Arms Control -- A Review of 1999
and a Look Ahead to the Year 2000
John Holum, Senior Adviser to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament
Thursday December 9, 1999
MR. HOLUM: (In progress) -- people around the world. For example, we've continued to eliminate hundreds of weapons, nuclear weapons, from both the U.S. and the Russian stockpile. Since 1988, we now have reduced a total of 13,000 warheads in the United States, and those have been completely eliminated. Roughly 60 percent of all the nuclear weapons from the peak of the Cold War have gone out of existence. And that's largely happened out of the public view, but it's a profoundly important process in disarmament.
We're also pressing, as warhead numbers are coming down, to make the resulting materials, the highly-enriched uranium and the plutonium, more secure both in the United States and in the states of the former Soviet Union. We've been building on the Chemical Weapons Convention implementation process and are getting ready, hopefully by early next year, to have U.S. industry declarations finally submitted for that process.
There have been intensified worldwide efforts to discourage all kinds of proliferation -- missiles, chemical, nuclear, biological -- through the various regimes, like the nuclear suppliers group, the missile technology control regime, the Australia group. We've had just recently a successful negotiation to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, to bring it into line with post-Cold War realities and continue it as a very strong security instrument for all European countries.
We've stressed a great many regional efforts on non- proliferation; the small arms initiatives in Latin America and in Africa, our efforts in India and Pakistan dealing with their nuclear potential, looking for opportunities in the new environment of the Middle East to a positive new environment to advance the arms control cause there.
But I have to say that there have also been some serious setbacks. The most prominent was the failure of the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has had profound reverberations both here in the United States and around the world. We just completed last week a discussion in Vienna, an assessment of the Wasenauer (ph) arrangement, where a number of countries, including the United States, had come forward with fairly ambitious proposals to strengthen that important regime dealing with both conventional arms transparency and dual-use technologies. Those ambitions weren't realized. There were some modest changes. But we have a great deal of work still ahead to strengthen our global controls on small arms, on conventional arms and on dual-use technologies.
I've also seen in this past year, maybe particularly in the Biological Weapons Convention negotiation context, a disturbing trend in which countries are starting or intensifying their assertion that arms control is something that requires compensation; that if countries give up, for example, the option of pursuing biological weapons as part of the global agreement, they somehow deserve payment in terms of transfer of technology or other steps, and that perverts the whole idea of arms control.
The first benefit of arms control is national security for all of its members; the assurance, the reliable assurance, that by joining a regime that other countries join, your neighbors and rivals aren't acquiring these weapons, and you know they're not because of strong inspection regimes. So we've got some major challenges.
We've got a big agenda next year. I mentioned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We'll continue our efforts to engage with the Senate to ratify the treaty. Meanwhile, as the president has said, we will not conduct nuclear tests and we'll encourage other countries to ratify. We strongly believe that this treaty will ultimately come into force.
We'll continue the efforts to make the Biological Weapons Convention enforceable by strengthening the compliance process and providing for on-site challenge inspections. We need to break the logjam in the Conference on Disarmament. We're hoping we can do that in January with a work program that will include a cutoff on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. We plan to continue our discussions on START III, encourage Russian ratification of START II, and so we can take more major steps along the nuclear disarmament path.
And, of course, we have the challenge now of dealing with the ABM Treaty issue. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of our strategic stability and of our arms control efforts. But at the same time, the world has changed dramatically since the treaty was negotiated in 1972. The threat of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to carry them from a few rogue states is growing, it's real, it's unpredictable, and it's in the near-term. And so we're considering the possibility of deploying a national missile defense, which would require changes to the ABM Treaty while still preserving its essential purpose. And we're engaged in discussions with Russia on that front.
We'll also continue a whole range of regional preventative proliferation efforts, especially focused on North Korea, on Iran and on Iraq through the U.N. process. Through all of these efforts, arms control will remain a central element of U.S. security strategy as we look to the new millennium.
With that, I'm happy to take your questions.
MR. SILVER: Okay, let's start in the back and we'll work our way forward, okay?
Q (Inaudible) -- Chinese Television Network of Taiwan. Two questions, actually. How do you see the Chinese missile buildup against Taiwan? And in a related matter, Taiwan's vice president, Ben Jon (ph), and a presidential hopeful, says that Taiwan should develop long-range land-to-land missiles as part of the national defense strategy. How do you see that?
