General Eugene E. Habiger
Q: Recently you had some meetings with your counterpart from
Russia, General Yakovlev, and I wonder if you would spend a few
minutes here talking about what you discussed, what came out of
that, and what is likely to ensue as a result of those meetings?
Habiger: First of all the military-to-military contacts that
I've been associated with began in April of last year when I had
the opportunity to host, then Gen Sergeyev, who is the commander
in chief of their missile forces back then. I took him to F E
Warren and took him into a nuclear weapons storage area, I didn't
ask anybody, I just did it, in the spirit of openness. The intent
was hopefully that he would reciprocate which he did at Secretary
Cohen's request. I had the opportunity to be the first non-Soviet,
non-Russian ever to go into a Nuclear Weapons Area inside of Russia.
This occurred in late October of last year - an extraordinary
achievement. They were very open to me and what they were trying
to do was show me they are deadly serious about the security and
safety of the nuclear weapons. As you recall last summer there
was a great deal of activity in the press about loose nukes in
Russia, the fences that were broken down that sort of thing.
Well, I went to one base and I was told it was representative
of their missile bases and I would tell you that from what I saw
if it was representative of the 19 or so missile bases they are
deadly serious about the safety and security of their nuclear
weapons. Then during that visit I got to know General Yakovlev,
who is Sergeyev's replacement. Yakovlev, first name is (Vladimir),
he is the youngest Commander in Chief ever in the history of
Russia, he is 43 years old, married to a pediatrician, two young
daughters, one 12 and the other 4. We hit it off very, very well
during that October trip. We agreed to two things, number one,
that he would come as soon as he could and that we would....I
was struck by the lack of technology that the Russians have applied
in their nuclear weapon storage areas. A lot of manpower its
effective, but they get by with less manpower if they used low
light TV, microwave sensors, that sort of thing. So he agreed
that we would exchange security experts. We also agreed that
we needed to get this military to military contacts down to a
much lower level. He also agreed that we would exchange missile
crew members and let me tell you first of all, the first of the
security experts will arrive this Sunday, a group of eight from
the Rocket Missile Forces and from the General Staff. I plan
at this point in taking them to a missile base, and to one of
my submarine bases, Bangor Washington. So they can see how the
United States Marine Corps guards nuclear weapons and how the
United States Air Force guards nuclear weapons. They're not that
much different, but in the spirit of openness, and hopefully the
Russians will reciprocate at some point. And then in early May
a delegation of Russian operators from their missile force will
arrive at F E Warren and they will spend a week with their counterparts,
shadowing them for that entire week. Now Yakovlev was here in
mid-March, he spent a week with me, I spent the entire time with
him, flew into Dulles picked him up off of his Delta flight that
came in from Moscow. I took him to Omaha, spent Monday just showing
him my headquarters and how I operate, very open, very candid
discussions. Then on Tuesday and Wednesday took him to missile
base, F E Warren where I took him into the weapons storage area.
He was very impressed with the technology that we applied and
this kind of reinforced what I had told him in October. I showed
how our missile crew members operate how they train, took him
out to a missile silo showed him the young crew. A young captain
missile crew commander, a female lieutenant deputy. The Russians
do not have females in their missile forces as operators. They
are administrative specialist, computer specialists that sort
of thing. Saw how our security forces operated. Then, I took
him to Bangor Washington where I showed him a nuclear submarine.
