional Protocol must remain a high priority objective.
The United States remains firmly committed to its obligations under
the NPT. We are pursuing a number of avenues that promote the goal of
nuclear disarmament. The Moscow Treaty and other U.S. actions are
based on a desire and an intention to reduce our reliance on nuclear
weapons and eliminate surplus stocks of weapons-grade material.
The NPT reflects our common realization that the spread of nuclear
weapons would gravely destabilize our world. An NPT to which all
states adhere and fully comply would serve to protect against the
prospect of regional nuclear competition and to reduce the risk of
nuclear war.
The NPT can only be as strong as our will to enforce it, in spirit and
in deed. We share a collective responsibility to be ever vigilant, and
to take concerted action when the Treaty, our Treaty, is threatened.
Let us act promptly and effectively to meet the challenges to the NPT.
By doing so, we can help ensure that it remains an effective
instrument of global security.
And that is the end of the message of the Secretary of State.
The Chair this morning called for a comprehensive assessment of the
current state of the health of this treaty. I agree with the Chairman.
While we meet here in Geneva, home of the Conference on Disarmament,
our job is broader. We need to look at the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I say this because more than
ever before, proliferation is on the front page of newspapers all over
the world and worry about its threat is on the minds of all of our
citizens. Many observers are too quick to write the epitaph for the
NPT and for our common efforts. Let me say, as the Secretary said, up
front, that the United States of America rejects that view. Like the
Chairman, we note the remarkable record of achievements and we
congratulate and we affirm the over 180 nations which live by their
Treaty commitments. For 33 years, we have come together to address the
unique challenge of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Much has happened since this group gathered last year in New York.
While we have made important progress on some aspects of the Treaty's
implementation, we also face significant new problems.
The NPT's core purpose is preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
It's in the title. While the Treaty has been largely successful in
this respect, irresponsible NPT parties are taking actions that pose
fundamental challenges to the Treaty.
Today, each of us must make a choice. The time for business as usual
is over. The time for resolute action is here. Without full compliance
by all states, the security benefits of the Treaty will erode. Without
strict enforcement, the international confidence that has underpinned
the Treaty will dissolve, and the basis for peaceful sharing of
nuclear technology will be destroyed. The world will become a far more
dangerous place as more nations contemplate their future amid growing
numbers of nuclear weapon states (NWS).
We must choose to strengthen our political commitment to the NPT. We
must build stronger barriers against those who try to violate the
Treaty's fundamental obligations. One part of that choice requires
dealing firmly with countries whose nuclear programs today pose a
serious threat to the NPT. By doing so, we send a clear message to
stop any other Treaty party that would seek to acquire or spread
nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technologies.
In October 2002, North Korea admitted to a secret uranium enrichment
program as part of its nuclear weapons program. It is not just that
this program compounded previous DPRK violations of the NPT and
several other international agreements. But it also happened even as
my country and others were engaged in nearly a decade of good faith
efforts under the Agreed Framework and other international agreements.
I need not repeat the sequence of events since that revelation or say
more than how deeply regrettable it is that North Korea decided first
to further violate the Treaty and then withdraw. Its withdrawal action
was both cynical, in light of its long-standing breach of the Treaty,
and dangerous in its impact on security in Northeast Asia. The
international community is determined to see the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. It is only by eliminating its nuclear weapons
program that North Korea can hope to improve its international
standing and obtain the cooperation it needs for economic development.
If NPT withdrawal and threats to acquire nuclear weapons become the
currency of international bargaining, our world will be in chaos.
While all our options remain available, we are determined to end North
Korea's threat through peaceful, diplomatic means. We met in Beijing
last week for multilateral talks with China and North Korea. There
were no breakthroughs, but we were able to make clear to North Korea
our resolve in achieving the verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of
its nuclear weapons program. It is important for every country
represented here to send the same message to the DPRK: abandon your
nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT.
Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the
NPT. This is a country that professes to be in full compliance with
its safeguards obligations. It is a country that has been one of the
largest beneficiaries of IAEA technical cooperation for peaceful
purposes. But, as recent revelations have made all too clear, Iran has
been conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive
nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a
nuclear weapons program.
How many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states built an enrichment plant
before their first power reactor was finished? None. What responsible
country would or could commit to building a production scale plant
without extensive research and development? None. How many other NPT
non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear programs based solely on light
water reactors have also built large-scale heavy water production
plants? None. Why has Iran sought clandestinely to acquire laser
enrichment technology? Iran has not answered, nor even admitted to
this effort.
Recent revelations by private groups and the IAEA raise profound
doubts about Iran's intentions. Despite the professions of
transparency and peaceful intent, Iran is going down the same path of
denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in
North Korea and Iraq. We have seen the pattern of cheat and retreat
before -- of begrudging compromises on process but obstinacy on real
disclosure. It is hardly reassuring to us that, 11 years after it was
first issued, Iran has only belatedly accepted the IAEA's 1992 call on
all states to declare new facilities prior to construction. Iran was
the very last state to accept this call, and then only after its new
facilities were made public by others.
