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09 November 1999

Transcript: Holum, Wolf Worldnet on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

(Nov. 9: Discuss ABM Treaty, CTBT, other issues) (8,170)
Ambassador John Holum and Norman Wolf were the guests November 9 on
the U.S. Department of State's Worldnet "Dialogue" program on "U.S.
Policy on Nuclear Non-proliferation."
Holum is senior advisor for arms control and international security
affairs at the U.S. Department of State, and Wolf is senior advisor
and special representative of the President for nuclear
non-proliferation.
Questions from journalists in Moscow, Prague and Kiev focused on U.S.
intentions with regard to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the
recent failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In his opening remarks, Holum emphasized the ambitious U.S. arms
control agenda for the coming year, including efforts to strengthen
the NPT and the Biological Weapons Convention and to negotiate a
cut-off in the production of the material from which nuclear weapons
are made.
The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT he termed a
"detour," not a reversal. "We are not changing course. This was a very
abbreviated debate brought up in an unfortunate partisan circumstance
that didn't allow members of the Senate to examine the treaty
closely," Holum said. The Clinton administration intends to abide by
the treaty, urge others to ratify it, and continue to seek Senate
approval, he said.
In response to questions about the ABM Treaty, Holum said the United
States has "no intention" of withdrawing from the treaty. "What we are
trying to do is work cooperatively with our Russian partner to
negotiate modest amendments to the treaty that would permit deployment
of a national missile defense that would not threaten Russia's
deterrent, that wouldn't have any significant capability against
Russia, but would allow both countries to deploy modest national
missile defense systems to protect us against the rogue state threat."
Holum said the amendments the United States seeks will strengthen
rather than weaken or undercut the treaty "because they demonstrate
that this treaty that was negotiated in 1972 can be adjusted, can be
modified to account for new realities, for threats that weren't
contemplated at the time the treaty was negotiated."
Regarding concerns that the United States is abandoning arms control
efforts and multilateral fora such as the United Nations, Wolf said
that "nothing could be further from the truth."
"More and more it is recognized in the United States that our security
is inherently that of the security of the rest of the world, and that
the non-proliferation effort must in fact be a global effort," he
said.
Following is a transcript of the program:
(begin transcript)
WORLDNET "DIALOGUE"
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Broadcast Services
Washington, D.C.
GUESTS: Ambassador John Holum, Senior Advisor for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Norman Wolf, Senior Advisor and Special Representative of the
President for Nuclear Non-proliferation
TOPIC: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Non-proliferation
POSTS: Moscow, Prague and Kiev
HOST: Rick Foucheux
DATE: November 9, 1999
TIME: 07:00 - 08:00 EST
MR. FOUCHEUX: Good afternoon, and welcome to a special edition of
Worldnet's "Dialogue." I am Rick Foucheux.
Last month as you know the United States Senate voted against
ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In spite of the
stalemate, U.S. administration officials cautioned that it would be a
mistake to conclude that America's commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament is in any way diminished.
(Begin videotape.)
ANNOUNCER: Three years ago at the United Nations, President Bill
Clinton became the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, or CTBT. The United States played a leading role banning
all nuclear explosive tests. On October 13th, the U.S. Senate voted
against ratification of CTBT. The next day a clearly disappointed
President Clinton vowed that efforts to bring the test ban treaty into
force will continue:
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Today I say again on behalf of the United States we
will continue the policy we have maintained since 1992 of not
conducting nuclear tests. I call on Russia, China, Britain, France,
and all other countries to continue to refrain from testing. I call on
nations that have not done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and I will continue to do all I can to make that case
to the Senate. When all is said and done, I have no doubt that the
United States will ratify this treaty.
ANNOUNCER: Meanwhile, the United States is progressing ahead on all
fronts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. A leading means is
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and its regime of
strengthened safeguards.
In keeping with their disarmament obligations under the NPT, the U.S.
and Russia have made massive reductions in their strategic arsenals.
Since 1988, America alone has dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear
warheads and 80 percent of its non-strategic nuclear stockpile. Both
countries are well ahead of their scheduled START II reductions,
although that treaty has yet to be ratified by Russia.
In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the
outlines of the START III agreement, which would cut the two
countries' strategic arsenals even more deeply, to 80 percent below
their Cold War peaks. Senior U.S. and Russian officials began meeting
late this summer to discuss both START III and the ABM Treaty.
(End videotape.)
MR. FOUCHEUX: We are most fortunate to have with us today two key such
officials, Mr. John D. Holum, the administration's senior adviser for
arms control and nuclear security affairs; also joining us today is
Norm Wolf, the administration's senior adviser and chief negotiator
for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Good morning both of you, welcome very much to our
program.