And again, just to show him how we operate; the quality of people
we have, the professionalism, took him into the nuclear weapons
storage area there. From there we went to Vandenberg, cause he
wears two hats now under the reorganization, he is a missile and
space command chief. General Estes as Commander in Chief of our
space forces hosted General Yakovlev for two days at Vandenberg,
and why 2 days at Vandenberg? Because a big snow storm in Colorado
Springs locked us out for one day. And then Gen Estes hosted
General Yakovlev for 3 hours at Cheyenne Mountain to show him
how we operate our missile detection and threat assessment capability
there at Cheyenne Mountain. Then Yakovlev came back for one day
at Offutt and then we sent him on his way. Accompanying him,
at my request, was General (Mikhail) Oparin. General Oparin is
commander of the Russian bomber forces. Wanted to rejuvenate
that spirit. And I got a lot of bomber stink on me, most of my
career has been in bombers. So General Oparin came with his chief
navigator and I had General Phil Ford, who is commander of 8th
Air Force, my bomber task force commander take General Oparin
to Whiteman, where he saw the B-2, he climbed all over the B-2,
he flew the B-2 simulator, he saw how we guard nuclear weapons
at a bomber base, and General Ford took him to Dyess to show him
our B-1 operation and to show him cause I want to make this point
that our B-1s are no longer nuclear bombers their conventional
only. And Oparin was able to see that. Again in a move that
we can hopefully gain some reciprocal visits, I had General Ford
take Oparin to Kirtland AFB where we have a nuclear weapon storage
area for tactical nuclear weapons, because I will get to this
point in a few minutes, if I have any concerns about Russian safety
and security of nuclear weapons it's in the tactical area, cause
there's so damn many of them. And they have not allowed us much
insight into their tactical nuclear weapon storage sites. Gen
Oparin got to see that at Kirtland, and General Ford took him
back to Barksdale where General Ford has his headquarters and
in addition an orientation program, General Oparin got to fly
a B-52, include air refueling, got to sit in the seat while refueling,
got to fly a simulated low-level bomber, of course, no weapons
involved. Then General Oparin has agreed to an exchange program
where we will probably see a Russian bomber or two go to Barksdale
and again, it's to get this cross-flow of discussions at the crew
member level so that - the Cold War is over and we need to start
laying the ground work for future discussions.
Q: Is this Elaine Grossman?
Habiger: Before you begin. Elaine and I have been in somewhat
of a food fight. Her boss sent me a terrible letter accusing
me of all kinds of bad things about my assassination of Elaine's
character and I apologize to you Elaine, and here's a small token.
It is not a poisoned pen.
Q: Realistically speaking what are the chances of the Duma passing
START II. I know the government is pushing at the Yeltsin government,
what are the chances?
Habiger: I am the most optimistic person in America. I think
you are going to see a ratification very quickly of START II.
Number of reasons. Number one, it's in the Russians best interest,
if you look at their forces Charlie, if you look at their SS-18's,
which is their work horse, there MIRV System, Multiple Independent
Reentry Vehicles, ten warheads apiece, they've got a hundred-and-fifty-plus,
that's 1500 warheads. They're flat running out of service life
in those things. Their warranties are expiring and Yakovlev and
Sergeyev have made a point of that. If you look at their submarine
force, right now they've got precisely 19 operational ballistic
missile submarines. Depending on who you talk to in the intelligence
community that number will be reduced as much as half in the next
two to three years. Yeltsin wants very much to have President
Clinton come visit and I'm not going to get into what Mike McCurry
said in a press conference the other day, but I think Mike made
it very clear that the President was not going to entertain a
trip to Moscow until START II was ratified. Yakovlev has made
several trips to the DUMA, as a matter of fact, he's told me he's
visited there at least nine times in past several months, speaking
from the podium. He has hosted several groups of DUMA members
to his facilities, to show them, not that the infrastructure is
crumbling about them but the fact that the systems are flat getting
old. So it's going to be in their best interests - I see the
Russians ratifying START II quickly, wanting to go immediately
to START III, and they will get to START III very quickly.
Q: General, recently there has been some discussion about de-alerting
of some US nuclear forces, I wonder if you could give us your
view on whether you think that's a good idea. Some have called
for unilateral de-alerting forces of US forces and the administration
is saying that it should be done in conjunction with the Russians.
What's your view on that?
Habiger: Ok, first of all let me ask you a question. Why should
we de-alert?
Reporter: You're the CINCSTRAT.
Habiger: You all need to know that I did two things in the past
couple of months. First of all I was getting tired of having
Frank Gafney taking cheap shots at us selling the farm, and I
was getting tired of Bruce Blair taking cheap shots as why we
needed a farm. In mid-December I had Frank out for two days and
told him why we hadn't sold the farm. I think we did a pretty
good job of convincing him. And then in an extraordinary step
I took the initiative. I invited Bruce Blair, he brought Frank
VonHipple, and Hal Fvierson out and I spent about 8 hours with
those guys. And just to show them and try to get into their do-loop
as to why they're pushing for de-alerting. Here's the point I
made to them. The glide path we're on now for de-alerting is
stable, its verifiable, and it's well thought out. Today the
Russians have almost 3,000 weapons on alert, under START II those
numbers will be down to around to a 1,000 or so, and under START
III those numbers will be down to probably less than 700. What's
the problem? What problem are we working here? The United States
has taken some extraordinary steps. Is anyone here from the New
York Times? OK, when Bruce Blair was there (STRATCOM) in mid-January
there was editorial in the New York Times that said United States
ought to move out in de-alerting, let's replicate what happened
back in 1992 when the United States and Russia de-alerted several
hundred ICBMs. That's flat out wrong, the United States in 1991
unilaterally de-alerted 450 Minuteman II's. The Russians did
not reciprocate, in spite of what the New York Times said. Now
Gorbachev in a press conference said he was going to reciprocate,
but he never did. If you look at the things, and I have had our
folks construct the things that we have done since 1990 to do
the kind of things you talked about Bill. There are 19 separate
items that the United States has accomplished and the Russians
have reciprocated in 6 of those 19. So I get back to the basic
question, "what's the problem?" Now I know what the
problem is, the problem is were trying to get down to lower and
lower weapons on alert. Well, we're doing that in a rationale,
verifiable manner. And when you start doing things unilaterally,
and again I don't want to sound like an arm waver, cause I'm not,
then you start planting seeds, well maybe we can pull something
off here.
