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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

15 February 2002

Feith Says U.S. Is Developing New Defense Triad

(Strategy includes diverse set of capabilities) (4990)
The United States is developing a "New Triad" as the cornerstone of
its 21st century defense strategy that comprises a diverse set of
nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive capabilities, a top
Pentagon policy official says.
"The United States will transform its strategic planning from an
approach that has been based almost exclusively on offensive nuclear
weapons, to one that also includes a range of non-nuclear and
defensive capabilities," Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas
Feith said February 14. "In particular, because deterrence will
function less predictably in the future, the United States will need
options to defend itself, its allies and friends against attacks that
cannot be deterred."
Feith, who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), said that previously the United
States could focus its strategic defensive apparatus on a single
opponent, the former Soviet Union, and prepare for a few threatening
contingencies. "We now need the flexibility to tailor military
capabilities to a wide spectrum of contingencies, to address the
unexpected, and to prepare for the uncertainties of deterrence," he
said.
And, he noted, the new defense strategy recognizes that Russia, unlike
the former Soviet Union, is not an enemy.
The New Triad encompasses nuclear forces and non-nuclear strike means,
such as information warfare; passive and active defenses, notably
missile defense; and a defense-industrial infrastructure to build and
sustain these elements, he said. Included in the New Triad, and
critical to its ability to function, are command, control and
intelligence systems, he said.
President Bush sent the NPR to Congress on January 8, the first such
comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces since 1994.
Of particular concern to the United States in the current era of
uncertainty is the emergence of hostile regional powers armed with
missiles and nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass
destruction, Feith said.
"The emerging feature of the international landscape has rendered the
failure to deter or promptly defeat a threat much more dangerous for
all Americans," he said. "We can no longer take comfort in the belief
that the conflict will be 'over there,' or that opponents will be
deterred in predictable ways."
Following is the text of Feith's testimony as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review
February 14, 2002
Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 required
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy, to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces and
to develop a long-range plan for the sustainment and modernization of
United States strategic nuclear forces. The Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) constitutes the Department of Defense response to this
requirement.
We submitted the NPR to Congress on January 8, 2002. It is the first
comprehensive review of nuclear forces since 1994, when the first
Nuclear Posture Review was completed. The primary purpose of the 1994
review was to determine the strategic nuclear force structure to be
deployed under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).
The current review of the U.S. nuclear posture differs from the 1994
review. The 1994 review assumed that the central strategic U.S.
concern was managing a potentially hostile relationship between the
two largest nuclear powers. The current review recognizes that the
United States and Russia have a new relationship, and that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has created
new challenges for deterrence. It defines the capabilities required of
the nuclear forces in the new strategic environment, and in relation
to other U.S. defense capabilities. Most especially, it recognizes
that Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, is not an enemy. There is ground
for mutual cooperation, and the United States is seeking to move
beyond the outdated Cold War nuclear confrontation to develop a new
strategic framework with Russia.
A New Era
The basic features of the Cold War shaped our approach to security,
including the role and size of our nuclear forces and deterrence
policies. Our current nuclear triad of ICBMs, bombers, and ballistic
missile submarines, and the ways we have pursued deterrence and arms
control negotiations, reflect the conditions of Cold War. The new
features of the international system, particularly the types of
threats we face, are dramatically different. Consequently, President
Bush charged the Department of Defense with transforming our approach
to defense, including nuclear weapons and missile defenses, to meet
the new challenges of the post-Cold War era.
During the Cold War we faced a single, ideologically hostile nuclear
superpower. We prepared for a relatively limited number of very
threatening conflicts with the Soviet Union. Much of the world was
part of two competing alliances and the stakes involved in this
competition were survival for both sides. We must never lose sight of
just how dangerous the situation was.
There was, however, considerable continuity and predictability in this
competition of two global alliance systems. For decades, U.S. nuclear
forces were organized and sized primarily to deter the Soviet Union,
and there were few sharp turns in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on the
continuities of the international system at the time, the successful
functioning of nuclear deterrence came to be viewed as predictable,
ensured by a sturdy "balance of terror." Many argued that defenses
which might lessen that terror by offering protection against Soviet
nuclear attack would instead undermine the predictable "stability" of
the balance of terror.
