19 November 2001
Text: Bolton Says Iraq, North Korea Violate Biological Weapons Pact
(U.S. official proposes new approaches to BW threat) (3020)
John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and
international security, has accused Iraq and North Korea of pursuing
biological weapons programs in violation of the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC).
Bolton said the United States also believes that Iran, Libya, and
Syria have offensive biological weapons programs, and is concerned
about Sudan, which has shown a growing interest in developing a BW
program.
"We also know," he said, "that Usama bin Ladin considers obtaining
weapons of mass destruction to be a sacred duty, that he has claimed
to possess such weapons, and that he has threatened to use them
against us. We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire
a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support
from a state."
Bolton spoke November 19 at the opening of the Fifth Review Conference
of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) at the United Nations in
Geneva. The BWC treaty bans the development, production, and
stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons.
Bolton said the time had come for "straight talk about BWC
compliance." In a direct and hard-hitting speech, Bolton called on
signatories of the convention to be "courageous, unflinching, and
timely" in fighting the proliferation of germ weapons.
The parties to the Biological Weapons Convention "must demonstrate an
unwavering commitment to fighting this undeniable threat," he said.
Bolton insisted the "flawed" draft protocol previously under
consideration by BWC members and rejected by the United States in July
2001 would have created a "false sense of security." It would have
allowed violators to continue with their offensive biological weapons
programs while publicly proclaiming their compliance, he said.
"The time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over. It is time for
us to consider serious measures to address the BW threat," he said.
"It is time to set aside years of diplomatic inertia. We will not be
protected by a 'Maginot treaty' approach to the BW threat."
Bolton laid out a series of proposals, which the United States
believes, would provide "sound and effective ways to strengthen the
BWC and the overall effort against biological weapons." The proposals
include:
-- agreement by the Parties to enact national criminal legislation to
enhance bilateral extradition agreements with respect to BW offenses
and to make it a criminal offense for any person to engage in
activities prohibited by the BWC.
-- adoption by the Parties of strict standards for the security of
pathogenic microorganisms.
-- establishment of a mechanism for international investigations of
suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents.
-- setting up a voluntary cooperative mechanism for clarifying and
resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent.
-- adoption and implementation by the Parties of strict biosafety
procedures, based on World Health Organization or equivalent national
guidelines.
Following is the text of Bolton's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Statement of The Honorable John R. Bolton
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
United States Department of State
to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention,
Geneva, Switzerland,
November 19, 2001
Mr. President, the United States congratulates you on your election,
and pledges its cooperation in the vital work before us. We are here
to review the functioning of the Biological Weapons Convention under
circumstances none of us would have wished and none of us foresaw.
Suddenly, all of us are engaged in a war -- a war that ignores
national boundaries and threatens the very fiber of our societies.
President Bush warned in his recent address to the UN General Assembly
that: "the world faces the horrifying prospect of terrorists searching
for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into
holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so." This
conference is therefore unfortunately timely.
We, the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, must demonstrate
an unwavering commitment to fighting this undeniable threat. We must
overcome years of talking past each other, and address the real
issues. Will we be courageous, unflinching, and timely in our actions
to develop effective tools to deal with the threat as it exists today,
or will we merely defer to slow-moving multilateral mechanisms that
are oblivious to what is happening in the real world?
The United States has repeatedly made clear why the arms control
approaches of the past will not resolve our current problems. This is
why we rejected the flawed mechanisms of the draft Protocol previously
under consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. Countries that joined the BWC
and then ignore their commitments and certain non-state actors would
never have been hampered by the Protocol. They would not have declared
their current covert offensive programs or the locations of their
illegal work -- nor would the draft Protocol have required them to do
so. By giving proliferators the BWC stamp of approval, the Protocol
would have provided them with a "safe harbor" while lulling us into a
false sense of security. Although the United States has been
criticized publicly -- both in the media and by foreign governments --
for rejecting the draft Protocol, many of those same governments have
told us privately that they shared America's reservations, describing
the draft as "flawed" or "better than nothing." Do we really believe
that a Protocol that would allow violators to conduct an offensive
biological weapons program while publicly announcing their compliance
with the agreement is "better than nothing?" We think not. We can --
and must -- do better.
Before we consider new ways to strengthen the Biological Weapons
Convention, however, we must first confront the failure of many states
to abide by that very document. Too many states are parties to the BWC
but have not lived up to their commitments. Any nation ready to
violate one agreement is perfectly capable of violating another,
denying its actual behavior all the while. The United States will
simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to
develop and deploy biological weapons. We will continue to reject
flawed texts like the draft BWC Protocol, recommended to us simply
because they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary
deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United
States and many other countries represented here today.