MR. HOLUM: Well, I would echo -- on the first question, I'd echo the president's statement that we view with very serious concern any buildup and any threatening gestures that suggest a violent approach to the Taiwan Straits and to the issue of China and Taiwan relations. The president's also made clear that our policy remains that of recognizing one China. But at the same time, consistent with the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, we believe that the future of Taiwan should be determined in a peaceful way between China and Taiwan, and we view with grave concern any indications or preparations for military action.
As you know, under the Taiwan Relations Act, we've provided a great deal of defense technology and support to Taiwan, consistent with its security. And we'll continue to evaluate requests and programs in that light. I don't want to prejudge any particular kinds of programs.
In the broadest sense, it seems to me the right direction for both Taiwan and China, and certainly consistent with U.S. policy, is to draw back from more ambitious military programs rather than embark on new ones. But we obviously review Taiwan's security very carefully as we go through the process each year.
Q (Inaudible) -- on the second question, do you have any -- would you support or oppose Taiwan's development of a long-range land- to-land missile?
MR. HOLUM: I was answering that question when I talked about how we would review these programs, but I don't want to prejudge an outcome.
MR. SILVER: Let's take a question from the front.
Q (Inaudible) -- from Times of India. Mr. Holum, there is the ongoing debate in India about whether to sign the CTBT or not. The government has said they are looking for a national consensus. In your opinion, where do you see this going? What is the administration's views now of still insisting on the benchmarks before? Because there is the sanctions question related to it, and the Indians have said, you know, there has to be give-and-take on this issue. So where do you see this going? And what are the expectations as far as the signing of the CTBT in India is concerned?
MR. HOLUM: Well, I hope India will sign the CTBT. And I've followed with great care and interest the process of commencing a debate now that the government is in place. It seems to me that the CTBT is consistent with India's own policy of not conducting further nuclear tests, of continuing a testing moratorium. Therefore, I don't think it's a giant step. It should be a fairly easy step. I recognize that it's a controversial one. But in the context, it should be a relatively easy step.
It is connected with the benchmarks that the United States has established. There has been considerable easing of U.S. sanctions related to both India and Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment. We've used the waiver authority that the Congress has provided, not completely, but to a considerable extent. We still are looking for progress on all of the elements of the benchmarks -- strategic restraint, no testing, and adherence to the test ban treaty, fissile material cutoff in production, and negotiations in Geneva, and strengthened export controls. So those remain integral to U.S. policy.
I hope India will see it in its own interests to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to work in the direction of defusing the risk of an arms race in South Asia.
MR. SILVER: A question from this side of the room.
Q Mark Reich (sp), American University Observer. So far, Russia doesn't seem like they're willing to negotiate on the ABM Treaty. And for us to deploy our national missile defense program by the year 2000 -- well, first of all, we're looking to deploy it in Alaska, which would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. And, of course, if we go ahead and deploy, it would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. Do you think if we cannot come to an agreement with Russia that we will walk from the agreement, like we are allowed to, by giving six months' notice?
MR. HOLUM: I don't want to prejudge or speculate on what the decision will be next year. That's clearly a decision for the president to make. Our job as negotiators is to avoid putting the president in that situation, putting him in that position, which means we need to work very hard to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty that would permit the kind of limited deployment that we have under discussion.
It is an accurate statement to say that Russia, as of this point, has not shown overwhelming interest in amending the ABM Treaty. But I think, over time -- I'm hopeful that over time, Russia will see it in its interest, as well as our interest, in not putting the United States in the position of having to choose between a defense against real threats that can be done without defeating the purposes of the ABM Treaty, or leaving the ABM Treaty, in which case there'd be no constraints on the kind of program we would build. That is not a decision we're in the process of making now. It's something that I hope we won't have to confront.
MR. SILVER: Mr. Mennen (sp) has the mike.
Q (Inaudible.) Ambassador Holum, do you think the recent developments in Seattle will in any way affect better understanding between, say, the U.S. and India about non-proliferation?
MR. HOLUM: The WTO discussions? I don't think so, but I think we still have some more work to do in terms of assessing the aftermath of the disagreements and the failure to make headway in other aspects of the demonstrations, other aspects of the events in Seattle. In my own mind, at least, I haven't fully come to terms with how that played out and the impact on our broader agenda.
MR. SILVER: Let's take a question here.