Q: Pull something off in what sense?
Habiger: You look for vulnerabilities.
Q: In your view de-alerting would not be a good idea?
Habiger: No, I said unilaterally, de-alerting would not be a
good idea. My point is, we're de-alerting at a pretty rapid rate
right now.
Q: What can you tell us about the Chinese strategic nuclear modernization,
and does that pose a current or future challenge?
Habiger: First of all the Chinese are in no way, I think at this
point, to be considered an enemy to the United States. We've
got some extraordinary things going on in all levels of our government
in terms of visits and exchanges and economic cooperation. The
Chinese do have an intercontinental nuclear capability and they
have a deployment of a intercontinental ballistic missile that
reaches most of the United States except for Southern Florida.
And as a matter of fact, one of you, a year-and-a-half ago, when
I was here, used that line as, "See you in Miami, it's the
place to go," so, don't do it to me again this time guys.
But they are modernizing their forces. The ICBM they have now
is a single warhead they're looking at putting a new system with
a multiple independent reentry vehicle. The Chinese built one
ballistic missile submarine in the early 80s, it has not been
very successful it has been in dry dock most of the time and they
just laid the keel for a new submarine within the past year or
so and we expect to see that submarine operational in five or
six years. With a new missile. And let me back up to the Russians
real fast The United States, and a lot of people don't like to
hear me say this, because of some very wise investments in the
'80's, we don't need to put any investments into our strategic
forces for another 10 or 12 years. The next time we need to start
putting a wedge into the service POMs (Program Objective Memorandums)
would be around the year 2010. Because we've got B-52s built
in 1961, they look like a '61 Oldsmobile, they drive like a '61
Oldsmobile, they smell like a '61 Oldsmobile, but we don't use
them like they came off the assembly line. When I first started
pulling alert in a B-52 was four, one point one, megaton weapons,
you go screaming across the Soviet Union at 300 feet, night, all
weather whatever. Today we use them as trucks, load 20 cruise
missiles, that are very stealthy, very accurate, very reliable,
and they launch those cruise missiles outside of harm's way.
And, oh, by the way, hopefully we'll use the B-52 until the year
2030-2035. Now think about that, that's a pretty old airplane.
But let me put it in perspective for you, you think about the
Boeing 767/757 it conjures an image of a pretty modern airplane.
The average number of fly hours on a Boeing 757 today is about
27,000 hour. Average number of hours in a 767 today is about 20,000
hours. The average number of flight hours on a B-52 that I have
today is about 14,500 hours. So what we have essentially is a
1961 Oldsmobile that's been driven by an old lady school teacher
for many years.
Getting back to the Russians, they have a development program
for a new ICBM that just went operational Christmas Eve, it was
declared operational by Sergeyev and Yakovlev. They actually
went out to a missile field and declared it operational. That
new missile is coming off the assembly line not in great rates,
but it is coming off the assembly line. They just laid the keel
for a new ballistic missile submarine called the Borey Class that's
Russian for Arctic Winds. We expect to see that operational in
the year 2005. They are developing a new ballistic missile to
go on that submarine called the SS X 28. It's had three test
firings, all three have been failures, and that missile will go
on that sub. Then we see them developing a new air launched cruise
missile for the bomber forces.