Straight Talk About BWC Compliance
The most important reason we gather here is to assess compliance with
the BWC provisions outlawing the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, or retention of biological weapons and their delivery
systems. While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have
conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is extremely
concerned that some states are engaged in biological weapons
activities that violate the Convention. We also are concerned about
potential use of biological weapons by terrorist groups, and states
that support them. So I plan to name names. Prior to September 11,
some would have avoided this approach. The world has changed, however,
and so must our business-as-usual approach.
First, we are concerned by the stated intention of Usama bin Ladin and
his al Qaeda terrorist organization to use biological weapons against
the United States. While we do not yet know the source of the recent
anthrax attacks against us, we do know that some of the September 11
terrorists made inquiries into renting crop dusters, almost certainly
to attack our cities. We also know that Usama bin Ladin considers
obtaining weapons of mass destruction to be a sacred duty, that he has
claimed to possess such weapons, and that he has threatened to use
them against us. We are concerned that he could have been trying to
acquire a rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with
support from a state. While the United States is not prepared, at this
time, to comment on whether rogue states may have assisted a possible
al Qaeda biological weapons program, rest assured that the United
States will not rely alone on treaties or international organizations
to deal with such terrorist groups or the states that support them.
Neither the Biological Weapons Convention nor the former draft BWC
Protocol would stop biological terrorism by groups like al Qaeda or
restrain their rogue-state patrons.
Beyond al Qaeda, the most serious concern is Iraq. Iraq's biological
weapons program remains a serious threat to international security.
After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and
stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons, and continued this
activity even after ratifying the BWC in 1991. Despite the obligation
to fully disclose and destroy its BW program, which the UN Security
Council required to conclude the Gulf War, Iraq denied having a BW
program and pursued a policy of obstruction, denial and evasion to
conceal its program. Only under increased pressure from UNSCOM and the
looming defection of one of Iraq's weapons directors did Baghdad admit
the existence of its offensive BW program. Baghdad unilaterally ended
UNSCOM weapons inspections and monitoring in Iraq in December 1998.
Even with unprecedented intrusiveness, UNSCOM, when faced with a
nation dedicated to deception and concealment, unfortunately could not
fully dismantle Iraq's BW program. Its successor, UNMOVIC, is prepared
to resume on-site activities in Iraq, but Saddam Hussein's continued
belligerence prevents it from so doing. The United States strongly
suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no UN
inspections to improve all phases of its offensive BW program. The
existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute, in complete
contravention of the BWC. The BWC Protocol would have neither hindered
nor stopped it.
Also extremely disturbing is North Korea's BW program. The United
States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to
achieve a BW capability and that it has developed and produced, and
may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention. North
Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of
biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to
do so. While we are hopeful that Pyongyang will come into compliance
with the BWC and end its program, the fact remains that the BWC has
been ineffective in restraining North Korea. The draft BWC Protocol
would have done no better.
We are also quite concerned about Iran, which the United States
believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation
of the Convention. The United States believes that Libya has an
offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may
be capable of producing small quantities of agent. We believe that
Syria (which has not ratified the BWC) has an offensive BW program in
the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing
small quantities of agent.
Finally, we are concerned about the growing interest of Sudan (a
non-BWC party) in developing a BW program. The BWC has not succeeded
in dissuading these states from pursuing BW programs and we believe
the draft BWC Protocol would have likewise failed to do so.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to demonstrate real
challenges left unaddressed by the Biological Weapons Convention.
There are other states I could have named which the United States will
be contacting privately concerning our belief that they are pursuing
an offensive BW program. The United States calls upon all BWC parties
and signatories that have not done so to immediately terminate their
offensive biological weapons programs and comply fully with their
obligations.
New Approaches to the BW Threat
In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, widespread violations
of the BWC, and the weaknesses of the draft BWC Protocol, which
rendered it incapable of effectively addressing these serious threats,
the United States has crafted alternative proposals. Just as we can no
longer rely solely on traditional means to fight a war against
terrorism, we need to look beyond traditional arms control measures to
deal with the complex and dangerous threats posed by biological
weapons. Countering these threats will require a full range of
measures -- tightened export controls, an intensified
non-proliferation dialogue, increased domestic preparedness and
controls, enhanced biodefense and counter-bioterrorism capabilities,
and innovative measures against disease outbreaks. Strict compliance
by all Parties with the BWC is also critical.
