November 10, 1999
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 10, 1999
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction" --
WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order
12938, and declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency
terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the
90-day period prior to each anniversary date, I publish in the Federal
Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency
is to continue in effect. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States. I am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, November
12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 1998, must continue in effect
beyond November 14, 1999. Accordingly, I have extended the national
emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding
activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration.
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant
to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation
Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress
pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the
"CBW Report."
On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effec-tively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4 strengthens Executive
Order 12938 in several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type
of proliferation activity that can subject entities to potential penalties
under the Executive order. The original Executive order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project
or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile chemical or
biological weapons; the amended Executive order also covers contributions
to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amend-ment expands
the original Executive order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the
range of potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of U.S.
Govern-ment assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports
into the United States and U.S. Government procurement. In sum, the
amendment gives the United States Government greater flexibility and
discretion in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures against
foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.
Nuclear Weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear
tests. World reaction included nearly universal condemnation across a
broad range of international fora and multilateral support for a broad
range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by international
financial institu-tions unrelated to basic human needs and on aid from the
G-8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have
worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United
Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward
developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join multilateral arms
control efforts and to conform to the standards of nonproliferation
regimes, to prevent a regional arms race and build confidence by practicing
restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences through
dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council have called on India and
Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions. The United States has
focused most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short
and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
engagement in productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT) and, pending their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint
in development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and
adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of
sensitive materials and technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials have yielded
little progress. In September 1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders had
expressed a willingness to sign the CTBT. Both governments, having already
declared testing moratoria, had indicated they were prepared to sign the
CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions. These declarations were
made prior to the collapse of Prime Minister Vajpayee's Indian government
in April 1999, a development that has delayed consideration of CTBT
signature in India. The Indian election, the Kargil conflict, and the
October political coup in Pakistan have further complicated the issue,
although neither country has renounced its commitment. Pakistan has said
that it will not sign the Treaty until India does. Additionally,
Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated publicly on September 12, 1999, that
Pakistan would not consider signing the CTBT until sanctions are removed.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament session.
However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 and we have no
indications that India or Pakistan played helpful "behind the scenes"
roles. They also pledged to institute strict controls that meet
internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and have begun
expert discussions with the United States and others on this subject. In
addition, India and Pakistan resumed their bilateral dialogue on
outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level.
The Kargil conflict this summer complicated efforts to continue this
bilateral dialogue, although both sides have expressed interest in resuming
the discussions at some future point. We will con-tinue discussions with
both governments at the senior and expert levels, and our diplomatic
efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in international fora. Efforts
may be further complicated by India's release in August 1999 of a draft of
its nuclear doctrine, which, although its timing may have been politically
motivated, suggests that India intends to make nuclear weapons an integral
part of the national defense.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea)
continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities consistent with
the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which calls for the immediate freezing
and eventual dismantling of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and
reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United States has raised
its concerns with the DPRK about a suspect underground site under
construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities contrary to
the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United States reached agreement
with the DPRK for visits by a team of U.S. experts to the facility. In May
1999, a Department of State team visited the underground facility at
Kumchang-ni. The team was permitted to conduct all activities previously
agreed to help remove suspicions about the site. Based on the data
gathered by the U.S. delegation and the subsequent technical review, the
United States has concluded that, at present, the underground site does not
violate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full compliance
with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a process that also includes
the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea. United States
experts remain on-site in North Korea working to complete clean-up
operations after largely finishing the canning of spent fuel from the
North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone on the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In May 1999, NPT Parties met in
New York to complete prepara-tions for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The
United States is working with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review
Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and viable part
of the global security system.
The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty on
September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed and 51 have ratified
the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the
Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held pursuant to Article XIV of
the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the entry into force of the Treaty.
The United States attended that conference as an observer.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret the
Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse its consent to ratify the
CTBT. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national security interests by
prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced
new types of weapons; contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation
and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace
and security. The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce
the nuclear threat and to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope
that at an appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in a
manner that will ensure a fair and thorough hearing process and will allow
for more thoughtful debate.
With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely
accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement. At its May
1999 Plenary and related meetings in Florence, Italy, the NSG considered
new members (although none were accepted at that meeting), reviewed efforts
to enhance transparency, and pursued efforts to streamline procedures and
update control lists. The NSG created an Implementation Working Group,
chaired by the UK, to consider changes to the guidelines, membership
issues, the relationship with the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and
controls on brokering. The Transparency Working Group was tasked with
preparing a report on NSG activities for presentation at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference by the Italian chair. The French will host the Plenary
and assume the NSG Chair in 2000 and the United States will host and chair
in 2001.