Q: General, I would like to do a follow-up on the de-alerting
and then ask another question. On the follow up, the administration
is however looking at de-alerting in the context of trying to
help the Russians implement closer up to schedule to START II
accord and I believe a study done by you in conjunction with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff I wonder if you can talk about the kinds
of things you looked at, the kinds of things we and the Russians
might do on a reciprocal basis to help them get back on the START
II time line. And my second question is START III, talking about
going down to 2,000 warheads, can the United States, in your opinion
go down to that many warheads and continue to provide an effective
nuclear umbrella for the new states that are being absorbed into
NATO and that includes the Baltics. There are some people who
believe that eventually if the Baltics commit to NATO, 2,000 are
not going to be sufficient number of warheads to extend our nuclear
umbrella effectively to cover all of NATO, should the Baltics
be brought in. Could you talk about that please?
Habiger: Ok, the first question about de-alerting, it's too early
for me to even start talking about that. There's a lot of leverage.
That's being worked at a very high level. It's more of a policy
issue at this point as compared to a warfighting issue.
Q: Are you comfortable with that?
Habiger: Very comfortable, because I'm part of the process.
The folks in the White House talked to me. Whenever the issue
of arms control is discussed in the tank I sit in on the deliberations,
I don't get to vote, I understand that but I'm part of the deliberation.
They listen to us so we have great credibility. So, too soon
for me to comment on that. In terms of is 2,000 enough. We
began this analysis back in the summer of 1996. We saw the handwriting
on the wall, that START III was coming. We were way out in front
of everyone else. We did three things. Number one we looked
at potential target base, number one, and how we cover that target
base. Number two we had a contractor who does war games for us.
I had these folks look at various scenarios, with eliminating
legs of the Triad to see if we can get by with just a diad. And
then the third thing we did is I had Ambassador Paul Robinson
who works for me as part of the Strategic Advisory Group on a
pro-bono basis, he runs a policy sub-committee of that advisory
group and I asked him to look at the policy implications as we
go to lower and lower force levels. All of that came together
in November in 1996, it all meshed and then early December Shali
called me and said "Hey, Gene you need to get serious because
the President is going to go to Helsinki." And I said, "Hey
boss, how about next week, I'll come show you what we've got."
We showed him the analysis and I could not have written the script
any better for Helsinki, on the 2,000-2,500. Do I feel comfortable,
yes. And the other thing I really don't see a linkage between
NATO Baltic states and nuclear weapons.
Q: I believe there's been some testimony on the hill I think,
correct me if I'm wrong, former Secretary Schlisinger talked about
his concerns that won't be sufficient. That there will be an
insufficient number of warheads.
Habiger: I don't know where he's coming from. CD did you hear
anything about Schlisinger testimony?
CD Smith: No sir
Reporter: Why would that be insufficient. Can't you...and I
mean, with computers, it's so easy to retarget these missiles,
you don't have to cover all contingencies at the same time do
you? Why would 2,000 less missiles not be enough?
Habiger: Hey, I'm on your side.
Q: It's easy to retarget these things?
Q: On your comments on START II ratification, there are budget
implications and force implications if that doesn't happen. I
think you guys have been planning for and budgeting for and if
that doesn't happen there's a crunch, you just go strictly with
the consequences on the strategic forces if START II doesn't get
ratified and go into effect? What is the crunch.
Habiger: You need to cushion what I'm about to say, if you would please, cause the analysis is still being done, the Secretary of Defense has not signed off on it, but........
Bob Dudney: Excuse me a second General, but you're not going to be able to "cushion" anything...
Habiger: OK, all right. I'll just lay it on out, sorry. There
are two potential bills if we stay at 18 subs, ballistic missile
submarines, and convert the additional four to the D-5 the bill
for that from 00 to 05 is about $5.2B. There's a bill, if we
keep the Peacekeeper up from 00 to 05 of about $550M. The Secretary
will forward the results of the analysis, and I don't know what
the final outcome will be but I think what will happen is the
Secretary will forward a series of options to Congress relating
to keeping START I force levels up. Again, I'm very, very optimistic
and again I'm in the minority, and my boss, Secretary of Defense,
kind of beats me up from time to time, says "Gene where are
you getting your intel." Well, I'm getting it from talking
to senior Russian military folks and I'm optimistic by as early
as the end of June or July we'll have START II ratified.
Q: You're saying the financial crunch doesn't come until after
the turn of the century.
