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20 March 2003

Wolf Says U.S. Determined to Push Back Nuclear Proliferation

(Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (5570)
The United States is "determined to do what it takes to push back" the
efforts of Iraq, Iran and Libya to achieve nuclear weapons
capabilities, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John
Wolf told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 19.
"Failure to arrest nuclear proliferation would profoundly affect US
and allied defense interests and policies," he said.
In Wolf's assessment, the world is changing with respect to
proliferation and "not for the better."
"Curbing supply of dangerous technologies, including nuclear
technology, is made more difficult by the ambivalent approach of many
governments in Europe and Asia," he said.
Among Wolf's comments on particular challenges to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
- Iraq: "Iraq is a unique threat," Wolf said. "We are resolved to
eliminate Iraq's ability to use WMD [weapons of mass destruction] to
threaten its neighbors, our friends and allies, and our interests. And
we are determined not to wait until it is too late." The United States
will be sending a message in the way it deals with Iraq: "Ending the
threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will send a
powerful signal to other proliferators that the world will not stand
idly by."
- North Korea: "Some ask why disarming Iraq is more urgent than
resolving North Korea's nuclear threat. The facts are different, and
so too should be our policies. While all options are on the table, we
will be patient yet deliberate in working for de-nuclearization of the
Korean peninsula. We are working quite closely with our South Korean
and Japanese allies, with Russia, China and with the EU [European
Union] to seek a peaceful, multilateral path to end the North's
nuclear weapons program." Wolf also warned: "North Korea must not
imagine it can blackmail the international community."
- Iran: "Recent visits to Iran by the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency] have made all too clear what we have been saying
publicly and privately to counterparts in the EU, Russia, China, and
other countries in Asia - Iran has a sizable, heretofore clandestine,
effort to acquire capabilities that makes sense only as part of an
effort to produce fissile material for weapons. It has done this while
maintaining the pretense of adherence to its NPT safeguard
obligations."
Wolf faulted the international response to such challenges. "What's
missing in today's international debate is a sense of outrage;
international standards of acceptable conduct - embodied in treaties
like the NPT and other nonproliferation treaties - are being violated
by countries and the world is reluctant to impose consequences," he
said.
He expressed impatience with current treaties not only because of
their voluntary nature, but also because they lack enforcement
mechanisms. "What we're not doing enough of is taking concrete action
to enforce commitments more strictly and make proliferation more
costly -- politically and financially," Wolf said.
The assistant secretary also outlined State Department involvement in
non-proliferation programs, including the Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) Program, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI);
non-proliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union; and cooperation
with the IAEA.
Following is the text of Wolf's testimony:
(begin text)
Washington, D.C.
March 19, 2003
NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES AND INITIATIVES
John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
I am pleased to have the chance to talk with you today about our
policies and initiatives on nonproliferation. I know we share a view
that weapons of mass destruction in the possession of hostile states
and terrorists are one of the greatest security challenges facing the
United States. Over eleven years ago, this chairman of this committee
showed extraordinary foresight in proposing the Nunn-Lugar authorities
to address a problem that has broadened and become more serious.
Since then, our nonproliferation policies and programs have come a
long way. Executive agencies have forged powerful partnerships in many
areas. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has partnered the
Departments of Defense, Energy and State on vital programs within the
former Soviet Union. These include programs managed by my own Bureau
of Nonproliferation (NP) in the Science Centers in Russia and Ukraine,
and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) projects and
export control assistance programs, which can operate worldwide. I
will have a few more words to say about other areas of interagency
cooperation later in my testimony.
We face a world in change, and in the nonproliferation world, this
change is not for the better. I'd like today first to offer some
thoughts about the worldwide situation we face. I will then describe
some of what we are doing about it.
Our challenges have multiplied in many worrisome ways since the end of
the Cold War. During the first 40 years following World War II, we and
our allies depended largely on deterrence and tight export controls to
limit the spread of dangerous weapons. Looking back, things seemed
more manageable - perhaps because the Soviet threat superceded all
others.
Today, we face a substantially increased risk from countries and
international terrorist groups with access to chemical and biological
weapons, and at least several states with access to components and
technology for making nuclear weapons.
Nuclear issues have the most public visibility. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policies, and we can take some satisfaction that, of
the 188 countries that are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, most have made irrevocable decisions to forego the nuclear
option. States like South Africa, Brazil and Argentina actually turned
back. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus chose not to try to maintain the
nuclear weapons that were left on their territories following the
Soviet Union's collapse.
