06 June 2002
Wolf Says Russia, China Must Pursue Non-proliferation
(State's John Wolf testifies before Senate subcommittee) (2780)
A key State Department non-proliferation official says Russia faces
the threat of U.S. sanctions if it does not improve enforcement
efforts aimed at halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction to
Iran and other countries.
As for China, the problem extends beyond enforcement to setting up the
laws and regulations that would bring reality to the non-proliferation
policies announced by that country's leaders, Assistant Secretary for
Nonproliferation John Wolf told a Senate subcommittee June 6.
Testifying before the Government Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Wolf took
note that the U.S.-Russian relationship is "in the process of massive
transformation from the adversarial relationship of the Cold War."
Nonetheless, he said, "We remain concerned...that Russian entities are
providing proliferant states with technology related to weapons of
mass destruction and missiles."
Citing instances of "sensitive cooperation with Iran" on Russia's
part, Wolf assured the senators that U.S. officials "have made clear
to Russia that it must take enforcement action to stop assistance to
proliferators -- and that does not mean just Iran.
"If Russian action does not terminate such assistance, U.S. sanctions
may be required," he said.
Turning to China, Wolf expressed continuing concerns about that
nation's non-proliferation performance, asserting that "loopholes
remain in Chinese controls and enforcement with respect to
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.
And while China has agreed to launch no new ventures in nuclear
cooperation with Iran, he said, "We will continue to evaluate whether
subsequent interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities are
consistent with" that pledge.
While the United States will work multilaterally and bilaterally to
promote non-proliferation, it will proceed unilaterally, when
necessary, "to stop the flow of weapons and technologies that
constitute a direct threat to the United States, our forces stationed
abroad, our allies, and our friends," Wolf said.
Subcommittee Chairman Daniel Akaka (Democrat, Hawaii), observed in
opening the hearing that it was being held "on the eve of what the
whole world fears could be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan"
-- two states that he said might never have developed a nuclear
weapons capability without assistance from Russia and China.
"To make a real difference, non-proliferation must start with Russia
and China, the major suppliers to proliferant countries," Akaka said.
Following is the text of Wolf's statement, as prepared for delivery.
(begin text)
Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S.
Wolf
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal
Services
June 6, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to testify before you on behalf of the State
Department on the important subject of our proliferation concerns with
Russia and China. Non-proliferation is not just one of many issues in
U.S. policy, but rather, as the President and many others have said,
it is a cardinal issue, one on which we have to "get it right." It's
fused in many ways to our effort to root out terrorism and to stop the
flow of dangerous materials to countries that support terrorism and/or
threaten key U.S. interests. Both Russia and China have helped in
important ways in the fight against terrorism in the wake of the
September 11 attacks, yet differences remain between us on critical
non-proliferation issues. I would like to outline our concerns and
describe some steps we have been taking to deal with the problems. I
have just returned from a trip to Europe. I was delighted to hear from
a senior official at the EU (European Union) that they share our view
that proliferation is one of two galvanizing threats confronting
Europe. We are working to translate that understanding into more
effective action that will complement and supplement the many
activities the U.S. is pursuing.
Let me turn first to Russia, addressing your questions as follows: (1)
What are our current proliferation concerns with Russia? (2) How does
Russia participate in multilateral export control agreements? (3) How
successfully has Russia implemented its agreements and enforced
domestic regulations? (4) What assistance is the U.S. providing to
Russia?
Proliferation Concerns
Any discussion of Russia needs to be put in perspective. The
relationship is in the process of massive transformation from the
adversarial relationship of the Cold War. The President's visit in May
cemented important parts of the strategic arrangement we seek to leach
with Russia. In addition to the treaty that Presidents Bush and Putin
signed on reducing strategic offensive weapons, the Presidents also
agreed to intensify efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. Two days later, NATO initiated a new NATO-Russia Council
that will help implement this undertaking. We remain t concerned,
however, that Russian entities are providing proliferant states with
technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles.
Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace,
and nuclear industries profit from exports and transfers to states on
our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Some Russian universities and
scientific institutes have shown a willingness to earn needed revenues
by providing WMD-related or missile-related teaching and training for
foreign students.
