Text: Clinton Letter to Congress on Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Extends national emergency relating to these weapons) (5180)
President Clinton has notified Congress that he is extending the
national emergency relating to chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons ("weapons of mass destruction" -- WMD) and has broadened the
range of activities that would be subject to penalties aimed at
deterring the spread of such weapons.
Clinton announced these actions in a November 10 letter to the
Congress, which also contains a report on the administration efforts
to control proliferation of these weapons.
Following is the White House text:
begin text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
November 10, 1999
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass
destruction" -- WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to
the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in
effect. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the
United States. I am, therefore, advising the Congress that the
national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995, November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November
12, 1998, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999.
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12938, as amended.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is
contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of
Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
(Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and
the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to
section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the "CBW
Report."
On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effec-tively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4
strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject
entities to potential penalties under the Executive order. The
original Executive order provided for penalties for contributions to
the efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire,
design, produce, or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the
amended Executive order also covers contributions to foreign programs
for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction. Moreover, the amend-ment expands the original
Executive order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include the
prohibition of U.S. Govern-ment assistance to foreign persons, and the
prohibition of imports into the United States and U.S. Government
procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government
greater flexibility and discretion in deciding how and to what extent
to impose measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation
programs.
Nuclear Weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear
tests. World reaction included nearly universal condemnation across a
broad range of international fora and multilateral support for a broad
range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by
international financial institu-tions unrelated to basic human needs
and on aid from the G-8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the
United Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further
steps toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join
multilateral arms control efforts and to conform to the standards of
nonproliferation regimes, to prevent a regional arms race and build
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of
concrete actions. The United States has focused most intensely on
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); engagement in productive
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending
their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in
development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft;
and adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of
sensitive materials and technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials have
yielded little progress. In September 1998, Indian and Pakistani
leaders had expressed a willingness to sign the CTBT. Both
governments, having already declared testing moratoria, had indicated
they were prepared to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under certain
conditions. These declarations were made prior to the collapse of
Prime Minister Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, a
development that has delayed consideration of CTBT signature in India.
The Indian election, the Kargil conflict, and the October political
coup in Pakistan have further complicated the issue, although neither
country has renounced its commitment. Pakistan has said that it will
not sign the Treaty until India does. Additionally, Pakistan's Foreign
Minister stated publicly on September 12, 1999, that Pakistan would
not consider signing the CTBT until sanctions are removed.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament
session. However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 and
we have no indications that India or Pakistan played helpful "behind
the scenes" roles. They also pledged to institute strict controls that
meet internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and have
begun expert discussions with the United States and others on this
subject. In addition, India and Pakistan resumed their bilateral
dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign
Secretary level. The Kargil conflict this summer complicated efforts
to continue this bilateral dialogue, although both sides have
expressed interest in resuming the discussions at some future point.
We will con-tinue discussions with both governments at the senior and
expert levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5,
G-8, and in international fora. Efforts may be further complicated by
India's release in August 1999 of a draft of its nuclear doctrine,
which, although its timing may have been politically motivated,
suggests that India intends to make nuclear weapons an integral part
of the national defense.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)
continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities consistent
with the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which calls for the
immediate freezing and eventual dismantling of the DPRK's
graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and
Taechon. The United States has raised its concerns with the DPRK about
a suspect underground site under construction, possibly intended to
support nuclear activities contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March
1999, the United States reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by
a team of U.S. experts to the facility. In May 1999, a Department of
State team visited the underground facility at Kumchang-ni. The team
was permitted to conduct all activities previously agreed to help
remove suspicions about the site. Based on the data gathered by the
U.S. delegation and the subsequent technical review, the United States
has concluded that, at present, the underground site does not violate
the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full compliance
with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a process that also
includes the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea. United
States experts remain on-site in North Korea working to complete
clean-up operations after largely finishing the canning of spent fuel
from the North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone on the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In May 1999, NPT Parties met
in New York to complete prepara-tions for the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. The United States is working with others to ensure that
the 2000 NPT Review Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as
a strong and viable part of the global security system.
The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty on
September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed and 51 have
ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories conducted numerous
meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS)
established by the Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held
pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the
entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that
conference as an observer.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret
the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse its consent to
ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security
interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the
development of advanced new types of weapons; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
and to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at an
appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in a manner
that will ensure a fair and thorough hearing process and will allow
for more thoughtful debate.
With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely
accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement. At its May
1999 Plenary and related meetings in Florence, Italy, the NSG
considered new members (although none were accepted at that meeting),
reviewed efforts to enhance transparency, and pursued efforts to
streamline procedures and update control lists. The NSG created an
Implementation Working Group, chaired by the UK, to consider changes
to the guidelines, membership issues, the relationship with the NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and controls on brokering. The
Transparency Working Group was tasked with preparing a report on NSG
activities for presentation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the
Italian chair. The French will host the Plenary and assume the NSG
Chair in 2000 and the United States will host and chair in 2001.
