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30 January 2003

World Community Should Stand Up to WMD Challenges, Wolf Says

(Says various counter-proliferation tools must be used) (5710)
The international community needs to "stand resolutely" in the face of
weapons proliferation challenges posed by countries such as Iraq and
North Korea, a key U.S. arms control official says, and if it does, "a
united world" will send a very powerful message.
To be successful in countering nuclear, chemical, biological or
missile proliferation challenges, "We're going to need to have a
little more passion in the discussion," Assistant Secretary of State
for Nonproliferation John Wolf said.
Speaking to reporters January 29 at the Washington Foreign Press
Center, Wolf said success in stopping proliferation requires not just
words, but the "willingness to engage and, in essence, to confront the
issue." The United States is concerned, he said, that a number of
nations are pursuing efforts "to clandestinely acquire nuclear
capabilities" even though they are party to the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A variety of tools must be employed to
forestall that, he added.
With respect to North Korea's obligations under the NPT and the
North-South Denuclearization Agreement, Wolf said Pyongyang must
acknowledge its Highly Enriched Uranium program and dismantle it in a
verifiable way, freeze and reconcile its accounts at Yongbyon with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and "put back in place the kinds
of safeguards on whatever remains such that the world community can
have confidence" in what has transpired. This issue confronting the
international community is one that the United States, South Korea,
Japan, Australia, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
and the European Union are all grappling with, the State Department
official said. The key question, according to Wolf, is whether or not
North Korea comes back into compliance with its international
obligations.
On the pressing subject of Iraq, Wolf said the president, secretary of
state and the rest of the Bush administration hope that Iraq will make
the decision to disarm itself. "And it still has time to do it, but
time is running out," he said. If conflict becomes necessary, however,
he said it will become obvious "that we have more than considerable
support, and certainly more support than would be necessary to
accomplish the goal of disarming Iraq."
Iraq's Saddam Hussein doesn't need additional time to disarm, Wolf
said. All he has to do is drive his mobile laboratories to U.N.
headquarters in Baghdad, order the delivery of sensitive documents
from private homes to U.N. weapons inspectors, disclose details about
Iraq's illegal unmanned aerial vehicle program, arrange for Iraqi
scientists to hold private interviews as well as account for mustard
gas shells and VX gas that was allegedly weaponized. "He can do it all
today. He does not need a final opportunity," he said.
Asked about Secretary of State Powell's planned February 5 appearance
at the U.N., Wolf said he will "provide additional perspective" about
Iraq's transgressions and he will "reinforce a number of points that
are already on the United Nations Security Council's public record."
After reviewing existing intelligence, he said the United States will
seek "to help amplify the kinds of concerns that the inspectors have
catalogued and the kinds of concerns that were on the record from even
1998 and previously."
Wolf said Powell will speak publicly -- not just to the Security
Council -- for "anybody who chooses to listen" and the case against
Iraq "will be what the case is."
Wolf was also questioned about China's role in counter-proliferation.
He welcomed China's cooperation in the Security Council and noted that
the U.S. is consulting closely with China on concerns related to Iraq
and North Korea. "We welcome the assurances that the government of
China shares our concerns about proliferation," he added.
At the same time, Wolf expressed concern about Chinese entities that
"appear able to export sensitive technologies to proliferant countries
and ... it's not clear to us that ... [they] understand clearly that
the government of China is determined to rigorously enforce the new
laws and procedures that they've put in place."
Following is the transcript of Wolf's briefing:
(begin transcript)
FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING
JOHN S. WOLF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION
TOPIC: "GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION CHALLENGES"
THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 29, 2003
[Transcript Prepared by Diversified Reporting Services, Inc.]
MR. DENIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the
Foreign Press Center.
As you know, the situation with regard to weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq and North Korea is of grave concern to both the United States
and the international community. On Monday, Drs. Blix and ElBaradei
submitted their reports to the U.N. Security Council on the situation
in Iraq, and last night, President Bush devoted considerable attention
to weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation in his State of
the Union Address.
So we're delighted to have a very timely briefing today with Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf. He will have a
brief opening statement, and then will take a question from New York
and then questions from the audience here.
Assistant Secretary Wolf.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Thank you all. Thank you for coming out on a
wet day, a grim day maybe, and maybe it fits the subject.
Anyway, I'm not going to talk very -- I'm not going to speak very
long, because I wanted to come and have a chance to answer your
questions.
