• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

04 March 2003

Transcript: Rademaker Says Arms Control Remains Viable in the 21st Century

(Urges universal adherence to chemical, biological arms treaties)
(5080)
Washington - A leading U.S. arms control official says arms control
remains viable in the 21st century and, as evidence, points to the
2002 U.S.-Russian Moscow Treaty that he says will produce "the largest
reduction ever in deployed strategic nuclear warheads."
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker says,
however, that the Bush administration's approach to arms control "has
been to proceed cautiously because we don't share the attitude that
you can find elsewhere that any agreement in the area of arms control
has to be a good thing."
Speaking in a recent one-on-one interview with Washington File
Security Affairs Writer Jacquelyn Porth, Rademaker went on to explain
that administration officials "are not prepared to sign up to
negotiations just because the process of negotiating is a good thing."
Having just returned from a session at the Geneva-based Conference on
Disarmament (CD), he said: "We don't accept the notion that process is
more important than substance. And, I think you do find that many
other countries have a strong devotion to the process of arms
control."
That process can become deadlocked. Rademaker pointed to the CD's
inability over the past six years to agree on a mandate for the ad hoc
committee that would negotiate a ban on fissile materials. "The
principal sticking point is the linkages that have been established by
certain other delegations, he said, "where they take the position that
they would not be prepared to agree to the initiation of negotiations
on a FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) unless there were also
agreement within the CD to commence other negotiations, or at least a
discussion of other proposed arms control agreements."
Rademaker said there have been three agreements that have been linked
"in one way or another to the initiation of a FMCT negotiation." These
take the form of a Prohibition of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS),
negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states, and a
proposal to create an ad hoc group with a mandate to discuss possible
ways to achieve nuclear disarmament.
Talking about broadening the scope of existing arms control accords
during his February 20 interview, Rademaker expressed gratitude that
countries such as Guatemala and Palau have subscribed to the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). "It is our view that treaties like the CWC and the
BWC should be universally subscribed to," he said, "and so we actually
make it a practice to encourage countries that have not yet acceded to
the treaties to do so." The official said he met earlier this year
with the president of Palau and urged him to consider acceding to both
the CWC and the BWC and, in fact, he responded favorably: Palau
acceded to both treaties in February.
Rademaker also discussed U.S. concerns about the long-term viability
of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "It's been a
concern with the NPT for a long time that if countries began to
develop nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT that would lead other
countries to conclude that they needed to do the same in order to
defend themselves - that they could no longer rely on the NPT for
defense against nuclear-armed neighbors and some would say they needed
to resort to developing their own nuclear weapons."
It is that kind of potential unraveling of the regime, he said, "that
people have long been concerned about." The United States does not
want to see the NPT unravel, Rademaker said, "so the best way to avoid
that is to ensure that the NPT's norms of behavior are adhered to by
all countries, including North Korea."
Rademaker discussed other arms control issues including the upcoming
CWC Review Conference in April in The Hague, the effectiveness of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, conventional arms control in
Europe, missile defense, confidence building measures, the G-8
proposal to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and a
U.S. proposal to restrict the global export of non-self-destructing
landmines.
Following is the transcript of the Rademaker interview:
(begin transcript)
Interview with Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen
Rademaker
Question: What are your primary areas of responsibility?
Answer: My primary areas of responsibility are the implementation of
existing arms control agreements and consideration of possible new
agreements.
Q: You mentioned possible new agreements, is there something under
consideration?
A: This is on my mind, in part, because I just returned from the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which is a permanent
U.N.-affiliated body that looks at possible arms control agreements,
and there are a number of issues that are before the CD. There is one
in particular, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or FMCT, that the
U.S. favors negotiating -- if a way can be found to agree on a mandate
for an ad hoc group to negotiate it within the CD.
Q: What is preventing the successful conclusion of a FMCT?
A: We haven't even begun the negotiation of a FMCT, and the reason for
that is there has been an inability in Geneva for the past six years
to agree on the mandate for the ad hoc committee that would negotiate
it. The principal sticking point is the linkages that have been
established by certain other delegations where they take the position
that they would not be prepared to agree to the initiation of
negotiations on a FMCT unless there were also agreement within the CD
to commence negotiations, or at least a discussion of other proposed
arms control agreements. There are three such agreements, in
particular, that have been linked, in one way or another, to the
initiation of a FMCT negotiation. They are the so-called PAROS
(Prohibition of an Arms Race in Outer Space) agreement, another having
to do with nuclear disarmament and a third that concerns negative
security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states.
