The White House Briefing Room
November 12, 1998
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 12, 1998
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
November 12, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction"
-- WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive
Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration, unless I
publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of
its continuation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
Indeed, on July 28, 1998, I issued Executive Order 13094 to strengthen
Executive Order 12938 by, inter alia, broadening the types of
proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. I am,
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on
November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998.
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive
Order 12938, as amended, and have sent the attached notice of extension
to the Federal Register for publication.
On July 28, 1998, I amended section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that
the United States Government could more effectively respond to the
worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities.
The amendment to section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several
significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of pro-liferation
activity that subjects entities to potential penalties under the
Executive order. The original Executive order provided for penalties for
contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to
use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile chemical or biological
weapons; the amended Executive order also covers contributions to foreign
programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the
original Executive order to include attempts to contribute to foreign
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens
the range of potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of
United States Government assistance to foreign persons, as well as the
prohibition of United States Government procurement and imports into the
United States.
The following report, which covers activities on or before October 31,
1998, is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703)
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and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation concerns and nonproliferation
efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report on the
Pro-liferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to
section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation
Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress
pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as
the "CBW Report."
Nuclear Weapons
In May, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests. In
response, I imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by the
Glenn Amendment. Beyond our unilateral response, world reaction was
pronounced and included nearly universal condemnation across a broad
range of international fora and a broad range of sanctions, including new
restrictions on lending by international financial institutions unrelated
to basic human needs and aid from the G-8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have worked
unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United
Nations to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward
creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join multilateral
arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms race and build
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of
concrete actions. The United States has over the past 5 months focused
most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short and
medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional
adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a
moratorium on production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, and engagement in
pro-ductive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);
restraint in deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and
adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of
sensitive materials and technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
U.S. high-level dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials has yielded
some progress. Both governments, having already declared testing
moratoria, indicated publicly that they are prepared to adhere to the
CTBT under certain conditions. Both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on
Disarmament session. They have also pledged to institute strict control
of sensitive exports that meet internationally accepted standards. In
addition, they have resumed bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes,
including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level.
In recognition of these positive steps and to encourage further progress,
I decided on November 3 to exercise my authority under the Brownback
provision of the 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277) to
waive some of the Glenn sanctions. Through this action, I have
authorized the resumption of Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and International
Military Education and Training programs in India and Pakistan and have
lifted
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restrictions on U.S. banks in these countries. We will continue
discussions with both governments at the senior and expert levels, and
our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5 and in international fora.
So far, 150 countries have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT. During
1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory
Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of
the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the Treaty.
On September 23, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting
prompt advice and consent to ratification. The CTBT will serve several
U.S. national security interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions.
It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear
weapons; end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and
to build a safer world.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 1998 Plenary in Edinburgh,
Scotland, March 30 to April 2, on the twentieth anniversary of the
publication of the Nuclear Suppliers
Guidelines. With 35 member states, the NSG is a mature, effective, and
widely accepted export-control arrangement. Over the past 7 years the
NSG has established a Dual-Use Regime (DUR), agreed to require full-scope
safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply, created an effective Joint
Information Exchange, and strengthened controls over technology and
retransfers. The NSG is considering further activities to promote regime
transparency, following
the success of the 1997 Vienna transparency seminar, and is preparing for
a transparency seminar in New York during the run-up to the 1999 NPT
PrepCom.
The NSG is considering membership for Belarus, China, Cyprus, Kazakhstan
and Turkey. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a
member of the NSG, although China did join the Zangger Committee last
year and recently has expressed an interest in learning more about the
NSG.
The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee has demonstrated its continued
relevance to the multilateral nonproliferation regime as the interpreter
of Article III-2 of the NPT by the membership of China in October 1997 by
recently agreeing to a statement deploring the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests. This is the first time the Zangger Committee has ever
issued a statement not directly related to publication of its Guidelines.
Furthermore, the Zangger Committee is considering a U.S. proposal to add
conversion technology to the Trigger List.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be
applied by the Department of Commerce in order to control the export of
items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165
signatories as original States Parties.
