DoD News Briefing
Thursday, April 9, 1998 - 2:40 p.m. (EDT)
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD (PA)
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Q: Are you any closer to a decision on (inaudible) sanctions on the results growing out of the recent Pakistani missile test? Also, any comment on any of the reports that maybe there wasn't a test? And a third thing, any growing concern here over the intensification of missiles and other worrisome weapons in South Asia?
A: I don't think our concern is intensifying, because it's been quite intense for some time. We made it very clear both to India and Pakistan that we believe an arms race is not in the interest of stability in the Indian subcontinent region. We believe that it will not advance the security of these two countries. It could well weaken the security of these two countries. We have appealed to them to stop an arms race.
In addition, we have been working very hard over the years in discussions with China and North Korea and other countries to try to get them to stop promoting the proliferation of missile technology in Asia and elsewhere, particularly the Middle East. And we have achieved some success with China. We're continuing to work with North Korea in that regard.
One of the points we're making is that missile technology can come back to haunt any state that allows proliferation, and that in this world, no state can be immune from the threat of increasing missile technology. So that continues.
In terms of the reports of a test, we believe the test took place. We know that Pakistan has an active program to develop missiles, and they do test them from time to time.
Q: Any closer to any decision on possible sanctions?
A: As you know, we have imposed sanctions against Pakistan in the past under the Missile Technology Control Regime. We're continuing to review this particular case. We're in the advanced stages of that review, but I don't think we've reached a decision yet.
Q: What's the Defense Department's reaction to the proposal from ACDA that they be given a role in approving weapons development in the Pentagon?
A: We believe we have an interagency system now that works. It's a system that has been in place since the days of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, SALT I, under the Nixon Administration.
The way that works is when the Department of Defense starts designing or planning a new weapon system, it also sets up an internal analysis to look at the arms control implications, if any, of that weapon system. This is done with the Acquisitions and Technology Division, now Under Secretary Jacques Gansler in charge. But everybody in DoD with an interest in the system is included in that review.
In practice, people at State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council are informed and fully consulted as we continue work on the weapon system. Their lawyers and their policy people are fully engaged in reviewing the system as it goes forward.
We think this has worked, and we don't see any reason to change that system. Just as recently as the last few years we've been discussing in the interagency forum the arms control implications of some of our missile defense technologies that we're developing. As you know, the Russians have raised some questions about that. We work very hard to develop demarcation rules that will segregate work on our theater ballistic missiles from national missile defense, etc.
Q: Can you just clarify, did they actually ask the Defense Department for a formalized role in weapons development? Has Secretary Cohen said to Secretary Albright, no thank you?
A: There have been discussions between John Holum who is the Under Secretary of State and the head of ACDA, and Under Secretary Walt Slocombe, about this. Our concern is basically that we continue to develop the weapons that are in the nation's interest, that prepare us for future threats as well as current threats, and that we do this in an interagency way that allows everybody to comment and discuss the arms control implications of these weapons.
The Defense Department has been a very strong proponent of arms control agreements for a long period of time. We think it helps limit the threats we have to face, it helps make the world more predictable, and that is what makes it easier to reduce the threat of conflict. So we have nothing against arms control agreements. What we think we have today is a system that allows us to develop the weapons we need with proper attention to the implications of arms control agreements, and we think we've developed a system that in fact allows us to build new weapons that are compliant with the treaties that we at the Defense Department want to honor.
Q: Did Mr. Slocombe finally reply to the letter from Mr. Holum?
A: As of an hour or so ago, I don't believe he had sent over his reply. That may have happened in the last hour.
Q: ...Iran has received some warheads from a former Soviet Republic. Have you any comment on that?
A: I've seen a wire service account of that story. We have no evidence whatsoever that that's the case. We, of course, worry about this type of thing and we've had extensive conversations with officials in Russia and elsewhere about preventing just this type of transfer of dangerous technology, either nuclear technology or technology that will allow countries like Iran to build longer range missiles.
We've set up a program called the Nunn/Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which is designed to... Or Congress has set up this program, and we execute it. The program is designed to prevent nuclear technology from falling into the hands of rogue nations.
Kazakhstan has been very cooperative in that program over the years, and it's been a real beneficiary of that program. Kazakhstan is one of the three former Soviet Republics that is now nuclear free as a result of the Nunn/Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. They used to have close to 2,000 nuclear weapons and now they have none.
As you may remember, in 1994 we shipped out of Kazakhstan nearly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium which they called to our attention and asked us to move out of Kazakhstan for safe keeping so it wouldn't fall into the wrong hands. So we work closely with Kazakhstan to prevent this type of proliferation. We have no evidence that Iran has been able to purchase nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan or from other Soviet Republics.
Q: Has the Russian government given assurances that they've been able to account for all of the warheads from the former Soviet Union, and how much confidence do you have in those assurances?
A: We are working closely with Russia on precisely that issue. I think you've heard one of their former Defense Ministers, Mr. Rodionov, discuss the Russian government's determination to maintain strict control over fissile material. We are providing under the Nunn/Lugar program -- in fact I believe you saw some of this outside of Moscow the last time you were there with Secretary Cohen -- we are providing equipment to them to help them secure fissile material, and I think they are working hard to do that.
Q: Are you aware of any other individuals who've refused to take the anthrax vaccination besides those that the Navy and the Air Force have spoken of in the Gulf?
A: I believe there are a total of 16 people so far who have refused anthrax vaccinations.
I should point out that we believe that, our records show that 25,547 people have received shot number one in the Gulf; 10,952 have received the second shot; and a handful, I think three people according to my latest figures, have received the third shot. The third shot figures do not include Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, both of whom have received their third shot in the vaccination program.