The Cold War system of two competing blocs has been replaced by a new
system, one with a broad spectrum of potential opponents and
threatening contingencies. The continuities of the past U.S.-Soviet
relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability of potential
opponents who are motivated by goals and values we often do not share
nor well understand, and who move in directions we may not anticipate.
We no longer confront the severe but relatively predictable threats of
the Cold War; instead we have entered an era of uncertainty and
surprise. As the attacks of September 11th demonstrated, we must now
expect the unexpected. What we can predict today is that we will face
unanticipated challenges, a range of opponents -- some familiar, some
not -- with varying goals and military capabilities, and a spectrum of
potential contingencies involving very different stakes for the United
States and its foes. These conditions do not permit confident
predictions about the specific: threats against which we must prepare
or the "stability" of deterrence.
Of particular concern in this era of uncertainty is the emergence of
hostile, regional powers armed with missiles and nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons of mass destruction. When the U.S. failed to deter
or promptly defeat a challenge in the past, two great oceans generally
provided protection to American civil life. Nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons technology, however, increasingly is in the hands of
brutal leaders who have few institutional or moral constraints and are
motivated by an extreme hatred of the United States and the personal
freedoms and liberties we hold dear. This emerging feature of the
international landscape has rendered the failure to deter or promptly
defeat a threat much more dangerous for all Americans. We can no
longer take comfort in the belief that the conflict will be "over
there," or that opponents will be deterred in predictable ways. As was
illustrated by September 11th, we now confront enemies who are eager
to inflict mass destruction on innocent civilians here and abroad,
without regard for the possible cost.
Transforming Defense
What are the implications of these changes in the international system
for how we think about security? Most basically, we must transform our
forces and planning to meet the dramatically different conditions of
the new security environment. Rather than focusing on a single peer
opponent, and preparing for a few threatening contingencies, we now
need the flexibility to tailor military capabilities to a wide
spectrum of contingencies, to address the unexpected, and to prepare
for the uncertainties of deterrence. We can no longer approach our
military requirements by conveniently defining one or a few countries
as the specified "threat," and then sizing our military capabilities
against that defined threat. U.S. planning can no longer be so
"threat-based" because, in an era of uncertainty, the precise source
of "the threat" is unpredictable.
Our defense preparations must now focus on, and be responsive to, a
wide spectrum of potential opponents, contingencies, and threatening
capabilities, some of which will be surprising. A capabilities-based
approach to defense planning will look more at the broad range of
capabilities and contingencies that the United States may confront in
the future, as opposed to planning against a fixed set of opponents
identified as the threat.
Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential, particularly for
assuring allies and friends of U.S. security commitments, dissuading
arms competition, deterring hostile leaders who are willing to accept
great risk and cost to further their evil ends, and for holding at
risk highly threatening targets that cannot be addressed by other
means.
Instead of our past primary reliance on nuclear forces for deterrence,
we will need a broad array of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive
capabilities for an era of uncertainty and surprise. The United States
will transform its strategic planning from an approach that has been
based almost exclusively on offensive nuclear weapons, to one that
also includes a range of non-nuclear and defensive capabilities. In
particular, because deterrence will function less predictably in the
future, the United States will need options to defend itself, its
allies and friends against attacks that cannot be deterred.
A New Triad for a New Era
The current nuclear triad is a legacy of the Cold War. It is
exclusively nuclear and offensive. As part of the defense
transformation, we will move to a New Triad. The New Triad comprises a
more diverse set of nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive
capabilities. These capabilities encompass nuclear forces and
non-nuclear strike means (including information warfare), passive and
active defenses (notably missile defense), and the defense-industrial
infrastructure needed to build and sustain the offensive and defensive
elements of the New Triad. Command, control and intelligence systems
are also critical to deterrence. They form an integral part of the New
Triad.