The NSG is currently considering membership requests from Turkey and
Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only agreement by Russia to join
the intercessional consensus of all other NSG members. The United States
believes it would be appropriate to confirm intercessional consensus in
support of Turkey's membership before considering other candidates.
Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and other members
including Russia and the United States regarding its interest in membership
and the status of its implementation of export controls to meet NSG
Guideline standards. The United States will not block intercessional
consensus of NSG members in support of NSG membership for Belarus, provided
that consensus for Turkey's membership precedes it. Cyprus and Kazakhstan
have also expressed interest in membership and are in consultation with the
NSG Chair and other members regarding the status of their export control
systems. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a member of
the NSG, primarily because it has not accepted the NSG policy of requiring
full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear trigger list
items to nonnuclear weapon states. However, China has taken major steps
toward harmonization of its export control system with the NSG Guidelines
by the implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use equipment
and technology.
During the last 6-months, we reviewed intelligence and other reports
of trade in nuclear-related material and technology that might be relevant
to nuclear-related sanctions provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945, as amended; and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. No
statutory sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting
period. The administrative measures imposed against ten Russian entities
for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation with Iran remain in
effect.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be applied
by the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other agencies, in
order to control the export of items with potential use in chemical or
biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC?s 165 States Signatories as original
States Parties. The United States was among their number, having ratified
the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997,
and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. To date, 126 countries
(including China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States
Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at
entry-into-force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW,
located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States
Parties) for implementing the CWC. It consists of the Conference of the
States Parties, the Execu-tive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat
(TS). The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and
presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities
throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 500 routine
inspections in some 29 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken
place. To date, nearly 170 inspections have been conducted at military
facilities in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector
presence at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah and Johnston
Island.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for any
state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
activities. The CWC?s declaration requirements improve our knowledge of
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult,
more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted
into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appro-priation Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law
105-277). My Administra-tion published an Executive order on June 25,
1999, to facilitate implementation of the Act and is working to publish
regulations regarding industrial declarations and inspections of industrial
facilities. Submission of these declarations to the OPCW, and subsequent
inspections, will enable the United States to be fully compliant with the
CWC. United States noncompliance to date has, among other things,
undermined U.S. leadership in the organiza-tion as well as our ability to
encourage other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely
declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
prohibited by the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key
chemicals. The relevant treaty pro-visions are specifically designed to
penalize countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating
the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). We
participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties striving
to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance
with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc
Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The
Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/December 1996, urged the AHG
to complete the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next
Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft
rolling text through insertion of national views and clarification of
existing text. Five AHG negotiating sessions were scheduled for 1999. The
United States is working toward completion of the substance of a strong
Protocol next year.
On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, I
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the effort to
erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of
BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect and
deter cheating. The United States is working closely with U.S. industry
represen-tatives to obtain technical input relevant to the development of
U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach international agreement on
data declarations and on-site investigations.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in the
30-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent annual
AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, during which the Group
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the Group's
viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members
continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments
will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on chemical and
biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these Conventions must
take steps to ensure that their national activities support these goals.
At the 1999 Plenary, the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG
export controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW
terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active
outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional
consultations on export controls and non-proliferation to further awareness
and understanding of national policies in these areas. The AG discussed
ways to be more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC
contexts.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions
determinations were reached during this reporting period. The United
States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues carefully to control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
and closely to monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In
March 1999, we imposed missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern
entities for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I missile sanctions imposed in April
1998 against North Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from
North Korea to Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the Ghauri
missile remain in effect.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems.
This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
In June the United States participated in the MTCR's Reinforced Point
of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners held in-depth
discussions of regional missile proliferation concerns, focusing in
particular on Iran, North Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed steps
Partners can take to further increase outreach to nonmembers. The Partners
agreed to continue their discussion of this important topic at the October
1999 Noordwijk MTCR Plenary.
Also in June, the United States participated in a German-hosted MTCR
workshop at which Partners and non-Partners discussed ways to address the
proliferation potential inherent in intangible technology transfers. The
seminar helped parti-cipants to develop a greater understanding of the
intangible technology issue (i.e., how proliferators misuse the internet,
scientific conferences, plant visits, student exchange programs, and higher
education to acquire sensitive technology), and to begin to identify steps
governments can take to address this problem.
In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the MTCR Annex.
The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve clarity and uniformity
of implementation of MTCR controls while maintaining the coverage of the
previous version of the MTCR Annex.
The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, The
Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners shared
information about activities of missile proliferation concern worldwide.
They focussed in particular on the threat to international security and
stability posed by missile pro-lifera-tion in key regions and considered
what practical steps they could take, individually and collectively, to
address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. During their
discus-sions, Partners gave special attention to DPRK missile activities
and also discussed the threat posed by missile-related activities in South
and North East Asia and the Middle East.