Obviously we launched this program to protect our troops. Not just those in the Gulf, but ultimately all active and reserve troops -- 2.4 million in all -- against the threat of anthrax. When these shots are eventually given to everybody, they'll be given in a very routine way, just as we vaccinate people against measles, tetanus, yellow fever, polio, etc.
So 16 people so far out of nearly 26,000 people have refused, and they are being subject to the type of punishment that normally falls on people who disobey orders.
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Q: On anthrax, how does the 16 refusals compare with your average yearly tetanus booster or whatever? Do you get a lot of refusals of that? And what happens to those people? Can't people refuse shots in the armed services?
A: That's a good question. Well one, they cannot refuse shots because they are ordered to have these shots for force protection measures. We have to be able to deploy people in all conditions. We have to make sure that their medical records are up to date. So shots are required as a condition of service in the military.
You've asked a good question about how this compares with people refusing measles shots or tetanus shots, and I just don't know. My recollection from getting these shots years ago is that I didn't have a lot of time to ask questions about what they were giving me shots for. I suppose one of the issues here is that there's been quite a lot of publicity about the anthrax shots and people have had, I guess, some time to think about it. But maybe they haven't taken the time to study the need for these shots, or also the safety of the vaccine.
Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Rudy de Leon, just returned from the Gulf. He made an inspection tour over there precisely to look at the progress in giving the anthrax shots to the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the Gulf. What he found was that at the time he went, 21,000 people had been vaccinated. This was late last week. He found only two had shown very, very mild reactions to the shot. One had a fever and some muscle aches; the other had a slight skin rash and some mouth sores. But they passed very quickly.
So this has been proven over the years to be an extremely safe vaccine.
Q: Given that all the medical literature shows that this is a safe and effective vaccine, is this phenomenon of some small number of troops refusing to take the shots, is that, would you say, a sort of Gulf War illness hysteria? An irrational fear of Gulf War illnesses generated by the experience during the Gulf War?
A: I can't psychoanalyze why these people have not taken the shots. Under Secretary de Leon reported back after his trip that there was a common thread to the refusals. And that was that the refuseniks cited reasons that tended to be more emotional than factual in their opposition to taking the shots. Several of the service members indicated that they just didn't feel good about having the shots.
As I said, I don't know specifically why each one of these people is refusing to take the shots, but we have worked very hard to discuss the need for these shots -- that is protection against a possible future threat; and the safety of the vaccine. We've worked very hard from this podium and elsewhere. The Secretary has done an interview with Armed Forces Radio and Television on this topic to educate the troops about the safety of the vaccine and the force protection importance of taking it.
In addition, we've put a very extensive amount of information on the Internet on DefenseLINK about this, and that's available to any soldier, as many do now have computers with them and they can tap into the Internet.
Q: You said that the refuseniks, as you called them, were subject to the type of punishment that normally falls on people who disobey orders. Can you elaborate on what sort of punishment they face in this case?
A: It's non-judicial punishment, generally. Two of the sailors have been discharged as a result of this. They can get a reduction in rank. They could suffer a monetary penalty as a result of this, a reduction in pay over a period of time, or they could be discharged.
Q: And the discharge is honorable or dishonorable?
A: I don't know the circumstances of the discharges.
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A:
Colonel Bridges has corrected my imprecise knowledge of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The sailors who were discharged were discharged for refusal to get shots and for other instances of misconduct, not for refusing shots alone. Discharges are not given for refusing one shot, but rather for a pattern of misconduct.
So the other types of penalties they could get would be, they could range from a pay penalty, a reduction in grade, isn't that correct? And various restrictions could be placed on them for a period of time.
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Q: The Persian Gulf. When will the United States begin to withdraw troops and ships to start to return to the more routine level of force deployment in that region?
A: That's a good question and the answer is I don't know because those decisions have not been made. We do review force levels there from time to time. We have to do this in the context of the political situation, how the inspections are proceeding, overall compliance beyond the inspections alone is proceeding, what Iraq is doing to dismantle or get rid of his weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological, long range missiles, etc.; and where it stands on its commitment to dismantle its nuclear program. So that's under review. No decision's been made. I don't know when one will be made.
Q: Considering that Iraq has granted the UN inspectors access to the sensitive sites and those inspections have been completed, wouldn't it be likely that the United States would, say, move to a one-carrier presence in the Gulf sometime soon?
A: I think it's premature to say that. As Secretary Cohen has pointed out many times, compliance with the inspection regime is only one small part of what Iraq has to do. Remember the goal of the UN mandate is not only that Iraq allow inspectors into palaces or presidential sites or other sensitive places. The goal is the complete dismantlement of their weapons of mass destruction program. That is the weapons they have now and their ability to build these weapons in the future.
In that regard, there have been and still are considerable failings on the part of Iraq. Ambassador Butler, who is the head of the UN Special Commission, has said that their biological weapons program is a black hole. There have been UNSCOM reports, technical evaluation missions, multinational missions -- one led by a Russian -- that have been to Iraq earlier this year and found a pattern of stonewalling and deception on the part of the Iraqi authorities in providing information to UNSCOM.
As you know, [Iraq] has declared that it filled 50 warheads for SCUD missiles with chemicals, it has not been able to... It claims to have destroyed all 50 of them, but can only account for having destroyed 20 or 30 of them, and cannot account for having destroyed the others, so we don't know if they've been destroyed or not. In addition, they've said that they filled 25 warheads with biological agents such as anthrax. They have not been able to prove to UNSCOM that they have dismantled or eliminated any of these 25 warheads. So there is concern on the part of the UN Special Commission and its members that Iraq is still protecting these weapons and refusing to destroy them as required by the United Nations. As long as those doubts persist, I think that Iraq will not have... It will be found to be non-compliant with the UN resolutions and the sanctions will remain.
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Press: Thank you.
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