This New Triad will provide the United States with the broad range of
capabilities suitable for an era of uncertainty and a wide variety of
potential opponents and contingencies. In some cases, where nuclear
weapons may have been necessary for deterrence and defense in the
past, the use of advanced non-nuclear strike capabilities or defensive
systems may now be sufficient militarily, involve less risk for the
U.S. and our allies, and be more credible to foes. In some cases,
nuclear weapons may remain necessary to deter or defeat a particularly
severe threat. The New Triad will provide the spectrum of offensive
and defensive military capabilities, and the flexibility in planning
necessary to address the new range of contingencies, including the
unexpected and the undeterrable.
The New Triad differs in a number of important ways from the current
triad. In addition to the difference in its overall composition, the
strategic nuclear forces of the New Triad are divided into two new
categories: the operationally deployed force and the responsive force.
The operationally deployed force includes bomber and missile warheads
that are available immediately or within a matter of days. These
forces will be available to address immediate or unexpected
contingencies. Thus, our stated nuclear forces will correspond to our
actual nuclear deployments, which did not occur during the Cold War.
By using such "truth in advertising," we will no longer count "phantom
warheads" that could be deployed, but are not. To address potential
contingencies -- more severe dangers that could emerge over a longer
period of time -- the responsive force augments the operationally
deployed force, largely through the loading of additional warheads on
bombers and ballistic missiles. Such a process would take weeks to
years. The capability for force reconstitution provided by the
responsive force allows significant reduction in the current number of
operationally deployed nuclear warheads. This reduction can be
achieved prudently and without the need for drawn out and difficult
negotiations.
In addition, the New Triad expressly serves multiple defense policy
goals. Deterrence of nuclear or large-scale conventional aggression
was viewed as the main objective of the Cold War triad. The deterrence
of aggression, although still an essential aim, is just one of four
defense policy goals for the New Triad. The capabilities of the New
Triad, like other U.S. military forces, not only must deter coercion
or attack, but also must assure allies and friends of U.S. security
commitments, dissuade adversaries from competing militarily with the
United States, and, if deterrence fails, decisively defeat an enemy
while defending against its attacks on the United States, our friends,
and our allies. Linking nuclear forces to multiple defense policy
goals, and not simply to deterrence, recognizes that these forces, and
the other parts of the New Triad, perform key missions in peacetime as
well as in crisis or conflict. How well the New Triad serves these
multiple goals-thereby enabling us to cope effectively with the
uncertainty and unpredictability of the security environment is the
standard for judging its value.
The New Triad offers several advantages in this regard. Its more
varied portfolio of capabilities, for example, makes it a more
flexible military instrument. This greater flexibility offers the
President more options for deterring or defeating aggression. Within
the New Triad, nuclear forces will be integrated with, rather than
treated in isolation from, other military capabilities. This creates
opportunities for substituting non-nuclear strike capabilities for
nuclear forces and defensive systems for offensive means. This does
will not blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, but it
will reduce the pressures to resort to nuclear weapons by giving U.S.
Presidents non-nuclear options to ensure U.S. security.
The New Triad reflects a capabilities-based approach to nuclear force
planning and the type of defense transformation required in a new era.
It deserves wide support. It gives the United States the greater
strategic flexibility needed in an era characterized by surprise. It
provides the basis for shifting some of the strategic requirements for
dissuading, deterring, and defeating aggression from nuclear forces to
non-nuclear strike capabilities, defensive systems, and a responsive
infrastructure. As we reduce our nuclear forces to bring them into
line with the security environment, the New Triad will mitigate the
risks inherent in an increasingly fluid and dynamic security
environment. Getting to the New Triad will require us to sustain a
smaller strategic nuclear force, reinvigorate our defense
infrastructure, and develop new non-nuclear strike, command and
control, intelligence, and planning capabilities so that we possess
the ability to respond to the kinds of surprises the new security
environment holds. By taking these steps, we will reduce our
dependence on nuclear weapons and build a New Triad that serves a
broader range of American national security goals.