However, we can no longer say we have held the line at five nuclear
armed states. South Asia has crossed the nuclear threshold. So too
apparently has North Korea. Iraq, Iran, and Libya are among the list
of nuclear wannabees. These wannabees seek nuclear weapons
capabilities even though they are all parties to the NPT.
We are determined to do what it takes to push back their efforts. We
need to get this right. Failure to arrest nuclear proliferation would
profoundly affect US and allied defense interests and policies.
Curbing supply of dangerous technologies, including nuclear
technology, is made more difficult by the ambivalent approach of many
governments in Europe and Asia. While combating proliferation is, for
us, a central, focusing national security issue, many others trade off
concerns about the spread of WMD against economic and political
interests. For us, though, we clearly see a threat -- from real
countries, with real names, and real capabilities, capabilities which
pose real security problems for the U.S. and our allies and friends.
Iraq is a unique threat; and one the President is determined to see
ended. For twelve years, Saddam Hussein has reneged on his disarmament
commitments and defied the international community by continuing to
produce prohibited weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.
That defiance will now end. We are resolved to eliminate Iraq's
ability to use WMD to threaten its neighbors, our friends and allies,
and our interests. And we are determined not to wait until it is too
late.
Some ask why disarming Iraq is more urgent than resolving North
Korea's nuclear threat. The facts are different, and so too should be
our policies. While all options are on the table, we will be patient
yet deliberate in working for de-nuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. We are working quite closely with our South Korean and
Japanese allies, with Russia, China and with the EU to seek a
peaceful, multilateral path to end the North's nuclear weapons
program.
Iran is another proliferation problem - both for its indigenous
programs and for the risk of onward proliferation. Recent visits to
Iran by the IAEA have made all too clear what we have been saying
publicly and privately to counterparts in the EU, Russia, China, and
other countries in Asia - Iran has a sizable, heretofore clandestine,
effort to acquire capabilities that makes sense only as part of an
effort to produce fissile material for weapons. It has done this while
maintaining the pretense of adherence to its NPT safeguard
obligations.
As I will expand on in a moment, we count on IAEA to be forthright and
forceful in identifying problems and safeguards violations, and we
expect it to insist on immediate action by Iran to end its clandestine
nuclear weapons programs. This is not just an IAEA problem; again the
international community must act in concert. All nations that have not
yet done so should sign the Additional Protocol. That would enhance
global security through more rigorous safeguards.
The situation in South Asia deserves special mention, as it is quite
different from the dangers posed by the rogue states. India and
Pakistan are two very different countries, with which we are pursuing
boldly different relationships. Each poses special challenges. We need
to take account of the unique situation posed by their possession of
nuclear weapons. From the NP Bureau perspective, ongoing tensions in
South Asia make especially important these countries' controls on
sensitive technology. We are also mindful of the risks that nuclear
weapons could be used, either intentionally or accidentally in a
crisis. We discuss these issues regularly with officials from both
countries: I convey our concerns and help identify possible solutions
whenever I meet with my Indian and Pakistani counterparts. But with
India, there are tough questions about how far we can go. We must
continually weigh our mutual interests in cooperation against our
obligations under the NPT, NSG, and the Atomic Energy Act.
In the face of such challenges, what's missing in today's
international debate is a sense of outrage; international standards of
acceptable conduct - embodied in treaties like the NPT and other
nonproliferation treaties - are being violated by countries and the
world is reluctant to impose consequences. I have said to my
colleagues, in Europe and India for instance, that what the rogue
states are demonstrating is a deep seated antipathy for our systems
based in law, religious tolerance, and respect for human rights and
ethnic pluralism. Today their target may be the U.S., but one can well
expect these states to strike out against all who share these values.
Against this grim backdrop, there is a risk that complacency, inertia,
and timidity are preventing the international community from blocking
attempted violations, or from reacting decisively to them. Clearly, we
cannot simply wring our hands and hope things will get better. We have
an active agenda, in partnership with a wide range of other countries
and international organizations, and unilaterally.
I have set five goals for the Nonproliferation Bureau. They are:
- Curbing the supply of material, equipment, and technology for WMD
and missiles to proliferators or terrorists;
- Persuading states seeking to acquire WMD and missiles to cease those
efforts;
- Maintaining and strengthening the international system of
nonproliferation treaties and regimes;
- Promoting international nuclear cooperation under the highest
nonproliferation and safety standards; and
- Containing the transfer of advanced conventional arms to states of
concern, and to terrorists.
