Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=06/6/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01134

TITLE=U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR ACCORD

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Please note: This is a rebroadcast episode of On the Line. The episode originally aired 05-30-02 and was originally numbered 1-01130.

Host: A dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons.

Host: On his European trip, President George W. Bush stopped in Russia. There, he and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty to reduce U-S and Russian nuclear arsenals to about two-thirds of their current levels. The number of deployed nuclear warheads will go from about five or six thousand to between seventeen-hundred and two-thousand. The agreement reflects the new relationship between Russia and the United States, but it is also part of a broader imperative to limit weapons of mass destruction and terrorist access to those weapons. As President Bush said, "The attacks of September 11th made clear that the new dangers of our age threaten all nations, including Russia. The months since have made clear that by working together against these threats, we multiply our effectiveness. Joining me to talk about the U-S-Russia accord and its implications is John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Welcome. Thanks for joining me today.

Bolton: Glad to be here.

Host: Why don't we start by talking about the specifics of this treaty which you had a large hand in negotiating and what are the key provisions of the treaty?

Bolton: Well, basically we have focused on the deployed strategic nuclear weapons, that is to say the warheads that are the most severe threat both to the United States and Russia. And what we have done is agreed over a ten-year period that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed warheads two-thirds below their current levels, as you said, down to a range of between seventeen to twenty-two hundred each.

Host: Now by operationally deployed weapons, you mean ones that are actually on a missile, ready to go.

Bolton: Right. Mated to missiles or associated with heavy bombers at their bases. And these are the weapons that are really most threatening to us, to the Russians, or to anyone if we might have to use them. That's why we focused on the most dangerous part of the inventory and why this is such a significant agreement from a strategic point of view because it dramatically lowers the threat to both countries.

Host: What will happen to these weapons that are being taken out of operational use?

Bolton: Many of them will be destroyed because they're no longer necessary. Some of them will be stored. Some will be used for spares. And I think it's important to understand that no prior arms-control treaty, not START I [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] or START II, not the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] agreements from the seventies and eighties, dealt with the question of what was done with the downloaded warheads. Basically what these treaties have focused on is what we've tried to focus on here -- the weapons that are actually most ready for use. And we have followed in that tradition of earlier arms-control treaties.

Host: Has there been discussion, however, about how to protect those weapons that are perhaps taken out of operational use but are in warehouses someplace?

Bolton: On the United States side, we are very certain that our weapons are under the most stringent controlled conditions that we can imagine and really with safeguards beyond any possibility of penetration. We have specifically asked the Russian side to make sure that their safeguards are equally as secure. And in fact, we have extensive programs and have had for the past decade under the Nunn-Lugar program to enhance their control and protection of their warheads as well. So, no human system is perfect, but we have a high degree of confidence that both the Russian system of control and our system of control will ensure that the nuclear warheads that are in storage are not subject to being hijacked by terrorists.

Host: There's been a lot of talk over the last decade of nuclear weapons in Russia and their security. Is there any reason to think that weapons that had been stored earlier have not been secure?

Bolton: We have no indication on the Russian side that they've lost any of their strategic or tactical warheads.

Host: And the distinction between a strategic and tactical weapon is?

Bolton: A strategic weapon is typically one you'd associate with intercontinental use, direct threats to the United States. Tactical nuclear weapons are more of the battlefield variety and generally with a smaller yield. The Russians have been adamant in their statements to us that they have full control over their entire stockpile. And we know of no verifiable incident where a warhead has actually been lost. There are dangers, to be sure, from radiological containers and things like that, of which there are a lot around the world. And we do worry about that. But in terms of real warheads, especially given the visibility that the United States has achieved inside Russia in the past ten years, we too have a high degree of confidence that the Russians have control of their warheads.

Host: What sort of negotiations took place to get this agreement in place? In the past, negotiations between the U-S and Russia over nuclear reductions were very long, very drawn-out processes. This seemed to move pretty quickly.

Bolton: It certainly did move quickly. And that really is another piece of evidence as to why this is a different kind of arms-control agreement for a different kind of relationship. Arms-control agreements during the Cold War were painful to negotiate because fundamentally it was a case of two adversaries sitting down across a table and trying to see if there was something that was mutually advantageous that they could agree on. But they came from very different starting positions. They had very different objectives and very different circumstances that they had to try and reconcile. By contrast, what made this easier to achieve was that we were determined to form a new strategic framework for the relationships between the United States and Russia. We, the year before, had very extensive discussions about the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972, where President Bush had directed us to try and find a mutually acceptable way for us and the Russian government to move beyond that treaty. So we had already -- although that was not successful -- we had already had very extensive discussions that were a predicate to these and because, basically, the two presidents had already told us what their policies were going to be. They were both committed to very substantial reductions in the operationally deployed warheads. And that also was a difference from Cold War negotiations. So, because the relationship between Russia and America was fundamentally different, we were able to negotiate this agreement in a fundamentally different way.