The IAEA, which is following up the revelations made during Director
General Elbaradei's February visit, undoubtedly has its own extensive
list of questions. Some of these may relate to small issues and others
to more fundamental matters. But the answers the IAEA is seeking are
critical, are critical, to determining whether Iran is in compliance
with its safeguards agreement -- and therefore meeting its fundamental
NPT obligations.
I want to make this clear: this is not, this is not, a bilateral issue
between Iran and the United States. This is an issue between Iran and
the rest of the world. Every NPT party has a stake in seeing the veil
of secrecy lifted on Iran's nuclear program. Many countries have
concerns and questions about Iran's intentions and the capabilities
that must be addressed. The IAEA needs to ask the hard questions and
it deserves, it needs to get complete answers. It needs to go wherever
necessary to find the truth; and it needs to measure each answer
against the pattern to date of denial and deception. Member states of
the IAEA will need to know how Iran has responded to requests for
access. Iran has repeatedly asserted that its nuclear program is
"completely transparent" and that it is "fully cooperating with the
IAEA." Now is the time for Iran to provide full disclosure. IAEA
members will be satisfied with nothing less than the truth. We look
forward to the Director General's comprehensive report on Iran at the
June Board of Governors meeting.
Our experiences with Iraq, Iran and North Korea reveal an objective
message. We must constantly be mindful that an irresponsible NPT party
may use its "declared" peaceful nuclear program to mask its
development or acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities. What is
presented as "compliance" may in fact not be real. Only genuine
commitment, true transparency, and rigorous verification can lead to
genuine confidence.
Some argue that, absent a formal finding of noncompliance with
safeguards, that non-nuclear-weapons states have a "right" to acquire
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Article IV certainly
provides for cooperation among NPT parties in pursuing peaceful
nuclear programs. And many NPT parties have benefited from Article IV
assistance over the life of the Treaty. But, underpinning and
fundamental to this cooperation are the nonproliferation obligations
in Articles II and III. These obligations require that nuclear
material and facilities be used solely, solely, for peaceful purposes
as set forth in the Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Nuclear
commerce must not continue when there are questions, even if those
questions have not yet resulted in formal findings of noncompliance.
Recent history demonstrates that suppliers need to exercise far
greater caution with countries of concern. Some may argue they must
see the "smoking gun." Unfortunately, the smoking gun for clandestine
nuclear programs may well be the mushroom cloud above an exploding
weapon.
Today, we also face another risk -- that of terrorist access to
nuclear materials. The tragic lesson of September 11 is that
terrorists are looking for ways to kill or injure large numbers of
civilians, innocent civilians, and they are looking to create panic
and economic dislocation. Nuclear and radioactive material offer
terrorists a tempting means to those ends. Lest anyone think this is a
problem only for the United States, or perhaps a few western countries
-- think again. Remember, the economic tidal wave spawned by the
September 11 terrorist actions is still, still, crashing down all
across the world, causing economic losses in the trillions of dollars
and misery and economic deprivation for millions all around the world.
Use of a stolen nuclear weapon, or even a radiological dispersion
device, could cause far more extensive damage for all of us.
Many here already have spoken to the key importance of disarmament and
the need to match the Treaty's disarmament and nonproliferation
obligations. And I quite agree with that. Balance, balance, is an
inherent part of the Treaty. The Treaty has three pillars:
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear cooperation. But
the fact is, today, the Treaty is dangerously out of balance.
Disarmament continues, and in fact took a significant step forward
with the signing of the Moscow Treaty. We are leading that process,
and we will continue to do so. In the past 15 years, huge strides have
been made in reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. The United
States has dismantled over 13,000 nuclear weapons. We have eliminated
more than a dozen different types of warheads and we have reduced the
number of nuclear weapons by about 60%. Under the Moscow Treaty we
will cut the number of strategic weapons again by two-thirds to 1,700
to 2,200 by the year 2012. In two decades, the United States will have
eliminated or decommissioned three-quarters of its strategic arsenal.
We have also given up whole classes of tactical nuclear weapons, and
we have withdrawn remaining stocks from almost every overseas site.
We also are making progress under the U.S.-Russia agreement that
ensure excess fissile material can never be used in nuclear weapons.
Over their lifetime, these agreements will contribute to the
irreversibility of nuclear reductions. They will ensure that fissile
material capable of manufacturing over 30,000 nuclear weapons is no
longer available for such use. And that's not all.
We are purchasing from Russia low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel
that has been down-blended from hundreds of tons of highly enriched
uranium, uranium from dismantled warheads. The United States and
Russia have agreed to permanently dispose of 34 tons each of weapons
usable plutonium.
We spend about a $1 billion a year on a variety of nonproliferation
and threat reduction programs in Russia and other states of the former
Soviet Union. And much of this effort is to reduce nuclear material
stocks and secure that which remains. We fostered last year's decision
by G-8 Leaders to launch a Global Partnership and commit up to $20
billion over 10 years for nonproliferation assistance. The United
States' share of that $20 billion is $10 billion.