We focus considerable attention on the need to stop leakage of WMD
expertise, sensitive materials and technology from the states of the
Former Soviet Union. Looking first at nuclear materials, it's
axiomatic that one cannot build a nuclear weapon without fissile
material. Thus a key part of our efforts relates to securing the
hundreds of tons of such materials present mainly in Russia and other
states of the FSU. The FY 2004 budget request currently before the
Congress seeks about $1 billion for our Global Partnership effort in
the former Soviet Union to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. This request includes $459 million for Department of
Energy (DOE) programs to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons,
material and expertise, $451 million for Department of Defense (DOD)
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, and $81 million for Department
of State programs to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and expertise.
Our goals for nuclear nonproliferation within this effort are to:
- Improve security at Russia storage facilities;
- Consolidate stored fissile materials;
- Stop new production; and
- Purchase or down-blend former nuclear weapons materials to reduce
supply.
My bureau provides the diplomatic lead for several of the
nonproliferation and weapons reduction programs funded and implemented
by the Departments of Defense and Energy. Just last week, for example,
Secretary Abraham was able to sign the Plutonium Production Reactor
Agreement thanks in part to such support from the State Department.
Similarly, with Energy, we are leading the multilateral negotiations
on an agreement to finance Russia's plutonium disposition program.
We also oversee the U.S. Government's participation in the
International Science Centers in Russia and Ukraine. These provide
flexible platforms for engaging former Soviet WMD scientists and for
redirecting them toward peaceful, commercial projects, and away from
rogue states or terrorists. The centers also are used as partners when
needed to support other U.S. nonproliferation programs. The Defense
Department, for example, as a partner of the Moscow Center,
contributed assistance for pathogen security projects when it was
unable to negotiate an implementing agreement for such biological
weapons nonproliferation research projects in Russia.
The centers have had some notable successes. Russian scientists
regularly tell us that the prospect of working with the Center
provides them a genuine incentive to spurn offers from rogue states,
and we continue to receive reliable reports that such offers are being
made. Research done under the auspices of the Science Centers has
produced tangible benefits for Russia -- and for us. One project, for
example, resulted in development of a high altitude laser which can
detect leaks from gas pipelines and is now under commercial
development. Another has identified new electronics applications for
beryllium that allow a shift from weapons to commercial manufacturing.
Recently, some of our biggest achievements have been in the
bio-medical sphere. In research jointly sponsored by State and the
U.S. Public Health Service, Russian scientists have identified two
anti-viral compounds that hold promise of effectiveness against
smallpox. If this effort bears fruit, we could have an important new
tool in the event our nation is ever exposed to attack with a smallpox
virus. Similarly, Russian researchers in the program are hard at work
developing kits for rapid diagnosis of West Nile, Newcastle, and Avian
flu. I am sure all members of this committee who have poultry
producers in your states understand the importance of reacting quickly
to stop these diseases.
Improved access is another important benefit of our engagement
programs. The economic advantages of participating in them are so
great that with time and persistence we have steadily reduced the
number of institutes closed to us. In recent months members of my
staff were the first Americans to receive a thorough tour of the
Berdsk biologics facility and the Vostok joint stock company
facilities at Omutninsk. They also were the first Americans to be
received in any fashion at the Institute of Toxicology in Saint
Petersburg. The Kirov-200 facility you tried to visit, Senator Lugar,
still eludes us despite much effort. We will not give up, however. We
have developed good relations with members of the local university and
are now looking into the feasibility of working with the EPA to site
an environmental monitoring station there.
In the coming year, we will continue our engagement efforts with a
significantly increased focus on chemical scientists, and we will
reform our efforts to better guide scientists to commercial
self-sustainability. This means in the first instance reorganizing the
Moscow and Kiev centers to clarify lines of authority and add staff
specialized in the marketing of scientific research. The $30 million
Congress provided in Defense Emergency Response Funds for FY 2002 for
conversion of former bio-production facilities will also play an
important part in the sustainability effort. We are using it to assist
such institutes to obtain western business development expertise and
to foster the formation of a bio-consortium led by the Moscow Medical
Academy to assist Russian biological researchers in marketing their
research. We will also, of course, help support American firms seeking
to invest in projects at these institutes. We are very grateful, in
particular, for the interest shown by the Eli Lilly company in
producing a drug at one of these institutes. We will assist and
encourage others to follow.
In the year ahead we will press this case with Russian authorities,
and we will insist on more access and bringing more institutes into
the tent. We want to establish a basis for real commercial
partnerships with U.S. industry, but progress has been slow,
frustrated by Russian bureaucracy and suspicion.