Host: Now you mentioned the A-B-M discussions that were held the year before. There were a lot of people who were talking about the prospect of the U-S moving forward on missile defense as being something that would not only undercut negotiations for nuclear reductions but perhaps spawn a new nuclear arms race. And obviously that didn't happen. Why didn't that happen?

Bolton: Well there were a lot of doomsayers out there when we were talking about what to do with the A-B-M treaty. We thought the A-B-M treaty codified an adversarial relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union, which of course, doesn't exist any more. It was outdated in that sense, in that it affected our relations in a very different kind of context. But we also felt the A-B-M treaty was outdated because at the time it was written, we only had to worry about a ballistic missile threat from one country. Today, over thirty countries have ballistic missile capabilities and yet the A-B-M treaty precluded both us and the Russians from developing defenses against these new potential threats. So we believed that actually eliminating the A-B-M treaty would enhance strategic stability around the world. And to those of our critics who said, well if you withdraw from the A-B-M treaty there'll be a new arms race and things will become much more uncertain, much more unstable -- we thought that they were just wrong and I think we proved that in negotiating this treaty with the Russians. Quite the opposite from being an arms race, it will reduce our operationally deployed warheads by two-thirds over a ten-year period, which is a pretty substantial reduction in anybody's book.

Host: Now, the Bush administration has been criticized from many corners for being anti-treaty, if you will, unwilling to enter into a multilateral agreement, bilateral agreements, and yet this rather dramatic treaty happened fairly quickly. Is there something about this treaty that illustrates what the Bush policy is with regard to agreements that are made for security reasons?

Bolton: It was never accurate to say that we were against treaties as if it were some form of disease. What we're interested in doing is advancing the important national interests of the United States. There are plenty of cases where treaties make eminently good sense and where we are adhering to treaties that currently exist or entering into new ones. This is the case on the offensive weapons treaty. But there are other cases where treaties are outdated, where they no longer serve our interest, where it would be imprudent for the United States to enter into it, where we don't think the treaty represents a good deal for us, and where we've either withdrawn from or refused to enter into the treaties. I think if you really ask the leaders of any other nation in the world if they would willingly enter into treaties that they thought were contrary to their national interest, they'd say, well no, of course not. That's exactly the same standard we're following. We may have a difference of opinion on what's in our national interest, but that's why we have democratic institutions in this country for the voters to elect governments to make those kinds of decisions.

Host: Now you've achieved dramatic reductions on nuclear weapons. The former Soviet Union of course also had a large biological warfare program, large chemical weapons program, and there's been a lot of talk about the threat that those former programs and what's left of them may pose for terrorists trying to get their hands on biological agents or chemical agents. Have there been any related talks about those weapons of mass destruction and how to keep control of them or reduce them?

Bolton: Right. We've had extensive discussions with the Russians on really the third part of the new strategic framework. If you consider moving beyond the A-B-M treaty the first part, the treaty on offensive weapons reductions [is] the second part. Dealing with the subject of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is really the third part. There are two aspects to it when we come to the Russians. The first is what they're doing themselves on chemical and biological weapons. Pursuant to the chemical weapons convention, which both Russia and the United States are parties to, they are committed to the destruction of the existing chemical weapons stocks that they have and production facilities for those weapons. We've been in very intense discussions with them to make sure that they have fully declared all of their chemical weapons stocks and facilities, and those discussions have been conducted right up through the summit in fact. On biological weapons, President [Boris] Yeltsin some years back admitted what I think we knew for some time, that Russia did have an offensive biological weapons program. He committed to destroying it. We still have some questions we've been discussing with the Russian government on whether they've carried through on that. It's a very important issue for us for the reasons you've stated -- so that these weapons don't fall into terrorist hands but also so that we can be in a stronger position and the government of Russia can be in a stronger position to say the rogue states around the world who have signed up to the biological weapons convention or the chemical weapons convention but who are violating it, "You must stop. You must come into compliance with these conventions. We had been saying that we were pleased when our other friends and allies were able to say that with us. We'd like the Russian government to be in the same position.

Host: What kind of discussions did you have with the Russian government about the issue of technology transfer, both ballistic missile technology and nuclear technology transfer specifically going to Iran?

Bolton: That is the second major aspect of the proliferation question we've been discussing with the Russians -- the first being their own weapons of mass destruction. But the second being the issue of outward proliferation -- assistance that they are providing to Iran and to other states across the whole range of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, biological and the technology to deliver them through ballistic missiles. We especially had been concerned about their cooperation with Iran's covert nuclear weapons program and the Iranian ballistic missile program. But we're also worried about work they've done in other rogue states around the world. President Bush raised this directly with President Putin. I'm sure we're going to have further discussions on that subject. We think that stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the highest priorities that the Bush administration has. It was a priority before September 11th, but in the wake of that tragedy it's an even greater priority because of the risk not only that rogue states might use or threaten to use these terrible weapons, but that the very states that seek to acquire them are also the biggest sponsors of international terrorism. So the tie-in is really very clear, as President Bush made the point in his State of the Union message earlier this year.

