15 November 2002
U.S. Welcomes Biological Weapons Convention Work Plan
(Rademaker describes BWC program as "constructive and realistic")
(620)
By Wendy Lubetkin
Washington File Staff Correspondent
Geneva -- The United States has welcomed the adoption November 14 of a
three-year work plan on measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), the international treaty which bans the use,
production or stockpiling of biological weapons.
"The United States is very pleased by the outcome here today," said
Stephen Rademaker, assistant secretary of state for arms control. "We
believe that the decision that has just been adopted unanimously by
the conference represents a constructive and realistic work program
for the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention over the
next three years. The problem of biological weapons is of great
concern to all of humanity."
At a briefing following adoption of the work plan, Rademaker said the
United States is committed to the BWC because it establishes the
important norm in international law that the possession of biological
weapons is "immoral and illegal." But he added that the U.S. has long
believed that the BWC is "inherently unverifiable."
Biological weapons are very different from the other two weapons of
mass destruction, nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, since they do
not require a large and relatively conspicuous infrastructure to
produce, Rademaker explained. In Iraq, he noted, it has been suggested
that there are mobile units that can travel from one location to
another while producing biological weapons.
Another problem is the necessity of maintaining bio-defense
activities, which are allowed under the treaty, but can be very
difficult to distinguish from offensive weapons programs. Inspectors
investigating suspicious activity would have to prove the "intent" of
the government, something that would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to do. And by exposing the details of defensive programs,
inspections would carry the risk of potentially hostile nations
discovering where a nation's bio-defense vulnerabilities lie.
Rademaker emphasized that the United States believes efforts to combat
the threat of biological weapons have to be pressed "on multiple
fronts" and in several different national, plurilateral and
multilateral fora.
The work of the Australia Group on export controls is a good example,
he said. "It is the view of the United States that the single most
effective step to combat the threat of biological weapons is to
prevent proliferation in the first place. In other words: not to
discover biological weapons programs once they are in existence, but
rather to prevent such programs from getting off the ground. Central
to that policy is the effective enforcement of export controls, and
the Australia Group is a mechanism that is showing a critical value in
preventing proliferation."
Rademaker said it is necessary to be realistic about what can and
cannot be achieved by the Conference of the Parties of the BWC. "The
five agenda items identified in the decision adopted today are things
that can realistically be achieved," he said. "There are other things
that cannot be achieved in a forum that includes violators of the
convention."
The decision adopted November 14 by States Parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention calls for three annual meetings of the States
Parties of one week duration each year beginning in 2003 to promote
"common understanding and effective action" in five areas. Those five
areas, as stated in the text of the agreement are:
-- "the adoption of national measures to implement the prohibitions
set forth in the Convention including the enactment of penal
legislation;
-- national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and
oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;
-- enhancing international capabilities for responding to,
investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of
biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;
-- strengthening and broadening national and international
institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting
humans, animal and plants; [and]
-- the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for
scientists. "
(The Washington File is a product of the Office of International
Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site:
http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