Strategic Nuclear Forces in the New Triad The positive shift in the
U.S. relationship with Russia is of great significance in considering
today's nuclear force requirements. Russia is not the Soviet Union,
nor is it an enemy. We no longer have to focus our energies on
preparing for a massive Soviet nuclear first strike. Rather, we now
seek a new strategic framework with Russia to replace the Cold War's
balance of terror.
President Bush has announced his decision to reduce our operationally
deployed strategic nuclear force to 1700-2200 warheads over the next
decade, a level informed by the analysis of the NPR. While roughly
one-third the number of our currently operationally deployed warheads,
this range is adequate to support our new defense policy goals,
including the deterrence of immediate contingencies. It also preserves
the flexibility and capability for reconstitution necessary to adapt
to any adverse changes in the new security environment.
These reductions, and other adjustments in our offensive and defensive
capabilities, will be achieved outside the Cold War's adversarial and
endless negotiating process that was centered on the balance of
nuclear terror. Today, that competitive and legalistic process would
be counterproductive. It would impede or derail the significant
reductions both sides now want; it would lock both sides into fixed
nuclear arsenals that could be excessive or inadequate in the future;
and, by perpetuating the Cold War strategic relationship, it would
inhibit movement to a far better strategic framework for relations.
I would like to highlight five key findings of the NPR. Each needs to
be well understood:
1. A New Relationship With Russia: Away From MAD. The planned
reductions to 1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads are
possible and prudent given the new relationship with Russia. We can
reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads to this level
because, in the NRR, we excluded from our calculation of nuclear
requirements for immediate contingencies the previous, long-standing
requirements centered on the Soviet Union and, more recently, Russia.
This is a dramatic departure from the Cold War approach to nuclear
force sizing, which focused first and foremost on sustaining our side
of the balance of terror and mutual assured destruction (MAD). In the
NPR we moved away from this MAD policy framework.
This, of course, is not to imply that we will not retain significant
nuclear capabilities, or that we can ignore developments in Russia's
(or any other nation's) nuclear arsenal. Nuclear capabilities will
continue to be essential to our security, and that of our friends and
allies.
Nevertheless, we no longer consider a MAD relationship with Russia the
appropriate basis for calculating our nuclear requirements. MAD is a
strategic relationship appropriate to enemies, to deep-seated
hostility, and distrust. Russia is not our enemy, and we look forward
to a new strategic framework: for our relations.
2. Reductions Plus Security. The President's plan for nuclear
reductions permits us to cut the number of operationally deployed
nuclear weapons by about 65percent, to levels far below current
levels, without taking great risks with America's safety. The new
relationship with Russia makes such cuts possible, and the President's
plan prudently preserves our option to respond to the possible
emergence of new threats. Some commentators say we should continue to
reduce our forces without preserving our capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances, but doing so would require an ability to predict the
future with enough accuracy to ensure we will not be surprised or face
new threats.
Because the future almost certainly will, in fact, bring new dangers,
we do not believe it is prudent to set in stone the level and type of
U.S. nuclear capabilities. We have embarked on a program to deploy a
New Triad that may allow us increasingly to rely on non-nuclear
capabilities, and under the President's plan we have the option to
adjust our nuclear forces down even further than now planned if
appropriate. If severe new threats emerge, however, we must also
retain the capacity to respond as necessary. The President's plan is a
reasonable way to both reduce nuclear forces and prudently preserve
our capability to adjust to the shifting requirements of a dynamic
security environment. In the NPR we have recognized that force
requirements are driven fundamentally by the realities of a changing
threat environment, and we have adopted, in the capabilities-based
approach, the commonsense standard that we must retain the flexibility
necessary to adjust to and shape that environment.
3. New Emphasis on Non-nuclear and Defensive Capabilities. The
President's plan, for the first time, emphasizes the potential for
substituting non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for nuclear
capabilities. In many likely cases involving an attack against us, our
allies or friends, it will be far better to have non-nuclear and
defensive responses available. For example, during the Cold War, one
of the President's only options to limit damage to the United States
was to strike the enemy's offensive weapons, raising the stakes in any
confrontation. Defenses will offer the ability to limit damage to the
United States without requiring America to "fire the first shot." In
the case of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles, defenses
will give us the opportunity to destroy such weapons before they
inflict any damage on the United States, its friends, or allies.