We have engaged in high-level efforts to halt Russian sales to the
proliferants. President Bush was quite direct in his conversation with
President Putin last month. We have offered Moscow lucrative
incentives to end sensitive cooperation with Iran and made clear that
failure to do so will limit the scope of the new strategic framework
we seek to build with Russia. Moscow's response to our efforts has
been mixed. Russia updated its export control laws in 2001 and has
limited some particularly dangerous exports. However, Russian entities
continue to engage in a broad array of cooperative projects which aid
the WMD and missile programs of countries of concern, as well as to
sell these countries advanced conventional weapons (ACW). We also have
made clear to Russia that it must take enforcement action to stop
assistance to proliferators -- and that does not mean just Iran. If
Russian action does not terminate such assistance, U.S. sanctions may
be required.
Participation in Multilateral Export Control Agreements
Our bilateral differences notwithstanding, the United States and
Russia have worked for more than 30 years in support of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Last fall, Presidents Bush and Putin
reaffirmed their mutual commitment to the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and
endorsed efforts to strengthen the NPT. In Moscow two weeks ago,
Presidents Bush and Putin called on all countries -- meaning Russia
and the United States as well -- to strengthen and strictly enforce
export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and
tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation.
It goes without saying that conformance to treaties like the NPT, CWC,
and BWC cannot be only a matter of degree.
Russia is a member of several of the multilateral export control
regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement. It is not
a member of the Australia Group (AG), but controls the items on the AG
control lists. In 1998 Russia adopted "catch-all" controls to cover
unlisted items destined for WMD/missile programs, and in 1999 passed
the Federal Law on Export Controls, which created a comprehensive
basis for controlling items of proliferation concern. The Russian
government has since enacted a number of implementing regulations
under the new law, revamped the export control administration,
expanded and updated its control lists and provided new authorities
for punishing violations.
The framework for Russia's export control license procedures appears
to be similar to that in the United States. Representatives of
relevant agencies and ministries review all license applications and
participate in an interagency Export Control Commission, chaired at
lower levels by the Department of Export Control in the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade. Ultimate authority as to whether to
approve or deny a license resides with the President, and by his
delegation, the head of the cabinet-level Export Control Commission
chaired by the Prime Minister.
Implementation
Notwithstanding this export control framework, implementation and
enforcement remains insufficient. The Russian government on occasion
has taken steps to investigate alleged violations. However,
proliferators continue to have access to a wide range of sensitive
technologies from Russian entities. In some cases official Russian
export policy is contributing to the proliferation threat, such as
with the decision to proceed with nuclear power plant cooperation with
Iran.
Russian exports related to WMD and missiles to proliferate states take
place in a complex environment. Strong economic motivation for
enterprises to increase exports vie with mixed enforcement of export
controls, a level of official corruption, and governmental policies
that often confuse rather than clarify what is permissible and what is
not. Russia's policy on such exports is generally to interpret its
non-proliferation commitments narrowly. In selling uranium fuel to
India in the face of overwhelming opposition from the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Russia made decisions contrary to the guidelines.
Moscow also tends to downplay the threat posed by proliferant weapons
programs and to express the belief that the limited technological
capability of proliferant states will prevent them from developing WMD
and missiles. That view is shortsighted and dangerous.
U.S. Assistance
We have been working with the Russian government for several years to
help strengthen its export controls and enforcement. This assistance
played a significant role in creating the legal foundation for export
controls that is now in place in Russia. It was a catalyst for
industry government outreach programs that educate Russian companies
about their obligations under Russia's export control system. U.S.
assistance has also funded installation of radiation detection
equipment at a number of key transit and border sites throughout
Russia to detect and interdict illicit nuclear transfers. With the
legal and regulatory basis for Russia's export controls now
essentially in place, our assistance efforts are increasingly focusing
on enforcement efforts and working with customs and law enforcement
officials on combating illicit transfers.
Ultimately, the Russian government must demonstrate the political will
and devote the necessary priority and resources to use these
capabilities effectively to stop illicit transfers, as well as to set
responsible policies for what constitutes legitimate transfers. It has
not yet done so. We will continue to press Moscow for this commitment.
And now I would like to turn to China, addressing your questions in
the following order: (1) In what way does China participate in
multilateral export control agreements? (2) What are our current
non-proliferation concerns with China? (3) How successfully has China
implemented its multilateral export control agreements? (4) What
assistance is the U.S. providing to China?
Participation in Multilateral Export Control Agreements
Like Russia, China is a party to the key treaties to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acceding to the
Biological Weapons Convention in 1984, the Non-proliferation Treaty in
1992, and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. As a
relative newcomer to non-proliferation, China's policies are still
evolving and, aside from the related Zangger Committee, China does not
belong to any of the multilateral export control regimes.
