25 November 2002
U.S. Confident in Future Potential of Missile Code of Conduct
(Bolton says the ICOC is an important non-proliferation tool) (1640)
A key U.S. State Department arms control official says the United
States views the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (ICOC) "as an important addition to the wide
range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back" the
threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered by these
missiles.
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton told delegates at a conference launching the ICOC in The
Hague November 25 that this regime "is a concrete demonstration" that
the international community is looking for more ways to address WMD
proliferation. The U.S. places "great value" on the ICOC and has "high
confidence in its future potential," he said.
One element of the U.S. strategy against missile proliferation is
being fulfilled through multilateral efforts such as the ICOC and the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), he said. Another element of
that strategy, Bolton said, is the development of a missile defense
system.
"Missile defense, the MTCR, and the ICOC play important roles in
deterring and reducing missile proliferation, and the United States
will be ready to work with members of the ICOC, and the MTCR, to
ensure that these complementary efforts are mutually reinforcing,"
Bolton added.
Bolton added: "[I]t is no secret that the ICOC has its limitations.
For example, in taking on the political commitment pursuant to the
ICOC to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development,
testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction, the United States -- like other countries
-- understands this commitment as not limiting our right to take steps
in these areas necessary to meet our national security requirements
consistent with U.S. national security strategy."
With respect to implementation work, he noted that the U.S. plans "to
make pre-launch notifications and annual declarations pursuant to the
ICOC based upon current U.S. proposals in its negotiations with the
Russian Federation on a Pre-Launch Notification System, including the
question of which launches are to be notified." At the same time, he
pointed out that the United States "reserves the right in
circumstances of war to launch ballistic missile and space-launch
vehicles without prior notification."
In the short term, Bolton said notifications and annual declarations
to the ICOC will be based on the U.S.-Russian Pre-Launch Notification
System; but in the longer term, he said the United States agrees with
Russia that the bilateral U.S.-Russian system should be
multilateralized.
The official also used the conference as an opportunity to point out
once again that certain countries are violating their commitments to
the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, namely Iraq, North Korea,
Iran, Libya and Cuba. He also cited "a grave threat" to the integrity
of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty due to North Korea's
admission to enriching uranium for nuclear weapons.
Following is the text of Bolton's remarks:
(begin text)
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security
Remarks at the Launching Conference for the International Code of
Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
The Hague, The Netherlands
November 25, 2002
(Remarks as delivered)
Mr. Chairman, Ministers, Ambassadors, Distinguished Delegates:
I am honored to represent the United States of America as an initial
Subscribing State to the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). The entry into effect today of
the ICOC marks an important contribution to the international effort
against the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- an effort that the United States
has always strongly supported.
The large number of countries that have subscribed to the ICOC and are
represented here is a concrete demonstration that the international
community has recognized and is looking for additional ways to address
the proliferation of the most threatening means of delivery for
weapons of mass destruction. It is no accident that the dangerous
proliferation of ballistic missiles occurs predominantly in parallel
with programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
International concern about such ballistic missile programs is
heightened by the fact that weapons of mass destruction [WMD] programs
also often exist in parallel with support for terrorist groups. Viewed
in this context, it is clear why the proliferation of ballistic
missiles threatens international peace and security on a worldwide
basis.
The United States regards the proliferation of ballistic missiles
capable of delivering WMD as a direct threat to the U.S., our deployed
forces, our friends and allies, and our interests in key regions of
the world.
The United States sees the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important addition to the wide
range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back this
proliferation threat. One element of our strategy is multilateral
efforts against missile proliferation, such as the ICOC and the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Another important element is
missile defense. We view our missile defense efforts as complementary
to, and consistent with the objectives of, the ICOC and the MTCR. Each
seeks in different ways to protect us from the dangers posed by WMD
and ballistic missile proliferation. We are now in the process of
discussing with allies and friends, including the Russian Federation,
cooperation on missile defense programs because our nation is hardly
alone in needing the additional protection that such programs can
provide. Missile defenses, the MTCR, and the ICOC play important roles
in deterring and reducing missile proliferation, and the United States
will be ready to work with members of the ICOC, and of the MTCR, to
ensure that these complementary efforts are mutually reinforcing.
While an important new addition to the broad arsenal of
non-proliferation measures, it is no secret that the ICOC has its
limitations. For example, in taking on the political commitment
pursuant to the ICOC to exercise maximum possible restraint in the
development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction, the United States -- like
other countries -- understands this commitment as not limiting our
right to take steps in these areas necessary to meet our national
security requirements consistent with U.S. national security strategy.
This includes our ability to maintain our deterrent umbrella for our
friends and allies, and the capabilities necessary to defeat
aggression involving WMD attacks. But all subscribing states will have
the opportunity to discuss these issues in detail, and to participate
in consensus decisions to evolve the text.
Most of this implementation work will concern the ICOC's requirements
for pre-launch notification of subscribing states ballistic missile
and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. The United States
intends to make pre-launch notifications and annual declarations
pursuant to the ICOC based upon current U.S. proposals in its
negotiations with the Russian Federation on a Pre-Launch Notification
System, including on the question of which launches are to be
notified. For example, the United States reserves the right in
circumstances of war to launch ballistic missiles and space-launch
vehicles without prior notification.
Once implementation is completed, the notifications and annual
declarations that the United States provides pursuant to the ICOC will
be based upon the U.S.-Russian Pre-Launch Notification System, to be
established in connection with the U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange
Center. Over the longer term, we agree with the Russian Federation
that the bilateral U.S.-Russian system should be multilateralized. We
hope, in turn, that such a multilateralized system might provide the
mechanism by which all ICOC subscribing states exchange pre-launch
notifications. We plan to keep all subscribing states informed on the
progress of the implementation of the U.S.-Russia agreement on launch
notification, and on the implications and opportunities that a
multilateralized U.S.-Russia Pre-Launch Notification System can
present for the ICOC.
Some have been concerned that the ICOC is simply a political
declaration and not legally binding. But surely the real issue is not
the nature of the commitment, but the extent of the political will to
comply with the code that signatories demonstrate. Too often in the
arms control and nonproliferation fields, countries make a great
public flourish about adhering to codes and conventions, and then,
quietly and deceptively, do precisely the opposite in private.
In the context of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), for
example, we know that several member states are violating their
commitments to the treaty. To expose some of these violators to the
international community, we have named publicly states the U.S.
government knows to be pursuing the production of biological warfare
agents in violation of the BWC: including Iraq, North Korea, Iran and
Libya, as well as Cuba, which we believe has at least a limited,
developmental offensive biological warfare R&D [research and
development] effort, and which has provided dual-use biotechnology to
other rogue states.
Even as we speak, we face a grave threat to the integrity of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea brazenly admitted last month to
having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This egregious
violation of its treaty commitments threatens the security of all
nations, as well as the continued credibility of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Surely, none of us wants this disdain and disregard to happen to the
new ICOC. That is why we are not concerned about the states that have
chosen not to subscribe to the code. Far better to know who is
actually prepared to live under its terms, and who is not. Far better
to know who is truly serious about stopping the proliferation of
ballistic missile technology and the risk that such technology could
be used to carry weapons of mass destruction against innocent civilian
populations.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States places great value on
the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation and has high confidence in its future potential. We
pledge our full support to you and our fellow Subscribing States in
the demanding tasks ahead. Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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