Some may debate whether this pace is fast enough -- but it is not
credible to argue that we are not on a steady downward path toward the
goals of Article VI.
Yet, the path for nuclear proliferation is spiraling upward. And what
must we do?
IAEA safeguards play an indispensable role in the process of ensuring
confidence in NPT compliance, but safeguards need further
strengthening. We rely on the IAEA to safeguard peaceful nuclear
programs around the world and to look for evidence of clandestine
activities. It must have the resources and the resolve necessary to
ensure that peaceful nuclear programs are not mere facades. The work
of this unique international organization advances our collective
security. We need to respond positively to the IAEA's chronic
shortfall in regular budget safeguards funding. At the same time, we
must recognize that it will take more than additional funding for the
IAEA to meet its maximum verification potential under the NPT. NPT
parties must recognize the dangers that exist, and they must summon
the political will to support a more assertive IAEA safeguards system.
More resources must be matched with strengthened enforcement.
We need to take the next big step by substantially increasing the
political momentum behind the Additional Protocol. In May of last
year, President Bush transmitted the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to
the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. In doing
so, the President made clear his support for universal adoption of the
Additional Protocol.
Since we met last year, there has been some progress globally in
acceptance of the Additional Protocol. But the pace should intensify.
Some states with significant nuclear programs have yet to bring a
Protocol before the Board. The 2005 NPT Review Conference offers a
target date for action. All NPT parties, including my government,
should exert a maximum effort to have a Protocol in force in 2005.
Sustained and rapid progress over the next two years in completing
both Protocols and the 48 NPT safeguards agreements that are not yet
in force would represent a solid achievement in support of the NPT and
global security. Even NPT parties with no civil nuclear programs can
contribute. Every safeguards agreement and Protocol that is concluded
reinforces the fabric of the NPT and assists the IAEA in verifying
that nuclear programs are genuinely peaceful.
There is a task for members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and for the
Zangger Committee as well. They should continue to search for ways to
ensure that items under their control do not find their way into
nuclear weapon programs. Information sharing among NSG states is
critical to this goal. But members must act on this information by
recognizing the increased risk of diversion and they must act to deny
nuclear-related items to states of concern. We applaud the recent
action by the NSG to address the threat of terrorism. These supplier
groups can provide a boost to the Additional Protocol by adopting it
as a condition of supply, perhaps by 2005.
And strong national export controls are essential to enforcing the
goals of the NSG and the NPT. There should be severe penalties for
those who violate the law. And supplier governments must have
authority to stop items not on the control lists. We should consider
incorporating the concept of "catch-all" controls as an explicit NSG
requirement. We all need to reflect on the fact, that North Korea and
Iran obtained proven enrichment technologies largely undetected, even
though, suppliers increased their scrutiny of enrichment transactions
more than a decade ago.
The ongoing effort to amend the Physical Protection Convention will
strengthen international standards for protecting nuclear material and
facilities used for peaceful purposes. A resolution adopted at last
fall's IAEA General Conference noted with concern the lack of progress
and called for the early completion of negotiations on an amendment.
The drafting group convened by the IAEA Director General completed its
work in March without reaching a consensus. It is time for parties to
set aside political agendas and to realize our common goal. The need
for an amended Convention is as critical as ever.
International cooperation in securing and regulating radioactive
sources was given a boost last month at a conference in Vienna
co-sponsored by Russia and the United States. And more than 120
countries joined the call for stronger national and international
security over radioactive sources, especially the kind that can be
used in "dirty bombs." Among the key recommendations were the need for
national plans, to manage sources throughout their lifetime, as well
as to locate, recover and secure high-risk radioactive sources. This
is not an issue on which interests of developed and developing
countries differ. Virtually no state is immune from the risk posed by
these sources. Here is another opportunity for us to work together.
The U.S. will be active in helping.
There are many opportunities for every state to make a difference in
achieving nuclear nonproliferation objectives. It starts with robust
support for the NPT. But declaratory statements must be backed up with
political resolve to confront those who undermine nuclear
nonproliferation and to take direct action to strengthen the barriers
against possible future offenders. There must be serious consequences
for those who violate their NPT commitments.
U.S. support for the goal of universal NPT adherence remains
undiminished. We do not support any change to the NPT that would
accord a different status to states currently outside the Treaty. The
2000 NPT Review Conference recognized that universality would depend
on successful efforts to enhance regional security in areas of tension
such as the Middle East and South Asia. We continue to recognize the
validity of the goal of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and we
are committed to helping the parties of the Middle East to achieve
peace.
In closing, let me reinforce that the NPT is more important today than
ever before. As we prepare for the 2005 Conference, we should
recognize the new proliferation challenges we face and attach a higher
priority to strengthening the Treaty. The vast majority of parties,
parties in this room, honor their obligations. Yet, the Treaty's value
to future generations depends on what we do to preserve the Treaty as
an effective instrument against the spread of nuclear weapons. I am
confident that working together with strong resolve we can ensure the
NPT and other multilateral approaches continue to play a critical role
in the fight against the security threats of the 21st century.
Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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