Q: What are they looking for in terms of nuclear disarmament?
A: The proposal that's been on the table for several years would be to
establish an ad hoc group with a mandate to discuss possible steps
that could be taken in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and there
has been resistance to that not just from the United States, but from
a number of the nuclear weapons states under the NPT (Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Q: Do you think arms control is still viable in the 21st century?
A: Well, clearly, we just negotiated a major arms control agreement
with Russia, in the form of the Moscow Treaty, which provided for the
largest reduction ever in deployed strategic nuclear warheads, so
there certainly remains room for arms control.
But the approach of the Bush administration has been to proceed
cautiously because we don't share the attitude that you can find
elsewhere that any agreement in the area of arms control has to be a
good thing. And that means that we are not prepared to sign up to
negotiations just because the process of negotiating is a good thing.
We don't accept the notion that process is more important than
substance. And I think you do find that many other countries that have
a strong devotion to the process of arms control.
Often times, for example, we want to talk about compliance because
there is a whole raft of existing arms control agreements and we think
it's important that all the parties to existing agreements live up to
their obligations. Discussions about compliance become very
uncomfortable because as you engage in such a conversation you
eventually come to the point of having to make accusations and then
you might, perhaps, have to even confront the question of how to
penalize violators. And that becomes very awkward and there are a lot
of countries, we find, that would prefer not to address that. They
just want to go on and negotiate new agreements without doing the hard
work of making sure that the existing ones are complied with.
Q: Do you think most of the world has been slow to address the
potential threat of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological
weapons, or perhaps naïve about possible use?
A: We have existing agreements that limit nuclear weapons to five
countries, that prohibit chemical weapons, and that prohibit
biological weapons. We don't have an international agreement about
radiological weapons. On the other hand, we have no country that today
deploys radiological weapons so that seems to have been a less
pressing issue in the past. I don't think the world has been remiss in
addressing these arms control challenges through the negotiation of
international agreements. Where the world has been, perhaps, remiss is
in ensuring that there is global compliance.
Today, we have the NPT that speaks to nuclear non-proliferation and
the NPT is in trouble, not because the NPT as an agreement doesn't
work, but because some countries are moving in the direction of
violating it -- particularly North Korea which has a nuclear weapons
program and has now announced its intention to withdraw from the
Treaty. So, the solution to that is not to go negotiate another NPT,
it's for the international community to figure out how we can persuade
North Korea to come back into compliance with the existing NPT.
And, we see similar problems in the area of chemical and biological
weapons where the problem is not the existing prohibitions; the
problem is the degree to which all countries are living up to their
existing obligations.
Q: Has any progress been made since the G-8 (the group of seven
industrialized nations plus Russia) announced last year its
partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, or do
you expect a progress report this June when they meet again?
A: Given the potential of that initiative, I'm sure that it will be
discussed in June. Under Secretary of State (for International
Security and Arms Control John) Bolton is going to Moscow at the end
of February to continue discussions with the Russians on this issue.
The basic problem that we've encountered is that to carry out these
programs in Russia, there have to be understandings reached about some
practical details of implementing the programs. And we are not
prepared, for example, to spend a lot of money to establish assistance
programs only to have to pay taxes or import duties and pay fees in
order to do what we think enhances our security as well as Russia's
security. This has been a recurring problem, not just for the global
partnership, but also for programs that have been in existence for
years. And it's been a problem not just for the United States, but
also for Japan, Germany, Canada, and the other countries that have
been serious about these kinds of issues.
Q: Are there any practical arms control issues that the U.S. is
working on within NATO?
A: We coordinate closely with our NATO allies on arms control issues,
and particularly conventional arms control issues in Europe, which is
the area of NATO's responsibility. For instance, there is the Adapted
CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty, which we hope to
bring into force. We are working very closely with our NATO allies on
that, consulting regularly on the steps that need to be taken for the
Treaty to be submitted to parliaments for ratification.
Q: What are the obstacles and is there a timeframe for the Adapted CFE
accord?