The NSG is currently considering membership requests from Turkey and
Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only agreement by Russia to
join the intercessional consensus of all other NSG members. The United
States believes it would be appropriate to confirm intercessional
consensus in support of Turkey's membership before considering other
candidates. Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and
other members including Russia and the United States regarding its
interest in membership and the status of its implementation of export
controls to meet NSG Guideline standards. The United States will not
block intercessional consensus of NSG members in support of NSG
membership for Belarus, provided that consensus for Turkey's
membership precedes it. Cyprus and Kazakhstan have also expressed
interest in membership and are in consultation with the NSG Chair and
other members regarding the status of their export control systems.
China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a member of the
NSG, primarily because it has not accepted the NSG policy of requiring
full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear trigger
list items to nonnuclear weapon states. However, China has taken major
steps toward harmonization of its export control system with the NSG
Guidelines by the implementation of controls over nuclear-related
dual-use equipment and technology.
During the last 6-months, we reviewed intelligence and other reports
of trade in nuclear-related material and technology that might be
relevant to nuclear-related sanctions provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act
of 1945, as amended; and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994. No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during this
reporting period. The administrative measures imposed against ten
Russian entities for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation
with Iran remain in effect.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be
applied by the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other
agencies, in order to control the export of items with potential use
in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC?s 165 States
Signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among
their number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia
ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on
December 8, 1997. To date, 126 countries (including China, Iran,
India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at
entry-into-force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW,
located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States
Parties) for implementing the CWC. It consists of the Conference of
the States Parties, the Execu-tive Council (EC), and the Technical
Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the verification provisions of
the CWC, and presently has a staff of approximately 500, including
about 200 inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and
industrial facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has
conducted over 500 routine inspections in some 29 countries. No
challenge inspections have yet taken place. To date, nearly 170
inspections have been conducted at military facilities in the United
States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at
operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah and Johnston
Island.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical
weapons-related activities. The CWC?s declaration requirements improve
our knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection
provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared facilities
and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and
stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted
into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appro-priation Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public
Law 105-277). My Administra-tion published an Executive order on June
25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and is working to
publish regulations regarding industrial declarations and inspections
of industrial facilities. Submission of these declarations to the
OPCW, and subsequent inspections, will enable the United States to be
fully compliant with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has,
among other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organiza-tion as
well as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make
complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
prohibited by the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key
chemicals. The relevant treaty pro-visions are specifically designed
to penalize countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons
(BW). We participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States
Parties striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen
and enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated
by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review
Conference, held in November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete
the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review
Conference to be held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling
text through insertion of national views and clarification of existing
text. Five AHG negotiating sessions were scheduled for 1999. The
United States is working toward completion of the substance of a
strong Protocol next year.
On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, I
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the
effort to erect stronger international barriers against the
proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new
international system to detect and deter cheating. The United States
is working closely with U.S. industry represen-tatives to obtain
technical input relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating
positions and then to reach international agreement on data
declarations and on-site investigations.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in the
30-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent
annual AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, during which the
Group reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the
Group's viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC.
Members continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by
all governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban
on chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to
these Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national
activities support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary, the Group
continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing
information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. The AG also
reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach program of
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations
on export controls and non-proliferation to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in these areas. The AG discussed
ways to be more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and
BWC contexts.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period.
The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and
other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues carefully to control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, and closely to monitor activities of potential missile
proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile
sanctions laws. In March 1999, we imposed missile sanctions against
three Middle Eastern entities for transfers involving Category II
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I
missile sanctions imposed in April 1998 against North Korean and
Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of
equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile remain in
effect.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and with
other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners
also emphasized the need for implementing effective export control
systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of
missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs of
concern.
In June the United States participated in the MTCR's Reinforced Point
of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners held in-depth
discussions of regional missile proliferation concerns, focusing in
particular on Iran, North Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed
steps Partners can take to further increase outreach to nonmembers.
The Partners agreed to continue their discussion of this important
topic at the October 1999 Noordwijk MTCR Plenary.
Also in June, the United States participated in a German-hosted MTCR
workshop at which Partners and non-Partners discussed ways to address
the proliferation potential inherent in intangible technology
transfers. The seminar helped parti-cipants to develop a greater
understanding of the intangible technology issue (i.e., how
proliferators misuse the internet, scientific conferences, plant
visits, student exchange programs, and higher education to acquire
sensitive technology), and to begin to identify steps governments can
take to address this problem.
In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the MTCR Annex.
The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve clarity and
uniformity of implementation of MTCR controls while maintaining the
coverage of the previous version of the MTCR Annex.
The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, The
Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners shared
information about activities of missile proliferation concern
worldwide. They focussed in particular on the threat to international
security and stability posed by missile pro-lifera-tion in key regions
and considered what practical steps they could take, individually and
collectively, to address ongoing missile-related activities of
concern. During their discus-sions, Partners gave special attention to
DPRK missile activities and also discussed the threat posed by
missile-related activities in South and North East Asia and the Middle
East.