Mr. Holum, I understand that you have some brief opening remarks
before we begin the Q&A today.
AMB. HOLUM: Thank you. Just a few thoughts. It's a great pleasure for
me to participate in this dialogue this morning. The coming year could
be, and likely will be, a pivotal one for the whole arms control and
non-proliferation process. We have had some setbacks, as the film
noted, including the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But we have an important agenda ahead,
including next April's review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
a number of efforts to strengthen safeguards under that agreement. The
Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened, and efforts
are underway in Geneva to do that. We have a challenge ahead to
continue the process of reducing the Cold War build-up of strategic
nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia and ultimately to
include other countries. We want to negotiate a cut-off in the
production of the fuel for nuclear weapons, the fissile material from
which they are made.
The United States will be centrally engaged in all of those efforts.
As the president said after the Senate vote on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, we intend to continue this effort, and in the meantime the
United States will not conduct nuclear tests; we'll continue to urge
other countries to ratify the treaty so that it can ultimately be
brought into force. We intend to remain at the forefront of all of
these efforts.
I look forward to a good discussion with all of you this morning, and
I am very happy to be here with my colleague Norm Wolf.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right. And once again we are happy that you were
able to give us a little time for this very important discussion.
We now welcome our participants who are standing by in Moscow, Prague
and Kiev. Let's begin with your questions and comments. Please go
ahead first in Prague.
Q: Good morning. (Inaudible) -- according to French Agency --
(inaudible) -- for all remaining nuclear weapons from Europe. Can you
confirm this report?
AMB. HOLUM: I have heard this report in the press, and I don't know
what the basis for it is. Nuclear deterrence remains a central part of
U.S. involvement in the NATO alliance, and the strategic umbrella
afforded by U.S. nuclear weapons, including those stationed in Europe,
remains fundamental to us.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you, Prague. We now move on to Moscow. Please go
ahead with your question in Moscow. Okay, we are still waiting for
Moscow to come across our lines. Let's move on to Kiev for their first
question. Please go ahead in Kiev.
Q: I'm interested in the question having to do with the group headed
up by Mr. Robert Joseph. In particular this group suggests not just
resuming nuclear testing, but also to step up work on creating
tactical weapons, including using it for locally based wars. To what
extent do these views currently in the United States and in the
administration can be considered serious or weighty? Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: Well, as the president said, and I've repeated, and the
secretary of State has made clear, we have no intention, no need to
test nuclear weapons, and no interest in developing new kinds of
nuclear weapons. I think it's a serious mistake to consider lowering
the nuclear threshold by making ever smaller nuclear weapons. The key
to us is to maintain a sharp dividing line between nuclear and other
kinds of armaments, and we are not interested in pursuing new kinds of
small tactical nuclear weapons or indeed any new kind of warhead.
Since the Cold War the role of nuclear weapons has declined
dramatically. The use in low-intensity or smaller conflicts has always
been outside of our doctrine, and it certainly is now.
MR. FOUCHEUX: And now we invite Moscow to join in the discussion.
Please go ahead with your first question or comment in Moscow.
(Technical difficulties.) I'm sorry, but we are still having a bit of
a technical problem with our line to Moscow. We'll try to get that
fixed. Let's continue the discussion now in Prague for more questions.
Please go ahead once again in Prague.
Q:     Good morning -- (technical difficulties).
MR. FOUCHEUX: Unfortunately, Prague, we are also having a bit of an
audio problem with our connection with you as well. We are going to
try one more time. I would ask you to repeat the question again, and
in English if you don't mind. And failing our ability to understand
that perhaps we'll move on to Kiev. But let's try Prague once more.
Please again slowly and in English if you don't mind, Prague. Thank
you.
Q:     Good morning -- (technical difficulties).
AMB. HOLUM:  I couldn't make out the question, I'm sorry.
MR. FOUCHEUX: No, I'm sorry, evidently there is some interruptable
line going on here because we are getting only, say, every other word
from you, Prague. So again we'll try to get that technicality worked
out as well.
We do have Kiev on the line, so let's continue our program in Kiev
while we try to fix our connections with Moscow and Prague. So let's
go to Kiev again.
Q: Voice of Ukraine Newspaper. Since 1993 Ukraine gave up its nuclear
arsenals the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons has
grown significantly, although officially the nuclear club has not been
expanded. Can Ukraine count on additional guarantees of security given
the fact that the map of nuclear states of the world has changed?
Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: At the time that Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal the
nuclear weapons state extended, including the United States, the
principle of a negative security assurance precisely to Ukraine,
making clear that we wouldn't use or consider using or threatening
nuclear weapons against Ukraine. In addition to that, the assurance
included positive indications of the kinds of support that would be
available should Ukraine be threatened with nuclear weapons.
The number of states, as you indicated, that are openly claiming
nuclear arsenals, has grown in light of the tests by India and
Pakistan. The number that we consider to be nuclear capable has not
grown; in fact, the trend has been the other direction. I'd like my
colleague, Norm Wolf, who has been working the Non-Proliferation
Treaty extensively, to indicate progress in that area.
MR. WOLF: Thank you, John. It is indeed true that there has been
progress toward reducing the number of countries with the capability.
For example, several years ago Argentina and Brazil were both
considered countries that had unsafeguarded nuclear programs, and
therefore the potential to have the possibility of a nuclear weapons
program. They have since put all their facilities under IAEA
safeguards and have become parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Similarly, in Africa, South Africa, not only had a nuclear capability,
but they indeed claim to have nuclear weapons. And they have since
turned over all that material to international controls, have become a
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the IAEA, the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, has in fact been able to
give assurances that all of this material is now under safeguards.
So while it is true there has been a demonstrated potential in South
Asia by India and Pakistan, on the other hand we should not forget
that there had been pluses and some progress made elsewhere in the
world.
AMB. HOLUM: In fact, the total number of members of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty is now up to 187. Only four countries in the
world -- India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba -- remain outside the
treaty. So this global agreement against the adoption of nuclear
capability is getting stronger I think rather than weaker. And of
course one of the most important developments in that trend was the
decision by Ukraine as well as Kazakhstan and Belarus to completely
give up their nuclear potential.
Q: (Inaudible) -- TV channel. Recently the prime minister of Hungary,
Victor Orban, has not excluded possibility under certain conditions of
placing nuclear weapons on the territory of Hungary. Then he actually
rescinded the statement. But how does the United States view their
intention of new NATO members to have nuclear weapons on their
territory? How would you view this in the future as well? Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: We don't have plans to station nuclear weapons in new
members. As I said earlier, the role of nuclear weapons is declining.
There is a remaining nuclear presence in some locations in Europe. But
we have made clear we have no plans to ask additional countries, in
particular new NATO members, to station nuclear weapons on their
territory.
Q: Sergei -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. The United States has not
ratified the NPT -- the Senate has not ratified the NPT treaty. To
what extent will this complicate or compound the U.S. position on the
ABM Treaty talks with Russia? Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: Well, we do intend to continue the effort to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a detour. It is not a reversal.
We are not changing course. This was a very abbreviated debate brought
up in an unfortunate partisan circumstance that didn't allow members
of the Senate to examine the treaty closely. And for us to do the
normal kind of review that we do, for example, when we ratified the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and to attach understandings and other
steps to the resolution of ratification that makes it more appealing
to more senators -- that kind of effort still remains to be done.
Remember that the United States is not preventing the treaty from
entering into force. We regret that we are not leading now the cause
to ratify the treaty, that the United States is not among those who
have ratified. But there are 17 other countries whose ratification is
essential in order for the treaty to enter into force. As we continue
our own efforts in the United States, we are going to encourage others
as well to ratify the treaty.
I view that as a distinct issue from the ABM Treaty modifications we
are working on with our Russian colleagues. The reason for seeking
modest amendments to the ABM Treaty is to deal with the circumstance
of a few countries who seem to be remaining outside the global norm,
the global agreement against both nuclear weapons and long-range
missile capabilities.
We are not seeking a major disruption of the ABM Treaty; we are
seeking a moderate adjustment of the treaty, not involving any nuclear
testing, any nuclear capabilities, but the ability to deal with a few
tens of incoming weapons from a country such as North Korea or Iran,
who are developing the capability to send missiles and weapons of mass
destruction over inter-continental ranges. But this is a proposal that
does not in our judgment upset the nuclear balance. It poses no threat
to the nuclear deterrent of Russia. We think it should therefore be
negotiable in our work with Russia, as well as ultimately other
members of the treaty.
Q: Sergei -- (inaudible) -- Kiev University. After the failure of the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, don't you think
that the situation in this area to great extent is becoming hostage to
the domestic situation, the political situation in the United States?
Another part to the question: How and what do you see the prospects,
if any, of involving such de facto nuclear states such as India,
Pakistan and Israel into the existing non-proliferation regimes? Thank
you.