The United States was among their number, having deposited its
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instru-ment of ratification on April 25. Russia ratified the CWC on
November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 5, 1997. As of
October 31, 1998, 120 countries (including Iran, Pakistan, and Ukraine)
have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at the entry into force
(EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The
Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for
implementing the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections,
and serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States
Parties. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the
Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).
The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the United States) and
acts as the governing body for the OPCW between annual meetings of the
Conference of the States Parties. Since EIF, the EC has met numerous
times to address issues such as scale of assessments, CW production
facility conversion requests, facility and transitional verification
arrangements, and staff regulations.
The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently
has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout the
world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 300 inspections in some 20
countries. It conducted nearly 100 such inspections in the United
States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational
U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted
into law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277).
Accordingly, we anticipate rapid promulgation of implementing regulations
on submission of U.S. industrial declarations to the OPCW. Submission of
these declarations will bring the United States into full compliance with
the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has, among other things,
undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our ability to
encourage other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely
declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
prohibited under the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key
chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically designed to
penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the
world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons. We anticipate rapid
promulgation of U.S. regulations implementing these CWC trade
restrictions.
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The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW).
We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) striving to
complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance
with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or
BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/December
1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible but not
later than the next Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is
progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of national views
and clarification of existing text. We held four AHG nego-tiating
sessions in 1998, and five are scheduled for 1999.
On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I announced
that the United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect
stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of BW
by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect and
deter cheating. The United States will work closely with U.S. industry
to develop U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach international
agreement on: declarations, nonchallenge clarifying visits, and
challenge investigations. Other key issues to be resolved in the Ad Hoc
Group in 1999 are details on mandatory declara-tions, placement of
definitions related to declarations, and questions related to assistance
and export controls.
On the margins of the 1998 U.N. General Assembly, senior United States
Government representatives attended a Ministerial meeting hosted by the
Government of New Zealand and sponsored by the Government of Australia to
promote intensified work on the Compliance Protocol. I will continue to
devote personal attention to this issue and encourage other heads of
state to do the same.
The United States continued to be a leading participant in the 30-member
Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. The United States
attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 12-15,
1998, during which the Group
continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing
information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the
United States, the AG first began in-depth political-level discussion of
CBW proliferation and terrorism during the 1995 Plenary Session following
the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year. At the 1998
plenary, at the behest of the United States, AG participants shared
information on legal and regulatory efforts each member
has taken to counter this threat. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment
to continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG
countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national
policies in these areas.
The Group also reaffirmed the participants' shared belief that full
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
global elimination of CBW, and that all States adhering to these
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities
support this goal. The AG participants continue to seek to ensure that
all relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC
and CWC. The AG parti-cipants reaffirmed their belief that existing
national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-and biological
weapons-related items help to fulfill their obligations established under
Article I of the CWC and
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Article III of the BWC that States Parties not assist, in any way, the
acquisition, manufacture, or use of chemical or biological weapons.
Given this understanding, the AG participants also reaffirmed their
commitment to continuing the Group's activities, now that the CWC has
entered into force.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period. The
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other
countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues to carefully control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction
and to closely monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
concern. We also continue to implement the U.S. missile sanctions law.
In April 1998,
we imposed Category I missile sanctions against North Korean and
Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of
equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile. Sanctions
imposed against two North Korean entities in August 1997 for transfers
involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex
items also remain in effect.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to work with each
other and with potential non-Partner supplier and transshipment states to
curb proliferation. Partners
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems and
cooperated to interdict shipments intended for use in missile programs of
concern.
The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's highly
productive May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting. At the
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in an in-depth discussion of regional missile
proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on South Asia. They also
discussed steps Partners could take to increase transparency and outreach
to nonmembers, and reached consensus to admit the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR. (Reports on their membership have
been submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 73A of the Arms Export
Control Act.)