During this reporting period, the United States continued to work
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export
responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage
international focus on missile proliferation issues, the USG also
placed the issue on the agenda for the G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in
an undertaking to examine further individual and collective means of
addressing this problem and reaffirming commitment to the objectives
of the MTCR. Since my last report, we continued our missile
nonproliferation dialogues with China (interrupted after the
accidental bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy), India, the Republic
of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In the course of
normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such discussions with
other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth round of
missile talks to underscore our strong opposi-tion to North Korea's
destabilizing missile development and export activities and press for
tight constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports.
We also affirmed that the United States viewed further launches of
long-range missiles and transfers of long-range missiles or technology
for such missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to
the United States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that message
at every available opportunity. In particular, we have reminded the
DPRK of the consequences of another rocket launch and encouraged it
not to take such action. We also have urged the DPRK to take steps
towards building a constructive bilateral relationship with the United
States.
These efforts have resulted in an important first step. Since
September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK will
refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind during our
discussions to improve relations. In recognition of this DPRK step,
the United States has announced the easing of certain sanctions
related to the import and export of many consumer goods.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and
nuclear development programs, the United States continued its
high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United
States and Russia can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive
goods to Iran's ballistic missile development program. During this
reporting period, Russia's government created institutional
foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation policy and
passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also passed new export control
legislation to tighten government control over sensitive technologies
and began working with the United States to strengthen export control
practices at Russian aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian
government's nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian
entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile program
and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr
reactor project. The administrative measures imposed on ten Russian
entities for their missile- and nuclear-related cooperation with Iran
remain in effect.
Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls
United States national export controls -- both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those
implemented unilaterally -- play an important part in impeding the
proliferation of WMD and missiles. (As used here, "export controls"
refer to requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or
limitations on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to
certain destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic
sanctions that also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however,
export controls are only one of a number of tools the United States
uses to achieve its non-prolifera-tion objectives. Global
nonproliferation norms, informal multilateral nonproliferation
regimes, interdicting shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions,
export control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and
robust U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all
work in conjunction with export controls as part of our overall
nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because every
proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from
other countries. Proliferators look over-seas because needed items are
unavailable elsewhere, because indigenously produced items are of
insufficient quality or quantity, and/or because imported items can be
obtained more quickly and cheaply than producing them at home. It is
important to note that proliferators seek for their programs both
items on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR
Annex and nerve gas ingredients on the Australia Group list) and
unlisted items (like lower-level machine tools and very basic
chemicals). In addition, many of the items of interest to
proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, key ingredients
and technologies used in the production of fertilizers and pesticides
also can be used to make chemical weapons; vaccine production
technology (albeit not the vaccines themselves) can assist in the
production of biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or even
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology
for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national
export controls -- and similar controls of our partners in the
Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear
Suppliers Group -- have denied proliferators access to the largest
sources of the best equipment and tech-nology. Proliferators have
mostly been forced to seek less capable items from nonregime
suppliers. Moreover, in many instances, U.S. and regime controls and
associated efforts have forced proliferators to engage in complex
clandestine procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking time
and money away from proliferant programs.
United States national export controls and those of our regime
partners also have played an important leadership role, increasing
over time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation
export controls. For example, none of the following progress would
have been possible without the leadership shown by U.S. willingness to
be the first to apply controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has
grown to 32 member countries; several nonmember countries have been
persuaded to apply export controls consistent with one or more of the
regimes unilaterally; and most of the members of the nonproliferation
regimes have applied national "catch-all" controls similar to those
under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. (Export
controls normally are tied to a specific list of items, such as the
MTCR Annex. "Catch-all" controls provide a legal basis to control
exports of items not on a list, when those items are destined for
WMD/missile programs.)
United States export controls, especially "catch-all" controls, also
make important political and moral contributions to the
nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal obliga-tions the
United States has undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(Article I), Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical
Weapons Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD
activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. "fingerprints"
on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our
friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely
and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent proliferation
from the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use
export to proceed under circumstances where, without export control
scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help
build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in
turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation
regimes, for example, has a "no undercut" policy committing each
member not to make an export that another has denied for
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest -- unless it first
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy
make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a "level playing field" for exporters.
Threat Reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in
Russia and other Newly Independent States, causing concern. My
Administration gives high priority to controlling the human dimension
of proliferation through programs that support the transition of
former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian research and technology
development activities. I have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for
programs embodied in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative that
would support activities in four areas: nuclear security; nonnuclear
WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and military relocation,
stabili-zation and other security coopera-tion programs. Congressional
support for this initiative would enable the engagement of a broad
range of programs under the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641 (c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the
declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as
amended, during the period from May 15, 1999, through November 10,
1999.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 10, 1999.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.)