Habiger: There are some minor bills in '98 and '99. I think
in '98 there's a bill for about $50M in the budget for long-lead
items. It's $70 or so million in '99 and then the bills start
cropping up big time in the year 00. Now let me just say, originally
there was a massive bill $2.1B for Peacekeeper. That was a result
of just a blatant "we're testing X number of Peacekeepers
a year, we're going to run out of test assets so let's reopen
the assembly line start building brand new Peackeepers."
Well that doesn't make any sense.
Q: Looking back to the Nuclear Poster Review in 1994 it stated
at that time that the United States did not need any new design,
production or design of new nuclear warheads. Was that meant
to be the policy that was going to last through time and if that's
still true today? Or was that a description of the reality of
the time that in 1994 it wasn't necessary, but perhaps in the coming years? And the
second question on the Russians ability to maintain their level
of nuclear weapons at even the 2,000-2,500 for START III. If
you anticipated those numbers to go down (inaudible) be more around
just a thousand, with attrition and obsolescence.
Habiger: Getting back to your question about the current state
of our nuclear weapons, the statement that the nuclear posture
review is accurate and still is. The Department of Energy has
proposed a science-based stewardship plan to the tune of about
$4.5B a year for about 10 years. I fully support that program
that will obviate testing. We look at the stockpile every year
and in August of 1995 when the President said he was going to
sign the comprehensive test ban treaty, he said he would ask for
an independent assessment on an annual basis by the lab directors
and the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command. In 1996, I provided
to my boss the Secretary of Defense my assessment on the stockpile
health. I'm not organized, trained or equipped to do that with
the staff that I have, but again getting back to the Scientific
Advisory Group, the group that's been around for over 35 years,
not the same people, the concept's been around, I have nine of
the best brains in this country who are the nuclear weapons subcommittee
and they have gone out in the past two years, and are in the process
of doing it for a third time, making an independent assessment
to the health, safety status and reliability of our nuclear weapon
stockpile. They will report to me, as they have done in the past,
probably in the June/July time frame on the status. Every year
they come to me, they give me a very in-depth briefing a lot of
discussion and at the end of the briefing for the past few years
it's been "OK Habiger this year it's OK, but we're not guaranteeing
what's going to happen next year." Independent, besides
being smart. What's going to be the status of the Russian nuclear
arsenal, don't know. As I mentioned they've got the TOPAL-M,
that's the SS-27, they just went operational on that. It is in
serious production, single warhead, START II compliant. They
are building a new sub, a new missile to go on the sub. You can
put MIRVd warheads on sea launched ballistic missile submarines.
It all depends on the rate of production for those systems.
So I guess what I'm telling you Elaine, there is probably a range
and I'd rather not get pinned down on what that range is but I
can guarantee you our analysis and assessments will be based on
an analysis of the threat, if you will, potential for threat,
and not just one on "well, 1,500 or 2,000 looks about right."
Q: Just a quick follow-up. If it turns out that they do start
getting down to levels of around a thousand warheads, is that
the kind of thing that the United States might want to follow
them down and sit there at that level, say a reciprocal agreement
that we don't need anymore than a thousand ourselves. Or is there
a floor above that for which we just can't go down.
Habiger: I don't even want to come close to drawing a line in
the sand with a number. But I go back to the third piece of the
puzzle I told you we did in the summer of '96 when I had Ambassador
Robinson look at the policy implications. As you go down to the
lower and lower numbers the policy folks need to start thinking
about issues such as extended deterrence. You know if we go to
such low numbers perhaps you drive some of our allies into nuclear
weapons programs only because they perceive extended deterrence
is no longer applicable to them. That is point number 1. Point
number 2 is as you go to lower and lower force levels, the counter
force targeting strategy is no longer applicable because you don't
have the weapons to cover all the targets so then you go into
counter value and that's back to "City Busting." So
those are some of the issues that you need to look at. To say
that this is the number is much more than just looking at the
data. That's why I said we looked at this thing in a much more
macro perspective.
Q: You said China is not considered an enemy and you say the
same about Russia?
Habiger: Yes, but from where I'm coming from is as follows:
And this is a rhetorical question. What is the only thing that
can destroy the United States of America as we know it today?
It's the 6,000 nuclear weapons that are out there in Russia.