During this reporting period, the United States continued to work
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile
proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage international focus on missile
proliferation issues, the USG also placed the issue on the agenda for the
G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in an undertaking to examine further
individual and collective means of addressing this problem and reaffirming
commitment to the objectives of the MTCR. Since my last report, we
continued our missile nonproliferation dialogues with China (interrupted
after the accidental bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy), India, the
Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In the course
of normal diplomatic relations we also have pursued such discussions with
other countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth round of
missile talks to underscore our strong opposi-tion to North Korea's
destabilizing missile development and export activities and press for tight
constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. We also
affirmed that the United States viewed further launches of long-range
missiles and transfers of long-range missiles or technology for such
missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the United
States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that message at every
available opportunity. In particular, we have reminded the DPRK of the
consequences of another rocket launch and encouraged it not to take such
action. We also have urged the DPRK to take steps towards building a
constructive bilateral relationship with the United States.
These efforts have resulted in an important first step. Since
September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK will refrain
from testing long-range missiles of any kind during our discussions to
improve relations. In recognition of this DPRK step, the United States has
announced the easing of certain sanctions related to the import and export
of many consumer goods.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and nuclear
development programs, the United States continued its high-level dialogue
with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work
together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic missile
development program. During this reporting period, Russia's government
created institutional foundations to implement a newly enacted
nonproliferation policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also
passed new export control legislation to tighten government control over
sensitive technologies and began working with the United States to
strengthen export control practices at Russian aerospace firms. However,
despite the Russian government's nonproliferation and export control
efforts, some Russian entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic
missile program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the
Bushehr reactor project. The administrative measures imposed on ten
Russian entities for their missile- and nuclear-related cooperation with
Iran remain in effect.
Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls
United States national export controls -- both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented
unilaterally -- play an important part in impeding the proliferation of WMD
and missiles. (As used here, "export controls" refer to requirements for
case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations on exports of
particular items of proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather
than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that also affect trade.) As
noted in this report, however, export controls are only one of a number of
tools the United States uses to achieve its non-prolifera-tion objectives.
Global nonproliferation norms, informal multilateral nonproliferation
regimes, interdicting shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and robust U.S.
military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction
with export controls as part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because every
proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from other
countries. Proliferators look over-seas because needed items are
unavailable elsewhere, because indigenously produced items are of
insufficient quality or quantity, and/or because imported items can be
obtained more quickly and cheaply than producing them at home. It is
important to note that proliferators seek for their programs both items on
multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve
gas ingredients on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items (like
lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of
the items of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. For
example, key ingredients and technologies used in the production of
fertilizers and pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons;
vaccine production technology (albeit not the vaccines themselves) can
assist in the production of biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or even
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology for
use in their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national export
controls -- and similar controls of our partners in the Australia Group,
Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group -- have
denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best equipment
and tech-nology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many instances, U.S.
and regime controls and associated efforts have forced proliferators to
engage in complex clandestine procurements even from nonmember suppliers,
taking time and money away from proliferant programs.
United States national export controls and those of our regime
partners also have played an important leadership role, increasing over
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation export
controls. For example, none of the following progress would have been
possible without the leadership shown by U.S. willingness to be the first
to apply controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member
countries; several nonmember countries have been persuaded to apply export
controls consistent with one or more of the regimes unilaterally; and most
of the members of the nonproliferation regimes have applied national
"catch-all" controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a specific list
of items, such as the MTCR Annex. "Catch-all" controls provide a legal
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when those items are
destined for WMD/missile programs.)
United States export controls, especially "catch-all" controls, also
make important political and moral contributions to the nonproliferation
effort. They uphold the broad legal obliga-tions the United States has
undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological
Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention (Article
I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities. They endeavor to
assure there are no U.S. "fingerprints" on WMD and missiles that threaten
U.S. citizens and territory and our friends and interests overseas. They
place the United States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent proliferation from
the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use export
to proceed under circumstances where, without export control scrutiny, the
only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries applying
similar controls that, in turn, results in increased trade. Each of the
WMD nonproliferation regimes, for example, has a "no undercut" policy
committing each member not to make an export that another has denied for
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest -- unless it first
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy make
it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime members, it
establishes a "level playing field" for exporters.
Threat Reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia and
other Newly Independent States, causing concern. My Administration gives
high priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation through
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists to
civilian research and technology development activities. I have proposed
an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative that would support activities in four areas: nuclear
security; nonnuclear WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and
military relocation, stabili-zation and other security coopera-tion
programs. Congressional support for this initiative would enable the
engagement of a broad range of programs under the Departments of State,
Energy, and Defense.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641 (c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of
the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the
period from May 15, 1999, through November 10, 1999.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 10, 1999.
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