I think that the discussions on Monday and continuing today focus on
some very straightforward issues. 1441 was a resolution with one goal,
two tests.
First, the goal: disarmament. And the Council was very clear that
after 11 years of waiting for Iraq to disarm, after a variety of
resolutions that were more or less rigorous, 1441 was rigorous, and it
was unequivocal. The task that the Council set for Iraq was to disarm,
to disarm fully, to disarm immediately, to cooperate actively.
And there were two tests, as I said, for the disarmament goal.
The first test was a declaration that was due December 7th. The second
test was full, active cooperation. And I think it's all summed up by
what Dr. Blix said to the Council when he said -- let me come back to
that.
First test, declaration: and I think there is nobody in the Council
who would argue that it was 12,200 pages of old news. It was a rehash
of documents previously submitted. It didn't answer the questions
about Iraq's program -- programs -- before 1998, and it denied,
despite clear and abundant evidence, denied having any programs that
continued after 1998. They didn't pass that test. We described it as a
material breach.
The second test was cooperation -- full, immediate, and active. And
there, I'll simply stop with what Dr. Blix said: "Iraq appears not to
have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament
that was demanded of it." While there was quasi-cooperation on
process, there was little, if any, cooperation on substance. This is
not about process. This is about substance. It's about achieving the
one goal, disarmament, and achieving it now.
When President Bush talked to the U.N. September 12th, he said there
were two tests out there. One is whether or not Iraq could finally be
brought to comply with its obligations under Resolution 687 and a
whole series of others, whether it would disarm. And the second test
was a test of the U.N. and the international community. Could it hang
together? Could it hold together in order to provide a determined
view? I think those tests are still out there.
And with that, I'd be glad to answer your questions.
MR. DENIG: OK. Let's take the first question, from New York.
QUESTION: Hi. Tom Kelly from the Press Association of the UK.
In the last few hours, both the president and, in London, Tony Blair
have spoken of evidence of links between al-Qaeda and Iraq, possibly
with a view to Iraq supplying the terrorist group with weapons of mass
destruction.
Do you have any specific evidence or more detailed evidence that you
could share with us about this alleged link?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I don't think there's anything that I would
share today. I think the secretary actually spoke to this earlier this
morning, and he said we do have information that suggests that there
have been these kinds of links over the years, and that there continue
to be links between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda.
It's abundantly clear that Iraq has had contact with terrorist groups.
You will all remember that Abu Nidal died somehow by shooting three
bullets into his brain. But I think this is an issue which we look, as
we look more and more at what we are learning, and if we look back in
time, the secretary said, then we're able to connect, begin to connect
the pieces; and for us, we see a link.
MR. DENIG: OK. Up front here, Dimitri.
QUESTION: Dmitry Kirsanov of Russian News Agency Tass.
I remember Secretary Powell as saying, before last week, as saying
before leaving to Switzerland, as saying that it is yet to decide for
the United States how to -- how to lead a dialogue with North Korea,
whether it would be strictly bilateral, whether it would be
multilateral, whether it would be bilateral within some kind of
multilateral mechanisms.
Have you already taken decision on this, and if yes, when and where
you will start this dialogue?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: No, there's no decision. We have a number of
ideas that we're consulting on with our allies, South Korea and Japan,
as well as with members of the -- permanent five members -- of the
Security Council; active discussions taking place in Vienna at the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The important point for us is that this is not an issue between the
United States and North Korea. This is an issue where North Korea is
in breach of its obligations to the international community, where the
weapons program that it admitted to is -- also contravenes agreements
that it had with South Korea, with us, with the international
community; and it is important for North Korea to come back into
compliance with its obligations.
We are prepared to talk about that. We've made clear that we would
talk. We've made clear we won't attack. We've made clear that we don't
have hostile intent. We're consulting with others, and we're looking
for a peaceful way to solve a problem which is multilateral in nature.
QUESTION: Excuse me. Can I have a quick follow-up? Are you ready to
somehow codify your intent of not attacking North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think other senior officials have said
that's probably not the most difficult of the issues. The key issue is
will the North return to compliance with its obligations?
We're very clear and very public about our intent or lack of intent.
QUESTION: Michael Backfisch, German Business Daily Handelslatt.