AMB. HOLUM: I think there was some political context to the defeat by
the Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And one of the things
we have to do now in our domestic debate and deliberations is to work
on ways to restore the bipartisan consensus that has always been
engaged in the arms control process.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a good example of that. It began
with one of our greatest Republican presidents, President Dwight
Eisenhower, in the 1950s. He described the failure to achieve a
Comprehensive Test Ban as one of their greatest regrets, the greatest
disappointments of his presidency looking back on it. And we have to
work very hard -- not at intensifying the political aspects of this
issue but to downplay and to soften the sharp partisan edges that seem
to come into play.
I suspect, given the recent history, it would be very difficult to
accomplish that in the course of the next year, but we are going to
continue the effort. We are going to be consulting with leadership in
the Republican Party in the Senate, working with senators who have
taken a long-time interest in arms control to see if we can't turn
that process around.
One of the things that I think would be positive in that respect if
the Indian and Pakistani processes would allow them to join the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We don't anticipate their joining the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty any time in the near future. The
current effort is aimed at trying to prevent the situation there from
becoming worse and from touching off an arms race in South Asia. But
one of the important benchmarks that would help prevent an arms race
in South Asia would be if both were to sign and join the test ban
treaty. I think that would also have a valuable impact on the U.S.
deliberations.
Do you want to add anything to that, Norm?
MR. WOLF: Yes. With respect to the caller's question regarding the
ratification of the NPT, it has been and continues to be U.S. policy
to seek universal adherence to the NPT. And as John indicated in an
earlier answer, we already have 187 countries who are party to the
NPT. Certainly we seek NPT ratification by India and Pakistan, and
indeed a Security Council resolution applicable to South Asia calls
for such ratification. But as John indicated, that's probably not
going to be the first step. And certainly CTBT would be a useful first
step.
Israel on the other hand has made clear that in a declaratory policy
that in the context of a just and enduring peace in the Middle East
they would be prepared to consider a weapons of mass destruction free
zone in the Middle East, and presumably in that context would see
ratification as a possibility. But of course there is still some way
to go before that type of peace has been put into place.
MR. FOUCHEUX: We thank you for those questions, Kiev. Let's move on
once again to Moscow. Moscow, please go ahead with your questions or
comments for our guests.
Q: Mr. Holum, currently in Russia they're frankly talking about a new
cold phase in the relationship between Washington and Moscow. This
cannot help but negatively impact the whole negotiation process,
disarmament process. What does Washington intend to do to ameliorate
and rectify this situation?
AMB. HOLUM: Well, I hope that proves not to be the case. We have made
enormous progress bilaterally between the Soviet Union and Russia and
the United States in turning back the potential for nuclear holocaust
and in lessening the role of nuclear weapons and reducing their
numbers. The START II treaty will eliminate -- to bring us down to
below 60 or 65 percent below the Cold War peaks of nuclear weapons
when that's brought into force. The Helsinki agreement in 1997 between
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin will bring us 80 percent below Cold War
peaks. In the meantime we are intensely engaged in cooperative efforts
to bear the cost of taking down not only the nuclear delivery systems
but actually dismantling warheads and bombs. We are working
cooperatively on steps to dispose of spent fuel, to dispose of
plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, to purchase and ultimately
burn up highly-enriched uranium that comes out of nuclear weapons. So
there is a broad range of cooperative efforts.
Now, it's true that we've had various times during the course of the
last decade down periods in our relationship. Political tensions have
tended to rise and fall. One of the things I think that is encouraging
about the trend is that we have managed to keep these programs going
to keep these common efforts going throughout those ups and downs in
the political character of our relationship.
I think ultimately that is a reflection of the fact that both
countries see a common interest, a self-interest in both cases in
reducing the nuclear danger and in eliminating some of these costly
and dangerous systems. Chemical weapons is another area where we are
cooperating, and both countries have concluded that even maintaining
these old stockpiles of chemical weapons is a danger to our society.
So it makes sense for us to continue to cooperate in that and other
areas, even when we are arguing off and on over other issues. We have
managed to avoid linkage of issues across the board, and I think
that's in both of our interests.
MR. FOUCHEUX:  And Moscow once again -- please go ahead in Moscow.
Q: Russian Television. A question for Mr. Holum. Are you in any way
afraid that the U.S. intention to back out of the ABM Treaty will
undermine the nuclear system all over the world? Even the START I,
START II treaties, they stipulate that the ABM Treaty will be abided
by in the forum that it was concluded in originally. Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: Thank you. We've made clear, and the president has
repeatedly said that the -- and agreed -- that the ABM Treaty remains
a cornerstone of strategic stability. And we have no intention of
withdrawing from that treaty.