China remains the only member of the Zangger Committee that is not
also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which requires
full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear
weapon states. China has not yet been willing to accept the full-scope
safeguards policy, although it has expressed some interest in joining
the NSG.
China's nuclear export control regime applies not only to Zangger
Committee Trigger list items, but also to so-called dual-use items
that have both civilian and military applications. For transfers of
both Trigger and dual-use items to a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS),
China requires nuclear non-proliferation assurances. In May 1997,
China's State Council approved a circular notice to government and
industry requiring strict implementation of China's nuclear export
policy of not assisting other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. In
September 1997 China promulgated nation-wide nuclear export control
regulations accompanied by a list of controlled nuclear items which is
identical, the Chinese informed us, to the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Trigger List. In June 1998 China's State Council promulgated
regulations, on control of nuclear dual-use items and related
technology.
Proliferation Concerns
We continue to have concerns about Chinese non-proliferation behavior.
In particular, we want to ensure that Beijing fully lives up to its
May 1996 commitment not to provide assistance to any unsafeguarded
nuclear programs and facilities. In October 1997, China gave the
United States assurances regarding its nuclear cooperation with Iran.
China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supplying a uranium
conversion facility (UCF) and to end further cooperation after
completing within a reasonable period of time two existing projects --
a zero-power reactor and a zirconium production plant. We will
continue to evaluate whether subsequent interactions between Chinese
and Iranian entities are consistent with the Chinese "no new nuclear
cooperation" pledge.
With regard to chemical and biological weapons, China is a Party to
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
But China's chemical-related export controls are not yet up to the
Australia Group standard and only cover 10 of the 20 Australia
Group-listed items not also on the CWC schedules. Chinese officials
have told us they plan shortly to increase coverage to reach the
Australia Group standard. This would be a welcome improvement.
However, loopholes remain in Chinese controls and enforcement. Since
1997 the U.S. has imposed sanctions on 13 Chinese entities under the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
1991 and the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any
country in the development of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Annex-listed ballistic missiles, to improve and reinforce its export
control system, and to publish at an early date a comprehensive
missile-related export control list and related regulations. However,
China has failed to fully implement its commitments. Chinese entities
have recently provided Pakistan with missile-related technical
assistance. In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use
missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several
other countries of proliferation concern -- such as Iran, North Korea,
and Libya. In September 2001, the U.S. imposed missile sanctions on
Chinese and Pakistani entities for their involvement in the transfer
of MTCR Annex Category II items that contributed to Pakistan's MTCR
Annex-listed ballistic missile program. We have had discussions,
including by President Bush this spring in Beijing, concerning China's
failure to implement fully its November 2000 commitments.
Implementation
There is a continuing gap between the commitments China has made and
its implementation of these commitments. We remain concerned about
gaps and loopholes in Chinese export controls, as well as by exports
by entities with and without government concurrence. China still has
not promulgated all the laws and regulations that would implement the
non-proliferation policy that Chinese officials at every level say is
China's policy. There will be no horse trading. Our view is very
clear. If China's policy is as it describes -- opposition to
proliferation -- then it needs to put the tools in place and use them
effectively.
U.S. Assistance
The U.S. has taken modest steps to help the Chinese identify problems
in their export control systems. The Department of Commerce (DOC) has
conducted a seminar on U.S. export control regulations for the
Ministry for Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the U.S. and Chinese business communities in
China. It has also brought MOFTEC officials to the U.S. to exchange
views with DOC export control officials.
A Final Word
The message is same for our oldest friends and our newest: as in the
war on terrorism, one cannot be neutral. Results, not words, are the
means by which we can measure China's, Russia's, or indeed any other
country's commitment to the effort to stem proliferation. President
Bush made clear at the time of the Beijing summit that China's
fulfillment of its non-proliferation commitments would be an important
factor in determining how far the new U.S.-China relationship can
develop. He said the same thing to the Russians in Moscow in May. We
will rely on international treaties and multilateral agreements. We
will work actively with friends and allies, as I discussed last week
in Vienna, Berlin, and Brussels at the EU and NATO. But we will also
work bilaterally and, when necessary, unilaterally to stop the flow of
weapons and technologies that constitute a direct threat to the U.S.,
our forces stationed abroad, our allies, and our friends.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