The secretary of state will go to the United Nations Security Council
next week, and the president said he'll reveal some hard evidence. Of
course, you can't give us a preview, but can you elaborate a little
bit? What is your greatest concern? Evidently, the secretary won't
present an Adlai Stevenson-type photo of a smoking gun, but what are
your major concerns?
And Senator Biden was talking about circumstantial evidence the
administration has in regard to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
What does that mean?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think the case was clearly made on Monday
for those who cared to listen. As I said, no one, but no one, thinks
the declaration met the tests set in Resolution 1441, and no one who
listened to Dr. Blix say, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine
acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of
it." There are indications that VX was weaponized. We must assume
chemical bombs are unaccounted for. We found mustard gas precursors.
There are strong indications that Iraq has produced more anthrax than
it declared. Iraq's ballistic missile programs might very well
represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems, that propellants
and missile engines were illegally procured -- that's the case for
non-cooperation right there.
I think what the secretary will do will provide additional
perspective. What he will do is reinforce a number of points that are
already on the United Nations Security Council's public record, and
points which are well known to a number of member governments
represented on the Security Council. That is, that through their own
national means, they're aware of these illegal programs. They are
aware of procurement. They are aware of the mobile labs that have not
been declared. They are aware of the facts, but we will provide a kind
of reinforcement of what Drs. Blix and ElBaradei described. We will
dip into the intelligence that we have to help amplify the kinds of
concerns that the inspectors have catalogued and the kinds of concerns
that were on the record from even 1998 and previously.
QUESTION: But obviously, the secretary won't just give a second
reading on 1441, so what does reinforcement mean?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Tune in Wednesday.
QUESTION: You can't say anything? I mean, is it chemical --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I told you, he's going to look at the case
that they presented. He is going to provide additional reinforcement
for --
QUESTION: Additional evidence?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Yes.
QUESTION: Thank you. I'm Arin Basu with Radio Free Asia. If we could
go back to North Korea for a minute, please.
Could you update us where North Korea's nuclear program is right now?
They're out of the NPT. We know there's new stuff, fuel rods.
Do you have any sense of whether they're processing any of these
chemicals? Is there activity going on with their nuclear program that
is recent and that we should be concerned about, or do we really not
know what they're doing?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, I don't think I can get into all the
details. We should be concerned by their admission that they have a
program to enrich uranium; and we should be concerned by clear
evidence that is available to all of us that they probably have enough
fissile material from their plutonium program to construct one or two
bombs; and we should be concerned that they have a nuclear weapons
program; and we should be concerned that they have announced that they
are in the process, but they have not yet withdrawn from the NPT,
because under the NPT, one requires 90 days notice; and we should be
concerned that they threw the International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors out of the country, took the seals off the various nuclear
facilities, disassembled the cameras; and we should be concerned by
the kind of activities that may be taking place now under the veil of
secrecy.
We should be concerned about all of this, not panicked, but concerned,
and the concern should be that a country which sticks its thumb in the
eye of the international community, a country which is developing
nuclear weapons despite its commitment on nuclear weapons, which can
threaten the security and stability of Northeast Asia, those are the
things that we should be concerned about.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I can't.
MR. DENIG: (Inaudible.)
QUESTION: Joon Lee from Joongang Daily in Seoul, Korea.
Let me just follow the NPT situation of North Korea you just
mentioned, that when they -- earlier this month -- when they announced
that the NPT (inaudible) insisted that they are out of the NPT as of
right now; so because that in 1991, North Korea, they just suspended
NPT through (inaudible) cancellations. So they just -- we don't have
to wait for 90 days for the exact release of the treaty.
So how do you think about -- how the United States government regard
this, their insistence?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, there's a fairly theological point,
and we actually think that one requires a new 90-day notification
pursuant to the specific provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty,
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and that it needs to be done in a
certain way.
But, rather than get hung up on whether it's now or 90 days from now,
and we happen to think it's 90 days from the date of their
announcement, the more important question is what they've been doing
for a dozen or more years. That is, they have clandestinely been
producing fissile material, designing a nuclear weapon, developing
multiple capabilities to acquire additional fissile material.
And that is the issue that confronts the international community. It's
the issue that we're working with Korea, Japan, the permanent five
members of the Security Council, the European Union, Australia, and
others. That's an issue that's before all of us, and that's what we're
concerned about.
QUESTION: Stefano Marchi from the Italian daily newspaper, Il Tempo. I
would have two questions, if I may.