What we are trying to do is work cooperatively with our Russian
partner to negotiate modest amendments to the treaty that would permit
deployment of a national missile defense that would not threaten
Russia's deterrent, that wouldn't have any significant capability
against Russia, but would allow both countries to deploy modest
national missile defense systems to protect us against the rogue state
threat. But no decision has been made even on deployment of a U.S.
national missile defense. As the president has said, that ultimate
decision will depend on cost, it will depend on the threat, it will
depend on the technical feasibility of the system, and it will depend
on the status of our arms control negotiations.
Pursuant to the agreement of our two presidents in Bonn in June, we
have had several rounds of discussions with our Russian colleagues on
this question, on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty, as well as on
how we would approach the START III, the further negotiations to
reduce strategic offensive arms. I can't report that those discussions
have been successful, but I think we have laid an information base and
are at least understanding each other's positions better.
But I want to underscore again that our intention and our very strong
interest is to approach this problem in a cooperative way, to do it
through mutually agreed adjustments, modest adjustments to the ABM
Treaty, and also to approach the threat from rogue states in a
cooperative way in terms of the operations of any national missile
defense programs.
Q: Another question from the Russian Public Television. You just said
that make certain modifications to the ABM Treaty and this will not do
any serious harm. But suppose Russia does not agree to such
modifications in the ABM Treaty? Such moods actually do exist
currently in Russia. No way would we allow for changing this ABM
Treaty. The U.S. press many times has run articles to the effect that
the U.S. has a moral right to withdraw from this ABM Treaty in order
to implement its goals. Don't you think that this can engender a new
arms race? Russia of course in the economic sense is not fully capable
to have a full-blown arms race and to respond in the ABM sense to the
United States, but Russia as an adequate response can continue to
develop its TOPOL (ph) weapons, its offensive capabilities, so this
can push Russia towards developing its offensive capability and
delivery systems for MIRVs and so forth, because Russia would not be
able to set up its own ABM. Don't you think that currently we are
faced with a huge threat from this arms race? Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: I think a renewed arms race would be unfortunate. But I
also don't think it's either in prospect or would be called for by the
circumstances. Remember that the -- as you know, the ABM Treaty does
contain a supreme national interests clause that allows either country
to withdraw from the treaty upon six months' notice. But what we are
trying very hard to do, and what I certainly intend to do, is to
devote all the effort I can, and I hope we will have the same -- I am
sure we will have the same involvement from our Russian colleagues --
to avoid having that question ever come up, because again the kind of
system we are talking about does not defeat the object and purpose of
the ABM Treaty. The contributions of the treaty to strategic stability
can be preserved if the treaty is amended in a very limited way to
allow a limited defense that wouldn't interfere with Russia's
deterrent.
Now, what I would argue very strongly is that far from weakening the
treaty or undercutting the treaty the amendments that we are going to
be talking about in negotiations would actually strengthen the treaty,
because they demonstrate that this treaty that was negotiated in 1972
can be adjusted, can be modified to account for new realities, for
threats that weren't contemplated at the time the treaty was
negotiated. It seems to me it is both of our interests, recognizing
the value of the treaty, to put our best efforts into trying to
preserve those benefits, not by putting up a brick wall against any
adjustments, not by keeping the treaty frozen in time, but by making
clear that the treaty is flexible enough to accommodate changes in the
strategic environment. That's what we are trying to do in these
negotiations.
Q: Mr. Holum, Interfax Agency. Russian press has published reports
that you the United States suggested to Moscow -- proposed certain
confidential concessions. I don't know what they are about -- in
exchange for Russia's giving up its highly negative stance on the ABM
Treaty. Can you clarify what concessions could they be talking about?
Thank you.
AMB. HOLUM: I don't know what they are talking about, if they are
talking about concessions from our negotiating position. What we've
determined from the beginning of this process is that we wouldn't try
to play negotiating games with Russia, that we wouldn't come in and
jack up our negotiating position in order to be able to give away
concessions later on in the process. We came in basically saying,
Here's the threat, here are the limited kinds of responses we think
are warranted, and the modest adjustments to the treaty that would be
necessary to allow them. But without, and being very straightforward,
without building in concessions. So I don't know what concessions that
might be referring to.
Perhaps it relates to the fact that we have discussed in the context
of these negotiations possible other cooperative measures with Russia
that would make Russia, as well as the United States, more secure
against the growing threat of missiles from rogue states, keeping in
mind that Russia is much closer to Iran, to North Korea, to the places
where missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities might be
combined in the near future. So Russia also has an interest in being
able to protect itself against those capabilities. And so we've talked
about things like shared early warning, other kinds of steps, help on
radar systems, that would make Russia, as well as the United States,
more secure against these dangers. That underscores again the way we
are looking at this as a cooperative enterprise, both in negotiating
adjustments to the treaty rather than walking away from it, and in
working on the kinds of defenses that the two countries can share.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, Moscow, we thank you for those questions, and
we are glad that we were able to get our line reestablished with you.