A: The basic obstacle to ratification and entry into force of the
Adapted CFE Treaty is the so-called Istanbul commitments. These are
commitments made by Russia in Istanbul in 1999 when the Treaty was
signed. And, with regard to the countries of Georgia and Moldova, they
were commitments by Russia to withdraw their forces from deployments
in those countries. In the case of Georgia, it involves two bases that
Russia has not yet agreed to close as required by the Istanbul
commitments. And in the case of Moldova, it requires the withdrawal of
their forces, but in order for them to withdraw their forces there is
a large amount of ammunition that has to be withdrawn, and there have
been some practical problems encountered regarding ammunition
withdrawal. So until those two issues are worked out, the
understanding within NATO is that no NATO country will proceed to
ratify.
We are also still working within NATO on missile defense issues. This
is not really an arms control issue, although there is an important
arms control dimension to it. This has become an issue that NATO is
paying increasing attention to.
Q: Can you explain why it would be politically reprehensible to the
United States for Iraq to assume the presidency of the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament through an automatic rotation?
A: This was an issue that was resolved February 14 when Iraq provided
notice to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament that
it would not seek to assume the presidency, but prior to receiving
that notice we were concerned about the potential harm the Iraqi
presidency might do to the Conference on Disarmament. Iraq is a
country, as you know, that has for 12 years been under mandatory
sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council because of its failure
to disarm. And to allow such a country to assume the presidency of an
institution called the Conference on Disarmament, in our view,
threatened to make a mockery of the Conference on Disarmament.
Coming on the heels of Libya's election as chairman of the Human
Rights Commission, our feeling was that it frankly threatened to
jeopardize public support in the United States for some of these U.N.
institutions that we think need U.S. support in order to succeed.
Q: With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), how has the
U.S. been working recently to strengthen implementation?
A: Over the past year, we became concerned about the leadership of the
OPCW, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons -- the
administering agency of the CWC. And we worked with other countries
that were also concerned to replace the previous leadership of the
organization with a new Director-General.
The campaign took a great deal of effort to succeed, but it did
ultimately succeed and there is now a new Director-General that is
doing an excellent job. Shortly after his election, we chose to make a
voluntary contribution of about $2 million to the OPCW to demonstrate
our continued strong support of the organization and its work.
We've also recently decided to upgrade the status of our
representation to the OPCW. We're in the process of sending an
ambassador to the OPCW. We have not had in the past a resident
ambassador to the OPCW in The Hague.
On a practical level we will continue our close cooperation with the
OPCW. We're working with the new Director-General to assist him and
strengthen the management there and enhance the stability of the
organization.
Q: Is the United States grateful that countries like Guatemala
continue to ratify the CWC?
A: Yes we are. It is our view that treaties like the CWC and the BWC
(Biological Weapons Convention) should be universally subscribed to,
and so we actually make it a practice to encourage countries that have
not yet acceded to the treaties to do so. Just within the last two
months, I personally met with the President of Palau and urged him to
consider acceding to both treaties. And the response was favorable.
Just a few days ago (February 3) Palau acceded to both of those
treaties. This is something that we encourage and we hope that
eventually every country in the world will be a party to these
treaties.
Q: And what issues does the U.S. hope will be addressed at the April
Review Conference in The Hague?
A: We are still in the process of working with the other States
Parties to determine how we are going to structure the Review
Conference, but we are working toward a thematic approach to the major
issues that are before the OPCW. The idea would be to review the
progress that has been achieved in those areas, such as inspections
and the types of activities that are the focus of inspections and how
to achieve consensus on how to carry forward the work of the
organization over the next five years.
Q: You were talking earlier about the NPT. Is the United States
concerned that the regime might unravel if additional nations decide
to unilaterally withdraw from it?
A: It's been a concern with the NPT for a long time that if countries
began to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT that would
lead other countries to conclude that they needed to do the same in
order to defend themselves -- that they could no longer rely on the
NPT for defense against nuclear-armed neighbors and some would say
they need to resort to developing their own nuclear weapons.
And even today you read in the press speculation that if the North
Korean nuclear problem is unresolved then Japan or South Korea may
feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, in Japan now, some
politicians are starting to talk about how that might be something
that Japan might be required to do. So that's the kind of unraveling
that people have long been concerned about. We naturally don't want to
see the NPT unravel and so the best way to avoid that is to ensure
that the NPT's norms of behavior are adhered to by all countries,
including North Korea.
We're gratified that the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
last week (February 12) voted to refer the North Korean matter to the
U.N. Security Council. This is a threat to international peace and
security that warrants consideration by the Security Council.