The first question is, to which extent will the evidence to be
provided by Secretary Powell to the Security Council next week be
circumstantiated, and will partly, at least partly, such evidence be
made public?
The second question is, last night, President Bush reiterated that it
is up to Saddam Hussein's regime to disclose the prohibited weapons.
Does it mean that, after the provision of evidence to the Security
Council, the United States will give Saddam Hussein a further, maybe
final opportunity, but a fair and real opportunity, to provide
evidence, to disclose and destroy those weapons?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think your first question was will our
evidence be substantiated.
The evidence already on the table is quite clear, and it's not even
ours. It's others' conclusions. It's the U.N.'s conclusions.
We will put out, we will amplify, we will reinforce that. We will use
information that is available to us, and it will be public. The
secretary is not going to speak in a closed room. The secretary will
speak not only to the Security Council, but to anybody who chooses to
listen, and I suspect there will be a rather wide audience, and the
case will be what the case is.
It's not some special Hollywood, you know, contrivance. It will be
factual, it will be sober, and it will be straightforward. I will
amplify, it will reinforce the kinds of points which, on their own --
the points that were put out on Monday -- on their own are clear
indications of non-cooperation, clear indications, in the British
words and the Australian words, and our words, too, of further
material breach.
In other words, the story is out there, and we will amplify it.
Now, to your second question. I guess you're asking, are we going to
provide a final, final opportunity, or, if you think back to 1991, and
I was there when we wrote Resolution 687, that was a one-time, "Do it,
it's your obligation. Do you agree?" "Yes." Did they violate it? Yes.
So that was a final opportunity, and there were 15 more resolutions.
So I guess I could say, but I don't want to bore everybody, are you
suggesting we should have a final, final, final, final, final, 16
times final plus one more, opportunity?
Saddam Hussein has shown his colors. If he wants to -- he doesn't need
-- he doesn't need more time. As the secretary said this morning,
today he can drive those mobile vans to U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad.
Today, he can take the documents out of the private residences where
they've been hidden, and he can deliver them to the U.N.. Today, he
can account for the VX. Today, he can account for the mustard gas
shells. Today, he can disclose the details of his illegal unmanned
aerial vehicle program. Today, he can talk about illegal programs.
Today, he can talk about his nuclear efforts. Today, he can make
people available for private interviews. Today, he can encourage them
to go out of the country. If they have nothing to hide, why shouldn't
they? He can do it all today. He does not need a final opportunity.
In Iraq, you don't need a vote of Parliament. In Iraq, you don't need
search warrants. In Iraq, you don't need to pay much attention to
public opinion. But Saddam Hussein has not yet apparently made the
genuine acceptance, not even today, of the fact that disarmament --
that was demanded of him. He's not accepted that.
If he makes the decision, he knows where to find the U.N.. He has
their phones tapped, I'm sure, so he must know the phone number. He
should pick up the phone and tell them, "I'm coming to deliver the
arms."
QUESTION: (Inaudible) that the February the 5th meeting will be
somehow a convicting sentence for Iraq, or will the United States
provide such an evidence for the purpose of the United Nations
inspections?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The secretary, the president -- the
president, the secretary, others who speak for the administration,
have been very clear. We're engaged in a process of consultation. We
will talk to the members of the Security Council, our friends and
allies, about where we are and where we go.
Right now, inspections are continuing. There were inspections today.
There were inspections yesterday. There will be inspections tomorrow.
The United States is providing very -- quite broad, as broad as we
can, support to the U.N.. But the purpose of inspections was not to go
looking under rocks. It was not, as the secretary said the other day,
to feel around in the darkness.
The purpose of inspections, dating from 1991, and certainly the
purpose of inspections in Resolution 1441, were to verify a decision
by Iraq to disarm peacefully. If they make that choice, the
inspections can work. If they don't make that choice, then the
inspections won't work.
So we're in a process of consultation, and the consultations between
the president and other heads of government, the secretary and other
ministers, when those consultations are complete, then we'll have a
better idea of the next steps that we want to take.
QUESTION: Scott Gordon, the Asahi Shimbun.
I just wanted to ask, concerning yesterday's State of the Union
Address, President Bush made it clear once again that if things didn't
improve, he would lead a coalition, a coalition to disarm Saddam,
right?
So my question is, who are the players in this coalition, and who,
other than the U.S., will lend major troop support and whatnot?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I think we have said before that when the
time comes, it will be clear. If you look at movements towards the
Middle East, you can already begin to see some of the outlines.