The NPR, for the first time, explicitly calls for the integration of
non-nuclear and defensive capabilities as part of our strategic triad.
This is another reason we can move forward with deep nuclear
reductions while being careful to preserve our security. The new
non-nuclear and defensive capabilities that are emphasized in the NPR
may also provide the basis for further nuclear reductions in the
future, depending on their effectiveness.
4. A New Diverse Portfolio of Military Capabilities for a New World.
The NPR's call for a New Triad begins the transformation of our
strategic capabilities to suit a world that is very different from
that of the Cold War. In the past we focused on the Soviet Union and a
few severely threatening contingencies. We prepared our military to
address this relatively narrow Cold War threat.
Today the sources of the threats that face us are much more diverse
and even unpredictable, as the September 11 attacks showed. The spread
of missiles and weapons of mass destruction makes the current spectrum
of potential opponents significant. Whereas in the past, only the
Soviet Union posed a serious threat to American cities, in the
foreseeable future, several countries -- and perhaps some non-state
actors -- will present such a risk. Our defensive capabilities must
take these new post-Cold War realities into account.
The President's plan will transform our military to provide us with a
new portfolio of capabilities to meet these new threats, even while
reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons. This portfolio will enable
us not only to tailor our force options to the range of potential
contingencies and types of opponents, it will help us to shape the
threat environment in the most benign directions possible.
5. The Rejection of Adversarial Negotiations. The rejection of the
Cold War's adversarial-style of arms control negotiations represents a
key change introduced in the NPR. The NPR moves us beyond the
essentially hostile and competitive negotiations of the Cold War
because such negotiations no longer reflect the reality of
U.S.-Russian relations. We do not negotiate with Britain or France
with regard to the permitted features of our respective nuclear
capabilities. Although our relations with Russia are; not yet
comparable to our relations with our allies, they are not based on
Cold War hostilities.
Were we to have put nuclear reductions on hold until we could have
hammered out a Cold War-style arms control agreement with Russia, we
would not be making the reductions we plan over the next decade. We
would be under pressure to hold on to the weapons we no longer require
as bargaining chips because that is the logic of adversarial arms
control. Russia would be pressed by the same logic.
We see no reason to try to dictate the size and composition of
Russia's strategic nuclear forces by legal means. Russian forces, like
our forces, will decline about two-thirds over the next decade. In
truth, if the Russian government considers the security environment
threatening enough to require an adjustment in its nuclear
capabilities, it would pursue that adjustment irrespective of its
obligations under a Cold War-style treaty. In fact, the Russian
government did just that in 1995 with regard to the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Because the security situation had
changed, Russia did not meet its obligations to reduce its
conventional forces to the proscribed levels. The Russian Defense
Minister at the time stated that Moscow would not fulfill legal
obligations that "bind us hand and foot."
A highly dynamic security environment such as we now confront
ultimately cannot be tamed by rigid, legal constructs, however
sincerely entered into. It would be highly imprudent now to rigidly
fix our capacity to respond to and shape such an environment by
extending the negotiating practices of the Cold War into the future.
We seek a new strategic framework in our relationship with Russia, not
a perpetuation of the old.
Reducing the Number of Nuclear Warheads
Some now argue that the nuclear weapons removed from our strategic
forces must be destroyed or the announced reductions would be "a
subterfuge." The NPR, of course, calls for the destruction of some,
but not all of the U.S. warheads removed from the operationally
deployed force. We must retain these weapons to give the United States
a responsive capability to adjust the number of operationally deployed
nuclear weapons should the international security environment change
and warrant such action. Presidents from both parties have long
recognized the need for such a capability. For example, the previous
Administration adopted a "lead and hedge" policy with regard to
reductions below the levels required by the START II Treaty in the
1994 NPR. The last Administration planned to retain the U.S. ability
to regenerate capabilities reduced by the START 11 Treaty as a "hedge"
against the possibility that Russia might reverse its course towards
democracy. The previous Administration continued that policy through
its last day in office.