Let's hope that we've had the same kind of luck with Prague as we
return there. Let's go back to Prague for questions.
Q: (Inaudible) -- Czech Radio. Mr. Holum, do you consider the
situation in Asia more dangerous after both India and Pakistan have
tested their nuclear weapons? And do you see any way how to persuade
the two countries not to deploy those weapons? Would you consider --
(inaudible) -- ?
AMB. HOLUM: Well, I think the situation is more dangerous, and it's a
particular concern because India and Pakistan are so close to each
other. They've fought several wars since they both became independent.
They have border conflicts. And if they both develop and deploy
nuclear weapons and have them mated to missiles so they are readily
operational, one can imagine a situation where the flight times of the
missiles would be so short that they'd be shorter than the warning
times. That means that a nuclear war would be in a hair-trigger
situation. It's a very dangerous circumstances. So a major effort
we're engaged in is to try to persuade both of them to put a lid on
further development in both the missile and the nuclear areas.
Ultimately, as my colleague Norm Wolf said, our interest is in having
them join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in the meantime we have to
do our best with other countries to make sure that the situation
doesn't get any worse, to try to prevent an arms race and a hair
trigger situation with respect to their nuclear weapons.
Would you want to add anything on that?
MR. WOLF: I think you pretty well covered the concern, John. But
certainly in a situation where these two countries have fought three
prior wars over a border dispute, one cannot look at this problem with
a sense of complacency. And indeed our diplomacy has been aimed at
trying to convince the parties that it is in their mutual interests to
stop where they are and ultimately begin to reverse the process they
have begun. Those efforts were interrupted by the elections in India,
and now with the change in government in Pakistan by the military
takeover, it's not clear how fast we can proceed. But certainly we
intend to begin a resumption of a dialogue with India in the next
several days.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Okay, let's continue in Prague. More questions in Prague
-- please go ahead once again.
Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- Czech Television Prague again. The
current NATO strategy doctrine allows for the first nuclear strike.
Does the American administration plan to suggest any change to this
concept?
MR. FOUCHEUX:  Did you not get that?
AMB. HOLUM:  I didn't hear anything.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Oh, I heard it loud and clear. I'm sorry, Prague, I am
going to have to ask you to repeat your question. I got it in my ear,
but evidently our guests lost direct contact with our control room.
Please go ahead once again in Prague.
Q: The NATO strategy allows for the first strike. Does the American
administration plan to suggest any change to this concept?
MR. FOUCHEUX: Does the American administration plan to change the
concept of first strike?
AMB. HOLUM: I think what the question refers to is our doctrine
relating to no first use, and the fact that we have not adopted that
position because we have retained the option, which I think is
increasingly remote, but nevertheless real, of using nuclear weapons
in response to an overwhelming conventional attack or other kind of
weapons of mass destruction in certain circumstances. And I don't see
any likelihood that we will change that. I think the likelihood of the
option being exercised is very limited.
But remember that -- and I assume this question arises in the NATO
context, that we have just completed a strategic review of NATO's
nuclear doctrine and other elements of NATO's doctrine, and no change
was made. Obviously discussions will continue on these subjects, but
we don't see any reason to adjust this at this period.
Q: Thank you. You said the importance of nuclear weapons declined.
Analysts speak of another loss of political value of nuclear weapons
in case of the abolition of the first strike doctrine in NATO. Is that
loss of political value something positive or negative?
AMB. HOLUM: I think it's a positive thing that all countries, or at
least the United States, regard the utility of nuclear weapons as
declining, that the roles that they might be used for are dropping
just like the numbers of weapons and the numbers of different kinds of
weapons are declining. So I think it's a positive trend. At the same
time, I wouldn't want to project a near-term elimination of nuclear
capabilities and reliance on nuclear weapons in certain circumstances.
On the plus side in terms of nuclear weapons, a lot of people argue
that they have prevented even conventional conflicts between the
United States and the former Soviet Union because of the risk of
escalation that both sides recognize. So they've tended to help
maintain the peace.
I suspect that that role of nuclear weapons, while it's diminished,
while it's importance is less, will continue for some time into the
future. At the same time, as the political process evolves, as various
other arms control regimes strengthen, we still expect and seek the
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. And I think that will be a
happy day for the international community when we finally reach that
objective.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Holum, I understand that you have an important
meeting coming up in just a few moments, so you are going to have to
be leaving us here on the set. Before you leave, however, do you have
closing comments for our guests overseas?
