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20 October 1999

Text: Holum Remarks to UN General Assembly on Arms Control

(U.S. commitment to arms control, nonproliferation is unwavering)
(2860)
Despite the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), "the United States commitment to arms control and
nonproliferation is unwavering," John Holum, senior advisor for the
United States for arms control and international security, said
October 20.
"The global community can count on the United States to continue to
lead the fight against weapons of mass destruction and missile
proliferation and to work seriously and steadily to support effective
and necessary arms control and nonproliferation agreements," Holum
said.
Participating in the opening debate on disarmament issues in the UN
General Assembly's First Committee, Holum pointed out that in the past
year, despite some disappointing setbacks, "we did move ahead in
reinforcing the consensus against proliferation." He cited a list of
specific actions taken by the United States and other countries
regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, reduction of nuclear weapon
stockpiles, increased transparency, and suspending missile tests.
On the CTBT, Holum said "we will complete the task of bringing the
treaty into force," and on the Biological Weapons Convention he urged
states to complete negotiations on the BWC protocol in the year 2000.
He stressed that a "renewed agenda," not a new agenda, is the way to
achieve nuclear disarmament. He said delegations should redouble their
efforts to complete the current arms control agenda.
"From the START process, to the Biological Weapons Convention
Protocol, to the Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty, to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we have a full plate," Holum said.
"...Our problem is not too few items on the agenda, it is too little
headway on those already there."
"Our collective problem is not insufficiently lofty goals, but
insufficient collective willingness to grasp attainable ones," he
said.
Urging nations to "remain realistic about the constraints...rein in
frustrations, and not allow the perfect to become the enemy of the
good," Holum said that "arms control is not about instant
gratification - but about patient, tenacious work. The long, strong
history of arms control is proof that the results are worth it."
Following is the text of Holum's remarks:
(begin text)
Statement by John D. Holum, Senior Advisor for the United States for
Arms Control and International Security, in the First Committee
General Debate, October 20, 1999
Mr. Chairman, let me join in congratulating you on your selection to
preside over the final UN First Committee session of the millennium.
My delegation pledges to support your efforts toward a productive
session. The approach of the new century is an opportune time to
reflect on where we are and where we are headed. An ancient Chinese
saying says: "May you live in interesting times." At best that is a
mixed blessing. But it is a fitting way to view the present and future
of our arms control efforts. Last year I spoke of the significant
challenges facing the global arms control and nonproliferation regime
and of the need to redouble our efforts to solidify gains and to move
forward.
An honest assessment of the past year is that, despite some real and
disappointing setbacks, we did move ahead in reinforcing the consensus
against proliferation. The United States continued to reduce its
nuclear weapon stockpile and to work with the Russian Federation and
others to ensure that nuclear materials are safe and secure, to
enhance transparency, to place excess fissile material stocks under
international safeguards, and to transform -- irreversibly -- excess
plutonium into forms unusable in nuclear weapons.
We have worked with others to build and strengthen the Chemical
Weapons Convention implementing organization, and in the United States
to complete the process for U.S. industry declarations to the OPCW. In
September North Korea announced it was suspending its long-range
missile tests and launch program, in the context of a broad initiative
developed by former Secretary of Defense William Perry. Worldwide,
efforts to discourage missile tests, and exports of destabilizing
missiles and related technologies have intensified. Likewise, from the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to the Australia Group, to the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative, the reach and breadth of efforts to
discourage proliferation are expanding.
We have also seen progress in efforts to address the regional
dimension of nonproliferation. The United Nations is negotiating a
global protocol to deal with the dangers posed to civil society and
regional stability by small arms, building on a similar Convention
agreed to by the Organization of American States. In South Asia, we
and others have sustained efforts with both India and Pakistan to
promote strategic restraint and adoption of the nonproliferation
benchmarks outlined in UNSCR 1172. Recent political developments in
the region make further progress even more essential.