Host: How significant is the Iranian program in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at this point?

Bolton: Well, we're very concerned about the advanced stage of development of the Iranian ballistic missile program. And it's one of these things if you draw circles on a map based on the range of ballistic missiles, they now have the capability to hit close American friends and allies like Turkey and Israel, deployed American forces in Turkey, for example. And in a relatively short period of time [they] will have a capability that extends deep into Russia and into Europe as well. Their nuclear weapons program is very sophisticated. It's a great concern to us. And we've made the point, particularly to the Russians, it's hard to see how, even from the perspective of Russian national interest, they could feel comfortable with a nuclear-capable ballistic missile-equipped Iran, which is after all, a lot closer to them than it is to the United States. But our concern is for the spread of these weapons of mass destruction and the threat that they pose, not necessarily to the continental United States but to our friends and our allies and our interests all around the world.

Host: How much of that aid to Iran, participation with Iran has been from Russian institutions and how much is this other concern of scientists who had formerly worked in the large Soviet missile and nuclear organizations, institutions who have been looking for other work?

Bolton: Well you know, Russia obviously is in a transition to a market economy. That was one of the issues in the summit -- whether we would designate them as a market economy. But large chunks of Russia are still state-owned enterprises and even if they're somewhat independent of the central government, there is still a certain official capacity that they have. We're concerned not just with the transfer of certain pieces of equipment or specific pieces of weaponry, but with technology transfer as well. That's really the most dangerous part in terms of creating a nuclear weapons program or designing or enhancing a ballistic missile capability. That's what we really need more cooperation from the Russians about. You know the United States and most of our allies have very extensive export control programs. It's a burden on our businesses. It reduces things that they could do with other countries. But we've all made the decision these export control programs are necessary to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because that's important for our overall national security. And that's the point we've been making to the Russians. They need to understand that as well. They may get some short-term economic advantage from participating in a weapons program or a ballistic missile program, but over the long term, all of our securities would be enhanced if they forwent that kind of activity.

Host: Now, though it was not without its tense and dangerous moments, the principle of deterrence largely was effective in keeping a nuclear conflagration from happening throughout the Cold War, but is deterrence possible in the context of terrorism and if there is this spread of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of terrorists? How do you deal with the threat that comes from terrorism? Is it deterrence? Is it something else?

Bolton: Well, I think one of the lessons that September 11th taught us, very tragically, was that there are some people in the world for whom deterrence just doesn't mean a thing. The hijackers who crashed the planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon obviously were willing to commit suicide. Not just to cause the terrible, three-thousand or more deaths that they caused, but they were willing to kill themselves in the process. Those are not people that are subject to fine theories of deterrence as we practiced during the Cold War. And as I think [Defense] Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld and Secretary [of State Colin] Powell have made clear, if these people had weapons of mass destruction, they would not hesitate to use them. So that the notion that deterrence alone, the threat of a massive retaliation if someone used weapons of mass destruction against us, would suffice to protect us, I think is sadly one of the things we know we cannot count on, quite apart from the fact that the terrorists and their state sponsors really pose a very asymmetric threat to the United States. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear conflagration between the United States and the Soviet Union meant both countries would be destroyed. Yet a terrorist group by definition is not nearly as extensive as the damage that could be caused to one American or European city. So the idea of retaliation providing a deterrent fails for a number of reasons. That's one of the reasons why I think the President has said that the global campaign against terrorism really has to be a long and protracted struggle -- to go after them where they are, to make sure that we don't have to rely on deterrence, that we solve the problem before it gets larger than it is now.

Host: And if not deterrence, then does that mean that if there are regimes that are threatening with weapons of mass destruction that they could put in the hands of terrorists, that there has to be some kind of action to thwart that before it has an opportunity to become a real threat?

Bolton: I think President Bush has made it clear, for example, in the case of Iraq that regime change is very definitely our goal there. And he said in the State of the Union message, you know, "Time is not on our side. We can not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to acquire the world's most dangerous weapons." That's why a vigorous policy of non-proliferation and also counter-proliferation to try and stop the spread or roll back the spread of weapons of mass destruction is so important. You know it's interesting, what a convergence there is of regimes that are state sponsors of terrorism. The ones on the State Department's annual list, with a list of states that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, it's basically a one-to-one correlation, which shows the kind of regimes that we're worried about.

Host: We only have a few seconds left. Where does missile defense fit in with this threat of weapons of mass destruction from rogue states?

Bolton: Well, I think if rogue states thought they could blackmail us with the threat of using ballistic missiles with nuclear, chemical, biological warheads, they would feel that they were in a position to affect our behavior in a very substantial way. Missile defense, when it's developed and deployed, should give us some confidence that those threats become meaningless.

Host: Well I wish we had more time to talk about this. There's a lot to get to. But I'd like to thank my guest, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.