Under START II, what is the only thing that can destroy the United
States of America. It would be those 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear weapons
out there. The anomaly that we're faced with is the fact that
the Cold War ended and did the looser really lose? Did you see
a demobilization? Did you see all those nuclear weapons come
down in Russia? No. It took us almost 40 plus years, to build
this nuclear machine and now we're in the eighth year in bringing
this nuclear machine down and I think we're doing a pretty good
job. And, oh by the way, for those of you who want to get into
an historical perspective, the United States in the summer of
1946, under the leadership of a great statesman, Baruch went to
the United Nations in June of that year saying let's do away with
all nuclear weapons. The only nuclear weapons were in the hands
of the United States in 1946. He went to the United Nations Security
Council under the sponsorship of the State Department and made
the proposal. The Russians rejected the proposal out of hand,
the French and the British did not support us, because they had
nuclear weapons of their own. My point to you is, we had a unique
opportunity in 1946 and the United States was the initiator of
that opportunity that never came to fruition.
Q: Can you ever imagine nuclear weapons being used by the Russians?
For any reason?
Habiger: If they are ever used against us, or anyone else, then
the concept of deterrence has failed. And the concept of deterrence
is to make it such a horrific act and that the response would
be so devastating and overwhelming that no one would even think
of using a nuclear weapon. And again, let me go back to a theme
that I think it is important for you to hear and that is I agree
with what a number of people have been saying over the past several
months, that we should do away with all the nuclear weapons in
the world. I agree with that, because it is the policy of the
United States of America. Zero nuclear weapons is the policy
of the United States of America and has been our policy since
1968. For over thirty years, the policy of the United States
of America has been zero nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Nonproliferation
Treaty the United States is one of the first three nations to
sign that over 177 nations have signed it today. Article 6 says
the ultimate goal of this treaty is the total elimination of nuclear
weapons on the face of the earth. But you need to read the fine
print. Given the proper preconditions and that's the hang-up.
I doubt if we'll ever see the proper preconditions where you
have zero nuclear weapons on the earth.
Q: How would you prioritize the threat? What are the threats
as far as you're concerned as CINCSTRAT out there and then I have
a follow-up.
Habiger: I don't think we can put it in terms of a threat. It
gets back to this concept of what's the issue, the issue is what
can destroy the United States what can impede our national security
and it's those 6,000 nuclear weapons. I don't think we have a
nation state out there that is our enemy. It's just the ending
of the Cold War was such an historical anomaly trying to get those
nuclear weapons down to lower and lower levels is the issue.
Q: So essentially one nuclear weapon out there is a threat, it's
not directed at any one specific place?
Habiger: Yes. The other part of the nuclear weapon issue is
as Bob Bell has so eloquently discussed in his comments over the
past couple of months. We now have a policy that's articulated
that says nuclear weapons will be used in response to the use
of rogue states using weapons of mass destruction.
Reporter: I don't think they really said that, did they? They've
suggested that?
Habiger: Suggested it. I'm not saying, I'm suggesting it. Let
the record reflect, I suggested it.
Q: We are not going to be spending a lot of money on modernization
for at least a decade. But what would you prioritize as your
most important systems that you need in this interim period?
Habiger: At this particular point my position is that you still
need a Triad, at some point we will have to fall off the Triad.
I don't know what that point is, those are the kinds of analysis
we are doing now. But all three legs of the Triad bring us something
unique and different to the fight and I cannot look anybody in
the eye and say that one system is more crucial than any other.
Q: But as far as small modernization efforts?
Habiger: We don't need anything
Q: What did you mean when you said that the warranty is running
out on the Russians?
Habiger: Service life. If you read some of the stuff that Yakovlev
has been saying in their media, the factories that crank out this
stuff, put a warranty on it. We just kind of continue service
life extension programs and that sort of thing but the factory
that produces the SS18 for example has. As I recall, a 15 year
warranty on it.
Q: The warhead itself
Habiger: No, no, the warheads are a separate issue, they are
done by an entirely different company, not company, MINATOM is
the organization that does their nuclear warheads. And this is
not something where you have to worry about the missile blowing
up in a silo or something like that it's just the fact that the
missile is going to launch and get within x number of meters of
the target is what their talking about. Yakovlev has made several
comments recently that many of his, some of his systems have exceeded
the manufacturer's warranty.
Q: In order to keep that system going are they going to have
to reinvest?
Habiger: The point is he is talking about systems that go away
under START II. That's one of the reasons why I'm optimistic
that they're going to sign up to START II because some of the
stuff they've got now is going to flat run out of service life.
They're going to have to get rid of it rather they sign START
II or not.
Q: Somewhere downstream should there be a revaluation of the
relationship between offensive and defensive forces be looked
at again, is there an existing mechanism, a standing mechanism
for your two commands to noodle around with this stuff and downstream
is there some argument for revisiting the command plan.