In the Middle East, an emerging climate of cooperation has opened
opportunities for progress on regional security issues. We have worked
to cultivate this atmosphere, and to discourage actions in
multilateral fora that could undermine it. So, there is reason to be
hopeful about the overall direction of arms control and
nonproliferation. But events, including those recently in the United
States, also show the hard work that lies ahead. Today, I want to
outline U.S. perspectives on key priorities before us in the coming
year.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):
On October 13, the U.S. Senate voted against ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This action was a deep
disappointment to me personally as well as to others who have labored
in support of the CTBT. The outcome is clearly a setback, but the
effort to bring the CTBT into force is not over. Indeed, President
Clinton has made clear repeatedly since the Senate vote that his
efforts to secure ratification will continue. We will continue as well
to urge others to ratify the Treaty, particularly those among the 44
required for entry into force. In the meantime, the President also
made clear that as we pursue ratification, there will be no return to
nuclear explosions. The U.S. will sustain the nuclear testing
moratorium it has observed since 1992. In the too-brief Senate
consideration, stockpile stewardship and verification were raised as
concerns. Our program is strong on the first, and the Treaty is fully
adequate on the second. Given time and experience, we believe the
concerns can be resolved. The CTBT Article XIV Conference earlier this
month demonstrated once again that support of the international
community for the CTBT remains a powerful force, one that will be
sustained and cannot be ignored. We will complete the task of bringing
the Treaty into force.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
More broadly, it would be a profound error to conclude that my
country's dedication to nonproliferation and arms control has flagged
or, even worse, to take the Senate vote on CTBT ratification as reason
for anyone else to stand back from that cause. For, after all, each of
us takes nonproliferation and arms control steps not as a favor to
someone else, or a lever for other ends, but a matter of vital
self-interest. It is for that reason that one of the most important
U.S. priorities for the coming year will be to ensure that the 2000
NPT Review Conference reaffirms the Treaty as an essential part of the
international security system. Over the three years it met, the
Preparatory Committee has given form to the concept of a strengthened
review and helped defined the key issues for the Review Conference.
The United States is looking forward to a constructive Review
Conference, one that produces a balanced and thorough assessment of
the Treaty. We recognize that there will be vigorous debate, and that
there will be differences of view on key issues, such as Article VI
and approaches to regional proliferation threats. Let there be no
doubt, however, about the continued strong U.S. commitment to its
Article VI obligations. We believe that the NPT has served all its
parties well. The challenge before us is to achieve further progress
toward the goals of the NPT in the future. We need, however, to avoid
extreme positions and to approach our work with a healthy sense of
realism about what the NPT Review Process can achieve. Attaching
unrealistic expectations to this Process risks undermining the very
regime we seek to strengthen.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC):
Another key U.S. priority is to conclude negotiations on the Protocol
to the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention. The BWC is a linchpin of
the global nonproliferation regime. We have been laboring in the
Geneva Ad Hoc Group for four years. The parameters of the Protocol to
strengthen the Convention are well established. Countries' positions
have been discussed and debated at length, and their bottom lines --
or "red lines" -- have been made clear. The United States strongly
believes the time is now to settle remaining core issues.
The United States recognizes that the multilateral arms control
calendar is full and that staff resources for many countries will be
stretched. But strengthening the BWC is far too important; we must not
let this effort falter, especially when we are so close to finishing
our work. I urge all states to agree to schedule remaining sessions
early in 2000, so that the negotiations can be completed next year.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT):
Another initiative that has languished for far too long is the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). International consensus for a Treaty
was established in 1993, reinforced by the 1995 NPT Conference, and
reiterated by the First Committee last year. Still, we are marking
time because CD (Committee on Disarmament) members cannot agree to a
work program. The United States strongly hopes that we can do so in
January. Failure will threaten not only the achievement of an FMCT --
an essential step toward nuclear disarmament -- but the credibility of
the CD itself. The United States has supported the efforts of the CD
President to forge a work program for next year. We are also pleased
that CD members are working between sessions toward that end. The U.S.
has offered to be flexible in accommodating the views of others for a
diverse work program. We hope other countries will respond in kind so
that FMCT negotiations finally can begin.
START Process:
The START process remains at the top of our arms control agenda. The
United States is strongly committed to furthering systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at their Summit in Cologne in June of this
year to begin discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty in late
summer. I conducted the first such meeting with Russian officials in
August, and further meetings are planned shortly. The U.S. is looking
forward to Russia's ratification of START II even as we continue our
discussions of START III to reach aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500
strategic nuclear warheads by December 2007, a cumulative reduction of
80% from Cold War peaks.
ABM Treaty and National Missile Defense:
The ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability, remains critical
to preserve confidence on both sides in the stability of our
respective strategic deterrent forces. The ABM Treaty remains
fundamental to achieving our objectives for START II and START III and
maintaining strategic nuclear cooperation efforts. The international
environment has changed dramatically since 1972. The threat of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery
means is real, it is growing, and it is increasingly unpredictable. We
are, accordingly, considering a limited capability to defend against
rogue states' long-range missile threats.