Q (Inaudible) -- of Lebanon. Mr. Holum, I have just attended a press conference upstairs less than an hour ago that was concentrating on the problem of coming back from the brink, which is the problem of de-alerting the arsenals of the two countries, the U.S. and Russia. My question is, how high is re-alerting on the agenda of arms control policy of the United States, if it is in any way part of that policy, because the image reflected by that conference was really scary, to be true to you.
MR. HOLUM: We have looked very closely at the whole question of de-alerting, because there's been a lot of interest in it, particularly in the NGO community. And we have developed, in response, one specific initiative, which is the assistance to Russian early warning and shared early warning, to avoid or make far less likely the possibility of a mistaken response to what is perceived to be but is actually not a nuclear attack. And we've had some episodes that suggest that there has been some risk of that.
As far as specific de-alerting proposals are concerned, no one has yet, that I've seen, come up with a reliable means of doing that that would be verifiable and at the same time something each side would be willing to do. There's also the risk that de-alerting in a crisis situation, if countries move to re-alert, could, in fact, cause a crisis to boil out of control. So it's an area of inquiry that has a great deal of popular appeal on the surface, but when you dig into it, it becomes far more difficult to pursue. The concern it addresses is a real one, and we're trying to address it in other ways, such as through the shared early-warning effort.
MR. SILVER: Before we take another question from India, let me change the field. The correspondent from the Jerusalem Post has sent in a question by E-mail, and it's a good one, so I'm going to raise it if I can. What does the U.S. expect from Israel -- it comes from Janine Jakaria (ph). What does the U.S. expect from Israel in terms of arms control and non-proliferation as part of a comprehensive peace deal in the region?
MR. HOLUM: Well, it's a good question and a very optimistic one that takes, I think, a lot of promise, as I do, from recent developments in the Middle East and an indication that the peace process may be back on track and moving forward, potentially at a very good clip.
In the context of an overall settlement, Israel has in the past, with other Middle Eastern countries, supported the idea of a weapons- of-mass-destruction-free zone, including nuclear weapon-free zone, as part of a broader restriction on weapons of mass destruction in the region. I'm sure that in order to get to that point, there would have to be a very strong and reliable assurance of security under a peace agreement. But I think this new opening does, as the question implies, rightly cause us to start thinking about that question again in a serious way.
Q Can I have a follow-up on this side, please?
MR. SILVER: All right, let's take it.
Q You have just hinted to the idea of having guarantees in a peace treaty or in the peace process in general with the Israeli nuclear arsenal. If I'm right, this would be the first time I see any kind of combination or kind of interrelation between the two.
MR. HOLUM: Between?
Q Between the peace process that's going on about land-peace exchange with the idea of an Israel that could participate in a free zone of arms -- (inaudible).
MR. HOLUM: I don't think it's new. It's something we've supported and Israel has supported in the past in the context, for example, of U.S. General Assembly resolutions that call for, in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement, looking at a weapons-of- mass-destruction-free zone in the region. And I think what makes it more tangible now is the fact that we're looking at the promise of real progress in the peace process.
MR. SILVER: Let's go back to -- (inaudible).
Q (Inaudible) -- Press Trust of India. Recently there were many statements from New Delhi that, as a result of a series of talks between Mr. Talbott and Foreign Minister -- (inaudible) -- Singh, the United States now agrees in principle that India needs a credible nuclear deterrent. Do you share that? And also, India has agreed to not do any further testing, not to transfer nuclear know-how to other states, and has gone even beyond what the U.S. and some of the other powers are willing to; namely, a non-first-use pledge. Why do you really need the Indian signature on the CTBT?
MR. HOLUM: Why do we need --
Q Indian signature on the CTBT when it has given (the substance?) of the CTBT and gone even beyond where the U.S. has gone; namely, a non-first-use pledge.
MR. HOLUM: Well, as far as the first question, I don't want to speak for Strobe Talbott on the content of his discussions. But I do not believe it's the case, and I don't think you've seen a U.S. person say we accept the idea that India should have a nuclear capability, number one.
Number two, one very important reason for why we need India's signature, why the international community needs India's signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is because India is one of the indispensable parties for the treaty to go into force. And it seems to us, leaving aside how India manages its nuclear potential, that the international community will want a common collective global agreement. As the entry-into-force provisions of the treaty imply, that includes all countries that have the possibility of developing nuclear weapons as part of a regime agreeing not to test.
MR. SILVER: Let's go here.