In May 1998, the United States was an active participant in the
German-hosted MTCR workshop on brokering, catch-all controls, and other
export control issues. In June, the United States played a leading role
at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshops on risk assessment in MTCR licensing
decisions. The workshops involved the participation of MTCR Partners, as
well as several non-MTCR members, and were successful in providing
practical insights on export control and licensing issues. In
particular, it helped participants identify risk factors and ways to
assess them.
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The MTCR held its Thirteenth Plenary Meeting in Budapest, Hungary on
October 5-9. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information about
activities and programs of missile proliferation concern and considered
additional steps they can take, individually and collectively, to prevent
the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction,
focusing in particular on the threat posed by missile-related activities
in South and North East Asia and the Middle East.
During their discussions, the Partners gave special attention to North
Korean (DPRK) missile activities, expressing serious concern about the
DPRK's missile export practices and its efforts to acquire increasingly
long-range missiles. The MTCR Plenary Chairman issued a statement
reflecting the Partners' concerns, noting in particular that the Partners
urged the DPRK to refrain from further flight tests of WMD-capable
missiles and to cease exports of equipment and technology for such
missiles. The Partners also agreed to maintain special scrutiny over
their missile-related exports in order not to support North Korean
missile development in any way.
At Budapest, the Partners also discussed ways to further the MTCR's
efforts to promote openness and outreach to nonmembers, including by
sponsoring additional seminars and workshops for members and nonmembers.
The Partners supported a U.S. proposal for an MTCR-sponsored workshop in
1999 on "intangible transfers of technology," in order to develop a
greater understanding of how proliferators misuse the Internet,
scientific conferences, plant visits, and student exchange programs to
acquire sensitive technology and to identify steps countries can take to
address this problem. They also agreed to give further consideration to
a technical-level workshop for border guards and Customs authorities on
export control enforcement. In addition, the Partners noted China's
increased willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on missile
nonproliferation and export control issues, and renewed their previous
invitation in principle to China to take the steps necessary to join the
Regime.
The Partners also made additional progress at Budapest toward
reformatting the MTCR Annex (the list of MTCR-controlled items) to
improve clarity and uniformity of implementation while maintaining the
coverage of the current Annex. They hope to complete this process in the
near future.
During this reporting period, the United States also worked unilaterally
and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile
proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued
missile nonproliferation discussions with China and North Korea and other
countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
In October 1998, the United States and the DPRK held a third round of
missile talks, aimed at constraining DPRK missile production, deployment,
flight-testing, and exports. The United States expressed serious
concerns about North Korea's
missile exports and indigenous missile activities, and made clear that we
regard as highly destabilizing the DPRK's attempt on August 31 to use a
Taepo Dong 1 missile to orbit a small satellite. We voiced strong
opposition to North Korea's missile
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exports to other countries and made clear that further launches of
long-range missiles or further exports of such missiles or their related
technology would have very negative consequences for efforts to improve
U.S.-North Korean relations. The talks concluded with an agreement to
hold another round at the earliest practical date.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive
items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development
program, the United States continued its high-level
dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia
can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's
ballistic missile development program. This effort has netted some
positive results. For example, during this reporting period, Russia
began implementing "catch-all" provisions imposing controls over the
export of any material destined for a WMD or missile program, and
provided detailed implementing guidance on these controls for Russian
entities. Russia also agreed to meet regularly with the United States to
discuss export control issues. In addition, at the summit in September,
President Yeltsin and I announced the formation of seven bilateral
working groups -- nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal compliance,
conventional weapons, law enforcement, licensing, and customs -- for the
rapid exchange of information on the wide range of nonproliferation
issues.
In July, Russia launched special investigations of nine entities
suspected of cooperating with foreign programs to acquire WMD and missile
delivery systems. Russia subsequently took steps to end exports to Iran
by three of these entities and to pursue two of the cases as smuggling
issues. Consistent with the Russian
action, the United States took action against seven of the nine entities
in July pursuant in part to Executive Order 12938, as amended. We
suspended all United States Government assistance to these seven entities
and banned all U.S. exports to them and all of their imports to the
United States.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to
the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national
emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period from May 14, 1998,
through October 31, 1998.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
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