AMB. HOLUM: Well, I just want to compliment the questioners on some
very good and challenging questions. It's clear that there is a great
deal of understanding, both of the intricacies of the arms control
process and its fundamental importance to global security and to
future peace and prosperity for all of us. So I appreciate the
participants and the way they've sent questions to us. And I am sure
my colleague Norm Wolf will handle the remaining questions with no
difficulty.
MR. FOUCHEUX: That's great. We still have about 15 minutes to go. It
will be me and Mr. Wolf. I am glad to have you as well, sir. Mr.
Holum, thank you very much, and good luck at your meeting at the White
House.
AMB. HOLUM:  Thank you.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Let's go back to Prague for more questions. Please go
ahead once again in Prague.
Q:     Okay, this is -- (inaudible) -- Czech daily.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Hello Prague? (Technical difficulties.) Okay, sorry,
Prague, we just lost you. How about Kiev? Let's try Kiev once again.
Please go ahead in Kiev.
Q: Voice of Ukraine newspaper. Madeleine Albright has stated that the
CTBT Treaty will be reintroduced to the Senate at a time that is more
appropriate. Is that before the presidential election or after? And
what will be the future fate of this treaty? Will it be rejected by
the Senate again? And maybe Democrats will not win the election. Thank
you.
MR. WOLF: I got part of that question, and I'll try to answer the part
that I heard. The decision on the ABM Treaty and whether to go ahead
with deployment of this limited national missile defense system that
Mr. Holum has talked about, that decision is due to be made in June,
and I don't believe there is any likelihood that that decision will be
made at an earlier date. I'm sorry, beyond that I did not catch the
rest of the question.
MR. FOUCHEUX: There was a question about whether the treaty might come
up for another vote in the Senate before the national elections here.
MR. WOLF: The Comprehensive Test Ban? Well, it is certainly our hope
that this issue could be looked at and decided on by the Senate prior
to our national elections. However, I think the likelihood of a
reconsideration of the Senate before the election would probably
require some changes and for example increased ramifications of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty might very well be the type of plan that
would create a situation which a decision by the Senate to relook at
this issue. Certainly the administration will be continuing to press
for ratification.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Okay, thank you in Prague. Let's return once again to
Moscow -- more questions in Moscow. Go ahead please.
Q: Good afternoon, Russian Information Agency, Novistye. Mr. Wolf, in
the opinion of many foreign and Russian experts, Pakistan, India, and
even more so North Korea, in no time soon will be able to set up
delivery systems that would be able to reach the territory of the
United States or parts of Russia. Just simply they are still using
oxen to harvest. And the non-ratification by the Senate of the CTBT
treaty and U.S. attempts to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to start
setting up a national nuclear defense is viewed by those experts as
active lobbying on behalf of the military industrial complex of the
United States within the Senate and within the administration. Could
you comment, refute or confirm or just say anything on this issue?
Thank you.
MR. WOLF: Certainly there is no effort to create a -- shall we say an
impenetrable shield that would allow the United States to live
blithely under this shield and ignore the rest of the world. That is
not what is intended. And indeed as Ambassador Holum made clear, the
shield that is contemplated, the national missile defense that we have
in mind, would address a modest threat such as that that could be
posed by North Korea for example. It would not be adequate to address
a threat such as that posed by the Russian missile forces. So clearly
there is no way that in that context that one can withdraw from
nuclear arms control agreements. We are, as John Holum indicated,
actively engaged with Russia in a variety of places in addition to the
START III negotiations, to try to collectively work on reducing the
nuclear threat. And we will continue to be actively engaged.
The one prominent example that I have spent some time working on is
called the trilateral initiative. This is an effort between the United
States, Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop
an agreement that would place excess materials in both of our
inventories under IAEA supervision. And the role of the IAEA would be
to ensure that this material was never again used for nuclear weapons.
So I don't believe that the concept that somehow the United States is
withdrawing from the world, or that the Senate vote indicates that
there is a turning away from nuclear arms control is an accurate
indication of where the United States is
Q: Mr. Wolf, Interfax Agency. In our local press and in the European
press they have written a lot about the fact that Washington allegedly
has sent a good will signal and has released a leakage about its plans
to withdraw out of seven European countries the remainder of your
nuclear weapons. You probably heard about this story based on
unclassified Pentagon, declassified materials. How would you assess
those press reports both in Europe and in Russia that we hear about so
much? Thank you.
MR. WOLF: I think with respect to those stories I would have to
indicate the same answer that John Holum gave to a similar question: I
know of no basis for that story, and to my knowledge there is no such
plan to remove such weapons.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you, Moscow. Let's return to Prague once again. Go
ahead please in Prague.
Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- Czech Television Prague again. There is a
certain danger in the poor living standards of the Russian top nuclear
scientists. Does the United States do anything to help them to try to
prevent them from selling their knowledge to maybe dangerous countries
or terrorists?
MR. WOLF: That's an extremely good question, and it's certainly an
area in which we have put some time and effort. There has been
established in Moscow the International Science and Technology Center,
and it's purpose is to provide funding for Russian nuclear scientists
in areas that have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. It is precisely
because of the concern that you indicated, that these scientists, even
if not desiring to betray these secrets to other countries,
nonetheless feel that there is no alternative to obtain a paycheck,
that they would make such an effort.
So the United States, along with several European countries, is
funding this ISTC unit to do precisely what I suggested; that is, to
provide an alternative to keep them gainfully employed. There are a
number of other initiatives that also are being undertaken by the
Department of Energy in the United States, called the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, and the idea there would be to see if one could not create
other employment in those nuclear cities -- the so-called closed
cities of the days of the Soviet Union -- to ensure that there were
alternatives available for earning a living. So these issues are being
addressed, and not only in Russia I might add but also in Ukraine.
MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, let's return to Kiev once again. Go ahead in
Kiev.
Q: In 1992 Russia and the United States talked about setting up a
global ABM system. Are they still thinking about, and involving
Ukraine's and other European countries' potential to this system?
Thank you.
MR. WOLF: Could you -- I didn't quite catch the question I am afraid.
MR. FOUCHEUX: He was talking about the agreement in 1992 between
Russia and the U.S. to set up a global ABM system. Would that
continued, and would it involve other countries such as Ukraine?
MR. WOLF: I am afraid I don't know of any such plan to create a global
system. We certainly have talked with Russia about an early-warning
system, so that if there were a missile launch information would be
conveyed to the Russian authorities if we picked it up for example,
telling them precisely what the launch was; or even better, perhaps
providing advance notification of launches before they occur, so there
is no misunderstanding with respect to what is happening.
Presumably under this approach we would also receive similar warning
from Russia: if they were to engage in a launch, they would provide
advance notification. These negotiations have been going on for some
time now and I believe they are close to agreement. Similarly, because
of concerns about the Y2K issue, there is a plan in place that has
been negotiated to provide greater assurance to both Russia and the
United States during the transition into the year 2000, and this would
include the presence of Russian military at U.S. early-warning sites,
such as the one out in Colorado.
But I am afraid with respect to any global ABM approach, I am not
familiar with that.
MR. FOUCHEUX: And we go once again to Moscow. Please go ahead again in
Moscow.
Q: Russian Public Television. Mr. Wolf, as it is known, a final
decision about deploying an ABM system will be taken by the Clinton
administration June of next year. Russia takes a very negative
approach to those plans. Under what conditions can the U.S. give up on
setting up and creating such a system? Thank you.
MR. WOLF: Well, as Ambassador Holum indicated, there are four factors
that would go into a decision with respect to whether to deploy or
not: cost, the threat, technical feasibility, and the status of the
negotiations between the United States and Russia. I think it would be
premature to speculate as precisely which one of those factors would
have to be out of alignment as it were for the United States to give
up with a system. Certainly if the remaining tests that are to be
conducted of the system that is being contemplated go well, I am sure
that will add increased inducement to go ahead with the system. But at
this point I could not conjecture what circumstances would persuade us
or persuade the administration not to proceed with this system.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Wolf, we were happy to have both you and the
ambassador on our program today. We are about to close up. We have
about a minute and a half to go. I wonder if you would have any
closing comments for our guests as well.
MR. WOLF: The only comment I would make would be to emphasize that the
United States, despite the setback of the CTBT vote, has no
expectation of withdrawing from the world. I was recently in New York
last week for three or four days talking with colleagues, and
certainly there was a real concern that, number one, the United States
was abandoning nuclear arms control efforts; and, number two, perhaps
even abandoning multilateral fora such as the United Nations. All I
can say is nothing could be further from the truth. More and more it
is recognized in the United States that our security is inherently
that of the security of the rest of the world, and that the
non-proliferation effort must in fact be a global effort. This is not
something that we can do on our own. We must work with others if we
are to keep the nuclear genie from spreading to other countries. Thank
you.
MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you very much, Norm Wolf, senior advisor and chief
negotiator of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Thank you very much for being with
us today. Thanks as well to your colleague, Mr. John Holum, senior
adviser for arms control and international security affairs, who as
you know was with us earlier in the program. And we have a big thanks
as well to all of our participants in Prague, Kiev and Moscow, as well
as our entire international audience of Worldnet. We thank you very
much for watching. Have a good day.
END
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State)