Habiger: Sure I think downstream there is. At this point both
General Estes and I are in lock-step, that now is not the time
to give one senior military leader a finger on the offensive trigger
and one on the defensive trigger, and I feel very, very strongly
that you need one senior four-star general or admiral focused
on the nuclear deterrence of our country.
Q: Is there any kind of standing mechanism between the two commands?
To look at the interaction.
Habiger: No, the unified command plan, which has just been signed
by the President in January, that's reviewed on a semiannual basis
and it will pop up every time the UCP is reviewed.
Q: Just a follow-up on an earlier point, that at some point in
the future, dropping one leg of the Triad. You're doing some
analysis now, can you give us some sort of a time frame as to
when some of this will be announced?
Habiger: No. There are too many variables Frank. I don't know.
I've got a pretty good idea where START III is going, 2000-2500.
Here's where I'm coming from. I look at this arms control drawdown
as something like a chess game. We should not be just focusing
on START IV, we ought to be looking at START V and VI. And my
fear is long after I'm retired in the year 2012 some four-star
at Offutt's going to go "wow why did those guys in the year
1999 decide to cut up all those subs." That's what I'm trying
to obviate.
Q: As of right now there's no real modernization for the force.
I wonder if you could talk a little bit about nuclear command
and control. Where is that system going? Some folks seem to
think it's a little outdated and it doesn't take advantage of
some of the latest in command and control technology?
Habiger: We just updated our command and control systems and
Mil-Star is coming on line. We've done some extraordinary modernization
and command and control we are right in the middle of the Year
2000 issue. Making sure there are no hiccups there as a matter
of fact I review everyone of our systems at Strategic Command
once a month in terms of status with the Year 2000, but my primary
focus obviously being on command and control systems. I will
tell you that there are no show stoppers for the Year 2000 but
there are areas of concern. As a matter of fact General Yakovlev
and I have had extensive discussions about that particular issue.
I don't know where those folks are coming from. We've got a
system that has been upgraded, it's redundant, it is secure, and
that's something that I wouldn't come close to commenting on as
being a problem.
Q: How would you rate the Soviet Sensor Warning System? Is it
being maintained or are they investing in it to the level we are
and are they concerned about an increasing number of false alarms?
Habiger: I'm not concerned about increasing number of false alarms.
I don't see false alarms. The situation that occurred in Norway
in 1995 appears to have been just flat somebody in the process
forgot. The Norwegians did all the right things. They notified
everyone in accordance with the ICAO, the International Commission
on Aviation and issued a NOTAM, Notice to Airmen, whenever a missiles
fired by any country they issue these things so, the Norwegians
did that. The Norwegians went through the embassy, the chain.
But I can tell you based upon my analysis, this was nothing more
than a bureaucratic foul-up. No Russian system went beyond anything
else but the stand-by mode, which they're in day-to-day.
Q: OK, but how about their warning satellites, are there holes
developing that you're worried about
Habiger: Let me put it this way, they're not nearly as robust
as they were during the Cold War.
Bob Dudney: Are they investing? They're investing though.
Habiger: Yes. I don't want to give you a false impression.
There not in a crash program to get back to where they were in
the Cold War but they're still putting up systems to cover where
they can?
Q: There's nothing comparable to the SIBRNET?
Habiger: No.
Q: Since you say the threat may even be one nuclear weapon can
you tell us were you brought into the planning on Secretary Cohen's
recent announcement about using the Guard and Reserve to deal
with the crisis of potential with chem-bio and nuclear weapons?
How comfortable are you with the Guard and Reserve getting involved
in this?
Habiger: Very comfortable. I was not part of the process Suzanne
for a lot of obvious reasons. As I understand the initiative
it's mainly a CONUS kind of activity and I naturally wouldn't
be brought into anything like that. Let me put it in perspective
for you. Eighty percent of the tankers that support the Single
Integrated Operational Plan come from the Air Force Guard and
Reserve. I could not be more pleased with the support we get
from those folks, professional in every respect.
Q: Could you elaborate a little more on the concept of using
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against chem and bio. In a recent
example of Iraq it's still hard to imagine, let's say Iraq used
Scuds and showered Israel with anthrax hit our base at AlJabar
with anthrax, it's still hard to imagine using a nuclear weapon
against them, but I just kind of wonder does that really work
as a deterrent in a situation like that?