Another tool we use to curb supply globally is our Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund, for which the President has requested $35
million in FY 2004, more than double the FY 2003 appropriation. NDF
has tackled tough, urgent, and often unanticipated problems on a
worldwide basis. In the recent past, it has negotiated and executed
the removal of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Serbia, the
destruction of missiles in Bulgaria and the return from Cyprus of
nuclear reactor parts en route to the Middle East. The NDF has also
led a successful international effort to develop a state-of-the-art
automated tracking system referred to as Tracker designed to help
governments strengthen their control over sensitive exports or
transshipments. Tracker has been a key tool for engaging nearly two
dozen countries - either as design partners, current users, or in
discussions of future implementation. Now deployed throughout Central
Europe to track sensitive exports, this system is increasingly of
interest to countries in Western Europe and Asia as a means to track
terrorists and to monitor the movement of dangerous materials. The
State Department is closely coordinating this export control
assistance tool with other U.S. equipment assistance provided to these
states.
In the future, we expect the NDF to focus on urgent, unanticipated
opportunities to eliminate missile systems; destroy, secure and remove
biological pathogens; eliminate chemical agents and weapons; rescue
orphaned radiological sources; inventory and track dangerous
materials; assist countries in developing laws and regulations to
control the movement, storage, and security of dangerous materials;
and encourage countries in the Middle East and South Asia to use the
Tracker system and to assist with its development.
The NDF funding increases that we seek anticipate the substantially
accelerated effort we will make to work worldwide to help countries at
risk secure dangerous materials. We want to help countries establish
better accounting and control mechanisms to secure radioactive
materials, pathogens, and sensitive precursors, from the laboratory to
movement in internal and international commerce. This Dangerous
Materials Initiative (DMI) aims for synergies among U.S. Government
agencies and programs, and also with international partners and
international organizations.
At this point, we are not seeking separate funding for the DMI but
expect that the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund will be a major
resource, along with other U.S. assistance programs. Although still in
the design stage, we are aiming to encourage international support
under this umbrella at the G8 Evian Summit in June, and we have
already started several small pilot projects to prove our concept and
to survey worldwide legal authorities for controlling dangerous
materials.
Another of our major programs to curb supply is centered in State's
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. We provide
policy direction and coordination and draw on the expertise of the
Departments of Commerce and Energy, as well as Customs and Coast Guard
(now incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security). We also
work closely with the Department of Defense to coordinate our efforts.
We currently have active programs in some 30 countries, with 20 EXBS
program advisors serving overseas engaging foreign officials on ways
to strengthen controls, directing training activities and providing
much-needed detection and enforcement equipment. In a number of
countries officials trained by EXBS or using EXBS-provided equipment
have seized sensitive goods or weapons components bound for countries
or programs of concern. U.S. export control assistance is largely
responsible for over a dozen European and Eurasian countries adopting
comprehensive export control laws that meet recognized international
standards.
Even before September 11, 2001, the EXBS program and its advisors were
active in key Central Asian countries, a factor that doubtless paid
unanticipated dividends when these countries were thrust into the
front line of the war against terrorism. Following September 11,
increased EXBS resources were focused on this strategic region to help
these countries, and key countries in the Caucasus as well, shore up
vulnerable borders and improve capabilities to deter, detect, and
interdict the transit of illicit goods and weapons.
In Europe, we are increasing EXBS assistance to the Baltics and
Southeastern Europe, and Mediterranean transshipment points like Malta
and Cyprus. All states, especially those with large ports, must do
their part to forestall the transit of dangerous materials and
technology.
Export controls can only succeed as a multilateral endeavor, creating
a network of controls that is capable not only of detecting and
interdicting illicit shipments but deterring them. In the last twelve
months, we have hosted major conferences and seminars for European,
Central Asian, Caucasus, Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries.
Countries have stepped forward to take new leadership roles, provide
training and equipment. Countries with inadequate controls are
committing to adopting new laws to strengthen them and devoting
increased resources to enforcement. Other governments are now talking
to each other about areas for cooperation in export controls and
border security, thereby complementing and reinforcing our efforts.