Q Just coming back to the --
MR. SILVER: Identify yourself, please.
Q Sorry?
MR. SILVER: Just identify yourself.
Q I'm sorry. I'm Chris Wilson from Reuters. Just coming back to the ABM Treaty for a moment, could you tell us if there is any incentive for the Russians to agree to a modification of ABM? And if, by this missile defense system, you intend to move away from the idea of mutually assured destruction, and really the missile defense system is aimed more at defending against rogue states than it is against Russia or China, what benefit is there for Russia in agreeing to a modification? And how is this tied in to the broader START talks and other arms control talks with the Russians?
MR. HOLUM: Well, let me begin with the latter point. Just as a matter of process, we are engaged in discussions with Russia, pursuant to the two presidents' agreement at Cologne in June, on both ABM Treaty issues and START III issues. Now, as to START III, our position remains that before we actually begin negotiations on START III, Russia should ratify START II. We're still hopeful that will occur. But in the meantime, we are laying the basis for negotiations by sharing ideas, fleshing out in some detail what the two presidents agreed at Helsinki in 1997.
Now, as to Russia's incentive, Russia has, in many respects, some of the same interests we have in developing the capability to defend against unpredictable countries with nuclear capabilities. Both North Korea and Iran, for example, are much closer to Russia than they are to the United States. So it's quite conceivable to me that Russia will want to have some of these same capabilities itself over time.
In addition, both we and Russia have a strong stake in preserving the benefits, for our own bilateral relationship and strategic stability, of the ABM Treaty. And we can do now again what we did previously in 1997 when we agreed to adjust the treaty to make clear that very robust theater missile defenses are permitted under the treaty. I contend that that agreement strengthened the ABM Treaty by making clear that it doesn't stand in the way of legitimate defenses to real, new emerging threats.
By the same token, I think we can strengthen -- and this should be in Russia's interest as well as ours -- we can strengthen the ABM Treaty, again, by showing that it doesn't stand in the way of defenses against longer-range missiles from unpredictable sources and that we can do that at the same time as we preserve the core benefits of the treaty.
The kind of national missile defense that we're discussing would not have any significant capability against Russia. It poses no threat to Russia's deterrent. But at the same time, it does answer something that we feel very strongly needs to be addressed in our own national security interest. So Russia has the opportunity here to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty, and also to provide a basis for responding to threats it may well also face.
Q Can I just follow that up? Does this imply that you might be prepared to share some of your national missile defense technology with Russia?
MR. HOLUM: Yes. Part of the discussion and part of our plans for pursuing national missile defense includes cooperative steps. The obvious first area of cooperation is in cooperating to modify the treaty. But we're also talking about technical and operational cooperation in various ways with the Russians.
MR. SILVER: Let me try to make things easier for the microphone- holders and the cutaway. Let's take a question from Nadia. Then we'll go to Thomas, and then we'll go to the back. Okay.
Q Nadia -- (inaudible). Last time we heard from the Pentagon that they're making great progress about military exchange between the U.S. and China. I'm just wondering, when will you resume the talks with non-proliferation issues with China? Is there any date set for -- (inaudible) -- visit here? And the second question is, the U.N. passed a resolution not too long ago that actually opposed U.S. to develop missile defense system. Would you continue that (while?) there is different voices from other countries?
MR. HOLUM: On the first question, I wonder the same thing; that is, when we will resume our non-proliferation and arms control dialogue with China. We've been interested in doing that. We've proposed various dates and times for doing it, just as we've proposed dates to resume the human rights dialogue. And as of this moment, we don't have an agreement on a time to do it. So we're still interested and anxious to do it, but haven't yet been able to work it out.
In terms of the U.N. resolution, I think it was very important that quite a number of countries saw fit to abstain on the resolution, both in the first committee, and then a somewhat smaller number, but still a large number of countries, including almost all of our allies, to abstain on the resolution, I think taking the view, which we agree with, that this is essentially a bilateral question, and it unfairly tries to tilt the table of a bilateral negotiation to have it brought up and considered in the U.N. General Assembly.
So we intend to continue working on our -- on the negotiations with Russia, and also continue working on development of the technology that will put the president in position to make a decision, at the earliest, next summer.
MR. SILVER: Let's take a question from Thomas.
Q Thomas Gorguissian, Al Wafd, Egypt.