But I guess this is the time to make an important qualification, or
just to keep the context. The president didn't say we are going to
lead a war, and you didn't say that, but I just want to make clear,
there has been no decision to go to war.
The president's hope, the secretary of state's hope, all of our hope
remains that Iraq, even while time is running out, will make the
decision to disarm. And it still has time to do it, but time is
running out.
If he doesn't make that decision, if it is necessary to use arms, I
think you will see that we have more than considerable support, and
certainly more support than would be necessary to accomplish the goal
of disarming Iraq.
QUESTION: I'm Malcolm Brown from Feature Story News. I have a sort of
more general, two-part question, really.
I wonder how you see the future of nonproliferation efforts as they
regard nuclear weapons? Do you see it as some kind of inexorable
process that the United States can at best slow down, or do you think
it can be avoided?
And secondly, what do you say to those who level the charge that the
United States has itself weakened the nonproliferation regime with its
apparent aversion to treaties, development of new low-yield weapons
and so on.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I'm not sure about whether we've actually
done the latter.
QUESTION: The posture review?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Our posture reviews go on every year. The --
our -- we are concerned that there are a number of efforts by
countries within the NPT to clandestinely acquire nuclear
capabilities. We need to use a variety of tools to forestall that.
I have said before that I actually am concerned that, while this is a
core issue for the United States, a focusing issue of our national
security policy, as the president said yesterday, as we've said in our
various national security statements over time, it's only one of many
issues that seems to be out there for a lot of countries; and indeed,
while we get into big wrangles with some of our friends and allies
about this architecture, about treaties and whatnot, that the actual
willingness to engage and, in essence, to confront the issue, either
by tightening export controls, more rigorous enforcement of national
laws, more rigorous enforcement of multilateral conventions, more
rigorous approach to the proliferation wannabes -- that's sometimes
missing.
And I think, if we are to be successful in countering proliferation,
whether it's nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, then we're going
to need to have a little more passion in the discussion. We're going
to need to have a little more than words about architecture. And I
think if we do, I think if we are committed, I think if we match our
words with our actions, and I think if we stand resolutely when there
are challenges like Iraq, or like North Korea, then I think the
message that a united world will send will be very powerful, and
that's key.
QUESTION: Joy Culberson (phonetic), ABC TV, Australia. Back to Iraq.
Unless there is a significant and immediate about-face from Iraq, do
you believe that matters will come to a head on or about February
14th, if not before? How quickly will that snowball?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: I don't think I want to pick a date. We've
got an office -- no, we don't have an office pool, because no decision
has been made. What we're going to do is consult. Consultation is
underway now. The Secretary has spoken to Foreign Minister Downer
several times in the last week about a variety of issues, and we will
continue to consult. I would -- and I think -- I don't remember
whether the president has or hasn't spoken, I think he has spoken to
Prime Minister Howard, and I'm sure he will continue to speak about
these issues.
We're consulting. Next Wednesday, the secretary of state will go to
New York. He will present a case that is designed to reinforce the
record of non-cooperation that was laid out to the Council on Monday.
When the consultations are done, we'll decide where and how we proceed
forward.
But we're working through this. We're working through it methodically.
But I think it would be fair to say there's not a lot of time left for
the peaceful solution that we all want.
QUESTION: Chris Cockel from the China Post of Taiwan. A question about
China, if I may.
I believe you met with China's chief arms control negotiator, Liu
Jieyi, here in Washington towards the end of last year. From that
meeting, can you give us a sense of how discussions between Washington
and Beijing are going? Are you satisfied with the results so far, and
what more are you asking of the Chinese at this time?
And one quick attachment to that, if I may. When do you plan to meet
with the Chinese again?
Thank you.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, Under Secretary Bolton, as you know,
was just in Beijing last week, had discussions with Vice Foreign
Minister Wang, and I think Liu Jieyi actually participated in those
discussions, so it's not like I'm the only one or that's the only
conversation that takes place.
I think, in the various discussions that the director general and I
have had about nonproliferation, we have gained a better understanding
of our -- of concerns, his, I of his, his, I trust of ours, and China
has made some noteworthy steps in terms of putting forward new export
controls for missiles, chemical and biological weapons. They've
revamped the process of licensing, and all of that on paper, all of
that on paper is quite good.