Q: Do you think the United States and Russia have been given
sufficient credit for reducing nuclear weapons under the 2002 Moscow
Treaty? And are arms control proponents making the connection between
the bilateral treaty and obligations under Article VI of the NPT?
A: We make the point that in negotiating the Moscow Treaty we were
taking significant steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, but
I'm not sure that everyone wants to give us credit for that because I
do hear complaints that we haven't done enough. I think a two-thirds
reduction from the existing levels -- which is what is provided for
under the Moscow Treaty -- has to be considered progress by any
measure, so we will continue to make the point that we're moving in
the direction required by the NPT. We can't force other countries to
give us credit for that, but I think the facts speak for themselves.
Q: When do you expect the Senate to take up the Moscow Treaty and do
you see Senate action as pro forma, or do you anticipate any
contentious issues to crop up?
A: As you know the Treaty has been approved by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee unanimously and our understanding is that it will
be on the floor of the Senate as soon as the end of February.
There is the possibility of amendments being offered and we've not
seen the text of any amendments. We understand that there may be one
or two amendments that are offered to the resolution of ratification.
It's not possible to amend the Treaty, but it is possible to seek to
amend the resolution of ratification. So, we'll have to address that.
We're satisfied with the text of the resolution as it was reported by
the Committee, so the administration doesn't favor amendment to the
Senate resolution on the floor.
Q: What is the U.S. position with respect to the draft treaty that is
currently being negotiated in Central Asia to ban nuclear weapons
there?
A: There are a number of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones around the world,
and in the past the United States has worked with Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zones and on occasion provided binding negative security assurances.
So we are waiting to see what emerges in Central Asia and once it is
clear we'll have to consider how to apply our policy to this new zone.
Q: Generally speaking, are you looking with favor on it?
A: The Bush administration has not previously confronted the question
of what to say to or how to respond to Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, so I
think once this issue ripens it may force us to look at the question
as an administration for the first time. We haven't begun the process
of looking at it. And I'm not even sure what they are going to ask of
us, so until we see it, it's premature for me to tell you what
precisely we are going to do.
Q: Does the U.S. view the IAEA as en effective international mechanism
for curbing nuclear non-proliferation?
A: The IAEA tries very hard to police the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. They've had some success, as in North Korea, and they've had
some failures as in Iraq prior to the (Persian) Gulf War. It's my
impression they've learned from the failures and are trying hard.
(Director General) Mohamad ElBaradei is on his way to Iran today
(February 20) to talk about their nuclear activities, so the IAEA is
working hard and has our support as it goes about its business.
Q: Is the U.S. doing anything either to strengthen it or boost its
budget?
A: Absolutely. First of all, in the past year the Bush administration
submitted to the Senate the so-called "Additional Protocol," which is
an enhanced inspection arrangement. That Protocol is awaiting Senate
action.
The reason we did this is to demonstrate to other countries that this
is an important step that we would hope they would take as well.
Frankly, the Additional Protocol doesn't make a whole lot of sense by
itself for the United States because the point of the Additional
Protocol is to provide for enhanced inspections to ensure compliance
with the NPT and as a member of the NPT we admit that we have nuclear
weapons. There isn't much to be done (by the U.S.) under the
Additional Protocol other than to confirm that we are what we say we
are, which is a nuclear weapons state. But it is an important thing
for other countries to do. So, as a demonstration of our support for
the Additional Protocol, we signed it and submitted it to the Senate.
With regard to the IAEA budget, the United States is the largest
contributor to the IAEA both in terms of assessed contributions and
also with regard to voluntary contributions. Quite honestly, if you
speak to supporters of the IAEA I think you would find some that
actually would not want the U.S. to give more money to the IAEA
because if we were to do so it might become harder to refute the
notion that the IAEA is an extension of the U.S. government, which is
a charge that the North Koreans and others have made.
Q: When do you think the Senate might take up the Additional Protocol?
A: I don't know the answer to that.
Q: Does the United States have to ratify it first, before other
nations do so?
A: No, we don't have to go first. A number of other countries have
signed and ratified. The intention is to try to get every NPT adherent
to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol.
Q: Can you talk about what has been going on behind-the-scenes since
the 5th Review Conference on the BWC was held in Geneva in November?
A: We're preparing for two meetings that will take place this year in
accordance with the decisions that were reached at the Review
Conference. There will be an Experts Meeting for two weeks in August
this year and a meeting of the States Parties in November. Internally,
we are developing papers and we're focusing a lot of energy on trying
to give substance to the elements of the work program that are the
subject of this year's meetings: national implementing legislation for
the BWC, and enhanced security for biological pathogens.