Ambassador Holum, in view of previous answer for the new expected environment in the Middle East, and a broader question, how do you foresee your security strategy in the Middle East, I mean concerning -- I'm not going to say that as the peace process you are going to leave the sides decide what they need, what they don't need. How do you foresee your security strategy and the role of United States in guaranteeing security in the region, whether it's -- you know well that a stock of arms are there, and different kinds of all these sorts, and most of the exports even come from the United States. And talking about the missile defense system and all these things; is there any clear vision of what do you want from that region?
MR. HOLUM: Well, that's a very broad and complex question, and I only have responsibility for part of it.
Q Which part?
MR. HOLUM: (Laughs.) I mean, I am obviously very interested in and follow closely, what my colleagues on the political side of the State Department are doing and what the secretary is intensely engaged in, to pursue the peace process. And a great many of the elements of the security environment in the Middle East will be decided in that context.
What my interest is, in particular, is to try over time to have all sides reduce the level of military capabilities. We tend to focus, first of all because of the enormous destructive potential, on weapons of mass destruction. And so I welcome the question on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the context of a broad settlement.
But in addition to that, I am hopeful that a peace agreement will allow -- I would guess, beginning with revival of the ACRS process, the Arms Control and Regional Security process, dialogue, confidence- building; and through that process, gradual reductions and redeployments of military forces so that a war is less likely anytime in the future; that obviously -- will be a follow-on to the peace process -- I think we need to be engaged in it. We have tried to engage in the various elements of the ACRS process, even when all countries haven't been participating. But I'd like to see that kind of process resumed so we can reduce the overall level of armaments in the region.
Q And just as a follow-up, you mentioned the peace process. But in the last, let's say, 20 years or whatever, the last war between Israel and Arab -- but it was between before -- I mean, the '90s war between, like, Kuwait and Iraq. And always there is an expectation that something will happen between Arab countries Bahrain and Qatar. And all these are weaponed people. And how do you force -- I mean, how this process --are you playing a role to disarm these people?
MR. HOLUM: To disarm? I don't think we have got the capability or the authority to decide on levels of armaments. Those are essentially national security decisions.
But I think what we can do is try to facilitate more transparency in military plans and capabilities that, over time, as it's worked in the European context, as it's working in Latin America, decisions by the countries involved -- that they want to spend money on other things.
MR. SILVER: Let's go to the back.
Q Ambassador, I'm Andrew Shin (sp) with VOA. I have a question with regards to China. What kind of technology has China put into the M-11 missiles for Pakistan? And has China stopped its nuclear proliferation, and what will be the U.S. reaction to China's behavior?
MR. HOLUM: We've seen -- some of that touches on intelligence matters that I can't go into. We've obviously seen press reporting over a period of time on China's missile relationship with Pakistan. We have, as you know, a missile proliferation law that includes sanctions. We have applied that in the past in the case of Chinese transfers to Pakistan, imposing sanctions I think twice in '91 and '93. And if we take those laws seriously, if we accumulate the level of evidence that is required to invoke the law, we would apply it again, including sanctions.
MR. SILVER: We have time for maybe one or two more questions. Let's go here.
Q Yeah. Floyd Davis (sp) with the Arms Control Association. Returning to the ABM treaty, you noted that the current U.S. NMD plans pose no threat to Russia's deterrent. However, it would seem to negate China's. Could you discuss what steps we're taking to alleviate China's concerns with the U.S. NMD plans and possibly how this relates to breaking the logjam in the conference on disarmament on prevention of an arms race in outer space talks?
MR. HOLUM: Just let me begin -- I'm answering everybody's questions backwards. But I just don't want to miss the CD part of this.
We have proposed in the conference on disarmament some flexibility with respect to outer space talks. We still don't see a need for, or rationale, for a formal negotiation on outer space, but we have been willing to consider discussions of some kind, if it's part of a comprehensive work plan that will include the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which really does need to be addressed.
But that's -- I view that as distinct from the other part of your question, and one of the things we need to do to address any concerns China may have about our national missile defense is to resume the strategic dialogue that we've been trying to hold and has been interrupted for some time. I don't want to go into the content of those discussions or what we plan to say at this stage, but it seems to me it's extremely important for us to be able to engage with China so they have a fuller understanding of what our plans are and whether or not they have implications for China.
MR. SILVER: With that, I'd like to say thank you very much, Mr. Holum.
MR. HOLUM: Thank you. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
END.
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