But we've made the point to China, and we continue to be concerned
that enforcement action, implementation of the laws and the
regulations, is the only test. We welcome the assurances that the
government of China shares our concerns about proliferation. We are
consulting closely with China on issues of mutual concern, like North
Korea and Iraq. We welcome the cooperation that we've had in places
like the Security Council. There are big parts of the record which are
quite good.
But on the question of proliferation from China, it would not -- I
would not -- I would be less than candid if I didn't say that we are
still concerned that entities within China appear able to export
sensitive technologies to proliferant countries, and that those -- and
it's not clear to us that, in the marketplace within China, that the
entities understand clearly that the government of China is determined
to rigorously enforce the new laws and procedures that they've put in
place.
QUESTION: Hi. Wei Jing from Phoenix TV of Hong Kong. Two separate
questions.
One is the missile export. If these states are trying to get some
international support or get a missile export regulation, a new kind
of treaty or something, especially after the Korean missile boat was
caught, that's one thing.
And then separately, are the hidden weapons that you say Iraq has, are
you confident that even and if U.S. troops went in, if -- if the
inspectors cannot find them with cooperation from Iraqis, can the
American soldiers locate them quickly without them using them first?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: Well, two questions. The international
community, I forget how many countries, four or five months ago,
signed the International Code of Conduct, which was designed to create
a kind of new body of international thinking against the spread of
ballistic missiles. And we support that. We supported that effort
strongly.
We also work actively within the Missile Technology Control Regime to
control the spread, the sale of the kinds of technologies that would
facilitate countries' ability to build ballistic missile programs, and
we have laws in the United States that would require -- which require
us to sanction foreign firms which do export things that are listed by
the Missile Technology Control Regime.
I think there's a bit of a -- changing slides -- I think there's a bit
of a misimpression about what the inspectors, U.N. inspectors' task
is. It is not the 108 inspectors with their eight helicopters and 40
or 50 vehicles -- it's not their job to go dig the stuff up, to go
find it. Their job is to verify the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. But
it's Iraq's decision to -- but that only works if Iraq makes the first
decision.
And while it's a hypothetical, and clearly no decision has been made,
I think there is confidence that if the other path -- if Iraq forces
the international community to go down the other path, which is
forceful disarmament, then there'll be more than 108 people available
for the task.
MR. DENIG: One last quick question, if you would.
QUESTION: Nori Sawaki, Tokyo Shimbun. Back to North Korea. When you
say that you are demanding North Korea scrap their nuclear weapons
program, what exactly do you mean? Are you demanding the freezing of
the nuclear facilities as they did in 1994, but this time with much
wider scope, which is to include uranium as well as plutonium? Or are
you demanding the physical destruction of the facilities?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: We're not -- it's not a U.S. demand. Their
obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, their obligations under
the North-South Denuclearization Agreement, their obligations under
several other bilateral or multilateral agreements was not to acquire
the capabilities to build a nuclear weapon. So it's not our demand,
but their obligation is to acknowledge and dismantle in a verifiable
way their HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) program, to freeze and then
reconcile their accounts at Yongbyon with the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) and to put back in place the kinds of safeguards
on whatever remains such that the world community can have confidence.
Right now we have no confidence at all.
QUESTION: But that means you won't do the destruction of the
facilities because in 1994 you did not -- or not within the Framework
Agreement North Korea did not destroy.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The object of the 1994 agreement would have
been to -- was to put spent fuel in -- to can it and put it under
safeguards and eventually -- and to get it, in due course, out of the
country. That still needs to be done. It contains fissile material.
They have no need for it.
It would be to -- it would be to fully, fully justify their
correctness and completeness declaration with the IAEA; couldn't do
that if they had hidden nuclear weapons, research, development,
production capabilities; can't do it with the highly enriched uranium
capability. So all of those things would be subject to dismantlement.
All of it needs to be [done] verifiably.
Our bottom line, like the international community's bottom line, is
that North Korea must be the nuclear non-weapon -- the non -- must be
a non-nuclear, non-weapon, the nuclear weapons -- must be a state
without nuclear weapons -- (laughter) -- that the Korean Peninsula
needs to be denuclearized.
QUESTION: (Inaudible).
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLF: The freeze, the freeze -- the question was
eliminate versus freeze, and I'm just saying freeze was only a way
station on the way towards the denuclearization of North Korea.
Thank you very much.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)