We have amended the ABM Treaty before. We should be able to work
cooperatively to amend the ABM Treaty in a manner consistent with the
original goals of the Treaty, to permit deployment of a limited NMD
(national missile defense) in a way that preserves its essential
purposes -- that is, strategic stability and strategic offensive
weapons reductions -- while providing limited defenses against rogue
states' missile threats. A decision on whether to proceed with
deployment will be made next summer, consistent with considerations of
feasibility, threat, cost, and arms control. Above all, we approach
this issue with the objective of reinforcing strategic stability,
promoting transparency, and preserving our security within a framework
of continued cooperation with all countries on arms control matters.
A "Renewed" Agenda
Mr. Chairman, a number of states have urged a "new agenda" in arms
control, including a range of measures, old and new, taking us toward
a world free from nuclear weapons. The United States recognizes the
frustration that some countries feel about the pace of progress toward
nuclear disarmament. We have made a serious and conscious effort to
engage in discourse bilaterally, collectively in the NPT process, and
in unofficial venues on our approach to nuclear disarmament and our
views on the best way forward. We have and will continue to put on the
record the many steps we have taken to support this process.
We consider ourselves part of the international consensus on nuclear
disarmament. But there is no consensus on how best to attain that
goal. There is also no agreement that the answer is a "new agenda." I
believe that reflects not a failure of the international community or
a deficient commitment to disarmament, but rather the essence of the
disarmament process. Progress to date confirms that disarmament is
best achieved through practical, discrete, incremental steps, each
building on its predecessors and each calibrated to the realities of
the international security environment. Disarmament does not occur in
isolation or upon demand, but from a number of tangible factors: the
commitment of states to the process; a stable security environment;
effective verification regimes; agreements that can be enforced.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has maintained a fairly consistent perspective
on the call for a "new agenda." And I suggest that the way forward is
not through a new agenda, but a renewed agenda. We have before us
today a broad arms control agenda awaiting completion. From the START
process, to the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, to the Fissile
Material Production Cutoff Treaty, to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, we have a full plate. Important efforts are also underway to
strengthen the IAEA, to improve fissile material controls and
transparency, to address small arms proliferation, and to promote
greater regional confidence building measures. Listing the extensive
array of efforts underway -- unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral
-- would take far longer than I have time for today.
Our problem is not too few items on the agenda; it is too little
headway on those already there. Our collective problem is not
insufficiently lofty goals, but insufficient collective willingness to
grasp attainable ones. Certainly we should continue discussing the
future arms control agenda. But let us also redouble our efforts to
complete the current one. There is one road forward, and we cannot
bypass its key milestones in our haste to reach our shared
destination.
Conclusion:
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the U.S. Senate action on the CTBT, some
have questioned the U.S. commitment to arms control and
nonproliferation and its credibility as a negotiating partner. To
those I say do not let this delay in CTBT ratification mislead you
about U.S. intentions. The United States commitment to arms control
and nonproliferation is unwavering. The global community can count on
the United States to continue to lead the fight against WMD and
missile proliferation, and to work seriously and steadily to support
effective and necessary arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
Those who ask the United States Government to support and lead global
nonproliferation efforts are pushing on an open door; the problem
comes with the reality that, at times, what is behind that open door
is a tall stairway that may take some time to climb.
As has been the case since arms control efforts began more than four
decades ago, there will be a degree of unpredictability to the
process. Arms control is not about instant gratification -- but about
patient, tenacious work. The long, strong history of arms control is
proof that the results are worth it; this process like no other lends
true meaning to the saying that "Anything worth having is worth
waiting for." We must not lose confidence in or sight of our ultimate
objectives. At the same time, it is important to remain realistic
about the constraints inherent in the process, to rein in
frustrations, and not allow the perfect to become the enemy of the
good. For there are good arms control and nonproliferation efforts
underway and more to come.
Mr. President, I began my statement noting that these are "interesting
times" for arms control and nonproliferation. I believe that the
coming year could also be a pivotal one in charting the future course.
The United States looks forward to working with all of you to ensure
that, as we prepare for tomorrow and the dawn of a new century, we
make the most of the opportunities before us today to achieve a world
free from nuclear weapons, to reduce the risks of WMD and missile
proliferation, and to advance prospects for global peace and
prosperity.
Thank you.
(end text)