The current Nuclear Posture Review makes a similarly prudent decision
to maintain the ability to restore capabilities we now plan to reduce.
The difference, however, is that the NPR's responsive force is not
being sized according to the dictates of a possible resurgence in the
threat from Russia. Instead, our new responsive capability is being
defined according to how it contributes to the four goals of
dissuading potential adversaries, assuring allies, deterring
aggression, and defeating enemies.
At this time, the appropriate size of our responsive force has not
been determined. However, the analysis that helped determine the size
of the operationally deployed force and the decision to pursue
non-nuclear capabilities in the New Triad suggests that our responsive
capability will not need to be as large as the "hedge" force
maintained by the previous Administration. Given the era of
uncertainty we now face, maintaining a responsive force is only
prudent and consistent with the capabilities-based approach to our
defense planning.
Finally, the pace with which we reduce the nuclear stockpile will be
determined in part by the state of our infrastructure and the very
real limits of our physical plant and workforce, which has
deteriorated significantly. For example, the United States today is
the only nuclear weapon state that cannot remanufacture replacements
or produce new nuclear weapons. Consequently, we are dependent on
stored weapons to maintain the reliability, safety, and credibility of
our stockpile and to guard against the possibility of a technical or
catastrophic failure in an entire class of nuclear weapons. Other
nuclear states are not bound by this limitation of their
infrastructure. Repairing the U.S. nuclear infrastructure and building
the responsive infrastructure component of our New Triad may well
permit us to reduce the size of the nuclear stockpile needed to
support the responsive force.
In sum, the NPR develops an approach to reductions that provides an
accounting of reductions that reflects "truth in advertising,"
protects conventional capabilities from efforts to limit nuclear arms,
and preserves the flexibility necessary in an era of uncertainty and
WMD proliferation. This is the only prudent path to deep reductions
given the realities of the threat environment we face.
Programs
Developing and fielding the capabilities for the New Triad will
require a dedicated effort over the next decade. Program development
activities must be paced and completed in a manner such that the
integration of capabilities results in the synergistic payoff
envisioned for the New Triad. The Department has identified an initial
slate of program activities that we propose to fund beginning in FY
2003.
DoD Infrastructure.
Funding for the sustainment of strategic systems will be increased.
This effort will support surveillance and testing of weapon systems
slated for life extension programs such as the Air-Launched Cruise
Missile (ALCM) and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). We propose to
conduct additional test flights for solid rocket motors and to
increase our efforts for unique technologies for strategic systems,
such as missile electronics and navigation. In addition, the
Department will fund the development and qualification of
radiation-hardened parts for strategic systems.
Offensive Strike.
Funding has been programmed for two specific advanced conventional
weapon applications and one concept development program to explore
options for advanced strike systems. The two advanced conventional
strike applications include a fast-response, precision-impact,
conventional penetrator for hard and deeply buried targets and the
modification of a strategic ballistic missile system to enable the
deployment of a non-nuclear payload.
Missile Defense.
The Department will conduct an aggressive R&D program for ballistic
missile defense and we are evaluating a spectrum of technologies and
deployment options.
Strike Support.
Advancements in offensive and defensive capabilities alone will be
inadequate without enhancements in sensors and technology to provide
detailed information on adversary plans, force deployments, and
vulnerabilities. Such systems are critical in developing the advanced
command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities
required to integrate all three legs of our New Triad. Therefore the
Department has proposed additional funding for the development of
advanced sensors and imagery, for improved intelligence and
assessment, and for modernization of communications and targeting
capabilities in support of evolving strike concepts.
Conclusion.
A half a century ago, in the midst of the Cold War, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill noted in the House of Commons the "sublime irony"
that in the nuclear age, "safety will be the sturdy child of terror
and survival the twin brother of annihilation." The Cold War is long
over and new approaches to defense are overdue. As President Bush has
stated, "We are no longer divided into armed camps, locked in a
careful balance of terror.... 0ur times call for new thinking." The
New Triad, outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, responds to the
President's charge.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
      



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