The United States has a dedicated bio-defense program to ensure that
Americans and our friends and allies are protected against bioweapons
attacks. In light of the recent anthrax attacks, our efforts will
increase. Robust biodefense efforts are necessary to combat known
threats, and to ensure that we have the means to defeat those specific
threats. U.S. bio-defense programs are a means to an end, to protect
Americans and our friends and allies. An essential element in our
strategy is to find agreement in this body on measures that countries
can undertake immediately to strengthen the BWC. We strongly believe
that the key is to broaden our understanding of the biological weapons
threat and the types of measures that are potentially valuable in
countering it.
U.S. Proposals for Strengthening the BWC
National Implementation (Article IV). Let me begin with measures to
strengthen National Implementation. The United States proposes that
Parties agree to enact national criminal legislation to enhance their
bilateral extradition agreements with respect to BW offenses and to
make it a criminal offense for any person to engage in activities
prohibited by the BWC. While Article IV permits the adoption of such
legislation, it does not explicitly require it. This body must make
clear that doing so is essential.
Further, Parties should have strict standards for the security of
pathogenic microorganisms and: (a) adopt and implement strict
regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms,
including regulations governing domestic and international transfers;
and (b) report internationally any releases or adverse events that
could affect other countries. Sensitizing scientists to the risks of
genetic engineering, and exploring national oversight of high-risk
experiments, is critical and timely, as is a professional code of
conduct for scientists working with pathogenic micro-organisms.
Such measures, if adopted and implemented, will contribute
significantly to doing what none of the measures in the draft BWC
Protocol would do: control access to dangerous pathogens, deter their
misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert states to their risks.
Individually and collectively, they would establish powerful new tools
to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability to prevent the
development, production or acquisition of dangerous pathogens for
illegal purposes. These benefits can be achieved quickly, since
implementation does not depend on lengthy international negotiation.
Consultation and Cooperation (Article V). The United States seeks to
establish a mechanism for international investigations of suspicious
disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents. It would require
Parties to accept international inspectors upon determination by the
UN Secretary General that an inspection should take place. This would
make investigations of such events more certain and timely. It would
also allow us to acquire internationally what is likely to be the
first hard evidence of either accidental or deliberate use of
biological warfare agents and help insure that any such event did not
get covered up by the responsible parties.
We are also supportive of setting up a voluntary cooperative mechanism
for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent, to
include exchanges of information, voluntary visits, or other
procedures to clarify and resolve doubts about compliance.
Assistance to Victims (Article VII) and Technical and Scientific
Cooperation (Article X). Enhanced cooperation with the World Health
Organization would be in everyone's interests. As we are aware,
biosafety standards vary widely throughout the world. The United
States strongly believes every country would benefit from adopting
rigorous procedures, and therefore proposes that Parties adopt and
implement strict biosafety procedures, based on WHO or equivalent
national guidelines. Furthermore, we should enhance support of WHO's
global disease surveillance and response capabilities. Parties could
agree to provide rapid emergency medical and investigative assistance,
if requested, in the event of a serious outbreak of infectious
disease, and to indicate in advance what types of assistance they
would be prepared to provide.
Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of
dangerous pathogens, strengthening international tools to detect
serious illness and/or potential illegal use of biology and providing
assurance of help in the event of a serious disease outbreak -- these
measures all enhance collective security and collective well-being --
which is, after all, our ultimate objective. With the exception of the
final measure, none of these measures was contemplated in the draft
BWC Protocol.
The United States believes these proposals provide sound and effective
ways to strengthen the Convention and the overall effort against
biological weapons. These are measures State Parties can adopt now to
make the world safer and proliferation more difficult. The choice is
ours.
Review Conference Objectives
To preserve international unity in our efforts to fight against
terrorism and WMD proliferation, we need to work together, and avoid
procedural or tactical divisiveness during the Review Conference that
may hinder reaching our mutual goal of combating the BW threat. We
welcome all reactions to these ideas, and additional new ways to
strengthen the BWC.
The time for "better than nothing" protocols is over. It is time for
us to consider serious measures to address the BW threat. It is time
to set aside years of diplomatic inertia. We will not be protected by
a "Maginot treaty" approach to the BW threat. The United States asks
the states assembled here to join us in forging a new and effective
approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons. I have laid out
serious proposals that the United States hopes will form the basis of
this new approach. I ask that these proposals be endorsed in the Final
Declaration.
By working together during this Review Conference, by exchanging ideas
and proposals that will help us meet this critical challenge, I am
confident this Convention can succeed in advancing the worldwide
effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate the biological weapons
threat.
Thank you, Mr. President.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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