Habiger: Obviously, a policy question. But if you go back and
look at the record in terms of since the end of the Cold War.
How often did we use that massive and devastating response.
We used it against Sadam Hussein in 1990 and we used it against
North Korea in 1995 when they started to get out of the box with
the nuclear reactor business. It appears it gets the message
across pretty quickly.
Q. Does any tailoring of our force need to be done to accommodate
that? Low-yield, that kind of thing?
Habiger: No. We've got everything we need. Low-yield, high-yield,
medium-yield. You call, we haul.
Q. Nuclear hand grenades?
Habiger: No, we don't have man-packs.
Q: What's your opinion about deploying a national missile defense
and what are the Russians doing at Yamatau mountain?
Habiger: I'm in complete agreement with the administration's
approach on National Missile Defense in terms of taking a look
at what we've got at the end of the three year period and then
looking at the threat is, how much it will cost and what the technology
is and then making a decision about deploying a system. So no
problem with that. Yamatau is a major concern to me. I've asked
senior Russian leadership about it. This is a facility that's
been undergoing construction since 1978. There are over 20,000
people working there today, and we are very interested in it.
I've asked senior Russian leadership what's going on there and
the answer I've received from two different, very high-level sources
is that "it's not a military installation, don't worry about
it." It is a national governmental crisis control center
is the way it's been described to me. I've asked to go there
and I've also asked to go to Kozvinski Mountain and I was told
both facilities are not ready for visitors yet.
Q: Why is a major concern to you?
Habiger: Well, because I don't know what's going on there.
Q: Do you suspect something military? Are the Strategic Rocket
Forces involved?
Habiger: I have no indications of that, no, none at all.
Q: I'm still a little unclear on this issue of using nuclear
weapons in response to an attack by a Rogue state using weapons
of mass destruction? What is your understanding of what that
standing policy is?
Habiger: I'm going to dodge this one, I have a very thorough
understanding, but I'm going to let Bob Bell continue to be the
spokesman because it's a policy issue.
Q: Yes, you walked up to it and suggested that, in fact, if I
wrote down what you said correctly, "we now have a policy
of saying that nuclear weapons would be used or could be used
against a rogue state using weapons of mass destruction? Under
what circumstances, like what kind of weapons of mass destruction
attack might invite that response.
Habiger: Again, I'll refer you back to the quotes by Bob Bell
over the last couple of months. It's a policy issue I don't want
to get into.
Q: Doesn't this determine how you do business though?
Habiger: Policy makers tell me how to do my business. I don't
mean to sound sarcastic, but for me as a warfighter, or commander
in chief of a Unified command to get into policy issues would
not be appropriate.
Q: Let's go to the other end of the missile defense for a minute,
should you actually have to worry about, God forbid, actually
getting through. Could you talk about the current capabilities
of Soviet missile defense system, the dedicated system, the declared
system whatever residual capabilities reside in the SA-10 or
the -12? And to my astonishment, you and I may be the only two
people in the room who've been here long enough to remember this,
somebody has resuscitated the SA-5 and that's apparently back
out on the street?
Habiger: I'm not worried about the -10 or the -12, not worried
about the SA-5. The numbers of SA-5s sites is going down dramatically.
I'm at odds with the intelligence community regarding the ABM
system around Moscow, in terms of its capability. The Russians
have told me that the system is no longer operational.
Q: Do you accept that?
Habiger: My view is the system is not as capable as the intelligence
community says, how's that.
Q: But that's not the same as saying it's not operational?
Habiger: That's right.
Q: You say you fully support the administration's stockpile stewardship
management program, part of that is the comprehensive test ban
treaty. It's been lingering up on the hill because the chairman
of the foreign relations committee basically doesn't believe that
we can do without testing. Have you been up to the hill to tell
them you're comfortable with the program, and do you see a need
to pass this treaty very quickly?
Habiger: Yes I have, and I have. Let me just say one thing.
I appreciate the opportunity to come talk to you. I have a standing
offer, some of you have taken me up on it. Come out to Omaha,
come out one afternoon, we'll get you out by noon the next day,
the Midwest Express has a great flight, first class seats, chocolate
chip cookies, but we would like to have you out, number one.
Number two, please call us for follow up. My frustration is you
write stuff, I don't care if you slam-dunk us, but do it with
the right data. Ok. If I'm going to take a gut shot I want to
make sure that we helped construct the bullet.
End of Interview
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