The State Department also works cooperatively with other, related
agency programs to synergize efforts abroad. For example, we have a
close working relationship with both the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), which funds and
manages the Second Line of Defense program that provides advanced
radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, and with
Customs/DHS, which has the lead on the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) designed to secure the supply line of cargo shipments destined
for U.S. ports. The State Department's Export Control and Related
Border Control Assistance (EXBS) program has worked with NNSA to
support NNSA's assessments of countries in which NNSA is considering
providing material assistance. NNSA experts perform repairs and
maintenance on radiation detection equipment previously provided under
both Defense and State programs. State is also working closely with
U.S. Customs/DHS officials to ensure that U.S. Government approaches
to countries with "megaports" to join the Container Security
Initiative are integrated with our broader nonproliferation policy and
with export control outreach and assistance efforts we are carrying
out in some of these countries.
Our third goal, making the export control regimes stronger, is also
one on the supply side. As we noted in our response to last year's
examination of the regimes by GAO, the Administration is in process of
reviewing the nonproliferation regimes. Since September 11,
anti-terrorism has been adopted as a formal goal of the Australia
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, and
Nuclear Suppliers Group. We have won Australia Group agreement to
adopt catch-all provisions and last year the Group issued its first
export control guidelines incorporating catch-all, setting the
standard for the other regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement amended its
dual-use export control list to begin adding items specifically of
concern for terrorists, and this year is reviewing its controls on
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) like SA-7s and SA-18s with
a view to further strengthening them.
In the year ahead we intend to push adoption of catch-all controls and
denial consultation in areas where they haven't yet been implemented,
continue to review control lists to make sure they are keeping up with
technology and the threat and, as always, look for ways to strengthen
implementation and enforcement. We are also working in the NSG and
MTCR on other ways to tighten further these agreements. We will be
sending to Congress soon a strategy report, prepared in partnership
with our colleagues in the Arms Control Bureau.
But while strong regimes are necessary, they are not enough. Most are
voluntary agreements, which aren't legally binding. I talked a moment
ago about the differences we have with Europe. I think we spend too
much time debating what I'd call "architecture" -- treaties,
arrangements etc. -- and not enough time discussing how to put in
place a strong commitment to action to back up those fine words on
paper. What we're not doing enough of is taking concrete action to
enforce commitments more strictly and make proliferation more costly
-- politically and financially.
Tightening regimes and improved enforcement are part of the answer.
Many governments tell us about their export controls and laws. But
what counts is their willingness to enforce the laws, to make clear
there is a price for violating the law. Proliferators need to know
they face isolation and consequences if their efforts continue. Ending
the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will send a
powerful signal to other proliferators that the world will not stand
idly by.
And, North Korea must not imagine it can blackmail the international
community. The world community has spoken on this in the IAEA's report
to the Security Council. As Secretary Powell said, "The United States
stands ready to build a different kind of relationship with North
Korea, once Pyongyang comes into verifiable compliance with its
commitments. The North must be willing to act in a manner that builds
trust."
India and Pakistan are two very different countries with which we are
pursuing boldly different relationships. Each poses special
challenges. We need to take account of the unique situation posed by
their possession of nuclear weapons. From the NP Bureau perspective,
ongoing tensions in South Asia make especially important those
countries' controls on sensitive technology. We are also mindful of
the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, either intentionally or
accidentally in a crisis. We discuss these issues regularly with
officials from both countries. I convey our concerns and help identify
possible solutions whenever I meet with my Indian and Pakistani
counterparts. With India, there are tough questions about how far we
can go. We must continually weigh our mutual interests in cooperation
against our obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the NPT and
the Atomic Energy Act.
To help deal with determined proliferators not prepared to conform to
international standards, we employ a number of tools. One important
tool I mentioned earlier is the IAEA. The Agency has a vital role in
ensuring that civilian nuclear facilities are not diverted to weapons
purposes, ferreting out covert weapons efforts, and reducing the risk
of nuclear and radiological terrorism.
The IAEA underpins the basic bargain of the NPT - non-nuclear weapon
state access to nuclear technology in exchange for forgoing nuclear
weapons. In the current environment, where some non-nuclear weapon
states are violating the basic tenets of this bargain, the IAEA must
aggressively pursue every hint of questionable activity and frankly
and fully report to the world whenever safeguards are compromised or
violated.
The IAEA needs to be strong enough to alert us to tomorrow's problems,
wherever they occur. More than 70 countries have now signed on to the
Additional Safeguards Protocol, which provides the IAEA with more
information and broader access rights. But despite a large expansion
of responsibilities, the IAEA's budget has remained essentially flat.
That is why the United States is supporting the Agency's efforts to
increase its budget to implement its safeguards responsibilities,
working diplomatically with others to get them on board.
