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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

FRANCE 14-17Foreign Minister Vedrine's Comments on US Role / Global Power

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QUESTION: Mr. Chirac had a very interesting speech over the weekend in which he referred to the United States in a rather unique way, as a hyperpower rather than just a super power. I'm wondering if the State Department has any reaction to Mr. Chirac's interpretation?

MR. RUBIN: I do know that Foreign Minister Vedrine has called the United States a hyperpower before. Secretary Albright occasionally during the Kosovo conflict would begin her conversations with him by saying this is "This is Hyper Madeleine," which he was amused by.

I think that the fact that he's described the United States recognizing the indispensable role we play in the world in that way is not of a particular concern to us. Clearly there are some comments suggesting that France needs to pursue its own interests and sometimes disagrees with the United States, and thus is concerned about the extent to which we pursue multilateral diplomacy and the extent to which we work together.

Our view is that when we work together we tend to achieve our objectives the way we worked together in Kosovo, the way we worked together in Bosnia. When we have differences, as in the case of Iraq or others, it becomes harder to achieve our objectives. Certainly we want to be a partner with Europeans countries, including France, in pursuing our joint interests and we want to act in a way that is based on partnership.

We also think it's important for countries in Europe to understand the dangers that we as a global power have to confront, from proliferation from weapons of mass destruction. Being the United States means that at the end of the day, very often the French and others expect us to resolve a problem in a part of the world outside of Europe, so often we need their cooperation in dealing with that problem before it needs to be confronted by the United States.

It also would be helpful if countries in Europe didn't always suggest that our policies were based on anything else than our view of our national interest. Our national interests require us, as a global power, often to act in ways different than Europeans countries.

Finally, I would say that the desire on the part of some, occasionally some in France, to differentiate themselves from the United States by disagreeing when they don't really disagree is a matter of frustration. To be different than the United States doesn't add to any country's force unless the difference is justified, and often we feel that being different for difference sake sometimes drives some in Europe.

QUESTION: Do you have a website for France?

MR. RUBIN: Well, maybe we'll need one after that.

QUESTION: On the same subject, what do you make of the suggestion by the same President that the Europeans need to really move on establishing their own separate power, as it were, because the United States foreign policy is often rendered completely impotent by Congress?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I didn't read that anywhere in his speech, but I think I understand the point you're making. With respect to European Security and Defense Initiative, the ESDI, that is something that we're supportive of and we want Europe to be able to act and improve the European pillar in their trans-Atlantic alliance.

I don't think it is so much a question of Congress. I think after the war in Kosovo it became clear to many in Europe that it was only the United States that had the military technical capabilities to conduct the operation in Kosovo and that it was only the United States that was in a position to act with the modern communications, intelligence, and technology necessary to operate in the 21st Century.

It wasn't a question of Congress so much as a question of the fact that the United States has some rather capable military forces that some in Europe wish they didn't have to rely on all the time. To the extent the Europeans want to build a pillar that doesn't duplicate NATO, that doesn't decouple our security from that of the Europeans and doesn't unnecessarily discriminate against certain countries in Europe that can't be part of that, we think that's a good thing. We want the European pillar to be stronger.

QUESTION: That's not really my point. The point was mainly the profound disappointment that many people in Western Europe or many leaders in Western Europe had over the failure of CTBT and the fact that the United States is now - or at least the Executive Branch of the government is not always in a position to be a world leader because it has got this kind of annoying thing called Congress which, unfortunately, is mandated by the Constitution there. So that is really --

MR. RUBIN: I certainly wouldn't put it that way.

QUESTION: I mean that was what I read into it.

MR. RUBIN: All right, let me try to respond as best as I can. Again, we are talking off, I think, a bit of a caricature of what he said. Certainly we, like our allies and friends in Europe, were deeply troubled by the decision in the United States Senate to not advise and consent to ratification of the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban. We think that was a blow to the efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We think it will be harder to get countries in Europe and countries around the world to support us in trying to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because of that vote. That was the view that we took. The Senate rejected that view. We are going to try to overcome the damage done to our leadership in non-proliferation by working that much harder with our allies and elsewhere.

I think that the suggestion that the Europeans need to go their own way on the defense side is not related to their concern about the Comprehensive Test Ban. It is related to their concern about what transpired in Kosovo.

QUESTION: When you say we want to try to overcome what happened with CTBT by working closely with our allies on arms control, what do you mean?

MR. RUBIN: Certainly what I intended to say was there was harm done to our leadership effort to convince countries in Europe, countries around the world, to stop the proliferation of missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons. When we are trying to galvanize support for a problem like Iraq or a problem with North Korea or a problem with Pakistan or a problem with India, it is harder now because of the vote. But we are going to just have to work that much harder to overcome the damage done so that we continue to have the support of our allies in cases like Pakistan and India and North Korea and Iraq and elsewhere, but it is unfortunate that we have to overcome the damage caused by this vote.

Our signature holds. We have made clear that we are not going to act to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, meaning we're not going to test, and we feel that that is consistent with international law because the President has not decided to repudiate his signature and he is going to seek ratification through advice and consent at some future date when the climate is improved. So we're seeking to overcome the difficulties caused by this but we, like others, recognize the difficulties.

QUESTION: You don't see that damage has spread to any other area , though? The damage in the leadership?

MR. RUBIN: Earlier someone asked me about the hegemonic United States, and I said, Well, if I took that personally, we couldn't do business in the international community. There is always going to be an element of people accusing us of hegemony. That is what it means to be the United States. The French do that sometimes. I guess they've got a new word, "The Hyperpower." Other countries in the Middle East do it. Countries in Asia do it. It is not new.

Certainly the fact that the Senate rejected any consideration of the impact this would have internationally in its decision-making, we didn't see a lot of Senators explaining, well, we're going to vote against this treaty, but they had already taken into account the potential negative effects abroad. We don't think they took those into account. We think they should have taken those into account. There are effects.

I remember a few years ago we had the issue of the Secretary General of the UN; we had the ILSA debate; we had Helms-Burton; we had the UN arrears. Most of those we have gotten through and every once in a while there is another issue that feeds the view that we're a hegemonic power and we need to be clear that we'll act alone where necessary, but our preference is to work with partners in Europe and elsewhere.

QUESTION: Sorry for the philosophical question perhaps. In the long term, what do you think the effect on the international influence of the United States would be if the Europeans really did develop an independent and credible common defense which could operate independently of the United States in places like Kosovo?

MR. RUBIN: As I indicated earlier, we support them improving their capabilities to act without the United States. We think that's a good thing so as long as it doesn't decouple our security from theirs, so long as it doesn't discriminate against countries that can't be in that defense community, and so long as there isn't excess duplication in the efforts that our fellow allies need to make with respect to NATO. In general, we think that's a good idea.

I think it is pretty clear to us that most NATO countries have no interest in developing an independent capability that would have that effect of decoupling the security interest of the United States and European countries so we don't really think that's a big danger. We want them to do more to create the European pillar; we just don't want it to happen in a way that takes away from their ability to improve their posture vis-à-vis NATO.

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