Q: What is the issue with the pathogens?
A: The issue is how does a country protect anthrax and other
pathogens, like smallpox, that exist in laboratories or medical
facilities, and how does a country ensure that those pathogens that
are needed for research and medical purposes are kept out of the hands
of people who might try to turn them into biological weapons? So that
is one of two elements of this year's work program and the idea is to
convene the States Parties to talk about what we are all doing
individually to enhance the security of such pathogens in our
countries.
A big part of what we're trying to do is identify what States Parties
have already done, and the idea of the meeting will to compare notes
and maybe come to some understandings about what we think the best
practices are in this area and suggestions about what other countries
should do.
Q: You've talked a bit about missile defense in the NATO context, but
what kind of cooperation is taking place with countries like Japan,
the U.K., and Israel?
A: We're working with a wide range of countries, including Russia, on
missile defense issues. The President, on December 17, outlined the
initial deployment that he envisions for a missile defense system to
protect the United States and our allies. This is just the initial
phase of it, but even the initial phases require some cooperation by
our allies. There are radars on territory controlled by the U.K. and
by Denmark that we hope to upgrade as part of the initial missile
defense deployment. Also, there are issues between the United States
and Canada that have to do with NORAD, the North American Aerospace
Defense Command, and its role in missile defense. So with those three
countries, in particular, we look toward close cooperation in the
initial phase.
As we look at additional steps that are going to be taken further down
the road, we see allies in both Asia and Europe as increasingly
important. In the case of Japan, we are already engaged in joint
research activities to develop technologies that we hope to
incorporate into the system.
Q: What are the Russians saying? Are they seeking shared information,
are they wanting to do research?
A: We are still in a dialogue with them about exactly how we will work
together in this area under the CGSS, the Consultative Group for
Strategic Security, that was set up at the last U.S.-Russian Summit in
Moscow. There is a working group that focuses on missile defense
issues that has been meeting over the past year. There is some joint
research that we are trying to do with the Russians to develop
technologies that can have applications in the missile defense area.
The RAMOS (Russian American Observation Satellite) program that we
have worked on for a number of years is a major research program that
is under way. There is the Joint Data Exchange Center which is, in the
first instance, a mechanism for exchange of early warning data on
missile launches, but it could also, over time, evolve to have missile
defense applications.
Q: Is there any serious thought being given to introducing a proposal
in the Conference on Disarmament, or elsewhere, to restrict the global
export of non-self-destructing anti-personnel landmines?
A: Yes. We proposed such an initiative last week at the CD in Geneva.
Q: What kind of a reception did you receive?
A: It was in the context of a long speech so I'm not sure that
everyone at the CD focused on it immediately. But it was our hope that
given the gridlock that still exists in the CD where there are these
four issues that have been basically bundled together: FMCT, PAROS,
nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances -- if those four
issues remain wedded to one another and no progress is possible on one
of them without progress on all of them --- which has meant over the
past six years no progress at all -- our idea was to see if we could
put an idea forward that, perhaps, could be worked on independently of
these things that have been tied together. That was the spirit in
which we made a proposal on non-self-destructing landmines.
Whether it is possible in today's Conference on Disarmament to
initiate any negotiations on anything without addressing these other
four issues is something that remains to be seen.
Q: Were there any follow-up queries about it?
A: There were a few follow-up queries at the time and we promised to
provide some additional information about what we have in mind.
Q: Is anything active right now on Confidence and Security Building
Measures (CSBMs)? For example, is there any hope for any CSBMs in the
context of the Middle East Peace process or is anything happening in
Latin America?
A: The notion of CSBMs has achieved its greatest success in Europe
with the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty and the
Vienna Document. There are periodic efforts to try to model CSBMs in
other regions along the lines of what has been achieved in Europe.
For instance, there was a conference last week in Miami to talk about
confidence building measures that could be agreed on within Latin
America. It was sponsored by the OAS (Organization of American States)
with State Department participation.
One of the innovations of the Bush administration with regard to
policy on the Korean Peninsula was to call for some progress in the
area of conventional arms control so we have been looking at these
types of measures in the context of Korea, but that work has been
overshadowed now by the breakdown of the Agreed Framework between the
United States and North Korea.
But CSBMs are something that remain under active consideration in a
worldwide context.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)