Beyond safeguards, IAEA has an important role in preventing nuclear
terrorism. After September 11, 2001, the IAEA moved quickly to develop
a comprehensive program to help states protect against acts of nuclear
and radiological terrorism. Just last week the Department of Energy,
working with IAEA and Russia, hosted a Conference to validate a new
work program to control radioactive sources. Part of our voluntary
contribution will support this important effort.
While regimes and institutions, such as the IAEA, can make important
contributions to halting the spread of WMD and WMD delivery systems,
they alone are simply not enough. The United States also has a variety
of tools to help us in these instances:
Interdiction: Where controls fail and international bodies are unable
or unwilling to act, interdiction is an option; properly planned and
executed, interception of critical technologies en route to dangerous
end users can make a difference. At a minimum, interdiction can
lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons
capabilities, and demonstrates our commitment to combat the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In some
instances, interdiction can prevent proliferators from acquiring new
capabilities. Procurement efforts are becoming increasingly
sophisticated, and our efforts to halt those procurements must keep
pace.
Sanctions: On sanctions, from our vantage point, companies have a
choice: sell to proliferators, or sell in the United States, but not
both. Where national controls fail, and where companies make the wrong
choice, there will be consequences. U.S. law requires it. That said,
U.S. legislation currently offers a crazy-quilt of overlapping
requirements that are difficult for foreign entities to understand
(which is required to deter them from misbehaving) and that are often
difficult to apply in a flexible manner to advance our
nonproliferation policies. We hope to be able to work with you to
consolidate and rationalize these important authorities.
Positive Measures: "Sticks" are an inescapable reality in fight
against proliferation. But carrots too can play a useful part.
The G-8 Leaders' agreement at the Kananaskis summit last June to a new
Global Partnership was an important step that reflects the shared view
that nonproliferation work remains under-funded. They embraced an
initiative to widen European and Japanese support to complement and
accelerate this process. G8 leaders pledged to raise up to $20 billion
over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism,
and nuclear safety projects to prevent WMD from falling into the hands
of terrorists or states who sponsor them.
Since the Summit, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, John Bolton, has continued to lead U.S.
efforts to ensure the success of the initiative. The U.S. has so far
carried most of the burden. More cooperation is needed from Europe and
Japan. We want total G8 commitments, by the Evian summit, to meet the
$20 billion target. The Senior Officials Group continues to press
Russia to take concrete actions to meet donors' concerns about
exemption from taxation and adequate liability protections in order to
move forward.
We also look to the business community, which has key interests in
stable foreign partners. The same protection of intellectual property,
and controls on illegal exports of technology, that they seek, are
important tools in the fight vs. proliferation. Good corporate
governance, transparency, the rule of law -- both government and the
business community have a shared interest in seeing our partners
strengthen the institutions that make the international marketplace
transparent and predictable. Business itself prospers from a secure
international setting.
But the most vital partnership of all is, of course, between the
Administration and the Congress. You give us the tools we need to take
on our vital mission through spending authorities and appropriations.
Since you have asked, Mr. Chairman, that I come today with ideas for
what Congress can do now to help strengthen our efforts, I would like
to offer some general proposals.
You encouraged us to think broadly and creatively. The President has
requested major funding increases this year to allow non-proliferation
programs to take advantage of new opportunities in the post September
11 world. We of course seek your authorization of those amounts, as
well as the budget proposal for Science Centers and bio-engagement,
and our voluntary contribution to the IAEA.
The U.S. may very well be confronted with new requirements that go
beyond our existing authorities. So we urge the Congress to support
the President's proposal to broaden the current Cooperative Threat
Reduction spending authorities to permit use of up to $50 million of
CTR funds beyond the Former Soviet Union, allowing the President to
use those resources in the best way he can.
And, of course, I strongly urge Congress to support the President's
request that the authority to waive the requirements for CTR and Title
V of the Freedom Support Act certifications be made permanent. We also
strongly support permanent waiver authority to cover construction of
the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction plant in Russia.
Conclusion -- Nonproliferation is a Team Effort
We are all partners in the worldwide effort to make the world safer.
There are many areas where the interlocking nature of the challenges
confronts us all. Nonproliferation challenges are multiple and
multiplying. We need to focus on the meat of the issue, and not lose
the forest for the trees.
Enhancing nonproliferation dialogue with our worldwide partners is
essential to success. But dialogue is no substitute for concrete
action, and where dialogue fails we will use other means - whether
multilateral, plurilateral, or unilateral. That was at the heart of
President Bush's National Security Strategy.
There are lots of opportunities to make progress; it's up to us to
transform opportunity into reality.
Thank you.
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